RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA 1950-54

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• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 28, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION IN COMMUNIST
CHINA 1950-54
CIA/RR 72
28 May 1956
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
SECRET
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA
1950-54
CIA/RR 72
(ORR Project )3.541)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
The increasing dependence of the growing economy of Communist
China on rail transport emphasizes the need for a comprehensive
evaluation of the Chinese rail system. Widely differing estimates
of rail activity, however, thus far have prevented agreement among
members of the intelligence community on the performance of Chinese
railroads. This report attempts to provide a basis for reconciling
the existing differences and to provide an over-all assessment of
the role of railroads in the Chinese economy. Although this report
has been written for those having a general interest in he subject,
it also gives supporting analyses of controversial aspects for the
specialist in the appendixes.
The report has been coordinated within ORE but not with other
IAC agencies.
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CONTENTS
Summary
I. Introduction
II. Growth of Rail Transport
Page
1
2
6
A. Tons-Originated Performance ..... , . . . .
.
.
8
B. Ton-Kilometer Performance . . . . . ........
9
III. Factors Affecting the Growth of Rail Transport ? ?
?
?
11
A. Freight Traffic Demand
11
B. Administration and Organization
12
C. Operational Characteristics
13
1. Expansion of Facilities
13
2. Equipment Utilization
14
IV. Current Problems and Trends
16
A. Decreasing Rate of Growth of Rail Transport . .
.
.
16
B. Measures to Augment Rail Transport Capabilities
.
.
17
1. Construction of New Lines
17
2. Improvements in Existing Facilities
19
C. Economic and Military Role of Rail Transport .
.
.
19
D. Future Trends of Rail Transport in the Chinese
Communist Economy
21
Appendixes
Appendix A. Tons-Originated Traffic
23
Appendix B. Administration and Organization
53
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Appendix C. Freight Car and Locomotive Park
Page
57
Appendix D. Freight Car Turnaround Time 77
Appendix E.
Tons per Freight Car . . . . ........ 91
Tables
1: Estimated Volume of Internal Traffic in China, by Type
of Carrier, Selected Years, 1937-54, and 1955 Plan ? . 4
2. Investment for Basic Construction in Communist China
by Economic Sector, First Five Year Plan, 1953-57 . 9 9 7
3. Estimated Freight Car Requirements in Communist China,
14
1952-54
4. Estimated Tonnage of Basic Commodities Originating
on Railroads in Communist China, 1953-54
5. Estimated Production of Coal in Communist China,
by Area, 1953-54 24
6. Estimated Amount of Coal Exported from Communist China,
by Destination, 1953-54 25
7. Ratio of Coal Originated by Railroads to Total Production
of Coal in Manchuria, 1937-43 28
8. Estimated Volume of Construction Materials Moved by
Various Means of Transportation in Communist China,
1953-54 30
9. Estimated Production of Timber in Communist China,
1953-54 33
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10. Estimated Production of Ferrous Metals and Percent
Moving by Modern Transport in Communist China,
1953-54
11. Linear Regression of Coal Production Tonnage on Total
Rail Freight Tons-Originated for China, 1936-55 . . .
12. Linear Regression of Timber Production Tonnage
on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for China,
1938-55
13. Linear Regression of Cement Production Tonnage
on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for China,
1936-55
14. Linear Regression of Electric Power on Total Rail
Freight Tons-Originated for China, 1936-55
15. Linear Regression of Ferrous Mining Production
Tonnage on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for
China, 1936-5
16. Linear Regression of Modern Manufacturing Production
on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for China,
1936-55
Page
34
39
4o
41
42
43
44
17. Linear Regression of Gross National Product on Total
Rail Freight Tons-Originated for China, 1936-55 . 45
18. Derivation of the 1952 Freight Car Park in Communist
China from the 1945 Park in China Proper and
Manchuria
19. Reported Freight Car Park in China
Manchuria, 1934-45 ......
20. Estimated Requirements for Chinese
Cars in North Korea by Rail Line,
Proper and
.........
Communist Freight
1952 ? ? 0 ? . .
6o
61
65
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22. Freight Car Park in Manchuria, by Type of Car,
1945
23. Estimated Park of Locomotives and Rolling Stock
in Communist China, Selected Years, 1952-57
24. Freight Car Turnaround Time in China, Manchuria,
and the USSR, 1939-54
Illustrations
Page
73
75
78
Following Page
Figure 1. Pattern of Growth of Selected Economic Sectors
within China, 1936-55 (Chart) ..... . . 12
Figure 2. Linear Regression of Coal Production Tonnage
on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for
China, 1936-55 (Chart) 14
Figure 3. Linear Regression of Timber Production Tonnage
on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for
China, 1936-55 (Chart) 38
Figure 4. Linear Regression of Cement Production Tonnage
on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for
China, 1936-55 (Chart) 38
Figure 5. Linear Regression of Electric Power on Total
Rail Freight Tons-Originated for China,
1936-55 (Chart) 38
Figure 6. Linear Regression of Ferrous Mining Production
on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for
China, 1936-55 (Chart) 38
Figure 7. Linear Regression of Modern Manufacturing
Production on Total Rail Freight Tons-
Originated for China, 1936-55 (Chart) . ? ? 38
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Figure 8. Linear Regression of Gross National Product
on Total Rail Freight Ton-Originated for
China, 1936-55 (Chart)
Figure 9. Table of Organization of the Ministry of
Railroads in Communist China, 1954
((Chart)
Communist China: Railroads and Selected Roads, 1 April 1956
(Map)
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54
Inside
Back Cover
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CIA/RR 72 S-E-C-R-E-T
(ORR Project 43.541)
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA*
1950-54
Summary
The 26,500 kilometers (km)** of Chinese Communist railroads, meas-
ured in terms of current performance, are adequate to meet the needs
of the economy, although on certain key sectors of lines traffic
and capacity are almost identical. Between 1950 and 1953, rail
traffic almost doubled, and in the latter year it equaled the pre-
vious 1945 peak. As a result of increases in rail traffic, the
transport sector of the Chinese economy has been able to support
the planned increases in the economic activity of the nation.
The present high level of rail performance has resulted from
various factors. The railroads, now operating on a national scale,
have developed an effective centralized administration. Although
all aspects of rail operations are centered in Peiping (Pei-p'ing,
Pei-ch'ing, Peking), this centralization is flexible. Reorgani-
zations and modifications of the rail administration, reflecting
the changing pattern of the Chinese Communist economy, have been
numerous during the period of Communist control and have permitted
intensive exploitation of the rail system.
High traffic levels have been attained through an intensive
utilization of the existing facilities and equipment of the rail-
roads. It is estimated that the Chinese Communists had an inventory
of about 3,420 locomotives, 6,240 passenger cars, and 73,000 freight
cars in 1954. This indicates that sizable additions to rolling
stock inventories have been made. Previous estimates of low net
annual additions to the freight car park are rendered suspect by rapid
traffic increases, by reports of persons who have recently worked for
the Chinese railroads, and by analysis of factory markings data. This
matter of the relation of the car park to traffic is crucial, and is
discussed at greater length elsewhere in this report.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORB as of 1 January 1956.
** Estimated operable route kilometrage as of the end of 1955.
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The efficiency of the system is indicated by the attainment of an
estimated 4-day turnaround time in 1953. This figure, which compares
favorably with a 6.7-day turnaround time in the USSR for a somewhat
longer average haul, is a significant indication of Chinese Com-
munist ability to attain high levels of performance.
The pattern of rail development and operation established by the
Chinese Communists shows that they are scheduling rail operations to
meet the needs both of the military and of the basic economy. No
evidence is available to suggest that either interest has been
seriously hindered by a lack of rail transport. A net general trans-
port shortage does not exist as yet, although rail transport is
operating under stringent conditions, and, in spite of complete eco-
nomic control and appreciable Soviet assistance, the rail situation
is fast becoming critical. It would be dangerous, however, to
presume that the current problems of rail transport were not fore-
seen by the Communists well before 1955. The performance of the
Chinese Communist railroads thus far should give pause in estimating
that they will be incapable of achieving the short-term and long-
term goals of both the economic and the military sectors.
I. Introduction.
The most notable feature of the internal transport system of
Communist China is the extent to which rail services currently pre-
dominate. Their rise from a minor to a major role is not necessarily
a direct achievement of the Communist regime but is in line with a
long trend for which favorable geographical factors and Japanese
influence are also responsible. A few mountain barriers and other
natural Obstacles do impede rail construction to some extent, but
on the whole they have proved less serious for railroads than for
other carriers. Furthermore, the unique qualifications of the
railroads as instruments of mass transport have helped assure their
primacy.
In terms of metric tons* originated, as well as in ton-kilometers,
the railroads' share of total traffic has risen progressively from
* Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report except
where otherwise indicated.
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approximately one-half the volume carried by all forms of transport
in 1937 to 73 percent of total inland traffic in spite of a 240?per-
cent increase in total overland traffic. Although water transport,
which is second to rail transport, has had a relatively slow rehabili-
tation, rail traffic in terms of tons-originated has so increased that
the total for Communist China in 1954 was approximately 33 percent
above the pre-Communist record year of 1945. The estimated volume of
internal traffic in China, by type of carrier, for selected years,
1937-54, and the 1955 Plan is shown in Table 1.*
In the period immediately before the Sino-Japanese War, inland
water transport accounted for roughly one-half of total ton-kilometer
performance in China. At present, however, because of the rapid war-
time increase in rail capacity, the concurrent loss of inland water
tonnage capacity, and the reorientation of domestic commerce to a
north-south axis, inland water transport comprises less than 9 percent
of total ton-kilometer performance and less than 10 percent (excluding
coastwise traffic) of total tons-originated for Communist China.
Although the inland water system of Communist China is one of the
most extensive in the world, a number of factors have served to
impede its rehabilitation by the Communists. Before the Sino-
Japanese War, the internal traffic of China was mainly east-west,
moving to and from the major coastal ports, whereas the greater part
of its present trade is north-south. The trade of Manchuria (North-
east Area**) is predominantly by rail to the rest of China (China
proper) or to the USSR. The currently existing imbalance of river
traffic has probably raised the cost of river transport. Also,
seasonal navigability, floods, and low-water periods are major
deterrents to the continuous supply of large-scale industry by water
transport.
Although it is growing rapidly, motor transport in Communist China
is still an insignificant carrier of freight and passengers. Probably
the chief curb to the growth of motor transport is the condition of ?
the road system, which, in spite of improvements, remains quite
primitive. Motor transport consequently has functioned principally
* Table 1 follows on p. 4.
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Table 1
Estimated Volume of Internal Traffic in China, by Type of Carrier
Selected Years, 1937-54, and 1955 Plan
Rail
Inland
Water 2/
Highway
Year
Volume
(Million
Metric Tons)
Percent
of Total
Volume
Metric Tons)
Percent
of Total
Volume
(Million
Metric Tons)
Percent
of Total
Total
Volume
Metric Tons)
1937
56.9 12/
48.7
60.0 E/
51.3
0.05 d
117.0
1942
126.6 ej
N.A.
0.3 f
1943
130.2 z/
N.A.
0.3 11./
1944
122.2 1/
N.A.
0.4 1/
1945
137.7 h/
N.A.
0.7 1/
1950
99.2 I/
90.3
3.9 111/
3.5
6.8 2/
6.2
109.9
1951
110.5 2/
88.5
6.2
5.0
8.2 E/
6.6
124.9
1952
131.0 2/
81.2
9.6 t/
6.0
20.7 11./
12.8
161.3
1953
157.0 y/
77.7
15.0 -iii
7.4
30.0 L[/
14.9
202.0
1954
183.0 y/
74.4
20.0
8.1
42.9 LI/
17.4
245.9
1955 (Plan)
207.912:12/
73.1
25.0 21/
8.8
51.5 II/
18.1
284.Li-
a. Excluding wooden sailing vessels and junks.
b. 1/ Tonnage for Japanese-occupied North
China is estimated to have been 4 million tons.
c. This figure is an estimate, as firm data are not available. Before World War II the Yangtze River
alone accounted for about 45 million tons of cargo per year, which is about 75 percent of total inland
water traffic for China.
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Table 1
Estimated Volume of Internal Traffic in China, by Type of Carrier
Selected Years, 1937-54, and 1955 Plan
(Continued)
d. 2/
e. 3/
f.
g. 5
h.
i. 7j
j.
k. 2/
1. 110/
m. 11/
n. 12'
o. 13/
cl? 15/
r.
s.
t. 1_/
u.2;2/
v. 22/
w? 21/
Y. yz. 2 /
aa.
bb.
cc. 27
dd. 117
Tonnage for Japanese-occupied North China is estimated to have been 43.9 million tons.
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as an auxiliary service in handling traffic to and from rail heads
and ports; the average length of haul is only 40 kilometers. 22/ A
further important contribution is the servicing of outlying local
areas which lack other means of transport. Trucking is of paramount
importance in these roles.
II. Growth of Rail Transport.*
As a result of constant effort in all sectors of rail activity,
the Chinese Communists have been able to increase the volume of rail
traffic to an extent generally consistent with the needs of the
economy. There were indications in 1954, however, that rail trans-
port shortcomings might soon become acute for both the economic and
the military sectors of China. At the moment the Chinese railroads
are believed to be in such difficulties that short-term remedial
measures will not suffice. Extensive investments must be made in
existing railroad facilities and equipment in order to increase over-
all transport capacity commensurate with the projected growth of the
economy. The First Five Year Plan (1953-57) of the People's Republic
of China, published in August 1955, indicates that of total expend-
itures of 76.64 billion yuan, 55.8 percent, or 42.74 billion yuan,
will be invested in basic construction. The investment for basic
construction in Communist China, by economic sector, in the First
Five Year Plan, 1953-57, is shown in Table 2.**
The capital investment of 5,670 million yuan allocated to rail
transport represents about 13 percent of what appears to be new
capital investment and 69 percent of the 8,210 million yuan reserved
for investment in all forms of transport and communications. The
allocation of basic construction investment funds to waterways and
highways is not specifically noted in the Five Year Plan. It is
estimated, however, that of the combined total of 2,078 million
yuan assigned to the Ministry of Communications and to local com-
munications, 900 million yuan have been allocated to highways,
800 million yuan to waterways) and 378 million yuan to posts and
telecommunications on the local level. The railroads thus have been
assigned a larger share of total capital investment than has any
other single form of industrial activity. Such outlays tend to
indicate the Chinese Communist intention to develop rail transport
* See the map, inside back cover.
** Table 2 follows on p. 7.
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Table 2
Investment for Basic Construction in Communist China
by Economic Sector, First Five Year Plan, 1953-57
Economic Sector
Investment
(Million Yuan)
Percent
of Total
Basic
Construction
Investment
Percent
of Total
Rail
Investment
Heavy industry
Light industry
Agriculture, forestry,
22,070
2,780
51.7
6.5
and water conservancy
3,260
7.6
Other
6,420
15.0
Ministry of Communications
1,339
3.1
Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications
361
0.8
Civil aviation
101
0.3
Local communications
739
1.7
Railroads
New lines
2,364
5.5
41.7
Improvement of existing
lines
1,854
4.3
32.7
Increase in rolling stock
park
1,219
2.9
21.5
Planning and design
233
0.6
4.1
Total railroads
5,670
13.3
100.0
Total 42 740
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at a rate likely to meet the increasing burden being placed on it by
the increasing economic and military requirements of the country.
Whether or not the Chinese Communists have the capital and material
resources available to implement such an extensive program remains
to be seen. Notwithstanding possible Chinese shortcomings, however,
it is probable that should the USSR so desire, all current problems
faced by the Chinese railroads could be overcome through the import
of necessary material and equipment from the Soviet Bloc.
A. Tons-Originated Performance.
Since the Chinese Communists gained control over mainland
China in 1949, all parts of the industrial sector of he economy,
especially the railroads, have shown marked increases, both relative
and absolute. In some instances the magnitude of the annual increases
can be accounted for by the depressed level of performance of the
economy in 1949. The large annual increase in tons-originated
traffic is believed to have been caused by the ability of the Chinese
Communists to obtain maximum efficiency from existing equipment and
facilities and to expand existing facilities where the need for rail
service is greatest.
Since 1949, when traffic was at a low of 48.2 million tons-
originated because of the economic and political disorganization
resulting from civil war, the Chinese Communists have announced
annually sizable gains in tons-originated. Commodity analysis and
other cross-checks indicate that the announced figures are reliable
and are consistent with independent estimates within a small margin
of error which might result from variations in the interpretation of
statistical procedures. Chinese announcements of rail tons-originated
are (1) historically consistent, both within China and in comparison
with world rail experience*; (2) in close agreement with the current
performance of basic sectors of the Chinese economy; and (3) internally
consistent. After extensive analysis and evaluation (see Appendix A),
therefore, the Chinese Communist claims have been generally accepted.
It should be noted that statistical estimates of operational factors
such as average length of haul, turnaround time, and freight car park
are largely predicated upon announced tons-originated traffic. Thus
the determination of levels of tons-originated is crucial.
* Although in some instances Chinese Communist statistics appear to
be out of line with world rail experience, a proper evaluation of the
methodology of these statistics indicates that they are reasonable.
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In February 1953 it was announced that in 1952 the Chinese
Communist railroads handled* 131 million tons of freight. 12/ On
26 January 1954 the New China News Agency (NCNA) in Peiping announced
that "In 1953, the railroad loading plan was fulfilled by 108.3 per-
cent, constituting an increase of 15.7 percent over 1952. The
planned target of total delivery tonnage was fulfilled by 112.9 per-
cent, or an increase of 20 Lpic; that is, 19.27 percent as compared
with that in 1952." 21/ If tons-originated in 1953 are equated to
the 19.9 percent increase of "total delivery tonnage," a figure is
obtained for 1953 of 157 million tons-originated,** a net gain of
26 million tons. The Chinese Communist government announced on
12 April 1954 that "freight transport this year will be increased
by 15 percent as compared with 1953." 2/ This increase yields a
planned figure of 180.5 million tons. Subsequently the government
announced, on 1 January 1955, that the 1954 "planned rail trans-
port target for 1954 was fulfilled ahead of time. Up to 28 December,
more than 12,000 cars were loaded in excess of the target for the
year." 12/ The overfulfillment of approximately 76,000 carloads
(4 days at 16,000 cars per day plus 12,000 cars), or 2.28 million
tons (at 30 tons per carload), added to the 180.5 million tons planned
yields a total for 1954 of approximately 183 million tons. Although
no information is available to permit an independent check of the
figure, it is believed to be in the proper magnitude. One announce-
ment does report that the "overhaulage of freight trains was
20,000,000 tons." .1.L..q This would indicate that the total increase
for 1954 over 1953, assuming the same number of trains, was more than
20 million tons.
An announcement on 1 March 1955 that rail freight tonnage
would increase by 13.6 percent 22/ in 1955 indicates that the Chinese
Communists planned to originate 207.9 million tons in 1955.
B. Ton-Kilometer Performance.
Railroad ton-kilometer performance for 1953 in Communist
China was reported to be about 129 percent of the announced 59.5
billion ton-kilometers performed in 1952, 2Y or 76.6 billion ton-
kilometers. In view of officially reported tons-originated figures
and of available information concerning the average length of haul,
* "Tons?handled" should be interpreted in this connection to mean
"tons-originated."
** Not including narrow-gauge traffic.
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this ton-kilometer figure is considered to be consistent with known
facts and is believed to be statistically accurate. The best crite-
rion for comparing increases in ton-kilometer performance with
increases in tons-originated performance of the Chinese Communist
railroads is the average length of haul, which is obtained by dividing
ton-kilometers by tons-originated. The average length of haul on
Chinese railroads, as derived from official statistics of the
Ministry of Railroads for the period of Communist control of the
railroads, are shown as follows:
Year
Length of Haul
(Kilometers)
1949 N.A.
1950 400Ty
1951 466 1_/
1952 454 12/
1953 488*
1954 500 (estimated)
These figures are considered to be both reasonable and
accurate in the light of previous experience in Manchuria and of
current practices in the USSR. The indicated increases in the
average length of haul under the Chinese Communists are in some
measure attributable to the reorientation of internal Chinese traf-
fic which followed the Communists' rise to power. Because of the
curtailment of international ocean trade, internal rail traffic has
been reoriented from an east-west to a north-south pattern. This has
had the effect of increasing long-haul traffic density and thus the
average length of haul.
Another factor tending to increase the average length of
haul has been the powerful Chinese Communist effort to develop the
economy of China proper at a relatively greater pace than that of
Manchuria. There is clear evidence of this movement in the rela-
tively greater allocation of resources to capital construction
projects in China proper, such as the T'ai-yuan and Pao-t'ou steel
complexes, the development of Hankow (Han-klou) industries, and
extensive projects in Szechwan (Ssu-chtuan) and Sinkiang (Hsin-chiang)
Provinces, than to projects in Manchuria.
* 76.6 billion ton-kilometers for 1953 divided by 157 million tons-
originated.
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III. Factors Affecting the Growth of Rail Transport.
Increases in tons-originated and ton-kilometer performance, which
indicate a pronounced annual growth in the economic contribution of
the Chinese Communist railroads, are believed to be reasonable in
view of the general increase in the economic activity of the country
and of the improvement in the administrative and operating efficiency
of the railroads during 1950-55.
A. Freight Traffic Demand.
The accompanying chart, Figure 1,* indicates graphically the
increase in the gross national product (GNP) of the Chinese Communist
economy and in the following six selected areas of economic activity
in 1936-55: modern manufacturing, ferrous mining, electric power,
cement, timber, and coal. Each of these basic industries, as well
as the GNP, is a fairly representative measure of the economic
activity of a country. The chart shows that in Communist China
the increase in these economic indicators parallels the increase
in tons-originated on the railroads during the same period. This
correlation refleCts the fact that the increased demand derived
from the production of goods and services has both supported and
made necessary the growth of rail transport during the period of
Communist control.
The chart, in conjunction with an analysis of the cor-
relation existing between rail tons-originated and each of the
selected economic indicators (see Appendix A), is an attempt to
evaluate more precisely the current performance of the Chinese
Communist railroads. The results of this technique indicate that
the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy, especially since 1949,
has been paralleled by a similar rate of growth in rail transport.
This in turn tends to substantiate estimates of tons-originated
traffic based on Communist announcements. The close correlation
between the growth rate of the selected economic indicators and
that of rail traffic further confirms the belief that the Chinese
Communists are not deliberately falsifying rail tonnage statistics
or reporting tons-hauled as tons-originated.
* Following p. 12.
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The correlation between the economic indicators and rail
traffic also tends to confirm information on the currently tight
situation of Chinese Communist rail operations. Available estimates
of the growth of the economy confirm the level of rail transport
performance shown in this report. Figure 2* clearly demonstrates
that any estimates of rail tons-originated appreciably below
announced rail performance figures for the postwar period would be
suspect in view of the considerable gains made in other basic
industries and in GNP. To reject the rail tons-originated figures,
therefore, would be to reject production estimates in the basic
sectors of the Chinese Communist economy.
Substantiation of the officially reported high level of
Chinese rail traffic is also possible through an analysis of
(1) the commodity breakdown of traffic, (2) the regional dis-
tribution of traffic, and (3) announcements of operating statis-
tics (see Appendix A).
B. Administration and Organization.
A second factor of major significance, which has contributed
materially to the growth of rail performance in Communist China,
has been the centralization of rail administration and organization
on a national basis (see Appendix B). An appreciable advantage also
results from the 5-year period of stable control by the Chinese Com-
munists. Earlier groups which controlled Chinese railroads were
continually hampered by unusual circumstances resulting from
expanding or contracting borders and from military damage. From
1937 to 1945 the Japanese continually were faced with the problem
of incorporating newly conquered regions into the framework of
railroads under their control. In 1945-49 the Chinese Nationalists
were faced with the opposite situation. Both groups were equally
hampered by the effects of military action which continued through-
out both periods. Since 1949, in contrast to the instability of
rail transport operations and administration in China in 1937-49
the Communists have been able to develop their control and
operations in an atmosphere of relative stability. This has per-
mitted the training of needed personnel and the improvement of
those already assigned positions of responsibility. Moreover, it
* Following p. 14.
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450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
PATTERN OF GROWTH OF SELECTED ECONOMIC SECTORS
WITHIN CHINA, 1936-55
1936=,00
/
/
\
/
/
/
/ /
/
A/
/
'
.......-
/
',...-/...
........
.......
\
\
.?
/
-
\
1
...........,
/
/
1936 37
25413 5-56
38 39 1940 41
42
43
44 1945
46
47
48
49
1950 51
52
53
54
Figure 1
Cement Production
Electric Power
Modern Manufacturing Production
RAIL TRANSPORTATION
Ferrous Mining Production
Coal Production
Timber Production
1930=100
Gross National Product
1955
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is believed that 5 years have given the Chinese Communists sufficient
time to develop a technical perspective which will enable them to
cope with new problems more effectively.
C. Operational Characteristics.
The third factor of major
volume of tons-originated traffic
is the increased efficiency which
equipment and facilities (in part
from the 620,000 employees.
importance which supports the high
on the Chinese Communist railroads
the Communists have obtained from
through increased investment) and
1. Expansion of Facilities.
Since the end of 1949, when the Chinese Communists had
only 21,700 km of operable rail lines, they have allocated a large
part of the available resources to expanding the system and to
strengthening existing facilities. In view of the 25,500 km of
track operable at the end of 1954 LC" and of the additional 1,000 km
of new lines to be constructed in 1955,112/ it is obvious that con-
siderable progress has been made. Such progress is also apparent
in announcements about the completion and planning of projects
designed to strengthen the system. For example, the entire length
of the Peiping-Mukden (Shen-yang) line and the northern sections
of the Peiping-Hankow line have been double tracked.liEj Besides
double-tracking programs, lines carrying heavy traffic have also
received additional sidings and improved signal equipment. Increases
in the length of sidings during 1954 were reported to total 280
km.1-13./ Yard congestion is being partially eliminated by the pro-
posed expansion and reconstruction of station facilities at such
key points as Mukden, Tientsin (T'ien-ching), Ssu-p'ing, Chin-chou,
and Feng-t'ai./iY Reports also indicate the strengthening of
bridges and the inauguration of a new rail car ferry between
Wu-ch'ang and Hankow during 1954. According to the 1954 rail plan
reported by NCNA Peiping on 12 April 1954, 50 percent of the
funds invested by the state will be used to strengthen existing
installations of the railways ... and add new wagons and loco-
motives." Li2/ It is impossible, on the basis of available infor-
mation, to interpret accurately the value of the "50 percent
of the funds invested by the state." The statement does indi-
cate, however, that appreciable attention is being given to the
development of rail capacity.
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2. Equipment Utilization.
The Chinese Communists have devoted particular attention
to obtaining maximum utilization of available rolling stock by
decreasing turnaround time and increasing tons loaded per car. The
estimated freight car requirements in Communist China in 1952-54,
based on an analysis of the relationship between traffic and avail-
able operational data, are shown in Table 3. (See Appendix C.)
Table 3
Estimated Freight Car Requirements in Communist China
1952-54
Million
Tons-
Year Originated
Tons
Loaded
per Car
Total
Daily Turnaround Freight Car
Carloadings Time (Days) Requirements
1952
131
28.3
22,682
3.8
56,000
1953
157
29.3
14,673
4.o
65,000
1954
183
31.6
15,866
4.o
68,000
Each of the estimates allows for (a) a 4-percent factor
to account for cars under repair and (b) a factor for cars in reserve,
amounting to 10 percent in 1952, 6 percent in 1953, and 3 percent in
1954. The variance in the latter figures reflects the increasing
traffic which, it is believed (although no firm evidence has been
found), is being handled in relation to the size of the car park.
Total freight car requirements of the Chinese Communist
railroads have been obtained through a mathematical evaluation of
tons-originated announcements in terms of the average load per loaded
car and turnaround time. It is estimated that 28.3 tons were loaded
per car in 1952 and that this amount was increased by 1 ton in 1953,
bringing the figure for that year to 29.3 tons per car. On 6 February
1955, Peiping announced that the average load per car for 1954 had
been raised 2.3 tons over that for 1953. This would yield a 1954
figure of 31.6 tons per car./1161 Although this figure may seem
high, it is believed to approximate closely the actual average load
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Coal Production (Metric Tons) 1936=100
440
400
360
320
280
240
200
160
120
80
40
Figure 2 50X1
LINEAR REGRESSION OF COAL
PRODUCTION TONNAGE ON TOTAL
RAIL FREIGHT TONS-ORIGINATED FOR CHINA
1936-55
::.
[0
F2I.
CA csi
[Or')
0)
,
Zr
,A
-
1
-
rv '2
40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440
25414 4-56
Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated (Metric Tons) 1936=100
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per car. Chinese Communist success in this respect may be attributed
to the existence of a large number of 40- and 50-ton cars as well as
to the considerable volume of heavy loading freight which the rail-
roads are currently moving. It is believed that an average load of
31.6 tons per car is not inconceivable under present operating
conditions.
The function of turnaround time is equally vital to the
procurement of maximum efficiency from the existing park of rolling
stock (see Appendix D). The Chinese Communists annually have
announced turnaround time figures which have ranged between 2.9 days
and 3.09 days since 1952. Assuming that the Chinese Communist
definition of turnaround time is the same as that in the US -- that
is, the time required for a car to be loaded, move to its destination,
be unloaded, and be placed ready for its next loading -- it would
appear that the Chinese railroads are operating at an exceptionally
high level of efficiency. Analysis of Chinese Communist statements
indicates, however, that they in effect have perverted the meaning
of the term by excluding the time cars are empty. It is believed,
therefore, that the Chinese are actually referring to a loaded car
turnover rate instead of to conventional turnaround time. It
follows, then, that to obtain turnaround time figures consistent
with a proper definition of the term, the announced Chinese figures
must be increased by a factor which reflects the empty haul of a
freight car. On this basis, the estimated turnaround time for
1950-54 is shown as follows:
Year
Days
1950
4.7
1951
4.1
1952
3.8
1953
4.o
1954
4.o
The factors of "tons per car" and "turnaround time" are
seen to be of crucial importance when it is realized that their com-
bined use serves to determine minimum freight car requirements for a
given level of traffic. Although each of these figures indicates
that the Chinese Communist railroads are operating at a slightly
greater rate of efficiency than is the case in the USSR, this level
of efficiency is credible in view of the differences between the two
countries in the availability of rolling stock and in the average
length of haul.
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Available information on the total number of locomotives
in operation indicates that approximately 3,420 were available at
the end of 1954. (See Appendix C.)
The current high levels of traffic volume (tons-origi-
nated) on the Chinese railroads have resulted from major increases
in the production of basic industries, which have created a pro-
portional increase in the demand for rail transport. These high
traffic level requirements have been met largely as a result of
Chinese Communist achievements in organizing and marshaling their
railroad system so as to obtain maximum efficiency.
IV. Current Problems and Trends.
Along with Chinese Communist announcements describing the con-
siderable accomplishments of their railroads, there have been
recurring statements about difficulties facing the system. More
recent announcements tend to confirm the general belief that the
rail situation in China is approaching a level of strain which,
if not alleviated, might jeopardize the economic and defense plans
of the Chinese Communist government.
The Minister of Railroads reported in October 1953 that there
was "waste of transportation power." 47/ This statement indi-
cates that, ln spite of the heavy volume of traffic, Chinese
railroads were capable of carrying additional tonnage if waste
could be eliminated. The Minister stated that unwise planning had
set the 1952 Plan too high and that, in order to fulfill it,
freight had to be solicited. In 1953 the rail plan underestimated
the amount of freight to be carried, and the unforeseen heavy
traffic burden resulted in confusion in the transport system
and in uneconomic utilization of rail resources. These problems,
which are essentially marginal in nature, apparently were to be
resolved by administrative measures. With the announcements of
1954 accomplishments and 1955 goals, however, more active attention
is being given to discussion of the physical facilities which set
absolute limits to rail transport capabilities.
A. Decreasing Rate of Growth of Rail Transport.
It is evident, in view of the year-to-year increases in
freight tons-originated, that the Chinese Communists have been
forced to give additional attention to increasing the capability of
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available rail facilities as well as to expanding the scope of the
rail network. Although the magnitude of annual increases in terms
of tonnage increments has been increasing from year to year, the
proportionate increase during recent years has become progressively
smaller. The rate of growth of tons-originated has fallen from a
20-percent increase in 1953 over 1952 to a planned 13.6-percent
increase in 1955 over 1954. Both Chinese Communist announcements
on alleged traffic increases in tons-originated
indicate that the Chinese have reached a
definite turning point in their development of rail transport.
Palliative measures to increase transport capability through a
series of administrative reforms and workers' emulation campaigns
are believed to have reached the point of diminishing returns.
Further progress by the railroads can now be accomplished only
through a program of additional capital investment, designed to
increase both the capacity of routes and the availability of motive
power and rolling stock.
B. Measures to Algment Rail Transport Capabilities.
1. Construction of New Lines.*
It appears from available information that the Chinese
Communists are attempting to increase the capability of their rail-
roads by extending the network as well as by improving existing
lines. Extension of the rail system into hitherto undeveloped
regions has been one of the prime targets of the Communist govern-
ment. This program, designed to achieve increases in rail capability,
in economic resources, and in political and military control over
greater areas of the population, has varied somewhat in intensity
from year to year. In 1950, the first full year of Chinese Communist
control, new construction amounted to 523 km./ This was raised to
771 km in 1951 L2/ but fell to 482 km in 1952, 22/ probably as a
result of commitments in Korea. The rail construction program has
increased regularly since 1953, however, amounting to 589 km in that
year, 21/ 831 km in 1954, 2E/ and a planned addition of 1,000 km of
new track in 1955, 53/ which would bring the total length of oper-
able routes to about 26,500 km by the end of 1955. 2V
* See the map, inside back cover.
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The Chinese Communists have concentrated the major part
of their effort to construct new lines in the western provinces of
China. After the completion of the 505 km Chungking (Ch'ung-ch'ing) -
Ch'eng-tu line in the Szechwan rice bowl, work began on the 700-km
Ch'eng-tu - Pao-chi line, designed to link the Szechwan line with
the main network of China. Some 313 km of this project were com-
pleted as of 12 December 1954 on the southern section, and work is
in progress in the mountainous region of the northern sector
immediately south of Pao-chi. 22/
Building westward, the Chinese Communists have moved
the Lung'hai railhead from T'ien-shui to Lan-chou. Work began in
1953 on the 2,800-km section of track which is to extend westward
from Lan-chou by way of lumen and Urumchi (Ti-hua) to the Chinese
border, where it is to connect with a line from Alma-Ata on the
Turkestan-Siberian Railroad (Turk-Sib). ..5g Currently, the rail-
head is at Wu-wei, 250 km northwest of Lan-chou. 2// It is believed
that this line will receive high priority in the allocation of
resources for new construction at least until 1957, at which time
it is estimated that the railhead will be in lumen and in a position
to assist in the exploitation of oil resources located at this point.
It is doubtful that the line will reach Urumchi before 1960 or the
Soviet border before 1961. Available evidence, however, indicates
that the USSR is presently engaged in the survey of rail routes from
the Turk-Sib Railroad toward the Chinese frontier. 58/ Should the
USSR begin construction in the near future and continue until joined
with the Chinese effort, it is possible that the line will be com-
pleted for Sino-Soviet traffic in 1960.
A third major construction project, which was recently
completed, is the Chinese Communist section of the Trans-Mongolian
Railroad, 22/ a southeastern extension of the-Trans-Siberian Rail-
road. This section, approximately 350 km in length, was completed
from Chi-ning on the Peiping-Suiyuan line to the Sino-Mongolian bor-
der station of Erhlien on 11 December 1954. Rail laying on both
sides of the border was completed on 8 February 1955. ?.2/ Announce-
ments in the Chinese press indicaue that the line will have broad-
gauge track over its entire length, with transloading facilities
provided at Chi-ning, LI and probably will be serviced by diesel
locomotives. Chinese tolerance of Soviet broad-gauge track on
Chinese territory is indicative of the Chinese Communist desire to
obtain maximum efficiency out of existing facilities. The service
provided by the USSR on this line will permit savings in Chinese
rolling stock to be employed elsewhere within China.
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2. Improvements in Existing Facilities.
In addition to the construction of new lines, the Chinese
Communists devoted considerable attention during 1949-54 to the
improvement of existing facilities through construction or restora-
tion of double tracks, installation of communications equipment, and
the like. According to an official announcement in November 1954,
"the volume of rail traffic has become heavier day by day and
has exceeded the capacity of the railway facilities." t2/ During
1954, numerous projects to increase line capacity were carried out,
and in 1955 the size and number of such projects were to be greatly
increased. In 1955, on 3 lines* alone, an aggregate of 240 km of
double tracking was to be completed, 700 km were to be surveyed for
double tracking, initial designing for 8.50 km of line was to be
undertaken, uncompleted surveys on 619 km of line were to be
finished, and technical designs for an additional 559 km of line
were to be drawn up. ..6_31 In addition, several important yards and
railroad stations were to be rebuilt or enlarged, automatic signaling
installed, and sidings lengthened. Although there are inadequate
data on the total magnitude of this effort, it is apparent that the
Chinese Communists have embarked on a major program of rail con-
struction. It is also significant, in view of the large commitments
of capital resources necessary for this program, that 20 percent of
total investments in railroads planned for 1955 were to have been
devoted to the manufacture of rolling stock and motive power.
It is impossible to translate this investment into the number of
units to be built, although the magnitude of the investment does
support the belief that freight car production is considerably higher
than previously estimated.
C. Economic and Military Role of Rail Transport.
Since the present and future plans for the Chinese Communist
rail system are conditioned by the dual necessity of supporting a
growing economy and satisfying the needs of the military establish-
ment, any evaluation of rail transport in China must be made in
terms of these responsibilities. In the economic sector, the rail-
roads are committed to handling rapidly increasing levels of traffic
on lines fast becoming overburdened. Long-term needs of the growing
economy require that the railroads expand into areas having exploit-
able resources. In the military sector, the railroads are committed
* Peiping-Suiyuan, Peiping-Hankow, and Shih-chia-chuang (Shih-men) -
T'ai-yuan.
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to supplying troops throughout China and along its borders, such as
in Kwangsi (Kwang-hsi) and in North Korea. Long-term planning of
the military must envisage a China under armed attack. This, in
turn, requires a railroad pattern in depth, capable of rendering
the army's logistics as invulnerable as possible.
The Chinese Communist Ministry of Railroads, in an
apparent effort to reconcile the needs of the economic and the
military sectors, initially concentrated on rehabilitation of the
existing railroad network. This was immediately followed by an
extensive program of construction of new lines having both economic
and military significance. When completed, probably about 1961, the
projected Lan-chou - Yumen - Urumchi - Alma-Ata line will aid
materially in the exploitation of oil resources in Sinkiang. It
will also provide the military with a highly strategic fourth link
with the industrial USSR, its principal supplier of ordnance, and
accordingly will reduce the vulnerability of rail connections between
Communist China and the USSR. The recently completed Trans-Mongolian
line provides a much more economical route than either the Man-chou-li
Harbin (Ha-erh-pin) or the Sui-fen-ho - Harbin connections for the
overland movement of import-export traffic between the USSR and China
proper. Located farthest inland, it is the least vulnerable of
existing Sino-Soviet rail connections.
With the completion of the Chungking - Ch'eng-tu line and
the initiation of construction at both Pao-chi and Cheng-tu designed
to link this line with the main network, the Chinese Communists will
soon be in a position to profit more fully from the resources of the
Szechwan rice bowl. This western construction project also has con-
siderable military significance. Once Chungking is linked with
Pao-chi, there remain to be completed only the Chungking - Chan-i
section to the south and the Lan-chou - Pao-t'ou section to the north,
and China will have an inland artery stretching from the Trans-
Siberian Railroad to Indochina. Since work is believed to have
started on both of these sectors, this project may soon be completed.
In addition to announced rail construction projects,
there is increasing evidence that military considerations are
becoming more competitive in the demands made on available railroad
resources and capital investment. On 7 July 1955 the Chinese Com-
munists announced the completion of a rail line between Fort Bayard
(Chan-chiang) on the South China coast and Litang (Li-hua) on the
Hu-nan - Kwangsi line. .6_2/ No indication of Communist activity in
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this area had appeared in the press before completion of this line.
It is expected that the line will serve primarily the military sector.
A second railroad is reported under construction between Kuei-ch'i
and the coastal ports of Amoy (Hsia-men) and Foochow (Fu-chou)
opposite Formosa (Taiwan). As in the case of the Fort Bayard
line, it is probable that this line is also being constructed to
satisfy military requirements, particularly those in Fukien Province
(Fu-chien).
D. Future Trends of Rail Transport in the Chinese Communist
Economy.
In view of the growth pattern of the Chinese Communist
railroads, the factors which have supported this growth, and the
commitments under which the rail system is obliged to labor, it
appears that the Chinese efforts to fulfill both short-term and
long-term transport requirements for economic growth and military
support should provide an excellent test of the strength and
adequacy of the developing rail transport system. With the
expansion of economic activity and the concurrent dependence of the
economy on adequate transport services, the resources that will be
required for the expansion of the railroads must in large measure
be generated by the Chinese economy. Should the economy fail to
produce the increasing coal, steel, and capital requirements for
expansion of the railroads, then the growth of the over-all
economy, and more particularly the growth of the modern industrial
sector, will be impaired.
Such a failure seems unlikely in view of the present regime's
power to allocate labor and capital resources in accordance with its
determined pattern of national industrialization at any cost. In
view of the close working relationship which has been developed
between the USSR and the Chinese Communists in the planning, design,
and procurement of material and technical aid, it seems equally
unlikely that the USSR would fail to provide the Chinese with the
resources required for rail expansion during the next several years
if the Chinese economy should fail to generate the resources needed
for rail expansion. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that in spite
of complete economic control by the government and appreciable Soviet
assistance, the situation of the railroads is becoming critical.
This would not be considered abnormal if other sectors of the economy
were experiencing similar difficulties, but Communist China is believed
to be stockpiling coal and steel, and cement is being exported.
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Although it would be dangerous to assume that the current problems
of rail transport were unforeseen by the Communists well in advance
of 1955, all explanations of this apparent anomaly advanced to date
must be considered tentative. Perhaps there is adequate slack in
the over-all economy to overcome the shortage of rail transport.
Perhaps increased Soviet aid will resolve the transport shortage.
In any event, there is ample reason to believe that the Chinese
Communists have bitten off an extremely ambitious mouthful. Their
performance to date should give pause in estimating that they will
be incapable of achieving the short-term and long-term goals of both
the economic and military sectors. Also, future developments in the
field of transportation, especially rail transport, should provide
excellent criteria for judging the strength and adequacy of the
Chinese economy.
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APPENDIX A
TONS-ORIGINATED TRAFFIC
1. Commodity Distribution of Traffic.
The estimated tonnage of certain basic commodities originating on
the railroads in Communist China in 1953-54 is shown in Table 4.
Table L.
Estimated Tonnage of Basic Commodities Originating on Railroads
in Communist China
1953-54
Million Metric Tons
Commodity
1953
1954
Coal
52.0
61.0
Construction materials
30.0
32.6
Food crops
23.5
27.5
Timber
13.4
15.9
Ferrous metals
7.9
10.6
POL
1.0
1.1
Total 127.8
148.7
On the basis of total tons-originated estimates of 157 million tons
in 1953 and 183 million tons in 1954, it is believed that the above
estimates of 127.8 million tons and 148.7 million tons, for basic
commodities only, support the position that the Chinese Communist
announced figures of total rail traffic are reasonably accurate and
are expressed in terms of tons-originated. The above commodity
estimates, which represent approximately 80 percent of total tons-
originated for each year, would be higher if it were possible to
obtain more precise information on the amount of miscellaneous
freight originated on the railroads. Unless the production esti-
mates of the commodities noted above can be successfully challenged
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however, the Chinese Communist announcements of total tons-originated
should be considered verified.
a. Coal.
The estimated production of coal in Communist China, by area,
in 1953-54 is shown in Table 5. It is estimated at 69.0 million tons
for 1953 and 80.0 million tons for 1954.
Table 5
Estimated Production of Coal in Communist China, by Area
1953-54
Million Metric Tons
Area
1953
1954
Northeast Area (Manchuria)
34.4
4o.o
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
0.7
0.8
North China Area
20.7
24.0
East China Area
6.9
8.0
Central and South China Area
2.1
2.4
Southwest Area
2.8
3.2
Northwest Area
1.4
1.6
Total
69.0
80.0
Although no data are available, it is believed that' if there
were any imports of coal into Communist China in 1953 and 1954 the
amounts were negligible.
The estimated amount of coal exported from Communist China,
by destination, in 1953-54 is shown in Table 6.* The Northeast,
North China, and East China Areas are the principal sources of coal
exported.
* Table 6 follows on p. 25.
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Table 6
Estimated Amount of Coal Exported from Communist China
by Destination
1953-54
Thousand Metric Tons
Destination
1953
1954
USSR
500
1,000
Japan
147
47
North Korea
750
650
Pakistan
100
200
Hong Kong
7
N.A.
Total 1,50)-i- 1,897
The general pattern of coal production in Communist China
closely parallels that prevailing before the Communist seizure of
control. The pattern of coal distribution, however, and to some
extent the pattern of coal consumption, have undergone consider-
able change. Before 1950 a considerable amount of the coal
produced in North China moved by rail to the ports of Ch'in-huang-
tao and T'ang-ku, where it was transferred to coastwise vessels
and moved by water to Shanghai (Shang-hai). This water movement
was interfered with in 1950, necessitating the movement by rail to
Nanking (Nan-ching) and Shanghai of substantial volumes of coal
originating in the North China and Northeast Areas, pending an
increase in coal production in Central and South China. In the main,
the present centers of coal-consuming industries are of long standing.
They were developed and grew up in proximity to coal-mining areas
and to coastal waters and the navigable rivers. These centers are
served largely by local mines from which the transportation hauls
are comparatively short. Where the movement beyond is by coastwise
vessel the rail movement from originating mines to transshipment
ports is also relatively short. In some instances, variations in
the quality of coal produced in the several districts do result in
crosshauling of coal from one district to industrial centers con-
tiguous to another district. An example of this is the movement of
high-quality coking coal from the Kailan (K'ai-lu, Kai-lu-hsien)
mines in Hopeh (Ho-pei) Province in North China to iron foundries and
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steel mills in Mukden and An-shan. Some coal is also coked at
country ovens near the mine mouth and moved to distant points of con-
sumption.
The Chinese Communists, in an attempt to alleviate some of
the strain on the railroads imposed by heavy coal traffic, have
encouraged a twofold program which envisages the increased exploi-
tation of coal resources close to areas of consumption and the
diversion of coal traffic to river vessels wherever possible. It
is doubtful, however, whether such measures have as yet obtained
results which offset significantly the combined effects of the geo-
graphical location of currently producing mines; the reorientation
of export coal traffic from coastal ports to an overland rail haul
to the USSR; the increased crosshaul of coal resulting from varia-
tions in the quality of coal produced in the different areas; and
the increased total volume of coal produced, which rose from
69.0 million tons in 1953 to 80.0 million tons in 1954. ?1,/
Although there is little specific information available to
make possible a detailed breakdown of coal traffic, the available
information on current production and on pre-Communist coal traffic,
together with various press releases by the Communists, does permit
an estimate of approximate coal movements.
During 1936, 16.7 million tons, or three-fourths of the coal
production of China proper, were carried by railroad, and only 4
million tons were transported by sea and by inland waterway. .?_ig
The ratio of coal tonnage hauled by rail to total rail freight traffic
in 1931-34 in China proper was usually around 50 percent, occasionally
even higher. ?.2/ Available information on the ratio of coal origi-
nated by railroads to the total production of coal in Manchuria in
1937-43 is shown in Table 7.* With increasing coal movements in
Manchuria and shipments to the Northwest Area, plus greater fluidity
existing between all areas as a result of the political and economic
unification of Communist China, it would seem reasonable to assume
that in 1953-54 the railroads were even more important in the coal-
carrying trade than heretofore. For purposes of comparison, however,
when the prewar ratios are applied to the current regional production
estimates in Table 5,** the following results are obtained:
* Table 7 follows on p. 28.
** P. 24, above.
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Amount
(Million Metric Tons)
Area
1953
1954
Northeast Area (Manchuria)*
27.5
32.0
China proper
26.0
30.0
Total
53.5
62.0
Various statements appearing in the Chinese Communist press
provide some indication as to the magnitude of coal movements on
the railroads in China proper. The chief item of freight in 1949
in China proper was coal, which constituted 61 percent of the total
volume of freight shipped. Later it was announced that by August 1950
the Chinese railroads had transported over 60 million tons of freight,
over 50 percent of which was coal. /2/ For all of 1950 it was
reported that coal constituted 58 percent of total rail freight. /1/
At a still later date it was reported that for 1954, one-third of
total freight was coal. /21 If the one-third factor is used to
estimate coal traffic on the railroads, this would yield 52 million
tons for 1953 and 61 million tons for 1954. These figures agree
well with a 1951 figure for coal traffic of 38 million tons which
was reported by a Communist rail official in 1955.
Additional confirmation of a current coal traffic figure in
excess of 50 million tons is to be found in a Chinese Communist press
release which notes that "in 1954, the average weight per car-
load was raised 1.3 tons over that for 1953. That gain is equivalent
to the loading, on the average, of an additional 6,500 tons in each
24 hours." /2/ The context of this statement indicates that it
applies to coal movement and not to total traffic. On the basis of
a national average of 31.6 tons loaded per car, this yields a mini-
mum annual total of 57,670,000 tons of coal for 1953.
In view of the ratios of coal traffic to total traffic
existing in China proper and Manchuria in earlier years, however,
* Total production for Manchuria has been reduced by 20 percent to
account for minehead and local consumption. The resultant ratio of
80 percent of total coal production moving on the railroads agrees
well with that of the pre-Communist period, as shown in Table 7.
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Table 7
Ratio of Coal Originated by Railroads
to Total Production of Coal in Manchuria
1937-43
(1)
(2) (3)
Ratio of Coal
Originated
Total Coal Originated to
Production of Coal 2/ by Railroads 12/ Total Production
Year (Thousand Metric Tons) (Thousand Metric Tons) (Percent)
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
14,303
15,849
17,623
19,430
21,909
22,428
24,783
14,090
16,510
19,430
23,470
25,340
25,680
89
94
100
107 2/
113 2/
104 2/
a. IV
c. The percentage figures in column (3) show that in 1941-43, more
coal was originated on the railroads than was actually produced. It is
believed that these figures are high, because of the double haul of
some portions of total coal production and the fact that during this
period, freight arriving on the Manchurian railroads by way of the bor-
der station of Shan-hai-kuan (Lin-yu) increased 29 times. Although
the bulk of this increase was undoubtedly coal from mines in North
China, it is believed not to have appreciably exceeded 3.5 million tons
for any given year.
plus the fact that the volume of coal originated on the railroads
during recent years has probably increased, it is believed that the
figures of 52 million tons for 1953 and 61 million tons for 1954 are
reasonable and closely approximate the total volume of coal originated
on the Chinese Communist railroads.
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b. Construction Materials.
An estimate of the volume of construction materials -- that
is, the earth, stone, sand, gravel, crushed stone, brick, and cement
which is moved by various means of transportation in Communist China
has proved particularly difficult because of the lack of any precise
figures on the annual production of these materials. Independent
estimates of total production and the relative amounts moved by the
various means of transportation have been compiled on the basis of
known construction activity in Communist China. The estimated
volume of construction materials moved by various means of trans-
portation in Communist China in 1953-54 is shown in Table 8.* This
table indicates that approximately 45 million tons of construction
materials were moved by the railroads in 1954 as opposed to
34 million tons in 1953. In view of the lack of information avail-
able on construction projects in China, as well as on the production
of construction materials, the above estimates are considered to be
highly tenuous and open to revision. It may be noted, however, that
these estimates do not differ widely from estimates derived from
pre-Communist rail records and recent statements appearing in the
Chinese Communist press.
The 1943 records of the Manchurian railroads indicate that
of a total of 84.6 million tons of freight originated, 12.69 million
tons were "rocks," 2.12 million tons were limestone, and 1.64 million
tons were cement. 7?/ Although it is not known whether "rocks"
includes sand and earth, the above rock, limestone, and cement,
totaling 16.5 million tons, is known not to include bricks. The
5 to 1 ratio of total freight to construction materials in
Manchuria indicated by these figures would therefore be a minimum
figure, since it does not include all construction materials, and
the intensity of construction activity in Communist China is
believed to be greater today than it was in Manchuria in 1943.
With these considerations in mind, the Manchurian ratio of
construction materials-originated to total tons-originated when
applied to the figures of 157 million tons-originated for 1953 and
183 million tons-originated for 1954 would yield minimum figures
of 31.4 million tons of construction materials moving by rail for
1953 and 36.6 million tons for 1954. These minimum figures tend
to support the estimates in Table 8.**
* Table 6 follows on p. 30.
** Text continued on p. 32.
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Table 8
Estimated Volume 2/* of Construction Materials
Moved by Various Means of Transportation
in Communist China
1953-54
Commodity
Means
of Transportation 12/
Percent
of Annual
Total
Amount
(Thousand Metric Tons)
1953
1954
Earth
Coolie
Rail
Truck
Marine
95
3
2
3
475,000
15,000
10,000
15,000
665,000
21,000
14,000
21,000
Annual total 2/
500,000
700,000
Stone 1/
Coolie
50
2,500
3,000
Rail
40
2,000
2,400
Truck
4o
2,000
2,400
Marine
6o
3,000
3,600
Annual total 2/
5,000
6 000
Sand, gravel, and
Coolie
70
19,600
23,800
crushed stone 2/
Rail
50
14,000
17,000
Truck
50
14,000
17,000
Marine
50
14,000
17,000
Annual total 2/
28,000
34 000
Bricks
Coolie
50
1,300
1,500
Rail
30
750
900
Truck
50
1,300
1,500
Marine
5
130
150
Annual total 2/
2,500
3,000
* Footnotes for Table 8 follow on p. 31.
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Table 8
Estimated Volume of Construction Materials
Moved by Various Means of Transportation
in Communist China
1953-54 '
(Continued)
? Amount.
Percent (Thousand Metric Tons)
Means of Annual
Commodity of Transportation 12/ Total 1953 1954
Cement
Coolie 5 150 240
Rail 80 2,400 3,760
Truck 40 1,200 1,880
Marine 40 1,200 1,880
Annual total 2/ 3,000,4 7oo
. ,_____
Totals by each Coolie 499,000 694,000
means 1/ Rail 54,000 45,000
Truck 28,000 8/ 37,000 8/
Marine 33,000 44,000
a. There is considerable overlap in these figures, because in many cases
some of the tonnage is moved by more than one means of transportation
before reaching its final destination.
b. Coolies have been included as a means of transportation in this table
since they continue to play a major role in the complete movement of con-
struction materials as well as in loading and unloading of other means
of transportation and in transshipment operations.
c. The underlined totals are the estimated amounts produced and trans-
ported annually (excluding duplications), except that the figure for
earth does not include dredging or hydraulic means of transportation.
d. Including cut stone, rip-rap, and other large stone.
e. Crushed stone has been included here because in most cases its uses
are similar to those of sand and gravel.
f. Totals are rounded.
g. This figure is presumed to include intraplant movement, which
probably does not contribute to the national total truck tons-originated
figure.
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c. Agriculture.
Food crop production in 1953 and 1954 is estimated at
160 million tons for 1953 and 158 million tons for 1954. The food
surplus and food deficit areas have been located by means of esti-
mates based on the regional distribution of total food crop
production and on the apportionment of net food availability among
the different areas by population. On this basis it has been
estimated that the interregional rail movement of food crops
amounted to approximately 8 million tons in 1953 and 9 million tons
in 1954. Since these figures do not account for any intraregional
movement of food crops, they are believed to be quite low.
"Farm freight" in Manchuria in 1935-38 averaged 16 percent
of total freight but fell to about 8 percent in 1939-43. 12/ In
China proper under the Nationalists in 1936, 12 percent of total
tons-originated consisted of agricultural products. i.101/ In the
first half of 1950 it was reported that 10.5 percent of total
tons-originated consisted of agricultural products. L31/ Because
of the increased exports of grain to the USSR, the increased urban
population, and the almost complete domination of the wholesaling
and distribution of food crops by the state, it is believed that
rail transport of grain has risen appreciably under the Communists.
It is doubtful that food crops moved on the railroad would con-
stitute less than 15 percent of total tons-originated for 1953 and
1954. This would yield a 1953 figure for food crop movement of
23.5 million tons and a 1954 figure of 27.5 million tons.
d. Timber.
The estimated production of timber in Communist China is
shown in Table 9.* It has been assumed that almost all of the tim-
ber transported by modern means is industrial wood or is timber
destined for nonfuel uses, although some fuelwood does move by rail. 50X1
The breakdown of timber production by areas
gives production goals for
1951 in the various areas in percentages of the national total. 82/
Because timber production occurs over large areas and enters the
transport network at numerous points, these regions will be con-
sidered as centers of production. The only standing timber reserves
* Table 9 follows on p. 33.
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Table 9
Estimated Production of Timber in Communist China
1953-.54
Thousand Metric Tons
Area
1953
1954
Northeast Area (Manchuria)
9,000
11,600
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
1,000
1,200
Central and South China Area
2,100
2,600
Southwest Area
1,200
1,500
Northwest Area and Shansi Prcvince
700
800
Total
14,000
17,700
of any size are located in the northern and eastern parts of
Manchuria, the northeastern part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region, the Southwest Area, and the mountains in the Central and South
China Area. Increases in construction and a general increase in the
demand for wood to fulfill the needs of the expanding economy have
meant considerable expansion in timber exploitation in all regions.
In Manchuria in 1939-43, timber averaged 9 percent of total
tons-originated. ?..1/ In 1936, timber traffic on the Chinese rail-
roads averaged less than 1 percent of total tons-originated. gl-/
in 1953, timber traffic on 50X1
the Chinese Communist railroads totaled about 12 million tons. 85/
On the basis of statements made by Peiping, a figure was derived for
timber of 13.4 million tons for 1953.* Since the total production
of timber for 1953, including industrial timber and fuelwood, was
25.6 million tons, the 13.4-million-ton figure does not look
unreasonable, especially since it would amount to only about
* Peiping announced that "by increasing the average loading of
each car by 2.1 tons of timber, as compared with 1952, an annual
aggregate saving of 35,350 cars was obtained." Letting x equal tons
per car, or 29.3, and y equal cars, then the following would obtain:
(x - 2.1) (y + 35,350) - xy = O. Solving for y equals 457,867 cars,
or 13.4 million tons, of timber originated on the railroads in 1953.
1
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8.5 percent of total tons-originated. A projection on this figure
of the announced plan to increase 1953 timber shipments by 18.3 per-
cent would yield a 1954 figure of 15.9 million tons.
e. Ferrous Metals.
The estimated production of ferrous metals and the percent
moving by modern transport in Communist China in 1953-54 is shown in
Table 10.
Table 10
Estimated Production of Ferrous Metals
and Percent Moving by Modern Transport in Communist China
1953-54
Amount
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Percent Moving
Ferrous Metals
1953
1954
by Modern Transport
Pig iron
2,230
3,030
38.8
Crude steel
1,760
2,200
N.A.
Finished steel
1,487
1,722
70.9
Iron ore
6,233
8,408
100
Total
11,710
15,360
a.
This table indicates that in 1953, 11.7 million tons of
ferrous metals products and ore were produced and thereby became
susceptible to movement by modern transport. In 1954 this amount
was increased to about 15.4 million tons. Because of the nature of
ferrous metals production and the large amount moving by water, con-
siderable portions of the above amounts would not move by rail.
Except for 150,000 tons of pig iron which are known to move down-
stream from Ma-an Shan to Shanghai by water, the remaining bulk of
pig iron which moves by modern transport probably moves by rail.
This would yield 715,000 tons in 1953 (2,230,000 times 38.8 percent
minus 150,000) and, similarly, 1,026,000 tons in 1954. All crude
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steel is consumed locally in making finished steel in the form of
rolled products or castings and in making semifinished steel. Of
the total volume of 1,054,000 tons of finished steel which moved
by modern transport in 1953 and of 1,221,000 tons similarly moved
in 1954, 13 percent moved by water from Chungking and Ta-yeh, half
of which probably was the object of a rail haul before reaching
its ultimate destination. This would indicate that approximately
980,000 tons of finished steel moved by rail in 1953 and 1,136,000
tons in 1954.
All of the iron ore except that exported from Yu-lin is
believed to have moved by rail. The totals of these estimates of
ferrous metals movements by rail are as follows:
Amount
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Product
1953
1954
Pig iron
715
1,026
Finished steel
980
1,136
Iron ore
6,233
8,408
Total
7,928
10,570
Although these figures are open to revision, it is believed
that they closely approximate the volume of iron ore and finished
products originating on the railroads.
in 1953
the railroads transported several million tons of iron and steel
and their products.
f. POL.
Production of crude oil in Communist China has been esti-
mated at about 800,000 tons in 1954 and 630,000 tons in 1953. The
total quantity of refined products consumed in China in 1954 is
estimated at 1.4 million tons. .?./ It has been estimated that
about 1 million tons of POL (all products) were imported by China
in 1953. _?.21/ In view of the fact that the major portion of POL
imports is moved by rail from the USSR through the border stations
of Man-chou-li and Sui-fen-ho, it is estimated that approximately
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1 million tons of POL were moved on the railroads out of a total
tonnage available of 1.6 million tons. Allowing for a 10-percent
increase in 1954, this would yield a figure of 1.1 million tons
of POL products originated on the railroads.
2. Comparison of the Rates of Growth of Rail Transport
and Other Sectors of the Economy.
The Communist regime has made noteworthy progress in restoring
and developing the economy of China to a state of productivity sur-
passing the levels of activity under the Nationalists and the
Japanese. Economic activity in 1931-52 was complicated by the
series of political upheavals resulting from the Sino-Japanese war
and the Civil War that followed. Economic trends in 1931-37 were
relatively homogeneous for the area that is now Communist China.
Economic development in Manchuria in 1937-45 proceeded rather
rapidly, whereas development in China proper was scattered and
spasmodic. Economic development in 1945-46 was relatively depressed
in all of China, including Manchuria. In 1946-49 there was a period
of increasing production in most areas, ending in a decline resulting
from the disruption of the Civil War. Production in 1949-52 again
increased, generally reaching in Manchuria the level attained under
the Japanese in 1941-45. Since 1950 the modern industrial output
for China as a whole has climbed by an average annual increase of
about 26.8 percent; the index of industrial output in 1954 stood
at 142 percent of 1952 production and at about 258 percent of 1950
production. 22/
Figure 1* demonstrates this fluctuating pattern of the economic
development of Communist China during 1936-54, and in addition)
indicates a rather pronounced degree of association among all of the
selected economic indicators. For example, during the depressed
1945-49 period, all of the selected sectors of the economy, without
exception, are at below-normal levels. In the majority of sectors,
recovery starts as of 1949, with the exception of coal, railroads,
and ferrous mining, which preceded general recovery by 1 year --
thus reflecting the known interdependency existing among basic
sectors of the economy.
* Following p. 12, above.
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The analytical process known as linear correlation may be used
to observe and measure more precisely the relationship which occurs
between the rates of growth in rail transport and in other sectors
of the Chinese Communist economy. In such a procedure the indexes
of the 2 related or associated series (that is, rail freight tons-
originated and the selected indicators of Chinese economic activity)
are plotted graphically, with 1 variable (transport) placed on the
X axis and the other variable (economic indicator) on the Y axis.
The result is known as a scatter diagram. The relationship resulting
from plotting the associated variables is expressed as a line
(regression line) which is in effect a computed average of the dis-
tribution of these variables about a fixed relationship.* The
greater the degree of correlation between the variables, the closer
will the plotted points tend to conform to the plotted line. Should
all points fall exactly on the line, perfect correlation will be
indicated. The results of this correlation analysis are presented
* The relationship resulting from plotting the associated variables
is expressed as a line known as a regression line. This line
averages the distribution of the variable, or, in other words, it
expresses mathematically the average relationship between the two
variables. With an imperfect relationship or correlation, the
variation will cause the plotted points to depart from the indicated
line, thus creating a scatter about the line of regression. If there
is a close association, the scatter will be confined to a narrow path
which will lie along the line of regression. The less perfect the
relationship between the two variables, the more widely will the
plotted points scatter about the line of regression.
A line of regression could, of course, be fitted by visual
inspection of any of the scatters, but a more accurate result is
obtained in this report by solving the following generally accepted
simultaneous equations used for this purpose and then plotting two
or more base points from which to draw the regression line, as
follows:
1. 17(y) = Na + 2: (x)b
2. E (xy) = (x)a + ECx2)b
The values required for the solution of these equations may be
derived from the data following each graph. Substituting the values
-37-
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graphically in Figures 2-8.* The basic data and formulas used in
establishing the regression lines are shown in Tables 11-17.**
Inspection of the graphs, particularly as concerns the slope of the
regression lines and the position of plotted points relative to the
line, indicates rather uniform characteristics prevailing.
With the exception of cement, ferrous mining, and modern
manufacturing, the computed lines of regression lie on a plane
indicating that the growth of rail tons-originated is at a rate
somewhat greater than any one of the selected indicators of Chinese
Communist economic activity. This characteristic is particularly
presented for coal production, for example, the equation becomes:
1. 2,418 = 20a + 3,034b Solving simultaneously:
2. 434,690 = 3,034a + 570,216b a = 27.252
b = 0.617
From the first equation above:
y . a + bx
Substituting the obtained values for a and b, the required
equation for plotting the lines of regression is:
y = 27.252 + 0.617x
A mathematical expression has now been secured for the relation
between the two variables being studied, rail tons-originated and
the selected economic indicator (coal production in this case). Any
value may be substituted for either x or y for the purpose of
selecting the base points. For example, if, in the above equation,
values of 100 and 200 are assigned to x, then y will equal 89.0 and
150.7. These two sets of values are then plotted on the graph, and
a line is drawn between them. The resulting line is known as the
line of regression.
* Following p. 38.
** Tables 11-17 follow on pp. 39-45, below.
-38-
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Timber Production (Metric Tons) /938=100
440
400
360
320
280
240
200
160
120
80
40
Figure 350X1
LINEAR REGRESSION OF TIMBER
PRODUCTION TONNAGE ON TOTAL
RAIL FREIGHT TONS-ORIGINATED FOR CHINA
1938-55
Pi/ill
1111111111irsi
II
-
:,,
?
111
is
40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400
25415 4-56
Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated (Metric Tons) 1938=100
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440
50X1
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440
400
360
0
0 320
11
(-)
280
240
_
Cement Production
200
160
120
80
40
50X1
Figure 4
LINEAR REGRESSION OF CEMENT
PRODUCTION TONNAGE ON TOTAL
RAIL FREIGHT TONS-ORIGINATED FOR CHINA
1936-55
rn
(r)
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? 1945
40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400
25416 4-56
Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated (Metric Tons) 1936= ioo
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440
50X1
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Electric Power (Kilowatt Hours) 1936=100
440
400
360
320
280
240
200
160
120
80
40
Figure 5
LINEAR REGRESSION OF
ELECTRIC POWER ON TOTAL RAIL
FREIGHT TONS-ORIGINATED FOR CHINA
1936-55
50X1
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a)
.-.
v
En
cr,
,
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co
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a)
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o
to
,
k
40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440
25417 4-56
Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated (Metric Tons) 1936=100
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Ferrous Mining Production (Metric Tons) 1936=100
440
400
360
320
280
240
200
160
120
80
40
Figure 6
LINEAR REGRESSION OF FERROUS
MINING PRODUCTION TONNAGE ON TOTAL
RAIL FREIGHT TONS-ORIGINATED FOR CHINA
1936-55
rn
'i
?
C.7
-er
a)
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cr,
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40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400
25418 4-56
Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated (Metric Tons) 1936=100
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440
50X1
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Value of Modern Manufacturing 1936= ioo
440
400
360
320
280
240
200
160
120
80
40
0
Figure --/50X1
LINEAR REGRESSION OF
MODERN MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION ON
TOTAL RAIL FREIGHT TONS-ORIGINATED FOR CHINA
1936 and 1949-55
CD
?
0
CO
0)
40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440
25419 4-56
Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated (Metric Tons) 1936= too
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4.
"ro
4.
440
400
360
320
280
240
200
160
120
80
40
0
50X1
Figure 8
LINEAR REGRESSION OF
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ON TOTAL
RAIL FREIGHT TONS-ORIGINATED FOR CHINA
1936 and 1950-55
(N
(0
0)
,
?
0)
CCD
0)
,-1
?
`rr
En
o)
.
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(0
0)
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0)
0)
'-C.
? 0
10
a)
.--,
.
(0
cr,
,
40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440
25420 4-56
Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated (Metric Tons) 1936=100
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Table 11
Linear Regression of Coal Production Tonnage
on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for China
1936-55
Year
1936
- 100
100
10,000
10,000
1937
85
94
7,990
7,225
1938
108
81
8,748
11,664
1939
135
98
13,230
18,225
1940
151
119
17,969
22,801
1941
170
150
25,500
28,900
1942
188
166
31,208
35,344
1943
194
160
31,040
37,636
1944
182
159
28,938
33,124
1945
205
49
10,045
42,025
1946
35
44
1,540
1,225
1947
46
52
2,392
2,116
1948
37
51
1,887
1,369
1949
72
80
5,760
5,184
1950
148
106
15,688
21,904
1951
164
132
21,648
26,896
1952
195
164
31,980
38,025
1953
234
179
41,886
54,756
1954
274
209
57,266
75,076
1955
311
225
69,975
96,721
Total
3,0311
2 418
434 690
570,216
y = 27.252 + 0.617x
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Table 12
Linear Regression of Timber Production Tonnage
on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for China
1938-55
Year
X Yxy x2
1938
100
loo
10,000
10,000
1946
32
loo
3,200
1,024
1947
43
100
4,300
1,849
1948
34
100
3,400
1,156
1949
66
100
6,600
4,356
1950
136
125
17,000
18,496
1951
152
131
19,912
23,104
1952
180
138
24,840
32,400
1953
216
162
34,992
46,656
1954
252
175
44,100
63,504
1955
287
194
55,678
82,369
Total
1,1.i-98
1,2+25
224,022
284 914
y = 79.116 + 0.370x
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Table 13
Linear Regression of Cement Production Tonnage
on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for China
1936-55
Year
X
yXY
X2
1936
100
100
10,000
10,000
1937
85
85
7,225
7,225
1938
108
84
9,072
11,664
1939
135
86
11,610
18,225
1940
151
82
12,382
22,801
1941
170
96
16,320
28,900
1942
188
126
23,688
35,344
1943
194
123
23,862
37,636
1944
182
91
16,562
33,124
1945
205
3
615
42,025
1946
35
17
595
1,225
1947
46
49
2,254
2,116
1948
37
56
2,072
1,369
1949
72
53
3,816
5,184
1950
148
112
16,576
21,904
1951
164
199
32,636
26,896
1952
195
238
46,410
38,025
1953
234
321
75,114
54,756
1954
274
380
104,120
75,076
1955
311
418
129,998
96,721
Total
3,034
2,719
51#14,927
570,216
y = - 46.786 + 1.205x
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b-h-U-E-E-T
Table 14
Linear Regression of Electric Power
on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for China
1936-55
Year
X
Y
XY
X2
1936
100
100
10,000
10,000
1937
85
105
8,925
7,225
1938
108
128
12,744
11,664
1939
135
132
17,820
18,225
1940
151
145
21,895
22,801
1941
170
150
25,500
28,900
1942
188
171
32,148
35,344
1943
194
176
34,144
37,636
1944
182
184
33,488
33,124
1945
205
132
27,060
42,025
1946
35
100
3,500
1,225
1947
46
111
5,106
2,116
1948
37
113
4,181
1,369
1949
72
113
8,136
5,184
1950
148
121
17,908
21,904
1951
164
153
25,092
26,896
1952
195
187
36,465
38,025
1953
234
237
55,458
54,756
1954
274
284
77,816
75,076
1955
311
345
107,295
96,721
Total
3,034.
3,177
564 681
570,216
y = 44.714
+ 0.752x
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b-h
Table 15
Linear Regression of Ferrous Mining Production Tonnage
on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for China
1936-55
Year
X
Y
XI
X2
1936
100
100
10,000
10,000
1937
85
97
8,245
7,225
1938
108
94
10,152
11,664
1939
135
136
18,360
18,225
1940
151
153
23,103
22,801
1941
170
242
41,140
28,900
1942
188
287
53,956
35,344
1943
194
312
60,528
37,636
1944
182
262
47,684
33,124
1945
205
124
25,420
42,025
1946
35
1
35
1,225
1947
46
1
46
2,116
1948
37
8
.296
1,369
1949
72
26
1,872
5,184
1950
148
62
9,176
21,904
1951
164
95
15,580
26,896
1952
195
122
23,790
38,025
1953
234
186
43,524
54,756
1954
274
251
68,774
75,076
1955
311
315
97,965
96,721
Total
3,034
2,871+
559,61+6
570,216
= - 26.902 + 1.125x
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 16
Linear Regression of Modern Manufacturing Production
on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for China
1936-55
Year X Y XY X2
1936
100
100
10,000
10,000
1949
72
73
5,256
5,184
1950
148
104
15,392
21,904
1951
164
141
23,124
26,896
1952
195
196
38,220
38,025
1953
234
21.1.7
57,798
54,756
1954
274
286
78,364
75,076
1955
311
312
97,032
96,721
Total
1,11.98
1,11.59
325,186
328,562
y = - 20.173 + 1.082X
- 11.11. -
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 17
Linear Regression of Gross National Product
on Total Rail Freight Tons-Originated for China
1936-55
Year
X
Y
xy
x2
1936
loo
loo
10,000
10,000
1950
148
95
14,060
21,904
1951
164
109
17,876
26,896
1952
195
123
23,985
38,025
1953
234
133
31,122
54,756
1954
274
140
38,360
75,076
1955
311
146
45,406
96,721
Total
l,1.26
846
180,809
323,378
y = 68.403 + 0.257x
S-E-C-R-E-T
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pronounced in the case of GNP. As will be noted, the plotted points
of GNP indicate almost perfect correlation with freight tons-
originated, while the nearly horizontal position of the regression
line indicates that Rail Freight Tons-Originated is growing at a much
greater rate than GNP. While world rail experience testifies to
the fact that in the initial stages of economic development, rail
transport service tends to increase at a rate somewhat greater than
does over-all production, it does not support rail advances of the
magnitude indicated in the GNP regression line. Actually, the
pronounced growth of rail traffic in relation to GNP results from
conditions peculiar to China, where about 75 percent of GNP is
derived from the agricultural sector, which is incapable of any
significant growth. Hence, the predominant characteristic of the
regression lines is that Rail Freight Tons-Originated is growing at
a somewhat greater rate than other sectors of the economy, confirming
the existence of what is generally adjudged to be a normal situation
in a developing country such as Communist China.
The most significant characteristic apparent in the graphs is
that the plotted points in all cases tend to cluster rather closely
about the path of the regression lines, thereby confirming cor-
relation. Correlation in most instances is not perfect; however,
the points do not scatter widely about the line of regression. In
addition, the plotted points for 1953-55 on all graphs, with the
exception of Ferrous Mining, lie on or above the regression line.
This indicates a slight deviation from the average relationship
established by the regression line between rail transport and the
other variable. Since the points for 1953-55 are consistently
above the line, this indicates that the deviation is in favor of
the y axis: that is, that production is tending to develop at a
slightly faster pace than would be expected on the basis of the
relationship established by the regression line. Various factors
could cause this; however, it is believed to be a reflection of
the tight situation of current Chinese Communist rail operations.
The fact that rather close linear correlation exists between
Rail Freight Tons-Originated and the selected variables is
additional support for the position that the Chinese Communists
are in fact reporting rail traffic gains in terms of tons-
originated. The 1936 figures are known to be in terms of tons-
originated, and any Chinese Communist change of reporting from
tons-originated to tons-hauled would result in a much lower
coefficient of correlation than is shown in Figures 2-8.
-46-
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Because on the one hand there is close association among all of
these variables, as shown in Figure 1,* and because on the other
hand the graphed regression lines indicate close correlation between
freight tons-originated and each separate sector of basic economic
activity, it becomes evident that, in view of the rapid expansion
of production in Communist China, the absolute level of tons-
originated rail traffic must be at least as high as has been esti-
mated herein. Contemporary organization of economic activity will
not support an autonomous increase in total over-all production
without a comparable increase in transport performance. Hence,
to reject current estimated levels of rail performance implies that
an adequate basis must be provided for first rejecting the indicated
growth pattern of the other economic sectors used in the present
correlation analysis.
3. Regional Distribution of Traffic.
Few specific data are available on the volume of traffic moved
in the various regions of Communist China. One notable exception
is in the area of the Harbin Railroad Control Bureau, which receives
considerable attention in the press. One statement dealing with
the traffic position of this Bureau partially corroborates the
national figure of tons-originated for 1953. On 14 December 1953,
Peiping reported the fulfillment of the Harbin Bureau's 1953 goal
by 5 December, with a statement that the workers were planning to
load an additional 84,000 freight cars by the end of the year. 21/
This would indicate that the Harbin Bureau would load 3,360 cars
daily. Converting this to annual carloading and multiplying by
30.4 tons per car (announced as average tons loaded per car in 1953
in the Harbin Bureau 22/) would yield a 1953 tons-originated total
of 37,282,560 tons, which is approximately 24 percent of the total
tonnage of 157 million tons-originated in Communist China. This
percentage is entirely consistent with the position of central
Manchuria in the Chinese economy and lends support to the national
estimate of 157 million tons.
A more recent report supports the 1953 performance of the Harbin
Railroad Control Bureau. This report states that because of improved
loading in the Bureau during the first half of 1954, the average
carload had been increased to 31 tons and that "This figure
represents a planned increase averaging 0.6 ton per car over that
in 1953. This was equivalent to a saving of 14,600 cars." 2_31
* Following p. 12, above.
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Expressing the statement in an algebraic formula where x equals
tons per car (31 tons), y equals cars, and xy equals tons-originated,
the following is obtained:
(x - o.6) (y + 1)+,600) - xy = 0
xy + 14,600x - 0.6y - 8,760 - xy 0
Solving for y on the basis that x equals 31 tons yields:
0.6y = 452,600 - 8,760
0.6y = 443,840
y = 739,733 cars loaded in the first half of 1954.
At 31 tons per car, this would equal about 22,932,000 tons-
originated during the period. If this same level of activity was
maintained throughout the remainder of 1954, tons-originated by
the Harbin Bureau would have been about 45,864,000, or about
25 percent of total tons-originated in Communist China. The Com-
munist plan to increase tons-originated by 15 percent to 180
million tons in 1954 would presumably require that the Harbin
Railroad Control Bureau account for approximately 25 percent of
the total. Hence, if the 1953 figure of national tons-originated
was in fact 157 million tons, to attain 180 million tons in 1954
(a net increase of 23 million tons), the Harbin Bureau, in order
to maintain its relative position, would have to increase tons-
originated by about 8.0 million tons. The fact that such increases
are apparently being met attests to both the validity and the con-
sistency of Chinese Communist transportation reporting.
The 1954 tons-originated figure for the Harbin Railroad Control
Bureau represents a 23-percent increase over 1953, compared with
the 15-percent national increase. This is to be expected, however,
since a more efficient utilization of the car park is possible in
Manchuria, permitting a larger tonnage increase than could be
obtained in China proper.
A recent Japanese publication 21Y provides a regional distri-
bution of traffic on the basis of estimated locomotive assignments
in Communist China. According to this source, the regional distri-
bution of freight as of the end of 1952 was as follows:
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Area
Northeast Area (Manchuria)
North China Area
Central and South China Area
Total
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Amount
Billion Million
Ton-Kilometers Tons-Originated
41.5
21.3
8.5
80 to 85
50 to 55
lo to 15
71,3 140 to 155
The Chinese Communist press has announced that 54 percent of total
freight traffic originates in Manchuria, and on the basis of the
1953 tons-originated figure of 157 million tons, this tabulation
would agree. Since the above is for 1952 and not 1953, however,
the agreement is not close enough to permit full acceptance of
this regional breakdown, which is developed on the basis of loco-
motive allocation. The text of the Japanese report allocates
31 percent of total freight locomotives to the Harbin Railroad
Control Bureau. Since the Bureau originated about 24 percent of
the total volume of freight, however, there would appear to be an
additional point of minor disagreement.
4. Official Announcements of Operating Statistics.
At various times the Chinese Communist press, in an attempt to
propagandize Communist successes in railroad transport has released
figures which, probably unintentionally have disclosed considerable
information. For instance, the present estimate of performance by
Chinese Communist railroads in 1953 is based on the following official
information released from Peiping on 26 January 1954: "In 1953, the
railroad loading plan was fulfilled by 108.3 percent, constituting
an increase of 15.7 percent over 1952. The planned target of total
delivery tonnage was fulfilled by 112.9 percent, or an increase of
20 Lpic; that is, 19.7 percent as compared with that in 1952." 22/
If tons-originated in 1953 are equated to the 19.9 percent increase
of "total delivery tonnage," this would yield a figure for 1953 of
157 million tons of freight originated,* which is a sizable increase
for a rail system judged by some to have been operating under a
strain in 1952. This figure results from a literal interpretation
* Does not include narrow-gauge traffic.
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of the Peiping announcement. There is additional information which
supports a like interpretation which, in eff9ct, results from an
analysis of (a) the above statement that rail loading increased by
15.7 percent over 1952, and (b) a statement made in the same article
that "the net loading capacity of freight wagons was raised by
one ton on average as compared with that in 1952, thereby saving a
value equal to 580,000 revenue wagons* in the whole year."
As concerns the increase in rail loading, it was announced in
another article** that in 1952 the average number of tons loaded
per loaded car was 28.3. On this basis, dividing 131 million tons-
originated in 1952 by 28.3 tons per car would yield 4,628,975 cars
loaded during 1952, or 12,682 cars loaded daily (4,628,975 divided
by 365). Assuming that the increase of 15.7 percent in the rail
loading plan in 1953 refers to daily carloadings, then 1953 total
daily carloadings would be 115.7 percent of 12,682, or 14,673 cars
loaded daily. Consequently, 14,673 cars loaded daily converted to
an annual basis and multiplied by 29.3 tons (28.3 plus 1 ton
improvement for 1953) yields 156,920,398 tons-originated in 1953.
This agrees closely with the postulated 1953 tons-originated figure
of 157,069,000, which is based on a 19.9-percent increase in 1953
traffic over 1952.
In reference to the above statement about 580,000 revenue
wagons saved by increasing the average net load by 1 ton, it can
be shown that tons-originated was in the order of 157 million tons.
Expressing the statement in an algebraic formula where x equals
tons per car, y equals revenue cars, and xy equals tons-originated,
the following is obtained:
(x - 1) (y + 580,000) - xy = 0
xy + 580,000x - y - 580,000 - xy = 0
Solving for y on the basis that x = 29.3 tons would yield:
y = (580,000 x 29.3) - 580,000
y = 16,994,000 - 580,000
y = 16,414,000 revenue-car-days
* From analysis and interpretation of various press reports it has
been determined that a revenue wagon, or car, is equal to a loaded
car-day.
** See Appendix E.
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Converting this to revenue cars per day (16,414,000 divided by
365) yields 44,970 revenue cars in daily operation, which includes
both cars originating on a particular day and loaded cars in transit
on that day. To use the data to obtain tons-originated on the
number of freight car days per day, the revenue cars in daily
operation must be divided by a loaded car turnover rate. Dividing
the announced turnaround factor of 3.09 days (see Appendix D, where
this shown to be loaded car turnover rate) into the calculated
44,970 revenue car days per day yields a daily carloading figure
of 14,553 cars. If, then, 14,553 cars are loaded daily to 29.3
tons per car, a total of 155,637,058 tons of revenue freight would
have been originated in 1953. This again compares well with the
Communist announcement of 157 million tons-originated in 1953.
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APPENDIX B
ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION
The history of the administration and organization of Chinese
Communist rail transport is characterized by an increasing degree
of centralization, reform, and ideological orientation. Since 1949,
rail centralization has continually increased and has now reached
heretofore unknown dimensions. During the same period the structure
of the Ministry of Railroads has undergone frequent changes, neces-
sitated on the one hand by the ever-increasing size of the physical
plant and on the other hand by the increased responsibilities of
rail transport within the enlarging scope of the Chinese economy.
Also, the Chinese concept of Communist economic control require-
ments has penetrated quite significantly into the organizational
structure of the railroads with the establishment of political and
security organizations which have considerable power and autonomy.
1. Centralization.
As presently constituted, all aspects of control, direction,
and responsibility of the rail system and its 620,000 employees
are centralized in the hands of the Minister of Railroads, Teng
Tai-yuan, who is also a member of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party. Assisting the Minister and directly responsible to
him are seven Vice-Ministers. 97/
The Ministry has, like most Chinese Communist economic
ministries, a simple line and staff organizational structure. The
central administration is broken down into a number of functional
bureaus, which perform the typical staff functions of planning and
the like (see Figure 9)0. The line organizations are made up of
14 regional control bureaus. Each of these has subordinate depart-
ments or sections corresponding to the staff functional bureaus
at the ministerial level but responsible directly to the regional
control bureaus. 2.& The effect of such an organization is to
make each regional control bureau responsible for the management
and the economic and operational activity of the territory assigned
to it. Regional control bureaus report directly to the Ministry
* Following p. 54.
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of Railroads. The regional control bureau is thus a completely
independent administrative unit and is the basic management unit
of rail transport. 22/ This organizational structure is typical
of rail organizations, especially in Communist countries.'
2. Changes in Administrative Structure.
During the period of Communist control of the Chinese rail-
roads there have been numerous reorganizations and modifications of
the rail administration. As the functions and areas of responsibil-
ity of various central bureaus and regional bureaus increased, new
bureaus were created to facilitate over-all administration of the
lines. In 1949 the Ministry of Railroads was originally formed
with a total of 15 functional bureaus and regional bureaus. Since
then the number of functional bureaus and regional bureaus has doubled.
Some of these changes, such as the creation of the Chungking Rail-
road Control Bureau, reflect an increase in operational trackage. 100/
Characteristic of the trend toward centralization was the
replacement of the somewhat autonomous Northeast Railroad Bureau
with regional bureaus at Harbin, Tsitsihar, Kirin, and Chin-chou in
May 1952. 101/ The new regional bureaus were made directly respon-
sible to the Ministry. It is believed that this major reorganization
in Manchuria foreshadowed a change in status of the Sino-Soviet-
operated Chinese Ch'ang-ch'un Railroad, which reverted to complete
Chinese control in January 1953. 102/ A further reason for the
reorganization in Manchuria was doubtless to de-emphasize the
importance of this area relative to China proper. A similar
development took place in 1952 in other economic sectQrs in Manchuria.
The centralization of Soviet influence was first noted when
the Soviet Specialist Office was established on the ministerial level
in January 1952. 103/
In view of the continued trend toward centralization and the
ever-expanding pattern of the rail network, it is believed that
administrative reforms will be made periodically to maintain a close
control over the system. Although it is difficult to foresee exact
changes, it is possible that in the future the 14 regional bureaus
will be grouped into 3 or 4 large geographic units under the
Ministry of Railroads in order to increase control over the various
bureaus and to centralize their operations.
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COMMUNIST CHINA
ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF RAILROADS, 1954
MINISTER
OF RAILROADS
SEVEN
VICE-MINISTERS
STAFF
Figure 19 50X1
[Legal Office
Public Security Office
Soviet Specialist Office
International Transportation
Bureau
Electricity Planning Bureau
Repairs Bureau of Locomotives
and Cars
Engineering Bureau of Business
Railroads
Finance and Accounting Bureau
Basic Construction Bureau
I-Five Sub-Bureaus
Material Supply Bureau
Staff Livelihood Supply Bureau
CENTRAL BUREAUS
Planning Bureau
I?Four Sub-Bureaus
LEighteen Survey and
Planning Teams
Train Bureau
Locomotive Bureau
Commercial Bureau
General Bureau of Works
General Bureau of Engineering
for New Lines
Railroad Yard Bureau
Car Bureau
Railroad Research Bureau
Statistical Bureau
Public Safety Bureau
Education Bureau
Sanitation Bureau
Workers Pay Bureau
Design Bureau
Technical Bureau
Personnel Bureau
Political Bureau
25421 4-56
REGIONAL CONTROL
BUREAUS
Harbin
Tsitsihar
Kirin
Chin-chou
Peking
Tientsin
Cheng-chou
Tsinan
Shanghai
Canton
Liuchou
Chungking
T'ai-yuan
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3. Communization of Chinese Railroads.
All key positions in the Ministry of Railroads seem to be
held by Communist Party members. 104/
an important economic function of the
Communist Party is to serve as a propaganda device to stimulate
greater production and efficiency. There is no indication that
Party responsibilities are in conflict with the functional neces-
sities of the railroads, although ideological considerations may
limit the freedom of action and the scope of responsibility of the
operating heads of the several bureaus.
The Chinese Communist experiment should benefit immeasurably
from Soviet experience. Policies and programs can be compared with
Soviet results obtained from like action in similar situations. As
long as the present cooperative relationship obtains between Com-
munist China and the USSR, the administration of the Chinese rail-
roads is aided in that its approach to current problems can be
founded on the practical working experience of the USSR.
4. Structural Organization of the Ministry of Railroads.
the following lines:
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the 14 regional bureaus are set up along 50X1
Executive Office of a Regional Bureau
General Affairs Bureau
Civil Engineering Bureau
Bureau of Engineers
Bureau of Finance
Bureau of Personnel
Bureau of Supplies (has depots at various
points)
Bureau of Public Security
Bureau of Health
Bureau of Education (supervises schools for
both employees and dependents)
Following p. 54, above.
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Bureau of Statistics
Bureau of Capital Construction
Bureau of Electricity
Bureau of Workshop
Bureau of Inspection and Supervision
Bureau of Shipment
Planning Bureau
Bureau of Rolling Stock
Central Supplies Office (supervises cooperative
stores and subbranches)
The Civil Engineering Bureau, the Bureau of Engineers, the
Bureau of Rolling Stock, and the Bureau of Shipment are subdivided
into units of area control. Each subbureau has about 200 km of
rail trackage under its control. Other subbureaus, referred to as
shipping administrations, are located at major stations.
Military transport is handled by a Military Council, not
by the Railroad Administration, and men conscripted from the rail-
road by the military authorities are under a separate Military
Administration. In the Tsinan Railroad Control Bureau there were
30 people in the Military Representative's office. 106/
It should be noted that, in the case of the Tsinan Rail-
road Control Bureau, at least 17 of the 22 subbureau chiefs are
Communist Party members. 107/ Assuming that this proportion is
typical, the administrative chain of command exercised by the
Ministry of Railroads is apparently seconded by a system of Party
control. Because the Minister himself is a prominent member of
the Party organization, Party control and administration on all
levels are effectively centralized.
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APPENDIX C
FREIGHT CAR AND LOCOMOTIVE PARK
In October 1949 the Chinese Communist Ministry of Railroads
reported that there were in China 30,000 freight cars in use and an
additional 9,600 out of service. 108/ It was planned that in 1950
the operable park was to be increased to 39,500 cars. On 8 March
1950, however, it was officially reported that as a result of a
nationwide inventory an additional 10,278 freight cars had been
"found," of which 3,088 were in immediately usable condition. 109/
Although these statements indicate a total freight car park of
49,878 in 1950, the figure is not in itself sufficiently firm to
be taken as a base from which to calculate the current park.
Estimates of the present park are, therefore, based on analyses
of requirements, production, war losses, attrition, imports,
and a projection of the Manchurian car park.
Three methodologies have been developed in an attempt to arrive
at an accurate measure of the car park. The first method, pri-
marily a deductive approach, takes as its point of departure the
performance figures annually announced by the Chinese Communists.
The second method, an inductive approach, is essentially historical
and takes as its point of departure the known freight car park in
1945, qualified by estimated additions and subtractions through
1952.
1. Estimate of Freight Car Requirements.
In Appendix A it was noted that it was possible to obtain
daily carloadings for 1952, 1953, and 1954 -- 12,682, 14,673, and
15,866* carloadings, respectively. Daily carloadings multiplied
by turnaround time (see Appendix D) yield a minimum required car
* (183 million tons 365) 31.6 = 15,866.
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park for 1952, 1953, and 1954 of 48,192,* 58,692,** and 63,464***
cars, respectively. These figures represent the minimum number of
cars which the Chinese would need for the volume of traffic origi-
nated during corresponding years. They do not account for that
part of the total park which would be out of operation because of
repairs, and they do not allow for any reserve park which might
exist.
It has been estimated on the basis of world rail experience
that about 4 percent Of the total freight car park is out of
operation at any one time because of overhauls and repairs. This
figure is applied to the Chinese Communist freight car park,
although it may be high in view of the fact that the US reduced
the bad-order figure to 2.7 percent in 1943 when cars were badly
needed. 110/
Chinese Communist rail literature has occasionally made
reference to the existence of
In November 1951 the Chinese press
published a rather detailed breakdown of "Cars in Operation" and
"Cars Not in Operation." This article 112/ defines "Cars in
Operation" as all cars transporting freight except the following
eight categories of "Cars Not in Operation":
a. Cars reserved for the use of the Ministry of Rail-
roads
b. Cars serving as temporary substitutes for carrying
passengers, mail, baggage, and the like
c. Cars leased to various economic units of the rail-
roads operating on a budget basis and engaged in
the construction or restoration of rail tracks
d. Bureau work cars engaged in the work of the railroad
bureau
e. Storage cars and occupied cars
f. Special assignment cars such as cabooses, rescue and
relief cars, kitchen cars, and the like
12,682 x 3.8 = 48,192.
14,673 x 4.o = 58,692.
15,866 x 4.o = 63,464.
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g. Cars requisitioned by the military for use under its
control
h. Cars under inspection and repair (estimated at 4 percent
of the total park)
If the figure of 10 percent is used for the reserve park in
1952 and an additional 4-percent factor is used to cover that part
of the total park under repair, the total park for that year would
be about 56,037 freight cars.* In 1953, however, with the increase
in freight traffic, it is probable that some elements of the reserve
park were utilized in commercial service to supplement the working
park. Assuming this to be true, the reserve factor could be reduced
during the course of 1953 to 6 percent from the previous year's
10 percent. Allowing for a reserve factor of 6 percent and an
additional 4 percent to account for cars under repair yields a 1953
park figure of 65,213 freight cars.**
The 1954 minimum car requirements figure of 63,464 adjusted
by only 3 percent to reflect an even greater reduction of reserves
and a 4-percent factor to account for cars under repair yields a 1954
park figure of 68,241 freight cars.***
2. Estimate of the 1952 Freight Car Park Based on the Known
1945 Freight Car Park.
The derivation of the estimated 1952 freight car park in
Communist China from the known 1945 freight car park in China proper
and Manchuria is shown in Table 18.****
a. Freight Car Park for 1945.
According to official Chinese Nationalist statistics,
there were 25,848 freight cars in China proper in 1945. No attempt
is made to account for any freight cars which may have been in the
hands of the Communists during this period. Japanese records show
41,984 freight cars in Manchuria in 1945. Totaling these figures
yields a minimum freight car park for 1945 of 67,832 units. The
reported freight car park in China proper and Manchuria in 1934-45
is shown in Table l9MXXX
(12,682 x 3.8) 4- (100% ? 10% - )-i-%) . 56,037.
(14,673 x 4) (100% - 6% - 4%) = 65,213.
(15,866 x 4) 4. (100% - 3% - 4%) = 68,241.
Table 18 follows on p. 60.
Table 19 follows on p. 61.
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Table 18
Derivation of the 1952 Freight Car Park in Communist China
from the 1945 Park in China Proper and Manchuria
Units
1945 Freight Car Park
Minus:
Retirements
War losses
9,496
67,832
Civil War
2,500 to 5,000
Korean War
500 to 1,250
Soviet reparations
6,298
Total losses
18,794 to 22,044
Plus:
Production 1947-52
9,565
Imports
3,945
Total additions
13,510
1952 Freight Car Park
(Minimum loss plus additions)
62,548
(Maximum loss plus additions)
59,298
Mean
60,923
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Table 19
Reported Freight Car Park in China Proper and Manchuria
1934-45
Units
Year
Northeast Are
(Manchuria) 21
North
China Area 12/
Nationalist /
China Proper 21 Total
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
15,179
18,229
20,021
21,974
23,657
26,987
30,056
32,353
35,781
39,309
41,826
41,984
11,154
15,082
16,010
17,152
17,321
18,414
18,709
15,482 sij
15,000 2/
12,000 21
10,000 2/
6,045
6,379
4,493
4,261
2,307
25,848 1/
46,811
52,069
52,111
55,884
57,595
61,984
62,842
67,832 e
a. 113/
b. Japanese-controlled area. 114/
C. 115/
d. 116/
e. Estimated.
f. Does not include totals of Hainan and Taiwan. Includes 18,532 in the North China
Area.
g. 117/The increase of 4,990 cars in 1945 over 1944 is believed to represent
largely the units surrendered to the Nationalists by the Japanese-controlled Central
China Railroad Company (estimated at 3,000 units) and the South China Railroad Com-
pany (estimated at 1,000 units). 118/
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b. Losses since 1945.
(1) Retirement.
From the 67,832 freight cars available in Communist
China in 1945, there have been losses because the retirement of worn-
out cars, seizures by the USSR, and destruction resulting from the
Civil War and the Korean War. Although figures are not available for
the current rate of retirement of rolling stock in China, records of
Japanese rail operations in North China during 1937-45 indicate that
retirements for that 8-year period were about 1 percent per year. 119/
The foregoing table indicates that more than 30 per-
cent of the freight cars in operation in Manchuria and China proper
in 1945 were less than 8 years old. By comparison, in 1951, 31 per-
cent of the freight cars in the US were less than 10 years old.
It is probable that the Chinese Communists have a slightly higher
retirement rate than the 1-percent rate of the North China railroads
in 1937-45. Given the newness of the Chinese freight car park and
the need for cars in Communist China, however, iu is doubtful whether
the retirement rate has risen above 2 percent per year.*
Using a straight-line retirement rate of 2 percent
per year on the 1945 total of 67,832 cars for 1946-52 would indicate
that 9,496 freight cars were retired. This method of calculation
produces a conservative bias in the total park for 1953, since the
rate is applied to some freight cars that were lost to the Chinese
Communists through other causes.
(2) Reparations to the USSR.
In his report to the President of the United States
in July 1946, Edwin W. Pauley estimated that the USSR had removed
some 27,000 freight cars from occupied territory. 121/ No basis for
this estimate was given and no independent evidence has been found
to support it. (-)xi
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0.86 percent per year in 1942 to 2.48 percent per year in 1944. 120/
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Manchurian freight cars have been observed in the
USSR by both German and Japanese prisoners of war since 1945. In
1945, when the Chinese Nationalists were pushing north, the USSR
may have been vitally interested in preventing freight cars in
Manchuria, as well as other industrial resources, from falling into
Nationalist hands. For example, the USSR dismantled numerous plants
and sent them to Soviet territory or to border points removed from
the immediate danger of capture by the Nationalists. When the Chinese
Communists began to launch successful offensives, much of this equip-
ment was returned to Manchuria. The same policy may have held true
for rail equipment.
In all probability the estimate of 15 percent given
above would amply cover all freight cars actually removed from the
railroads of Manchuria by Soviet action and subsequently seen in the
USSR. Based on the 41,984 freight cars in Manchuria in 1945, it is esti-
mated that a total of 6,298 freight cars may have been lost in this way.
(3) Civil War.
No information is available on the number of freight
cars lost in the Chinese Civil War. Few major battles were fought
in concentrated industrial areas where large numbers of freight cars
would have been exposed to heavy damage. Most losses resulting from
military action must have been confined to individual trains or cars
on isolated sidings. In any case, possession, not destruction, would
have been the aim of both sides. Furthermore, freight cars can stand
a great deal of punishment before they become irreparable. It is
therefore estimated that not more than 2,500 to 5,000 freight cars of
the total available in 1945 were permanently lost during the Chinese
Civil War.
(4) Korean War.
There is considerable evidence to indicate that
Chinese Communist freight cars operate on the North Korean rail
system; however, they appear to have operated into and out of Korea
rather than as an integral part of the North Korean system. The extent
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to which freight cars from Communist China have been exposed to
bombings in Korea would depend, therefore, on the quantity of freight
moving into North Korea and on the number of freight cars needed to
handle this traffic.
It is estimated that the Chinese Communist and North
Korean freight requirements during hostilities were 4,018 short tons
per day and Lhat, of this amount, only 2,520 short tons moved into
Korea by rail. 123/ Assuming that this freight was loaded on an
average of only 20 short tons per car
the total requirements at any one time
in North Korea for freight cars from Communist China would have been
703 cars. The estimated requirements for Chinese Communist freight
cars in North Korea, by rail line, in 1952 are shown in Table 20.*
After the level of Chinese Communist involvement in
Korea has been determined, the freight car losses can be estimated on
the basis of World War II experience. During World War II, up to 1944
the French National Railroad's losses of freight cars from military
action and from foreign levies totaled 310,000 cars out of a total pre-
war park of 478,500 cars. 124/ This represents a loss of 64.8 percent.
An Italian publication reports that in 1939, Italy
had 150,637 freight cars, and that by 1945 the number had been
reduced by 60 percent, to 60,637 cars. 125/
Both French and Italian experience indicates that
something over 50 percent of the total number of freight cars hit
were returned to service in a year's time. The freight cars in
North Korea were exposed to more or less constant attack during a
period of 2-1/2 years. Although it is true that these freight cars
were subjected to the highest concentrated bombing effort in history,
it is equally true that the North Korean park was not subjected to
the depredations of an enemy retreating under desperate circumstances
as was the case in France and Italy. In addition, operation of the
Korean railroads was largely confined to hours of darkness, with the
cars concealed during the day to limit the effect of bombings as
much as possible. Hence it is believed that the European 60-percent-
loss factor is applicable to the Korean experience, since conditions
in Europe and in North Korea would have a tendency to equate them-
selves.
* Table 20 follows on p. 65.
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Table 20
Estimated Requirements for Chinese Communist Freight Cars
in North Korea by Rail Line
1952
Rail Line
Distance
(Miles)
Daily Tonnage
South-Bound
(Short Tons)
Daily Car
Requirements
(20 Short Tons
per Car)
Turnaround
Time 51
(Days
Total Car
Requirements
(Units)
Sinuiju to Sinanju
92
900
45
3
135
Sup'ung-dong to Chongju
77
420
21
3
63
Manp'ojin to Kaech'on
186
950
48
7
336
Namyang to Wonsan
406
250
13
13
169
Total
2,520
127
703
a. Turnaround time is the time required for a car to move from the Manchurian border to its
Korean destination, spend 1 night in Korea for unloading purposes, and return to the
Manchurian border.
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On this basis, 703 Chinese Communist freight cars in
North Korea would, during the course of 1 ydar, represent 256,595 days
of car exposure. In France, cars were damaged or destroyed at an
average rate of 850 cars per day -- that is, 0.18 percent of the cars
exposed were destroyed or damaged each day. Applying this rate to
North Korea would indicate that 462 cars were destroyed (256,595 x
0.0018), or about 500 cars per year. Because the European rate is
based on the assumption that all losses were sustained in a 1-year
period -- an assumption known to be untrue -- the above figure of
500 cars would tend to be biased upwards. On the other hand, the
cars lost in North Korea would be replaced from stocks in Communist
China. Hence the Chinese involvement during the period of 1 year
was probably greater than the computed 703-freight-car figure would
indicate. To account for this, it will be assumed that the 500-car
loss represents annual losses and that, for the 2-1/2 year period,
total losses could have been as high as 1,250 freight cars. Although
the resulting range of 500 to 1,250 cars destroyed is open to con-
siderable refinement, the magnitude of the estimate of cars destroyed
will probably remain in the order of the expressed range.
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(2) Imports.
It is known that UNRRA shipped 3,445 freight cars to
China after 1945.
Under trade agreements between Communist China and
the Satellites, rail freight cars could be included under the general
categories of Machinery and Equipment. In the 1952 and 1953 trade
agreements between China and the Satellites, rolling stock was
included in the list of Polish exports, but no quantity was given.
In summary, the following imports of freight cars
into Communist China are estimated for 1945-52:
Origin Units
UNRRA 3,445
USSR 600 to 2,000
Satellites 100 to 200
Total 4,145 to ,6)-i.
The estimate of imports from the USSR may be low, as
it would be easy for Soviet freight cars to move into Communist China
overland and to operate on the railroads for some time without being
seen by foreign observers.
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The freight car park in Manchuria, by type of car, in
1945 is shown in Table 22.*
From this table it appears that approximately 82.7 per-
cent of the freight car park in Manchuria in 1945 was composed of
boxcars and open-top cars. Applying this percentage to the 58,952
minimum-estimate figure yields a minimum total car park estimate of
71,284 for the end of 1954.
The 71,284 estimate is weak. It probably continues to
contain a significant downward bias, however, since the suspected
bias in the 58,952 figure which results from the more frequent
appearance of "better condition" cars is not eliminated in this
exercise, but rather, is proportionally augmented.
Neither the 80,000-car figure nor the 71,000-car figure
arrived at above represents an attempt to estimate the freight car
park. These figures are set forward here merely to show to in what
order of magnitude the 58,952-car figure might be biased downward.
The obvious conclusion to draw from the above is that at the end
of 1954 the Chinese Communists probably possessed not less than
71,000 freight cars and that the actual figure might be as high as
80,000 freight cars.
4. Official Announcements of the Freight Car and Locomotive Park.
The Chinese Communists in their Five Year Plan made the
followin statement: "In the period of the First Five Year Plan ...
ge wilI7 increase the number of large-model locomotives by 550;
* Table 22 follows on p. 73.
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Table 22
Freight Car Park in Manchuria, by Type of Car 2/
1945
Type of Car
Number
Percentage Distribution
Boxcars
Closed boxcars
Livestock cars
Ventilation
Subtotal
Refrigerator cars
Subtotal
8,876
93
92
9,061
21.9
1.1
465
465
Open-top cars
24,280
Mud transportation cars
908
Subtotal
25,188
6o.8
Flat cars
2,564
Subtotal
2,5611W
6.2
Limestone and mineral cars
2,049
Subtotal
2,0)#9
4.9
Tank cars
435
Subtotal
435
1.0
Others (general cars, crop cars,
ballast cars, and so on) 1,673
Subtotal 1,673
Total )4l,)435
a. 132/
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repair and restore to use 136 locomotives. By 1957 the total
number of locomotives will have been increased 16.6 percent as com-
pared with 1952. Increase the number of freight cars by 33,720;
repair and restore to use 805 cars. By 1957, the total number of
freight cars will have been increased 51.6 percent. Increase the
number of passenger cars by 1,437; repair 145 cars; adapt 1,704
easily converted 2reighg cars for passenger use; by 1957 the total
number of passenger cars will have been increased 58.7 percent over
1952." 133/
It was subsequently announced, in September 1955, that
during the first 3 years of the Plan (1953-55) 284 locomotives,
18,800 freight cars, and 1,390 coaches would have been added to the
rolling stock inventories. 134/
On the basis of these official announcements, the
estimated park of locomotives and rolling stock in Communist China
for selected years, 1952-57, is shown in Table 23.*
If it can be assumed that production of rolling stock
during 1955 was at the rate of approximately 110 locomotives, 287
passenger cars, and 6,744 freight cars, then the end-of-1954 park of
the 3 categories would be in the order of 3,420xx locomotives,
6,240xxx passenger cars, and 73,087 xxxx freight cars.
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**
***
3,497
6,420
78,524
- 110 + 33 = 3,420
- 287 + 107 = 6,240
- 6,744 + 1,307 =
73,087
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Table 23
Estimated Park of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in Communist China
Selected Years, 1952-57
Units
Category
Locomotives
Passenger
cars
Freight cars
End-of-
1952 Park
3,313 pi
5,351 2/
65,349 1/
Five Year
Plan
1953-57 Less End-of- End-of-
Production Retirement 1955 Park 1957 Park
550 100 12/ 3,497 E/ 3,697 1/
1,437 321 1/ 6,420 z/ 7,957 LI/
33,720 3,921 ?1/ 78,524 Lc/ 90,830 1/
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g?
h.
3.1.
k.
1.
550 16.6% = 3,313.
Retirements straight line at 1 percent per year for 1953-55.
3,313 -1- 284 ? 100 = 3,497.
3,313 + 550 ? 166 = 3,697.
1,437 + 1,704 -1. 58.7 = 5,351.
Retirements straight line at 2 percent per year for 1953-55.
5,351 + 1,390 ? 321 = 6,420.
5,351 + 1,437 + 1,704 ? 535 = 7,957.
33,720 51.6% = 65,349.
Retirements straight line at 2 percent per year for 1953-55.
65,349 + 18,800 ? 3,921 ? 1,704 = 78,524.
65,349 + 33,720 ? 1,704 ? 6,535 = 90,830.
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APPENDIX D
FREIGHT CAR TURNAROUND TIME
Turnaround time, as a measure of rail efficiency, is defined in
the US as the average time which elapses between one loading of a
freight car and its next loading. The figure serves essentially as
a coefficient of rolling stock utilization and is a major measure of
over-all operating efficiency in a given rail system when considered
in conjunction with changes in average length of haul.
Official Chinese Communist announcements concerning freight car
turnaround time for recent years, the estimated conventional turn-
around time in Communist China, and a comparison with turnaround
time in Manchuria and in the USSR in 1939-54 are shown in Table 24.*
A comparison of Chinese Communist statements concerning "turn-
around time" since 1949 with similar statistics for China proper and
Manchuria for earlier periods and with current experience in the USSR
and East Germany, when related to average length of haul, would
indicate that current Chinese efficiency is remarkably high. Current
Soviet turnaround time is generally greater than that in Communist
China, because of the longer average length of Soviet commodity haul,
which in 1953 was 752 km, compared with 488 km in China. 135/ The
shorter Chinese turnaround time reflects the fact that the Chinese
economy is operating at a more primitive level than that of the USSR.
For example, less-than-carload-lot traffic and consumer goods traffic,
which tend to increase turnaround time, are less important in China
than in the USSR. Moreover, the volume of coal, mineral, and timber
traffic, which constitutes the bulk of Chinese traffic, moves over
considerably shorter distances in China than in the USSR. This
results from the greater degree of coincidence between raw material
and processing sites in China than in the USSR.
Although this tends to substantiate a shorter turnaround time in
Communist China and thereby confirms the magnitude of the announced
Chinese figures, there is information available which suggests that
the announced figures are distorted, possibly as a result of mis-
interpretation. Heretofore, translations of Chinese Communist
* Table 24 follows on p. 78.
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Table 24
Freight Car Turnaround Time in China, Manchuria, and the USSR
1939-54
Days
Year
Estimated
Conventional
Official Announcements Turnaround Time
in China 2/ in Communist China 12.1
Northeast
Area
(Manchuria)
USSR
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
7.89 !/
5.70
3.00
3.68
3.22
2.90
3.09 .,_]1/
3.04 1/
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
4.7
4.1
3.8
4.0
4.0
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
14.45 1./
N.A.
5.60 1/
4.90 L/
3.20 11_/
3.24 1/
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
7.25
7.37
6.92
13.80
12.60
N.A.
10.92
io.o7
9.61
8.68
8.28
7.65
7.26
7.04
6.67 h/
N.A.
a. These figures are considered to be "loaded car turnaround time" and
represent a misnomer on the part of the Chinese Communists.
b. These figures are considered to be representative of turnaround time
as defined in the US.
c. 136/ For all years except 1953.
d. 137/
e. 138/
f. 139/
g. 140/
h. 141/
142/
J. 143/
k. 144/
1. 145/
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material have assumed that the Chinese were using turnaround time in
the same sense as in this country.
the determination of a precise measure of turn-
around time is tantamount not only to evaluating the operating
standards and capability of the Chinese railroad system, but also
to establishing a definitive estimate of freight car park based on
daily carloadings. The problem can be approached from two different
avenues, by attempting to determine the significance of published
figures listed in Table 24 and by reconstituting turnaround time on
the basis of available information concerning its component parts.
Since both methods offer equally valid investigative possibilities,
each is fully developed so that complete exposition can be accorded
this highly controversial factor. Lastly, the Chinese Communist
methods for determining turnaround time are analyzed.
1. Significance of Official Statements Concerning Turnaround
Time.
a. Methods of Computing Turnaround Time.
Since 1950, considerable attention has been given in
Chinese Communist publications to the interpretation of turnaround
time. These articles 146/ are essentially concerned with establishing
a correct method of computing the lowest possible tuTnaround time. But
turnaround time, by definition, is a definite figure. Although there
is more than one way of deriving the figure, all valid methods will
produce the same result if the definition is not varied. The fact that
the various formulas suggested in Chinese publications yield varying
results is an indication of the possibility that the Chinese inter-
pretation of turnaround time is at variance with that of the West.
Essentially all formulas described in the Chinese Com-
munist articles resolve into two distinct approaches to the subject, a
simple formula called the car-count formula and a very involved formula
called the time-count formula. In all instances the articles are con-
cerned only with the computation of turnaround time within regional
bureaus.
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(1) Car-Count Formula.
In all of the Chinese Communist articles the car-
count formula is as follows:
Cars in Operation Turnaround Time
Cars Loaded Plus Loaded Cars Handled
The result is not turnaround time in the accepted sense. Cars in
Operation is considered by the Chinese to consist of all loaded cars
present in the particular regional bureau at 1800 hours of the day,
and is obtained by a physical count. This is divided by all the
cars loaded in the bureau during the past 24 hours, plus all loaded
cars received from adjacent bureaus during the same period of time.
The result of ignoring empty cars present and of adding loaded cars
received to those originated is to inflate the denominator, thereby
producing a turnaround time far less than it ought to be. This
method, which rejects the conventional consideration of empty car
movements, will not produce turnaround time as the term is understood
in most other areas of the world.
Most of these Chinese Communist articles state
explicitly that the car-count formula is designed to obtain the same
result as the time-count formula. Because experience has shown that
such is not always the case, the above series of articles was written
to determine what modifications are necessary in the time-count for-
mula to bring it into agreement with the car-count formula.
(2) Time-Count Formula.
The time-count formula for computing turnaround time
in Communist China is concerned with the summation of the length of
time required by a car at station stops, travel time, and time spent
en route excluding travel time. Although it is similar to the
methodology employed elsewhere in this Appendix to arrive at a turn-
around time of about 4.47 days, there are major differences.
The first term, Station Stopping Time, is the time
spent in initial and final stations for loading and unloading
operations. The Chinese Communists arrive at this as follows:
Cars Loaded + Cars Unloaded - Average Stopping Time per Car
Cars Loaded + Loaded Cars Handled
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Travel Time is the time actually spent en route,
exclusive of Station Stopping Time at points between origin and
destination. The Chinese Communists arrive at this as follows:
Average Turnaround Distance of Loaded Cars + Average Turnaround Distance
of Empty Cars
Traveling Speed
The third and final term, which is the time spent
en route exclusive of travel time, is arrived at as follows:
Average Turnaround Distance of Freight Cars x Average Switching Time
Average Distance Between Classification Yards of Freight Cars
The Average Switching Time of Freight Cars is obtained by averaging the
time required to switch cars in a given station. Not all empty cars
switched are included in the compilation of this figure; however, on
the other hand, all loaded cars passing the station are definitely
included in this average. Unfortunately, the criterion for determining
when an empty car is to be considered switched is not made clear in the
articles.
Summing up the results of these three separate factors
will produce turnaround time, according to the Chinese Communists. In
spite of the confusion existing in the two dissimilar methods) it is
evident that neither will yield a valid turnaround time) since neither
gives due weight to the movement of empty cars. The car-count formula
deals exclusively with loaded cars. The time-count formula considers
some aspects of switching of empty cars and seems to give some con-
sideration to empty car travel time. At most, however, only part of
the empty cars are considered.
It has not been definitely established whether either
of these formulas is used by the Chinese Communist Ministry of Rail-
roads to arrive at a national turnaround time or whether the national
figure is merely an average of turnaround figures reported by the
separate railroad control bureaus. No matter which method is used,
however, the announced national figure of 3.09 days for 1953 would
not be turnaround time as the term is understood in the US.
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b. Announced Turnaround Time Figures.
Considerable light has recently been thrown on this prob-
lem by statements published in the Chinese Communist press. From the
statement that "net loading capacity of freight wagons was raised
by one ton on the average as compared with that in 1952, thereby
saving a value equal to 580,000 revenue wagons in the whole year," 147/
it has been possible to obtain an interpretation of Chinese figures
which suggests strongly that the Chinese are actually referring to a
loaded car turnover time, rather than to the conventional turnaround
time. As such, the loaded car turnover time would exclude empty car
movement and would thereby yield a figure considerably lower than a
corresponding figure for turnaround time. The basis for this inter-
pretation is as follows:
Where x equals average load in tons per car for 1953 and
y equals total revenue cars, the following is obtained:
(x - 1) (y + 580,000) - xy = 0
xy + 580,000x - y - 580,000 - xy = 0
Solving for y on the basis that x equals 29.3 tons,
y = (580,000 x 29.3) - 580,000
y = 16,994,000 - 580,000
y = 16,414,000 revenue-car-days per year
16,414,000 365 = 44,970 revenue-car-days per day
But 44,970 includes both cars originating on a particular day and loaded
cars in transit on that day, and, therefore, when it is sought to use
the data to obtain tons-originated or the number of freight cars loaded
per day, the figure for revenue-car-days per day must be divided by a
loaded car turnover rate. Using the announced turnaround factor of
3.09 days for 1953 and dividing it into the calculated 44,970 revenue-
car-days per day yields a daily carloading figure of 14,553 cars.
This compares well with the estimated 14,680 cars loaded daily
obtained by dividing total tons-originated in 1953 (157 million tons)
by 29.3 tons per car to obtain annual cars loaded and then converting
this figure to daily carloadings. The agreement between these two
figures is well within the margin of rounding error in the statistics
used and strongly suggests that the 3.09 days turnaround time announced
by the Chinese Communists is in fact loaded car turnover time and not
conventional turnaround time. If 3.09 days were actual turnaround time,
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then the total number of loaded cars in daily operation divided by
3.09 would not yield a daily carloading figure. Hence it follows
that either the 3.09-day figure should be accepted as loaded car
turnover time, a perfectly valid measure of operating efficiency,
or that the tons-originated figures for Communist China must be
rejected as being too high.
It has been suggested that 11580,000 revenue cars saved"
should be interpreted as "580,000 operational cars saved" and as such
would include both loaded and empty car savings. An interpretation
ignoring the word "revenue" implies that the 3.09-day divisor is in
effect turnaround time and not loaded car turnover time as viewed
above. Such an interpretation is doubtful. First, if the total
revenue-car-days per year (16,41)-,000) is multiplied by the average
tonnage loaded per car (29.3 tons), a summation of total revenue-ton-
days in a year will result. This equals 480,930,200 revenue-ton-days.
Total revenue-ton-days when divided by tons-originated should yield a
loaded car turnover time and not turnaround time, since only car-
loadings and loaded car movements are considered. In the present
case this would be 3.06 days, which agrees well with the so-called
turnaround time announced by the Chinese Communists as 3.09 days.
Second, when ton-kilometers for 1953 (76.6 billion) are
divided by revenue-ton-days (481 million), the result should yield
daily kilometers per revenue-ton, which in this case would be 159.2
km. Since the average length of loaded haul is 488 km, and a ton of
revenue freight moves 159.2 km per day, the total time required for
movement through the loaded car cycle would be 3.07 days. This
figure agrees so closely with the announced turnaround time of 3.09
days that the weight of available evidence supports the acceptance
of the latter as loaded car turnover time and not as turnaround time.
It is interesting to note that in a more recently pub-
lished article the Chinese Communists stated that by reducing turn-
around time in 1954 they saved an equivalent of 480,000 car-days, and
that with this number of cars about 5 million tons more of goods
could be loaded. 148/ Dividing the 5 million tons by the 48ol000 cars
yields an average carloading of 10.4 tons per car, which is far too
low to be reasonable. By multiplying this 10.4 figure by the loaded
car turnover time of 3.04 days for 1954, however, an average car-
loading of 31.6 tons per car is obtained. Conversely, if total
turnaround time is considered to be as high as 7.5 days, then the
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loaded car turnover time would be 75 percent of 7.5, or approximately
5.6 days. This would yield an average loading per car of 58.2 tons
(10.)-i- x 5.6 days), which is far too high to be considered reasonable.
With the fact established that Chinese Communist announce-
ments of turnaround time are probably referring to loaded car turn-
over time, the problem then becomes one of determining a methodology
whereby the Chinese figure can be inflated to account for the empty
movement of cars and thereby approximate turnaround time as properly
defined. Since there is a rather well-defined ratio existing between
the loaded haul distance (loaded car kilometrage) and the empty haul
distance (empty car kilometrage), it is reasonable to expect that this
relationship will tend to approximate the relationship of loaded car
turnover time to empty car turnover time. It should be noted, however,
that the correlation between the distance relationship on the one hand
and the time relationship on the other will not be perfect. In effect,
the functions involved in empty car turnover kilometrage should be
performed at a faster rate of speed per kilometer than is the case for
loaded cars, since (1) approximately 10 percent of the cars unloaded
in a station are reloaded at the same station, (2) complicated routings
involving numerous classifications en route will not obtain in the case
of empty cars, and (3) the greater part of the time a car spends at
points of origin and/or destination in loading and unloading will
normally be considered as loaded car time. This latter point results
essentially from the terminal time requirements devoted to loading and
unloading operations when the car is actually considered as a loaded
car from the beginning of the loading operation to completion of the
unloading operation.
The actual relationship existing between loaded car haul
(kilometrage) and empty car haul (kilometrage) is believed to be about
3 to 1; that is, 25 percent of total car movement in the complete
turnaround cycle, including both empty and loaded movement, is accounted
for by the empty move. Applying this relationship to the announced
turnaround figure of 3.09 yields a figure of 4.12 days for 1953. In
view of the above discussion on the relationship between turnaround
time and distance, it is felt that the 4.12-day figure would be
expressed more accurately if it were rounded downward to 4 days.
Because there is such a minor difference between loaded car turnover
time for 1953 and for 1954, it is considered prudent to accept the
4-day figure for 1954 as well as for 1953, since both are estimates and
as such will contain some margin of error. The same methodology was
used to obtain true turnaround time estimates for 1950-52.
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It should be noted that a 4-day turnaround time indicates
a speed of movement through the total turnaround cycle of 6.77 km per
hour (650 km over 96 hours), which compares with a similar speed of
movement in the USSR of 6.4 km per hour in 1953 (1,020 km divided by
160 hours). 149/ That Communist China is apparently making a slightly
better showing than the USSR is to be expected, since a greater per-
centage of Chinese traffic consists of bulk freight, and the car
park and transport net are operating under a slightly greater strain
than is the case in the USSR.
2. Estimate of Turnaround Time Based on Time Required to Perform
Its Separate Component Factors.
a. Loading and Unloading Operations.
Under the heading of "General Information About the Trans-
portation of Freight," which appears in the Railway Timetables for
All China, 1 December 1950, 150/ there appears the following state-
ment: tiDemurrage. Four hours is the time allowed the owner of cargo
for loading and for unloading cars." That this is general practice
is confirmed
in 1946-47 the USSR began to introduce in
Manchuria Soviet regulations providing for round-the-clock work at
large stations for both acceptance and release of freight and the
reduction of loading and unloading operations from 6 to 4 hours. 151/
Analysis of Chinese rail statistics for the fiscal year
1 July 1935 to 30 June 1936 indicates that an allocation of 4 hours
for loading and/or unloading operations is consistent with Chinese
Nationalist experience. During this period, statistics show that
the average time spent for the combined loading and unloading
operation was 3.5 hours, and, if demurrage is included, the figure
becomes 4.2 hours. 152/ the
reasonableness of a 4-hour loading and/or unloading period. For
example, as early as 1947 a prisoner of war reported that his unit
was unloading and reloading freight cars at the Sui-fen-ho station
in 4 hours. _153/ The most recent information available on this
the Tsinan -
loading and unloading time for freight
cars is allotted according to the type of freight,with fines for
delays levied on either the shipper or the labor union.
"the increase in the speed of loading was a re-
sult of teamwork on the part of the crews." 154/ A Russian emigre
subject is
P'u-klou line,
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who worked at the Dairen Mechanical Works until March 1952 reported
that a loading time limit of 6 hours was rigidly enforced. 155/ This
higher figure probably results from the fact that much of the material
moved from the plants was carried on flat cars and was bulky freight,
requiring a longer time to load than the usual type of freight.
Although little new freight handling equipment is known
to have been added to the rail system, numerous accounts refer to the
organization of stevedore crews and their availability. The Ministry
of Railroads, in apparent recognition of the importance of freight
handlers in terms of car utilization, has accorded preferential
treatment to workers of this category. 156/
The Chinese Communist press contains many citations
relating to the expeditious handling of freight cargo. The majority
of the cases cited would indicate an abnormally short time involved
in the unloading of cars. For instance, in Tientsin it was reported
in 1950 that the time required for unloading a car of grain had been
reduced from 3 hours to only 4o minutes. 157/
some form of mechanized loading has been installed at certain coal
mines, such as the Chiao-tso mines, where loading time per car has
been reduced from 4 hours 10 minutes per car to 5 minutes per car, 158/
and the P'ing-hsiang mine, where loading time has been reduced from
11 man-hours per car to 1-2/3 man-hours per car. 159/ Photographs of
the ushin coal mine show the loading of side-dump gondola cars with
a power shovel. If this practice is general at the major mines of
Communist China, the over-all effect would be to yield a national
average of less than 4 hours for this operation. For purposes of
further investigation, however, it will be considered that L. hours is
the time required to load or unload a freight car in China.
b. Terminal Delay Time.
If terminal delay time is defined as that period when a
given freight car is in a loading or unloading yard, but not in the
shipper's or consignee's hands, and while it is under the juris-
diction of the railroad and retains its identity as a car rather
than as a part of a train, then total terminal delay time in one
turnaround period would be the sum of the time a car spends in
(1) yard classification, (2) moving from classification yard to
loading point, (3) returning from loading point to classification
yard, (4) classification in originating yard, (5) classification in
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destination terminal, (6) moving from classification yard to unloading
point, (7) returning from unloading point to classification yard, and
(8) final classification before moving as an empty car in a train.
The Chinese Communists, in published articles on the
subject, apparently use the term "stopping time" in referring to
terminal delay time. Analysis of these data yields an estimate of
average stopping time for all freight cars in 1953 of 15 hours.
Because less than 10 percent of all freight cars were reported to be
unloaded and reloaded at the same point in 1950, 160/ however, it is
believed prudent to allow double the stopping time, or an average of
30 hours, in computing the portion of turnaround time absorbed by
station stopping time.
If station stopping time is considered to include all
aspects of terminal delay time as enumerated above, it would average
3.75 hours per operation. This figure is reasonable in that for any
one of these operations, 3.75 hours is adequate time to perform the
move. If these operations are considered from the point of view of
engine and crew availability, however, a somewhat longer period of
time would be consumed in terminal delay time. Specifically, this
means that while any of the eight separate operations could be per-
formed in a relatively short time, yard operations are such that,
under heavy traffic conditions, each yard engine and crew would
specialize in the performance of a specific and limited duty. This
would have the effect of obtaining maximum efficiency from each
crew. That the assignment of jobs to specific crews is current
Chinese Communist practice has been confirmed by a locomotive
engineer who reported on switch engine assignments in the Harbin area
in 1951. 161/
Given job assignments of crews, it would be logical to
assume that each of these separate parts of terminal time would be
performed during the tour of duty of one crew with the following
operation being performed by the succeeding crew. This would then
require 8 hours for each operation, or a total of 64 hours for the
total of 8 moves. Because the loading and unloading time each require
4 hours at a maximum, both loading and unloading time would be included
in this period of 64 hours. Hence the maximum time allocated to ter-
minal delay would equal 64 hours less 8 hours, or 56 hours.
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A terminal delay period of 56 hours ,ould be reduced
substantially, especially in the case of coal, grain, and timber
traffic, where loading and unloading facilities would be available
for the handling of such traffic in entire trains. Because there is
a considerable amount of such traffic, the estimated terminal delay
time of 56 hours should be considered as fixing an upper limit to
the maximum effort.
c. Travel Time.
The third element in the compilation of turnaround time is
the time consumed in moving a car (either loaded or empty) in a train --
that is, that part of total turnaround time when the car loses its
separate identity and becomes part of the train -- and also time spent
in reclassification at stations en route. This would include delay
en route.
The Chinese Communists have given considerable publicity
to crews performing fast over-the-road runs. It is believed, however,
that average runs at a rate of more than 50 km per hour are more the
exception than the rule. Available evidence indicates that the
average travel time between originating and terminating terminals,
which by definition includes over-the-road time as well as time lost
in intermediate terminals and junctions, is about 15 km per hour.
A discussion of turnaround time for short hauls published
for Chinese Communist rail workers states that in the case of hauls
involving less than 30 km, the average turnaround time of cars is
48 hours, but the time during which they are actually moving is only
1.5 to 2 hours, which is barely 4 percent of the turnaround time. 162/
This would yield an average speed of movement between terminals
(excluding intermediate stops) of about 15 to 20 km per hour. It
should be noted that this statement would allocate 46 hours to ter-
minal delay time, which is fairly close to that estimated above.
a maximum estimate of 12 km per hour for the
cars between originating terminals and final
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speed of movement of
destination is reason-
able for 1950 and 1951. In view of the fact that the Minister of
Railroads has reported an annual increase of average freight train
speeds for 1951 and 1952 over the preceding years, 163/ however, it
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is believed that the true rate of travel may have been as high as 15
km per hour during 1953. This increased speed of trains is confirmed
by a Chinese railroad engineer, who states that increased operating
speeds have resulted from reinforcement of roadbeds and replacement
of rails.
Assuming an average travel time of 15 km per hour, a
total time requirement of 43.0 hours would result from the movement
of a car over the total turnaround distance of 650 km (488 km loaded
haul and 162 km empty car haul).
The time requirements computed above for the 3 distinct
aspects of turnaround time yield about 107.0 hours in 1 turnaround
cycle (8 hours loading and unloading plus 56 hours terminal delay
time plus 43 hours travel time). Converted to days, this would equal
4.46 days, which agrees well with the estimated turnaround time of
4.0 days based on a loaded car turnover time of 3.09 days in 1953.
It should be recognized that the methodology used above
to arrive at the 4.46-day figure contains numerous factors and
assumptions which are open to discussion. The exercise is included
in this report, however, to point out the difficulties involved in an
inductive reconstruction of turnaround time and to provide, as far
as possible, an approximation of the magnitude of this figure. The
major difficulty involved in this exercise results from the lack
of precise knowledge concerning the percentage of total turnaround
time allocated to the separate parts of turnaround movement. For
instance, as opposed to the allocation of 40.5 percent of total
time to travel time in the above exercise, it has been reported
elsewhere that 30.5 percent of time was spent in transit in 1952.
Assuming that the 3.04-day figure for 1954 is actually turnaround
time and includes both empty and loaded movement, then, on the basis
of 30.5 percent of time in transit, a total of 22.2 hours would be
required for movement of a car through the entire turnaround cycle
of 650 km. This would yield an average speed of 29.3 km per hour.
On the other hand, if the 3.04 figure is considered as loaded car
turnover time, then the same number of hours would be required for a
loaded car movement of 488 km. This would yield an average speed of
22.0 km per hour, which appears to be more reasonable than the 29.3-
km figure. In the USSR, comparable train speed -- that is, including
stops, but not division stops -- is estimated to be 20.1 km per hour.
If division stops are included, it is believed that travel speed
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would be reduced to about 15 km per hour. Hence it can be shown by
various approaches to this problem that, in spite of the lack of
precision in definitions and terminology, a reasonable estimate of
turnaround time can be obtained, and that for 1953 and 1954 this
figure was about 4 days.
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APPENDIX E
TONS PER FREIGHT CAR
Calculations made on the basis of the traffic statistics reported
by the Chinese Communists would, if accepted at face value, give an
average loading per freight car of 27.5 tons for 1952 and 28.5 tons for
1953, rather than the 28.3- and 29.3-tons figures which have been accepted
on the basis of consistency with available information. Because these
figures are crucial, reasons supporting the 28.3- and 29.3-ton figures,
as opposed to the 27.5- and 28.5-ton figures, are given in detail.
A mathematical analysis of Chinese Communist statements would
indicate that 28.5 tons were loaded per car in 1953. The Communists
stated that tons-originated in 1953 were 119.9 percent of 1952 and
that the rail loading plan for 1953 was 115.7 percent of 1952. This
would indicate that tons per car increased by 3.63 percent. Since
it is officially stated that the average carloading "increased by one
ton," this would imply (if 1 ton equals 3.63 percent of 1 load) that
the load per car in 1952 ws 27.5 tons per car and, therefore, that
in 1953 it was 28.5 tons.
On the other hand, in August 1952 it was officially announced
that "during April of this year L1952J, the average carload of
the National Railways weighed 28,8 tons. This was increased to
30.1 tons in July." 64/ In view of the fact that, during the early
part of 1952, freight transport quotas were not met, thereby forcing
greater activity during the latter half of the year, it would seem
logical that tonnage loadings per car would have increased, or at
least remained high, rather than declined after July. Applying the
statement about increasing the average load per car by 1 ton in 1953
would yield approximately 29.8 tons per car for 1953. In view of the
August 1952 announcement regarding 28.8-ton and 30.1-ton averages in
1952, therefore, the derived figure of 27.5 tons per car seems some-
what low. There is, however, a possible explanation of the discrepancy.
The 1-ton increase mentioned for 1953 is very unlikely to have
been exactly that, but is almost certainly a rounded figure. Under
this assumption it is interesting to note the fluctuations appearing
in the tons-per-car figure for 1952 when the 1-ton figure is varied
slightly, as follows:
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A net load increase of 0.9 ton would yield a load of 24.8 tons.
A net load increase of 1.0 ton would yield a load of 27.5 tons.
A net load increase of 1.1 tons would yield a load of 30.3 tons.
Whereas the figure of 24.8 tons is obviously far too low and that
of 27.5 tons seems a little low in relation to directly quoted loading
figures, the figure of 28.3 tons requires only that the true weight
increase between 1952 and 1953 be 1.03 tons, and certainly this would
have been spoken of by the newspaper as an increase of I ton. Inci-
dentally, to show the likelihood of such an occurrence, the same
article rounds a 19.9-percent increase in tons-originated to 20 per-
cent when discussing the matter. The 28.3-ton figure for 1952 has
therefore been retained on the basis of consistency with available
information, and allowance for the 1-ton increase in 1953 would yield
29.3 tons for that year.
In 1954 the average weight per carload was raised 1.3 tons per
car over that for 1953, according to an article of 18 February 1955 in
a Peiping newspaper. li51 The gain, according to the same article,
"is equivalent to the loading on the average of an additional 6,500
tons in 24 hours." The context of the article immediately preceding
these figures is such that, rather than referring to the national
average, it is possible that the figures refer to the average increase
in loading coal cars. If the 1.3-ton increase is accepted as referring
to coal traffic, this would indicate that coal traffic is in the order
of 56 million tons, which agrees with an earlier Chinese Communist
statement that approximately one-third of the freight originated on
the Chinese railroads is coal. An earlier press release of 6 February
1955 states that the average load per car in 1954 was 2.3 tons greater
than the average for 1953. 166/ This would indicate a 1954 average
loading per loaded car of 31.6 tons. Although it is difficult to
evaluate this figure with the information available, it would appear
that within the context of Chinese announcements, the 2.3-ton gain
for 1954 is the more likely figure.
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