RESISTANCE FACTORS AND SPECIAL FORCS AREAS HUNGARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R002600010004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 183
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2014
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 1, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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RESISTANCE FACTORS
and
SPECIAL FORCES AREAS
HUNGARY (u)
50X1 -HUM
INFORMATION CUT OFF
AUGUST 1957
50X1 -HUM
?sEcRET
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
2.
PART I
RESISTANCE
Resistance Background of the 1956 Revolution
The Revolt of October-November 1956
a. Introduction
b. Organizational Aspects
(1) Territorial Councils
(2) Budapest Councils
(3) Functional and Occupational Councils
(4) Workers' Councils
(5) Indications of Factionalism
Page,
1
5
5
7
9
12
13
17
18
c.
Armed Resistance
19
(1) Budapest
21
(2) Provinces
22
d.
Control of Key Facilities
29
e.
Post-Revolt Resistance
32
3.
Resistance Potential
41
a.
General Characteristics of the 1956 Uprising
41
b.
Peasants
53
c.
Industrial Workers
53
d.
Youth
63
e.
The "Intelligentsia" and Press
67
f.
The Communist Party
71
g.
Non-Communist Parties
77
h.
Church and State
81
i.
Military and Security Forces
88
(1) Security Forces
89
(2) Army
90
j.
Minority Elements
92
(1) Germans
93
(2) Jews
96
(3) Yugoslays
93
(4) Slovaks
93
(5) Gypsies
99
(6) Rumanians
99
(7) Others
100
k.
Cross-Border Hungarian Minorities
100
PART II
GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS AFFECTING RESISTANCE AND SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS
1.
Size and Location
103
2.
Terrain
103
a.
Kis Alfold (Little Plain)
104
b.
Nagy Alfold (Great Plain)
104
c.
by Hills and Mountains
106
d.
Lakes
107
3.
Climate
109
a.
Temperature
109
b.
Precipitation
111
c.
Snowfall and Snow Cover
113
d.
Winds
113
e.
Visibility
113
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4. Natural Vegetation 114
5. Land Utilization 117
6. Population 121
a. Density 121
b. Occupational Composition 123
c. Urban-Rural Composition 123
d. Settlement Pattern 123
(1) Urban Settlement 124
(2) Rural Settlement 124
7. Rural Roads 127
8. Cross-Country Nbvement 127
9. Diseases 131
1. Introduction
2. Security Forces
PAM III
INTERNAL SECURITY FACTORS
a. Security Police
b. Civil Police
c. Border Guard
d. Workers' Guards
e. Army
f. Air Force
g. Soviet Occupation Forces
3. Penal System
PART IV
ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES
133
135
135
137
138
140
141
141
142
143
1. Introduction 149
2. Transportation 150
a. Introduction 150
b. Railroads 152
(1) General 152
(2) Principal Routes 156
c. Highways 165
d. Waterways 169
e. Pipelines 172
3. Minerals 175
a. Coal 175
b. Coke 179
c. Bauxite 180
d. Oil and Gas 184
e. Iron Ore 188
f. Manganese 190
g. Uranium 191
4. Power 195
5. Telecommunications 201
6. Conclusions 205
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1. Introduction
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PART V
SUITABILITY AREA ANALYSIS
2. Geographic Factors
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
Hegyalja Mountains
Cserehat Mountains
Buick Mountains
Matra Mountains
Cserhat Mbuntains
Borszony Mbuntains
g. Pilis Mbuntains and Buda Hills
h. Gerecse and Vertes Mbuntains
i. Bakony Mountains
j. Necsek Mountains
3.,
Resistance and Population Factors
4.
Economic Vulnerability Factors
(Map a)
5.
Partial List of Key Structures
(Map a)
6.
Economic Vulnerability Factors
(Map b)
7.
Partial List of Key Structures
Map
8.
Economic Vulnerability Factors
p c
9.
Partial List of Key Structures
(Make)
FOOTNOTES
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
VL
N.
o.
P.
Q.
R.
S.
T.
....... ? .
MAPS
Resistance During the Revolt of October-November 1956
Historical Boundaries and Cross-Border Hungarians (S)
Terrain Regions (U)
Temperature (U)
209
213
214
215
216
217
218
218
219
220
220
221
223
227
233
241
246
255
257
261
Following page:
(s)
? ?
? ?
Number of Days Below Freezing (U)
Precipitation (U)
Forest Cover (U)
T nd Utilization (U)
Population Density (U)
Urban Settlement (U)
Cross-Country Mbimixent (C)
Major Security Dispositions (S)
Probable locations of Major Concentrations of Forced
Laborers and Political Prisoners (S)
Railroads (U)
Highways (U)
Pipelines and Navigable Waterways (U)
Minerals (U)
Power Plants and Transmission Lines (C)
Teleconnunications (U)
Special Forces Suitability Area and Orientation (S)
Nap al Special Forces Suitability Area
Nap bl Special Forces Suitability Area S
Map cl Special Forces Suitability Area (S)
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11.0
102
107
110
110
111
116
119
121
125
129
142
148
164
168
174
193
199
203
226
239
254
260
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1. Resistance Background of the 1956 Revolution
Throughout most of their history the Hungarian people have been unable
to mount any significant resistance movement against their oppressors,
whether against the Turks during the period from the 16th to the 18th
century, against the Austrian Hapsburgs from the 18th to the 20th century,
or against the heavy-handed Horthy regency from 1920 to 19. The most
noteworthy outburst of resistance during these long centuries was the
abortive revolution of 1848 led. by Lajos Kossuth. During the period
between World Wars I and II the Connunists were the only subversive group
in Hungary, but being an insignificant fraction of the population the
principal accomplishnent of their underground was the setting up of a
skeleton organization and archives for the post-World War II Soviet-
doninated Hungarian regime.1
The following discussion of World War II resistance is excerpted
from the National Intelligence Survey on Hungary :2
After the Germans occupied Hungary in Merch 1944, two
important groups emerged to resist them 1) The Hungarian
Independence Mbvenent
which consisted mostly of influential persons closely iden-
tified with the Horthy regime and whicli therefore had. a
resistance potential far greater than its small metbership
(estimated at about 2,700) would have otherwise warranted;
and 2) The Hungarian Front (Megyar Front--ME), which com-
prised the parliamentary left-opposition to the government
and included Smallholders, Social Democrats, and Radical
Peasants.
The Communists during this wartine resistance were split
into two major factions, one Soviet-sponsored and led by
Matyas Rakosi, the other a so-called "Hungarian Connunist"
movement, led by Jozsef Dudes (Dudes becane a number of the
Smallholders Party after the Liberation and was rumored to
have been arrested in 1946). Both factions were active in
the resistance, but their effectiveness was sharply reduced
by the split in their beliefs as to the proper degree of
closeness to the Soviet Union. The orthodox, Soviet-spon-
sored group joined forces with the MF, While the "Htngarian
Connunists" cooperated with the WM. After the war the
latter group disbanded and While sone of them joined
Rakosi's group, most joined non-Communist political parties..
In addition, three minor groups also participated in
the resistance: 1) the Students' Resistance Movement, the
menbership of which derived primarily from a Protestant
youth group but Which had a one-third orthodox Communist
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representation; 2) the Freedom Mpverent of Hungarian Patriots,
the nenbership of which was a mixture of "Hungarian Communists"
and middle-class elements; and 3) the Union of the Friends of
the U.S.S.R., which was under orthodox Communist domination.
The resistance novenents were a military failure; their
only successes beyond sporadic acts of sabotage were in illegal
propaganda activities. Efforts to organize armed resistance
on a large scale never achieved tangible results. The primary
reason was Horthy's indecisiveness. Though his misgivings
about Hungary's alliance with the Axis constantly grew, he
did not make the final decision to break with it until July
1944, four months after the German occupation. He failed
even to consult with the MEM and MF until too late to do any
good. An orthodox: Connunist-dominated Connittee of liberation,
ostensibly under Smallholder Endre Bajcsi-Zsilinszky (subse-
quently arrested and executed by the Arrow Cross) was belatedly
established to coordinate the activities of all resistance
groups ten days after a pro-German coup undercut Horthy's
proclamation on October 15, 1944 withdrawing Hungary from the
war, but it failed to achieve any significant results. The
failure of Horthy, the nominal head of the resistance, to
pull Hungary at once out of the war signalled also a change
In the Soviet attitude toward the resistance from one of
cooperation to one of indifference; this loss of Soviet sup-
port removed the resistance uovenent's last possibility of
success.
Ftrthernore, the leaders of the main resistance groups
were at least as anti-Marxist as they were anti-Nazi, and
some of them opposed the Conmunists even more then the Germans.
Even though many of them tried to establish a reasonable nodus
vivendi with the Communists, they inevitably becaue targets
for Communist suspicion.
During the post-World War II period, prior to the uprising of October-
November 1956, active resistance of both the guerilla or underground variety
had apparently been notably less in Hungary than in other East European
satellites of the USSR.3 This phenonenon is attributable both to the lack
of a significant resistance noveyent during World War II and the consequent
scarcity of experienced resistance leaders and personnel and to the rela-
tively poor topographical suitability of Hungary for the cover and conceal-
nent factors necessary for guerilla-type activities.
During the post-war period, between 1945 and 1956, there is little
evidence that armed guerilla bands in Hungary endured for any length of
tine and sone of those reported consisted entirely of criminals and army
deserters. Reports of partisan bands in the past have placed them in those
areas where the topography provided sone possibility of cover and concealnent.
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A summary account, presented in a previous Georgetown University study,4
of alleged guerilla-type activities based largely on incouplete and
inadequately authenticated reports and occurring mostly in the period
around 1950 identifies wrong the localities of guerilla operations such
areas as the Bukk, Matra, Borzsony, Bakony, Pills and )ecsek. Mountain
regions, the marshy regions of the Hortobagy River, and the lower course
of the Danube near the Yugoslav border. An incouplete listing in the
sane study of other evidences of active resistance incidents between 1953
and 1956 reveals the occurrence during this period of a number of positive
attacks upon the property, institutions, syubols, or ideals of the regime
by neans of nob action, leaflet distribution, and sabotage, but very little
to suggest extensive and/or highly organized opposition. A similar com-
pilation of arrests and trials of anti-regime elements during the years
1953 to 1956 reveal many regine allegations of organized conspiracy, but
while some traces of actual resistance activities and leaders may be found
therein, much of the content of such trials is probably exaggerated and
geared to the regime's propaganda machine.
Available evidence is inconclusive as to the extent of the post-World
War II clandestine underground movenent in Hungary. The aforenentioned
report on resistance lists a number of such resistance organizations
alleged to have existed during the post-World War II periods, but it
notes that the regiue itself may have sponsored sone of them for provoca-
tive purposes, that no such uoveuents had been reported since around 1954,
and that to all appearances none of the alleged novenents singly or toge-
ther could be construed as signifying a highly organized underground nove-
maent.
Despite the apparent low incidence of active resistance in Hungary
during the post-World War II period, the accumulation of evidence seems
to indicate that passive resistance in that period--absenteeism, job-
hopping, low-quality output, waste, fraud, and sonetimes deliberate
sabotage ?vas more common in Hungary than elsewhere in the satellites.5
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Mbreover the sociological characteristics and traditional values of the
people have marked them as fertile sources of potential resistance.
Hungarian nationalism is anti-Slav, anti-Rumanian, anti-Czedhoslovakian,
anti-Semitic, and anti-Communist. On the positive side it is Christian, pro-
German (as the lesser of two evils), and pro-Western, consisting of a deeply
ingrained sense of the historic role of Hungary as a Christian nation and an
outpost of Western civilization and culture.6 The estdblishnent of Roman
Catholicism as Hungary's national religion in 1000 A.D. oriented not only
religious feeling but also the nation's cultural and political developnent
toward the West and encouraged the Hungarians to regard. the Eastern Slays
as culturally inferior.7 Although many fundamental and largely irreconcil-
able differences remain between Hungarian nentality and German character,
the cultural affinity of the two peoples is based on a common Western heri-
tage. Magyars bear a deep-rooted resentment toward the concept of Slavic
supremacy. Their animosity toward RUnania and Czechoslovakia is an expression
of revisionist ambition?to regain sone of the territories lost to these
countries by the World War I settlement.8 Demands for revision of the Treaty-
of Trianon, by which Hungary lost about 71 per cent of its former territory
(including Croatia and Slovakia) and 63 per cent of its earlier population,
have been a focal point of nationalist agitation ever since it vas signed.9
In contrast with sone of the other satellites, Hungary has no territorial
issues to settle with Gernany.
Because Communism is dianetrically opposed to each element of Hungarian
nationalism its acceptance involves a complete rejection of the latter. That
Hungarians realize this can be presuned in view of their nenory of the short-
lived Bela Kun governnent of 1919 and their current experiences under a Com-
nunist regime. The Sovietization of Hungarian society and culture, the rejec-
tion of Hungarian revisionist ambitions, the disproportionate number of Jews
in high official positions, the savage attempts to collectivize the peasants,
and the persecution of religion are forceful illustrations that Conmunism is
the very antithesis of Hungarian nationalism.10
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Against the background of a limited resistance history in Hungary
during modern tines but, at the sane tine, of a popular mentality teeming
with grievances, the uprising of the Whole nation in October-November 1956
and the rapid formation of military and political organs of resistance
offer inportant lessons about the inherent weakness both physical and
ideological of Communist-dominated countries and about the potential of
an aroused people to turn against its oppressor even in the face of for-
bidding odds.
2. The Revolt of October-November 1956
a. Introduction
As indicated in the foregoing section of this report the puppet,
but at the sane tine unoccupied, status of Hungary during World War II,
as well as certain of the people's political predilections, kept at a
minimum the circumstances -which would have favored the development of an
underground or guerilla novenent. In the post-war years sore resistance
against the Conmunist regine has occurred, but information on these activi-
ties does not permit nore than tentative conclusions. Whatever limited
and local resistance activity took place after World War II is completely
overshadowed by the Hungarian rebellion of October-November 1956. It
provided the only post-:World War II exanple in the Soviet satellite enpire
in which the resistance potential of the population was translated into
organized armed hostility on a national scale and in which the various
segments of the population were given a real opportunity to demonstrate
their true allegiances and their capacities for guerilla warfare. An
examination of these events, which were widely reported to the Western
world, permits conclusions about human and geographical factors which
are of particular interest to Special Forces planning. The validity of
these findings has been highly enhanced by the investigation of the up-
rising by a special comnittee of the United Nations and by the publication
of its findings in May 1957 in a volune called "Report of the Special Com-
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nittee on the Problem of Hungary, "11 which is used extensively throughout
the present study.
Contrary to the official thesis of the Soviet governnent and of the
post-revolutionary Kadar governnent, the upheaval in Hungary from 23 October
to 4 November 1956 was not a counter-revolutionary attenpt by reactionary
forces inside and outside Hungary but rather a spontaneous national uprising
against a decade of totalitarian oppression, particularly against Soviet
domination and a system of control by terror, epitomized by the AVH, which
together were the real constitution of the Communist state. From start to
finish, the uprising, which was led by students, workers, soldiers, and
intellectuals, many of whom were Communists or former Conmunists, bore the
hallmark of continuous inprovisation. The nost publicized political denands
stipulated democratic socialism as the basis for the Hungarian political
structure. Although a broad popular novenent of dissatisfaction had been
taking shape ever since the death of Stalin, the uprising was brought to
a head by chance events, the most definable of which were (1) the successful
defiance of the Kremlin by the Gonulka faction in Poland, the news of which
was largely instrunental in bringing the Hungarian students together in
neetings on 22 October, (2) the truculent and non-concessionary speech of
Erno Gero, First Party Secretary, on the evening of that day, and (3) the
firing of the AVE upon the denonstrators and the subsequent appearance of
Soviet reinforcenents. The political character of the revolution was largely
determined by the Revolutionary and Workers Councils, which sprang up spon-
taneously in dIfferent parts of the country and replaced the collapsing
structure of the Connunist Party. Imre Nagy, a popular liberal Communist,
who, like the country at large, was somewhat taken aback by the pace of
developnents, was persuaded to throw in his lot with the insurgents and
becane head of the new governnent but never really gained the leadership
of the revolution. The popular nature of the uprising, the strongly
democratic content of the people's aspirations, the responsible intentions
of the insurgents, and the determination to be free of Soviet domination
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were evidenced not only in the circumstances surrounding the rise of the
various territorial and functional councils but by such developrents as the
free press and radio, the disbanding of the AVH, the steps taken to give
the workers real control of nationalized industrial undertakings, the
negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the readiness to
use arms against them if they intervened, and the agreenent by the insur-
gents to amalgamate, while maintaining their identity, into a National
Guard for the purposes of maintaining order together with the Army and
Police. An analysis of the Hungarian uprising clearly demonstrates that
the Charge of "counter-revolution" is appropriate not with respect to the
insurgent forces but rather with respect to action of the Soviet Union in
setting up the puppet Kadar government and in suppressing the new politi-
cal arrangements and the new government set up by the will of virtually
the entire Hungarian people.
b. Organizational Aspects
The swift and spontaneous formation of village, town, and county
Revolutionary Councils, which filled the vacuum created in public adminis-
tration by the virtual collapse of the entire Communist-controlled Party
apparatus, and the simultaneous developnent of Workers Councils in fac-
tories, mines, and other industrial enterprises, as well as of councils
in governnent offices, in the Army, and anong students; other youth groups,
and intellectuals, clearly signify, nore perhaps than any other phenonenon
of the uprising, the intense and universal resistance potential of the Hun-
garian people and at the sane time their capacity for the creation of
political and military organs under such circumstances of pressure as
Special Forces will be confronted with in wartine operations. The quick
formation in a matter of a few days, and in sone instances in a matter of
a few hours, of a leadership group which commanded the respect and coopera-
tion of a conmunity or a group and which set up contact with similar
organizations in other parts of the country provides sone assurance that
Special Forces operating in Hungary in tine of war will be able to acconplish
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their primary mission of contacting leading elenents in a community for the
purpose of organizing, training, and coordinating resistance forces.
The determination, popular support, and unity of purpose of these
councils were attested to by the efforts rade during the few days of free-
dom to achieve a national coordination of these initially autononous groups
and by the recognition of, and favorable attitude towards, them by the
central governrent, by the Central Committee of the Party, and by the
22
National Trade Union Council. Since at the outset of the Revolution Mr.
Nagy was not free to exercise the full powers of the premiership, the real
power of the nation lay within the Revolutionary and Workers Councils;
when free to act and seeing the true intent of the nation, he threw in
his lot with the insurgents ?13 Negotiations were carried on between the
government and several leading revolutionary councils once the governnent
becane aware of the strength and significance of these councils, e.g., the
Hungarian National Revolutionary Committee, the Revolutionary Military
Council of the Hungarian Arnly, the Revolutionary Insurgent Forces, the
Revolutionary Comnittee of Hungarian Intellectuals, the Students' Revolu-
tionary Council, the National Council of Free Trade Unions, the Writers'
Union, and representatives of the Workers Councils of Budapest's large
industries.
It may be noted not only that the spontaneous, swift, and unanimous
surge of these councils clearly resulted from a felt need for such a demo-
cratic instrument but also that the Communists in installing a uniform
system of local governmental connittees after World War II had sharpened
the popular awareness of the utility of these political bodies and hence
unintentionally contributed to the success of the organizational aspect
of the uprising. During the uprising these councils were precisely the
organs of public and social activity--both the highest expression and most
articulate mouthpiece of various national and class grievances and ambitions.
The efficiency of the improrptu revolutionary governnent organs during
the brief period between the outbreak of the uprising on 23 October and the
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beginning of the second Soviet intervention on 4 November is testified to
by the conditions which cane to prevail in Budapest, the central stage of
the rebellion. On the eve of the second attack, order was being rapidly
restored in the damaged streets of the capital. Good progress was being
made in the direction of political consolidation and the resunption of
work on nday, 5 November, could be confidently expected. Negotiations
had been conpleted for the formation of a National Guard under General
Kiraly, head of the Revolutionary National Defense Committee (see below),
with a view to ensuring internal security. A sense of confidence had
developed among the people .14 Thus, the energence of Revolutionary and
Workers Councils throughout Hungary was one of the nost characteristic
features of the uprising. It represented the first practical step to
restore order and to reorganize the Hungarian econony on a socialist
basis, but without rigid Party control or the apparatus of terror.15
(1) Territorial Councils:
The origin, activity, and characteristics of the terri-
torial councils in the following cities or counties are referred to in
the aforenentioned report of the Special U.N. Committee on Hungary:
Dunapentele
Miskolc
Debrecen
Gyor
Jas zbereny
Mosonnagyarovar
Tatabagya
Szotbathely
Kaposvar
Pecs
Veszpram
Eger
Nyiregyhaza
Szeged
Szekesfehevar
Szolnok
Zalaegerszeg
Nogrod County
Sonogy County (perhaps identical
with Council at Kaposvar, the
administrative center of this
county)
It is possible that the councils of those cities in the foregoing list
which are county seats were not in all cases one and the sane with the
county councils; yet, while available information is not conclusive on
this point, it is apparent that this list includes most of if not all of
the primary Revolutionary Councils operating during the uprising, except
those operating in Budapest proper and the Transdanubian National Council
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(see below). This is inferable from the fact that each of the above-listed
locations is either a county administrative center or a leading industrial
city, that the various "free radios" transnitted from these cities, and
that most of the significant political developnents in the provinces
during the uprising stemmed fro* one or more of these councils. In addi-
tion, smaller local councils arose every-where, which in certain individual
cases may have yielded influence comparable to those above listed. The
relatively even distribution of these councils throughout the Whole country,
except in its southeast quarter (see Map A), illustrates the nationwide
character of the revolt. At the sane tine it rust be noted that active
resistance against Soviet intervention was not uniformly intense throughout
the country. In general, with the notable exception of Pecs, very little
actual fighting occurred in the southern half of the country--a phenomenon
attributed in the U.N. report largely to the neutralization of the local
Hungarian Army units and the inability of the Revolutionary Councils to
secure the necessary weapons.16
The circumstances surrounding the formation of these councils, as well
as the class participation in them, point up significant resistance poten-
tials in Hungary. In almost all instances the setting up of these councils
was preceded by some altercation between the populace and the AVH. The
councils included representatives of all segments of the population. In
Debrecen, the council had 100 members, of whom 60 per cent were workers,
20 per cent university students, and 20 per cent representatives of the
armed forces. The councils of Gyor and Eger consisted of workers, peasants,
soldiers, and intellectuals, while half of the 28 nenbers of the council of
Jaszbereny were peasants. Revolutionary Councils were fully supported from
the beginning by the armed forces (e.g., Debrecen, Eger, Gyor, Szeged,
Szolnok, Veszpren)1 and by the local police (e.g., Debrecen, Gyor, Moson-
magyarovar, Szolnok, Tatabanya, Veszpren). Sone of the Revolutionary Coun-
cils were set up with the consent of the local committee of the Hungarian
Workers' (Connunist) Party (e.g., Debrecen); many of them had from the
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beginning to the end Connunist nenbers (e.g., Debrecen); others dropped
their Connunist nem:Doers after 1 November (e.g., Pecs). Mbst of them
enjoyed the editorial support of the local organ of the Hungarian Workers'
(Communist) Party. On the other hand, according to the editorial pro-
nouncenent of one of the revolutionary press organs (Hetfoi Hirlap, 29
October 1956), no action was taken against Party organizations which
endorsed the aims of the revolution, which after all were essentially
"socialist and democratic."
Sone of the Revolutionary Councils had radio stations of their own,
which broadcast news and announcenents during the whole period of the
uprising. The nein radio center of the provinces was in Gyor, where
Free Radio Gyor and Free Radio Petofi operated. Another important center
was the radio of the Workers Council of County Borsod in Miskolc.
The demands of the Councils varied sorewhat according to geographi-
cal and political differences, those from the western parts of the
country being more extrema than those of the Councils in the east.
Thus, demonstrators in Gyor put forward demands, which were subsequently
reiterated at the conference of the Transdanubian National Council, for
a formation of a "counter-government" to that of Mr. Nagy, for a request
for military help from the West, and for war with the Soviet Union. The
great majority of the Councils called for innediate cease-fire, the
withdrawal of Soviet troops, and free elections. An analysis of the
demands of the Councils of 12 cities and counties reveals a widespread
insistence on the following actions: complete independence and freedom
for Hungary; a protest to the United Nations against the presence of
Soviet troops and the intervention of the U.N. into the Hungarian
situation; equality with the USSR; recall of the old regime's represen-
tative to the U.N.; withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty; the proclamation
of neutrality; the abolition of the AVH and the creation of a new police;
the establishnent of the National Guard; liberation of political pri-
soners, in particular Cardinal Mindszenty; freedom of speech, press,
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religion, and association; setting up of Workers Councils in factories;
new agrarian policies and, in particular, abolition of compulsory delivery
of produce by the peasants. At the sane time it was reiterated over and
over again in the demands made by the Councils, as well as in the various
mAnifestoes issued by functional groups throughout the period of the
uprising, that no return to the estate system of agriculture or to the
individual private ownership of factories and nines would be tolerated.
The most forward steps taken during the revolution in the direction
of coordinating and subordinating the multiple autonomous revolutionary
councils and in pressing the major demands of the Hungarian people were
those of the TransdanUbian National Council, which claimed to represent
the people of Western Hungary and which appears to have wielded the greatest
political influence of all the Revolutionary Councils.17 It was set up in
Gyor on 30 October 1956 at a conference attended by sone 400 delegates from
the cities and counties of the Transdanubian region as well as by delegates
from the Revolutionary Councils of the eastern counties of Borsod and Bacs-
Eiskun and from the Csepel Workers Council of Budapest. The council, at
first receptive to a proposal that a "counter-government" to that of Imre
Nagy be set up, decided to enter into negotiations with the latter's govern-
ment when it became apparent that be had begun to take action on such
matters as the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the broadening of his
cabinet to include menbers of the non-Communist parties. It is apparent
that the chief significance of this regional council was its ability to
move the Nagy government to act upon sone of the national demands, such as
the declaration of neutrality, its insistence upon the inclusion of an
adequate representation of the freedom fighters in a new government, and
its role in the organization of the military aspects of the uprising, such
as inducing the Ninth Army Division to becone associated with it.
(2) Budapest Councils
Sone of the earliest councils to be set up were in the city
of Budapest itself. These groups, which at an early stage cane together
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with the Workers Councils and set up unified Revolutionary Councils, con-
tained a nixed representation of freedom fighters, political parties,
workers, soldiers, police, students and other intellectuals, small artisans,
and small shopkeepers. These councils like their counterparts in the
provinces took over the tasks of public administration and dealt with the
political and ideological issues of the revolt. General support was
expressed for an independent, socialist, and democratic Hungary.
(3) Functional and Occupational Councils:
Numerous functional and representative councils, largely
limited in extent, however, to the cultural center of the nation?Buda-
pest, were formed during the uprising to give expression to the special
grievances and attitudes of their particular groups and at the sane tine
to perform sone types of activity of general national interest. Many
of these councils played a significant role in armed resistance plans
and activities.
The Students' Revolutionary Council (Egyetemi Forradnimi Diak-
bizottsag) of Greater Budapest attempted to bring together the various
groups of student fighters scattered about Budapest, engaged in leaflet
circulation and in pressing political demands upon the government, and
helped organize the National Guard.
The Free Hungarian Revolutionary Youth Alliance (Szabad ForradAlmi
Magyar Ifjusag Orszagos Tanacsa) was founded on 27 October to include
all revolutionary youth and student organizations. The Students' Revolu-
tionary Council and various other new youth groups became nenbers of this
Alliance.
The Revolutionary Council of Young Workers and Working Youth
(Ifjumunkasok es Fiatal Dolgozok Harcos Szervezete) was intended to
cooperate with student and peasant youth groups and was to help in
strengthening the National Guard.
The Revolutionary National Defense Committee (Forradalmi Honvedelmi
Bizottmany) (abbreviated below as R.N.D.C.) was set up in the early hours
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of 31 October, at a meeting held at the Ministry of Defense, by 250 repre-
sentatives of (a) The Revolutionary Insurgent Forces CFelkelt Forradalmi
Erok); (b) The Revolutionary Military Council of the Hungarian People's
Army (Magyar Nephadsereg Forradalni Tanacsa); (c) The Revolutionary Council
of the National Police Command (Orszagos Rendorkapitanysag Forradalni
Tanacsa); and (he Revolutionary Committee of the Frontier Guards
(Hatarorsegi Forradalmi Bizottnany). The first three groups had been
set up on 30 October and represented young freedom fighters--including
the Hungarian Revolutionary Youth Alliance, soldiers, non-conmissioned
officers, officers, cadets, and staff officers of the arned forces--and
the central authority of the Hungarian National Police. The officers and
soldiers of the Frontier Guards, which since 1949 had operated under the
authority of the AVH, pledged their loyalty on 29 October to the Governnent
of Mr. Nagy, stating that they sincerely agreed with the revolutionary
changes. The invitation to the neeting also sunned. "the leaders of the
Revolutionary Army Committee of the units of the Third Motorized Arny Group,
which have replaced the Soviet troops withdrawing from Budapest." It
inplied that the power of disposition of the armed forces at that date
rested with the Revolutionary Military Council, in which leaders of all
army branches were represented, and not with the Minister of Defense--at
that tine Karoly Janza. Local revolutionary army connittees and military
councils had been set up about 28 October all over the country, in different
units, including the Air Force Commands and the military academies. The
R.N.D.C. was headed by General Bela Kiraly, formerly chief of the training
centers of the Ministry of Defense; Colonel Pal Maleter, Comnander of the
Kilian Barracks; Major-General Gyula Varadi of the Tank Corps; Colonel
Andras Merton of the Zrinyi Academy, and Lt. Colonel Istvan Marian, leader
of the freedom fighters of the Technological University. It adopted a
resolution of eight points which demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from the entire territory of Hungary, the repudiation of the Warsaw Treaty
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after the convocation of a conference of the signatory governnents, and the
occupation of the uranium nines by the Hungarian Army. The R.N.D.C.
approved the dissolution of the AVH, and demanded that former nenbers of
the AVH should not be allowed to join any armed formation or the National
Guard. The Connittee stated that the Soviet troops would be engaged by
the Hungarian armed forces if they did not leave Hungary by 11 December
1956. A few hours before the constitutive neeting of the R.N.D.C. on
31 October, Mr. Nagy, acting on behalf of the Council of Ministers,
"acknowledged and confirmed" the formation of the Preparatory Committee
of the R.N.D.C. 'which was, apparently, at that time already in existence.
Mr. Nagy added that the R.N.D.C., once formally established, would form
the new arned forces, made up of the units of the army, the police, the
revolutionary insurgent forces, and the workers and. youth brigades;
would restore the internal,peace of the country; and would operate
until the new governnent had been forned, after general elections by
secret ballot, and. had. taken office. Thus from 31 October, the R.N.D.C.
becane the suprene directing power of the Hungarian Arny, of other semi-
military formations, and of the freedom fighters. Between 1 and 3
November the Conmittee made several decisions of considerable inmortance
and issued statenents of policy with or without the governnent's formal
blessing. During the day of 31 October, the Connittee proceeded to
establish the Revolutionary Connittee of the Public Security Forces
(Forradalmi Karhatalmi Bizottsag), composed of the army, the police,
and the factory guards, Which was Charged with coordinating the activi-
ties of all security forces and developing further the National Guard
(Nenzetorseg), 'which was to be composed of members of armed formations
of those fighters Who were not members of the army, police, or factory
guards. Gen. Bela Kiraly was appointed Connander-in-Chief of the
National Guard, Which was to enjoy equal status with the regular army
and police.
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From 30 October, Revolutionary Committees were established in most of
the government departnents?the Ministries of Construction, Education, Food,
Foreign Affairs, Internal Trade, Justice, Metallurgy and Machine Industry,
and State Economy. Similar Committees were established in the National
Bank, the Suprene Court, the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, the General
Directorate of the Railways) and the Hungarian Radio. Revolutionary Com-
nittees were also set up in the Hungarian Embassy in Belgrade and in the
Legation in Vienna. In sone cases, the Minister was included on the Com-
mittee, as was Rezso Nyers, Minister of Food; While in others the Committees
removed the Minister from his post, sometimes with high officials serving
under him. According to available information, in the following Ministries
an offices the Revolutionary Committees took over the functions of the
deposed Minister: the Ministries of Construction, Internal Trade, Justice,
Metallurgy and Machine Industry; the National Bank, the Chief Prosecutor's
Office, and the Radio. Thus, in nany departments of Mr. Na 'S government,
the Revolutionary Committees were in complete control after 30 October. In
sone cases there is evidence that the Print Minister endorsed the changes ?18
Among the several connittees set up by or for specific professional
groups was the Revolutionary Connittee of Hungarian Intellectuals (Magyar
Ertelmisegi ForradaImi Bizottsag). It was originally composed of revolu-
tionary organizations of students, writers, journalists, and artists, as
well as representatives of the professors of universities, the People's
Colleges, the Fetofi Club, and of the League of Hungarian Uhiversity and
College Students (KRFESZ), but it was joined later on by the National Com-
mittee of the Hungarian Acadeny of Sciences, as well as by associations of
historians and nedical workers. Transforming itself after 4 November into
the Revolutionary Council of Hungarian Intellectuals (Magyar Ertelnisegi
Forradalmi Tanacs), it was to play a part in events after that date.
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(4) Workers' Councils:
Just as the Revolutionary Councils appeared to be an expres-
sion of popular dissatisfaction with the local councils of the regime, so
the Workers! Councils were an attempt to establish control by the workers
themselves in factories, mines, and similar enterprises and to improve
their conditions of work.19
In view of the paramount importance of the
industrial working class in a Communist country and of their supposedly van-
guard role in the creatioA of a socialist society, the revolutionary Workers!
Councils: which actually transcended purely functional and class signifi-
cance, have a particular importance in any evaluation of the national
resistance potential. Mutual recognition, close cooperation, and over-
lapping membership and responsibility characterized the relationship
between these and the 'Revolutionary Councils. The role of the councils
was recognized without delay by the Trade Unions, the Communist Party,
and the Government. The Workers' Councils! role of putting forth political
and economic demands to the Government, which declined somewhat in impor-
tance after the Revolutionary Councils were established, once more assumed
importance in the first days of November with the increased concentration
of Russian troops on Hungarian soil, and after 4 November it became of
paramount importance. The demands of the Workers! Councils in most
cases resembled those of the Revolutionary Councils, save that they were
accompanied with the threat of strike. The Councils were characterized
by a free democratic election of membership in which few Communists were
included, by the frequent voluntary relinquishment by the former Com-
munist leaders of their posts, the dismissal of the existing managerial
staff of the factory or establishment, especially if they were Communists,
the destruction of the "white card" files formerly held by the plant
personnel officer, and in some instances, even preparatory plans for
the improvement of production methods. The Workers! Councils differed
from the other revolutionary councils throughout the land in that they
were intended to evolve into permanent Councils in charge of the actual
management of the plant; such as those in Yugoslavia. The National Council
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of Trade Unions and the Government itself approved of a reform program which
featured this installation of Workers' Councils as the governing bodies of
enterprise, although they were apparently as much notivated in granting the
concession by the desire to get the workers back to their jobs as by any
great conviction about the justice of the workers' denands. Nevertheless,
the overWhelning support given to these Workers' Councils confirms the
impression that they were anong the most important adhievenents of the Hun-
garian people during their few days of freedom. After the second Soviet
intervention and the return of Communist tyranny to the land, the workers
carried on the resistance through the use of the passive weapon of strike
until January 1957.20
(5) Indications of Factionalism:
During the Revolution attempts were nude to set up central
organizations similar to the Transdanubiaa Council, in order to coordinate
the nunerous councils and committees throughout the country and to assist
the Governnent in re-establishing order and in holding elections. Sone
such bodies were in the process of formation but had. not developed to any
significant extent prior to the destruction of the Revolution by the Soviet
forces.
Inherent in the formation and activities of certain of the incipient
central organizations referred to above was the intent of some portion of
the population to effect a more drastic revolution in Hungary than most of
the programs, nanifestoes, and petitions which have come to the attention
of the Western world seened to envision. Western reporters visiting Gyor
(apparently the unofficial center of the revolution) observed that at least
two revolutionary factions had been found--one favoring the support of the
Nagy national front governnent, the other insisting on the "repudiation of
Communism and all its works."21 Such a radical elenent was apparently to
be found in the above-mentioned Trans danubian Council established at Gyor,
which, however, at one of its conferences voted to reject a proposal that
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an anti-Nagy governnent be set up. Another evidence of this radicalism
was the apparent attempt of Jozsef Dudas, a veteran Connunist Who led
a faction of the World War II Communist underground but Who be cams a
nenber of the Snaliholders Party after the liberation,22 to gain
leadership of the Revolution through the instrunentality of the Hungarian
National Revolutionary Connittee which he set up in Budapest. He claimed
at that tine to be in control of the majority of revolutionary groups,
including civilian arned patrols and former soldiers,23 and issued an
invitation to various national revolutionary organs to attend a national
congress, which however had to be called off because of subsequent
Soviet encirclement of the capital.24 At the second neeting of the
Transdanubian National Council, held on 31 October-1 November 1956,
a delegate of Jozsef Dudas was reported to have proposed once again
the establishnent of a "counter-goverment" within the franework of
the Council, a proposal which was once again rejected.25 On 2 November
Dudes was arrested by the government of Imre Nagy. In January the
Kadar government announced that he had been accorded the death penalty
In a secret hearing, 26 and on 7 May it was announced that three
followers of Jozsef Dudas had been sentenced to death.27 Arrests
in late July and early August, 1957, of persons accused of involve-
nent in "counter-revolutionary" conspiracy against the regine and
identified as ecclesiastical personnel, right-wing politicians, and
former military officers may be further illustrative of the diversity
of political aspirations during the uprising, as well as what seems
to have been a stronger strain of radicalism in the motivation of at
least sone revolutionary elenents than accounts so far available
indicate.
c. Armed Resistance
A complete account of the military and guerilla activity of
the insurgents against the Soviet forces as well as of the nunerous
resistance actions of the populace against the Communist regime?notably
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the AVH--is not presented in this report. On the one laud, information of
such a corprehensive nature is not yet available, and on the other, the
universality of the resistance of the Hungarian people during the uprising
has been sufficiently established to obviate the necessity of advancing
proof of resistance or resistance potential in each region of the country
or with respect to each class of the population.28
The declaration of war
by the Nagy governnent on 4 November against the Soviet invaders as well
as all major actions of the Nagy governnent, which in mast cases nerely
reflected the attitudes and demands of the Revolutionary and Workers'
Councils, were backed by the entire nation. Only nenbers of the AVE and
a small number of former Party officials fought on the Soviet side.29
The types of armed or violent resistance which occurred during the
revolution were 1) vengeful action against the oppressors of the old
order; 2) sporadic ad hoc incidents arising from efforts of insurgents to
take over the reins of public power both on a national and local plane;
and 3) active resistance by individuals or by guerilla-type or semi-
militarized formations against Soviet military power. Of the various
types of overt resistance which occurred during the uprising, the most
highly developed from the military standpoint and the most indicative of
the range and depth of the people's revolt was the armed and violent
reaction against the second Soviet intervention. This phase of the con-
flict illuminates clearly the guerilla-potential of the Hungarian people.
The following discussion of specific regional resistance activity is
intended to provide Special Forces planners with actual exanples of
guerilla-type activities in an area of possible future engagenent.
Although available information is insufficient to present an all-inclu-
sive survey of countrywide resistance during the period of the uprising,
it is apparent that the regions figuring nost prominently in the fighting
have a particular bearing upon the regional suitability of guerilla-type
warfare in Hungary. The tactics and novenents of the insurgents during
the uprising may be projected to similar activities that may in the future
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occur in Hungary. In addition, a brief sunnary of the fighting in Budapest
and of the negotiations with the Soviet forces carried on by the revolu-
tionary organs in that city is necessary to a proper understanding of the
eventual development of guerilla activity in the provinces.
(1) Budapest:
The first violent resistance of the Hungarian people occurred
on 23 October, when the Al/TI opened fire on the crowd around the Radio
Building in Budapest who were awaiting the return of the student delegation
which had entered there to have their demands broadcast. A part of the
infuriated crowd attacked arriving AVE reinforcenents and in this way the
first weapons were acquired. The uprising spread quickly in Budapest as
workers from Csepel, Ujpest, and other working-class districts obtained
arms from friendly soldiers or police or from military barracks and arms
factories. The detested AVHy which had been the chief instrument of
oppression during the preceding years of Communist totalitarian rule,
found itself paralyzed. Its nenbers were forced to seek refuge in various
strongholds, where they were subjected to persistent attack.30 In the
early morning of the 24th Soviet tanks arrived in Budapest from Cegled
and Szekesfehervar and were soon engaged in counter-action.31
For five days, until a cease-fire order of 28 October, a hard-fought
battle ensued in Budapest between the insurgents and Soviet armour assisted
by the AVE. Negotiations between the Government, which were firmly pressed
by the Revolutionary Councils, and Soviet representatives concerning the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Hungary seened to be
successful. The Soviet command conceded the evacuation which, because
of technical difficulties, was to take place gradually, connencing with
the city of Budapest. Subsequently, on 3 November, an agreenent vas
reached for the withdrawal from all of Him ary. The withdrawal from
Budapest, however, coincided with the surrounding by Soviet troops of,
first, Budapest's principal airports and, shortly after, the military
airfields held by the Hungarian Air Force, which had cone under the control
?
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of the revolutionary "Hungarian National Air Command" and. which was on the
whole kept in waiting, except for reconnaissance missions, until neutralized
by Soviet "withdrawal" tactics. During the period of negotiations the
Soviet military command was rapidly moving reinforcements into the country
and along its borders and the strategic rail and. highway routes were being
seized.
The Various mnifestations of Soviet buildup and intended treachery
during the cease-fire period were apparent to different insurgent elements,
sone of which would have engaged the Soviets without further delay; but the
insistence of the Government and certain revolutionary leaders that negotia-
tions be allowed to proceed, the hope-against-hope that the Soviets night
for sone unprecedented reason turn loose one of its Satellites, and the
fearful spectre of Soviet retaliation, all undoubtedly idhibited the respon-
sible leaders from permitting a suicidal attack. When the Soviets intervened
once more in Budapest early on the morning of 4 November, the insurgents in
the city and in its outlying industrial districts were ill-equipped to fight
the unequal battle. The resistance was conducted. by separate groups, each
under its own leadership. The fighting, conducted in several sectors and
strongholds of the metropolitan area, was waged fiercely for several days,
but one by one the various groups were forced to surrender and the last
vestige of organized military activity disappeared on 11 November. By this
date also the insurgent groups in the provinces had been routed from their
strongholds in the towns and only isolated pockets of resistance remained.
(2) Provinces:
During the period of the first Soviet intervention, most of
the available Soviet forces had been despatched to Budapest and fighting in
the provinces was limited to a number of incidents pursuant to the transfer
of power from the Communist bureaucracy to the new Revolutionary and Workers'
Councils. The local Soviet units were concerned rather to avoid conflict
32
with the Hungarian people. Thus units in Gyor, in Hajmasku near Veszprem,
Jaszbereny, and Debrecen stood aloof while revolutionary elements took over
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control of the areas. Contact between Soviet units and local revolutionary
authorities in the provinces often revealed on the part of the former an
understanding of and sometimes even sympathy for the objectives of the
people33--whether genuine or feigned is not certain. The interlude
after the cease-fire was one of watchful waiting for the Revolutionary
Councils in the provinces, during which tine they pressed upon the Govern-
ment, as their primary demand, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the
entire country.' Simultaneous with the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from Budapest, Soviet troops in the provincial centers withdrew from
the towns or, if garrisoned there, to the barracks, giving the impression
that their intervention in Hungary was coning to an end.35 The hope that
the Soviets would comply to this demand was; as indicated above, short-
lived.
Apparently the largest continuous sector more or less controlled by
the rebels at the height of the revolt was the western border area, the
eastern extremity of which was defined roughly by a line proceeding in
southerly direction from Kbmarom in the north, along the northwestern
shore of Lake Balaton, and terminating in the south in the vicinity of
Nagykaniza near the Yugoslav border.36 The chief centers of resistance
in this border area and elsewhere in the country were apparently Vbson-
magyarovar, Sopron, Gyor, Szombathely, Tatabanya, Szekesfehervar, Vesz-
prem, Pecs, Dunapentele, Vac, Miskolc, and Szolnok.
The extent and character of the fighting in the provinces throughout
the revolt was in large measure determined by the activity or inactivity
of local Hungarian Army garrisons. As already indicated, the rank-and-
file of the Army everywhere sympathized with and identified themselves
with the insurgent cause. Although very few units joined the insurgents
intact--since regular organization broke down almost completely?the
participation of small groups and individuals became a common feature
of the fighting. In general; the participation of Army elements depended
largely upon the attitude of the commanders of local garrisons. Since
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many senior officers had declared themselves neutral or against the uprising,
the rank-and-file of their garrisons were unable to assist the insurgents
either through lack of ammunition or through action by the AVH or the Soviet
MVD. Activity in the provinces sufTered--undoubtedly more than in Budapest
itself--from the failure, inability, or lack of opportunity of the military
leaders of the revolution to draw up an over-all plan of defense. Even if
such a plan had been drawn up it was obvious that the Soviet command had
more than sufficient troops in Hungary to make any widespread coordinated
resistance effort impossible. Thus Whether in Budapest or the provinces,
the resistance organizers worked on a local level and with improvised means.
The apparent intention of the Soviet High Command to avoid clashes
Wherever possible is substantiated by the fact that throughout the Whole
of southern Hungary, fromBekescsdba in the east to Ebrmend in the west--
with the notable exception of Pecs--there was no significant fighting during
the revolution. In towns and villages Where no Soviet or Hungarian troops
were stationed, and. where the AVH did. not
to the Revolutionary Councils, no weapons
needed. until the second intervention. In
resist the transference of power
could be secured nor were they
sone towns such as Szeged and
Kecskemet either Soviet intelligence agents or pro-Soviet Hungarian Army
officers took steps to neutralize the local garrisons and thus prevent the
distribution of arms to the insurgents.38 The presence of Soviet troops
at Miskolc and other cities of eastern Hungary, their continuous withdrawal
and buildup movement, and the consequent inability of the insurgents to
formulate resistance plans based either on the city or the countryside
limited the duration of actual fighting in this region during the second
intervention to a shorter period than in such western towns as Pecs, Duna-
pentele, and Vesziprem.39
On the Whole the fiercest fighting during the second intervention,
with the exception of a few clashes in the hills of Nbgrad and Baragya
counties, occurred in the industrial districts of Budapest.40 This
phenomenon was inevitable in light not only of the origin of the rebellion
24
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in Budapest itself but of the very short duration of the affair. The
fighting did, however, last long enough to see the development of guerilla-
type forces Which sought the protection of outlying areas and 'which
utilized guerilla hit-and-run tactics.
The following descriptions, excerpted from the United Nations report
except Where otherwise indicated, of the principal armed resistance actions
having some of the characteristics of guerilla activity provide details of
special significance for Special Forces planning.
At Pecs, the chief city of Baragya county, and an important
center due to its proximity to the uranium mines, nothing of
any military significance occurred between 23 October and 1
November. The AVE did open fire on the first demonstrators,
but during a second demonstration on 1 November, it was forced
to surrender and the Revolutionary Council took over all the
functions previously discharged by Communist Party officials.
A declaration of policy drawn up by the Council demanded as
its first point the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. It also
called for the exploitation of the uranium mines by the Hun-
garian State. On the evening of 1 November, the Soviet offi-
cials of the uranium mines were asked to leave with their
families; they were sent by truck to Szekszard, where sone
Soviet units were stationed. During the next two days, every-
thing vas quiet at Pecs' and the Revolutionary Council went to
work to reorganize the various public services. After 1
November, however, reports regarding the systematic building
up of Soviet troops at Dombovar, sone 25 kms. north of Pecs,
created an atmosphere of anxiety. Before the Russians returned,
the uranium mines were flooded. By the evening of 3 November,
it was obvious that the Soviet troops intended to take military
action against the insurgents. The commander of the Hungarian
forces in Pecs, who had originally agreed to fight in case of
a Soviet attack, decided during the night to disarm his troops.
The Revolutionary Council, in order to avoid the destruction
of the city, resolved to resist in the hilly regions surrounding
Pecs. On the morning of li November, the Soviet troops took
over the city. In the meantime, sone 5,000 volunteers--mostly
miners and students carrying arms and ammunition--joined the
insurgents in the Necsek Mountains, The Soviet troops made
numerous sorties against the positions of the insurgents but,
owing to the mobility of the latter and their lightning
guerrilla tactics, theo?Soviet troops suffered marw casualties
and, for sone three weeks, were unable to subdue the insur-
gents. (Fighting against the Soviets also occurred in the
mining town of Komlo north of Pecs.41) On the 8th, the insur-
gents attacked a convoy and killed the Commander of the Soviet
forces. Day by day, they harassed the Soviet troops by com-
mando raids and, though the insurgents had lost many men, it
was mainly lack of ammunition that forced them to give up the
fight and escape across the border to Yugoslavia.
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The events during the uprising at the inportant industrial
center of Dunapentele are particularly noteworthy because of
the representative character of its population. After the war,
it rapidly developed from a small village into an industrial
city under the flare of Sztaainvaros. Steel foundries: iron
works and chemical industries caused its industrial population
to grow to 28,000 by 1956. It was the most important experi-
ment undertaken by the Party in its industrialization programme
and was considered to be one of the main strongholds of Com-
munism. On 24 October the workers decided to follow the exam-
ple of Budapest. They organized a Revolutionary Council to
represent them and established Workers' Councils in the
various factories. The next day, during a demonstration,
the AVH opened fire on the crowd, killing eight people and
wounding 28. During the next two days, there was more fighting
with the AVH: who were now barricaded in the Amy barracks. On
the 29th, a helicopter landed on the barrack-ground and a Soviet
official with his family, the senior officers of the AVH, and
two senior Hungarian officers were flown away. Shortly after-
wards, a deputation from the barracks declared that the Army
was on the side of the revolution. The following days were
spent in organizing the activities of the Revolutionary Coun-
cil and in the military training of some 800 workers. Radio
"Rakoczi," which was transmitting from Dunapentele after 4
November, was repeatedly heard asking for assistance in weapons
and equiprent. It called on Efe, to pass on these appeals for
outside assistance against the Soviet intervention and also
re-transmitted the appeals of other "free" Hungarian stations.
On the 5th, Radio "Rakoczi" Appealed to the International Red
Cross for nedical supplies. On the 6th, a Russian armored
unit stopped on the outskirts of the town and asked for the
surrender of the insurgents. The commanding officer, with an
AVH interpreter, was escorted into the town and net the leaders
of the Revolutionary Council. It was pointed out to him that
the insurgents were not "fascists" or "capitalist agents" but
principally workers, many of whom had been staunch supporters
of the Communist Party. To convince him of this be was asked
to hear two card-bearing nembers of the Party from the crowd
which was assembled outside. These men explained that they
had been taught to believe that the Soviet Union defended human
rights and was the liberator of the peoples. They declared they
vented now to be free of Soviet intervention and. had denanded
the abolition of the AVH. When the Soviet officer stated that
be had to carry out his orders, the two Conmunist freedom
fighters tore up their Party cards and threw them at his feet.
The Soviet Commander withdrew, stating that be would take no
action against Dunapentele until he received new orders.
Nevertheless, the next day--7 November--the Soviet forces
attacked the town from three directions using a large armored
force, self-propelled guns and tactical air force. The battle
lasted all day, but the freedom fighters held strongly organized
positions and were able to vithstand the onslaught. By the
evening of 8 November, the mrmenition had been exhausted and
most of the fighters were ordered to go into biding. Soue
300 nen with side arm reneged to escape during the night.
They continued armed resistance in the countryside until
11 November when it was decided to disperse, as any further
resistance appeared to be futile. It was reported that during
the fighting in Dunapentele the factories did not suffer as
much as the living quarters of the population, where consider-
able damage was done by bombing. The freedom fighters lost
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240 nen during the fighting; 12 tanks and eight armored cars
of the Soviet forces were destroyed. Witnesses stated before
the U.N. Special Committee that the purpose of the workers'
resistance in Dunapentele was to deronstrate that all Hun-
garians wanted to see their country freed from external
domination. Witnesses were erphatic in pointing out that,
irrespective of creed or party affiliation, the factory
workers, with the officers and nen of the garrison, were
entirely united in their objectives and that throughout the
period 25 October to 8 November no one, except the uenbers
of the AVE, dissented from the policies of the Revolutionary
Council.
In the county of Veszprem? northwest of TAke Balaton,
the Revolutionary Council, having consolidated its position
by 26 October, concerned itself principally with political
and administrative natters as military questions appeared
to be less pressing. There had been no fighting in the
county with Soviet troops during the first intervention
except at Varpalota, where the miners, in attacking the AVH,
had also killed three SoViet political advisers. However,
the VeszpremBevolutionary Council assisted in the formula-
tion of a coordinated policy with the other Transdanubian
provincial councils, for the purpose of creating a military
command to protect Transdembia in case of a second military
intervention. Its first act was to purge from its reuber-
ship four of the five officers who had been originally
elected, on suspicion of naintaining contacts with the
Soviet forces; it elected instead a soldier and the bead
of the County Police, thus setting up, according to the
testimony redeived? a Council which was truly representa-
tive of all sections of the population of the province.
The next three days were devoted to political negotiations
for the resumption of 'work and for the organization of the
National Guard. By Saturday, 3 November, however, the sys-
tematic build-up of the Soviet forces within the county had
becone so apparent that the National Guard, consisting of
students, workers and soldiers, rade hasty preparations in
the city of Veszprem in anticipation of a Soviet attack.
This attack cane at 5 a.m. the next rorning. For two and
a half days the National Guard, besieged in the old city of
Veszprem? fought against greatly superior Soviet forces
which had launched the attack from three directions.42 By
midday of 6 November, the Rnnnnition of the insurgents was
exhausted. About 40 Hungarians and. possibly an equal number
of Russians had. lost their lives. The battle caused consider-
able destruction in the city, including damage to buildings
of historical and artistic significance. Mbst of the insur-
gents were able to escape and attempted to hide their side
erns. However, by the evening Soviet trucks were being
loaded with students seized from their bores and taken to
unknown destinations. According to the evidence, by 1
December none of these students had been returned. At the
end of the battle, it was reported that sone Soviet troops,
in a spirit of revenge, entered the University buildings and
destroyed the chemical equipment in the laboratory.
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At Miskolc, the university and industrial city of northeast
Hungary, military action during the second Soviet intervention
differed in sone respects from that in western Hungary. This
no doubt can be attributed to the presence in the area of Soviet
troops who were moving constantly in and out of the city, since
Miskolc is on one of the arterial roads between Budapest and the
northeastern frontiers. The presence of the Soviet troops
tended to nake it impossible for the insurgents to organize
a resistance plan based on the city itself. This sane problem
confronted the insurgents of other cities in eastern Hungary
and, as there I= no time for organized resistance in the
countryside, arned reaistance in eastern Hungary did not endure
as long as in Pecs, Deapentele and. Veszprem. The passage of
troops through the city in the early morning of Sunday, 4 Novem-
ber, was not unusual, and the attack against the University
buildings, one of the principal centers of the uprising in the
city, was to sone extent a surprise. The students fought for
about one hour with whatever weapons had been given them.
Several students were killed and the Soviet troops also suffered
a number of casualties. The Committee was told that, when the
fighting was over, nany students were seized by the Soviet troops
and taken to an unknown destination. On the other hand, troops
of the National Guard, who were fighting through the day in
Miskolc and the Hejocsaba district, retreated towards the Bukk
mountains. In the city itself fighting vent on until the after-
noon vhen the Revolutionary Council of Borsod County was obliged
to capitulate.
From various sources of infornation, including radio reports
emanating from both the "free" stations within Hungary and from
those coning under the control of the Soviet forces, it is pos-
sible to conclude that the Soviet troops during the night of
3 to 4 November advanced in a forced march from Dunafoldvar and
possibly Baja towards Kaposvar and NagykAnizsa will& were captured
with little or no resistance. From Szonbathely northwards there
was fighting throughout the day of 4 November. Battles took
.place in the north at Gyor, on the Gyor-Sopron road and on the
Gyor-Hegyeshalom road against parachute troops and forces
crossing the Czechoslovakian border possibly through Rajka.
The Hungarian force at GyoF4 reportedly 14,000 strong, was one
of the last to capitulate.45 At Konarom on the Danube, Hungarian
military units with freedom fighters fought throughout the day
against powerful Soviet units attacking from Hungrian territory
and from Czechoslovakia across the Danube bridge." At Tatabanya,
the miners fought with weapons which they had received from the
Army. Tatabanya as reported still in the hands of the rebels
as of 8 Noverber.45 At Szekesfehervar, the Hungarian military
garrison, after breaking through the Soviet encirclenent,
moved to positions in the Vertes mountains, while others pro-
ceeded southwest towards the Balcony mountains. There they
established bases for guerrilla operations against Soviet
troop novenents along the highways connecting Budapest with
western Hungary. The students of the Zrinyi Military Academy
of Budapest and the Budapest armpred brigade fought valiantly
in the Natra mountains against an armored division. The infor-
mation regarding the crossing of the Danube by Soviet troops at
other points east of Komarom is considered unreliable in view
of the fact that for a period of more than 10 days various Hun-
garian units were able to novo from the northeast between the
Buick and Matra mountains across the Danube to the southwestern
chain of the Vertes mountains.
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The fighting around the Danubian military centers of Szolnok,
Kecskemet and Kalocsa is illustrative of the Soviet control exer-
cised over the Hungarian Army. These three garrisons were,
throughout the period of the revolution, under the connand of
pro-Soviet officers. As the strength of the Soviet troops was
increasing from 1 November, the Hungarian garrisons were unable
to assist the local National Guard as other garrisons had been
able to do. At the outbreak of hostilities on 4 November, the
barracks at Szolnok: were surrounded and the Soviet tanks in-
flicted many casualties on the Hungarian troops who were taken
by surprise. At Kecskemet and Kalocsa there was no fighting
in the town, but a number of officers and nen were able to
break through the encirclenent, and for many days fought with$
the freedom fighters in the Danubian plain, inflicting damage
on the Soviet forces and supplies moving on the highways.
According to a press account Major General Bela Kiraly,
one of the military leaders of the revolt, when it becane
evident that Budapest could not be held, led a force of 400
nen and eight tvalks across the Danube to liberty Hill to the
west of Budapest. The tiny force hit at Soviet units as they
cane in to reinforce the garrison in the city. After four
days of attempting to organize guerilla resistance, General
Kiraly and his nen noved to the old castle at Nagy-Kovacsi
about 10 miles west of the capital. For days the general and
his men were pushed from village to village in the Vertes Moun-
tains. They would be given food and shelter by the peasants
only to be discovered within a few hours and forced to flee
again. As the party neared the border, they broke up into
small groups and set out separately* for the frontier.4
Other 16c ities Where inmjrgents offered notable resis-
tance were Vac, 7 Szombathely? SzoInok4.49 Nbsonmagyarovar,50
and Sopron.51
d. Control of Key Facilities
One of the first measures taken by the Soviets to strengthen
their position in Hungary was the unobtrusive seizure of as Tinny air-
fields as possible and the gradual neutralization of airfields where the
Hungarian Air Force was deployed. The following list indicates the
status of Hungarian airfields prior to the preparatory Soviet maneuvers
for the second intervention.
Airfields under Soviet control from the outset of the uprising:
Ferihegy (Budapest)
BudaorsBudapes1
Tokol Budapest
Szentkiralyszabadja (between Veszprem
and TP1cP Balaton)
Kecskermt
Szolnok
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Airfields apparently under revolutionary control prior to the second Soviet
intervention:
Papa
Szekesfehervar
Kaspovar
Kiskunladhaza
Kalocsa
Kunmadaras
?
The airfields controlled by the Soviets gave them, from the beginning of the
uprising, a tight ring of air control imnediately around Budapest itself and
an outer control ring at about a 100-kiloneter depth. Before the second
intervention was underway practically all of the airfields were under Soviet
control, and the Hungarian Air Force was unable to assist the insurgents.
During the last days of October the Soviet troops moving outward from
Budapest and inward from the eastern frontier?purportedly to facilitate the
negotiated withdrawal?seem to have converged at strategic locations along
the main arterial road system in a crescent about 150 kms. from Budapest
stretching from Gyongyos and liatvan in the north on the Budapest-Miskolc
highway, then through Cegled and Szolnok on the Budapest-Debrecen highway,
and Kedskeret on the Budapest-Szeged. highway, to Dunafoldvar which lies on
the western bank of the Denube.52 In TransdAnubia before 31 October, this
military consolidation was not as extensive as in the Danubian plain except
at Szekesfehervar, to which sone of the Budapest troops had been withdrawn.
However, this region too was subsequently benefitted by the rapid buildup,
as indicated by the reported appearance of a fresh unit at Donbovar, 20 kms.
north of Pecs.53 Zahony, the frontier station on the Transcarpathian border,
was the principal entry point of new troops, but, at the sane tine, troops
were deployed along nost of the roads leading into Hungary from the Ukrainian
SSR and Runania as well as from Slovakia?possibly as far east as Esztergom
(north of Budapest) to Rajka (north of Magyarovar)--whence they crossed the
Danube bridge at Komarom on 3 November. The Soviet Army used also the
main railroad line passing through Zahony. They seized the railway stations
at Zahony, Kisvarda, and Nyiregyhaza during 1 and 2 November, and sone armed
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clashes occurred. between Hungarian railway workers and Soviet troops. The
eastern lines were commandeered by the Soviet military command, and from
2 November the Hungarian railways could not operate between Szolnok and
NyiregYhaza.55 Eventually on the main lines the railroads actually had
to be operated by Soviet personnel and the trains were protected against
saboteurs and guerillas by Soviet armed guards. The secondary lines
were apparently in a chaotic state.56
Various media of telecommunications, both fixed wire and radio,
played significant roles in the uprising. The following is a list of
locations of Free Radios known to have operated during the revolution:57
Budapest ("Kossuth")
Budapest ("Roka" )53
Qyor
Qyor ("Petofi")
Miskolc (Radio of Workers' Council of County Borsod)
Szolnok ("Dendanidh")
Debrecen
Dunapentele
Eger
Kaposvar ("Rakoczi"*)
Szeged ("Szedhenyi")
Szombathely
Szekesfehervar ("Vorosmarty")
Nyiregyhaza (?) (Radio of the Workers' Council
of the County of Szabolcs-Szatmar)
Pecs 59
Free stations whose locations have not been definitely established were :60
"Rajk"
"Csokonay" (possibly' at Gyor61)
It is possible that these latter were alternate or popular names for one or
the other of those listed above. In addition, there were amateur and mili-
tary shortwave sets which broadcast at one tire or another during the
fighting ?62 The role of radio communication in the fight of the insurgents
cannot be overenphasized; the "Free Radio" becane one of the primary symbols
of the fight for freedom and its emissions were chayged with drama and
emotion that stirred the conscience of the world. A fight for the control
of the radio transmitter was the key action in several localities. Within
* Transmitting from Dunapentele after 4 November 1956.
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Budapest for instance it may be noted that whatever organized resistance
may have been planned against the second Soviet intervention had as a
whole ceased by eight o'clock on the first morning of the Soviet attack,
that is, shortly after the radio station had been taken over by the Soviet
'troops 63 At the sane time, there are indications that from the standpoint
of accurate and reliable communications within the country the internal
radios had their definite limitations and that in reality much of the
news of events was supplied by radios outside the country. It is not
within the province of this report to assess the highly controversial
question of whether and to what degree Radio Free Europe encouraged the
revolt, either by the language or tone of its broadcasts. For the pur-
poses of Special Forces planning, however, it is inportant to note that
Radio Free Europe, as 'well as other external radios, were looked to by
the insurgent groups in various parts of the country for a running account
of events and hence probably constituted an essential link between regional
activities which were otherwise largely uncoordinated nudh as Radio in the
64
American Sector (BIAS) did in the 1953 uprising in East Germany. On the
whole information is still inadequate to evaluate the tactical importance
of radio to the conduct of guerilla activity during the uprising. By the
evening of 3 November, by 'which time highways and railways were practically
sealed off by the Soviets, communications, according to the United Nations
report, were United to telephone .65 Another report identified the closed
circuit railroad telephone network as one of the nost inportant distributors
of news throughout the country, especially concerning developments in the
66
various cities.
e- Post-Revolt Resistance
In the make of the uprising the administration of the country had
to be taken over by the Soviet military forces for all practical purposes.
No segment of the population shoved that it was prepared to assist the
Soviet-sponsored government except individual nesters of the former AVH,
a few senior officers of the Hungarian Army, and a small number of former
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Communist Party officials. In some provincial centers, where the fighting
had been centered, the Revolutionary Councils 'were permitted to continue
their functions, with certain changes in personnel, under the over-all
supervision of the Soviet Command. In other centers, however, all Revo-
lutionary Committees were abolished by military order.67 Resistance
continued in the form of persistent strikes, deputations 'with demands
that were from the outset unacceptable, passive demonstrations, manifes-
toes, and the intermittent appearance of guerillas. The Soviets took68
over the control of the nerve centers of the country, such as broadcasting
stations, telephone exphanges? road transport, and the principal railway
lines.69
The Soviet Military Command adopted stringent measures--individual
arrests of persons suspected of leadership in the resistance, mess arrests,
and deportations. No accurate figures of the numbers of Hungarian citizens
deported are available, but these probably run into thousands. By January
1957, some of these had been returned to Hungary, but it you'd appear that
a considerable number still remain in the USSR.7? The passive resistance
of the workers, notably in the form of widespread strikes, proved particu-
larly crippling to the efforts of the regime and constituted the people's
main weapon against it.'1
After the installation of Janos Kadar as Prime Minister, the workers,
the peasants, the intellectuals, and the young people continued to speak
through the organizations 'which had spoken for them during the Revolution.
The &Oar regime vas hostile to the recognition of these organizations
as representatives of the people. The gestures of conciliation, the
discussions of enlargement of the government, the seeming concessions
to demands in various fields appear in retrospect as a sparring for time
to grow in strength and to pick off these organizations one by one. The
Workers' Councils, 'which continued to press demands in behalf of the
working class and the nation as a 'whole, gradually saw their paver
broken as a result of arrests of their leaders, the infiltration of
Party members into key posts, the abolition of all Councils above the
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factory level, and the application of capital punidhment to strike activities.
Sharing the burden of carrying on the negotiations with the government?but
to a lesser degree of effectiveness?vas the Writers' Union which received
the backing of journalists, artists, and other leaders of the nation's cul-
tural life; but these efforts proved, vain as the repression prevailed..72
Repressive neasures were also employed against the non-Communist political
parties and their representatives. The Social Democratic Party, which had.
emerged again at the end of October for a few days of independence, was
liquidated by the Communist Party, 'whose spokesman declared its existence
to be a danger to the Hungarian state. The press has regressed to the pre-
revolutionary level. Newspapermen have been officially reminded that the
Minister of the Interior is looking over their shoulder as they write. Yet
the allegiance which the government is able to command from the intellectuals
is so neager that it has had to disband their organizations .73
Legislative and police measures have been strategically employed to
break the resistance of the people. A decree of 8 December abolished the
Revolutionary Committees and Councils. A decree-law dated 14 December pro-
hibited public meetings and parades unless authorized by the police. On
20 December the governuent announced the establishment of a State Information
Office, Which was to exercise supervision over the press and information
services. The arrest of members of the executive conmittee of the Students'
Association, of several young university professors, and of a large number
of journalists and writers was followed by suspension of the activities of
the Writers' Union on 17 January and of the activities of the Journalists'
Association on 19 January. At the end of January, the National Council of
Free Trade Unions net and revoked the decision taken by the Hungarian unions
during the revolutionary period to withdraw from the World Federation of
Trade Unions. On 29 January Kadar declared that under the dictatorship of
the proletariat the right to strike served no useful purpose. A decree-
law of 24 March, made retroactive to 1 October 1956, provided that all
appointments, transfers or dismissals affecting posts of any importance in
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the Roman Catholic Church and the Reformed (Calvinist) and Evangelical
(Lutheran) Churches, as 'well as those concerning dignitaries of the
Jewish faith, would be subject to approval by the Praesidium. On 6
February a decree-law was issued which increased the penalties for
encouraging or assisting persons atteppting to cross the frontier illegally.
Persons failing to inform the authorities of such offenses were themselves
made liable to ipprisonment for terms of as nudh as two years.
After the second Soviet intervention and the rapid crushing of the
primary strongholds of the insurgents in the larger Hungarian towns, the
opposition of the Hungarian people took the form of passive resistance
spearheaded by the workers under the direction of the Workers' Councils,
and of guerilla warfare conducted primarily in the mountainous regions.
In the larger town and industrial areas numerous clashes continued to
occur between the populace, Who retained nagy of the arms seized during
the revolt, and the police forces of the Kadar regime backed up by
Soviet troops. (According to a Kadar government spokesman, about 20,000
arms got into the hands of unwarranted persons in Borsod County during
the revolt.74) The peak of this type of opposition occurred in connec-
tion with the intensification during the first part of December of the
general strike 'which the Workers' Councils used as their main weapon
in conducting negotiations with the 'Cedar goverament. During this
period clashes took place in Budapest itself and in other towns through-
out the country?notably in the industrial or mining towns of Pecs,
Tatabanya? SalgotarjanAeckescaba, Nagyarovar, and Miskolc and its
adjacent Borsod industrial area.75 At this juncture the government,
in a final move to wipe out the resistance, decreed the dissolution
of regional Workers' Councils, the imposition of nartial law, and the
summary execution of persons found possessing veapons.76 Although as
late as mid-December the Workers' Councils and insurgents were reported
to be in control in many towns and villages outside the larger provincial
cities77 and although sone isolated, if serious, clashes notably in
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Budapest occurred in early 1957,78 armed resistance of the workers and towns-
people was largely broken by the first of the year.
Because of the constriction of communications channels by the Khdar
regime the true extent of post-revolt aried guerilla activity in the moun-
tains and countryside cannot be stated with any certainty, but the piecing
together of bits of information reveals that this type of opposition continued
to be a serious problem for the regime for several weeks after the in
fighting was ended and there are indications that guerilla remnants were
bolding out in the hills well into 1957. At the time of the breakup of the
overt armed resistance forces by the heavy onslaught of Soviet troops it vas
reported that many of the rebels, who had withdrawn to the mountains, notably
the Bakony forests and the area around Miskolc, and to the swans between
the Danube and Drava Rivers near the Yugoslav frontier, hoped to mage
guerilla warfare from these vantage points .79 Available reports indicate
that the guerillas operated in most of the mountainous areas of Hungary
throughout November, with some remaining active until almost the end of
December. It is apparent from press reports that the most significant rebel
groups mere located in the Buick Mountains, adjacent to the industrial town of
Miskolc, the Bakony Mountains north of Take Balaton, and in the Mecsek Moun-
tains north of the mining town of Pecs.80 Press notices reported partisan
control around 20 November of the territory north of a line extending from
Vac, through Hatvan, Gyongyos, and north of Miskolc to the Czechoslovak border--
an area which takes in the Borzsony and Nhtra Mountains ;81 battling around
the 28th of November between Soviet troops and some 1500 students of Saros-
patak College in the Hegyalja forest in the extreme north44st of the country
near the Soviet border;82 the straddling around December by rebel forces
of the Hungarian-Rumanian border near 0radea,83 and the encirclement by
Soviet troops around 11 December of freedom fighters in the hills at HarmaSha-
tarhegy about 20 miles northwest of Budapest--84presumably in the Pilis
Nbuntains.
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Individual and largely unrelated bits of information may be included
here to indicate the type of guerilla activity that has occurred. Resis-
tance groups issued leaflets in November protesting deportations to the
USSR.85 Freedom fighters, immediately after the uprising, engaged in
liberating, usually after heavy fighting, intended deportees to the
Soviet Union from freight cars en route to the eastern frontier.86
According to an official government announcement of 8 June 1957, a
former captain of the police of County Heves and four accomplices mere
arrested and charged with planning to carry large quantities of arms and
ammanition after 4 November with a view to organizing resistance against
Soviet troops in the Bukk Mountains.87 One report, dated December 1956,
indicated the survival of some 500 partisans in the Bakony Mountains
and an unspecified number in the Pills Mountains, including, according
to unconfirmed information, a battalion of Soviet soldiers.88 During
demonstrations and fighting in Miskolc on December 11 and 12, 1956,
partisans were reported on the Avas H1li59 which overlooks the town
and which is on the eastern fringe of the Bak Mountain range. The
future compilation of detailed regional reports will undoubtedly show
that such guerilla remnants engaged in hit-and-run and sabotage activi-
ties were widespread during the first couple of months after the revolu-
tion.
As of Mhrdh 1957 resistance groups mere reportedly still in existence
in mountainous areas of the countryside but appeared to be dispersing
under the attack of Soviet troops. Most of the partisans Mho evaded a
general roundup in the Pills Mountain area in mid-February joined the
Csepel and Pecs movements (see below) as liaison men, although a group
of 300 or 400?including some students with a small number of armored
vehicles?remained in the area. It allegedly still had contact 'with a
Vertes Mountain group which 'was gradually being forced by supply shortages
to dissolve.%)
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According to a summary of resistance activities dated March 1957 an
underground movement, apparently organized on a national basis and centered
among the workers on Csepel Island, the miners in Pecs, and military per-
sonnel in Debrecen had been in the process of formation since December 1956.
These three groups, organized into small cells, were apparently in regular
communication. The underground's first objective after completing establish-
int of a comrinnications network was the organization of strikes to exercise
moral and economic pressure on the Kadar government. It was reported that
the Budapest Central Workers' Council, dissolved by the regine in early
December, had been reorganized and expanded underground and that it had
facilities for publication of a covert paper, a radio transmitter for use
under emergency conditions, and a stock of arms. In the period, prior to
15 Mardh, the underground centers were reported to be extending their com-
munications system to include less well-organized university and army groups,
at a tine When the regime was moving against alleged "armed revolutionaries."
Aside from the organized movement, uncoordinated underground activity repor-
tedly was in existence around Budapest, harassing Hungarian police patrols
and Soviet barracks in an attempt to provoke Soviet fire.91
It is quite likely that the regime is still troubled by organized
resistance activities and, in consideration of the opportunities afforded
by the revolution for conspiratorial organization and for the acquisition
of arms, will continue to be for sone time to come. In a speech on February
3, 1957, Kadar, warning against an outbreak of a new rebellion in March,
said that rebel activity was proceeding dangerously on two fronts, the
villages and the sdhools.92 He did not male it clear whether active resis-
tance was meant but it was apparent that the rural areas were considered
extremely hostile to the regime.
With the passing months of 1957 the regine accelerated its pace of
reversing the political gain of the revolution and of liquidating the
insurgent leaders. The end of the period of deceitful negotiation and of
lip-service to the class and institutional adhievenents of the revolution
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was clearly signaled by the government's manifesto of January 6, 1957,
enunciating the re-installation of the Communist Party as the leading
force in the state and the intention to use iron discipline to effect
conformity to its decisions. This was followed by a national roundup
of revolutionary elements from all classes of society, notably students
and intellectuals. Other indications of reaction which appeared in early
February included the re-introduction of Russian as a compulsory language
in the schools, the gradual repudiation of the promise to restore religious
instruction, the replacement of the wage system in industry with the old
piece-work system, the installation of armed factory guards to maintain
"working discipline," and the apparent invitation to the Party followers
of Rakosi to join the new Communist Party.93 Further wholesale arrests
were reported during mid-March.94 In the latter part of March the govern
nent issued an order banishing "dangerous citizens" and placing them
under police supervision; those banished could choose their new resi-
dence, except places specified in the warrant of expulsion, and had. to
move there within 15 days.95 At the end of May a new wave of arrests
was reported underway.96 Unofficial sources have indicated that as of
the end of May 1957 the number of Hungarians in prison, excluding those
in concentration camps, was approximately 22,000 and the number of execu-
tions more thnn 300.97
The latest manifestation of the drive prior to the termination of
this report was a wave of arrests, the victims of which Gyorgy rosan,
Minister of State, identified as "those in whom foreign supporters of
our counter-revolution put their hopes."98 This drive, the magnitude
of which was estimated to vary between 1500 to 10,000 arrestees, was
directed not only against persons believed to have had sone connection
with the uprising but also against persons with known anti-regime back-
grounds or inclinations. Hungarian police claimed to have smadhed 40
groups accused of espionage and subversion. One group allegedly included
several former big landlords and factory owners, who allegedly plotted
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with Cardinal Mindszenty restore capitalism to Hungary.99 Successive
arrests within a period of a few days of groups of Catholic c1ergymen,1W
of leading tenbers of suppressed political parties,101 and of a number of
officers of Hungary's pro-German arny of World War 11,1?2 strongly argue
that the regime is going beyond the actual participants in the 1956 uprising
and striking at the persons Who are sythols of anti-Colmnist aims. At
the save time the possibility cannot be dismissed that some element of
truth inheres in the Kadar government's charges and that the leaders of
these suppressed and persecuted groups did actually seize the opportunity
afforded by the uprising to conspire at least towards the rehabilitation
of the forces or institutions whidh they represent and perhaps towards the
re-establishment of the old order. Certainly the groups affected by the
arrests were among the princioal targets of the regime When it first took
over after World War II.
Thus at mid-1957 and the cut-off data of this report the Khdar regime
was still engaged in a punitive drive against the participants in the 1956
uprising and was apparently taking advantage of the suppression to strike
at its long-standing institutional and class antagonists. An evaluation
of the regime's persecution of its traditional opponents, as well as the
pinpointing of future localized resistance activities, will enhance the
understanding of the resistance potential among the various classes of the
population and of their degrees of adaptability to the requirements of
Special Forces activities. It is nnlikely, however, that anything in the
near future will provide as clear an insight into the resistance attitudes
and capabilities of the Hungarian people as that which can be derived from
the uprising of 1956 and its immediate aftermath.
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16
HUNGARY
MAP A
RESISTANCE DURING THE REVOLT OF
OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1956 (S)
Principal revolutionary committees
Major resistance centers during revolt
Retreat to the mountains after revolt
General area of guerilla bands after revolt
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3. Resistance Potential
a. General Characteristics of the 1956 Uprising
Perhaps the most important lesson of the Revolt is that the
enslaved, peoples of the Soviet empire suffer no illusions about the nature
of Communist totalitarianism, that they are quite specific about their
grievances against it, and will not support it in an eventual showdown.
Their resistance is ready and waiting; it does not have to be built up.
The most widespread and. unanimous demand of the Hungarian people as a
whole and of the various revolutionary comadttees and. petitions was the
withdrawal of Soviet troops, not necessarily because the latter 'were
hated on personal ground but because they were the gyMbol of Soviet
domination and exploitation of a decade's duration. The rapid develop-
ment of the ten-day revolt shoved beyond a doubt that the Communist regime
and the totalitarian Communist system in Hungary and in all probability
in the other satellite countries cannot survive except 'with the backing
of Soviet force. At the sane tine any assessment of the readiness, of
the people to tura upon the regime must take into account the all-per-
vading fear of denunciation and retaliation which has always been one
of Communism's most potent and deliberate weapons?precisely the weapon
of terror?and which only a few short months after the uninhibited
actions of the uprising has once more gripped the popular spirit.103
The uprising, which lasted only a few days and hence lent itself
to practically no opportunity for nation-vide resistance organization,
is nonetheless instructive as to the spontaneity and speed 'with 'which
the 'population can be marshalled for resistance purposes. Despite the
fact that the revolutionary leaders 'were unable ?and to sone extent
unwilling, in order not to provoke the Soviets--to draw up any concerted
plan of action, such phenomena as the formation of a National Guard, the
imparting of military training to sone vorkers,104 and particularly the
successful guerilla tactics carried on in the mountains, demonstrate
a high adaptability to the requirements of popular defense. While the
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success of such military ventures must in important pleasure be attributed
to the help and experience derived from Army deserters, it is a feature
Of the revolt that the insurgents generally mistrusted the regular military
organs of command and preferred to keep the command in civilian hands.105
Although unanimity and a widespread spirit of generous cooperation
energed as the most notable characteristic of the national conduct during
the revolution, certain phenomena of it, although difficult to interpret
with the still limited intelligence available at the coppletion date of
this report, indicate some diversity of opinion and objectives among the
various participating elements of the population. Many revolutionary coun-
cils showed a narked distrust of the governuent of Imre Nagy, largely no
doubt because of its slow development of a firm policy but conceivably too
because of its Communist, although national) character. A sindlar distrust
of the military establishment was indicated by the insistence of individual
insurgent groups on reporting to and receiving instructions directly from
the trusted Minister of Defense of the revolutionary government.i06 Perhaps
the most significant indication of diversity in the development of the revolu-
tion was the extreue1y radical demands initially made by sone elements of the
Transdanubian National Council situated at Gyor, nauely that the Nagy govern-
pent be ousted, that an appeal be made to the Vest for military help, and
that war be declared on the USSR. A study of the political aspects of the
revolt suggests that Gyor, one of the leading centers of the revolt, was one
of the pore radical centers of activity.107
In contrast, one report alleges
that the 2500 inhabitants of the village of Hernad, despite their knowledge-
ability of events derived from Radio Free Europe and Radio Kossuth, made no
atteppt to participate in the revolution, retaining their Communist council
and contributing practically nothing When the rebels tried to collect food
supplies.108 Several scattered and seemingly insignificant notes of discor-
dance during the course of the uprising lead to the conclusion that regional
population diversity remains one of the most important factors in Special
Forces operational planning.
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While the uprising shoved the demands of the people to be based on
single principles of justice and freedom, it was made very evident in
the demands of the various groups that such economic and institutional
gains as land reform, the public ownership of mines, factories, and
neans of production, and the organizations created for the working class
will not be surrendered in favor of a return to the old order. Leaders
of the revolution seem also to have closed the door on the return of
emigre political forces, at least as far as their re-accession to
political power is concerned. Ferenc Nagy, a leading peasant leader
in the pre-Coununist period and one of the most prominent figures in
the Hungarian emigration, atteppted to contact the resistance forces
at the frontier but vas ordered to leave 'by the Austrian government.1?9
Sone 600 young Hungarian emigres from Austria, Germany, France, and
Belgium 'were reported to have cone to Vienna during the uprising with
the intention of joining the rebels but to have been denied entry into
Hungary.110
That there is wide popular feeling in favor of socialistic predilec-
tions is clearly demonstrated by the articulate expression of them
throughout the revolutionary period and during the subsequent uonths
of the Kadar regime's stalling tactics. Thus at neetings with Kadar
after the revolution workers' councils, still pressing revolutionary
demands, made clear that they adhered strictly to socialism and the
social ownership of the neans of production)-- To What extent these
expressions advanced by those seguents of the population Which have
the greatest access to the nedia of public opinion and Whose leadership
has developed during the Communist decade in a milieu of socialist form
and symbols, actually represent the convictions of the majority of the
people or to What extent they would prevail in a free society and
economy cannot be determined at this tine. Whether the actual exer-
cise of individual initiative and the enjoynent of individually-earned
coupensation would erode the practice of socialism is also a matter of
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question. The revolutionary government conposed of Communists, Social
Democrats, Independent Smilholders, and the Petofi (former National
Peasant) Party agreed to retain from Communist achievements everything
Which could be used in a free, denocratic, and socialist country and
specifically that the reforms affecting ownership of the land and industrial
undertakings would not be disturbed.; but even during the short life of the
coalition disagreenent on sone issues were noted between the Socialists
and the peasant parties.112
Specific information about class participation in the armed aspect
of the uprising is very limited and relates mostly to the fighting in Buda-
pest during the first phase of hostilities against the Soviet occupier.
It is quite probable, however, that greater detail about this aspect of
the uprising would only confirm the general agreement of witnesses to the
episode that people of all ages and occupations showed remarkable unity
of purpose during the combat.113 The brunt of the fighting in Budapest
was borne by the younger segnent of the population, although there were
many instances of participation by middle-aged or elderly people.114 The
workers provided the numerical majority of the freedom fighters but the
contribution of the students to the fighting vas also in the first order
of importance.115 According to the testimony of a limited number of
escapees to the West Who had, been deported to the USSR innediately after
the uprising and subsequently returned to Hungary, the majority of the
deportees were soldiers and freedom fighters, mostly young workers and
students 116
E'en yo/Ing- 'boys participated in the fighting and readily
learned to make effective use of the rifles which cane into their posses-
sion.117 The peasants lent aid and assistance by supplying the fighters
in Budapest at little or no cot.12B Witnesses of the fighting at Duna-
pentele observed. how the factory workers) with the Hungarian officers and
nen of the local garrison, were entirely united, irrespective of party or
religious affiliation.119
One of the very few reports on the specific role
of minorities during the revolution refersto the aid sent to the fighters
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of Budapest by the Swabians (ethnic Germans) living in the neighborhood
of the city. 120 The ordinary police sympathized with the insurgents,
giving them weapons or fighting at their side. Certain units of the
Hungarian Army fought as such on the side of the insurgents,' and
there was no single instance on record of Hungarian troops fighting on
the Soviet side against their fellow countrymen. 122 The Army as a whole
disintegrated from the start of the uprising. Whenever they could,
soldiers handed over weapons and ammunition to their fighting compatriots
and, in very many cases, deserted, individually or in groups, to their
ranks. However, in general, the senior officers were pro-Soviet and
the insurgents mistrusted. them.
There is evidence that sone of the Russian soldiers disliked the
task assigned to them. During the first intervention Soviet troops,
many of whom had long been stationed in Hungary, were reported to have
given a total of 35 to 4o tanks to the freedom fighters and in general
were reluctant to engage them, while in the second intervention Soviet
troops, many of Asiatic origin, acted with much greater ruthlessness l23
Soviet soldiers who had spent tine in Hungary had. often established
friendly relations with the people, many of whom could talk to them in
Russian. There were a number of cases of fraternization with the Hun-
garians,'
and there seemed to be little personal animosity towards
the Soviet soldiers0125 They seemed to be affected by the suppression
of a civilian population including women, children, and elderly people
According to one report, troops of Ukrainian origin stationed in Pior
(4722N-1812F), who had always been quite popular with the population
there, sided with the rebels in the early days of the revolt and after
the suppression joined rebel groups in the Bakony area, taking their
equipment with them.126 Press reports dated November and December
1957 alleged the desertion of Soviet troops during the early post-
revolt period, many of whom joined the Hungarian guerillas.127 A few
claims that Soviet soldiers had chosen freedom in Austria were reported
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in the Austrian press.228 It has also been alleged that sone Soviet troops
sought amylum in Yugos1avia.129
In general, there are strong indications
that sore Soviet officers and soldiers fought and died on the Hungarian
side during the uprising13? and, furthermore, it is possible that sone
Soviet troops joined the rebels during the post-revolt period.
Other indications bearing upon group participation in the uprising
include the rumors that foreign students had. participated in the revolu-
tionary events. A low-level source rentions, for instance, proceedings
undertaken around April 1957 against Korean students in Budapest accused
of having joined the freedam fighters.131
This broad outline of the varying degree of class and group participa-
tion in the armed resistance, derived largely from observations concerning
the fighting in Budapest during the first Soviet intervention, nay be pre-
sumed to be valid with respect to the larger and more widespread action
begun When the Soviet troops intervened a second tine to crush the revolu-
tion. In all probability the peasants played a somewhat larger role in the
fighting in the provinces than indicated above, especially as the insurgents
retreated from their urban strongholds into the countryside or the nountains.
The workers, both factory hands and miners, and. the students, significantly
strengthened by the soldiery, continued, however, to bear the brunt of the
fighting to the very end.
According to an official Hungarian source (the Hungarian Central Statis-
tical Office (Statisztikai Szenle) Issue NO. 11-12, Vol. XXXIV, November-
December 1956), the number of people who died in the fighting can be
estimated at sone 1800-2000 in Budapest and 2500-3000 in the whole country.
Among those who died in the fighting between 23 October and 30 November
and whose deaths had been registered up to 1 January 1957, 84 per cent were
men and 16 per cent wonen. Nbre than one-fifth of these people were under
20 years of age, 28 per cent were between 20 and 29 years, 15 per cent
between 30 and 39: and 15 per cent between 40 and 49. In the provinces
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the greatest number of deaths in the fighting occurred in the counties of
Pest, Gyor-Sopronl Fejer: and Bacs-Kiakun.132
According to Premier Kadar in a speech before the Rational Assembly
in early May 1957, sone 170:000 young people had fled the country. About
that tire the United Rations High Conmissioner for Refugees put the total
number of refugees to Austria and. Yugoslavia at 193,216.133 The large
number of youths among the revolutionary dead and nore particularly the
extrenely high percentage of them among the post-revolt fugitives from
the country has undoubtedly resulted in a considerable reduction in the
reservoir of potential resistance fighters available in the immediate
future, although the generally rebellious post-revolt attitude of the
youth remaining in Hungary is a clear indication of a still trenendous
resistance potential that can be utilized advantageously for Special
Forces purposes. Rbreover the youth as well as nenbers of the other
classes who have fled the country represent a knowledgeable group -which
could supply Special Forces planners with valuable infornation about
their former localities. The presence, in the United States, of nany
of these refugees also poses the possibility of their selective incor-
poration into Special Forces units.
At the cut-off date of this report, it was still impossible to
delineate clearly the role played in the uprising by the religious
organizations of Hungary. Throughout the post-World War II period
the clergy, mainly that of the Catholic Church, has constituted perhaps
the most consistent force of opposition against the Conmunist regine
to be found in the whole country. Church resistance, however, has not
been characterized. by violence but by efforts to maintain the spirit
of the faithful and to preserve the physical and noral integrity of
church organization. Although it is apparent that this cautious and
conservative attitude was evidenced also during the uprising, recent
allegations by the Kadar regine of connections between church personnel,
especially Cardinal Rindszenty, and sone of the revolutionary activities
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that occurred pose the possibility that the role of churchmen was more
significant than aveilable informmtion has so far indicated.
Although, as already indicatedl all segments of the population of
Hungary participated in the revolt and were of one mind in their determina-
tion to bring a decade of foreign-sponsored totalitarian oppression to an
end, it is noteworthy that the urban areas were the well-spring of Tato-
lutionary organization and military action. In large neasure the lesser
significance of the rural areas was due to the lack of opportunity which
the short duration and logistical conplexity of the events entailed; and
there can be no doubt that, in a more protracted struggle in Which the
elerents of leadership, organization, and supply Imuld be better developed,
the rural population and the countryside would play a more important, if
not a paramount role in the resistance. Nevertheless the urban character
of the uprising, both in its military and. political aspects, project impor-
tant propositions concerning the future conduct of guerilla operations in
Hungary as yell as in other Fast European satellites. A decade of Communist
domination in the satellites has clearly altered the sociological face of
the satellite nations, projecting the urban class, especially the workers,
into the ascendancy over the rural population. As a result, in both %land
and. Hungary, the ferment and initiative of resistance proceeded from the
cities. This developnent has been a cardinal disappointnent to the Com-
munist regimes, which had placed in these classes their best hope for the
future. In their efforts to establish their reglue on a popular base, the
Communists in Hungary, as part and parcel of their industrialization program,
created a strong proletarian class, giving it through the trade unions--
however theoretical their actual power--the structural framework of class
organization and unity and the psychological buildup to convince them of
their class primaay. At the same tine they created a new intelligentsia
and student class, instilling them with ideological concepts designed to
cut this group off from Hungary's pre-World. War II national traditions and
values. During the post-Stalin period these 'well-indoctrinated classes of
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society openly turned their critical faculties upon the actual situation
in which they found themselves and began to derand the fulfil lnent of
protases, political, cultural, and economic, Which the Communist regine
did not and--in view of its actual totalitarian rationale--could not
fulfill. Thus it vas the intellectual class, principally the writers,
which sowed the seed of revolt; it was the students who organized the
demonstrations and drew up the first article of demands; and it was the
workers 'who, after the AVE turned the demonstrations into violence,
bore the brunt of civilian participation in the fighting.
During the revolt, When the cities and towns, Where the primary
resistance was organized, became untenable because of superior Soviet
forces and fire power, the insurgents escaped in sone instances to the
countryside but more notably to the mountains where because of available
suitabilities for guerilla warfare they were able to carry on the fight
for a while longer. This course of action is highly indicative of the
probable pattern of action in a future war in which the citizens of
Hungary would seek their liberation through an outside power. If in
a war local security controls would cease or loosen nunerous urban
dwellers would exploit the opportunity to retreat to the open country
or mountains where conditions for guerilla warfare are more favorable.
They would then provide a highly valuable reservoir of military potential
for Special Forces seeking to organize local resistance. That Special
Forces will inevitably have to deal with both urban and rural classes
is particularly apparent in the case of Hungary, a small, topographi-
cally uniform, and densely populated country where no region is really
distant from another and where smaller towns and villages form a thickly
settled population belt between the larger urban areas.
?
Although adequate information about the regional details of the armed
resistance of the uprising is lacking, it is apparent that it took place
in two phases, together lasting only a short time after the second Soviet
intervention: initial resistance in several large cities and towns and,
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secondly, the retreat from these centers into the plains and nountains for
last-ditch stands. Major resistance centers were: Pecs, a mining center
in the southwest; Dunapentele (Sztalinvaxos), a central Hungarian indus-
trial town on the Danube; Veszprem, one of the Chief cities of Transdandbia
(western Hungary); Miskolc, a university and industrial city of northeast
Hungary; Gyor, headquarters of th* -dical Transdandbian National Council,
and elsewhere in Gyor-Sopron county; Komarom county, notably Tatabanya
and Konarom; Szotbathay; Szekesfehervar; Szolnok; and Vac.
While the foregoing listing of resistance centers cannot be considered
comprehensive, it is nevertheless, on a broad regional basis, indicative
of the location of the nost significant armed resistance actions of the
uprising outside of Budapest. TO sone extent the location of the fighting
was determined by Soviet logistics and the disposition of insurgent forces
towards the western escape avenues; hence it may not be concluded that areas
of little or no armed resistance signify the complete absence of resistance
potential on the part of the local populations. Except for significant
action in the northernmost counties; relatively little fighting occurred
east of the Danube, although note must be made of such actions as the
breakodt of military personnel from the surrounded garrisons of Kecskemet
and Kalocsa who joined freedom fighters in the Danubian plain, inflicting
danage on the Soviet forces and supplies moving on the highways. Except
for the notable action in the Pecs vicinity of southwestern Hungary, the
fighting throughout the Whole southern half of the country was extrenely
limited as compared to the north. Reports of more radical denands from the
Revolutionary Councils of the western part of Hungary than from those of
the eastern part may be indicative of a greater degree of resistance poten-
tial in this area. This region is characterized by a lover percentage of
industrial and urban population and a higher percentage of Catholics.
It has been subjected to a lesser degree of industrialization under the
Connunist regime than the east of Hungary.
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As mentioned earlier, the alnost automatic withdrawal to the nearest
mountains of the insurgents besieged in the cities and towns stands out
as a notable phenonenon of the uprising in Hungary. It is of special
interest to Special Forces planning, as the mountainous regions, discussed
later in this study, are basically the ones from which guerilla warfare
could be carried on with sone success in Hungary. Map A shows that the
few mountainous regions in otherwise flat Hungary were almost all utilized
by the insurgents. The low, discontinuous, and topographically varying
system of mountains arching crescent-shaped from the northeast borders
of Hungary with the USSR to the southwestern corner of the country pro-
vided the last retreats for the insurgent forces. The Bukk, Matra, Vertes,
Bakony, and Mecsek Mountains all becane the scene of guerilla fighting in
the final days of the Soviet counterattack. The groups in the Mecsek
Mountains were able to continue the fight for sone three weeks and then
escape across the border to Yugoslavia. For nore than 10 days various
Hungarian units were able to nove from the northeast between the Bukk
and Matra Mountains across the Danube to the southwestern chain of the
Vertes Mountains. During the first couple months after the second Soviet
intervention the nost active rebel groups appeared to be those operating
in the Bukk, Bakony, and l*csek Mountains. Partisans in the Pills and
Vertes Mountains were reported to be surviving, but diminishing because
of supply shortages and Soviet attrition, as of mid-March 1957..
Irrespective of the tremendous Soviet force brought to bear to dis-
perse the guerillas in the mountainous areas and of .the lack of any
outside assistance to them, the limited nature of the cover and conceal-
nent afforded by the terrain features of Hungary made extremely difficult
any extended operations. In a future war the area of Hungary considered
by itself cannot be counted on as highly conducive to guerilla-type
activities. On the other hand, a more favorable role might be found
for Hungary if it is considered in conjunction with the physical features
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of cover and terrain in nearby-cross-border areas in Czechoslovakia, the
Ukraine, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.
The logistical and military aspects of the uprising clearly highlighted
the close relationship between the conduct of resistance ana the importance
of communication facilities. The rove of the Soviets at the very outset of
the uprising to secure such key facilities as bridges, highway and railroad
lines and junctions, and airfields rendered resistance hopeless. A study of
their tactics during this episode docurents the high irportance of such
structures to a war effort and at the sane tire highlights their potential
value and suitability to interdiction activity of Special Forces. The
important roles of the Free Radios both as instruments of communication and
symbols of the rebel cause suggest the possible importance of evaluating
radio equipment and sites, particularly of powerful transmitters, as Special
Forces objectives. Internal radio broadcasting, however, proved to have
serious limitations as a rediwn of accurate and corprehensive news coverage.
The irportance of outside communication facilities was evidenced by the
reported reliance of the different fighting groups on such broadcasts as
Radio Free Europe for information about activities and situations outside
'their respective localities.135
The use of telephones, including apparently
the closed railroad circuit, proved highly irportant in the course of the
revolution. The highly individualist nature of the insurgent military
operations during the uprising?in large asure dictated by the lack of
opportunity to coordinate and by a lack of trust in the regular military
hierarchy of officers?may be noted as a Characteristic of guerilla warfare
that Special Forces will inevitably encounter because of the nature of
their operations.
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b. Peasants
Prior to World War II Hungary was predominantly an agricultural
country and approximately 55 per cent of the population belonged to the
peasant class.136
On the eve of World War II less than one per cent of
owners of land possessed almost 50 per cent of the arable land. The
agricultural population of Hungary included a rural proletariat of more
than three million persons, consisting of estate servants, landless agri-
cultural laborers, dwarfholders, and tenants. Under the 1945 land reform
enacted by the coalition government about four and a half million acres
of arable land were distributed among 660,000 peasant families. Holdings
of less than 20 acres, 'which in the 1930s anounted to only about one-third
of the arable land of the country, now constituted about 65 per cent.
Imre Nagy, then Vinister of Agriculture, gained sone personal popularity
as a result of his role in the reform,137 Which gave the peasants a vital
interest in resisting the subsequent collectivization drive of the Com-
munist regime.
Under Connunist domination, agriculture has deteriorated so sharply
that as a result of the over-investrent of resources and manpower in a
rassive industrialization program in sone post-war-years Hungary has had,
to import grain. Heavy drafts upon the agricultural population to provide
the manpower for industrialization have reduced the agricultural popula-
tion, and as a result of other requirerents of the Whole Cormunist program
in Hungary the peasantry is no longer a nurerical najority in the country.
As of 1955, sone 45 per cent of the population was dependent on agriculture
for a livelihood.-8 A notable percentage of those Who left the farms
were youths. The disastrous effects of the heavy industry drive of the
early 1950s were recognized by Imre Nagy When he first became Premier in
Jay 1953. He tried to implerent a program giving priority first to con-
surer goods, While also permitting the peasants to leave the collectives.
However, after Nagy's forced "resignation" in April 1955, these "soft"
policies were tightened up once more.139
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At the end of 1955 as a resat of a collectivization drive whidh readhed
a nonentum reminiscent of the pre-New Course period, 1949,-1.9520 the collec-
tivized landholdings amounted to about 85 per cent of the level prevailing
before the withdrawals and dissolutions of 1953-1954. Thus from a 1954
low point of 18 per cent of the total arable land, the collectivized sector
(known as "producers' cooperatives") reached 22.4 per cent by the end of
October as conpared to the peak of 26 per cent reached. in 1953. This gain
plus the estimated 12.5 per cent of arable land in state farms--a total of
35 per cent--lent optimism to state planners Who set the 1960 goal for the
socialized sector at 50 per cent. It should be noted, however, that, although
the arable landholdings of the "cooperatives" at the end of 1955 stood at only
about 200,000 hectares below the highest figure (i.e., 1,404,000 hectares)
recorded before the withdrawals of 1953-19540 the number of households and
their membership retained eU below the peak status (i.e., 239,000 households
140
and 300,000 tembers as against 340,000 households and 515,000 members).
Although the main intellectual ferment of the uprising proceeded from
the urban areas, there was no lack of dissatisfaction in the countryside. In
the periodical Bse_e_ri_f_zy_abs.d.sel (Peace and Freedom), 9 and 16 May 1956, the
Stalin prize-winner, Tames Aczel? described the profound spirit of distrust
of the regime which he encountered among the peasants. One source tells how
the Irodalmi Ujsag, the Writers Union's literary review which was a primszy
organ of criticism against the regime prior to the revolt, was sold out even
141
in the country districts.
The participation of the peasant in the Revolution, especially in the
fighting aspect of it, was a relatively minor contribution. It must be
assumed that this inactivity was, to sone extent, apparent only, in that the
rural areas were not as systematically and completely reported on as the urban
areas, and the complete story of the peasant in the Revolution is yet to be told.
It has also been suggested that the peasant with his customary reserve sensed
a futility and misdirection in the Revolution that nade him hesitate.142
One
report alleged that no one in the village of Hernad, a village of 2,500
54
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inhabitants, attempted to* participate in the Revolution and that when the
rebels tried to collect food supplies, the local farmers contributed prac-
tically nothing.143 But in the main the lesser role of the peasant was
due to the lack of time, of opportunity, of arms, and, to sore extent,
of know-how to engage in the fight. In many villages the Revolution
did not advance very far beyond the setting up of councils. Against such
negative factors must be counted the absorption from the farms during
the Communist decade of large numbers of the village youth who in their
urban situation, together with the soldiers from peasant families, did
indeed fight in the Revolution.144
That the majority of the farmers
backed the Revolution was evidenced by the fact that they did support
the rebels in whatever way they could;145 that they supplied food,
especially to the rebels in Budapest, at little or no profit;146 and
that the strong passive resistance of the workers daring the early period
atter the revolt was supported by passive resistance on the part of the
peasants .7 In early December it was reported that "farmers' guards"
set up all over Hungary had engaged in clashes with the Misr militia,
had. taken over responsibility for public order, and :had nade conn
cause with the workers' councils against the militia0143 Later the
same month it was reported that farmers' councils openly controlled
affairs in nnst Hungarian villages and covertly where the police had
been installed.149
On the whole there is little doubt that given the
opportunity, equipnent, and the psychological incentives?which factors
were available to the urban rebels--the peasants would have carried their
share of the fighting.150
The peasantry emerged from the Revolution -with virtually the only
gains achieved by the nagon. Kadar has so far retained the earlier
agricultural concessions, nanely the abolition of the hated system of
forced crop deliveries, a significant increase in the prices paid for
agricultural products, 'which have been raised an average of 35 per cent,
and the cutback in forced collectivization. In the wake of the revolt ,-
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the number of collectives dropped front 3,954 to 1,469. According to govern-
mental authorities, 1,103 collectives were re-formed during the spring of
19570 but the remaining loss of membership still amounts to 10 per Cent and
the actual acreage regained was only 300,000 acres as compared to 1,2000000
acres taken out.151
The comparatively good fortune of the peasantry may seem somewhat
ironical in view of: the relatively minor role played by that class in the
actual fighting of .the uprising; however, their gain is by no means a token
.1'
of Communist affection for their class. It is rather a recognition--which
was likewise mode in Poland--of the virtual failure of socialized agriculture
as practiced. by the Communist regime to provide a decent level of food con-
sumption for the nation. Although in its manifesto of 6 January. 1957 the
Kadar regime did not insist on the reconstitution of the collectives which
were dissolved during and immediately after the revolt, it stated that
socialization of agriculture, including the machine stations, would. be con-
tinued and that collective farms would play an important role.152 During
the Party Congress of 27-29 June 1951 Kadar observed that "when peasant
opinion settles down, it may be hoped that--after the recent setback, and
after two or three years have passed--there will again be a favorable atmos-
phere for the development of the collectivization movenent."153 The official
maintenaztce of the theory of collectivization and of a still considerable
socialized sector of agrianitu.relaovides the framework for the suppression
of private farming whenever the situation permits. As a result of increased
prices paid by the state for livestock, notably pigs, the farmers were repor-
ted at the beginning of January 1957 as being better off than they had, been
for years; but at the same time, the state was deducting back taxes front
the purchase price of the aniwAls and the farmers were having a difficult
54
tine finding consumers' goods to buy with their money.1 Among the reported
manifestations of strictures upon the farmers since the revolt are the exor-
bitant charges levied for cattle taken out of the collectives and the concen-
trated campaign by the regime to collect taxes and tax arrears.155 Although
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"full freedom of peasant production and marketing" has been promised by the
regime, a new system of state contractual bulk-buying at "free state prices"
limits the freedom sonewhat.156 Tae true meaning of the new privilege of
the peasants of selling their bread grain to private purchasers (doubtlessly
at prices higher than paid by the state) was brought in question by Radio
Budapest on 22 June 1957, when it urged peasants as a civic obligation to
sell their surplus grain to state buying agencies.157
The long-term survival of peasant gains, therefore, is by no means
taken for granted, and many in Hungary are dubious that the Kadar regime
will permit such an "anti-socialist" situation to remain once its power is
fully consolidated and agricultural production has reached a higher level.
Even in the nnlikely case that the peasants will be allowed to retain
indefinitely sore measure of control over their own production activities
the Communist way of life is so alien to their cultural, social, and reli-
gious traditions that they will continue to remain the most uniformly anti-
Communist element of the population.
As for actual participation in guerilla units in event of war, the
Hungarian peasants, who, like all peasants are not easily separated from
their land, and who, unlike the peasantry of the more mountainous regions
of Eastern Europe, have no particular tradition of vio]ence, may not prove
to be as easily stirred to action or as amenable to training in irregular
warfare as members of the urban society. What are more important factors,
however, in their slow response are their relative lack of closely-knit
organizations and of effective political leadership, their dispersion
among relatively small communities, and, hence, their inability to
generate a "strength-in-numbers" atmosphere which is frequently the._
medium of revolution. In Hungary the peasantry, especially in Trans-
danubia, is mostly Catholic and takes a large measure of their leader-
ship from their priests, whose counsel is often that of caution but
whose anti-Communism is the stoutest in the nation. In the event of
war, therefore, outside agencies seeking to enlist the aid of the
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peasantry will find the local priest an indispensable contact. Trustworthi-
ness and intimate knowledge of the countryside and of remote regions are
qualities of the Hungarian peasant which, coupled with what can be expected
to be a rather general willingness in the long run to support and participate
in indigenous guerilla activities, make this group appear of great potential
value to Special Forces operations. Their actual value would be increased
considerably if the menbers of this group are, in individual operations,
strengthened by the moral and tangible support of other, especially urban,
segments of the population.
c. Industrial Workers
Since World War II the industrial labor force of Hungary has increased
from about 320,000 (1939) to about 1,600,000 (1956).258 The latter figure in-
cludes workers in factories, mines, building construction, and transportation.
Except for skilled workers, the industrial class in pre-Communist Hungary
represented an economically and socially depressed class. Uhion activity was
banpered by police pressure and cheap seasonal labor from the villages tended
to keep industrial wages low.159 The post-war buildup of the industrial force
necesSitated by the ambitious industrial expansion plans of the Communist
regime was accomplished to a large extent by the recruitment, often forcibly
undertaken, from anong the non-industrial sectors of the population, notably
the peasantry. In accordance with the political and social doctrines of
Marxism, the workers as a class were elevated to a position of supremacy in
the social structure of the nation; but as individuals their standards of
living and working conditions were if anything inferior to those prevailing
in the pre-war period,160 and their efforts to achieve sone voice in the
management of industry and some measure of actual control of their trade unions
were largely futile. The relaxation of controls which ensued after Stalin's
death and Khrusdhev's denunciation of Stalin prompted the leaders of the
working class to formulate their grievances and agitate for their alleviation.
In late October 1956 the workers were among the first to join the students in
publishing demands upon the regime.
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4
During the revolt the workers were not only the backbone of the insur-
gents' fighting force once the battle was joined. but, also, organized in
their Workers' Councils, equally important with the over-all territorial
Revolutionary Committees in the political work of the uprising. Mbreover,
they emerged from the revolution as the organs of representation which most
enjoyed the confidence of the whole people and the demands they presented
to the Kadar government reflected this nation-wide responsibility. The
strength of the workers and, hence, the recognition accorded their revo-
lutionary councils by the Kadar government derived from their key role in
the economy and the advanced state of their organizations. The experience
gained in their previous organizational activity encouraged by the Com-
munists for both practical and ideological reasons qualified them to deal
with the Kadar government on its own grounds. The government was forced
to negotiate with the Councils because they constituted the only force
capable of bringing about the resumption of work.
In the weeks following the Soviet suppression of the revolution, the
Councils sought to fortify their position as masters of the factories by
taking over managerial functions in relation to the orgardzation of pro-
duction as well as the direction of work itself, but as the regime con-
solidated itself through the instrumentality of Soviet troops, police
terror, and arrests of leading revolutionaries, the power of the Workers'
Councils was gradually abridged. Strikes and other outbursts of disorder
were matched by ever-increasing severity on the part of the regime. A
decree of 21 November provided that the Councils should play an economic
role as organs of "worker self-management" but prohibited them from taking
over functions performed by factory directors or Party-controlled trade
union comnittees. The seriousness of this setback to the aspirations
of the workers which this development entailed was signified by their
call for a 48-hour strike on the following day.
The question of the degree of workers' control in the management of
the economy has emerged from the satellite upheavals of 1956 as one of the
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most controversial issues in the Communist 'world. The demand on the part
of the workers for a substantive asure of control, independent of Party
supervision, provides a fresh illustration of the inherent contradiction
in the concept of "one-Party democracy. Even the Gomulka regime in Poland,
'which undertook an apparently bona fide experiment in limited denocracy
and economic decentralization, had not after almost a full year been able
to give the workers any real voice in management. It is unlikely that the
Kadar regime is either willing or able to devise a method of worker control.
In protest against further arrests of leaders of the Workers' Councils
and the outlawing of the Budapest Central Workers' Council, which had becone
spokesman for the entire country, and all Councils above the factory level,
a general strike was initiated on December 12. Gradually, however, the
workers were faced with the realization of the futility of their efforts
and of the need to return to 'work.
Another important demand which Kadar rebuffed was the abolition of
Party organs within the factories--a measure which the Councils had enforced
during the revolution. Shortly after the accession of the Radar governnent
Party cells were once more forcibly insinuated into the factories but since
the 'workers could not be compelled to join the Party, Party menbership grew
very slowly and the Hungarian Press reported that there was no proper contact
between Party officials and the vorkers.161 The reluctance of 'workers to
join the Party prevailed in the face of 'widespread dismissals as part of the
rationalization drive throughout the economy and in spite of the apparent
application of a political reliability standard in deciding who mould be
retained.162
For a short 'while after the accession of the Kadar government spokes-
men for the National Council of Free Trade Unions (formeay the National
Council of Trade Uhions) continued to reflect sone of the ideas adopted
during the revolution, such as the independence of the trade unions from
the government and Party and the substantive role of the Workers' Councils
in the management of enterprise. However, with the passing months they
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began to veer to the Kadar line, declaring the primacy of the trade
unions over the Workers' Councils and finally condemning the October
Revolution.163
In January 1957 it was announced that the directors of enterprises
were to be appointed by the state and to be personally responsible for
the economic managenent of the factories.164
On January 13, 1957:
strikes and every effective form of opposition were made liable to
punishment by death ?165 On January 28 Kadar guaranteed the "autonomy"
of trade unions but insisted that they could not be independent of the
Party.166 The whittling-away of their powers and re
the incased police
and Party activity among them during the first part of 1957 prompted a
number of the Workers' Councils to resign and resulted further in the
flare-up of new demonstrations and in an increasing severity of punish-
ment for strike activities.167
By May 1957 the campaign to entrench the
Party cells within the factories was well underway, and governnent repre-
168
sentatives began to question the very usefulness of the Workers' Councils.
At the end of June 1957 a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry stated that
the Workers' Councils formed during the uprising had been "dissolved volun-
tarily" in a majority of enterprises and that in others they existed
"in name only." Where they still existed their role was no different
from that of the trade unions.169 (Communist trade unions are an arm of
the state and perform no independent functions on behalf of the workers.)
The most significant aspect of the workers' conduct during and after
the uprising was their complete lack of responsibility towards their van-
guard role in the advancenent and preserTration of the proletarian dictator-
ship. When the first serious crisis in the public order developed, they
turned their strength against the regime and quickly constituted the
strongest fighting elenent of the insurgent forces. Through the articu-
late demands of their leaders and the rapid organization and effective
functioning of their Revolutionary Councils, they enunciated) along with
the students and the intelligentsia, the ideological basis of the national
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uprising. They showed a determination unprecedented in the Conmunist world
to achieve in actual practice the rights and prerogatives of the working
class which Marxist doctrine has historically proclaimed for them. Perhaps
more important, in the immediate circumstance, than their political role--
since the nation needed very little prompting as to its objectives--was the
leading role of the workers in the actual fighting of the insurgent forces.
Thus the workers whom the regime had counted on to perform the primary
economic functions of the nation and to provide a strong measure of internal
security through the instrumentality of factory guards, workers' militia,
etc., becane its most serious class liability. The Communist regime must
reckon with the distinct likelihood that in the event of war this class,
because of its occupation in the factories and nines and its residence in
urban centers, will prove to be the most dangerous element in the whole
country.
,The attitude of the workers and their leading role in the short-lived
guerilla warfare during the uprising constitute, therefore, important factors
in Special Forces planning. In the event of war many industrial workers and
other urban elements will take advantage of the defects in security controls
to flee to the countryside and especially to the mountains and in this way
become available to Special Forces units seeking to organize guerilla move-
ments. Such a likelihood is enhanced by the small geographical area of
Hungary and the close ties between the urban and rural populations resulting
from the absorption of many rural youths into the industrial economy. The
demands aired by the workers during the recent uprising and the allegiance
to certain socialist principles and achievements which these demands reflect
make it imperative, however, that any program of appeal to the working class
to join resistance forces must imply no bias to the political and economic
gains by the workers under the Communist regime, for many of these gains are
credited by the workers to socialism rather than to the Moscow-dominated
Communist regime.
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d. Youth
The post-Stalin process of liberalization Which was set in motion
in 1953 under the relatively enlightened regime of IMre Nagy was after a
brief interlude of repression by Rakosi given its final momentum by the
anti-Stalinist policies set
Party of the Soviet Union.
*Weis, notably the Writers'
forth by the 20th Congress of the Communist
The vanguard of criticism were the intellec-
Union, and, only slightly less important, the
youth. During the late spring of 1956, young intellectuals, belonging to
the League of Working Youth (DISZ), the Communist youth federation, estab-
lished the Petofi Club. It became one of the primary springboards of the
revolt.170
Recognizing the temper of the students of the country, the DISZ made
efforts to correct long-standing grievances, such as the discriminatory
policy against middle-class youth in high school and college admissions,
but the remedy was brought forward too late 171 Both high school and
college students rejected the Party plans for an improved DISZ and pushed
for its dissolution or, at least, total reorganization. Such proposals
were voiced in October at meetings of the Petofi Club, and students at
DISZ meetings drew up a program which in its specific content was limited
to the academic field but which at the save tine implied criticism of
basic political tenets. Even the high school students, at a so-called
"parliament" which opened on October 19th, drew up resolutions criti-
cizing the educational policy of the regime.172
The revolutionary developments in Poland towards the end of 0ctobe'2
evoked particularly great exciterent among the students in Hungary and
prompted demands for specific changes. On 19 October the Minister of
Education had announced certain concessions, such as the discontinuation
of compulsory Russian-language study. On 20 October the students of the
university town of Szeged set up a League of Hungarian University and
College Students Associations (NEFESZ). A meeting called for 22 October
by the Executive Committee of DISZ at the Building Industry Technological
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Uhiversity.in Budapest in order to discuss strictly student demands and
to head off the new organization quickly evolved into an open debate of the
big political problems of the day, especially the question of Soviet occu-
pation. Out of the meeting there emerged a sixteen-point program, which
became the most influential document of the uprising. Efforts to have it
broadcast on 23 October led to an altercation between the crowd in front
of the Radio Building and members of the AYH, who set off the uprising by
firing the first shots.173
The Sixteen Pants of the students included requests which appealed
to the mess of the people. In addition to such broad demands as the with-
drawal of Soviet troops, free elections, the punishment of the Rakosi
clique, economic concessions to workers and peasants, and freedom of opinion
and expression, the document made such specific requests as the elevation of
Imre Nagy to government leadership, the punishment of Mihaly Parkas, former
Minister of Defense and notorious terrorist, the investigation of the USSR's
exploitation of Hungary's uranium deposits, the replacement of the Stalin
monument in Budapest by a memorial to the freedom fighters of the 248 revo-
lution, the reintroduction of the old. Kossuth coat-of-arms, and the expression
of sympathy with the Polish national independence movement.174
Thus the academic youth?children of the working class and products of
a Communist education?played the leading 'cart, together 'with the intelli-
gentsia, in formulating the ideological basis of the uprising and in organizing
the demonstrations that erupted into a revolt. This emphasis on youth was
characteristic of the uprising throughout. They took their places in the
various regional revolutionary councils and formed functional councils of
their own. It was the younger generation, first the young workers, then the
students and soldiers, Who played the most prominent part in the fighting.
While the largest part of the fighting force was apparently furnished by the
workers, the participation of the students in the street-fightidk of Budapest
and in the guerilla bands which retreated to the mountains was of primary
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importance. The high percentages of youth among the revolutionary dead,
as well as among the exiles, is ample testimony to their vanguard role.
After the uprising the various revolutionary councils of students
and youth were quickly suppressed, although the Revolutionary Council
of Hungarian Intellectuals in which the Petofi Club and the MIEFESZ
were represented continued until its dissolution to maw. representations
in behalf of the whole country and to engage in fruitless discussions
with the Radar government.175 As late as 6 January 1957 the League of
Hungarian University and College Students (MEFESZ) at a neeting held
in Budapest drafted a program which endorsed the "socialist order" but
did not abandon the revolutionary ideas proclaimed by the students on
23 October. The police broke up the meeting and eight student leaders
were reportedly arrested.176
In February 1957 the Party established
the League of Communist Youth (KISZ) to balance the influence of MEFESZ,
to replace the old League of Working Youth (rasz), and to win back both
the academic and working youth to the Communist cause. It vas apparent
in the early months of 1957 that KISZ was making only slow headway in
its membership buildup and that the revolutionary attitudes of the
academic youth continued to disturb the regime. The government an-
nounced, upon the reopening of the University of Budapest in February
1957, that Marxist-Leninist education; as well as the teaching of Russian--
would go on in the schools and that the universities would be closed
again at the first sign of any disturbance.177 The postponement of the
reopening of the universities until the end of February was deemed the
consequence of the strong resistance of the university students.178
Kadar in his speech to the National Assembly on 11 May 1957 observed
that the youth of the country were infected with too much idealism,
their conduct and attitudes being attributable to an emotional and
sentimental view of socialism and democracy.179
The second Soviet intervention and the crushing of open rebellion
did not destroy the revolutionary spirit of the youth. In late January
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1957 denonstrations occurred in schools all over Hungary. Sone students
appeared wearing cockades, such as had been carried by-denonstrators in
Budapest on the first day of the revolt.180 In early February 1957 the
Minister of Education conplained that a number of students and professors
were continuing their strike activities at the universities and a warning
was issued that the universities would be closed if disturbances continued.
At the sane tine the government disclosed that the bones of students of
Budapest University had been searched and that large quantities of arms,
ammunition, and "counter-revolutionary" literature had been seized.- Of
an estimated 17,000 persons reported to have been deported to the Soviet
Union in the wake of the uprising--nost of whom presumably have been
returned-80 per cent were said to have been of student age.182 According
to Kadar in a speech before the National Assembly on 11 May 1957 sone
170,000 young people emigrated from the country. (As of April 30th,
according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the total
number of refugees to Austria and Yugoslavia amounted to 193,216.)183 On
the Whole there is abundant evidence that the rebellious attitudes and
activities of the youth of Hungary will be one of the regime's most diffi-
cult problem for a long time to cone.184
The leading role played by the youth of Hungary in fomenting and execu-
ting the rebellion during October-November 1956 provided the world with
specific insight into the nentality and resistance potential of the Connunist-
indoctrinated youth of Eastern Europe. In the first place the episode re-
vealed beyond any question that the very segment of the population which had
been exposed exclusively to the Communist way of life was the most important
instrument in overthrowing it. Youth shared the ideological leadership with
the intelligentsia but that the revolt was primarily an affair of the youth
was everywhere recognized. The revolt also showed that the youth of the
nation--students, workers, and soldiers--, in the event that Hungary becones
engaged in an international war, can be expected to be the most eager to
fight the oppressor of their country. This conclusion seems to be valid
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in spite of the fact that many of the most daring freedom fighters among
the younger generation have left Hungary or lost their lives during the
uprising. In consideration of the stubborn post-revolt resistance of
the youth who remained there is every indication that the vacuum 'will
not long remain unfilled.
e. The "Intelligentsia" and Press
As in the other satellite countries of Eastern Europe in the
slowly developing atmosphere of denocratization after Stalin's death, the
intelligentsia in Hungary along with the student class supplied the ideo-
logical fernent. In the broadest sense the intelligentsia includes
teachers and other nenbers of the professional class, scientists, and
creative artists of all categories, but the most important segnents from
the standpoint of influencing the uprising of October-November 1956 have
been the writers and journalists. With the accession of Imre Nagy in
the summer of 1953 sharp criticism of Communist reality began to appear
in print, particularly in the literary journals. In effect, thoughnot
in administration, the Party's press nonopoly vas broken. In the early
spring of 1955 Rakosi ousted his rival from the Premiership, but con-
formity in cultural fields could not be enforced without the use of
Stalinist terror, then officially rejected by the new Kremlin leaders.
In fact the new stringent line provoked Rakosi's opponents to renewed
daring and the intellectuals, miciny of them Party nenbers, were in the
forefront of the struggle.15
The nost important expression of the revolutionary aim behind the
October-November 1956 uprising is to be found in the manifestoes of the
intellectual groups, as well as those of the students.186 The Proclama-
tion of the Hungarian Writers' Union of 23 October called for an indepen
dent national policy based on ,the principles of socialism; international
relations on the basis of equality (notably with the USSR); worker
participation in factory managenent and the establishnent of bona fide
trade unions; abolition of forcible methods of collectivization and of
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i forced deliveries to the state; the removal of the Rakosi clique from a
position of influence in the state and, at the sane time, vigilance against
counter-revolutionary attempts and aspirations; and the institution of a
free electoral system6187 In other manifestoes and in a number of articles
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and memoranda the writers put forward their demands for artistic freedom.1
After the suppression of the rebellion the Writers' Union played an
important role in negotiations between the people and the government. In
the circumstances this group and the even more important Workers' Councils
tended to subordinate their own class interests to the national demands.
The ability of the intellectuals to carry on passive resistance in an
atmosphere of repression was in considerable measure due to their mastery
of subtlety and innuendo.189 The Revolutionary Council of Hungarian Intel-
lectuals-90 issued, in late November, a manifesto signed by 110 leading
personalities'in the cultural life of Hungary identifying themselves with
the cause of the revolutionists, While at the sane time taking a stand
against the restoration of the pre-Communist social order. After this
organization was dissolved the Writers' Union carried on, and many writers
were arrested as the weeks passed. Finally on 21 April, 1957, the Writers'
Union was dissolved. Shortly before the Minister of Agriculture had said
in a speech that the majority of Hungarian writers had Chosen the path of
treason.
In retrospect, it VW the press which during the revolutionary period
between October 23 and November 4 supplied the direction, prodding, and
Inspiration which Imre Nagy failed to give. During this period took place
the transformation of even the Chief Party paper Szalarl Nep into an offi-
cial daily of the Nagy government, the ouster of Rakosi Stalinists from
editorial staffs in established papers, and the dedication of scores of
Hungary's best writers, including many Communists, to the national revolu-
tionary 'cause 191 After 4 November 1956: the newspapers born in the revolt
were imnediately suppressed; yet the status quo ante could not be reimposed
_ nor has it been reimposed up to the cut-off date of this report. The change
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in the press is largely one of tone and enphasis rather than of ideology--
for freedom of political discussion is once nore inpossible. In general
the press as of rid-1957 is in a transitional stage; it has little in
comnon with the product of the revolutionary interlude, but neither is
it comparable to journalism of the Bakosi era. Those writers who were
at the center of the vortex are now dead, abroad, in prison, or engaged
in an undeclared literary strike.
Although at the beginning of June 1957 Hungary was still experiencing
seemingly a "liberalization" of culture amid stern repression in other
spheres, a cutback in intellectual freedom was presaged at that tine
by the enthusiastic response in Parliament to a speech by a university
lecturer calling for the re-establishnent of rigid Connunist control
over Hungarian education, art, and science ?92 The probability of
stringent neasures was further substantiated by the announcenent on
4 August 1957 made by the Minister of Culture, Gyula Kallail of an
all-out campaign to break the intellectual resistance against the
regime. According to the broadcast of the announcenent, "new aggres-
sions" by certain intellectual groups have forced the governuent to take
several hard administrative measures against some of the leading reac-
tionaries, including artists and writers. Two days previously the
Hungarian news agency M.T.I. reported the replacement of six top
leaders in Hungarian university life, including the rector of Budapest
Technical University, as well as the heads of other universities in
the capital and in the cities of Pecs and Debrecen.193
The value of the service of the intellectuals to the people of
Hungary in sparking revolutionary ideas is incalculable and their
attack upon the Party mat one of the most inportant setbacks suffered
by the regime and by the whole Cormnnist system. From the standpoint
of resistance potential, the writers, journalists, teachers, artists,
scientists, and other elements of the intelligentsia have a less direct
bearing upon the actual operations of Special Forces than that of nost
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other segments of society. The importance of the intelligentsia is to be
found in the influence they exert upon the masses through propaganda media.
Since intellectuals are moulders of opinion and tend to develop their atti-
tudes more autonomously than other classes, it is difficult to formulate any
generalization about their prospective reaction to appeals for assistance or
participation in actual resistance activities. Their readiness to criticize
the excesses of Stalinist rule in Hungary once the first strains of liberali-
zation appeared under the New Course leadership of Imre Nagy and their refusal
to back down from their critical positions even after Rakosi regained control
are clear indications of their basic dissatisfaction with Soviet-imposed
Conmunism and of their willingness and ability to express their attitudes
even at considerable personal risk. Their forthright presentation of the
national grievances and their cardinal role in the ideological direction of
the uprising left no doubt that a significant segment of the intelligentsia
will, in the event of a future conflict, identify themselves with the national
interests of Hungary and will provide leadership in wsny phases of resistance
against the Soviet Union and a Soviet-oriented Hungarian regime. Their com-
paratively vide knowledge of events, personalities, and attitudes on a
national as well as a local basis could prove to be highly useful assets
to Special Forces operating on Hungarian soil. The group as a whole has
not been able to avoid involvenent with the Comminist regime--it is in fact
largely a post-World War II Cornnnist-created class--and many of its nenbers
were forced to give at'least nominal assent to the existing order, if only
to gain a livelihood. As the revolutionary manifestoes clearly indicated,
many of them?probably a greater proportion than in other classes--have
becone convinced of the desirability of sone sort of a socialistic society
in Hungary. While refuting Soviet Communism as it is decreed from Moscow,
they may prefer their own brand of Hungarian Socialism to the social and
economic systems of the West. The utilization of netbers of this group
within the limited franework of Special Forces plsnring and operations can,
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therefore, be effected only on an individual basis and. -with consideration
for the complex features of national pride and sensitivity. If the
support of members of the intelligentsia could. be gained, especislly
on the local level, they could prove valuable in promoting cooperation
with Special Forces among the indigenous population and in prompting
the latter to undertake resistance activities of its own.
f. The Cormmnist Party
The history of the Connunist Party in Hungary during the
post-Stalin period is characterized. by intra-Party strife and insta-
bility. Party morale in the weeks prior to the uprising was at a
low ebb. In response to orders from high Party echelons, reports were
submitted by district organizations after they had debated recent Party
resolutions concerning policy Changes in the direction of liberaliza-
tion. The Party presidium was shocked by the results. The reports
shoved general dissatisfaction with the light treatment accorded such
Party leaders as Mihaly Farkas, former Minister of Defense, who were
charged with cririnal actions, with the "window-dressing" quality of
the democratization process, and with the application of amnesty and
rehabilitation to only those purged Party nenbers who could. be of propa-
ganda value to the regime. The reports identified the-main errors
of the old regime as irresponsibility and impunity, insincerity in
both political and economic affairs, and the habit of lying. These
reports were said to have convinced the Party leaders that there were
only two ways to re-establish Party unity--either to break with the past
through a widespread and radical reform of such tactics or to revert
to the Stalinist system of fear and terror.194
One of the most noteworthy casualties of the uprising of October-
November 1956 was the Hungarian Workers (Connunist) Party itself, Which
was dissolved on 28 October. The depth of the Party's trouble in its
relationship to the nation was best illustrated by the demands of the
Workers' Councils that no Party organization would again be authorized
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in the factories.195 Comenist leaders who set about reforming it as the
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party formed a Preparation Committee for this
purpose but all of these with the exception of Kadar have been considered
enemies of the state following the second Soviet intervention. Because of
the defection of many Party members during the uprising, Kadar was hard-
pressed to reassemble the rank-and-file of the Party to deploy it in key
positions. Functionaries who had not sided with the revolution were rein-
stated and former members of the AVH were utilized to fill many vacancies,
but so many of the former officials had broken away during the uprising
that many essential posts had to remain vacant. In the industrial town of
Dunapentele, for example, with the exception of the AVH and one or two Army
officers, everyone had sided with the uprising. Evidence indicates that
Borsod County (Miskolc area) was administered independently up to January
1957 with few, if any, ties with the central government.196
The hopes of the revolutionaries that a readjustment of the political
power situation of Hungary would occur as a result of the clear manifesta-
tion during the uprising of the popular antagonism against one-party control
were dispelled by the comprehensive manifesto of the Kadar governnent's aims
and principles issued on January 6, 1957. The pronouncenent was, in effect,
a constitutional document. Seeming concessions to the revolution included
the condemnation of the Stalinist methods employed by Matayas Rakosi and Erno
Gero (pre-revolutionary heads of the Comminist Party), the abolition of exag-
gerated centralism in economic affairs, and the promise of implementation of
socialism in Hungary according to the specific needs of the country. But
the substantially unreconstructed concept of Communist Party monopoly of
political affairs was signalled by the condemnation of petty bourgeois
masking as Marxists, by the designation of the party of the working class--
the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party--as the leading force in the state, and
by the identification of the Peoples Front under the direction of the Party
as the organ of unification of all democratic factors. In short, the Kadar
regine dismissed as unacceptable the theory of the revolutionary spokesmen
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that a socialist state could be developed through the instrumentality of
a multi-party system. The revolution and all its concepts were thus
summarily outlawed and the Communist Party which had all but disappeared
during the revolution as a vital political force, was revived.
The circumstances and difficulties attending the rebuilding of the
Party during the first months after the suppression of the uprising hold
out few prospects for real Party unity in the near future. Kadar experi-
enced great difficulty in enlisting a new Party hierarchy. Many top
Communists snubbed him; he gained some support from collaborationists
among former non-Communist leaders, notably Istvan Dobi and Erno
Mihalyfil formerly of the Smallholders Party, and Sander Ronai and
Gyorgy Marosan, formerly of the Social Democratic Party.197 The recruit-
ment of fellow-travellers and crypto-Communists was no doubt deemed advan-
tageous in that it afforded sone basis for presenting a "popular front."198
Another device for building up membership was the "promise" that Party
members would not be dismissed from their jobs in the course of the
"rationalization" drive throughout the economy.199 Although Kadar in
February 1957 read out of the Party "forever"200 former Premier Imre Nagy
and his followers, as well as Matayas Rakosi and Erno Gero and sone of
their Stalinist disciples, factions in the Party soon becane painfully
evident. To many Kadar seemed to be in the sane middle position, occu-
pied by Gomulka in Poland, between Stalinists and revisionists. By
April many former leading Stalinists were reported back in Budapest and
many were getting back their old jobs.201 In May the Party's weakness
and lack of confidence was signified by the postponenent for two years
of the parliamentary election due in 1956.202 As the time approached
for the opening in late June of the first congress of the post-revolt
Communist Party, the struggle for power in the top levels of the Party
becane more evident. Kadar lashed out against both the revisionists and
Stalinists in attenpts to seal Party unity. Marosan, a Minister of State,
complained that the Party was being undermined by intrigue and personal
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quarrels; he insisted that the fight was not really over principles but
over jobs.203
This Observation puts the finger on one of the great weak-
nesses of the reconstituted Party as well as of the pre-revolt Party, namely
opportunism. The suggestion is probablk true that a considerable proportion
of the new Party nenbers have joined for pecuniary reasons and could not be
relied upon by the governnent in an emergency.204 The Stalinists were
attacked for their scheming to regain positions of power, Whereas the re-
visionists were accused of attempting to perpetuate sone of the ideas that
led to the uprising.205
Setting the tone for the Party Congress of 27-29
Jane 1957, the main Party organ, Nepszabadsag, called for the "complete liqui-
dation of revisionist, class-betraying, anti-Party opinions.H206
Noting that the Party had enlisted only 350,000 members (as compared to
the pre-revolt membership of 800,000), Radar stressed at the congress the
necessity of more intensive recruitment among the country's 1,900,000 trade
union members. Of the total Party membership at that tine 57.9 per cent were
workers, 16.7 per cent peasants, 6.9 per cent intellectuals, and the remainder
other categories. Mast of the members--85.2 per cent--had been in the pre-
revolt Party.207
If the January 1957 trend in the class composition of the
Party has prevailed,2C8 a large portion of the "workers" referred to above
may have been "white collar" employees. In March 1957 the regine organ
Szegedi Neplap admitted that although 65 per cent of Party members in Szeged
were of worker or peasant origin, only 25 to 27 per cent of the membership
were factory workers and that the relatively high percentage of white-collar
workers, sone of whom were "careerists," was unsound. This disproportion
indicated a lack of real revolutionary spirit.209
As of mid-1957, the hard
core, or elite, of the Party was estimated by one source to number about
15,000 persons.21?
The revolt demonstrated that the Communist Party of Hungary had no
significant mass base whatsoever. At best the rank-and-file of the menber-
ship proved to be Connunists of a nationalist persuasion but inimical to
Soviet control and hence to the over-all aims of the Communist world
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conspiracy. Many Party members threw in their lot with the Revolutionary
Councils and were often maintained by the latter in positions of importance;
many were distrusted and were ousted from their positions. But no matter
what their fate Communist Party members as a whole did not resist the
insurgents and did not assist the Soviets in their repressive actions.
It is apparent that many Communists sympathized with the insurgents without
joining their fight. Thus, according to one source, the Communist leaders
in Szombathely would have joined the freedom fighters had they not been
afraid of being liquidated in the event of the victory of the insurgents ?2U
Underlying the phenomenon of Party breakdown there appeared to be,
amotg other causes, a serious disillusionnent among the rank-and-file with
the inmoral conduct of Party and government affairs which had Characterized
the regine's ten-year tenure of power. That Communist Party members should
reveal such a sensitivity about moral values is a phenomenon of considerable
significance to any resistance potential estimate.
At the cut-off date of this report, the new Party was still in the
throes of organizing its leadership and building up its nembership. Any
ass6snent of the status of factionalism within the Party must be largely
conjectural. Nevertheless, the uprising revealed the existence of leaders
who favored a nationalist road to socialism; the failure of the revolution,
however, has probably relegated them as a group into the background. Sone
of them may have been retained in high positions--Kadar himself shoved
the makings of a nationalist--but they cannot for the present air their
opinions within the Party or the country. With the eventual relaxation
of the Soviet occupation and the stabilization of the country as a whole,
leaders with nationalist tendencies may find it feasible to press their
objectives once more. At present it is more likely that the revisionism
deplored by the Kadar regine is being nanifested at the lower levels of
the Party but especially by eleuents outside the Party. The Stalinists
or "Rakosiists" in the Party are not as roundly condemned as the revi-
sionist212s, and since the liquidation of the uprising was actually a
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Stalinist solution, since the Stalinists can be trusted to do the job for
Moscow, and since Kadar rust get experienced support where he can, their
prospects for the immediate future are brighter than those of the nationalists.
The activity of the Stalinists, probably even at the top level of the hierar-
chy, seem to be signified by the feverish jockeying for positions which
Kadar has been deploring. If the struggle for power gets under full way,
Kadar and his collaborators, whose Party strength is an unknown quantity,
may find themselves not only out of power but out of contention for it.
The scrambling for jobs has provided empirical evidence of the rank
opportunism which has long been considered by many outside observers as a
fundamental and potentially fatal flaw of political groups governing with-
out legitimate opposition. This phenonenon documents the gradual but con-
vincing indications coming to light since the death of Stalin that the
Communist system is devoid of any real strength based on the fidelity of
its Party menbers and that it is racked with personal intrigues for power,
position, and privilege. Kadar's admission of this problem so soon in the
life of the new Party seems to dispel any hope that it could be built into
an elite menbership that would be motivated by loyalty and devotion to the
Party for its own sake.
So far the Party nembership has achieved only a very weak representation
among the workers and the youth, the classes on which it traditionally depends
for its mass base, and its strength among the peasants is probably very low.
As tine goes on, the harsh exigencies of making a livelihood in a Communist-
favored econony will probably induce many, including those former Communists
who are still holding out, to take out nenberehip once more and the numeri-
cal strength of the Party may well reach its pre-revolt level. It is possible
that the new regine in Hungary will utilize the lessons of the revolt to
screen its nenbers, particularly its cadres, more carefully or at least to
assign key functions with greater care than in the past.213
In the immediate
future, however, it is apparent that opportunists and even known participants
in the uprising will be found in the Party ranks.
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After the spectacle of a complete and overnight breakup of the Party
under the tension of the rebellion, it seems highly unlikely that the
rank-and-file Party renbers can be counted on in the event of war to
support a Soviet-oriented regine. This generalization, however, is made
at a very early stage in the reconstitution of the Pal y and future
developments must be consulted to ascertain the specific characteristics
and couposition of its membership. It mist be assumed, in any event,
that many Communists, especially in the early stages of a war, will act
loyally to the Party and the state, and hence Special Forces operating
in Hungary should avoid indiscriminate contact with Party members
until such time as their individual attitudes can be evaluated. As
a rule the true character of Comminists is well known to the population
of the community in Which they reside. The acceptance by the insurgents
during the rebellion of many Party nenbers into the Revolutionary Coun-
cils is a case in point. Because of their special knowledgeability of
civic affairs the utilization of individual, carefully screened Party
menbers who would be acceptable to their countrymen will be of high
value for Special Forces purposes. The apparent fear on the part of
sone Communists during the uprising that they would. be liquidated if
the revolution were victorious and, hence, their failure to join the
insurgents, points up the necessity of assurances that indiscriminate
punishnent will not be meted out to Communists in the event of the
overthrow of the Communist regime.
g. Non-ComTunist Parties
Aside from the quick and universal formation of the Revolu-
tionary and Workers' Councils at the beginning of the uprising, the
strong survival of political factionalism among the people, even after
ten years of enforced standardization and indoctrination, was evidenced
by the rebirth and inclusion in the revolutionary governnents of the
historic political parties and the establishnent of numerous minor
parties and specialized organizations.214
The three major non'-Communist
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parties, namely the Independent Smallholders, the Petofi (formerly the
National Peasants) Party, and the Social Democrats, had in the elections
of 1945 von 245, 69, and 23 seats respectively of a total of 409, with
the Communists gaining 70. During their short-lived re-energence these
parties quickly built up their following once more. By 3 November 1956
these parties had groups reconstituted in most of the 23 districts of Buda-
pest, as well as in cities in the various provinces of Hungary. Other
smaller parties were re-established, i.e., the Christian Democratic Party,
the Democratic Peoples' Party, and the Hungarian Independent Party. In
addition, the Hungarian Revolutionary Youth Party was established and the
existence of the Hungarian Conservative Party, which functioned "for ten
years in illegality" was announced.
Although all the major parties avowed to champion the real gains made
under the Communist regi ne and disavowed any return to the "era of aristo-
crats, bankers, capitalists, and estate-owners," they expressed views that
augured the establishment of a democratic system of government and a
national re-espousal of Western values. Spokesmen for the Smallholders
insisted on the freedom for the peasants to be private landowners or to
join cooperatives. Even during the short period of revival two political
lines within this party seemed to be developing: a conservative group
oriented around pre-World War II principles and a progressive group willing
to implement post-World War II political developments.215
During its short-
lived revival the Petofi Party, which had taken shape prior to World War II
around a group of young intellectuals espousing socialist principles and
representing the interests of the agricultural laborers, stressed the right
of private property and of free production and marketing, while at the
sane tine pointing out the necessity for peasant cooperatives. The revived
and re-named party drew heavily on the intelligentsia for its leadership.216
The specific mention by these two peasant parties as well as by a re-estab-
lished minor party, the Christian Democratic Party, of the need to revive
Christian morality and institutions signifies the strong survival of
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traditional values and of the influence of the Christian churches as
realistic factors to be reckoned with in assessing the resistance poten-
tial of the Hungarian people. The Social Democratic Party, which tra-
ditionally has drawn its strength from among the working class, branded
as a lie the claim that the Communist regime had governed since 194a
in the nane of the workers and advocated strongly during its short
revival the establishnent of democratic socialist practice in Hungary.
The interlude of freedom turned the spotlight on Party leaders who
had sold out to the Communists after World War II. For example, the
left-wing Social Democratic leaders who had supported "fusion" with
the Communists were refused admittance to the party during its short
period of revival.
Thus it is evident from the swift re-formation of the non-Conmunist
parties that the ten years of Communist oppression and Marxist indoc-
trination had not dispelled the considerable interest of the Hungarian
people in the operation of a true party system. If anything, it nay be
said the Communist experience had only broadened the popular interest
in politics.
The political parties, having no such lever as that of the Workers'
Councils, i.e., control over the economy of the nation, were treated more
summarily by Kadar in early post-revolt negotiations concerning the
possibility of a coalition government. Kadar kept talking about the
incorporation into the government of those parties which agreed to work
according to socialist principles but, despite agreement of the non-
Communist parties on this point and their averred recognition of the
Communist Party as an indispensable elenent of political life, nothing
cane of it. On 8 December the Hungarian Socialist Workers (Communist)
Party adopted a resolution makingdt clear that it had no intention of
sharing power with any other party and reaffirming the merger of the
Communist and Social Democratic parties in 1948 as a basis of present
policy.217 At the beginning of 1957 Kadar continued to pose the
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possibility of the inclusion of two of the non-Comnunist parties in the
government but indicated that the Social Democratic Party would be liqui-
dated because there vas no need for it in Hungary (i.e., it competed with
the Communist Party for the workers' allegiance). Kadar's willingness to
negotiate 'with the non-Coununist parties was apparently only a delaying
tactic, approved. by the Soviet occupation authorities and prompted by the
desirability of a gradual weakening of the revolutionary opposition while
the regime regained its balance.
At the beginning of August 1957 the Kadar regime arrested 12 leaders
of certain right-wing parties that cane to the fore during the uprising.
The parties involved were identified as the Hungarian Freedom Party, the
Christian Hungarian Party, the Christian Front, the Hungarian Democratic
Union, and the Democratic people's Party.218
It is difficult to assess the
true significance of these arrests, since they followed in the immediate
wake of a roundup by the Kadar regime of a large number of enemies of the
state, designed apparently largely for propaganda purposes and-as a pre-
cautionary asure. However, the movement of the regine against these
right-wing groups throws light upon the strong survival of traditional
political attitudes in Hungary and the deep concern of the regime about
their potential influence.
The rapid revival of the non-Comnunist parties is one of the most sig-
nificant factors of resistance potential revealed by the Hungarian uprising.
Prior to this, the suppression of these parties and the persecution of their
leaders were generally deened to have practically destroyed their vitality,
and public support. From the standpoint of Special Forces planning, it is
now apparent that non-Communist party leaders, in the event of a crisis
in the present totalitarian system, will recapture a considerable measure
of their forner authority and influence' at both the national and local levels.
In the advanced state of war, especially, When the nature and course of its
conduct will be more and more affected by expectations of liberation and
Political readjustments, Special Forces seeking to enlist the assistance of
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the indigenous population would be greatly aided if they would possess
reliable intelligence on the political problems of the areas 'where they
operate. The dissatisfaction of large elements of the population of
Eastern Europe with the handling of the political aspects of guerilla
warfare in their areas during World War 11 strengthens the likelihood
that their willingness to fight in a future war will depend upon a clear
understanding of who the enemy is and upon assurances of non-interference
in their post-war political affairs. The uprising shoved that the Social
Democrats and the peasant parties--the Smallholders and the National
Peasants (Petofi)--all comnand significant popular following in Hungary.
At the sane tine the organization of a number of parties which stressed
the importance of a specifically Christian political philosophy indicated
the strong survival of sentiment in favor of conservatism and tradition.
While the clear-cut opposition against Commism of the major peasant
party and of the conservative parties represents a massive and relatively
uncomplicated resistance potential factor, it is apparent that the Social
Democrats, despite their historic susceptibility to Comnunist coalitional
overtures, nay be looked upon by the regime as its most dangerous party
opponent, since its strength, like that of the Comnunists, is largely
oriented around the working class. The predominant participation of the
workers in the actual fighting of the uprising and the expressed interest
of all the major parties in preserving many post-World War 11 socialistic
achievements, necessitate a careful appreciation in Special Forces planning
of the key role that the Social Democratic forces will play in the
fostering of resistance and in any future political settlenent.
h. Church and State
The strong religious allegiances of the population of Hungary
account for the fact that the churches play a significant part in the
country's resistance history and rank high as a positive resistance poten-
tial factor. The Ronan Catholic Church is the most important, but the
Protestant churches represent a sizeable minority. The 1940 ptatistics
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concerning the religious denominations?which nnst be used since no comparable
post-World. War II figure S have been published--show a picture of their rela-
tive strengths which is still reasonably accurate ?2l9
Number of
Denomination
Adherents
Roman Catholic
61120,000
Greek Catholic (Uhiate)
233,672
Reformed (Calvinist)
1,9350000
Evangelical (Lutheran)
557,000
Greek Orthodox
38,300
Baptists
17,917
Jews
14.00,980
Unitarians
8,14.6
Others
5,515
Per cent of
Total Population
65.6
2.5
20.8
6.o
0.4
0.2
4.3
0.1
0.1
In the geographical distribution of denominations in Hungary the most
important characteristic is that the greatest concentration of Roman Catho-
lics is in Western Hungary and that of the Protestants in Eastern Hungary.
The Greek Catholic (Uhiate) Church has one diocese in Hungary whose center
220
is Hajdudorog in northeast Hungary.
Small numbers of Greek Orthodox are
concentrated near the Hungarian-Rumanian border.221 As a result of the deci-
mation of their ranks during World War II, the total Jewish population is
only about half of its pre-war total. The greatest concentration of Jews
is in Budapest, with insignificant numbers in other cities 222 The center
of the Reformed (Calvinist) Church is Debrecen.223 According to one report
Bekescsaba on the Rumanian frontier is the center of the Evangelical Church.224
Available information is inadequate to present a more accurate picture
of the regional distribution of the various religious groups in Hungary. In
addition to the centers of concentration noted above, members of sore of the
religious groups, especially of the Catholic and Protestant, will be found
elsewhere in the country. This is particularly true of Catholics, who con-
stitute approximately 65 per cent of the population. Protestants, who are
concentrated in the east, are at the sane tine to be found in the western
part of the country, e.g., Evangelicals in the counties of Pest, Fejer,
Komarom, Vas, and. Veszpren225 and Calvinists in Nagykanizsa.226
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Beginning in 1948 the churches of Hungary were subjected to persecution
through measures connonly used by Communist regimes everywhere. These
measures included the nationalization without compensation of larger landed
properties; the confiscation of church schools and the virtual abolition
of religious instruction in the schools; the dissolution of a large number
of national and local charitable, cultural, and economic associations under
religious auspices; the abolition of many ecclesiastical holidays; the
forcible extraction from the clergy of an oath of loyalty to the government;
the disbandment of Roman Catholic religious orders; the subjection of
appointments of bishops and prelates to governnent approval with retroactive
effect; the establishment of a crypto-Communist "Movement of Peace Priests"
within the Ronan Catholic Church; and the abolition of the exenption of
clergymen and seminarians from military service ?227
In addition to these
measures, Which provided the "legal" frarPwork for the destruction of the
churches, anti-religious propaganda; intense police terrorism, brutal
treatment of the clergy, and discrimination against the steadfast among
the laity were enployed by the regime to break the religious spirit and
traditions of the people.228
Despite the struggle put up by the religious and lay officials of
the Protestant churches, notably Bishop Laszlo Ravasz of the Reformed
(Calvinist) Church and Bishop Lajos Ordas of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church, these religious bodies, together with the Unitarian Church, capitu-
lated rather easily to the regine's demands and had. signed agreements with
the state by the end of 1948.229 The arrest, conviction, and subsequent
detention of Cardinal Mindszenty, the Primate of the Roman Catholic Church
in Hungary, which, because of its ideological and numerical strength, was
the primary target of the regime's anti-religious canpaign, not only
failed to demoralize the forces of religion but created a synbol which
strengthened all segments of national opposition. It was not until mid-
1950, after almost two additional years of fierce struggle that an agree-
ment, much more severe than that extracted from the Protestant churches,
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was concluded. with the Ronan Catholic Bench of Bishops and signed by Arch-
bishop Jozsef Groesz, acting Primate during the detention of Cardinal
Nindszenty. The real intentions of the regine were signified by its
dissolution of the Catholic religious orders a few days after the conclu-
sion of the agreenent; the continued resistance of the Church was signified
by Archbishop Groesz's arrest barely ten months later.23? The failure of
the regine was subsequently signified. by the limited success of the "patriotic
priest" novenent, the toning down of the canpaign against the Church during
the "New Course" period (1953-1954) under the governnent leadership of Imre
Nagy, further easements in favor of the Church in 1956 after a new period
(1955) of intensified persecution under the leadership of Matayas Rakosi,
and finaliy the popular acclaim accorded during the uprising of October-
November 1956 to the persecuted leading Church dignitaries, notably to
Cardinal Nindszenty.
The efforts of the people during the uprising of October-November 1956
to restore the leading churchmen in Hungary signified the failure of the
regine to undermine their reputation or the principles of hierarchical
succession. Cardinal Mindszg5nty was released from detention by the insur-
A-
gents and restored to his see, but a few days later at the beginning of the
second Soviet intervention he sought sanctuary in the Uhited States Legation
in Budapest. Bishop Lajos Ordass? Primate of the Evangelical Church, was, on
6.,October 1956, cleared by the Suprene Court of Hungary of the charges for
which he was convicted in 1948 and was fully reinstated in his ecclesiasti-
cal position during the uprising, although he subsequently disdained having
taken any part in it.231 Bishop Laszlo Ravasz was reported to have becone
editor-in-chief of a Reformed (Calvinist) weekly during the revolt.232 No
other information about him is available but it is possible that he was
restored to the leadership of the Reformed Church and, like the restored
head of the Evangelical Church, has so far retained his post under the
Kadar regime.
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Details are lacking about the role during the revolt of the Catholic
clergy. The material so far available does not reveal that the clergy
assuned prominent positions in the leadership organs of the revolution.
To sone extent this apparent quiescence of the clergy nay be ascribed to
the fact that the peasantry, among whom they wield the preponderance of
their influence, did not becone involved in the ten-day rebellion to the
sane extent as the urban classes. On the other hand, the repression cam-
paign of the Kadar regine, which suddenly increased in intensity during
July and August 1957, suggests the possibility that the clergy nay have
played a larger, if relatively inconspicuous, role thpn presently known.
A few reports of arrests of local priests after the revolt also indicate
this possibility.233
Even though the specific role of the clergy in the various regions of
the uprising in Hungary cannot be determined at this tine, the continued
influence of the Catholic Church in Hungary and the importance of Cardinal
Minds zenty as a national symbol of opposition to Commilnism were amply
denonstrated. His release from detention had been one of the specific
demands in sone of the revolutionary manifestoes and his return during
the uprising was acclaimed by the whole nation. The possibility that
Minds zenty night even play an active political role was evidenced by the
demand of Zoltan Tidly, head of the Smallholders ParLy: that he be in-
cluded in the new government as the only man who could unite the country
politica11y,234 and by the Cardinal's own demurrer. that 4.evould make
no decision about his political role until he had had tine to inform
himself of the situation.235 He did speak out strongly in favor of the
revolution, calling upon the United Nations to save Hungary236 and
branding the Khdar government as a Soviet imposition.237 In a speech
made during the uprising he called for the recognition of the right of
"private ownership" but only to the extent that it is "rightly and
justly limited by social interests,"237 and at the tine of the second
Soviet intervention he denied that the fight for freedom had been aimed
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at the restoration of the pre-war political system6239 The Kadar regime
has subsequently singled him out more than any other person as the provo-
cateur of the bloody revolt, alleging that be advocated a return to the
old economic system of landed estates and private industrial ownership,
that the "Horthyite" leaders of the counter-revolutionary forces wanted
to thrust him into prominence as a man above parties, and that such counter-
revolutionary groups as the Catholic People's Party, the Democratic People's
Party, the Sacred Heart of Jesus Association, and the Christian Youth Party
were projections of his personality and influence.240 Advertisements of
the Hungarian government's "White Book" on the revolution displayed a
portrait of the Cardinal, suggesting his prime responsibility for the
episode.241
The January 6, 1957, mnifesto of the Kadar government, while guaran-
teeing freedom to the churches and religious instruction in the schools,
made it clear that they were not to oppose the principles of the one-Party
state.242
A decree of 23 March 1957 stated that while religious instruc-
tion would be permitted during limited sessions in the schools, the full
vigor of the law would be applied against those who tried to exploit this
right for political purposes.243
In the succeeding nonths subtle obstacles
have reportedly been placed against the conduct of religious education.244
Another decree of the sane date called for government approval of church
appointments made since the beginning of October 1956 and in the future.245
In February 1957 the Kadar regime accused Minds zenty of having ordered
the dismissal from their duties of 18 priests who had been cooperating
with the regime, including apparently members of the "National Peace Com-
mittee of Catholic Priests" (so-called "patriotic priests") and implied
that be VW attempting to discredit Catholic nembers of parlianent.246
This development was presumably connected with the Vatican's excomnunica-
tion during that month of Father Richard Horvath, vice-president of the
Peace Committee, and its threat of similar action against other "peace
priests" Who continued to hold church posts given them by the regime
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without ecclesiastical sanction.247 As of mid-1957 Kadar maintained that
he favored the revival of religious education, to be given at the option
of the parents, but at the same time made it clear that the church was
subordinate to the state.
At the beginning of August 1957, the regime struck out at the church,
arresting a number of priests Who allegedly had formed a large-scale
"counter-revolutionary" organization during the uprising of 1956 with
headquarters in the Central Theological Seminary in Budapest. The charge
specified that during the uprising they had, at the behest of Cardinal
Nindszenty, looted the Religious Affairs Office, and further that they
printed and distributed large quantities of leaflets and propaganda
material in centers of the uprising and that they maintained close con-'
tact with the rebels, conducted "personal agitation among the rebels,"
supplying them with food, and. helping them to hide out after the revolt.
The Ministry of Interior announcement added that "sone church leaders
48
were aware of the large-scale organization.?2 These arrests cane in the
imnediate wake of a late July roundup by the Kadar regime of a large number--
estimated between 1,500 and 10,000--of alleged enemies of the state, whose
arrests seem not to be related in all cases to the uprising of 1956 but
designed to isolate potential enemies of the Communist regime and to mini-
mize the possibility of a new outbreak.249
Together with the concurrent
arrest of a number of right-wing leaders of minor political parties formed
during the uprising and the alleged conspiratorial connection of sone of
them with Cardinal Mindszenty, 250 these events indicate the continuing
strong role of the Church in perpetuating the hostility of the Hungarian
people against Connunism and at the same tine attests to the regime's
substantial fear of the Church's influence and of the resistance potential
of its organization.
At present the Hungarian hierarchy, under the leadership of Archbishop
Jozsef Groesz, has been following a conciliatory policy towards the regime.
It has formed an organization called "Opus Pacis" (Work of Peace) to
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cooperate with the Communist-organized "peace novement..251
It was subse-
quently reported that the National Peace Committee of Catholic Priests
expressed satisfaction with the new organization and hence decided to
suspend its own activities.252
In spite of this uneasy truce it can be
expected that the deep-rooted antagonisms between the Connunist regine and
the Church will flare up again. The revelation by a regine spokesman in
early September 1957 that the Bishops of Veszprem and Vac had been banished
from their sees is the most recent indication of this probability.
In the event of future war the local Catholic clergy, especially in
the rural areas, will afford Special Forces knowledgeable and trustworthy
allies in their efforts to rally popular support to resistance undertakings.
Pro-regine priests will be found in sone localities, but the fact that they
are generally known as such to the local populace253 will facilitate avoidance
of them.
Although a wide diversity of convictions with respect to the social
and political values of Communist ideology and institutions will be found
anong the Protestant clergynen, a decade of tyranny, capped by a bloody
suppression of the national uprising of 1956, has probably left anong them
few hopes that Communism could be either acconnodated or even tolerated,
and hence many of them, perhaps the majority, especially in the rural areas,
will prove sympathetic to active anti-regime endeavors and many may be
willing to take the risks entailed in cooperation with Special Forces.
Contacts among them, which should be made by Special Forces on an indivi-
dually selected basis if possible, will yield valuable information.
i. Military and Security Forces
The conduct and attitudes of the Army, Air Force, and the various
police forces during the uprising of October-November 1956 have been discussed
in the previous sections dealing with the armed resistance and the political
organizations of the insurgents. The reorgsnizational problems and estimated
strength of these groups since the revolt are noted in Part III of this report.
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It is important, however, to summarize here the resistance potential aspects
of these groups as they affect over-all Special Forces evaluations of the
human element in Hungary.
(1) Security Forces:
With the notorious exception of the AVH the security forces
of the regine, whether the Civil Police or Border Guards, either sided with
the revolutionaries or did little to oppose them.
The United Nations Special Committee on Hungary has well defined the
AVE through the nost forceful technique of definition possible--description.
The full impact of the following passage will best be derived if it be
remenbered that the U.N. report in question was lauded throughout the free
world as a marvel of balance and dispassionateness.
The Committee was deeply shocked by what it learned from
witnesses who told of the sufferings inflicted on the Hungarian
people by the AVE. It was struck by the extent of the abuses
that could be perpetrated by a police force without control
and thus all-powerful, pitiless and unabashed. by any shaneful
act. It realized that the existence of such a body, whose
secret power affected every phase of public and private life,
prevented the enjoynent of all human rights and. perverted the
functioning of every independent institution.
. . . . Norinsily entrusted with the investigation of
offences against the security of the State, the AVE devoted
itself to the defence of the regine and mare particularly of
those who were in power. Granted milimited freedom of action
by the regine, it increased the number of its officers and
planted its spies and inforners everywhere. Through them it
penetrated into offices and factories: into apartnent houses
and schools, into diplomatic posts and into the courts. Its
uniformed police guarded important public buildings, and its
plain clothes police mingled with the crowds. Acting without
any outside supervision of any kind, its nenbers becane a
privileged group with innortant material advantages. Separated
from the rest of the population by a wall of hate, they becare
a state within the State and a group apart, dedicated to con-
trol of the people by terrorism and oppression. During the
days of October and November, the horrified revolutionaries
discovered in the AVE headquarters files containing "black-
lists" with information and reports on alnost every inbsbitant
of the country, countless recordings of telephone and private
conversations, and also "perfected" Lypes of torture chambers. .
At the beginning of the October Revolution, it was the
members of the AVE who first tried to put down the insurrection
with machine-guns and their usual methods of terror and torture.
The people's vengeance was turned against them, and it knew
no bounds. Their forner victims and the children of their
victim committed atrocities in their turn. There were
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lynchings, hangings and shootings, and the pleas of the provi-
sional leaders, who were trying to restore law and order, were
often ignored. Many nembers of the AVH found sanctuary in
refuges offered them by the revolutionary organizations pending
trial according to regular judicial procedure. 254
The conduct of the Security, or political, Police (the AVE) during the
uprising and that of the people towards them, provided conclusive proof that
the Communist-sponsored totalitarian dictatorships df Eastern Europe are
founded upon a class of nen whose conduct, character, and reputation are so
perverted as to make them capable of flouting not only the traditions and
loyalties of the society from which they have sprung but of attempting to
destroy the dignity of human nature itself. Mbre precisely, the basic
character and principles of the actual governing forces of the discredited
Soviet-oriented Hungarian state cannot, by-and-large, be distinguished from
the conduct of its brutal security arm, no mare than the ruling forces of
Nazi Germany could disassociate thenselves from the SS atrocities of World
War II. The brutality which the numbers of the AVE had visited upon the
people for the purpose of promoting and enforcing the Connunist order re-
coiled with a vengeance upon them as the mobs with unfailing primitive
instincts of justice turned upon their ten-year provoker. Thus the fury
of the mobs advertised to the world the most powerful elenental resistance
potential available against the Connunist system--its foundation upon an
unnatural and criminal treatment of humanity.
(2) Army:
One of the most important lessons of the uprising both from
the standpoint of the Soviets and the West was the refusal of the rank-and-
file of the Hungarian Army?drawn chiefly from the worker and peasant classes--
to fight for a foreign power against their own people. Virtually the whole
Hungarian Army wherever it was able lost no tine in helping or joining the
insurgents during the uprising. It is not known that any unit of the Hun-
garian Army fought against the insurgents or aided the Soviet cause. Nbst
of the higher-echelon officers apparently remained true to their comnissions,
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but sone of the latter did defect and one 'of them, Colonel Maleter,
emerged from the revolution as one of its most tragic heroes. Many
lower-echelon officers, their pro-Soviet indoctrination notwithstanOing,
sided with the uprising. Surprising to the Connunists was the joining
of the fight by the cadets of the military academies of Budapest.
About 800 such cadets from the Petofi Military Academy in Budapest
joined the first demonstration on October 23 and the students of the
Zrinyi Military Academy of Budapest, together with the Budapest armored
brigade, fought valiantly in the Matra Mbuntains against an armored
division.255
At the tine of the second Soviet intervention particular efforts
were exercised by the Soviet military command to bring under its control
the Hungarian Officer Corps, as it had been demonstrated that pro-Soviet
Indoctrination had not prevented many of the officers from siding with
the nationalist uprising. Sone of the deportees to the USSR were
officers. Orders requiring the armed forces to report to their units
were quickly countermanded by the order denobilizing a considerable
part of the standing Army, as it was realized by the Soviets that the
Army had disintegrated.256
Because of the status of the Army, the
Soviets demanded that state security forces be so organized as to
provide a inure effective political control over the contemporary
opposition and any subversive movements that night develop in the
future.257 It was estimated that perhaps 80 per cent of the Hungarian
officers were separated from the forces either as a result of their
participation with the insurgents or for their unwillingness to sign
a post-revolt declaration of loyalty.258
Unless the Army is reduced to the size and status of a mercenary
force, it will probably be a liability to the Soviets in the event of
var. The uprising would indicate that in the event of war ways and
means to defect could be found by the troops, although probably with
greater difficulty than in the uprising. Significant too for Special
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Forces planning is the facility with which the soldiery, when their units
disintegrated, joined insurgent bands, sone of Which were under civilian
command. The testimony of an escapee to the effect that many officers were
reluctant to join the revolution without assurances of retention in their
positions in the event of victory and that because of such misgivings the
national antiaircraft conmand joined the revolutionaries without enthusiasm59
points up the range of problems, political as well as military, which Special
Forces units will encounter in its contacts with various elements of poten-
tial guerilla material in the event of war.
j. Ninority Elements
In contrast to conditions which obtain in other countries of the
Soviet orbit, the racial minorities of modern Hungary are so few in total
number that they do not constitute a significant item in the over-all resis-
tance picture. The Germans, Jews, Yugoslays, Slovaks, Gypsies, Rumanians,
and other minority elenents together represent only five. per cent of the
Hungarian population and, for the most part, are so widely scattered and
disorganized that they have little capability of concerted opposition to the
regime. During the 1956 revolution there was no recorded instance of
minority partidipation en bloc on either the Communist or anti-Connunist
side except in the case of the Jews who (for reasons explained later in
this section) were found in relatively large numbers in both camps. At the
sane tine, it should be recognized that most, if not all, of the minority
grouPs in Hungary have reason to detest the present Communist regime. In
part this reaction stems from the patriotic and anti-Communist sentiuents
which are shared by the entire Hungarian population; in part also, from
(grievances which may be peculiar to an individual minority. Special
Forces teens operating in Hungary may be able to capitalize on these
grievances and, on a limited and localized scale, derive assistance from
members of various minority groups.
The niwPrical strength of the minorities in Hungary, according to
official U.S. estimates based upon the 1949 Hungarian census, is less than
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500,000 persons. The comparative strengths of the individual minorities,
both in relation to each other and the dominant Hungarian (Magyar) element,
are assessed in the following table:260
Population of Hungary in 1949
According to Mother Tongue
(in thousands)
Per cent of
Nationality
Number
Total Popn.
Hungarians
(Magyar)
8,721.0
94.75
Germans
252.0
2.74
Jews
130.0
1.41
Yugoslays
26.0
0.28
Slovaks
25.0
0.27
Gypsies
19.0
0.21
Rumanians
18.0
0.20
Other
13.0
0.14
9:204.0
100.00
The Germans, who form the largest single minority in Hungary, are most
numerous in four counties innEdiately west of the Danube (Baranya, Tolna,
Fejer, and Veszprem), in the southeastern county of Bacs-Kiskun, and in
the western outskirts of Budapest. Eighty per cent or more of the Jaw
are concentrated in Budapest, while the Yugoslays, Slovaks, and Rumanians
are mostly found in small enclaves near the northwestern, western, and
southern frontier. The Gypsies occupy no fixed place of abode and are
scattered throughout the country.
Particular information of interest to Special Forces planners on
individual minority groups in Hungary may be summarized as follows:
(1) Germans:
The estimated 252,000 Germans (often called Swabians) in
Hungary are nearly all descended from colonists who entered the country
during the 18th century, although some persons trace their ancestry back
to German settlers who moved eastward as early as the llth and 12th cen-
turies. Their character has been much the sane as German colonists in
other parts of Eastern Europe. Sober, industrious, and alnost impervious
to cultural assimilation by the surrounding Nhgyar population, they have
maintained a distinctive German identity and have built up a standard of
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living superior to most of their neighbors. Prior to World War II nost of
the Germans in Hungary were agriculturalists. There was also a thriving
business community and a skilled industrial force, nostly consisting of
coal miners.
Until 1945 the German population in Hungary was tornst twice its
present strength, numbering nearly 500,000 persons. In that year the Hun-
garian governnent, largely at Russian insistence, began a mass depoktation
of ethnic Germans to Germany on the grounds of alleged or proven Nazi
sympathies 'during World War II. It is estimated that upwards of 200,000
Germans were expelled in this nanner, while another 25,000 left Hungary
voluntarily or were carried off by the Soviet occupation authorities for
forced labor in the USSR. As a consequence of the deportations, many one-
tine German districts in Hungary entirely lost their German character and
were resettled by Magyars from other parts of Hungary and from Hungarian
261
colonies in Czechoslovakia. Another factor which helped to weaken the
German influence in Hungary were the arbitrary relocations of population
and labor force instituted by the Communist regine shortly after World War
II. Thousands of Germans were uprooted from lands they had tilled for cen-
turies and were either scattered through other agricultural areas of the
country or were assigned to mining and other industrial enterprises. The
Communist regine continued these persecutions and harassnents of the German
minority until early 1949, at which tine a halt was called to the deportations
and a mare benevolent attitude towards the remaining Germans was adopted.
In recent years the position of the German minority in Hungary has steadily
inproved: it is now guaranteed equal rights with R11 other Hungarian citi-
zens, is allowed to have special schools with instruction in both the Magyar
and German languages, and has been encouraged to form cultural societies of
its own.262
At the present tine the largest concentration of Germans in Hungary
appears to be located in Baranya county, where several score all-German
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mining villages are established at various points in the Mecsek Mbuntain
range. Next in inportance as centers of German settlement appear to be
the counties of Bacs-Eiskun, Pest, Tolna, and Veszprem, where there are
scattered German communities. The once important German settlenents in
northwest Hungary, however, have nearly all been cleared of their former
German inhabitants as a result of the deportations of 1945-1948 and later
evacuations of political unreliables from the frontier zone. West and
southwest of Budapest the surviving German population has apparently
becone much intermingled in recent years with its Hungarian neighbors
and, according to one reliable source, has endeavored to play down its
German identity in order to avoid unwelcone prominence and possible inter-
ference by the Commnist authorities.263
Very little information is available concerning the current attitudes
of the German minority towards the Hungarian Connunist regine. It nay
be presuned that a greater resistance potential exists among the German
conmunities which retain a strong consciousness of their national iden-
tity (e.g., the mining villages) than among those which have becone
diluted by adnixture with Magyar elenents (e.g., in the vicinity of
Budapest). Again, the opportunities for assistance to Special Forces
appear greater in all-German communities where there is a strong sense
of group cohesiveness than in mixed German-Magyar settlenents where
there is greater likelihood of mutual suspicion and betrayal. But in
either case it does not appear that the Germans in Hungary will be likely
to range themselves openly behind a Special Forces overture until the
prospects of victory are fairly well assured. They have already learned
through the bitter experiences of 1945-1948 the penalties of collabora-
tion with a foreign liberation force, and they probably realize that
their best protection in Hungary is to avoid political controversy and
the least appearance of disloyalty to the established regine. However
much the Germans in Hungary may synpathize with Special Forces opera-
tions, the aid which they may give will in all probability be cautious,
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furtive, and extrenely limited in scope. It is beyond the province of
this study to determine Whether or not Special Forces operations in regions
of German settlement could be aided by the utilization of carefully selec-
ted Germans deported from Hungary since 1945 and now residing in West
Gernany.*
(2) Jews
Official Hungarian statistics of 1953-1954 place the number
of Jews (i.e., persons professing the Jewish faith) within the country at
anywhere between 100,000 and 130,000. These figures represent a sharp
decline from the more than 400,000 Jews who were congregated in the
present-day territory of Hungary prior to 1939. The discrepancy is largely
explained by the pogroms instituted under the German occupancy of Hungary
in 1944, in Which about 220,000 Jews are believed to have perished., and
by the post-World War II emigration of about 50,000 Jews to various coun-
tries of the free world.264 Of the Jews still remaining in Hungary, the
great majority (between 80,000 and 100,000) live in Budapest.265
Mbst Hungarian Jews are active in business, the professions, and
governnent service. Relatively few seem to be engaged in agriculture or
as industrial laborers. According to one source, the number of male Jews
in Hungary between the ages of 16 and 55 is considerably below the normal
statistical average because of the persecution suffered. under Hitler.266
If this report is true, the military and labor force potential of the Jews
in Hungary is correspondingly reduced.
Under CotnUnist rule the Hungarian Jew have cone to occupy a sone-
what ambiguous position. The "traditionalist" Jews who still frequent
the synagogues and seek to carry on Jewish philanthropic and cultural
activities have been subjected to repeated repression by the governnent.
So also have been the real or suspected agents of Zionism. On the other
hand, the "progressive" Jews who are willing to cast off the religious and
* Cf. Georgetown University Research Project (under contract to A.C. of
S., I.), Project 9457, German Expellees and Refugees: Organizations and
Leaders, 12 September 1955 (S).
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cultural allegiances of their forefathers have found a ready haven in the
Comnunist Party. Sone of the most powerful Communist leaders in post-
World War II Hungary (e.g.) Matyas Rakosi and Erno Gero) are of Jewish
origin, and many reports confirm that, despite recent realignments in
the Hungarian Communist leadership, Jews continue to occupy a dispropor-
tionately high percentage of Party and government posts. This circumstance
has contributed powerfully to the popular dislike of the Communist dictator-
ship, and one of the most striking features of the recent resistance history
of Hungary has been the upsurge of anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic deton-
strations.267
Events during the October rebellion of 1956 served to illustrate
still further the divided political allegiance existing in the Hungarian
Jewish connunity. One U.S. Jewish spokesman, apparently well-inforned,
has claimed that sone 25,000 Jews in Hungary joined in the revolt against
Comnunism.268 Another source, also well-informed, claims that 16,000
Jews were anong the great tide of Hungarian refugees which crossed the
frontier and found haven in Austria.269 Granted these allegations are
true, the question remains as to what part was taken in the rebellion by '
the remaining 100,000 or more Jews in Hungary. No conclusive answer is
possible, but the available information suggests that while many of these
Jew took no action either for or against the governtent, a large per-
centage actively supported the Kadar regine and the Soviet intervention.
In this connection it may be noted that the hated. Hungarian secret police
(Aim), which remained loyal to the Communist Party throughout the rebel-
lion and was the principal target of revolutionary fury, is believed to
have been staffed in considerable neasure by Jewish personne1.270
Under present conditions existing in Hungary, both the resistance
potential of the Hungarian Jews and their possible utility to Special
Forces appear to be exceptionFIlly poor. A large proportion, possibly
the majority, of the Jewish population is apparently loyal to the Kadar
regime either through conviction or desire to live in peace. Of the Jews
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who sympathized with or aided the recent revolt, it seems likely that many
have been badly shaken by the anti-Semitic outbursts of the revolutionaries
and now ask themselves whether the position of the Jews in a liberated
Hungary would be any better than under a Comnunist government. It should
also be recognized that any overt attempt by Special Forces to enlist the
support of the Jewish minority would almost certainly arouse the instant
antagonism and suspicion of the dominant Magyar population on whom any
successful liberation venture must be based.
(3) Yugoslays:
Although a semi-official Yugoslav source has recently clained
that as many as 130,000 Yugoslays are now resident in Hungary, it would ap-
pear that the U.S. estimate of 26,000 is much closer to the real situation.
These 26,000 may be further subdivided into approximately 8,000 Croats,
3,000 Serbs, 2,000 Slovenes, and 13,000 Bunjevacs (Catholic Serbians). Vir-
tually all these persons are concentrated in the western and southwestern
areas of Hungary near the Yugoslav border except for an undisclosed number
who were removed from the frontier zone in 1950 as a security neasure and
were resettled elsewhere ?271
Practically all the Yugoslays in Hungary are peasants with little
political consciousness or resistance potential. A good proportion,
perhaps half, have been considerably Magyarized either of their own
volition or because of the cultural assimilation fostered by various
Hungarian governments during the course of the present century. Because
of their small numbers and engulfment by a vastly superior Hungarian popu-
lation, it is not likely that the Yugoslays in Hungary would venture openly
to assist a Special Forces mission, but it seems probable that many of them
harbor resentments against the Communist regime which would dispose them
to give covert aid where possible to a U.S.-sponsored liberation venture.
(4) Slovaks:
The estimated 25,000 Slovaks in Hungary are less than a
_ third of the nearly 100,000 Slovaks who were present on Hungarian soil as
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of May 1946. In that month more than 60,000 Slovaks resident in Hungary
took advantage of a Hungarian-Czedhoslovak population exchange agreegent
and opted for resettlenent in Czechoslovakia. The remaining 25,000
apparently passed up the opportunity to emigrate, presumably because
they preferred to live in Hungary or saw no prospect of better conditions
in Czechoslovakia.
Mast of the Slovaks in Hungary are farners and are scattered north
and northwest of Budapest, often in fairly close proximity to the Czecho-
slovak border. A few Slovaks may also be found in the Csongrad and
Bekes counties of the southeast. judging from the scanty information
available, it appears that the Slovak minority in Hungary does not
represent a very likely source either of resistance potential or of
aid to Special Forces.
(5) Gypsies:
The estimated 19,000 Gypsies in Hungary are distributed
widely throughout the country and apparently represent an outcast group
which the Connunist regige has alternately persecuted and tolerated.
The Gypsies are usually egployed during the sunner as farghands on the
state farms (sovkhozes) and eke out their living during the remainder
of the year at handicrafts and odd jobs 272
Because of their mobility
and familiarity with broad areas of the country, the Gypsies represent
a source of potential utility to Special Forces, but their characteris-
tic instability and lack of political consciousness may make them
very unreliable adjuncts.
(6) Rumanians:
Practically all the 18,000 Rumanians in Hungary are
found in the southeastern counties of Bekes and Hajdu-Bihar, near the
Rumanian border. Nothing is known of their political attitudes, and
It is probable that they are in the main a peaceable group anxious to
avoid entanglenents with the regine. Their resistance potential is
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negligible, and such assistance as they might extend to Special Forces
would be extremely limited.
(7)
Others:
Small clusters of several other national minorities can be
found on Hungarian soil, of whom the most numerous are probably the
Ruthenians who numbered 4,500 persons in 1941. The potential utility
of these persons to Special Forces may be considered negligible.
k. Cross-Border Hungarian Minorities
Demands for a revision of the post-World War I Treaty of Trianon,
by which Hungary lost about 71 per cent of its former territory and 63 per
cent of its earlier population, have been a focal point of nationalist
agitation ever since. During World War II, with the concurrence of Germany,
it reincorporated those portions of its lost territory where the largest
ethnic Hungarian populations resided (see Map B), but as a result of the
post-World War II settlement in Eastern Europe these territories were once
again alienated.
The estimated post-World War II total of the ethnic Hungarian popula-
tion in the various countries on Hungary's borders is about 3,000,000
persons, distributed as follows (see Map B):
Czechoslovakia 610,000273
Rumania 1,500,000274
(chiefly Transylvania)
Transcarpathian Ukraine 320,000275
(chiefly in the extrene southwest border
area and the town of Beregovo)
Yugoslavia 496,000276
(chiefly in the Serbian province of
Vojvodina, with much smaller groups
in Croatia and Slovenia)
Although the Communist regime of Hungary, in line with Soviet minority
and boundary policies, has consistently suppressed revisionist feelings, it
recognized as a matter of fact that the issue is not dead. The August 1955
issue of Propagandista singled out among other nationalist heresies the
(chiefly southern Slovakia)
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effort, Which could be linked to Imre Nay's "rightist deviation," to
divert attention from "socialist building" by exploiting the "closed issue"
of Hungary's frontiers. It justified the restriction of Hungary's terri-
tory after World War II as deserved punishment for its Axis collaboration
and called for the development of "socialist" rather than "national"
patriotism. It likewise urged upon the Hungarian minorities in Czecho-
slovakia and Rumania that they also adopt a "socialist patriotism" and
to consider these countries as their true "fatherland. "277
If Special Forces operational plans for Hungary, Where cover and
concealment factors are very limited, should provide for the utilization
of the more favorable terrain ringing its borders, sone of the Hungarian
minority elements in these regions would probably prove to be useful
allies in the conduct of guerilla activity. Since the revisionist
attitudes of these minorities differ in the various regions concerned,
their utilization by Special Forces would have to be preceded by an
evaluation of these groups in each specific area.
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10
gr
?
4.
so
48
12
G. D. R.
G. F. R
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4*
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Prague
C E
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AUSTRIA
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POLAND
610, 000
22
24
26
28
30
t"'"???\
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U.
Os
116
Vienna
Burgenland
iiev 4
S. S.
UKRAINIAN SSR
mOMAYIAmSSIC
K.ish,nevri
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YUGOSLAVIA
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1, 500, 000
1311( ha r e St
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100
200
400 M.
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BLACK SEA\
MAP B
HISTORICAL BOUNDARIES
AND
CROSS-BORDER HUNGARIANS (S)
c,
100
2(10
300
400 Km
BULGARIA
18
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z SECRET GREECE
\????
24
20
22
435, 000
26
Hungary before 1920
Acquisitions bei-ween 1938 and 1945
Present?day boundaries
Cross-border Hungarians
28
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?????m???????,61664466M1?6620r611009.1ffigaliii0
CA
Fri
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?
Cr,
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1. Size and Locationl
Hungary occupies an area of 35,912 square miles bisected by the Danube
River. Her western border with Austria, approximately 124 miles long, is
formed in part by mountainous outliers of the lens. In the northwest the
boundary crosses the Ferto Tava (Neusiedler See) and the Kis Altai (Little
Plain) to the Danube River, Which forms part of the border with Czecho-
slovakia. The boundary follows the Danube for approximately 93 miles.
It merges with the Ipay River, a tributary of the Danube, following it
for a distance, and then proceeds ' Aween the lower ranges of the Western
Carpathian NOuntains. In the east and south, the boundary crosses the Nagy
Alfold (Great Plain), portions of which are located in the neighboring
USSR, Rtmanial and Yugoslavia. The border with the USSR is about 50 miles
long; with Rumania it stretches over 186 miles. The boundary with Yugo-
slavia crosses the Nagy Alfold for over 124 miles. Then it is aligned
with the Drava River for about 93 miles and the Mira River for about 62
miles. Except for the river barriers and. mountains, Hungary 's borders
offer no natural defenses against invasion.
Major river valleys cutting
through the mountainous border areas provide natural routes of communica-
tion with Austria and Czechoslovakia.
2. Terrain
The bills, low mountains, and expanses of steppe are shown on map C.
Sixty per cent of the country is lowland. The mountains, While steep-
sloped in places, can be crossed by foot travelers. Thus relief offers
few obstacles to the foot traveler, Whether in the border areas or in
the interior. The flat, open plains, While favorable for large-scale
ground and air operations, are less suitable for Special Forces opera-
tions and guerilla activities. Forest cover and relief in the mountainous
areas in the west and northeast offer more favorable sites for guerilla
bases.
Drainage is the major deternmnt to cross-country movement. The
Danube and Tisza Rivers, dividing Hungary into TransdanUbia (Dunantul),
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the Duna-Tisza area, and Tiszantul, obstruct east-west movement. MOreover,
many marshy areas and large floodplains along the rivers, navigation canals,
and drainage and irrigation ditches obstruct vehicular traffic and impede
foot travel through much of the lowland. The plains are located in the Kis
Alfold in the northwest and in the Nagy Alfold, which comprises most of the
area east of the Danube River. They are separated by a chain of low hills
and mountains extending from the west of Lake Balaton to the area between
the northeastern border and the Tisza River.
a. Kis Alfold (Little Plain)
From the northwestern border with Austria and Czechoslovakia, the
ICis Alfold in Hungary extends southward to the Bakony Muntains, which form
the southern watershed of the Raba River and which run along the northern
shores of Lake Balaton. Moderately steep hills form the eastern and western
borders of the plain. The eastern part of the plain is rolling country,
while the northwest is flat and periodically marshy. Large areas of the
plain, particularly those northwest of Oyor, were formerly waterlogged but
have been drained and reclaimed for agriculture.
b. Nagy Alfold (Great Plain)
The Great Plain is for the most part a low steppe with the Tisza
River meandering sluggishly through the center of the region. Large parts
are known as the puszta, a treeless expanse of steppe and pastureland. Some
of these wastelands have been partially reclaimed through irrigation and
afforestation, but there are still large areas of puszta, best exemplified
by the Hortobagy. The present area of the Hortobagy, which is shown on
Map CI covers some 60,000 hectares. Some of the reclaimed land is extremely
fertile, while other sections have become wastes of alkali.
The portion of the plain east of the Tisza between Debrecen and the
Maros River is covered with a layer of fertile black earth about 50 feet
deep. It is dusty and hard in sumner, with vide, deep cracks which may
trip the foot traveler. During wet weather it becomes a heavy, sticky mud.
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In this area the skyline is unbroken. The Harms Koros River and its
tributaries flow sluggishly through the level land. Tiny round hillocks
ten to thirty feet in height serve as house sites in the extensive flat
tracts which are subject to flood.
Two large sand areas, shown on Map C, are located in the Na'
Alfold. One area lies between the Danube and the Tisza. The other area
is in Nyirseg, south of the great curve of the Tisza and northeast of
Debrecen. Long lines of sand dunes stretch across these areas. These
dunes are generally low, flat, sandy ridges five to ten miles long,
one and one-half miles wide, and trend north-northwest to
Some are as high as 50 feet, and may provide some measure
from ground observation. The shifting sands of the dunes
south-southeast.
of concealment
have been
stabilized with crop cultivation and the planting of acacia trees.
Broad hollows between dunes tend to be waterlogged. Many tiny salt or
alkali lakes are thus impounded. Some of these lakes dry up during the
intense heat of summer.
Extensive areas along the Danube and the Tisza, as well as along
their larger tributaries, are subject to flood in spring and early sur
when the snow melts in the mountains and when the break-up of the ice
results in a jam at constricted sectors of the rivers. In the Tisza
Basin, 34 per cent of the cultivated area, 47 per cent of the population,
and 50 per cent of the road and railroad systems are subject to flood.
Permanent and intermittent marshes and swamps line both rivers, imposing
considerable impediment to movement. The rivers have deposited natural
levees 20 feet or more above the adjacent plain. Dikes have been built
along some sections of the rivers to contain the flooded areas. During
vet weather these levees and dikes may be used as paths. In sectors of
the larger rivers, the floodplains are bordered by discontinuous low
? bluffs of loess deposits. Vertical loess bluffs 30 to 50 feet high
are common on the right, or vest, bank of the Danube River. The right
bank of the Danube is a continuous bluff between Budapest and Paks except
at confluences of the river with its tributaries.
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c. Low Hills and Mountains
The few areas offering refuge and concealment for guerilla-type
activities are located in the discontinuous northern highlands trending
northeast to southwest across northern BUngary and in the Necsek Nbuntains
north of Pecs. The highlands from the Hegyalja to the Bakony Mountains
and the Necsek Mountains served as areas of refuge for the Hungarian
freedom fighters during the uprising of 1956. Many HUngarians withdrew
to the mountains from which they hoped to wage partisan warfare against
the Russians.
In the west, the northern highlands are low and slope gently to rounded
summits though mountains near the Austrian border are higher. Here isolated
outliers of the Austrian and Styrian Alps rise to 975 feet. In the western
border area, outliers of the Austrian Alps are 1,814 feet high near Sopron
and 2,866 feet high vest of Koszeg. From the hills of Zala County towards
the northwest, both ruggedness of slope and altitude increases; a height
of 3,296 feet is reached at Mt. Kekes in the Matra Mountains. West of Lake
Balaton in the Zalaidomsag, sunnits of low hills are as high as 1,160 feet.
North of the lake the Bakony Mountains, which are old peneplained hill
ranges, rise from heights of 1,300 feet in the west to 1,950 and 2,275 feet
in the east. The vertes Mountains between the headwaters of the Gaja River
and Tatabanya are approximately 1,560 feet high. TO the north, between
Tatabanya and the Danube River, the Gerecse Mountains reach 2,060 feet.
Towards the east, mountain ranges rise to 11814 feet in the Buda MOuntains,
21460 feet in the Pills Mountains, 3,052 feet in the Borzsony Range, de-
cline to 2,119 feet in the cserhat Mountains, and attain the highest alti-
tudes of 3,136 and 3,296 feet in the Matra Nbuntains. Altitudes are
slightly lower towards the east in the Bukk and. Begyalja MOuntains. The
greatest elevation in the Bukk Nbuntains is 3,117 feet. In the Hegyalja
MOuntains, the elevation increases from 1,982 feet in the south to 2,912
feet at the northern border.
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South of Lake Balaton the country is a rolling low, plateau. It is
intersected by parallel streams Which afford natural north-south trending
routes. Vast loess deposits make this area one of intensive agricultural
pursuits. The erosion of loess surfaces results in narrow steep-walled
valleys, small gullies, and shallow basins which pit the level surfaces.
prom the center of this plateau rise the Mecsek Mountains like a massive
island. Elevations in the Macseks reach 2,216 feet.
d. Lakes
Lake Bilaton is the largest of three shallow, lakes in Trans-
danubia. It is 48 miles long, approximately five miles wide, and. has
an average depth of 12 feet. Its northern shore is a cliff 650 to 975
feet high, Where the Bakony MOuntains overlook the south. Dense sedges
and reeds grow along its southwestern tip.
Two smaller, shallower lakes are the Ferto Tava and the Velencei TO.
The former is a reedy frontier lake, most of 'which is in Austria. The
average depth of water varies from six feet in the west to three feet
in the east. Madh of the lake is covered with reeds. Velencei To is
six miles long and one to two miles wide. Its greatest depth is less
than ten feet. At least 38 per cent of the Velencei TO, moRtnlor the
southern part, is covered with dense reeds.
Ox-bow lakes prevail along the river courses, and several thousand
small lakes are scattered throughout the poorly drained Nagy Alfold.
Half of these are periodic shallow pools Which dry up in late summer
and. early autumn. The largest of these is Feher To, near Szeged. Its
shallow waters dry up almost completely in sumner.
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FIHNGARY
TERRAIN REGIONS (U)
Humenpe)
KO&ICE
Runavsk4 Sabot.
Lutenec
SANKT PtILTEN
.% 1,1111111?.11
?
--"sisrospata
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TIMISOARA
Kern''
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Kuhns
ZRENJ
Slavonska Poled.
The onternattonel boundaries shown on this map do not
necessarily correspond in all cases to the boundaries recog-
nized by the U 5- Government
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
RESEARCH PROJECT
9-57
Vukovar
inkovel
(DUNAW
NOVI SAD
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.epr,
Wvitati,
51:'
Gyorgy Gtu I %4%)'11..,)V.
p. 68. (U)
?
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3. Climate
Land-locked. Hungary has a continental clinate with long hot summers
and with winters of intense cold alternating with mild spells. The
climate is more inclenent in the NAV Alfold, for eastern Hungary enjoys
little of the tempering influence of the Atlantic Ocean. Mild oceanic
influences flaw through the Vienna gap and fan over the Kis Alfold, some-
times reaching as far as Budapest. Generally the climate in Hungary is
milder than that in countries of the sane latitude to the east, for the
Carpathian Muntains shelter Hungary from icy winter winds blowing out
of the USSR.
a. Temperature
The temperature maps Which follow this section show that the
lower temperatures prevail in the mountainous areas throughout the year.
During the winter and summer the greater extremes of temperature are
located in eastern Hungary. There is great variability in annual and
daily temperatures.
Absolute minim= temperatures below zero have been recorded at nany
stations throughout the country. In mountainous areas, absolute minimum
temperatures of -4?F. at Xekes and -7?F. in the Ellis MOuntains have been
recorded. Temperatures are lower in the plains, with an extrene tempera-
ture of -290F. at Xecskenet. The higher uountain teuperatures are probably
the result of tepperature inversion. During the mild winter spells,
maximum winter tenperatures have reached 60?F. Then the ground nay thaw,
becoming slippery and middy. When the nelted snow and ice cannot pene-
trate the frozen subsoil, the ground becores waterlogged and flooding
may result.
The differences of climate between eastern and western Hungary can
be seea again in Yap El which show the number of days below freezing.
Mpuntainous areas have the longest periods of teuperatures below 320F.
Western Hungary has shorter periods below freezing than eastern Hungary.
In January the mean temperatures are below freezing throughout the country.
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During the summer absolute ms.ximum temperatures in the upper nineties
and, over 1003F. have been recorded at most stations. A high of 1C6?F. has
been reached at Szeged..
Such extremes of 'winter and summer temperatures must be considered in
the storage of food and medical supplies. Suitable clothing for below-
freezing temperatures is necessary from December through February, and from
my through October anti-insect items should be available.
110
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.)
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100 120
120 140
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CONFIDENTIAL r(
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?
?
SECRET
b. precipitation
F shows the distribution and aunt of the an annual,
winter and summer precipitation. There is more precipitation in Trans-
danubia, particularly in the western and southwestern sectors, than in
the eastern half of the country. The nountains also receive greater
amounts of precipitation, but the sheltered slopes of the Hegyalja
MOuntains are quite dry. Towards the east the amount of precipitation
decreases. Ole dryest area is the Middle Tisza Basin with less than
15 inches of precipitation in sone years.
MDst of the precipitation occurs in Ney and June in the form of
summer thunderstorns. Winter precipitation frequently is snow. There
is precipitation on an average of 110 to 140 days a year. These days
are fairly evenly distributed except in the Nagy Alfold, Where rainfall
occurs nainly during occasional thunderstorms. Near the Drava River in
the southwest there is a tendency towards a secondary maximum in late
autumn caused by the Mediterranean influence.
111
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IPI rATION (INCHES)
Less than 20"
Sources: Andrew Ronai, Atlas of Centt al Eurupe, editt I by tit
Institute of Political Sciences, Count Paul I elekl Researt h
Institute, Budapest-Balatonfured, 194. (1))
Sour( es G\,orgy Ma rkus, Gtogi ail a V
p. 71. (U)
NIS 19, HungarN Section 23, "%k eati r tviu ( 11t1.0(
NIS 19, Hungary, Section 23, "Weather aid Clin ate," March 1(151, Flguri 23-47. (C
March 1951, Figure 23-47. (C)
MEAN WINTER
PRECIPITATION (INCHES)
(DECEMBER-FEBRUARY)
MEAN SUMMER
PRECIPITATION (INCHES)
(JUNE-AUGUST)
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C. Snowfall and Snow Cover
In the plains, where snowfall is lighter than elsewhere in Min-
gary, there nay be 17 to 25 days a year when there is nore than a trace
of snowfall. In the mountains the period of snowfall is longer; 53 days
of snowfall have been recorded at Kekes. The first fall nay cone in
November or Decenber; the last in Narch or early April.
The duration of snow cover varies between the nountains and plains
as well as from year to year. Generally, the number of days of snow cover
increases by approximately three for each hundred feet of altitude. With
respect to annual variation, in sone years there is no continuous snow
cover for nore than two weeks at a time. During mild winters there nay
be no snow cover at all in sone places, but during severe winters con-
tinuous snow cover may remain for one to two nonths. The principal thaw
usually occurs in March.
The depth of snow cover is also variable. The deepest cover occurs
in February. On the plains the normal depth is about three to four inches,
but in sone years the average depth is 20 inches. In occasional years
there nay be none. Snowdrifts may impede moveyent for short periods.
d. Winds
At tines the Na' Altai is swept by whirlwinds of sand in the
summer and of snow in the winter. During the winter and the transition
from winter to summer, kosava winds are likPly to occur. These are
strong southeast winds blowing particularly in the southeastern part of
the lowland, picking up considerable quantities of sand and dust and
whipping up large waves on the Tisza River. In their severest forms,
kosava winds blow with gale force up to 6o miles per hour and freeze
exposed flesh within a few minutes.
e. Visibility
Low-lying clouds in the nountains and fog near the numerous
rivers and swamps make for poor visibility. The clouds usually lift
during the forenoon but rilaY descend again at night. Two nountain stations
SE&ET
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have recorded average annual cloud cover of about 115 days. However, there
is much variation in visibility from place to place in the mountains. In
the lowland heavy fog forms more frequently in the winter and is often
widespread. It usually forms after clear, Viet nights when the air has a
tendency to stagnate.
4. Natural Vegetation
Cover and concealment features of natural vegetation are limited and
mainly seasonal. Major sources of such features are forests and tall marsh
vegetation. Areas offering cover and concealment for Special Forces opera-
tions are more plentiful vest of the Danube River, Vthere 10 to 20 per cent
of the total area is forested. East of the Danube, less than 10 per cent of
the land is forested. With only 13.5 per cent of the total land in forests,
Hungary ranks lowest among the east central European countries in both per-
centage of forest cover and amount of forests per capita. The forests are
largely of the broadleaf deciduous type, thus limiting their suitability to
seasons Vhen trees are in. leaf. Of the 1,253,000 hectares of forested land,
only 80,000 hectares, or 6 per cent of the total forests, are coniferous.
As may be seen in Nap G, the best and most extensive forest cover is
located in the northern mountain region stretching southwestward from the
Hegyalja Nmuntains near the Czechoslovak border to the Bakony muntains north
of Lake Balaton, and in the Necsek Muntains north of Pecs. The northern
mountain region varies in vidth from 13 to 28 miles. In the rolling hills of
Trans danubia, forest cover is discontinuous and interspersed with cultivated
land. In the plains regions, forest cover is sparse, for most of the land is
in grain fields and pastures. Along the western boundary, strips have been
cleared through many forests.
Beech and oak are the most common species of trees, although other
species, including chestnut, are found in the forests. Black pine grove in
isolated groves in the south and in a few small areas in northern Hungary.
Beech usually grows where the higher elevations result in decreased tempera-
ture..and increased precipitation. At lover elevations, where the climate
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in svampy areas and along rivers and lake shores, limited concealment
can be found in the tall reeds and sedges. Sone of the rushes, growing
thick and fast, are well over six feet tall by June. During the uprising
of 1956, the marshes near Yugoslavia between the Danube and Drava Rivers
became an area of refuge for the Hungarian freedom fighters, who planned
to use these swampy bases in their battle against the Russians.
116
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is warmer and dryer, oaks are dominant. Beech trees average 65 feet in
height with trunks two to three feet in diameter. They grow four to 16
feet apart and, like coniferous woods, have very little undergrowth.
Their dense canopy offers good concealment from air observation. Oak
forests may offer better concealment from ground observation as they
often have dense undergrowth of thorny bushes and braMbles six to 12
feet high. Oak trees are larger in the northern mountain region than
they are in the Necsek 1Muntains and in the rest of Tramsdanubia. In
the north they average 60 feet in height with trunks 1.5 feet in
diameter, whereas in the south they are an average 40 feet in height
with trunks one foot in diameter.
On the plains tree growth is limited to strips of woods along
streams and rivers, scattered copses, and trees bordering roads and
farms. Willow, ash, alder, and poplar with dense undeldiewth grow
along the rivers. Fairly good intermittent cover can be found in the
trees and shrubs on the floodplain of the Danube from Budapest to
Yugoslavia. Similar but less cover is available along the Tisza River.
In the Nagy Alfold forest cover is extremely poor east of the Tisza.
Nagykunsag is one of the bleakest parts of the plain. Cover is slightly
better between the Danube and the Tisza Rivers and in Nyirseg Where there
are scattered groves of acacia, and to a lesser extent of oak, hornbeam,
linden, and elm. Nyirseg is the only part of the Nagy Alfold with forest
soils and is fairly yell covered with virgin forests and newly planted
acacia trees. Remnants of ancient forests 'which once covere&the 54CY
Alfold are located near Csongrad, Debrecen and Kecskemet, but most of
the trees on the plain are in protective belts and young forests of
fast growing species, planted in an attempt at reforestation of cut-over
land, afforestation on poor soils and shifting sand dunes, and preven-
tion of floods along rivers. A five-year plan, announced in 1950 and
based on a USSR model, involved a total of 93,500 hectares. It is not
possible to estimate the progress of afforestation from available statistics.
SEC1hT
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48
4
HUNGARY
MAP G
FOREST COVER (U)
I
?
"'Zakopane
! 1'01 ? ?
I
11
Turks
? Rutornbero1.?
Spdske Nova Ves,o,?41
?Verlu Boren,'
KOSICE
0;(
1.J?
UZHGCROD
valava
PfeStv
LOOWS4
0
MUKACHEVO
Runavske Sobota
? Irshava
R.
49
Lutenee
SANKT ReLTEN
Murituschlag
./
%NV
WIENER?NEUST
Bad?
N?us?d1.,
.Beregovo
Khust
RATISLAV
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Sevlyush
ove Zlenky
NVIREGYHAZA
UMW
?
ehergyamnat
Metekeressies
?
MetAL
GbY Oar
Kapuvir
-
:A.aszetSasz
Napiunen
Haid
HAJDUBOS
OnkAtto
amazuNar
Hajdo0tObOnIb
Nunneries.
611sc.01?1
arcag
SZDI
BerettyOulfalu
,Boharnagy
Torokszentrruk16
orstenleld
?
T?ur key....et ?
1.?
Devava
&hark eresslesc.
Roped.
? 5:canal?.
Kornach
?
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k ES
BAA 60
?????
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Sar.Mae1
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OR.A"D
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MEZOVA ?
Orosna:.
VaraZdIn
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.)
Ns. ?t
?
Koprevntea
46
Kratevel.
SzentIanne
10
'BiARANYA
UBOTICA
Kis:ombor ?
SannIcotaul Mare
.E8elovar
ZAGREB
?
Verovitie
690Plany
Slides
KIKINDA0
Bane Yopola.
MISOARA
Sour, es Gyorgy Markos, Geografila Vengrii, Moscow, 1954. (U)
Andrew Ronat, Atlas of Central Europe, edited by the
Institute of Political Sciences, Count Paul Teleki Research
Institute, Budapest-Balatonfured, 1945, Map 10A. (U)
51avonskaPotepa
asternat,onal bneAdat.a.s c- s -sap do et
oec.,nnlyw,tnpond 0 all .....to tt-e bo,d?t?s wog
'wed by tha U S Go.v.nmenr
.1
Vukovar
tnkovci
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16
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT 9-57
NOVI SAD
'DUNA V
7
71
?
- 5
46
22 2
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5. Land Utilization
Cultivated land occupies a prominent position in the land utilization
pattern of Hungary. Sixty per cent of the total land area is under culti-
vation, 17 per cent in meadows and pastures, and four per cent is in
gardens, orchards, and vineyards. As previously mentioned in the section
on natural vegetation, 13.5 per cent of the total land area is in forests.
The remainder of the country is in svumps, wasteland, and other land use
such as urban areas. A more detailed regional breakdovn of land use in
Transdanubia, the Na- Alfold, and the northeastern highlands is shown
in Vap H. In all regions the largest proportion of land is used for
cultivated crops.
The predominance of open landscape limits the suitability of Hungary
for guerilla warfare. Cultivated fields, pastures, meadows, and waste-
lands offer little or no concealment. Open landscape is most pronounced
in the Nagy Alfold, especially in the two large areas of grassland not
suitable for agriculture. These areas, located in central and north-
eastern Hungary, are shown on Hap H. ElseVhere in the Nagy Alfold much
of the land is in grain fields. Orchards and vineyards are located near
the towns. The lover and wetter land, particularly near the rivers, is
usuelly left in meadovs.
In Transdanubia there is greater diversification in topography and
land use. The landscape is not as monotonous as it is In the Nagy Alfold.
Wide expanses of cultivated crops cover the lover hill slopes. Vineyards
and orchards are located on south-facing slopes. At intermediate altitudes
the farm lands are interspersed with the forests, and e.t higher altitudes
forested land is predominant.
In mountainous areas cultivated land is located on valley floors.
Vineyards and orchards cover slopes below 1,000 feet. The higher altitudes
are covered 'with forests, rocky slopes, and pastures.
Open areas are located also along the 'western border 'where a strip
approximately 150 feet vide has been cleared through the forest and
sEdiT
4e-
7r,
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cultivated areas. Fortification and military areas along the southern
border are also devoid of crops.
As crop areas are well distributed in most of Hungary, grains, vege-
tables, and fresh fruits are readily available for food during the summer
and early fall. Luring the fall harvest many of the vegetable crops are
stacked in the fields before being stored for the winter in cellars located
under most of the houses in the village. Grains, dried peas, beans and
flour are usually stored in the loft above the in builaing or the ad-
joining barn. Produce from collective farms is not easily accessible as
it is deposited in the villages in government storehouses which are locked.
Although food can be found in crop areas and local concealment may be avail-
able in tail crops, farm laborers are frequent] y present in cultivated fields.
local concealment for short periods of time may be available in vine-
yards, corn fields and orchards. The location of vineyards is shown in Rap
H. Major vineyard regions are on the south-facing slopes of mountains, in
the Drava Valley and in the sand areas east of the Danube. Concealnent in
vineyards is best during the late summer and early autumn in the Hegyalja
MOuntain region. Vines are trained on poles only four to five feet high in
most of HUngar, but in the Hegyalja Mountain region the poles are 12 feet
or higher. The sharp poles on which the vines are trained make vineyards
hazardous for paratroop landings. Map H also show the areas in which corn
is a predominant crop. Concealnent in corn fields is best about the middle
of August when corn reaches its maximum height of six to seven feet. Orchards
are located on the plains near towns and on south-facing slopes of mountains.
They are especially important around Eacskenet, Cegled and in the Hernad
Valley. Other crops are too low to offer any concealment features. Wheat
grows to three feet and rice to two and one-half feet.
The ditches and flooded fields in irrigated lands are obstacles to nove-
nent. In 1953, 44 per cent of the irrigated land was in rice, 35 per cent in
meadows and pastures, and 21 per cent in forage crops. The area put under
118
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irrigation increased ten times between the period before World War I/ to
1953. The increase in irrigated acreage is still continuing. /n 1954,
455,000 acres of land were under irrigation, and when the Tisza Dem and
its irrigation system are completed, the total irrigated land will
comprise two per cent of the present arable land.
119
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49
48
a_
e ii
HUNGARY
MAP H
LAND UTILIZATION (C)
Area in which corn is the predominant crop
Vineyards
Predominantly Pasture Land
? ?
?Pt??
Sources Great Britain, Joint Intelligence Bureau. "Agriculture,
Showing Where the Highest Percentage of Main Crops
are Grown," Hungary, Part I, J. I. B. 3/250, May
1956. (5)
List mid von Bressensdorf, Mittleuropa Gelandebildkartc
(Land Use Map of Central Europe), 1.2,500,000,
Leipzig, 1949. (U)
W. Stanley Lewis, "Some Aspects of Tanya Settlement
in Hungary," The Scottish Geographical Magazine,
November 1938, map. (U)
_
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Roofed
pOLAND
L . .
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Croric
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;scrota
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PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF ARABLE LAND
BY SECTORS
Sartolibrd
BEKES
Salonta
Si kid
? eis"scsAs
46
MARIBOR
,Oroshb:a
SO M 0
Plowed Land
Gardens and Vineyards
Meadows
Pastures
Forests
Other Land
VaratdIn
Sornogyszob
( KAPOSV
Negyatad
Korrsvnica
Krifevc$.
Seentl6r.nc
fonativer feksbrd
I 1?.
113 ek _
?
?
. -
-'1;1
* 4 4 'PI_
KiskuncIoronme
*
*
Kurombor ?
UBOTICA
Sannocolaul Mare
.J."\
?
-a
OMB?
Bathe two':
TIMISOARA
Podravske Slatigt
?ova
Source
Daruvar
Vela, Kenai
.,,./AndrewRo
\..\
"%.na, Atlas of Central Europe, edited by the
Institute of Political Sciences, Count Paul Teleki Re-
search Institute, Budapest-Balatonfured, 1945. (U)
. -I
?
5 ,
46
TA. ,nternottonoi bcvndo,es 'flop do ,nr
nocoslonly conospond rem to Oe bovndo,es wog
ncrad by US Go.e.nrcont
.Bosanslu Nov.
Siavonska Potega
ukovar
nhovo
19
(DUNA V)
NOVI SAD
22
16
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT 9-57
23
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6. Population *
SECRET
The population of Hungary has increased steadily except for a decline
during the Second Worldlier. The rise in population resumed after 1950.
According to the latest census of 1949, there were 9,287,000 inhabitants.
In 1956 the estimated population vas 9,861,314, or 106 persons per square
kilometer.
a. Density
As maybe seen in nap 1, most of Hungary is 'well populated. The
heaviest density is located in urban centers and industrial and mining
areas, such as Budapest, Wskolc, Szekesfehervar, and pees. Densely
populated areas are also located around agricultural tows in NihiCh
industry has been recently established, as in Hodmezovasarhely. The
mountsiri regions are not as well populated but the least populated areas
are located in the uncultivated steppelands of the Nagy Alfold.
411 * Ethnic couposition of the population is discussed in Part I.
lai
SECRET
tt
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HUNGARY
7
?
Ter ,Orire I
L
Tur??
SAW.
MAP I
? flutorntwrol.
Pop, ad
POPULATION DENSITY (U)
Mumenn*
Spit.* NoyA
Inhabitants per square kilometer
30-80
80-100
100-ISO
1;0-200
0%er 200
ISCAICE
uz80,0900
R.
/4?
\
tedassImes % \
?
SAturalfeashel
StoOsPatal.
glare
.,Itirrieessa Sobota
MusACrif VO
.itsnara
Etirliny
Bereewo
SANNT POLTEN
81,
RAT SLAV
GIV?
Seylyush
Serne:se
Z A
"Pus,
0 L C S - ?
Baldaldrenthara
a.
lamk,
TWIRLGTHSZA
Mkteta
WIENER NEUST
etoSeresates
Meteu 5:t
eirl
Bam Mere
Neun hen
pro',
liAl,
Murtzuschlog
idszentryw
urstenteld
)1111.
r
s
at i CellOomolk
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Korm
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Deets.
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ether4etesSieS
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ZalaloJ
alatontured
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8otosuwisn
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unstentn.
a.oeta
Swath
KISKUNFELEGYHAZA
lr:seYeltOt.
MARIBOR
KwIrdros .
Gyula -
at
ISKUN
?OrosNa?a
AOYKANIZ
ten?y'a
Mei0MovbcshAtd
Veratchn
ST...Kw:oh
KAPOSVAR
ItiSkUndOrOWS.
Nagyated
Itoor omit a
4c,iyAtati
zombi), ?
UHOTiCA
.Bieloyar
ZAGREB
Verce.f.,
"'"'"
KIKINDA 0
Bath. rowel:
SOMBO
im-isoARA
r?_---
/?--c?
_/
Daruyar
Source Andrew Rona', Atlas of Central Europe, edited by the
Institute of Political Sciences, Count Paul Teich' Besearch
In,titute, t -13 ilatonfured, l94C (U)
.Nut.na
ZRENJ
Vyonska Potega
?? ? ?
^4,0140
ICC e
nhovC.
NOVI SAD
.Bosanslu Nov.
GEORGETOWN UNI%ERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT 9-57
-.LOSII.Saleakae="AJA.Z.
II-
re
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SECRET
b. Occupational Composition
Since the end of World War II increasing industrialization caused
a drift of the population away from the rural areas. In 1946, 51.8 per
cent, or more than half of the population, was occupied in agricultural
pursuits. Thereafter, the proportion of industrial workers increased.
The number of industrial workers in 1949 exceeded the 1940 figure by
500,000. In 1954 it was estimated that the 1940 figure would be exceeded
by a million. With increased emphasis on industrialization, Hungary has
for the first tine a shortage of manpower. E0dhanization of agriculture
through the establishment of machine tractor stations, of 'which there
were 500 in 1955, freed sone agricultural laborers for industry, but
the transformation of the economy according to the five-year plan requires
an additional 650,000 workers.
c. urban-Rural Composition
There has been a trend toward urbanization for the last 100
years. From 1949 to 1954 the urban population of Hungary increased
approximately four per cent. In 1954, 40 per cent of the population was
classified as urban; 60 per cent as rural. Approximately one-half of the
urban population is located in Budapest. The other half is distributed
among sone 50 or 60 other cities.
d. Settlement Pattern
In the Hungary of old, the only urban areas were Budapest,
Pecs, Miskolc, and Szeged. Map J shows that in present-day Hungary a
number of sizeable population centers are located east of the Danube
where two-thirds of the population lives. In the vest there are fewer
urban areas as most of the people live in small villages 'which are well
distributed throughout most of the region. In the east there are few
small villages but many large towns with isolated farms known as tanyas
scattered between them.
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(1) Urban Settlement:
Map J shows the overwhelming urban development of Budapest
as compared to the rest of Hungary. It was estimated in 1955 that the popu-
lation of Budapest was 1,757,000. Only two other cities have populations
exceeding 100,000: Miskolc with 136,000 inhabitants and Debrecen with
113,000 inhabitants. Szeged, which formerly had a population of over 100,000,
now has only 88,000 inhabitants. However, the "peasant cities" near Szeged,
ouch as Hodmezovasarhely, are increasing in population with the advent of
industrialization. Other "peasant cities" of the Na' Alfold in which indus-
trialization is taking place are Rekescsaba, Mako, and Gyula.
Industrialization is also affecting small rural vill ges in other parts
of Hungary. An example of small rural villages which have become urban areas
is Razincbarcika in northern Hungary. It consisted originally of two rural
communities with a population totaling 3,329 people, located in the Sajo
Valley approximately 19 miles upstream from Miskolc. Industrialization and
avalgamation of the two commmities resulted in a population of approximately
12,000 people in 1953.
The table below shows the significant increase in population in cities
where industry is being established or expanded. The various types of indus-
tries located in these cities are discussed in the section on economic vulnera-
bilities.
Population Increase in Selected Industrial Cities
1949
1954
Kazincbarcika
5,059
11,819
YOmlo
4,609
17,540
Miskolc
109,146
135,780
OroszlanY
3,74o
7,150
Dunapentele
4,o69
27,472
Tata
13,199
16,223
Varpalota
11,065
15,970
Veszprem
18,229
22,640
Zalaegorszeg
15,159
16,900
(2)
Rural Settlement:
Most villages in HUngary consist of a nucleus of inner settle-
ments called the beltelek, surrounded by a periphery, or the kultelek. In
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the nucleus are clustered houses and small gardens While the periphery
includes arable lands, meadows, pastures, vineyards, and forests. Trans-
danubian villages located in close proximity to each other have smaller
areas of outer settlements than do the villages of the Na
gY Alfold. The
villages and towns of the plains have farmhouses along a main street
'which is several miles in length and wide enough for the movement of live-
stock. Villages in the mountains are usu lly composed of closely grouped
houses along a single narrow, winding street. Often an old castle or
fort located on a high hill overlooks the town.
Rural centers with populations over 10,000 are typical of the Nagy
Alfold. The large population centers of the Nagy Alfold, While they may
be called cities according to their population size, are actually rural in
Character according to their structure, function, and the occupational
composition of their population. The only industries located in most of
these cities are concerned with foodstuffs and offer only seasonal employ-
ment. Administration and trade offer employment to a negligible fraction
of the labor force although each of these cities includes under its adminis-
trative control the restricted urban area of compact settlement as well
as the sparsely settled tanya area.
A house on the tanya is usually a plain, single-story structure of
dried mud or loam bricks with a thatch, shingle or tile roof. An open
wood fence or earth wall keeps the livestock out. On the poorer tanyas
the animals may be housed under the sane roof. The limits of each tanya
are frequently marked by -willow and acacia trees growing along ditches
'which assist drainage and restrict livestrlek.
Althoagh the participation of ferners in collectivized agriculture
has been encouraged, rcarcely 20 per cent of the agricultural land was
in collective farms in 1956. Twelve per cent of the agricultural land
was in state ferns. In 1955 some 260,000 farmers participated in collec-
tive farms.
125
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49 ?
r
4r,
148..
SANKT PaLTEN
MumuSchlag
qa?-r"
r Baden
WIENER NEUST
?
HUNGARY
MAP J
URBAN SETTLEMENT (U)
Population
90.001-100,000 80,001-90.000
70,001-80,000 60,001-70.000
50,001-60,000 40,001-50,000
30,001-40,000 20,001-30,000
10,000-20,00
___
?Rulonstirtre.
Litt enec
Rrrnavslat Sobota
Poos?si
Sghtsha Nova V.s
Bartle ST,
Preto.
KOSICE
Satoraltsupwl
? - ?
1 ;
? - liiialaaa?aaaa?aa? 4
Human
Hy'.
k A N.
L
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uzi?GOROD
Mug( ACM CVO
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T611??
Intlilnd ?
"St
R.
seytyysh
RATISLAV
Senle.Cte
/ P
r
?
?
004 Z3nAy
Maass
?
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G Y ?
apuvar
ntnn
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SZOM 04
As Celldornalk
ST entgOtthat
SATu M
Beta Mare
K
R 0 NIBudap>., 1.
d
'Jest/mks gas
'TATOU
10,r/O?gr
almniu,d3ros
pT Godoll
RAVSPALOTA
Pestopwly
.Rakosszentm
Sashalom
11 ardusT
VESZEREM
Oerecser
alatonfured
? sg2tKESFEI
Mono,
.Jassladany
Kunhegye
10r01.. 5r5,11110
13 sTentryd
Zalaeg ,,,,
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TurYeyej-
Devaya
..g 1 RusPo?
STeghalow
town nap
c recen
11 A Negylea
efellyOurfanu
nat Batan.e.esttes
18,000
Cobol
Silvanrel
ORAD(
Silvanter
laclany
Endrod VesTIo
./
? Sarbogard
Ounalo
PulopsTallas
itunszentin
on gr
d
I; MARIBOR
KISKUNFtLEGYHAZ
BEKE
SaIonta
L.engyeltot$
Kaskero
KESCSA
13 A CS -
MindsTent
NAGYKANIZ
?Letenye
KISKUNHA
Varatchn
SonIngysToh
Dornbovat
Riskund0,0,51713
Nagvatod
Koprwn.ca
STentlOrinc
A ANYA
? Ble,Ovar
ZAGREB
V?royarr
Swifts
KIKINDA
SOMBO
TIMISOARA
1 e s
,"???? ?$.
^ red E r^e ? t
Stun.
%ayonska PoTega
Yukovar
44,01000,
NOVI SAD
/I
i.1
Sources Nungary, Kozponti Statisztikal Hivatul, Magyarorszag
Helysegnevtara, Budapest, 1956. (U)
Ka rtogra fiat Vallalat, A Magyar Nepkozta rsasag
Kozigazgatast Terkepe, 1 500,000, Budapest, 1957. (U)
S H. Steinberg, ed , The Statesman's Year-Book,
1956, St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York, 1956. (U)
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT 9-57
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7. Rural Roads
She road network is not as well developed in Hungary as it is in most
of Europe or in the United States. There are 19,000 square miles of
rotorable roads, giving Hungary a density of 55 miles per 100 square
miles of area compared to a density of 254 miles in England and Wales.
The density of roads is greatest in West Hungary and least in the flat
floodplain of the Tisza River.
Seventy-one per cent of all roads are classified as third class, or
as rural roads; 19 per cent as second class, or District roads; and 10
per cent as first class, or international roads. Rural roads vary in
width from 6`7" to 11'6" and are built on light foundations with gravel
or other loose surfacing. Few roads, approximately four per cent of the
network in 1953, have all-weather surfacing. Thus the majority of Hun-
garian roads, mainly in the plains east of the Danube, becone muddy and
less trafficable during wet weather. With the spring thaw many become
pot-holed and badly rutted.
In the Nagy Alfold roads fade out beyond the periphery of the popu-
lated centers and become tracks connecting the isolated tanyas. Cultivated
crops and the flat land offer little hindrance to movement across the plain.
In mountainous areas many cart tracks run through the woods and valleys.
These are frequently used by villagers, farmers, and foresters. Many
mountain trails, especially in popvlsr holiday areas, connect the various
villages and the major heights.
8. Cross-Country Mvement
Drainage presents the greatest problem to cross-country movement in
Hungary as is indicated in the factors of terrain and ground condition
shown on moa, K. The rivers, lakes, marshes and muddy ground restrict and
410 hinder novenent more than relief. Conditions are most favorable from My
through October, when lakes and marshy areas shrink. Although the largest
amount of precipitation occurs during summer, the ground usually dries
SECREIF
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within a day or two after heavy downpours. Drainage conditions are worst
from mid-February through April When extensive flooding, swollen marshy
areas, and the filling of periodic lakes occur.
The Danube, Tisza, and other large rivers dhannelize movenent into
directions parallel to their courses. They are too wide and deep to be
forded. MOvenent on the clayey and silty floodplains and terraces of the
rivers would be best from June through September When the ground is dry for
all but five to seven days each month. Late February and early March, when
spring thaws cause muddy ground and flooding, are the poorest months. The
area subject to inundation may extend for six miles on either side of the
river, and vast areas of stagnant water result from the floods. The flood-
plain of the Tisza is wider than that of the Danube. The eastern floodplain
of the Danube is more extensive. High bluffs aligning the river limit the
width of the western floodplain. The courses of the rivers change from
tine to time, so the floodplains are scarred by abandoned channels in the
form of ox-bow lakes.
Each winter ice forms on nearly all the rivers and lasts from one to
three months. Ice closes the Danube to river traffic. On the Tisza the ice
can be crossed by vehicles. In early spring the ice crust begins to break
WO, causing the most serious floods, especially along the Danube River.
The drifting ice jams on sandbanks and at narrow sections Where there are
river islands and clogs the river. Often these ice-jams are broken by
bombing.
Ice of sufficient thickness to bear a nun's weight also forms on Lake
Balaton. It covers the lake from shore to shore during cold winters. On
clear cold nights the ice contracts. Because it is frozen fast to stones
and plants on the shore, sharp crackling develops farther out where the ice
is weaker. The fissures which form may be six to ten feet deep. When
rendered invisible by snow covering, these crevices are treacherous.
Loess covers the greater portion of the Nagy Alfold, the Kis Alfold,
to the low plateaus of Transdanubia, and the lower slopes of mountains.
128
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During winter the loess areas are frozen for about 20 days each month.
In the intervening periods of thaw, the ground is waterlogged on the
poorly drained plains. During these periods and other periods of wet
weather the ground is muddy and foot movenent is difficult.
In level irrigated plains, there is the additional hindrance of
ditches and canals. Irrigation ditches, forming a dense network, nay
be spaced only 200 to 300 yards apart. The canals are more widely
spaced and are generally over 25 feet vide. However, these obstacles
may be crossed at the numerous floodgates spaced at close intervals.
In the two sand areas of the Duna-Tisza region and the Nyirseg,
conditions for cross-country revenant are best from Decenber through
February, for the sand is wet or frozen most of the time. Moverent is
possible in all directions. In spring and autumn movement on vet sand
would still be feasible, but direction would be restricted by the
flooded inter-dune depressions. In dry weather loose sand rakes going
difficult. Then areas Which have been stabilized with grass and crop
cultivation are more easily traversed.
Foot travel is possible throughout most of the mountainous areas,
though there are steep, stony slopes and narrow valley floors. Flooding
occurs locally where valleys are wider and swollen streams overflow
their banks. Conditions for movement through these valleys are better
from late spring to mid-autumn When the ground is dry. Rain and snow
are generally heavier on the windward slopes of mountains, but snow cover
usually does not hanper foot travel.
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SeNNI P61, TEN
MumruscnIeg
. Baden
ei:ENERNEMST
I
se
HU,N,GARY
`t 1) 1 1 15 M
G itt et, en!. r. t" -t? ? ? gr I w?1 ????w?
plilit in ?n't l, t. I ',a, ?tnd Ind rae. n ter It OS.
tithEor short pt rto.I s n M ? rsl inn Apr
G nnt tr.ov vett in .111 tit re, ?tOns on ????'' anti ,teni pia ns ph. trim,
?Uoi IOW hills Mud hinders o Olt II thin lilt v.Snter .ttul r:. r 11t4
'.1???? I? ',r.? t r ..t....1.1t1 ? Intl Itst ??4 t I
Sind, r. n..?? nt ? wr .1 .1 tss ????? ? I'US I
r.t w & hirt.tg ??? ir IT . it `.1,,r. ?
Ntl 3,1?11 t Iii rt sIr:, ? ? t 1, r r ,t
t old tor 1 mgor pr ? ?
It t
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M4.0
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_
GEORGETOWN OttiVERSITY RESEAR'11 'f4": 57 -
CONEID TIAL-
NOW SAD
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9. Diseases
Endemic diseases of military significance are malaria, typhoid and
;
dysentery. 1001arious areas include the entire course of the Tisza River,
the region east of the river, the Yugoslav border area between the Danube
and Tisza Rivers, and Bakes and Zala Counties. Central and northern Hun-
gary are free from malaria. The greatest incidence of the disease occurs
between June and August. Typhoid, 'which is 'widespread among the rural
population, is more prevalent in eastern Hungary. Its seasonal increase
in incidence is related to the increase in the number of flies from July
to pecerber, although human carriers any also transmit the disease. The
greatest incidence of dysentery occurs in rural areas in July and
August. Of all. European countries, dysentery is most prevalent in
Hungary.
Other diseases of military significance are typhus, 'which may becore
epidemic during tire of 'war, leptospirosis, 'which is endemic in the marshes
of 'western Hungary, diphtheria, scarlet fever, and influenza.
131
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1. Introduction
One of the most critical problems confronting the Connunist regime in
Hungary is the re-establishment of effective security controls over a
hostile population. This task is all the more formidable because the
events of October 1956 involved the near total collapse of the native
Hungarian security apparatus on which the government had heavily relied.
Of the various military and para-military organizations entrusted with
the defense of the country, only the hated Security Police (commonly
known as the AVE) remained loyal to the regime. The Hungarian Arty, Air
Force, Border Guard, and Civil Police proved either unreliable or ineffec-
tual when called into action against the rebels, and in the end the govern-
ment had to rely almost entirely upon Soviet troops to suppress the
revolution.
The first steps taken by the Hadar samlnistration towards reconsti-
tuting a system of state security were of necessity on an ad hoc basis.
Early in November 1956 so-called "R-Groups," consisting principplly of
nenbers of the forner AltH, were hastily gathered together in Budapest
"to liquidate all criminal and looting elements and to protect the popu-
lation." The "R-Groups" soon afterwards received the assistance of three
Officer Felice Regiments of 1,200 men each, tanned by Arty officers and
trustworthy NCOs. The Budapest City Police was gradually revanped, and
special Workers' Guards tanned by Party stalwarts were established in the
factories. The sane neans of control were apparently adopted in the
provinces, except that the role of the Officer Pence Regiments was
filled by militia units of company size staffed by Army and Air Force
personnel.1
In proportion as its strength within the country deepened during
411 411 December 1956 and the early maths ol 1957, the Kadar regine took steps
towards establishing its security controls on a nose permanent basis.
In December the "R-Groups" were disbanded and replaced by a new Security
Police organization (BACS) Which is believed to stand in direct line of
133
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succession to the old AVH.2 In February the Workers' Guards were reorganized
on a regular militia basis, under centralized control from Budapest.3 The
Border Guard, 'which had done little to obstruct the massive flovrof refugees
into Austria and Yugoslavia during the closing weeks of 1956, gradually
purged itself of unreliable elerents and resuned close surveillance of the
frontier early in February 1957. Reorganization of the two military ser-
vices, whose personnel had either been demobilized or transferred to duty
in the Officer Police Reginnnts and provincial militia, proceeded much anre
slowly. The Army eventually reacquired personnel and resources -which enabled
it to receive the 1936 conscript class in the spring of 1957, and the Hun-
garian Air Force as of the present writing (August 1957) is reported to
have recently concluded a full-scale reorganization.
Side by side with the revitalization of Hungary's security forces has
gone the re-establishrent and expansion of the country's penal system. No
sooner had the Kadar governrent overcone all formal opposition within the
country than it launched a series of arrests of persons implicated in anti-
Connminist activities. This process, -which is not yet complete, has probably
involved anywhere between 20,000 and 30,000 persons. To acccmmndate the
great influx of prisoners, it is believed that many of Hungary's prisons
and forced labor camps have been reopened or expanded. Another significant
return to Stalinist penal controls in Hungary is instanced by a decree of
March 1957 'which revived the old system of internal deportations by empovering
the police to expel persons froniany part of the country in 'which their
presence was considered detrirental to the public welfare.
The over-all security picture in Hungary at the present tire (August
1957) may therefore be defined as one in which the Corommist regine has
succeeded in reimposing a system of security controls comparable in almost
every important respect to the system of controls which existed prior to
the October revolution. The remainder of this section seeks to evaluate
the effectiveness of the new controls, with particvlsir reference to the part
'which each may play as a favorable or unfavorable factor in Special Forces
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planning. A brief note has also bee 1n added as to the role of the Soviet
troops in Hungary as a deterrent to current resistance activity and as a
potential security force in the event that Comnmnist Hungary's own system
of state security should once again break down.
2. Security Forces (Map L)
According to inforration now available, control of Hungary's security
forces (including the military establishnent) has been vested since Feb-
ruary 1957 in separate Ministries of Interior and National Defense.
Under the Ministry of Interior are the Security Police (BACS), Civil
Police, Border Guard, and Workers' Guardia. Under the Ministry of National
Defense are the Army and the Air Force. The Ministry of National Defense
presunably maintains close liaison with the Soviet troops now on occupa-
tion duty in Hungary.
The total strength of the Hungarian security forces at the present
tine (August 1957) is estimated at 155,000, as compared vith a pre-revolt
estinate of at least 260,000. Maeh of the difference between the two
estimates is explained by the drastic reduction in the size of the Hun-
garian Arry, which now nurbers barely half of its estimated October 1956
strength of 150,000. Soviet forces now in Hungary are believed to total
about 70,000 officers and yen.
Map L attached to this section indicates the approximate location
of the principal internal security forces--i.e., Security Police and
Border Guards?now operating in Hungary. The areas of major Soviet
troop concentration are also shown. For reasons noted in the text,
Map L does not identify units of the Hungarian Civil Police, Workers'
Guards, Axny, and Air Force.
a. Security Police
The backbone of the Comminist regine in both pre-volt and
post-revolt Hungary is the Security Police. Fragrentary information
now at hand indicates that this vital role is now being filled by an
organization known as the Security Group of the Ministry of Interior
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(Belugy Inizterium Allamvedelmi Csoport), commanly known as BACS.5 Very
little is known about either the size of SACS or its organization. It is
currently estimated to have a strength of approxinately 10,000, nearly all
of Whom are trusted veterans of the Security Police organization (NVH) of
pre-revolt Hungary. Assuming that BACS organization follows tore or less
the same general lines as its predecessor." it is probably divided into two
principal sections: (1) a relitaximed pniformed police, with detaahments
in Budapest, Pkovincial capitals (as indicated on Map L), and sone smaller
towns, and (2) a plialnclothes political section. The uniformed BACS per-
sonnel are presumably concerned with guard duties and riot control; the
political section presumably seeks to ferret out actual or potential
enemies of the state.
Although the Kadar regime has repeatedly promised that the new Security
Police will not repeat the "Stalinist excesses" of the AVH, there seems little
prospect that BAGS will abandon any of the extra-legal processes so conveniently
employed by its predecessor. A special decree issued in December 1956 by the
Hungarian goverment authorized the police to seize and hold without trial
for six months any person Who "endangers public order, security, production,
and communications. "6, Another decree, issued in January 1957 and so far as
is known still unrepealed, places a ban on unauthorized public assembly and
strikes and provides for summary court procedure without written indictment
and a possible death penalty for all persons so accused.7 The show trials
of a few score revolutionaries in Budapest during recent nonths have probably
been intended as a smokescreen for the fact that since October 1956 anywhere
between 20,000 and 30,000 Hungarians have reportedly been sent to prisons and
labor camps administered by BACS.8
In its dealings with the civili n population BACS undoubtedly relies on
techniques familiar to every secret police and fully described in the U.N.
report on Hungary.9 As fax as its present personnel and means allow, BACS
may be presupposed to have an informant net Which penetrates into the humblest
walks of Hungarian life. Selected personnel may operate as agents provocateurs.
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The present snail size of BACS is probably an indication of the organiza-
tion's desire to retain only those personnel Whose loyalty to the regine
was tested and proved during the recent revolution. As conditions in
Hungary grow more stable and conditions for BACS recruittent improve, it
seems not unlikely that the Security Police may expand in size to its
estimated pre-revolt strength of 20,000.
Because of the proven loyalty of Security Police to the Communist
regine during the October revolution and the demonstrated hatred which
the organization aroused among almost all sections of the Hungarian
population, it may be expected that BAGS personnel would almost uniformly
resist any Special Forces mission with every teens at their disposal.
The experience of October-November 1956 has also indicated that even
those BACS personnel who might wish to aid a Special Forces venture in
Hungary would probably find the way barred to them because of popular
distrust of their motives.
b. Civil Police
Prior to October 1956 the Civil Police (rendorseg) were esti-
mated to number well in excess of 50,000, possibly even as high as 75,000.1?
In view of the routine nature of its ordinary duties--e.g., crine preven-
tion, registration of persons and property, traffic control, etc.--the
Civil Police has probably not experienced any substantial alteration in
its pm-revolution strength.
Civil Police detachnents can be found in appropriate strengths at
alnost every populated point in Hungary and therefore are not delineated
on Map L. One of the principal duties of the force in recent nonths has
been the validation of all identity certificates issued to Hungarian citi-
zens, a reasure evidently designed to furnish the governnent with a thorough
check on the whereabouts of persons suspected of anti-regime activity and
persons who have been missing since the revolution. The validation was
scheduled to be completed on 30 September 1957. 11
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The experience of October 1956 proved the unreliability of the Civil
Police at a time of national crisis, since nost of its personnel either
joined the rebels outright, gave them access to police equipment and sup-
plies, or refused to take effective action against them. During the present
year the regime has undoubtedly made strenuous efforts to rid the police of
disaffected elements, but it has been severely hanpered by the fact that
the relatively large size of the police force rakes it necessary to recruit
or retain personnel Who are not members of the Communist Party and whose
loyalty to the regime is at best lukewarm.
c. Border Guard
The Border Guard (Hatarorseg, sometimes known by the initials HO)
is under the administration of the Ministry of Interior and has an estimated
strength of 20:000 nen. During the revolution it seers to have disintegrated
as an effective force, losing many of its personnel through desertion and
emigration to Austria and. Beginning in November 1956 the Border
Guard WS gradually reorganized by the addition to its ranks of so-called
"Kadar soldiers"--i.e., Party volunteers and reliable Army personnel Who had
sworn allegiance to the new Communist regime. Soviet troops also assisted
for a short period with border control duties. By the end of January 1957
the reorganization of the Border Guard had progressed to the point where
control of the frontier was once more assured and many of the "Ehdar soldiers"
12
could be released from duty.
The functions of the Border Guard are purely regulatory: prevention of
illegal border crossings in or out of Hungary, maintenance of proper security
in the frontier zone, control and supervision of all traffic in the frontier
zone and across the frontier. As shown on Map L, the Border Guard is repor-
tedly divided into eleven district commands, each of which is directly
responsible to Border Guard Headquarters in Budapest. Border Guard districts
are smiller in size and mere heavily manned along the Austrian and Yugoslav
frontiers than in the regions of Hungary bordering on Czechoslovakia, the
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USSR, and Runanin..13 A Border Guard training school is reportedly now
in operation at Szeged.
Of particular interest to Special Forces planners are the security
controls maintaincd by the Border Guard in the frontier zone: which
extends inward fromBbngary's frontiers to a depth of about 20 Ions.,
although it apparently is considerably deeper at some critical points
along the Austrian and Yugoslav borders. The zone is subdivided into
three sectors: (1) first sub-zone, extending about 500 meters in from
the frontier line; (2) second sub-zone: extending about 10 kns, in from
the first sub-zone; and: (3) third sub-zone, extending about 10 kns. in
from the second sub-zone. Special permission from the police or Border
Guard is required for entry into the frontier sub-zones by persons who
are not normally resident or erployed in the frontier area. Hungarian
citizens who reside permanently in the second or third sub-zones have
a declaration affixed to their identity documents attesting that fact.14
Such persons are also screened carefully for political reliability and,
on occasion, are required to serve the Border Guard as volunteer
auxiliaries and informants.
Controls along the frontier line itself vary considerably according
to locality. Along the Czechoslovak, USSR, and Rumanian borders sur-
veil lnnce of the frontier line seers to be almost cursory and is
apparently limited to the customary plowed strip and the use of roving
and stationary patrols. Along the Austrian and Yugoslav borders the
frontier zone which had previously been cleared of minefields and barbed
wire entanglements during the summer of 1956, thus facilitating the
exodus of refugees from Hungary during the period November 1956-
January 1957, ha:, now been completely refortified. This process,
according to several sources, lisr involved the planting of an area
approximately 40 meters deep behind the frontier line with trip flares,
anti-personnel :Tines, barbed wire entanglements, plowed strips, and
other detection devices)-5
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Outside the narrow sector of resy,onsibility assigned to it, the Border
Guard has no military jurisdiction or competence. Its potential ability
to obstruct a Special Forces mission is limited alnost entirely to the
frontier zone. Inasmuch as the Radar government has apparently made deter-
mined efforts during the present year (1957) to weed out unreliable personnel
from the Border Guard and replace them with persons whose loyalty to the
regine seems assured, Special Forces would probably be well advised to
avoid Wherever possible both the frontier zone and contact with the Border
Guard.
d. Workers' Guards
The Workers' Guards, which were first employed as a temporary neens
of security control in the troubled weeks which followed the October revolu-
tion, were subsequently placed on a permanent footing by a decree of the Radar
governnent issued in February 1957. The decree stated that the new organiza-
tion mould be charged with the task of "assisting the armed forces in defending
the adhieverents of socialism, insuring the calm of the working people and
the smoothness of production, and preventing attempts to restore counter-
revolutionary elenents." To coordinate the work of individual Workers'
Guards units, a central headquarters 'was established in Budapest.
Menbership in the Workers' Guards, according to the sane decree, is
entirely voluntary and is open to all workers, men and women, Who are loyal
to the socialist order.16
Menbers are given arms and are required to attend
training for approximately two hours each week, but receive no pay for their
services. This last provision has probably curtailed the effectiveness of the
Workers' Guards to a considerable degree.
Very little infornation is available as to the present strength or
distribution of the Workers' Guards. The decree of February 1957 content-
plated that units of the new organization would be established in all indus-
trial enterprises except those under the direct supervision and guard of the
Security Police. According to a 4 March 1957 report by a correspondent of
East German Radio there were 160 Workers' Guards units organized as of that
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date.17 A U.S. source Who observed the May Day Parade of 1957 in Budapest
estimated that about 3,000 Workers' Guard personnel were seen on the streets,
either mardhing in parade or lining the parade route.2
e. Army
At the present 'writing (August 1957) the Hungarian Army is proba-
bly worthless to the Radar regime as an instrument of internal security.
Its morale is considered to be extremely low, and nagy of its officer and
NCO personnel who remained faithful to the Communist cause are believed to
have been siphoned off for duty with the Security Pence and Border Guard.
The fact that the Army now has an estimated strength of 75,000 is largely
accounted for by the induction of the 1936 conscript class during the
spring of 1957. The loyalty of these new recruits to the Communist
governnent is doubtful and, in any case, they will not be ready for unit
field training until the summer of 1958.
Reorganization of the Hungarian Army is now underway, but its outline
and general direction are far from clear. According to a statenent issued
by the government in April 1957, the nucleus around Which the High Command
will build appears to be the three Officers Pence Regiments (also known
as the "Emergency Force") 'which were organized in Budapest during November
1956 and are apparently still in existence.19 Other Army units, mostly of
undeterrined size and nature, are graduPlly being re-formed at garrison
points in the provinces, but present information is too fragnentary to
warrant plotting of their locations on Map L.
f. Air Force
According to the best information now available the Hungarian
Air Force, which numbered an estimated 12,000 officers and men as of
October 1956, is now undergoing a thorough reorganization. As was the
case with the Hungarian Army, the Air Force proved so unreliable to the
regine during the October revolution that its present potential as an
internal security force is negligible.
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g. Soviet Occupation Forces
The dominant role in the present internal security picture of
Hungary is occupied not by any agency of the Hungarian Communist governnent
but by the Soviet occupation forces which are stationed on Hungarian soil.
These forces, in the opinion of virtually every qualified foreign observer,
represent the only effective lever Whidh sustains the regine of Janos Kadar
in power. Except for their presence and the concomitant fear of further
reprisals by the Soviet Union, it seems almost certain that the Hungarian
people would not hesitate to renew their rebellion against Connmmist tyranny
and once nore overwhelm the security forces of the puppet governnent.
At the present tine the total number of Soviet troops in Hungary is
estimated at 75,000, an increase of 200 per cent over their estimated pre-
October 1956 strength. About 70,000 of these are Army personnel Who are
gathered into six understrength mechnnized divisions, one anti-aircraft
division, and attendant headquarters and support units. The approximate
location and maneuvering area of each of the seven divisions in Hungary
is indicated on Map L attached to this section. In addition to Argy person-
nel there are about 5:000 Soviet Air Force personnel in Hungary, most of them
concentrated at Budapest, Papa: Vessprem, and Debrecen, and an unknown number
of Soviet EVD troops.
During the October revolution and the weeks immediately following the
Soviet forces in Hungary, as noted earlier in this report, repeatedly inter-
vened against the insurgents and the civilian population. Mbre recently,
however, the Soviet forces seem to have surrendered all denlings with the
Hungarian people to the Kadar governnent and now appear to occupy the role
of a garrison force whose functions are to defend Hungary from outside
attack and to overawe would-be resistance eleuents within the country.
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HUNGARY
MAP L
Hurnenne
ercsictufr Indicates major center of Security Police
(BACS) concentration
HO Border Guard Unit
Soviet Army Unit
KO&ICE
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UZHCOROD
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Reported limits of Border Guard district
responsibility
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t'NOVI SAD
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3. Penal System (Map M)
At the outbreak of the 1956 revolution the old system of wholesale
internment and/or deportation of political unreliables in Hungary had
greatly declined in importance as an instrument of Communist policy. In
July 1953 the government of Imre Nagy had decreed the abolition of all
internnent camps and an early end to the forcible removal of political
unreliables from large cities and the frontier zone to penal areas else-
where in the country. Impleuentation of the Nagy decreq seems to have
proceeded slowly but with a fair degree of effect. General indications
are that by late 1956 the number of prisons and camps in Hungary housing
political prisoners and forced laborers had shrunk to a dozen or less,
While those persons Who had the means and the desire to return to their
former places of residence from deportation areas were generally given
the necessary permission.
The October revolution and the period of unrest which followed
seem to have convinced the Kadar regiue that there was no alternative
but to return to the sterner penal neasures of the Stalin era. In this
connection, however, it should first be noted that the nuCh-publicized
deportation of several thousand Hungarians to penal camps in the USSR
'which occurred during November and December 1956 was apparently the
result of an arbitrary decision by the Soviet authorities which may or
may not have been concerted with the Hungarian government. No deporta-
tions of Hungarians to the USSR have been reported since January 1957:
and an unknown percentage of the deportees taken before that date were
later handed back by the Soviet Aruy.20 Estimates of the total number
of Hungarians abducted into the USSR have ranged as high as 40,000-
50,000 persons, but these figures appear to be based entirely on hearsay
evidence and are probably excessive.
21
The Kadar regiue began its own series of large-scale arrests late
in 1956 and in the early months of 1957. The principal targets were
real or suspected revolutionaries, Army and police deserters, participants
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in the Workers' Councils 'which figured so prominently in the rebellion and
its aftermath, student leaders, intellectuals, and political prisoners Who
had been liberated by revolutionary action. By the end of May 1957 it was
reported that the number of arrested persons had exceeded 22,000, and the
number has since been swelled by further police roundups during the summer
of 1957.22 A punitive drive undertaken during late July and early August
1957 Which was variously estimated to have affected between 1500 to 10,000
persons included apparently not only persons connected with the uprising
but some with an anti-regime background, such as former landlords and
factory owners, Catholic clergymen, leading members of suppressed political
parties, and a number of officers of Hungary's pro-German' army of World War
II.23 On 10 September 1957 the U.S. representative to the United Nations,
Henry Cabot Lodge, presented a list of 1,768 persons against Whom the regime
had taken punitive action between November 1956 and
anti-regime activities during and after the October
was drawn entirely from Hungarian Communist sources
August 1957 for alleged
revolution. The list
and did not include any
individuals against Whom proceedings had been taken but were not reported
in the newspapers. "We have no way of knowing accurately how many of these
there may be," Lodge declared, "although some reports indicate the number
is in the tens of thousands."24.
Nap M and the table attached to this section indicate the probable
locations in Hungary where the great majority of political prisoners and
forced laborers may now be held. Only two of the camps and prisons shown
on the map (Kistarcsa prison in Budapest and the can at Satoraljaujhely)
have been positively identified on the basis of available information as
housing persons arrested since the October revolution. The other camps and
prisons have been included on the map either because they were previously
reported as having continued in operation after the Nagy amnesty of 1953
and/or because they are in the nature of permanent installations and work
sites which offer the best facilities for coping with a sudden influx of
prisoners 25
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Also shown on Map M are the important mining areas of Hungary and
one extensive agricultural tract (Hortobagy) in which forced labor had
been or was still being employed as of October 1956. The likelihood
that many post-revolution prisoners have been put to work in the coal
mines is enhanced by the January 1957 admission of the Communist Party
newspaper, Nepszabadsag, to the effect that some 40,000 coal miners
had left their jobs in the pits since the start of the revolution.26
Inasmuch as many of the missing miners may be presumed to have fled
from the country, or to be otherwise permanently lost to the industrial
labor force, it seems highly probable that the Communist leaders of
Hungary have resorted to the familiar expedient of using their political
enemies as forced laborers in the mines.*
Another standard feature of Stalinist Hungary which has made its
reappearance since the revolution has been the system of internal depor-
tations of politically unreliable elements from the large cities, frontier
zones, and other sensitive areas. A decree of March 1957, previously
mentioned, has given the police discretionary power to expel persons
from any part of the country where their continued presence is con-
sidered inimical to the state, public security, or the socialist order ?27
Although the decree goes on to state that the expelled persons may move
to any other part of the country not mentioned in their warrant of expul-
sion, and further specifies that an expulsion order may not stand for
more than six months without judicial review and in no case for longer
than two years, it is doubtful that these provisions have done much to
protect the personal security of any Hungarian citizen who attracts the
unfavorable attention of the police. The decree of March 1937 seems
rather to reiterate the familiar pattern of internal deportations in
* At the end of January 1957 the Hungarian regime claimed that the mine
labor force had almost regained its pre-revolt level. Widespread unem-
ployment outside the mines and liberal benefits accorded to miners were
partly responsible for this recovery, but there is a strong suspicion
that large numbers of forced laborers were also required.
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Hungary during the years 1947-1953 in which more than 150,000 persons are
believed to have been uprooted from western and central Hungary and re-
settled in concentration villages in the relatively underdeveloped eastern
regions of the country.28
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PROBABLE LOCATIONS OF MAJOR CONCENTRATIONS
OF FORCED LABOREPS AND POLITICAL PRISONERS IN HUNGARY
(See Map M)
Nap
No. Location
1. Albertfalva
2. Balassagyarmat
3. Bekescsaba
4. Bekescsaba
5. Budapest
6. Budapest
7. Budapest
8. Budapest
9. Cegled
10.)
u.)
12.)
13.)
Dunapentele
14. Dunapentele
15. Elep
16. Jaszbereny
17. Kalocsa
18. Kalocsa
19. Kistarcsa
Coordinates
4726N-19o2E
4805N-1917E
4639N-2105E
4639N-2105E
Remarks
Permanent camp; probably produces
building materials; reported capa-
city of 600 inmates.
Camp; reportedly used as a distri-
bution center; capacity unknown.
Camp; reportedly used as a distri-
bution center; capacity unknown.
Prison; capacity unknown.
4730N-1905E Prison in Tolonchaz area; serves
as permanent collection point;
capacity unknown.
4730N-1905E Prison in Gyujtofoghaz area; serves
as collection point; capacity unknown.
4730N-1905E Prison in Kobanya area (13 Kozma Ut);
serves as main collection point for
secret police; capacity unknown.
4730N-1905E Prison in Fo Utca area; serves as
distribution center; capacity unknown.
4710N-1947E Transit camp; capacity unknown.
4658N-1855E Four penal farms in Bernatkut area;
number of inmates unknown.
4658N-1855E Prison in Paihalma Puszta area;
reported capacity of 3,000.
4732N-2118E Camp; reportedly the largest in
Hungary; houses unknown number of
inmates who work on state fan s in
summer and road construction in
winter.
4730N-1955E Camp; distribution center with work-
shop; capacity unknown.
Penal farm; capacity unknown.
Prison; reported capacity of 3,000.
4632N-1859E
4632N-1859E
4732N-1916E
Major internrent camp; reported
capacity of 2,000-5,000.
1h7
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114
No.
Location
Coordinates
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Remarks
t!.
20.
Make
4613N-2029E
Transit camp; capacity unknown.
21.
Marianosztra
4752N-1852E
Distribution camp with workshop;
capacity unknown.
22.
Marianosztra
4752N-1852E
Prison; reported capacity of 1,500.
23.
NagYha1asz
4808N-2146E
Camp; reputecAy for purged Party
members; capacity unknown.
24.
Nyirad
4700N-1727E
Camp; reportedly holds 2,000 inmates
engaged in labor in nearby bauxite
mines.
25.
Satoraljaujhely
4824N-2139E
Distribution camp; capacity unknown.
26.
Satoraljaujhely
4824N-2139E
Prison; capacity unknown.
27.
Szeged
4615N-2009E
Distribution camp with workshop;
capacity unknown.
28.
Szeged
4615N-2009E
Penal farm in Nagyfa area; number
of inmates unknown.
29.
Szeged
4615N-2009E
Prison in Csillag area (Marx ter 13);
reported capacity of 3,000.
30.
Szentes
4639N-2016E
Transit camp; capacity unknown.
31.
Szolnok
4710N-2011E
Camp; holds unknown number of in-
mates reportedly engaged in mining.
32.
SzUhakallo
4817N-2039E
Camp; holds unknown number of in-
mates reportedly engaged in mining.
33.
Tal1ya
4814N-2114E
Permanent camp; holds unknown number
of inmates engaged in quarrying.
34.)
35.)
36.)
Six camps; each holds 600-1,000 in-
37.)
Tatabanya
4733N-1826E
mates engaged in coal mining.
40.
Vac
4746N-1908E
Prison; reported capacity of 4,000.
41.
Varpalota
4712N-1808E
Camp; holds unknown number of
inmates engaged in coal mining.
42.
Vasarosnaneny
4807N-2218E
Transit camp; capacity unknown.
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HUNGARY
-??? POLAND
L.
RutoenberolYi
PROBABLE LOCATIONS OF MAJOR CONCENTRATIONS OF FORCED LABORERS
Hernenne
KOSICE
Forced labor camps
Prisons reportedly housing persons charged with political crimes
Areas of industrial and agricultural development in which forced labor is now or may in the future be utilized
UZNGOROD
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NOVI SAD
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
RESEARCH
PROJECT 9-57
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PART IV
ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES
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?
1. Introduction
SECRET
Part IV of this report deals with those features of the Hungarian
economy which are vulnerable to exploitation by Special Forces. The
section does not attempt to repeat the basic information on the main
characteristics of the Hungarian economy which is readily obtainable
from standard intelligence reference sources. Rather, this part of
the report is intended to supplement (by presenting more recent infor-
mation than is available in some of the older reference sources) and
adapt existing intelligence to the peculiar requirements of Special
Forces operations planning. Wherever it has been found that basic
intelligence reference materials provide adequate information for the
purposes of Special Forces planning, only a summarization of the major
findings of those materials are presented here and the reader is
referred in the text to the relevant source(s). In those instances,
however, Where existing intelligence reference me.terials fail to meet
the requirements of Special Forces or where reference materials have
not been incorporated into unitary reports and studies, a more detailed
presentation of the information is offered in this report.
It must be borne in mind that although it is necessary in a report
limited to Hungary to consider the Hungarian economy in relation to the
country's national frontiers, in the final analysis this economy must
also be considered in relation to those of neighboring Russian satellite
states and to the USSR proper. It is only by considering these rela-
tionships in their fullest extent that valid conclusions can be drawn
concerning both the probable effect and the worth of Special Forces
operations against the Hungarian economy as a Whole or any part thereof.
In other words, Hungary should not be regarded by Special Forces planners
as an isolated entity. It is therefore necessary to refer to similar
Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas studies on neighboring
countries and in particular to those on the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia,
and Rumania, before making a finsl appraisal of the potentialities which
Hungary presents for Special Forces operations.
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2. Transportation
a. introduction
In Hungary, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe and in the LESR, rail-
roads are the backbone of the transportation system. Roads, although probably
better developed and maintained than in such other satellites as Bulgaria
and Rumania, are an inadequate substitute for the railroads. Navigable
waterways and pipelines possess a greater degree of economic importance
than roads but are not comparable, either strategically or economically, to
the railroads as traffic carriers and routes of invasion and supply from the
USSR to Southern Europe.
Budapest is the focal point of the Hungarian transportation system.
The principal road and rail lines radiate from the capital. The city is
also the most important Hungarian port (and one of the most important in
Southeast Europe), as well as one of the terminal points for the pipeline
which begins in the Zela County oilfields in the southwestern part of the
country. As a point of convergence for the main transportation routes,
Budapest is also a major bottleneck to through traffic. Rail transporta-
tion, especially to Transdanubia, Austria, and Western Yugoslavia, is
restricted at this point to two bridge crossings over the Danube. It is
significant that routes have been developed in recent years, reportedly at
Russian insistence, which enable sone traffic to by-pass this critical
point of stricture in the country's transportation system.
The inTortance which the USSR attaches to Hungary as a transit route
leading to South Central Europe, and, more concretely, the importance of
the Hungarian roads and railroads as lines of supply and communication to
Russian troops stationed in Hungary, was of course clearly demonstrated by
the Hungarian rebellion in late 1956. In a future war, the interdiction of
the major transportation media on Which Russian forces in Hungary would rely
for contact with the USSR proper, or those WhiCh would serve as invasion
routes into Austria and Yugoslavia in a drive toward the Adriatic, would
obviously be most disruptive of Russian military strategy.
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Although it is reasonably certain that in time of war railroads and
roads, in that order, would be the dominant transportation redia for the
movement of war materiel in and through Hungary, it would be presumptuous
to assert on the basis of present circumstances that the most important
transport routes would of necessity be those which are such in peacetime.
Obviously tactical and strategic considerations might necessitate the use
of alternate or secondary routes as heavy traffic carriers. Furthermore,
with respect to connections with routes in adjacent countries, currently
inoperative links could in a number of instances be reopened by the removal
of barriers or the relaying of short stretches of connecting railroad track
on existing roadbeds. Where connections would be re-established only
through the construction of bridges or replacement of structures destroyed
in World War II and not replaced since that date, a greater amount of time
would be required to open the routes to through traffic but the tasks
would not be impossible. In this way, routes which are presently of
minimal significance to the econouy of Hungary would acquire very great
importance. This importance would be based wholly on strategic considera-
tions of the norent and it cannot be anticipated on the basis of the
current economic importance
it is probable that certain
orientation, and ability to
tinue to be as important in
of the route in question. on the other hand,
transportation routes, by their location,
handle a large volume- of traffic, would con-
tine of war as they are in time of peace.
One such route, for example, would be that which enters Hungary from the
Ukraine at Zahony. It could be reasonably expected that the eneny would
make every effort to keep this critical route open in time of war. In-
deed, the success or failure of some of his operations night to a large
extent depend upon the non-interdiction of it and other routes like it.
In evaluating the transportation system of Hungary and its potential
value to the USSR in time of war, Special Forces operations planners must
bear in mind that many variabilities would be introduced into the transpor-
tation picture in time of war and that factors of a type and magnitude
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which can not be readily anticipated might completely alter the following
assessment of the vulnerability of Hungary 'a transportation system.
b. Railroads (See Nap N)
(1) General:
The Hungarian railroad system is a web-shaped complex in
which the principal lines converge on and pass through the urban industrial
Budapest area. These main strands of the railroad net are linked together
by numerous secondary lines, including some of narrow gauge, which act as
feeders to the main lines from agricultural and mining areas. The network
is relatively dense as compared to other satellite states and is evenly
distributed. It is, however, susceptible of division into isolated parts
by the destruction of bridges over the two large barriers to lateral move-
ment in the country, the Danube and Tisza Rivers.
At the end of World War II, HUngary's railroads were in a state of
extensive and heavy damage. Through traffic had been immobilized by the
destruction of bridges over the Danube and Tisza Rivers and by the removal
of important stretches of track. By 1948, bridge crossings had been rebuilt
and tracks repaired to a sufficient extent to permit the railroads to func-
tion nationwide on an adequate though limited basis. During the period
1949-1954 reconstruction continued, especially with respect to the replace-
ment of temporary bridges by permanent structures and the rebuilding of
temporarily replaced stretches of track to permit operation at normal
speeds throughout the length of the lines. At the sane tine, work VW
begun on improving the network through the double-tracking and electrifi-
cation of sone of the main lines, the conversion of secondary lines to
higher capacity, the improvement of roadbeds, the replacenent of light
rails with heavier ones, and the laying of new lines to previously un-
served areas. Much of the work of reconstruction and expansion was accom-
plished with Soviet assistance, and prime attention was devoted to lines
servicing Russian troops in Hungary and Austria. Despite the considerable
amount of progress that VBS made, there were still in 1955 sone 172 places
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on the Hungarian lines where trains had to be slowed to negotiate temporary
or semi-permanent bridges, and some major railroad bridges had not been
replaced.1 Although some of these were at border junction points with
Yugoslav and Czechoslovakian railroads, others were on internal lines.
One of the latter type, the railroad bridge over the Tisza on the line
Eal-Eisujszallas, is new being reconstructed but is not scheduled to be
opened to traffic before December 1957.2
The wartime destruction of physical structures on Hungarian rail lines
had consequences of long-lasting duration. Even today traffic cannot be
said to flow in its normal peacetime pattern. Though it may be true that
the reorientation of Hungarian railroad traffic according to the political
and strategic dictates of the Soviet orbit obviates the necessity of recon-
structing some of the wartime damage, and that it is this factor more than
the magnitude of the reconstruction task itself, that accounts for the delay
in rebuilding some of the more vital structures, World War II nevertheless
demonstrated that the destruction of key railroad structures in Hungary,
and particularly bridges over the Danube, Tisza, Drava and Baba Rivers
can isolate the Hungarian railroad system from those of neighboring
states, and at the same time effectively break the country insofar as
its major transport system is concerned into three or more segments.
The Hungarian railroad, system has been integrated with that of the
USSR. The principal point of integration in Hungary is at the translo a4lig
center of Zehony in northeast Hungary on the border of the Ukrainian SSR.
Extensive facilities have been developed at Zahony 'which permit the rapid
changing of axles and wheels of cars and locomotives from Russian bread
gauge to European standari gauge and vice versa. other facilities at
Zahegy are those for interchanging packaged and bulk freight, including
pumping machinery for the tranoleeeing of oil and gasoline from tank cars.
A recent report alleges that the Russian broad-gauge track 'which previously
terminated at Zehony has been extended as far as 'Omer? (4818N-2206E)
Where a new oil loading station has been built.3
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International connections are also maintained with Czechoslovakia,
Austria, Yugoslavia, and amnia, but of sore 50 border connections 'which
Thuggery had with neighboring states prior to World War I/ less than half
that number are operative at present.4 For the remainder, either bridges
have not been rebuilt or, for border control purposes, tracks have either
been sealed off or dismantled for sone distance inside the Hungarian fron-
tier. Nagy of these connections could be re-established with a minimum
of difficulty if necessary.
Rolling stock continues in short supply on the Hungarian railroads
despite the fact that the Hungarian rolling stock industry exports its
products in considerable quantity, principally to the USSR. As of 1955,
for example, holdings of locomotives and freight cars Imre still short of
the 1937 level for these itens.5
Thuggery has a well developed rail transportation eqpipnent industry.
NOst of the industry is located in or near Budapest, including the ;WAG
locomotive factory, GANZ wagon works, and ;Clement Gottwald electrical
equipment factory in the city proper, and the Dunakeszi railroad car
plant in Dunakeszi (4738N-1908E). The Gyongos (4747N-1956B) railroad
equipnent plant and Gyor (Wilhelm Pieck) wagon works in Gyor are also
important producers. The Gyor works is reportedly slated for expansion.
In addition to producing freight cars, including tank cars, the works is
expected to begin production of diesel electric locomotives in the early
future .6 Reliable production figures are not available, but it has been
estimated, that 200 main line locomotives and 7,000 freight cars were
produced in 1956. If it were not for deliveries to the USSR the Hun-
garian rolling stock shortage would soon be alleviated.
The considerable increase in traffic volune which has accrued in
recent years (an 80 per cent increase in the period 1949-1954) has been
achieved as a result of the most intensive use possible for existing
eqpipnent and lines. Under such a program, maintenance work on rolling
stock is inadequately carried out and freight cars are loaded well in
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excess of rated capacity and prescribed levels.7 Demands on the system
are constantly increasing and improvements with respect to lines and
rolling stock together with maximum utilization have not sufficed to keep
pace 'with the even more rapid developnent of mining and heavy industry,
'which together account for the largest share of the traffic.
Right-of-way maintenance is also neglected with respect to the replace-
mut of rails and sleepers 'which, on many stretches, are more than 40 years
old.8 TO some extent the neglect is due to an iefelevate supply of replace-
ment parts. However, track maintenance in Hungary is also complicated by a
lack of mechanical equipment; most maintenance work is performed manually.
A further liwetation is encountered in the loss of labor during the good
weather months of the summer to agricultural endeavors.
Of all the weaknesses of the Hungarian railroads, one of the greatest
is the lack of adequate and constant supplies of mai. This vulnerability
has been demonstrated zany times in recent years. During the 'winter 1955-
1956 rail service was drastically curtailed, reareing a virtual standstill
in February 1956, mainly because of a ehortage of locomotive fuel. In
Septenber 1956, well before the Novezber uprising during which coal
production ceased almost emtiroJer, the Hungarian press announced that
600 passenger runs yould be suepended during October because of the
inadequacy of coal supplies .9 Following the Novenber uprising the rail-
roads (as well as other branches of the economy) were able to resume
service only on the basis of imported coal supplies.1? It was also
officially predicted that the coal supplies for 1957 'would be 40 per cent
less tbn in 1956.11 Normally, a two-week reserve of coal is kept en hand
for railroad operation, but under the present conditions of exhausted
stocks and short supply coal is issued on a daily need basis?2 It is
evident that coal constitutes a vulnerability in the Hungarian railroad
system of special importance to Special Forces. Primarily because coal
is moved by rail from nining areas and points of importation to consrning
centers, the destruction of carefully selected railroad targets could wreak
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havoc with the railroads as well as with those other elements in the national
economy which are dependent upon unimpeded supplies of coal.
(2) principal Routes
Two routes of almost equal importance extend from Budapest
northeastward to the Ukraine and connect with Soviet broad gauge. The first
of these runs via Cegled, Szolnok, Debrecen, and Nyiregyhaza to Zahony and
Chop. The second leads from Budapest to Hatvan, Miskolc, Satoraljaujhely
and then through a short etre-WI of Czech territory to the Czech transship-
ment center at Cierna mad Tisou and beyond that point to Chop.
The Budapest-Zahony line is double-tracked at least as far as Szolnok
and is probably double-tracked from Debrecen to Zahony. Double-tracking
between Debrecen and Zahony has been in progress for a number of years and
was reliably reported in the final stages of completion in mid-1956.13
The stretch between Szolnok and Debrecen was originPlly double-tracked
throughout, but the second track was removed in 1945. The second five-year
plan (1956-1960) has as one of its objectives the restoration of the double
track in this sector. At present, it is likely that a second track extends
beyond Szolnok only as far an Karacag.
From Zahony, site of Hungary's major transshipment point between
Russian broad gauge and European standard gauge, the standard gauge line
is thought to continue across the border into the USSR at least as far as
Chop. This line apparently is not separate from the broad gauge track
between Zahony and Chop but is merely a third rail arrangement on the broad
gauge track permitting the operation of standard gauge trains. The bridge
spanning the Tisza at Zahony is a single-track, dual-gauge (i.e., three-
rail) structure. The line is used as part of a circuit between Hungary
and the USSR for the return of empty freight cars via Chop, the Czech-
USSR transshipment point of Cierna nd Tisou, and the Czech-Hungarian
border crossing at Satoraljaujhely. With the completion of double-tracking
between Szolnok and Zahony the circular routing of trains through Chop and
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Czechoslovakia may no longer be necessary but the route will undoubtedly
rennin of prine importance for obvious strategic reasons.
Traffic along both lines from Budapest to Chop is very heavy and
consists of Hungarian exports of railway rolling stock including locomo-
tives, machinery, electrical equipment, busses, trucks, textiles,
aluminum, alumina and bauxite, oil, uranium ore, and foodstuffs. Import
traffic consists of cotton, coke, coal, iron ore, and non-ferrous minerals
and metals. Cotton and iron ore undoubtedly originate in the USSR. Coke
and coal, on the other hand, probably come from Bland or Czechoslovakia
.via the USSR. It is very probable that much of the coal, coke, and iron
ore imports enter Hungary via Satoraljaujhely, the closest point to the
Ozd-Kazindbareika-Dioagyor steel-making area. Soviet military traffic,
including both troops and supplies, also accounts for a substantial
portion of the total traffic on the lines.
On the northern portion of the circular route between Hungary and
the uSSR, the 60-kM. section between Budapest and Hatmulhas been elec-
trified. Due to a shortage of electric locomotives, however, the use
of electric traction has been restricted to freight trains; passenger
aervice is still maintained by steam engine. The work of electrifica-
tion is to be continued in the direction of Miskolc under the latest
five-year plan but is not scheduled for completion before 1960. Tile
entire itretch between Budapest and Satoraljaujhely is thought to be
double-tracked throughout. Bridges along the route are double with
mutual abutments, i.e.,.each track leading over a separate bridge.
Traffic-m.1=e data on these important ,lines ig available. only
for the route via Miskolc and Hatvan. This line allegedly handles 45
trains daily in each direction.
From a strategic standpoint the route from Chop via Czechoslovakia
and Satoraljaujhely has two decided advantages over the one via Zahony
and Szolnok. In the first instance, it avoids two vulnerable Tisza
River crossings, i.e., at Zahony and at Szolnok, and in the second
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enables traffic eastbound. for points in Hungary, Czechoslovakia south of
the Carpathians, and Austria to avoid the Budapest bottleneck and the
vulnerable Danube River bridges in Budapest. Budapest is by-passed by
means of a connection between Aszod and Vac on the line to Szob and
Bratislava. This connection was opened in 1951 and followa a route Aszod-
Galgamacsa-Vachartyan. It is double-tracked at least between As sod. and
Galgarricsa and between Vachartyan (4732N-1915E) and Vac.14 The main line
Budapest-Vac-Szob to which this cut-off connects is also double-tracked
and is One of the principal connections between Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
and Austria.
The principal 1411es of northeast Hungary which connect with the USSR
are interconnected by a number of lateral routes which, in view of their
potential value an alternates and by-passes, help to reduce ths over-all
vulnerability of either of the rain lines. Atong the ucz's important of
these connections is a single-track stretch between Nyiregyhaza and
Szerencs which is used to return empty freight cars to the FO_skolc area
from the translonAing stations in Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine. The
connection is especially vulnerable as is another impertant l'nk, between
Fuzesabony and Debrecen, at the Tisza River crossing.
Another connection between Budapest and Szolmok via Ujszesz (4718N-
2005E) is according to current plans to be double -tracked throughout by
1960. This sector of railroad is part of the rain Badapast-Bucharest
route via LogOshaza (4634N-2114E). Sixty per cent of Htngary's traffic
with Rumania is carried via I8Oshaza. The line was origin g117 constructed
as a double-track line but portions of the second track ware r.roved during
the early 1930s, and again in 1945. Replacement of the second track has
been underway since 1951 and stretches between Budapest and Mende (4725N-
1930E) and between Nagykata (4726N-1945E) and WSZa87, were the first to
be replaced. At Ujszasz this alternate line joins a single-track line
from Hatvan. This latter connection has been much improved since the
war, with heavier rails and fortified roadbed. Although the Budapest-
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Ujszasz-Szolnok line represents an alternate route between Szolnoic and
Budapest on the Budapest-Zahony trunk line, it, together with the main
Zahony track via Cegled, could easily be rendered useless as a through
route by the destruction of either of the double-track railroad
bridges which span the Tisza and ZagYva Rivers between Szolnok and
Szajol. Destruction of either of these key structures would also
interrupt direct connection? with Rumania. It has been reported
that recognition of the extreme sensitivity of the Tisza River
crossing between Szolnok and Szajol has prompted a Russian request
for the construction of an atomic bomb-proof tunnel at this point.15
Additional lines of importance in northeast Hungary are two
brandies from the Budapest-Satoraljaujhely trunk line which provide
added connections with Czechoslovakia. One of these runs northward
from Miskolc, crosses the Hungarian border at Hidasneteti, and con-
nects at Kosice (Czechoslovakia) with the main line from Chop
(Ukraine) to Prague (Czechoslovakia). It is a principal traffic
carrier between northeastern Hungary and Czechoslovakia, with con-
nections to Boland. The nature of traffic carried on the line is
not known, but is likely to include coke for the steel plants in
the Eiskolc area.
The second branch from the Budapest-Satoraljaujhely trunk route
runs from Hatvan to Salgotarjan and connects with Czechoslovak lines
at 1ucenec. This line was also originally double-tracked but was
reduced to a single-track line in 1945. It currently is of greater
importance as a domestic line than as an international connection it
its availability as an alternate route to the Budapest area from
Czechoslovakia is of strategic interest.
From Budapest two main double-track lines of rail communication
lead north and northwest to Western Europe. These lines are extensions
of the trunk routes Which enter northeast Hungary from the Ukraine and
are of great strategic importance to the USSR. The first line extends
SET
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northward. from Budapest and follows the east bank of the Danube via Vac,
crosses into Czechoslovakia at Szob and continues to Bratislava and Vienna.
The relatively new connection between Vac and Aszod permits through traffic
from the 'USSR to Austria and western Czechoslovakia to by-pass the national
capital.
The second line is the double-tracked, electrified Budapest-Hegyeshalem-
Vienna line via Tatabanya, Kommrom and Gyor. This line is probably the best
in Hungary. It has a high traffic capacity and was forrerly used an a main
supply route for Soviet troops in Austria. An important vulnerability of
the line lies in its almost total dependence for electricity on the Banhida
power station (near Tatabanya). Loss of electric polder 'mould necessitate
the use of 90 steam locomotives to maintain traffic at current levels.16
In view of the Chronic Shortage of locorotives in BUngary, it is doubtful
that, if electric traction were interdicted on this line, service could be
maintained except at the expense of other lines in the BUngarian system, or
Pith considerable Soviet assistance.
At Hegyeshalom, a connection, possibly inoperative, leads to Bratislava
(Czechoslovakia) via the border-crossing point of Bajka. Another connection
between this line and Czechoslovakia is rade at norm= via the reconstructed
Danube River bridge.
From Gyor connections extend to Sopron (the old Gyor-Sopron-Ebtnxeurt
line) and to Szentgotthard via Cellaralk and Szombathely. Both of these
lines are important as alternate routes into Austria, the latter of the two
connecting at Celld8r6lk with an important main line from Budapest via
Szekesfehervar which handles nu& Soviet military traffic. Sore of the lines
crossing the Austrian border between Sopron and Szombathely have been repor-
ted as closed., sore as dismantled in part, and others as open on only a
lindted basis. The exact status of each of the individual connections is
unknown, but Begyeshalom is the only authorized crossing point for travelers.
When linked together these lines form important north-south routes between
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Vienna and Bratislava on the one hand, and Yugoslavian cities on the other,
via 'western Hungary.
Southwest Hungary is served by two rain lines radiating from Budapest.
The Budapest-Szekesfehervar-Nagykaniza-Nnrakeresztur trunk route, which
crosses into Yugoslavia at Kotoriba is important as a domestic carrier
serving the oilfields of Zala County and as an international connection
to Italy. The line is double tracked between Budapest and Szekesfehervar.
The sector Nagykaniza-Nnrakeresztur was formerly double-tracked but one
track was dismantled in 1945.
The bridge connecting this line mith yugoslavia over the Mira River
between Nnrakeresztur and Kotorbia was permanently reconstructed in 1955.
Previously a temporary bridge handled the occasional traffic between
Yugoslavia and Hungary at this border-crossing point. An alternate
crossing a short distance to the east near Gyekenyes is inoperative
due to the fact that the war-destroyed bridge spanning the Drava River
has not been replaced.
Double-tracking of the remainder of the Budapest-Narakeresztur line
has been reported for many years, and MSS Originally begun as a wartine
operation. It is lik ly that the work has been completed, but confirma-
tion of this possibility is lacking. The last five-year plan (1950-1954)
anticipated the electrification of the stretch Budapest-Szekesfehervar,
mith power being derived from the large Inota power station near Varpalota.
The plan was not realized and it is not known whether it has been aban-
doned. A. branch line from Szekesfehervar to KOrerom on the Budapest-
Hegyeshalom trunk line is igportant as a carrier of bauxite from mines
north of Szekesfehervar to the country's largest slprina plant at Alms-
fuzito. The processed slurping is returned to Inota for further processing
into aluminum.
The second major line serving southwest Hungary is currently of
dorestic importance only. It runs from Budapest to pees via Puszta-
szabolcs and Dombovar. It is an important carrier of coal from the
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Pees-ROmlo mining area to Budapest and beyond an well as to the new steel
center at Dunapentele (fornerly Stalinvaros). Plans call for the eventual
double-tracking of the line fromPusztaszabolcs to Dombovar. The roadbed
was allegedly widened for this purpose in 1951. Grades in the Dombovar-Pecs
area are steep enough to warrant the use of pusher locomotives on heavy
freight trains.
In order to avoid a roundabout route to Dunapentele from the Eionlo
coal nines, a connection was recently established between Retzilas and the
branch line from pusztaszabolcs to Dunafoldvar and Paks. The new stretch
has undergone nudh sinking, however, and is serviceable only for light
loads at low speeds.17
Coal continues to move to Dunapentele via the
longer route through Pusztaszabolcs. The stretch between this point and
Dunapentele was rebuilt in 1951. Curves were eliminated, bridges replaced,
and the roadbed strengthened during reconstruction. Between Racalmas and
Dunapentele reconstruction involved the laying of What amounts to a new
line which is 2-1/5 kns. shorter than the old route. It is eminently
possible that sone of the (coking) coal hauled on this route to Dunapentele
originates in Poland and reaches its destination vim Czechoslovakia and the
Danube River crossing at Eamarom.
The railroad lines of southwestern Hungary are linked to those in the
southeastern part of the country only by two vulnerable bridges over the
Danube, at Dunafoldvar and Baja. The Dunafoldvar crossing will Bass=
increasing inportance with the realization of plans to provide an addi-
tional through route from northeastern Hungary and the Ukraine to south-
western Hungary and Western Europe. This route will begin at Eisujszallas
on the nsin line to Chop and will run via Turkeve, Szarvas, KUnszentnarton,
Eecskenet, Fulopszallas, and Solt to the Danube River bridge between Solt
and Dunafoldvar. The beginning of the route will also connect via Debrecen
with an alternate route into Hungary via Runania from Chust in the Ukraine.
The clear purpose of developing this line is to enable traffic from the
USSR to by-pass Budapest. TO date, the only connections which have been
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built between existing sectors of the proposed trunk route are those from
Dunafoldvar to Solt, and Lakitelek to KUnszentrarton. At present the Chief
value of the Dunafoldvar bridge crossing lies in its establishing a
circuit route for freight shipnents between Budapest and Dunapentele,
relieving soneWhat the burden on the lines serving the western bank of
the Danube.
Of the two Danube River crossings in southern Hungary the one at
Baja is probably the more important. It permits the direct shipment of
coal from the pees mining district to consmthg centers in southeast
Hungary. The line also carries oil from the fields south of Lake Balaton,
and uranium from the pecs area, to the USSR via routes which by-pass
Budapest or by transshipnent into Danube River vessels at Baja. In
exchange, southwest Hungary is provided direct access to the crops of
Hungary's nein agricultural area. The stretch of line between Baja and
Bacsalmes WS reinforced by heavier rails after the war to permit the
novenent of heavy freight from Baja to Budapest via Bacsalnas and Els-
kunhalss. Prior to the destruction of the bridge over the Danube at Baja,
heavy freight shipments from the port at Baja had moved along the vest
rather than the east bank of the Danube.
As of 1953 work was reportedly in progress to establish a direct
connection between Baja and Budapest by connecting panapataj (4653N-1857E)
to Baja via Ealocsa (4632N-1857E). Leveling work on the roadbed was
allegedly underway at a number of points along the proposed route.18
Two strategieally important routes serve southeast Hungary from
Budapest. One of these is the nein route to central *Yugoslavia and the
southern Balkans via the border crossing between Eelebia and Subotica.
originally this line was constructed with double tracks between Budapest
and Ennszentmiklos but the second track was removed following World War I.
In 19148 re-laying of the second track was begun between Budapest and
Soroksar and it was planned to replace the second track as far as
EUnszentniklos. The extent of additional efforts in this regard is
163
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unknown. Of the twm connections which Hungarian railroads make with those
of Yugoslavia, the one at Kelebia is the mare important from the standpoint
of peacetime traffic volume.
The remaining in route from Budapest to southeast Magary runs via
Cegled to Kecskeret and thence to Szeged. The line is an important connec-
tion between Budapest and the Tisza River transloading center at Szeged.
Szeged is also an important textile center and the probable destination for
son m of the cotton imported.by rail from the USSR via Zehony. Pre-war
connections between Hungarian, Yugoslavian and Rumanian lines at Szeged have
not been re-established nor has the important Tisza River railroad bridge
in Szeged been rebuilt. From Szeged connections are maintained with lines
in eastern Hungary via Hodrezovasarhely and Bekescsaba. The connecting
line crosses the Tisza River on a combination railroad and highway bridge
seven miles northeast of Szeged.
Although the main route between Budapest and Szeged runs via Cegled,
a more direct route is available by neans of a branch from Budapest to
Kecskeret. This branch allegedly is the supply line for Soviet and Hungarian
military camps in the vicinity of Orkeny (4707N-1926B). The fact that the
line Budapest-Kecskemet passes through what is reliably reported to be a
restricted military area explains in part why the longer route via Cegled
is used for through traffic to Szeged.
A fincil railroad line of importance in eastern Hungary is one which
branches from the trunk route Budapest-Zahony at Puspokladany and leads
to Oradea, Rumania. The line is important as a main route through the
central Transylvanian Mauntains in Runania and as an additional connection
with the USSR via Sate Mare (Rumania) and Chust (Ukraine). The amaunt of
traffic carried on the line at present is not known, but is probably not
of very great volune.
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16
17
HUNGARY
MAP N
RAILROADS (U)
International
Main line
Alternate line
Domestic
Main line
Planned
4-4. 1-41. ?-?-?
Non-operational border connection X
19
CONF TIAL
? zP01 ,%; 'N I)
..0
13
Bardeso.
POLAND
/
eVerlu Belem.
wk.
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Nominal.
UZHGOROD
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R.
49
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101k
SANKT PelLTEN
. levtce
"1-31.""g41,. "
-
SetoralK161K
?
SAroSpet
Sollars
L?rords?
rt.verela
MUKACKE90
?
Serer,/
.Irsheve
Khust
RATISLAV
et,
Asirosnarnany
Sevlyush
46
Mutuuschlag
sc Baden
WIENER.NEUST
48
ove Zarnky
NYiREGYNATN:,
4!
? yltell6/17,
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\
jduhadilt
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NAJDUBOS
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-
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IS KTJ N
Kink undoronnia
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'BARANYA
BA
Becselrnas
UBOTICA
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rosheza
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Sar ked
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Bake Apo':
Podrevska SlotqSo
TIMISOARA
Daruvar
Vehk, Kenai
ZR EN./
The alternations, bounden,. shown on thq map do net
necessanly correspond nn all oases to the bounden., /.cog
bored by the U S Government
GEORGETOWN
16
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH
PROJECT 9-57
Slavonska Po/ega
ukovar
Vinkovci
.Bosanski Novo
(DUNAV)
NOVI SAD
17
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002600010004-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04:
CIA-RDP81-01043R002600010004-4
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c. Highways (Sec 14410 0)
As in the case of railroad development, recent improvements in the
Hungarian road net are closely related to USSR strategic military and economic
needs. /n northeast Hungary the principal routes to.the USSR have been
widened and resurfaced since 1950. Similar work has been performed on routes
leading to the southwest frontier.19 Primary roads in Hungary are hard-
surfaced (asphalt; concrete, paving block) all-weather highways; secondary
roads generally have a water-bound macadam surface .20 Both classes of high-
ways rest on heavy stone foundations.
As Nap 0 shows, the major highway arteries are those which lead from
the USSR into and through Hungary towards Austria and Yugoslavia. TO a
large extent these arterial routes parallel the railroads described in the
preceding section. A comparison of Naps 0 and N illustrates how closely
the major roads and railroad lines coincide and exemplifies the greater
economic and strategic importance which sone transport routes have in
relation to others in present-day Hungary.
The parallel nature of roads and railroads is of especial importance
to Special Forces in that, in a large number of instances, roads and rail-
roads cross water barriers side-by-side or even on the sane structure. It
is a very likely possibility that Special Forces could, in the course of a
single operation, interdict both an important rail artery and a correspon-
ding road route. The vulnerability of both of the major media of transport
to interdiction by Special Forces is therefore considerably increased.
Hungarian highways have a very limited economic importance. The
greatest part of the commodities exchanged in the course of national and
international trade are moved by rail. Due to a combination of stadia fac-
tors as limited vehicle park, inadequate width and other features of
secondary road construction, winding routes, and minirnm maintenance,
roads in Hungary cannot be expected to assune a greater economic impor-
tance for many years. The problem of Hungary's limited vehicle park will
not be solved until the domestic automotive industry (with a 1955 production
165
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of pp to 3,664 units) located on Csepel Island in Budapest, is relieved of
the necessity of exporting its products.21 For the foreseeable future,
Hungary's roads will probably continue to function wanly as links in the
donestic connunications system, as feeders to railheads and river ports,
and, most importantly, as strategic routes for military operations. In
the last-named regard, however, the limited load-bearing capacity of many
routes and of the bridges along them, together with the deterioration 'which
can be expected to ensue during the conduct of military operations, will
tend to restrict their over-all value. For exapple, during the course of
the November uprising, Russian military forces in a nunber of instances
had to erect temporary pontoon facilities when existing bridge structures
proved incapable of handling the volute and weight of their military traffic.
The vehicle bridge across the Tisza River at Szolnok, for example, was
weakened by heavy Soviet armor and forced the construction of a pontoon
facility at that point.22 similar structures were erected across the Tisza
at Zahony in an effort to break the bottleneck created there by the inade-
quacy of existing bridge-crossing facilities.23
As in the case of railroads, the events of November 1956 clearly denon-
strate which highways in Hungary are strategics-11y important. The Russian
Ground Forces intervention was carried out alnost entirely along the routes
designated in map 0 as international through routes. These are the routes
'which have received the greatest attention in recent years with respect to
maintenance and improvenent. /n November 1956 they were the principal
arteries for the movement of Soviet forces stationed in Hungary as well as
for the introduction of troops from the USSR, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia.
In the case of movement from the latter two countries, it appears that exten-
sive use was also made of primary routes paralleling the Hungarian borders
in neighboring countries, and emanating from the southwest corner of the
Ukraine. Accorcngly, the main arteries, with Budapest as a focal point,
proved to be:
166
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1) from southwest Ukraine--via Zahopy, Nyiregyhaza, Debrecen,
Szolnok and Cegled to Budapest;
2)' from southwest Ukraine--via Czechoslovakia and eastern
Hungary entering at either Satoraljaujhely or Hidasneneti
and thence to Miskolc, Gyongos, Hatvan, Godollo and Budapest;
3) from southwest Ukraine--via Czechoslovakia entering at either
Konaromor Rajka onto the route Budapest-Hegyeshalom;
4) from western Rumania to Budapest--via Oradea-Fuspokladany-
Szolnok and Cegled (part of Highway 1 above);
5) from Budapest--to Szentgotthard and Szombathely via
Szekesfehervar;
6) from Budapest--to Nagykaniza via Szekesfehervar;
7) from Budapest to Bares via Dunafoldvar and Pecs; and
: 8) from Budapest to Szeged via KOcskemet.
In the cases
of the third and fifth through eighth routes above, the
flow of Russian military traffic during the November uprising was from the
outlying terminals, where Soviet Ground Forces were already stationed,
toward Budapest. In a general war involving areas west and south of Hun-
gary, however, these highways would probably act as through traffic carrier
extensions of routes one, two and four above.
Another factor which was demonstrated during the November 1956 uprising
was the sensitivity of the Tisza and Danube River crossings. Soviet forces
quickly moved to protect not only the Danube River bridges in Budapest, a
fact that yns widely reported, but also those at Hajka, Kontaum, Dunafold-
var, and Baja. Tisza River crossing-points at Zahony, Szolnok and Szeged
were also promptly safeguarded.24 The rapidity with which these points
were secured further emphasizes the barrier nature of Hungary's major
rivers. Although it is true that if the main highway bridges across the
Tisza and Danube were destroyed they could be replaced by pontoon facili-
ties, it may be assumed that the USSR prefers to avoid the necessity of
having to build them, and would again undertake to afford the existing
167
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permanent bridges uaximum, protection in the event of further hostilities
in Hungary.
The inability of the seconaaryhighways in Hungary to serve as adequate
substitutes for the arterial routes in the handling of a large voltam of mili-
tary traffic miaS also demonstrated during the November uprising. During the
second phase of the Russian intervention, secondary approach roads from
Rumania became choked withmilitary traffic moving into Hungary. This
occurred at a tiun when the main highways were also handling a large volume
of military traffic.25 if the arterial routes had not been available, it
is questionable whether Russian Ground Forces would have been able to accom-
plish their mission without considerable delay. It is also likely that their
ability to move swiftly and in force over secondary roads would have been
seriously imnaired had it been necessary to handle return supply traffic.
Conceivably, this requirement might have necessitated the development of
one-way traffic patterns.
The vulnerability of ami.14ta-y- force operating in or through Hungary
to the interdiction of its raad supply routes is readily apparent when viewed
in the above lights. Through the interdiction of judiciously selected key
structures, Special Poraen could seriously impede Soviet military operations
in Hungary or in areas south and west of the country that are contingent
upon lines of supply and cover-mications extending through Hungarian territory.
The interdiction of priunxy reuter4, forcing a shift of traffic to ill-suited
secondary roads and possibly into one-way traffic patterns, would at the
very least prove to be a considerable Yardicap to eneuy operations.
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HUNGARY
urea
MAP 0
HIGHWAYS (U)
Primary routes
Secondary routes
?
utombera
49
Spate! Hove Ve5t4e,d
006 Beleinl
051. is,
. ? ,
????
KO?ICE
R.
UKACHEVO
? IISII?V?
Lutene
SANKT POLTEN
Bereitovo
Khust
4
Riat her cyan..
P
L-7
ova Zarney
WIENER NEUST
= _
Metolteresttes
?
Metocat
Na 1,6116
Murzzusehlag
Haidunen
Held dorog
Baia Mare
HAJDUBOS
?
.0(
STS
eirndustobos
Man,
ecses
Hallberg
1' E T
Honor
? Jasalad Any
=-
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-
tr "'
u eg .7"t? _
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? .????
fureSITY
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Dunavecse
;1
KISKUNFILEGYHAZA
nstentma
?
Is Tamest,
-a.
11.606,0,
ZENTES
roshtaa
NAG
enye
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KISKUNHALAS
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ZAGREB I
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TIM ISOARA
Kat.'"
Vent, Kanal
5
Tit? ?ntemanonel bounden., shown on re?s map do not
necenattly toltevond ?n all cases to the bounden.. ,ecog
n?ted by the U S Gmetnntent
Siavonska PoYega
.aoshcsw. Nov.
t3NOVI SAD
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT 9-57
22
23
48
46
je
1.7
7.4
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49
HUNGARY
MAP P
PIPLINES AND NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS (U)
Navigable throughout the year for water craft up to 1000
ton capacity
Navigable at high water (May-June) for water craft up to
1000 ton capacity/throughout the year for craft from 400-
600 tons.
Generally navigable for water craft from 400-600 tons.
Locks
,J;:i11i4,-"*AP1ft
Oil pipelines
Oil pipelines, unconfirmed
Pumping station
CON
?
---
N.- POLAND
L
\ .
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Rutornberok
.Val
Humenni
037
rag
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UZHCOROD
Ronavska Sobota
LuZeneC
MUKACHEVO
.Berei1.0
Saliva
.Irsheva
6.'11
Skerte
R.
49
SANKT PoLTEN
Murzzuschlag
RATISLAV
boar...any \.?
SevIvuols
-
Baden
WIENER?NEUST
Kerne:s?
Z A
OLCS
Baktalorinthaza.
-r?
hy
Hajdun
Ha
Bali Mare
HAJOUB
GYQ,?
Kapuvar
f"-
(!).ST Godoll
RAITSPALOTA
Pe stu:shos.wNky
.Rakosszontrni
sh
c/D
STS
relThno
*cu
es PEST
st
ITLORIN
?I,ASZBE
apketa
Haidustob
Hartberg
..laSaladany
SZC.
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16
.Bosanski Hour
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT
9-57
(DUNA o
NOVI SAD
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d. Waterways
HUngary's navigable waterways include, in addition to Lake Balaton,
approximately 1,000 km. of rivers .and. canals. Of these, only the ])rube
(416 kms. within Hungary), the lower Tisza, and the Upper Tisza including
the Trans-Tisza (or East Main) Canal accommodate vessels and barges of
1,000 tons capacity. The Middle Tisza; the Koros (from Csongrad to
Bekescaba); the Berettyo (from its confluence with the 'Oros to its junc-
tion with the Trans-Tisza Canal); and the Maros (from its confluence with
the Tisza at Szeged to Mako) can generally accommodate 400-600 ton craft.
During high water the larger-capacity vessels can navigate the Tisza
throughout. During the winter months navigation is generally suspended
because of ice, and river craft are berthed at the principal ports on
the Danube and Tisza Rivers. Detailed information on the foregoing
waterways is available in standard intelligence reference sources.
Despite the fact that it is a canalized river, the Sb, connecting
the Danube River and Lake Balaton, is navigable only intermittently
between Szekezard and Siofok. If improved, as long-range plans antici-
pate, this waterway from Lake Balaton to the Danube would assume a great
inloortance as an outlet for bauxite from the Balcony Mountains mining
area. The ability to ship bauxite direct to the USSR via the route
Balaton, Sb o and Danube would relieve the Hungarian railroads of a very
considerable burden.
The most important recent development concerning the waterways of
Hungary was the opening in 1956 of the Trans-Tisza Canal between Tiszalok
and Bakonyzeg (see Nap p). By means of this caul craft of up to 1;000-
ton capacity may now ply between the southern terminus of the canal and
Zahony on the Ukrainian border. The canal serves as an outlet for the
crop-producing area of eastern Hungary and provides direct access to
the nearest Russian transshipment points for these products.
BUngary's economic plans envision improvements to the Berettyo
(four locks and three dLam) and Koros Rivers to permit navigation by
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high-capacity craft between the upper and lower portions of the Hungarian Tisza
via the Trans-Tisza Canal. In addition, the middle portion of the Tisza will
also ,be improved, primarily by dams and locks near Xiskore and Szeged which
by regulating stream flow will lengthen the period of navigation for craft of
1,000-ton capacity.
ts
Plans for the much heralded Danube-Tisza Canal (the confluence of the
Danube and Tisza Rivers is.in Yugoslavia) apparently have been laid aside.
Emphasis is now being placed on the further extension of irrigation canals
(which will be navigable in part) in the.. region between Kiskore and Mazotour
in Szolnok county. Parts of the new system are under construction (see Map P;
see also Land Utilization above). The new canals will be fed from Tisza water
backed. up by a dam at Tiszabura.
Waterways are used almost exclusively for international trade but handle
only a minor fraction of the country's total freight tonnage. Hungarian
statistics allege that in 1955, 1,780,000 tons of Hungarian freight were
hauled. 847,000,000 ton kilometers on domestic waterways. Comearable figures
for railroad freight in 1955 were 67,8162000 tons and 8,780,000,000 tons
kilometers ?26 The principal items of freight conveyed by water are :27
coal
(324,000 tons); stone and gravel (336,000 tons); crude oil (274,000 tons);
iron ore and manganese (145,000 tons); and construction and fire wood (145,000
tons). Agricultural products and a minor amount of bauxite, both of which are
exported, are also moved by 'water.
Of the principal items of waterborne freights iren ore and manganese are
imported from the USSR and have as their dast-?netions the steel centers at
Dunapentele and Budapest. The iron Ore could originate either at Kerch' or
Krivoi Rog in the Ukraine. manganese could. come either from Blkopol via
the Dnieper River, or from the Caucasus (Chiatura). Coal is also an impor-
e,_
tent 'item and probably originates in the USSR (nearest source the Donbass),
although some amounts may come from West European ceuntries. In view of the
fact that Hungarian imports of coal were expected to rise very sharply in
0;PA
1957 (one million tons forecast--), coal traffic on the Danube and Tisza
Rivers may have increased considerably.
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Crude oil as transported. by water in Hungary is primarily an import
item, originating in Bulgaria and Rumania and shipped to Hungary for
refining. (Hungary has excess refining capacity.) Some HUngarian high-
viscosity crude which cannot be refined at Hungary's existing installa-
tions is, however, exported direct to the USSR. Major refineries at SzonY
and. Almasfuzito on the Danube above Budapest are the most likely destina-
tions for the imports. Hungarian statistics for recent years show
waterborne crude oil shipments ranging between 270,000 and 330,000
metric tons annually.29 The statistics make no mention of river ship-
ments of refined products which are reported by many sources to be shipped
to the USSR via Danube River barges. Such shipments totaled an estimated
336,000 metric tons in 1953.30
Navigable waterways in Hungary are vulnerable to interdiction by
Special Forces primarily through the collapsing of bridges into the main
channels. In this regard the new Trans-Tisza Canal is especially vul-
nerable in that it is crossed by approximately 20 bridges. Interdiction
of the waterways through the destruction of bridges would have the added
effect of interrupting highway transportation.
Of the few navigation locks *which exist on the waterway system,
all can be regarded as critical. Interdiction of the lock at Tiszalok
would render useless the Trans-Tisza Canal as an artery serving the agri-
cultural east. A lock and pumping station at Baja are vital to the
maintenance of the water level on the Baja-Hezdan (Yugoslavia) Canal
which acts as a feeder to the Veliki Canal in Yugoslavia. Another lock
and a dam at Siofok are critical to navigation between the Danube and.
Lake Balaton. The dam is used to regulate the level of water in the
lake and in the Sb o River. The interdiction of levees and floodgates
along the Tisza and the Trans-Tisza Canal could result in the flooding
of crop lands during high water and a denial of irrigation water during
the dry summer months.
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e. Pipelines
Hungary has at least one and probably two pipeline systems for the
transportation of crude oil and natural gas. The known-system is located in
Transdandbia and extends from the Zala county oilfields to Szony and. Almas-
fuzito with branches to Budapest and. Petfurdo. A second and never system
has been reported to span eastern Hungary. It allegedly connects the oil
and gas fields of Easzolajfalva to Nyirbator via Debrecen. Although pipe-
lines are an important part of Hungary's oil industry, available evidence
indicates that the bulk of the crude oil and refined products is moved by
rail and river barge.
The main line in the TtansdanUbian system is an eight- or nine-inch
welded steel line buried from one to one and a, half meters underground.
Closing valves on the line are located approximately ionellEmpir4Weethat
in the event of a break in the line the flow of oil or gas can be effectively
halted. Ujudvar is a central meeting point on this system for short lines
froutthe IiPee-Iovaszi area near the Yugoslav border. Zalaegerszeg, the
site of a new refinery, is also a terminal point for a short line from the
Gellenhaza and Nagylengyel oil fields.
Although a number of reports attest to the probability of a connection
between the lines originating in the Lovaszi-Lipse fields on the one hand
and the Nagylengyel-Gelleghaza fields on the other, reliable information on
this subject is not available 3l One recent report from a fairly reliable
observer alleges that a new pipeline is under construction between Zalaegers-
zeg and Szogy.32 The route of the new line is unknown.
Pumping stations are located along the routes of the pipelines in Trans-
dannbia Wherever terrain obstacles must be overcome. Pumping stations on the
main transmission line are located at Ujudvar, BalatonbereAy, Balatonboglar,
Siofok, KapoInasnyek? Erd (Danube River crossing), Baracska, Ujbarok, and
Szony. Reserve storage installations are also located at these stations;
their function is to permit the minterrupted transmission of crude oil
during emergencies resulting from a break in the line or a loss of pressure.
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The pumps are electrically motivated but each installation is eqpipped with
reserve internal combustion engine type pumps to be used in the event of
electrical failure.
The main pipeline in TransdanUbia is used alternately to convey crude
oil to refineries in Budapest, Szony, Almasfuzito, and Petfurdo, and natural
gas to Budapest and Petfurdo. Gas is piped through twice a week, usually on
Thursdays and Sundays, but only if sufficient stocks of crude oil have been
supplied to the refineries beforehand. The absolute quantities of the two
products transported via the TransdanUbian pipeline system are unknown. It
has been estimated, however, that up to loolow metric tons of crude oil
were shipped on this line in 1955. The amount of natural gas reaching the
Obuda gas works in Budapest has been placed at 220,000 cubic meters per
24-hour delivery period.
Information on pipelines in eastern Hungary is more fragmentary than
for western Hungary. An eight- or nine-inch line similar in construction
to the main line in Transdannbia has been reported to run from the oil and
gas field area of Maszolajfalva near the Rumanian border to Debrecen via
Barkonszeg. Pumping stations are said to be located at Maszolajfalva,
Bakonszeg, and west of Debrecen. The purpose of this line is not clear.
It may serve to transport crude oil to a relatively new refinery at Debrecen,
or to supply natural gas to that city, or for both purposes. A late 1956
Hungarian press release, which reported that a natural gas pipeline from
E0eroeszegapati (4702N-2158E) to Debrecen was under construction, fails' to
clarify the matter. 311.
Another line which may be an extension of the one from Maszolajfalva
and which according to available information was completed in 1954, extends
northeastward from Debrecen to Nyirbator.35 An installation variously repor-
ted as a refinery (200,000 metric ton capacity) or storage depot (6,400
metric ton capacity) is the northern terminus of the line in Nyirbator.
One source of untested reliability has reported, however, that the northern
terminus is not Nyirbator but Nyirbogdany (4803N-2150B) Where a 100,000 metric
ton capacity refinery is 1ocated.36
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Current economic plans call for the construction of a pipeline in this
general area of eastern Hungary to convey natural gas from Rumania to a new
chemical complex:under construction in Tiszapalkogya.37
It is not known
whether this line will be part of the above-described system or entirely
separate from it.
The sensitivity of HUngary's pipelines as a vulnerable part of the coun-
try's transportation system is illustrated by reports that the Transdanubian
line is patrolled throughout its length. Guard stations reportedly are located
at approximately ten-kilometer intervals along the line.
Interdiction of the main pipeline system in Transdanubia? if accomplished
at some point between Ujudvar and the northern tip of Lake Balaton, would
disrupt the flow of crude oil to the refineries and would also deprive Buda-
pest and Petfurdo (chemical works) of natural gas supplies. In selecting a
possible point of interdiction, however, Special Forces planners should bear
in mind that destruction of pumping facilities would be more beneficial than
would the simple cutting of the line. Pumping facilities cannot be easily
replaced whereas a broken line can be repaired in a matter of hours. Similar
considerations would apply to the lines in the eastern part of the country.
If Hungary's pipelines were interdicted, alternate means of transporta-
tion for the crude oil and natural gas usually handled by these facilities
would have to be employed. These means would necessarily be rail and road
tank cars. However, the rail tank car fleet can only with difficulty cope
with present dhipnent problems occasioned in part by the fact that high
viscosity crude oil from the country's largest producing field at Naglyengyel
is not suitable for pipeline transmission without sone arrangements for
.heating, especially at pumping sites. Pipeline interdiction, coupled with
the destruction of pumping facilities, would therefore have a most dele-
terious effect on the Hungarian industry. If accomplished in conjunction
with the interdiction of rail transport between the oil fields and the major
refineries: it would probably force a prolonged suspension of the industry's
activities.
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3. Idnerals
Of the commercially exploitable mineral deposits in Hungary, sone are
sufficiently valuable to have attracted the attention of the USSR. Included
in this category are bauxite, crude oil, and uranium. Hungarian bauxite
especially is important to the USSR, although the full extent of that coun-
try's dependency on the Hungarian product cannot be accurately assessed.
Only the large Russian alumina and aluminum plant at Zaporozh'ye in the
Ukraine is thought to be supplied with Hungarian bauxite and alumina
exclusive of any other source. However, the amounts of bauxite and alumina
annually exported from Hungary are more than sufficient to keep this plant
working at full capacity. It is possible, as is certainly the case with
crude oil and uranium, that the exploitation of Hungarian bauxite is founded
in Russian policy to make full use of satellite resources in order to con-
serve those of the Soviet union. It is in the light of the possible exis-
tence of such a policy that Special Forces planners must determine to what
extent it may be either necessary or desirable to interdict the mineral
products which Hungary supplies to the USSR.
Minerals other than the foregoing which are extracted in Hungary are
of such poor grade that they would be less than marginally valuable
other countries more richly endowed. In Hungary, however, they are
to that country's economic structure. Coal, including coking coal,
in
vital
and
iron ore fit this description. The quantitative and qualitative insuffi-
ciency of the domestic supplies of these minerals is a very important
aspect of Hungary's internal economic vulnerability.
a. Coal38
Hungary's coal deposits, which vary in size, type, and calorific
content of the recovered Bineral, are located in the crescent-shaped string
of mountains extending from Miskolc in the north to pees in the south.
Throughout this area there are located approximately 137 separate coal
mines.39 The most important mines are found in the districts of Pecs-
Komlo (site of the country's only hard coal reserves), Tatabanya-Dorog
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(good quality brown coal), Salgotarjan-Edeleny (law quality brown coal),
and Varpolata (lignite).
Hungary's coal reserves, even When managed under the nost intensive
productive conditions of the Communist regime, are not able to produce coal
in sufficient quantity and of adequate quality to neet all of the country's
internal needs. Although coal productivity doubled under the Com6unist
regine between 1949 and 1955 (i.e., from 11.8 to 22.3 million netric tons)
only a 20 per cent increase in available energy was derived because most
of the increase in volume was accounted for by poor quality lignite.
The poor quality of the coal currently available has posed serious
problems to HUngary's economic planners. Despite attenpts to inprove the
product by nixing it with higher quality inported coal, frequent break-
downs in boiler operations, including those of the railroads, continue to
result from the cumulative corrosive effects of the inferior fuel. Other
effects have been a further taxing of railroads due to the necessity to
haul greater tonnages to supply needed caloric values, and the necessity
to import increasing quantities of coal in an effort to meet the needs of
Hungary's expanding industrial enterprises.
The November 1956 uprising seriously aggravated Hungary's very delicate
coal position. As a result of the stoppage of production during the rebel-
lion together with production shortfalls in earlier months, 1956 production
fell ten million tons short of planned output. Despite counterneasures
by the regine which consisted mainly of large-scale energency imports, rail-
way services, power .plant operations, and nest industrial activity had to be
drastically curtailed through the winter of 1956-1957.42
Noreover, it was
not expected that the crisis would be easily alleviated and the regine fore-
cast that in 1957 Hungary would be forced to import four million tons of
coal--an anount eight tines more than the usual quantity, and equivalent to
16 per cent of the nation's requirenent of approximately 25 million tons.
Planned production for 1957, as determined in mid-year, set an optimistic
20.5 million tons as the target.43 If, as everything indicates, production
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should fail to achieve this goal, Hungary will again face a severe coal
crisis in the winter of 1957-1958.
The coal crisis of the winter of 1956-1957 was not an unusual event
in itself for Hungary although its severity was greater than any hereto-
fore experienced by the regime. previous winters had been the occasions
for similar crises with concomitant shortages of electric power, indus-
trial halts and slowdowns, and suspended railroad operations.44
The
meaning of these crises for Special Forces planners is that coal
obviously constitutes a glaring vulnerability in the Hungarian econony.
Hungary's railroads annually consune 20 per cent of the nation's coal,
power plants 30 per cent, and industry 33 per cent.45 Without coal
railroad services cannot be maintained, electric power cannot be'pro-
duced, and industry, whether dependent upon coal directly (for fuel or
in the manufacture of iron and steel, and coal chemicals) or indirectly
(for power as for exanple the aluminum industry) cannot function.
Alternative fuels are of little help in tines of coal crisis either
because they are not available within Hungary in sufficient quantity or
because the coal-reliant consumers are not prepared to use them. As
examples of sone of the alternatives which have been unsuccessfully
employed in the past there may be noted briquettes from East Germany/
and peat soaked in oil from Pakura. The forner have been of a most
inferior quality unusable even by East German standards. The latter
is difficult to use because of boiler conversion problems and has a
severe corrosive effect on boilers.
The problem confronting special Forces planners is how to inter-
dict the coal sector of the Hungarian economy. Two nethods susceptible
of practical exploitation by Special Forces suggest themselves. In sone
coal-producing districts one of these methods night suffice; in others
a combination of both would perhaps be necessary to achieve worthwhile
results.
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Interdiction of the railroads at points between the producing and con-
suming centers is the first, and. probably the best means available to Special
Forces to interdict Hungary's coal supplies. Railroad interdiction would,
however, have to be carefully planned. For example, in the case of coal from
the Pecs-Komlo district, the cutting of the very important branch railroad
between Komlo and Oroszlo would entirely prevent the movement of coal from
the Kbmlo mines. On the other hand, the interdiction of the in railroad
lines leading north and east from the area as a whole toward Budapest and
Dunapentele would, although seriously impede, not wholly stop coal shipments
because of the availability of alternate railroad routes. Knowledge of the
condition of the alternate lines in regard to roadbeds, weight of rails,
length and frequency of sidings, and capacities of bridges would be neces-
sary to determine the suitability of any single line for handling heavy coal
traffic. In all probability local reconnaissance would demonstrate that many
alternate lines would be incapable of carrying such traffic. The selection
of the best possible points for interdiction would have to be made on the
bases of normal coal traffic patterns, and the capacities of the in and
alternate railroad lines serving each coal-mining district. The availability
in Hungary of a greater number of alternative railroad routes than are to be
found in other possible areas of Special Forces operations, as for example in
rally parts of the USSR, necessitates a more thorough analysis of local rail-
road traffic patterns than can be undertaken in this study.
Special problems would confront Special Forces operating in the northern
part of Hungary. Here the selection of points of interdiction of railroads
with regard to coal traffic would be governed not only by considerations rela-
tive to severing the producing from the consuming centers, but also by those
relative to the railroad routes over which coal is transported. As in the
earlier case, interdicting the main railroad lines would obviously be the
first objective of Special Forces. But a more extensive program of interdic-
tion would be required in view of the fact that the large industrial consumers
are closer to their domestic sources of supply than in the case of Pecs-Konlo,
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and that the lines from the producing to consuming centers do not coincide
with those over which imported coal is supplied to the region. The Miskolc
area is the most noteworthy example. In this district local coal sources
are nearby to the northwest, whereas imported coal and coke are brought in
from the northeast. Finished products, consisting of steel, iron, chemi-
cals, and fertilizers leave the area to the southwest and northeast. In
order to sever the region from its coal supplies, more than one main line
would have to be interdicted. The smaller number of alternate secondary
routes over which coal can be shipped is, however, a factor favoring Special
Forces operations in this area.
The second and less propitious method of interdicting Hungary's coal
supplies consists of direct attacks on mines and their associated installa-
tions. Although the destruction of hoists and conveyors, the blocking of
shafts and the flooding of galleries could all be employed to render any
mine inoperable, such interdictory methods are less effective than those
which can be advanced against the railroads for the single reason of
economy of effort. A large number of direct attacks on nines would be
required before the cumulative effect would be as great as the interdic-
tion of one or two critical railroads. Nonetheless, in instances where
the interdiction of an important installation, as for example a power plant,
depends upon denying it its fuel from a nearby mine, the destruction of the
connecting coal conveyor system promises the best results. The large
136,000 kw. Matra plant and the 60,000 kw. Tatabanya facility which are
fed by conveyors from nearby coal pits are cases in point (see under Power).
b. Coke
Hongary has very little coal of the vality necessary to produce
metallurgical coke. Coal from the Pecs-Komlo district is coked at Pecs
and is also shipped to Dunapentele (formerly Sztalinvaros) for coking in
the ovens of the large, new, steel center at that place. Sone amounts naY
also be delivered to the Obuda gas works in Budapest for coking. At both
Dunapentele and Budapest it is believed that the domestic product is mixed
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with imported coking coal in order to produce a more satisfactory end product.
A large facility has been developed at Kazincbarcika to coke the brown coal
of the Borsod county nines according to a German-developed process.
At best, Hungary's coke plants can produce only 10 per cent of the coun-
try's industrial requirenents for coke and up to one million tons of that
product are imorted.46 Better than half of this amount is obtained from
Poland, either directly or through the internediation of the USSR. Czecho-
slovakia and Belgium supply each an estimated 100,000 tons annually to Hun-
gary; Up to 200,000 tons a year have been obtained in the past from West
47
Germany.
Nbst imported coke and coking coal is delivered to Hungary by rail
although sone amounts arrive by water. This latter method is probably
restricted to imports from Western Europe or the USSR. Water-hauled coking
coal is probably delivered to the Dunapentele steel works although sone
amounts nay also go to Budapest and other Danubian ports. The rail routes
entering Hungary at Zahony and Satoraljaujhely are heavy coke and coal
carriers. It is through their interdiction that Hungary could be deprived
of the greatest part of its imported coal and coke supplies.
c. Bauxite
Bauxite is Hungary's most valuable natural resource. The Hungarian
supply of this mineral is moreover one of the most valuable In the entire
USSR and satellite bloc. The extent of the USSR's dependency upon Hungarian
bauxite as well as on Hungarian processed alumina and aluminum is not known.
USSR bauxite production is reported to be only somewhat less than Hungarian
production of that mineral, and could cover an annual production rate of
300,000 tons of aluminum. However, the USSR is receiving bauxite, alumina,
and aluminum from Hungary in amounts equivalent to 200,000 tons or more of
aluminum.* It is possible that it is USSR policy to exploit Hungarian bauxite
* The exact amount is difficult to estimate and would depend largely on the
quality of the bauxite received.
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is preference to depleting its own domestic reserves of that product, but
such a policy would not constitute a dependency upon the Hungarian mineral.
111 It is also possible that the USSR could be stockpiling the Hungarian
products. Until some determination can be made of the aluminum consump-
tion rate within the USSR, however, it will be impossible to determine
the true importance of Hungarian bauxite, alumina, and aluminum to the
USSR econony.
The pre-war rate of bauxite production in Hungary has more than doubled
in the post-war period. More than 1.2 million tons of bauxite have been
produced every year since 1950.48 Hungary's bauxite reserves have been
estimated at 200 million tons of good quality ore, but accessible high
grade ore deposits are rapidly being eXhausted.49 The remaining high grade
reserves are located in deep strata where recovery is both more difficult
and more expensive.50
Nadia low quality ore is currently being mined
primarily because it is more readily accessible than are the better grade
deposits. It is the low quality ore which is retained within Hungary; the
better grades are exported to the USSR.
The decline in the quality of ore supplied to Hungary's alumina plants
is responsible for a relative increase in the amount of ore consumed by
them per ton of alumina produced. Whereas previously four tons of bauxite
yielded two tons of alumina from which one ton of aluminum could be pro-
duced, about six tons of bauxite are now required per ton of aluminum and
the ratio may become even more disparate.
Bauxite is recovered almost entirely from deposits in the Bakony and
Vertes Mountains, west and north of Lake Balaton. Bauxite mines near
Villany southeast of Pecs near the Yugoslav border are the sole exception
to this rule. In the Bakony district bauxite nines are located near
411 Tapolca (4653N-1726E)? Suneg (4658N-1716E), and Halitba (4702N-1732E).
Of these nines those at HaliMba are the most important. In the Vertes
Mountain area, nines are located near Gant (4723N-1823E) and northwest
of Szekesfehervar at Iszkaszentgyorgy (4714N-1818E)..
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Donestic capacity to produce alumina and aluminum is limited by shortages
of caustic soda and electric power and therefore up to 850,000 tons of the
mined bauxite are exported annually. The greatest part of this tonnage is
shipped by rail to the USSR. Manor quantities of bauxite are delivered to
other6atellites, among Which Czechoslovakia is the largest recipient. In
return for Hungarian bauxite Whidh is used for the nanufacture of abrasives,
Czechoslovakia supplies Hungary with 500 million kWh. of electric power. At
the present tine only minor amounts of bauxite are being exported by water
and improvements to the Sb o Canal connecting Lake Balaton to the Danube River
will have to be effected before water transportation of bauxite can be pur-
sued on a profitable scale.
From the 400,000 odd tons of bauxite Which remain in Hungary slightly
more than 150,000 tons of alumina are produced at plants located in Ajka,
Almasfuzito, and MOsonmagyarovar.
having a capacity of 60,000 tons.
100,000 tons at sone future time.
The Almasfuzito facility is the largest,
It is planned to expand this capacity to
The &Ike all in plant has an estimated
capacity of 40,000 tons and the Mosonmagyarovar facility's capacity has been
estimated at 25,000 tons.51 This latter plant also recovers in the form of
oxides 80 per cent of the titanium and vanadium present in the bauxite. The
titanium oxide is processed for titanium in Hungary and is used in domestic
steel production. Vanadium pentoxide is sent either to Czechoslovakia (Os-
trava) or Poland (Katowice) for refinement into vanadium.
Only an amount of alumina sufficient to produce 37,000 tons of aluminum
is retained in Hungary and the remaining surplus is exported in its entirety
to the USSR. The exportable surplus ranges between 60,000 and 80,000 tons
accorcling to the quality of the product and constitutes a valuable addition
to the total USSR alumina supply.
Allminum is nanufactured in Hungary at Ajka, Tatabanya, and Inota. The
Ajka plant operates on its own alumina production and has an aluminum capacity
of approximately 11,000 tons. The output of alumina at Ajka is more than suf-
ficient to supply the aluminum plant and yields a substantial portion of the
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total alumina export surplus. Tatabanya has a capacity for aluminum equal
to that of Ajka. It receives its alumina by rail from MOsonmagyarovar.
Electric power is supplied from the nearby 80,000 kw. Banhida power station.
The Inota aluminum works are the newest and largest in the country. The
design capacity of this plant is approximately 17,500 tons of aluminum.
Power is obtained from the 120,000 kw. Inota power plant, one of HUngary's
largest. Alumina is received from Almasfuzito via the rail route Komarom-
KIsber and Szekesfehervar. Between 30,000 and 35,000 tons of alumina are
required to produce the 16,000 tons or more of aluminum manufactured in
this facility.
Of the estimated 37,000 tons of aluminum ingots produced by Hungary's
aluminum plants, 20,000 tons are exported to the USSR and to other satel-
lites. The remaining 17,000 tons are processed at rolling mills in
Szekesfehervar, Vac and Budapest.
Hungary's aluminum industry is open to interdiction in a number of
ways. Exports to the USSR take place at the end of each step in the
aluminummaking process from bauxite nines to roiled-aluminum products.
The greatest damnge to the entire industry would be accomplished if
bauxite were prevented from reaching either the alumina plants in Hungary
or the USSR. With the denial of bauxite supplies production of the inter-
mediate and end products would cease when existing stocks of bauxite,
alumina and aluminum were exhausted. Railway interdiction between the
bauxite mines and the alumina plants, between the mines and the Danube
River ports, and between the nines and the transloading stations on the
Hungarian border undoubtedly are, in terns of long range results, the
most effective means available to special Forces to interdict this impor-
tant aspect of Hungary's economy. If it should becone desirable to halt
immediately the production of aluminum ingots in Hungary, the denial of
power supplies to the aluminum plants is the best means of accomplidhing
this Objective. Severing the rail connections between the alumina and
the aluminum plants would have much less of an immediate effect on aluminum
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production than would the loss of electric power, but would nevertheless
force the plants to shut down once their alumina stocks were consumed.
d. Oil and Gas
Hungary occupies a most unique situation insofar as crude oil
supplies and derivatives are concerned. The country is a net exporter of
crude oil and petroleum products, has an apparent surplus refining capacity,
but is dependent upon imported crude oil for its supplies of gasoline, diesel
fuel, and light oil lubricants. This anomalous situation is accounted for
by the fact that Hungarian refineries lack the necessary facilities to
crack the heavy asphalt-based crude oil now being produced in the country.
HUngary's oil wells have produced up to 1.6 million tons of crude oil
annually. This amount has been derived principally from two major fields
centering on Nagyiengyel and Dovaszi in southwest Hungary. Sone crude oil
is also being produced at fields in eastern Hungary near the Rumanian border
(see map Q). According to recent estimates the rate of production is now
only half of the figure given above. The drop in production is attributable
in part to the effects of the November 1956 uprising but mainly to a recent
decision to restrict production in order to prolong the life of the fields
and recover a greater proportion of the reserves.
Crude oil is refined in Hungary mainly at the following locations (produc-
tion capacity figures in parentheses): Szony (300,000 metric tons); A1masfuzito
(200,000 m.t.); Csepel-Budapest (250,000 m.t.); petfurdo (200,000 m.t.); Zalae-
gerszeg (200,000 m.t.); Nyirbogday (100,000 m.t.); and Szeged (50,000 m.t.).
The refineries are primarily of the atmospheric and vacuum distillAtion 'type.
only the Szony plant is thought to possess any thermal cracking equipment.
One recent report states, however, that similar equipment has been installed
at the Zalaegerszeg refinery.52 This statenent appears reasonable in view of
the fact that the refinery was developed especially to handle the highly-
viscous crude oil from the Nagylengyel-Oellenhaza fields. However, an offi
dial source whose information seems credible stated in 1955 when the Zalae-
gerszeg refinery was being built that thermal cracking capacity constituted
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only one per cent of the total refining capacity in Hungary and that
cracking capacity would not be further developed under then current
plans.53
In order to offset its lack of thermal cracking capacity and satisfy
needs for gasoline, diesel fuel, and light oil lubricants, Hungary imports
light crude oil from Austria and Rumania. The foreign products are suit-
able for refining at Hungarian distillation plants. Domestic crude oil
when processed at these refineries yields gasoline of only 26 to 30
octane and much modernization of equipment will be necessary before Hun-
garian plants will be prepared to supply a better product. The bulk of
the donestic crude oil is therefore exported either as such or as resi-
duals after topping, to other satellites and to the USSR. Poland and
East Germany are major consumers among the satellites. Both of these
countries have excess refining capacity in relation to donestic produc-
tion of crude oil.
The Danube River and the strategic railroad line to the USSR via
Zahony are the primary arteries for the outward novenent of POL products.
Budapest is the main trans1oading station for Danube River oil traffic,
although the refineries at A1masfuzito and Szony are also points of trans-
shipnent. KOMarOM on the main railroad line to Chop is the most important
point for the transloading of oil products shipped to the USSR by rail.
The Hungarian petroleum industry is most vulnerable to Special
Forces interdiction through attacks on pipelines and railroads (see
above under Transportation). If these transport redia were cut, crude
oil could not be noved from the oilfields for either refining or export.
Railway interdiction would also prevent the importation of Austrian crude
oil which is a major source of Hungary's gasoline and diesel fuel sup-
plies. Interruption of traffic on the Danube River to the south of
Budapest would effectively halt the delivery of supplies of Rumanian
crude oil. This conclusion is advanced in view of the fact that the
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country's largest refining, storage and handling facilities are located on
the Danube at Budapest, Szony, and Almasfuzito.
Natural and coke oven gases are assuming an increasing degree of impor-
tance in the Hungarian economy. An estimated 543 million cubic meters of the
natvral product were consumed in 1955.54 Natural gas supplies are obtained
from the main producing oilfields as well as from a number of locations in
eastern Hungary where gas has been discovered in the course of exploratory
drillings for oil. The more important sources which are currently being
exploited have been previously discussed (see above under Pipelines).
The largest industrial users of natural and coke oven gas in Hungary
are the chemical combines. Of these the Petfurdo chemical works is believed
to rely upon this raw material resource in the manufacture of carbon black
and nitrogenous fertilizers. The production of synthetic ammonia is an
important intermediate step in the process. Production of fertilizer at
the Petfurdo plant has been estimated at 75,000 to 80,000 tons per year.55
As of February 1957, the plant was operating at only 75 per cent of the
production rate in effect immediately prior to the November uprising. Re-
duced gas and coal supplies were responsible for the decline in production.
The supply of natural gas to this facility can best be interdicted through
the disruption of service on the main transmission line along the southern
shore of Lake Balaton.
Plans have been advanced to pipe by-product coke oven gas from Duna-
pentele to Budapest and from Kazincbarcika to Miskolc, but the completion
of work on the steel and chemical combines which are still under construc-
tion at those locations is a necessary prelude to the construction of the
pipelines. Similarly, a new chemical conplex at Tiszapalkopya, on which
construction was begun in May 1956, will utilize natural gas, to be piped
from either Rumania or sources in eastern Hungary, in the manufacture of
synthetic fibers and nitrogenous fertilizers. Production of the latter is
programmed for 30,000 metric tons annually. The center is due to be com-
pleted before 1960.
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MOst of the gas produced at Kazindbarcika in the coking of coal is
immediately utilized for the production of nitrogenous fertilizer, and
nitric and sulfuric acids. As in the case of the Petfurdo works,
synthetic ammonia production is 'bhe basis of the operation. Produc-
tion capacity estimates for this facility are unavailable due to the
fact that the plant has not yet been fully constructed. The history
of this much-heralded plant is interesting, however, in that it not
only sheds light on the current status of chemical and fertilizer pro-
duction in Hungary but also on the success Which has been achieved in
developing the process of coking brown coal. The plant was originally
opened in December of 1955; however, according to an official announce-
ment in September 1956, it lies only then about to start production.
Dtfatiliarity on the part of the workers with new machinery, breakdowns
in the machines thenseIves Which were largely prototypes, and errors in
construction and assembly were responsible for the delayed inauguration
of production. After a number of trial production efforts, a complete
overhaul of the plant was found necessary in June of 1956.56
During
the early trial production efforts, the facility was run on inported
coking coal rather than on the Borsod county brown coal -which the plant
was supposedly intended to coke.57 The most recent information on this
facility indicates that following the November 1956 uprising a large part
of the labor force was discharged and that three unserviceable conpressors
would have to be reconstructed before the plant could resune operation.58
Until such a tine as this plant is able to fulfill its intended function,
Hungarian steel plants in the Miskolc area will remain completely depen-
dent upon inported coke supplies.
Natural and coke oven gas supplies are vulnerable to Special Forces
interdiction primarily through attacks on pipelines and railroads. AS
previously indicated, interruption of service on the main pipeline which
supplies natural gas to the Petfurdo chemical works would effectively
disrupt the productive efforts of that facility. The denial of coking
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Coal supplies to the plant at Kazincbarcika would be sufficient to render
that plant inopeative. If the latter facility should continue to rely
upon imported coking coal, interdiction of the railroads approaching the
Miskolc area from northeastern Hungary would be sufficient to achieve the
objective of Special Forces. If, however, the plant should begin production
of coke from local reserves of brawn coal, it would be necessary for Special
Forces to interdict rail lines approaching the area from the northwest.
e. Iron Ore
Hungary has but limited iron reserves and the greatest part PO
per cent) of her requirements are imported from the USSR. The best domestic
reserves are found north of Miskolc at Rudabanya (488211-2038E) and vicinity,
but although they are the richest in the country, the deposits are of low
iron content and the ore is concentrated before leaving the mining area.59
The concentrated ore is further prepared before use by agglomeration. One such
plant for this purpose is located at Diosgyor, the site of the Lenin steel
works, one of two major iron and steel making facilities in Hungary. Ore
from the Rudabanya mining area is transported. to Diosgyor as well as to the
nearby steel manufacturing center at Ozd by rail and can be interdicted easily
by severing the branch rail line between Rudabanya and Kazincbarcika.
Iron is also found in the Bakony Npuntain mining district, mostly as
red mud in conjunction with bauxite. It has been reported that iron is
recovered from the muds possibly directly through a smelting process in
which alumina-bearing slag is also produced or indirectly from the ferru-
ginous waste accruing in the reduction of the bauxite into alumina.6? The
total amount of iron ore produced annually by all processes probably does
not exceed 430,000 metric tons.61 he current (1955-1960) five-year plan
anticipates that the domestic iron ore production will be raised to approxi-
mately 700,000 tons by 1960, but on the basis of the current Hungarian situa-
tion it would appear that this goal is considerably optimistic.62
Industrial requirements for iron ore in Hungary have been estimated to
be in excess of 3.5 million metric tons annua1ly.63
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This estimEtte seems
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much too high inasmuch as pig iron output amounts to less than 900,000 tons
per year (885,000 tons in 1955).64 The annual iron ore requirement for pig
iron production should not be much in excess of 1.7 million metric tons.
After deducting the amount produced domestically, imports of iron ore to
be used in pig iron production should therefore total approximately 1.3
million metric tons. On the other hand, the 1955 level of steel produc-
tion of 1.6 million metric tons indicates that at least 774,000 tons of
pig and scrap iron together with an additional undetermined amount of iron
ore are obtained from external sources, of which the USSR is the principal
source. However, only if steel production were managed wholly on a basis
of domestically produced pig iron and imported iron ore, a most unlikely
prospect in view of the wastefulness of the process, would Hungary need
to import 2.2 million tons of iron ore over the amount needed for pig
iron manufacture. It appears, therefore, that Hungary's iron ore require-
ments are undoubtedly much less than the current estimate of 3.5 million
metric tons. Mpreover, imports of iron ore, pig iron, and scrap iron
probably do not collectively total 3.5 million metric tons as judged by
the indicated _level of crude steel production.
Whatever the absolute quantity of iron (including ore, scrap, and
pig) imported by Hungary, Special Forces planners are primarily concerned
with the routes over which the materials are transported from Hungary's
frontiers, for it is upon the disruption of these that the interdiction
of Hungary's iron and steel making capacity primarily depends. Iron ore
deliveries to the Ozd and Miskolc steel centers are effected along the
two main railroad routes which link northeastern Hungary to Chop in the
Ukrainian SSR. Some shipments of these materials may arrive along the
alternate route between Miskolc and Czechoslovakia via'Hidasnemeti. The
production of iron and steel in the northeast Hungarian steel centers
is contingent upon unlimited access to the aforementioned railroad routes.
Sustained interdiction of the railway lines between Miskolc and chop
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would therefore seriously affect Hungary's steel making capacity and would
also prevent the shipping of raw and finished steel products to the USSR.
Interdiction of iron supplies to the steel mills at Dunapentele and
Budapest presents a somewhat different problem to special Forces planners.
The Dunapentele facility is supplied primarily by the Danube water route and
effective denial of imports would depend either upon the blocking of the
navigation channel of that transport artery or upon the interdiction of
facilities in the Kerch' peninsula, administratively part of the Ukraine,
'which is the most likely' source of the iron ore imports.65 The amount of
raw material being supplied to the new steel center at Dunapentele is not
known, but up to the tire of the November 1956 insurrection it was producing
at the rate of 750,000 tons of steel per year. This production figure
represents approximately 46 per cent of the estimated steel output for
Hungary as a whole 66 A recent report indicates, however, that 1957 produc-
tion at Dunapentele is only a third of the former level. The very sharp
decrease in the productive rate has been attributed by Hungarian officials
to a shortage of raw materials.67
Work on the construction of the Dunapentele steel center has not as
yet been fully completed. An ore concentrating plant, a second blast
furnace, and two rolling mills remain to be constructed, In addition to
the existing three open-hearth furnaces, a blast furnace, coke oven, and
68
various ancillary plants.
The Csepel Island steel plant (formerly known as Natyas Bakosi works)
in Budapest has four open-hearth furnaces, a rolling mill, a tube plant, and
various allied shops. It can receive its supplies of pig iron and crude
steel by either of the rail or water routes previously discussed. The inter-
diction of these routes, therefore, would be sufficient to cause production
in this facility to be suspended.
f. ynr anese
Manganese ore is mined in Hungary at Epleny and Urkut in the Bakony
Nbuntain area. The Urkut mines are the nore productive and are alleged to
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yield an average 7,000 netric tons of ore per nonth.69 Eplegy's production
has been estimated at 1,000 metric tons per nt4nth.7? According to these
estimates Hungary is capable of producing up to 96,000 tons of manganese
annually. Of this amount probably only half is needed by the domestic
steel industry and the remaining half is available for export.' 1 Poland
is a likely consuner of the Hungarian product although other manganese-short
satellites may also look to the Hungarian surplus.
Donestic consumers can be deprived of their manganese supplies by
severing rail connections between the eastern and western parts of the
country, i.e., at the Danube River. The Dunapentele steel center is the
sole exception to this rule. In the case of this facility, as well as in
the cases of foreign consuners, the diverse number of rail
the Bakogy region would make the interdiction of manganese
difficult for Special Forces. Hungarian manganese is not,
routes serving
shipments more.i.,
however, of such
strategic importance to warrant the singling-out of this product for con-
sideration by Special Forces planners. It should rather be considered in
relation to other strategic requirements and its interdiction acconplished,
where possible, in conjunction with the carrying out of other Special
Forces objectives.
g. uranium
Deposits of good commercial grade uranium ore were discovered
in Hungary in late 1954. Exploitation of these deposits was begun in
early 1956 under the direct supervision of USSR personne1.72 The ore
deposits are located near Pecs in the vicinities of Bakonya and Kovago-
szollos. The full extent of the reserves is unknown, but it has been
alleged that the ore is encountered in layers of from two to ten maters
in thickness beginning at a depth of 25 meters. The best ore has been
discovered 200 maters down in the Kovagoszollos area.
Initial plans anticipated the employment of 25,000 workers to mine
and prepare uranium ore for shipnent to the USSR.73 At the time of the
outbreak of the November revolt, however, only an estimated 2,000 workers
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were directly engaged in uranium production.74 blest of the miners were dis-
charged innediately after the revolt When the electric power shortage in the
Pecs area prevented the operation of the nine.75 The interrelated vulnerabili-
ties of power, uranium ore mining, and coal were clearly denonstrated in this
instance. Before adequate power supplies could be re-established in the
uranium nines, it was first necessary to restore production in nearby coal
nines inasmuch as the shortage of electric power resulted from a lack of coal.
The labor force in the Pecs area uranium mines was, therefore, transferred en
masse to the nearby coal pits.
Hungarian resentment over outright Russian exploitation of this national
resource was reflected in the demands made by various insurgent groups during
the November 1956 insurrection (see Part I, "Resistance"). At present it
appears that the USSR fully expects to continue to exploit the ore deposits
under the terns of a 25-year agreenent with Hungarian authorities ?76
Two nethods of delivering the ore to the USSR can be enployed. It can be
shipped by barge down the Danube River after transloading from railway freight
cars at either Baja or Mohacs which are the nearest ports, or it can be
shipped all the way to its ultimate destination by rail. Available informa-
tion indicates that the latter method has been decided upon. The Gyor rail-
way car manufacturing plant has reportedly begun production of 60-ton capacity
freight cars designed especially to transport uranium ore, and so constructed
as to permit the interchanging of trucks between European standard gauge and
Russian broad gauge.77 Interchanging of the trucks would be effected at either
78
Zahony or Chop.
Special Forces could interdict Hungarian uranium ore shipments to the
USSR in a variety of ways. Communication between Pecs and the Ukrainian
border could be completely severed by the destruction of the Danube River
bridges. The uranium nines could be interdicted directly through attacks
on installations including hoists, shafts, ventilating equipment, etc. The
mines could also be interdicted directly through their power supplies. The
best approach to the problem of interdiction, however, would probably be
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for Special Forces to consider uranium and coal output in the Pecs-Komlo
region as one interdictory assignment to be carried out through attacks
on vulnerable key railroad structures. This approach is justified not
only in view of the nature of Special Forces operations but also because
Hungarian uranium undoubtedly represents but a minor fraction of the
total USSR supply of this product and should not, therefore, be singled
out as a primary objective of interdiction in Hungary.
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HUNGARY
Trots
Stole
4
?
Power Plants
Over 25,000 kw
10, 000-25, 000 kw
I, 000-10, 000 kw
Under construction
Planned
Transmission facilities
110 kv line
60 kv line
Under 60 kv line (voltage unknown)
Selected substation
Thermal
Operating
?
ID
Hydroelectric
Planned
Hurnenne
9i 4,
P
0
0
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0
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KOtICE
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Source NIS 19 Hungary, Sec. 62, "Fuels and Power," March, 1956,
(5) (Sp Hay/-17-1 1,10FORN)
=.1
2
S1 M
00
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Slavonska Potega
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55
So
The international boundaries shown on this map do nor
necessanly correspond in all Cases to the bounder., r?cog
nived by the U S Government
Vukovar
nkovel
posanski Novi
OUNAV)
NOVI SAD
22
23
GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY
RESEARCH PROJECT 9-57
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#.3
Urizuschlag
Pi3LTEN
Oil
Gas
Coal
Brown Coal
fir
HUNGARY
MAP 1::1
MINERALS (U)
A
Iron
Manganese
Bauxite
Uranium
Fe
Mn
Al
19
CONFID
101 .fl.S1)j
Bar deyov
Turks
mad
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Humerus
.Verki Bream
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UZHGOTOD
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4. Fover79
Electric power production is handicapped in Hungary by a qualitative
and quantitative lack of coal and by the unsuitability of the country's
water resources to hydroelectric development schemes. Less than one per
cent of the installed generating capacity is of the hydroelectric type
and although a number of plans exist to develop hydroelectric power stations
on the Danube River, these have not yet been acted on. Faced with the neces-
sity of providing increasing anounts of power to the country's expanding
heavy industry, the Hungarian government has been forced to look to the
further development of thermal generating capacity. The construction of
two new hydroelectric plants on the Tisza River at Tiszalok and Tiszafured
in the northeastern part of the country are the only exceptions to this rule.
However, the decision to construct these plants resulted mainly from the
fact that regulatory dens were to be erected at these locations, and was
not in any way based upon a belief that these sites were desirable as
hydroelectric plant locations. The 11,520-kw. Tiszalok facility, which
is now in operation, was strongly opposed by Hungary's power engineers
on the grounds that the available head of water was both so small and
irregular as to hardly justify the construction of the plant. It was
built, as will be a similar plant at Tiszafured, in view of the argument
that however modest and irregular the power output it could not be neg-
lected because of the country's poor coal reserve position.8? Power from
the Tiszalok hydroelectric plant will be available only for slightly nore
than half the year, i.e., 208 days. The plant cannot function at either
high or low water periods ?81 There is no reason to believe that the per-
formance rating of the new Tiszafured plant will be any better.
Hungary's major thermal plants are significantly concentrated in three
areas which, for the most part, coincide with domestic coal deposits. Only
the 136,000-kw. Kelenfold plant in Budapest is not located near a coal field.
The areas of power plant concentration are:
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1) Between Gyor and Miskolc in a 30-mile-wide belt along the northern
border. Included in this area are major plants serving the Budapest
urban area; the coal and lignite mines at Banhida, Tatabanya, and
Dorog; the iron and steel mills at Miskolc, incluiing Diosgyor, and
Ozd; and various other industrial locations.
2) At the northern end of Lake Balaton at Ajka and /nota, serving the
aluminum industry in that area.
3) Near the southern border in the Pecs-KOnlo coal and uranium mining
region.
As Map R shows, few power plants of significant size are located in Hungary's
eastern agrarian region.
The installed capacity of Hungarian power plants is estimated to total
slightly over 1,000,000 kw. On this generating base Hungary produced in 1955
5.4 billion kwh. of electric current. under the current five-year plan,
663,000 lot. of new generating capacity is to be added to the existing base
and power output is to rise to 8.35 billion kwh. by 1960. It is unlikely
that the plan will be fulfilled on schedule insofar as new generating capa-
city is concerned, but power production may rise as a result of the more
intensive utilization of existing capacity and a further extension of the
national transmission system. A rise in the total amount of power available
within the country will also be abetted by imports of up to 710 million kwh.
of electric power from Czechoslovakia and Poland. rower is currently
received from Czechoslovakia via Komarom, and a new connection through Vac
is expected to tie in the Hungarian grid with the Czechoslovak system and
through it with that of Poland.82
Even with the realization of all of
these plans, however, demands for power will probably continue to outstrip
supplies, especially if further expansions to the aluminum industry take -
place and railway electrification continues to develop according to schedule.
Electric power constitutes one of the most serious vulnerabilities in
the Hungarian economy. The experience of recent years demonstrates that power
shortages and failures resulting vainly from a lack of coal can force drastic
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curtailments in industrial activity. The aluminum industry, which alone
consumes up to 17 per cent of the total power produced in Hungary, is
especially dependent upon uninterrupted power supplies, as are the elec-
trified railroads. The vulnerability of the Budapest-Hegyeshalom rail-
road has been discussed above Nith respect to the fact that 90 steel
loconotives would have to be employed to maintain service on this line
if electric traction were prevented by a loss of power.
Production shortfalls in recent years have been attributed equally
to a lack of coal and a shortage of electric power. The most recent
and most outstanding example occurred in December of 1956 when the
effects of the November revolt were being most severely felt. At that
time, industrial production was officially announced as being but a
quarter of the level in effect in September, just prior to the insurrec-
tion.83 The electric power shortage was given as a prize cause of the
814.
industrial shutdown. ' Similar though less widespread shutdowns in
previous years were also caused by power shortages 85 In the past,
during less severe crises, the regime has attempted to meet the power
shortage problem by staggering the working schedules of various indus-
trial plants in order to even out the power demand. curve ,86
Night shifts
have been resorted to frequently in this regard as have direct rationing
methods whereby industrial plants are allotted power quotas which they
may not exceed.87
In view of the high plant utilization factor (approximately 64 per
cent) which prevails in Hungary, it is obvious that with plants working
at almost two-thirds of their capacity at all times in order to meet
power demands, the loss of any major plant in the systemildll have an
innediate and serious effect on total power supplies.88 This effect
can hardly be minimized in view of the fact that power rationing, stag-
gered consumption schedules and night shifts are already a connon practice.
It is only through the combined output of all plants that power demands
continue to be met.
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Although electric power production is an outstanding vulnerability in
the Hungarian economy, this vulnerability is not one which can be easily
exploited by Special Forces. The situation in Hungary is somewhat unique
as compared to other areas of the Soviet orbit in that nearly all of the
principal power plants are located in close proximity to their fuel supplies.
The plants are, moreover, linked in a grid system that permits an exchange
of power with other countries and is designed to assure a continued flow of
power to the most needy consumers in the event of local power failures.
Nevertheless, Special Forces could in a variety of ways seriously impair
power production and distribution in Hungary.
Despite the fact that important power plants are located near their
fuel supplies, Special Forces might nonetheless, in sone instances, succeed
in depriving them of their coal by interdicting conveyors or short connecting
stretches of railroad between the power plants and the mines. In other in-
stances where the plants are removed from urban surroundings; it might be
feasible to carry out direct attacks on the plants themselves. In the case
of Budapest, which has the largest share of Hungary's industrial base, the
interdiction of coal between that city and the surrounding mining areas would
severely curtail its industrial output. Power could still be supplied through
the national grid but a combination of coal and power transmission system
interdiction would leave the city powerless.
A greater number of opportunities are open to Special Forces with respect
to the interdiction of Hungary's power transmission system. As map R demon-
strates, a large number of important sub-stations are located in areas remote
from major power-producing sites. The interdiction of these sub-stations or
of the high-tension transmission lines to either side of them would have the
desirable effect of isolating local areas from outside power sources. Simi-
larly, power from the large plants on the main transmission system can be
removed from the system by severing the transmission lines to either side of
the plants. In instances where more than two connections are maintained by a
Plant with the national grid as, for example, in the case of the 120,000 kw.
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Inota plant, all connecting links would have to be severed to deny that
plant's power to the system. It rust be remembered, however, that the
durative effect of interdicting Hungary's power transmission system
would not be as long as would be the effect resulting from the destruc-
tion of the power-producing facilities themselves.
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5. Telecommunications (144P S)
Hungary is a key telecommunications center between eastern and western
Europe and. between western Europe and the USSR. Despite a considerable
expansion in telecomnunications facilities in recent years, Hungary's
telecommunications system is 'Still inadequate to the needs of the country.
Telecommunications developnent has not kept pace with industrial expansion,
and areas in the southern and western parts of Hungary which have the
greatest need for improved facilities have been neglected in preference
to the developuent of a more extensive communications system in the
northern and eastern parts of the country. These latter areas, of course,
are strategically important to the USSR.
Existing teleconnunications facilities consist in the main of under-
ground and overhead telephone and telegraph lines and their associated
terminal equipment. These facilities are supplenented by radio connunica-
tions serving governnent enterprises; including the railways, the river
fleet, and the security forces, as well as by domestic and international
broadcasting stations. Recent and reliable analyses of the various parts
of the Hungarian telecomnunications network are readily available in
standard intelligence reference sources 89
Hungary is largely independent of external sources for telecommunica-
tions equipment. A number of factories in Budapest manufacture a wide
range of equipment including telephone exchanges for all types of service,
telephone and telegraph instruments, receiver and carrier equipment,.
radio receivers, low- and high-power radio transmitting equipment, and
telecomnunication cables. The Hungarian telecommunications equipment
industry is, however, dependent upon the uninterrupted flow of raw
materials supplies, sone of which are imported. Among the more inportant
import item are copper and materials with copper content, cadmium, lead,
and molybdenum. It is possible that in view of an acute shortage of
copper, aluminum is being substituted for this metal in Hungarian manu-
factured telecommunications equipment in all feasible instances.
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In the years since World War II Russian military forces have developed
in Hungary an independent teleconnunications network Which is obviously
designed to support Soviet military efforts to the vest and south of Hun-
gary. This network does, however, make full use of underground civilian
cable connections between Hungary and the Ukraine. Soviet military forces
have independent overhead wire lines, sone of which are, however, carried
on poles in con with civilian wires. One of the more important Russian
lines is a direct cross-country connection between the Soviet embassies
in Budapest and Vienna. Unlike the donestic Hungarian lines, the Russian
line does not follow road or railroad rdutes. All Soviet military tele-
communication lines and centers are afforded. a high degree of security
protection by Russian ground forces.
The Hungarian Army may or may not have a completely independent tele-
communications network. It is likelyAthat in: sone areas it makes use of
civilian wire lines whereas in other areas of strategic inportance it
avails itself of an independent network. This is, however, carried on
poles which also serve the civilian network.
The Hungarian railways, border guards, and internal security forces all
operate their own teleconnunications nets. The railroad net is the most
elaborate in that it includes two underground cables connecting Budapest
with MOsonmagyarovar and Tarnok. The remainder of the net is conposed
entirely of overhead open vire routes ?: The main railway teleconnunications
center is located in Budapest; secondary centers are located in Szombathely,
Pecs, Szolnok., Debrecen, and Miskolc, all of which are peripheral to the
national capital.
The most inportant teleconnunications centers in terns of all forms
of telecommunications are: Budapest, Szekesfehervar, Szolnok, Cegled,
Nyiregyhazal Miskolc, Gyor, Veszprem, and Lillafured. If these centers
were isolated through the destruction of equipnent in the facilities
located in them, or through the severence of the lines connecting them
to other centers, a large percentage og internal and international connuni-
cations traffic would be disrupted.
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In the absence of the total destruction of all lines and equipment,
alternate neans of telecomnunications will always be available to military
forces and governnent agencies in Hungary. The forced use of alternate
means of communication would, however, bring results of a considerable
decrease in traffic volune and delays in transmission due to overloaded
circuits. Such a situation would be to the advantage of Special Forces
insofar as it would disrupt enemy efforts against them wherever these
efforts were dependent upon rapid conmunications.
The interdiction of telecommunications facilities, especislly overhead
vire lines, could be carried out easily by Special Forces in conjunction
with the interdiction of the transportation network and especislly of the
railways. On the other hand, the interdiction of underground cables,
which are of more importance than overhead wires, would be a more diffi-
cult task for Special Forces. The cables generally follow the main high-
ways rather than the railroads and would have to be approached in a
different nanner. It would be possible to render them inoperative
through the destruction of repeating equipnent, Which is sometines housed
in bunkers located along the cable route. VOre frequently, however, the
repeating equipnent is housed in the main post offices
In all instances Special Forces woad probably want to
nunications interdiction as an objective to be carried
In urban centers.
consider telecom-
out in conjunc-
tion with a more important task, such as railway and highway interdiction.
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PRINCIPAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES
Underground Cable
Main Open Wire Line
Main Switching Center
City or Town Served
Repeater Station
International Radiocommunications Station
International Radiocommunications Receiving Station
Domestic Radiocommunications Station
International Radio Broadcast Station
Domestic Radio Broadcast Station
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GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT
?,cf's
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57;74'.
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6. Conclusions
The over-all economic vulnerabilities of Hungary must be viewed both
in terns of Hungary proper and of Hungary as an integral part of the Soviet
orbit. Insufficient supplies of basic minerals such as coal and iron ore
upon which the industry of Hungary depends in large tonnages constitute
a significant weakness in the country's economic structure. In terms of
Soviet orbit needs it is bauxite and uranium ore in particular which repre-
sent an important or potentially important contribution of Hungary to the
Soviet economy. In both cases the resulting economic vulnerabilities can
be best utilized by Special Forces operations through interference with
the railway transportation system which both for the internal economy of
Hungary as well as its links with the other satellite nations and the
Soviet Union itself constitutes the most important life artery and physical
vulnerability. This is not to say that in individual instances such as
discussed in the text direct interference at the source is not feasible.
Electric power production and distribution must be viewed as another
artery vulnerable to Special Forces operations.
Hungary's railway system can be split into three separate parts through
the destruction of major bridges over the Tisza and Danube Rivers. A dis-
ruption of the railway transportation system along these lines would have
a most adverse effect on the national economy. It would also prevent the
movement of war materials and troops from the USSR through Hungary to areas
south and west of that country. Inasmuch as the bridges over the Danube
and Tisza Rivers are of such large size and are so unfavorably located as
to place them, except under extraordinary circumstances, beyond the limit
of Special Forces capabilities, it is to equally vulnerable but more favor-
ably situated and smaller-scale key structures that Special Forces would
probably want to look to accomplish the task of railroad interdiction.
Structures of this nature are very numerous on the Hungarian railways.
Moreover, because of the fact that the principal railroad routes tend to
coincide with militarily important highway routes, Special Forces could
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often interdict both of these neans of transportation whenever they overcome
terrain obstacles on side-by-side structures. By concentrating their efforts
on railroad and highway interdiction, therefore, Special Forces could produce
crippling effects on both the Hungarian econony and any military effort by
the USSR that would be dependent upon these transportation media for its
success.
An insufficient amount of electric power, although an outstanding weak-
ness in the Hungarian economy, is nonetheless one which would be more diffi-
ault for Special Forces to exploit than would the weakness of the railroad
and other parts of the transportation system. The electric power transmission
network is, however, open to Special Forces attack although its interdiction
would probably have less of a long-term effect than would the outright'destruc-
tion of power plant facilities. In sone instances power production could be
interdicted indirectly through fuel (coal) supplies including the destruction
of conveyors and short connecting railroads between the coal nines and power
plants. In other instances, however, important power plants nay prove to be
so disadvantageously located (in highly urbanized areas) or afforded such a
high degree of security protection that Special Forces would choose to concen-
trate on the interdiction of the main transmission lines to either side of the
plants. They would thereby deny the power output of these plants to the national
grid. In Still other instances where it would be desirable to achieve the effect
of denying an important rural area of its power supplies the destruction of
readily accessible sub-stations on the main transmission lines would be well
'within the capabilities of Special Forces.
Hungary's telecommunications system and such secondary neans of transpor-
tation as pipelines and waterways are vulnerable to interdiction by Special
Forces but are not intrinsically inportant enough to warrant their being
selected as primary objectives of Special Forces operations. In view of the
fact, however, that the most important pipeline (in Transdanubia) and the major
telecommunications wire lines parallel railroad and highway routes in open
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country, these features of the Hungarian economy could be interdicted
together with the railways and highways in the course of a single
Special Forces operation.
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1. Introduction
(i) In accordance with the scope and format of previous studies,
the present report undertakes to describe and evaluate specific regions
-within Hungary -which, because of suitability factors of terrain and
population, as -well as of economic vulnerabilities, compare favorably
with other less suitable areas.
This task poses special problems in the case of Hungary. In the
first place, it should. be pointed out that the selection of a Special
Forces operational area delimited by the national boundaries of a sma..U.
country such as Hungary can easily become unrealistic because even
limited operations by Special Forces are not likely to be confined
always within the national boundaries of a particular country. }bre
likely they will in the case of Hungary extend over a larger area,
involving neighboring sections of other satellite countries such as
Czechoslovakia or of the Soviet Union itself. Wherever a region suit-
able for Special Forces operations within Hungary extends, as a natural
region, beyond its national frontiers, as is the case in regard to the
aforerentioned border areas of Czechoslovakia and. the USSR, the Special
Forces operations planner may in an individual case find it desirable
to center Special Forces operations directed at some objective -within
Hungary outside of this country, if an adjacent region offers better
physical and human features of the type which are a prerequisite for
such operations.
The conclusion to be drawn from this observation is that -while
the scope of the present study limits it by necessity to Hungary proper,
its findings may have to be supplemented by the Special Forces planner
by taking into consideration .coraparative findings 'which concern adjacent
territories; in particular, the Georgetown University Research Project
reports on the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania may have to be
consulted. For any of -these regions it see ras desirable that the con-
clusions pertaining to adjacent national territories be considered.
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(ii) The current report, like others of a similar nature, includes
a discussion of security forces factors and emphasizes that Special Forces
operations -would be seriously impeded in areas Where special security
neasures and border zones have been established. However: it should be
realized that these control factors remain valid only as long as uprisings
or limited war would be limited to the national area in question. In a
war Which would involve other countries in addition to Hungary: security
factors along the borders may easily becone obsolete. The withering-away
of the security zone and frontier control along the USSR-Hungary border
has been documented, on and after 4 November 1956, When the Soviet
mechanized units operating from the USSR: Czechoslovakia, and Rumania
entered Hungarian territory without regard to existent Hungarian border
controls.
(iii) In previous studies' practical and technical considerations
pronpted an anslysis 'which distinguished (a) between those areas of a
national territory Which: for reasons of their physical and human geo-
graphy, proved unfavorable for Special Forces operations, and (b) those
Where such operations might be more successfully undertaken because of a
combination of favorable or relatively favorable factors: such as cover
and concealment, presence of anti-Communist population groups, and accessi-
bility to the type of objectives which under Special Forces operations
doctrine would be of primary interest to Special Forces. Again, the case
of Hungary requires a different organization of the area analysis to be
presented. The smallness of the country and the absence of clearly distin-
guishable natural regions within the over-all area militate against sub-
divisions in terns of distinguishable Special Forces suitability areas.
Instead, the present report distinguishes between (a) those sections of
Hungary Which are not generally suited for .Special Forces activities,
either because of their highly urbanized, industrialized, or even metro-
politan character, or because of the fact that the countryside is more or
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less an open plain without cover and concealment features and one which
is densely populated throughout: and (b) other sections of the country
offering mare favorable physical conditions for Special Forces operations.
The present study deals with the latter complex in one Special Forces
Suitability Area which: for purely technical reasons: is on the naps
accompanying this part of the report (25 15 c) subdivided into three
sectors.*
In general, it must be stressed that Hungary, in spite of the fact
that its populace proved its violent anti-Communist determination during
the October-Novenber 1956 revolt and that its guerillas: during the
uprising itself and in the weeks following: carried out partisan opera-
tions in the mountains of the Special Forces Suitability Area: is a
territory which must be rated low in terns of Special Forces suitability
factors. None of the physical subregions possessing favorable: or rela-
tively favorable, cover and concealment features is extensive enough to
warrant the conclusion that guerilla or Special Forces units could be
maintained there for extended periods, if and as long as the rest of
the country is controlled by the enemy. In particular, Hungary ranks
low on the list of suitability areas as compared with nost**other satel-
lite countries as well as those territories within the confines of the
USSR on which studies have been prepared by the Georgetown University
Research Project.
(iv) The following discussion will be concerned with the examina-
tion, for the Suitability Area: of various physical and human as well as
economic vulnerability features which for the country as a whole
* The necessity to use three 1:250:000 naps to depict the Suitability
Area instead of presenting the entire area on one nap explains the
references in the text below to 11212LEE, 12, and c. This breakdown mist
not be interpreted as an indication of tee separate natural regions.
** The area of East Germany (GDR) shares with Hungary important nega-
tive features, such as lack of cover and concealment factors and
absence of regions distant from densely populated areas.
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have been treated in the first parts of this study. In the following
analysis the terrain, vegetation, and climatic factors of the suitability
region Which are of specific interest to Special Forces will be emphasized.
The discussion includes also population factors within this region,
inclueing distribution and density., ethnic and religious factors, and
Wherever possible distinctions in regard to resistance activities and
attitudes. Finally, While the study does not attempt to select any targets
within the Suitability Area, it is concerned with defining and evaluating
the objectives which are considered to be of specific interest to Special
Forces planning. Among these, as in previous studies, the communications
and electric-power systems of the country loom largest. Here emphasis
must be laid upon the country as a Whole and the role which it is assigned
within the Soviet orbit. Consequently such vulnerability factors Which
are of more than local consequence have been given special consideration.
On the other hand, specific objectives such as bridges, tunnels, power
stations, etc., have been evaluated only. Where they are found either
within the Suitability Area itself or close enough to warrant Special
Forces operations conducted from points 'Within it.
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2. Geographic Factorsl
The forested slopes of the mountains provide the best sites for basing
guerilla-type operations in Hungary. 007 few areas are suitable for such
sites as mountainous land is limited to less than 15 per cent of the total
territory. Suitable areas, designated by a shaded pattern on }hp T, are
located in the northern highlands extending across Hungary from the
Czechoslovakian-Hungarian border to the northern shores of Lake Balaton
and, in the south, in the Fbcsek.Pbuntains north of Pecs. Well-forested
mountain slopes are located also beyond the borders of Hungary. Mdp a
shows part of the mountainous region of southern Czechoslovakia from 'which
foot troops could penetrate Hungary by way of numerous mountain passes
and wide valleys of the tributaries of the Tisza and Danube Rivers.
Forested mountains in Yugoslavia, which could offer a basis for opera-
tions directed at Hungary, are shown on Kiap c; however, the Drava River
would be a major obstacle in the movement of troops into Hungary.
The areas designated as being suitable for guerilla bases do not
form a continuous mountain barrier but consist of groups of hills, high
plateaus, and mountain ranges separated by low corridors along which move-
ment is relatively easy. Terrain, vegetation cover, and population density
and distribution offer more favorable conditions for the purposes of
Special Forces planners in these selected areas than is the case in the
plains and low rolling loess plateaus. The mountainous terrain, while
it is rugged enough to provide concealment, does not entirely prohibit
cross-country foot movement. Forests in the selected areas provide the
best vegetation cover in Hungary. Population density in mountainous
regions is one-fourth that of the lowlands. Nbst of the inhabitants of
mountainous regions live in small valleys or on low mountain slopes..
Survival in the mountains of Hungary is made easier by the abundance
of wild animals, nuts, berries and mushrooms. Wild boars can be found
in the thick underbrush, an, d,4'in addition to deer, small animals,
expeci ily hares, are also present. Wild birds include pheasants,
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partridges and grouse. Trout and other species of fish live in streams and
lakes. Since World War II, there has been a decline in the number of fish
in sone streans.
Mbuntains in the selected areas are described in greater detail below.
The northeastern chain of mountains, which are the southernmost spurs of the
Carpathian Nbuntains, are highest in elevation. From the northeastern border
to the Danube River, the nountain ranges are the Hegyalja, Cserehat, Bukk,
Ehtra, Cserhat and Borszony. The configuration of these ranges, with the
exception of the asjor portion of the Borszony Nbuntains, may be seen on
Mhp a. The Borszony and the other ranges of the northern highlands appear
on Nhp b. In Transdandbia, the northern highlands include the Pills, Buda,
Gerecse, Vertes and Balcony Nbuntains. This chain is cut at its southern
edge by a fault depression occupied in part by Lake Balaton and the Velencei
To. Remnants of volcanic activity associated with the fault are visible in
the Tapolca Basin on the northern shore of Lake Balaton. The reining area
in Vhidh suitable guerilla bases may be located is the Mhcsek: Range in
southern Transdandbia. This range is shown on Map c.
a. Hegyalja Mountains
The Hegyalja Nbuntains, the easternmost mountain mass, are located
between the Bodrog and Hernad Rivers. They separate the Dipper Tisza Basin
from the loess-covered corridor of the Hernad. River. The nountains are rough
and high and have densely 'wooded volcanic slopes. MaAy peaks exceed 2,000
feet. Near the Czechoslovakian-Hungarian border, the summit is over 2,900
feet. The western edge of the nountain mass is a bluff which drops sharply
sone 350 feet to the Hernad Valley. In the southwest and the south, the moun-
tain slopes grade nore gently into the Tisza Plain. The range, which extends
into Czechoslovakia, is a deeply dissected narrow barrier throughout most of
its length. There are many steep slopes and rocky cliffs, but the ascent
along many of the roads which follow the valleys is gradual. Numerous
tracks skirting the peaks of the mountain range cross the area. However,
the drainage pattern makes cross-country novenent difficult. Dense beech
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forests cover the mountain sunnits. Oak forests occur at the lover eleva-
tions. There are scattered clearings on sone peaks and in the valleys, but
the most extensive clearings occur along the southern border of the range.
Here the slopes have a deep cover of loess, which supports many vineyards,
faned for their vines. Settlement is concentrated in the valleys and on
low slopes bordering the range.
b. Cserehat Mbuntains
The Cserehat Nbuntains are located west of the Hegyalja Mountains.
The range is contained in a triangular area bounded by the northern border/
the Sajo River, and the trench-like depression of the Hernad Valley. The
western half of the Cserehat is a dissected limestone plateau 'with gravel
terraces in the south. The terraces are aligned with the Sajo River. The
eastern half of the Cserehat is a low, hilly loess upland.
The limestone plateau is a rough region with deep, narrow valleys
separated by long narrow ridges. Ridgetops, which are higher in the north
than in the south/ are an average of 800 feet above the valley bottoms.
The highest point is about 1,900 feet above sea level. Steep slopes and
cliffs impose local barriers to novement.
Like many limestone regions, the plateau is pitted in places with
sinkholes. Underground water erosion has also carved a number of caves
in the limestone cliffs. Sone of the larger caves, such as the Aggtelek,
are visited by many tourists, and their value for Special Forces operations
may be limited. The Aggtelek cave system is one of the largest in Europe
and lies at the extrema northern border of the country. Four of its
total fourteen miles of underground passages are over the border in
Czechoslovakia.
Though the plateau is heavily forested 'with stands of oak and beech,
the forests are sufficiently open for foot troops. Roads crossing the
slopes and ridges are connected to valley roads winding through well
settled farmland, pastures, orchards and vineyards. Many roads lead to
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and beyond the frontier. One of the nein routes through the plateau follows
the Bodva River from the border to Miskolc. Most of the Bodva Valley is broad
and open, but there is marshland in several sectors and the valley is con-
stricted at several points where the river has cut gorges 700 feet deep.
The hilly upland in the eastern half of the Cserehat Mbuntains has a
complex pattern of ridges and spurs carved out of the deep deposits of loess.
Drainage is generally southward, and the trend of relief features is from
north to south. The southern part of the upland is less intricately dissected,
but the valleys are deeper. Many streans have cut valleys as deep as 350 feet.
Occasionally the beds of gravel and sedinentary rock on which the loess rests
are exposed. The upland has less forest cover than the limestone plateau to
the vest. Cover is extensive only locally as much of the fertile loess lands
are cultivated or in pastures. The loess becomes mud during vet weather and
hanpers cross-country movenent. At other times movenent is easy except for
the steep valley walls and locally cliffed sedinentary beds.
c. Bukk Mbuntains
Between Miskolc and Eger the Bukk Mbuntains stretch about 37 miles
from east to vest and 30 miles from north to south. The range is a limestone
block surrounded by deeply fissured summits. The surface of the block is
pitted with sinkholes leading to caves. Water disappearing into these sink-
holes emerges as springs along the lower slopes. The caves, though they are
not large in size, provide adequate cover for small groups of nen and supplies.
From the center of the range rises an arid upland plateau known as the "Giant's
Table." The highest summits here are over 3,000 feet. The plateau is about
12 miles long and four miles wide and is rimmed with a steep-sloped escarpment.
The surface of the plateau is conparatively less rugged than the block sur-
rounding it.
Wild life thrives in the Bukk Mountains. There are herds of deer, flocks
of mouflon, wildcats, foxes, badgers, squirrels, martens, and hares in great
numbers, in addition to nnaly species of wild birds. Numerous trout streams
run down the margins of the range, joining the Sajo River in the north and
east and joining the Eger River in the west.
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The entire range is covered with a carpet of forests. The southern
margin, of volcanic origin, is covered with luxuriant vineyards. The
valleys at the border of the range are cultivated and densely settled.
The valleys near Miskolc and Eger lead to resorts, cottages and hostels
in the nountains. Overlooks and marked hikers' trails are also con
in these areas. Recreational activities continue throughout the year.
In the winter there is sleighing, skating and skiing.
d. Matra Mbuntains
The Matra Mountains are separated from the Bukk Mbuntains by
the Tarna River in the east and from the Cserhat Mbuntains by the Zagyva
River in the vest. The Zagyva Valley is relatively open, but the Tarna
River notches the eastern extremity of the Mitras in four narrow gorges.
The range follows the northern boundary for about 25 miles and has an
average width of nine niles. From this solid block of mountains rise
the highest summits in Hungary. Mt. Kekes reaches a peak of almost
3,300 feet. The range is conposed of the eroded cones of four volcanoes
lying on limestone. Deep valleys and ravines have been carved in the
mountain ridge by wind and water erosion. Many snall caves offer con-
cealment. Some abandoned caves near Nigybatony were once used for
storage. The Western Nitre. Nbuntains rise abruptly from the Zagyva
Valley. In the Central Mitras the steep slopes of the northern portion
of the ridge are cut by deep valleys. In contrast the slopes of the
southern half of the ridge merge gradually with the plain. Low hills
extend as far south as the Budapest-Hatvan railroad. In the Eastern
Mitras there are steep slopes and occasional landslides.
Mbst of the range has a dense cover of forests. The northern slopes
and the higher elevations are covered with extensive beech forests.
Huckleberries grow it the lover margin of the beech forests. Below the
beech forests and in the southern region forests are conposed of oak
nixed with birch, wild fruit trees and brushwoods. Wild strawberries
and blackberries are conmon in areas cleared of forests. In the Western
Matra Mountains many slopes are barren.
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The lover slopes of mountains at the rim of the range are well settled
and cultivated with vineyards, melons and tobacco. In the interior of the
range there are only a few isolated communities, such as the village of
Matrakerosztes in the valley of the Kovicese River. However, there are many
health and recreation resorts on Gaya Peak and on the plateau south of it.
Here there are many mineral springs, the result of volcanic activity, ski
runs, overnight shelters, observation towers and a network of hiking trails.
The region is also famous for hunting. Constant care given to the preserva-
tion of game, chiefly deer, boar, and mouflon, accounts for the presence of
many game wardens in the forests.
e. Cserhat Mountains
The Cserhat Mountains, bounded by the Zagyva River, the Hatvan-
Budapest railroad, the road from Vac to Balassagyarmat and the Czechoslo-
vakian-Hungarian border, consist of an irregular low mountain area named
after one of its central peaks. Summits do not usually. exceed 2,100 feet.
The Whole surface is dissected by a close network of valleys. Most of these
valleys are relatively open, particularly the parallel system draining towards
the Zagyva in the southeast. Southward towards the Nagy Alfold the Cserhat
Mountains decline gradually into low undulating hills. Forest cover, Which
is less extensive in the Cserhat Mountains than in the Matra and Bukk Moun-
tains, is best on the isolated volcanic peaks. The entire area is well
settled and cultivated and is traversed by a fairly dense network of roads
and tracks.
f. Borszony Mountains
The Borszony Mountains lie west of the Cserhat Range. They are
bounded on the south by the Danube River and on the west and north by the
lower reaches of the Ipoly River. The configuration of the major portion of
the range can be seen on Map b. The eastern slopes appear on Mhp a. The
mass is only 10 to 12 miles in diameter and rises to a summit over 3,000
feet in elevation. Extinct volcanoes form a semi-circular ridge from Which
a number of narrow valleys radiate in all directions. The southern margin
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of. the range drops in a sheer cliff towards the Danube River, Which flow
through gaps between the Borszony and Pills Mountains.
The steep slopes of the mountains are covered with oak and beech
forests. However, forest cover has been reduced by large-scale timber
extraction, and the woods are criss-crossed by glades cut to control pests
and fire. The mountains are crossed by many trails so that even the more
remote parts of the range are within easy reach of Budapest. Many villages
are hidden in the mountains. They are connected by winding roads through
wooded valleys. The gentler slopes are covered with orchards. At lover
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altitudes herds of cattle graze on the wet meadows.
g. Pilis Mountains and Buda Hills
The Danube River guards the northern and eastern approaches to
the Pills Mountains and the Buda Hills, located between Esztergom and
Budapest southwest of the great river bend. The Pills Mountains are
separated from the Buda Hills by a trough extending from the northern
part of Budapest to Dorog, a village five miles south of Esztergom. Two
streams trending from northwest to southeast flow through the trough.
The center of the Pilis Mountains, only 15 miles from the heart of
Budapest, rises to a summit over 2,400 feet in elevation. Most of the
range consists of volcanic lavas and tuffs. Forested slopes drop steeply
in the north and east, where many small streams radiate from the range
in deep valleys leading to the Danube River. The south central part of
the range is a broad plateau approximately 2,300 feet high. To the south-
west, mountains of limestone and sandstone are separated in part from the
volcanic rocks by a deep valley southeast of Dobogoko. Small marsh lakes
occupy the valley. In the southwestern mountains caves are located among
the steep slopes and bare cliffs. Forest cover is sparse on the limestone
ridges. Some slopes are covered with low bushes, but often there are
exposures of bare white rock. The gentler slopes and valleys are covered
with orchards and fields.
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The Buda Hills, arid in parts, are a complex, broken mass of limestone
and sandstone. The highest part of the hills is a broad, flat plateau
slightly over 1,800 feet in elevation. In the northeastern and southern
parts slopes are very steep. The southern part, with rocky water courses
cutting through it, is one of the wildest parts of the Buda Hills. In the
limestone of this complex hill nass there are many caves and sone small
enclosed basins.
h. Gerecse and Vertes Mbuntains
Towards the west the Gerecse and Vertes Mbuntains are separated
from the Pilis Mountains and the Buda Hills by the Zsarbek Basin. The basin
has steep margins and a floor of rolling, lush meadowland. The Gerecse
Mountains consist of broad linestone blocks with summits over 2,000 feet
high. The blocks are broken by magy cliffed slopes and Buell valleys. In
the vest the mountain slopes descend steeply to the Tata-Tovaros lowland.
In the north the slopes fall abruptly to the Danube River. Mountain tops
are 'wooded and provide excellent observation stations. Low slopes are
covered with vineyards. South of the Gerecse Mountains, the Vertes }bun-
tains rise to a sumuit of 1,560 feet. The range, a square limestone plateau,
is both rugged and densely forested 'with birch and oak. In both the Gerecse
and Vertes Mountains, communication routes are poor. There are only a few
bad roads leading through the mountains.
i. Bakony Mountains
North of Lake Balaton, between the rcal Valley and the Mor trough,
the Bakony Mountains form a belt of forested country 60 miles long and 20 to
25 miles vide. The elevation of the summits, approximately 1,300 feet in
the west, increases to 2,300 feet in the east. The mountains are chiefly
limestone. They are heavily forested and have deep ravines. The forested
slopes have served as secure hiding places for outlaws in the past. Heights
are often dominated by the ruins of old castles. The mountain basins are
intensively cultivated. Orchards and vineyards are concentrated on the
slopes facing Take Balaton.
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The Bakony Mountains are divided into three groups by troughs. North
of the Veszprem-Devecser trough, the mountains slope gently towards the Kis
Alfold. The plateaus are arid. In sone places, such as in the mountains
near Szekesfehervar, there are bare rock slopes furrowed by the wind, but
for the most part the Northern Bakony Mountains are thickly forested with
oak and hornbeam trees. There are few roads through this area, and clay
soil on low slopes harpers cross-country noverent. The Central Bakony
Mountains, between the Veszprem-Devecser and the Tapolca-Sung troughs,
are composed of limestone in the vest and of volcanic basalt in the east.
The western part is roughly eroded, covered with forests and sparsely
populated. The eastern part is broken with steep hills covered with
vineyards. Nbvement in the east is easier than in the vest. South of
the Tapolca-Sig trough, the nountains rise fairly abruptly from the
surrounding country and join the hills of Zala County in the vest. Of
the three mountain groups, movement is easiest in the Southern Bakony
Mountains.
j. Miecsek Mountains
Though they are not very high, the Necsek Mountains provide
suitable guerilla bases in southern Transdanubia. The highest altitude -
is approximately 2,200 feet at Zengovar, ten and a half miles northeast
of Pecs. The view from this peak includes the mountains of Yugoslavia
to the south and the flat horizon of the Nagy Alfold to the east. The
range consists Chiefly of sandstone and limestone, in Which there are a
number of caves. There are sone lavas in the north and in the outlying -
hills to the southeast. The southern flank of the range is a steep
cliff facing the Pecs Plain. In the east, slopes fall abruptly from
a 150-foot terrace dominating the Danube floodplain. In the northeast
the range becomes gradually open with good sites for observation. In
the north and vest the range is an irregular broken area with wooded
hilltops and vineyards at the foot of the mountains. The northern
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3. Resistance and Pbpulation Factors
Despite a very limited history of resistance as evidenced by their
insignificant opposition to the German occupation during World War II and
notably less active resistance than other East European countries to post-
World War II Soviet domination, the Hungarians proved by their sensational
nationwide revolt of October-November 1956 that their national pride and
traditional values had not been destroyed by Connunist tyranny and that
they have a high resistance potential and capability for guerilla warfare.
With the exception of the AVH (security police), some senior army officers,
and a small minority of Connunist Party metbers all segnents of the popu-
lation supported the revolution. Axned opposition occurred in the north-
eastern and western counties of the country, notably in and around the
urban areas of Miskolc, Vac, Budapest, Szekesfehervar, Veszprem, Minapen-
tele, and Pecs and throughout the northwestern counties of Gyor-Sopron
and Komarom. Guerilla activity during the revolt period and in the weeks
following was nost prominent in the mountainous regions of the Special
Forces Suitability Area delineated in this report. At one period or
another guerilla rebels operated in the Buick, Matra, Pills, Vertes,
Bakony and Mecsek Mountains Which together constitute a low, discon-
tinuous and topographically varying system of nountains arching in a
crescent from the northeast borders of Hungary with the USSR, past lake
Balaton, and terminating at the southwestern border of the country around'
Pecs. Sone guerilla activity nay also have occurred in the Hegyalja Moun-
tains in the extrene northeast of the country and in the Borszony Mountains
directly north of Budapest on the border with Czechoslovakia. Thus the
liquidation of the uprising by overwhelming Soviet armed force reduced
the resistance of the Hungarian people to guerilla activity in the only
regions of Hungary Where cover and concealnent, however limited, could
be found.
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The uprising of October-November 1956 demonstrated that there are prac-
tically no differentiating characteristics among the people in the various
regions of Hungary that transcend their hatred of the Soviet-dominated Com-
munist regime that has tyrannized them during the post-World War II period.
Thus within the Suitability Area delineated in this report, Special Forces
will seldom be inhibited in their operations on account of hostile popula-
tion attitudes, although specific local contacts and operations must take
into account the danger of betrayal by individual pro-regime elements which
may be found in any area or in any occupational or class group. (The general
attitudes of various groups and their resistance potential have been discussed
in Part I of this report.)
Industrial workers, students, and the intelligentsia were the most active
participants in the revolt and will in all probability prove to be extremely
valuable sources of guerilla material and/or informational contacts in the
event of war, especially since the security forces of the regime will not be
able to contain them indefinitely in the urban areas Where they reside and
since in so small a country as Hungary no area of cover and concealment is
very far from one or more large towns.
The chief university towns in Hungary are Debrecen, Budapest, Pecs, and
Szeged.
The peasants, Who will in most instances be the class with Which Special
Forces will come in primary contact, are perhaps the most uniformly anti-
Communist class in the Whole country. Although, as their backwardness in
the uprising indicates, they are not as readily adaptable to,
of generating leadership for, the purposes of Special Forces,
worthiness and knowledgedbility of localisms will prove to be
nor as capable
their trust-
valuable assets
in the organization of guerilla activities, and in the long run they will
probably contribute an important share of manpower for such activities.
The Roman Catholic. clergy, Who with the exception of a few so-called
"patriotic priests" have been the strongest national bulwark against the
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ideology of Communism, prove to be valuable local contacts, especially
in the rural areas. Catholicism is the predominant religion in western
Hungary and is strongly represented in several other sections of the
country. The centers of the Protestant religion--chiefly the Evangelical
(Lutheran) and Reformed (Calvinist) churches--are in eastern Hungary. The
center of the Reformed religion is Debrecen; that of the Evangelical
religion reportedly in Bekescsaba. The very small Greek Orthodox body
in Hungary is located near the Hungarian-Rumanian border. There is one
Greek Catholic diocese in Hungary with its see in Hajdudorog in the
northeastern part of the country.
Of the various minority groups in Hungary the most likely to be of
practical assistance to Special Forces are the Germans, many of whom are
to be found in all-German mining villages in the Necsek mountain range
and sone of the other coal-mining areas of western Hungary. Other
German settlements are scattered through Bacs-Kiskun, Pest, and Tolna
counties and the southwestern environs of Budapest. The great majority
of Hungarian Jews are concentrated in Budapest. Yugoslav corrimnities
are established near the Yugoslav-Hungarian border in the vicinity of
Baja and Bacsalmas, in Baranya, Somogy, and Zala counties, and in the
Raba River valley in the west. Slovaks are found north and northwest
of Budapest; Rumanians are present in Bekes and Hajdu-Bihar counties.
Gypsies may be encountered in almost every part of the country and
appear to have no fixed point of major concentration.
The sizeable cross-border ethnic Hungarian rinority elements, many
of whom undoubtedly harbor irredentist aspirations, may prove to be
valuable assets to Special Forces operations in Hungary based on the
utilization of the more favorable cover and terrain features closely
surrounding the country on all sides, i.e., in Czechoslovakia, the
Ukraine, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Sizeable enclaves of Hungarians are
located in Slovakia along the whole length of Hungary's northern border;
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in Transcarpathian Ukraine, adjacent to the northeast border; in Rumania,
particularly in Transylvania; and in the Vojvodinan and, to a much smaller
extent, in the Croatian and Slovenian provinces of Yugoslavia.
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1
Bareepr
HUNGARY
MAP T
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Area cd Suitable Cover and Conccaln.ent
Index to Special Forces Sections
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23
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROJECT
9-57
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4. Economic Vulnerability Factors (Map a)
That portion of the Special Forces Suitability Area shown on Map
contains Hungary's second largest industrial corplex along the Sajo River
in the sector between Miskolc (4806N-2047E) and Ozd (4813N-2018E). Mbst
of the industry which consists of iron and steel rills together with Chemical
and other plants is concentrated in the vicinities of Miskolc (including
Diosgyor (4805N-2041E)), Kazincbarcika (4815N-2038E), and Ozd. The iron
and steel rills of this area are heavily dependent upon supplies of iron
ore and coking coal from external sources. Brown coal deposits in the area
are nonetheless extensively exploited. This coal is used to fuel power
plants and industrial establishments throughout northeast Hungary but it
is unsuitable for iron and steel raking. An atterpt is being made, how-
ever, at the Kazindbarcika coking plant to produce retallurgical-grade
coke from the brown coal and thereby reduce the dependency of the steel
rills in this region on imported coke supplies. Hungary's largest iron
ore deposits are in this part of the Suitability Area in the vicinity of
Rudabanya (4822N-2038E).
The transportation net in northeastern Hungary is probably better
developed than in other parts of the country. Recent ipproverents in the
transportation system in this area have been made largely under Russian
guidance and with a view towards irproving connections between Hungary and
the Ukraine.
Two strategically ipportant rail routes pass through the area. Both
emanate from Chop (4825N-2211E) in the Ukraine and lead to Budapest and
beyond that point to Austria and Yugoslavia (see Suitability Area Raps b
and c). Transloading facilities between Russian broad-gauge and European
standard-gauge are located at Zahony (4824N-2211E) and Kbmoro (4818N-2206E)
in Hungary, at Cierna nad Tisou in Czechoslovakia, and at Chop in the
Ukraine.2 The Zahony transloading station is the largest in Hungary and
probably exceeds in capacity the facilities at Chop. An average of five
to six Russian broad-gauge trains arrive daily at Zahony. Each carries
batsmen 2,500 and 2,600 metric tons of goods.3
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The daily capacity of the Zahony transshiprent center is estirated at
iEll000 tons of freight per day. The current upper limit at Zahony proper
is probably 15,000 tons with an additional 3,000 tons being handled at
nearby Koro. The freight transshipped at the latter location consists
entirely of crude oil and POL products. Zahony on the other :hand. handles
foodstuffs destined for the urban population of Budapest together with
the very important item of coal, coke, and iron ore for the Sajo River
industrial region. Pit props for the mines located in the Area of Map a,
as well as those in TransdanUbia (Map b) are also a significant item of
freight arriving at Zahony)
Export shipments through Zahony consist of bauxite from mines in the
area of Map b, oil from southwest Hungary (Map c), steel and steel products
including machinery, rotor vehicles and locomotives, alumina, aluminum, and
uranium ore from mines near Recsk (4756N-2006E) and Pecs (Map c). In view
of the fact that with the exception of crude oil the capacity of the Zahony
yards is fully utilized by incoming freight shipments, it is likely that
products exported from Hungary pass through Zahony for transshipnent at
Chop.
In addition to its economic significance the Zahony transloading area
has a prime military value. How great this value is has been indicated in
a report that between 31 October and 2 November 1956 during the course of
the Hungarian uprising up to 92 trains carrying two Soviet divisions passed
through this point.5 It has been alleged, however, that the Zahony yards
themselves could not handle the greatly increased volute of traffic at
this tine, and the Russian broad-gauge track which had terminated at Komoro
vas extended by 8,000 Soviet construction troops as far as Nyirbogdany
(4803N-2152E). At this point the arriving Russian troops disembarked
from the trains and proceeded toward Budapest by highway.
The conversion of the railway gauge was accomplished by outwardly
shifting one rail for a distance of 3-1/2 inches. The change in gauge was
made without regard to its effects on connecting lines. The track was
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probably restored to its original status when the emergency passed but
the rapid change of gauge has been cited as evidence of the logistical
capability of the USSR in respect to a major military effort by rail
through the Hungarian-Ukrainian border area.6
Little definitive information is available on the connections which
Hungarian railways make with the Ukraine via the Hungarian border-crossing
point of Satoraljaujhely (4824N-2139E) and the Czechoslovak-Ukraine border-
crossing at Cierna mad. Tisou. It is most likely that sore shipments of
coal, coke, and iron ore reach the steel mills in the area of Map a via
this route, and that finished and semi-finished products from these same
as well as other establishments elsewhere in Hungary are delivered to the
USSR along this rail line for transshipnent at Chop. The connecting rail-
road line NyiregYhaza (4758N-2143E)-Szerencs (4810N-2112E), which crosses
the Tisza River and its arms between Tokaj (4807N-2124E) and Rakanaz
(4808N-2127E) is very irportant as part of a circuit route between
Zahony, Miskolc, Cierna mad. Tisou, and Chop.
Other rail connections which are rade between. Hungary and Czechoslo-
vakia along the northern border of Hungary are also important both
economically and strategical my. The main route from Chop via Satoral-
Jaujhely, Miskolc, Hatvan (4740N-1941E), Aszod (4739N-1929E), and Vac
(4746N-19C8E) crosses into Czechoslovakia again at Szob (4749N-1825E)
(Nap b) and leads to the western part of Czechoslovakia with further
connections to Austria. The route avoids vulnerable bridge crossings
of the Tisza and DanUbe Rivers. The sector between Miskolc and Hatvan
is being electrified. South of Hatvan electrification is corplete as
far as Budapest.
A number of well-maintained highways are located in the area covered
by Mhp a. None has any great economic importance except in terns of its
111 use as a feeder to the nearest railroad. The military value of these
highways, however, cannot be overlooked and the vulnerable physical
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structures located along them enter therefore into the planning of Special
Forces wherever they would endeavor to cut a nearby railroad line.
The part of Hungary's transportation system included within the limits
of Map a is vulnerable to interdiction by Special Forces at the .numerous
key structures shown on the map._ The numbers appearing beside the symbols
representing these structures are keyed to the partial list of key struc-
tures following this text. While the interdiction of branch and alternate
railway lines with little traffic voluae would normally be less advantageous
than the interdiction of main trunk lines, this situation can change sig-
nificantly if, as a result of the disruption of service on the in routes,
the alternate lines should assume a greater than normal importance. In
many instances it will be found that on double-tracked lines in this as
well as in other parts of the Suitability Area each track crosses a terrain
obstacle on a separate structure. This situation is especially noteworthy
in respect to the double-tracked line entering Hungary at Satoraljaujhely.
If Special Forces were to sever this and similar lines they would have to
be prepared to interdict more than one structure at any location.
As examples of the results which could be obtained by Special Forces
operations against the transportation system in that part of the general
Suitability Area shown on Mhp a the following are mentioned. The interdic-
tion of structure No. 18 on Map a would deny the iron and steel mills at
Miskolc, Diosgyor, and Ozd direct access to the coal, coke, and iron ore
supplies Which they receive from the USSR. Shipments of domestic iron ore
from Rudabagya could be interdicted either through the disruption of
service on the branch line between Rudsbagra and Kazincbarcika or through
attacks on the mining installations themselves. The branch railroad line
crosses a number of small streams as yell as the Sajo River before connec-
ting At Kazindbarcika vith,the line between Miskolc and Ozd.
The bridge over the Tisza River between Zahony and Chop is vital to
the novement of goods between Hungary and the USSR. It could be approached
and interdicted by Special Forces from points to either side of the Hungarian-
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Russian border as well as from places in nearby forested areas in Czecho-
slovakia. An unconfirmed report alleges that an underwater crossing of
the Tisza has been piqnned for the Chop-Zahony connection in order to
reduce at this point the physical vulnerability of this very important
transportation route.7 The circuit between Zahogy? Chen, and Miskolc
could be broken by Special Forces through the ints,..diction of st,?c-turos
Nos. 3 or 12.
The interruption of over supplies in northeastern Hungary would
have many desirable advantages for Special Forces although the poser
distribution network in this area is elaborate enough to provide for
alternate supplies of power in tires of emergency. Nevertheless, because
Hungary as a whole suffers from a defiiency of electric power, the logo
of power produced by any of the major plax:to in the gystealLi
in areas far removed from the f.L.,,alt itself. For exs:wie? t'ne el.97,trified
section of railroad between EudEpt and Hat van is dependent up:,n 1,:vt9r
Iron the Matra power plant (key stract=a No. 83). If this
were interdicted, or if the tranogim'o-, l'wbo cennecting it
railroad were destroyed, electric tract4o:. on the railr,ad
probably have to be suspended. KEV strz..:tura No. 74 at Bera7ite (4814N-
204CE) which is one of the largest Ti.--.WiLT piTntsi Hungarci is a m,57.j:r
supplier of power to the indnstries and TrenPsin the Sajo Fii7er inA2.1s-
trial region. loss of power fro:it thin scuree vinradls.kv.-e a Vr.:1=y
if not a critical effect upon ina.astrial Ntdu.lti= in thin
Effects would also be produced .aion exeds v=vei fr)m the Sajo
Industrial region in that surpluo tower7:1:eLzce,' 48
into the national grid. The trans=it4gion lin-3 fnz,
toward the south would be readi3q7 accessills iinl Fr inter
diction.
Foyer production at the Berente, :plant is indireetly
through the interdiction of fuel supplies. These are obtained by
conveyor from a coal dressing plant located approximately one kilometer
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west of the power plant. By interdicting the conveyor system between the
power and coal dressing plants, Special Forces could seriously disturb
electric power output in this area. A similar type conveyor system extends
between nearby nines and the coal dressing plant. Coal is also delivered
to the preparation plant by rail. Local coal utilized by the power plant
and the other industrial facilities in the immediate area, including
especially the coking plant at Kazincbarcika, must be prepared beforehand.
Any damage which would force the coal preparation plant to suspend opera-
tions would therefore have a widespread effect.
Another possible worthwhile objective of Special Forces in northeastern
Hungary would be the destruction of the power plant and navigation lock at
the junction of the Tisza River and Trans-Tisza Canal near Tiszalok (4801N-
2123E). This canal is expected to become one of the more important navig-
able waterways in Hungary. By means of it the agricultural products of the
Eastern Hungarian Plain can be moved northward by river to the Soviet border
at Zahony and Chop. Forest products from areas in Rumania can also be Shipped
downstream to areas in eastern and southern Hungary. The destruction of the
navigation lock at Tiszalok would precent in large measure the easy movement
of these various Products. Interdiction of the power output of the asso-
ciated hyavelectric plant vPu....d. remove 12,500 kw. of rover from the total
amount of power available in this area.
Both above and underground teaecommmications lines connecting HengArY
with the USSR are found in the area covered by M211_2,:.. For the mst part
these lines follow the main rail and road routes in the area. Their inter-
diction would be disruptive of rapid telecommunications between the USSR,
Hungary, and. Austria. The telecommunications lines could be approached by
Special Forces in conjunction with an interdiction of an imnertant rail or
road route.
An oil or gas pipeline has been reported to extend between Nyirbator
(4750N-2208E) and Maszolajfalva? via Debrecen. Only a small length of the
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line is shown on Map a. It is possible that the line does not run to
Nyitbator from Debrecen but rather connects the latter place to Nyirbogdaay
Which has a small refinery. Nyirbogdany lies on the in railway line
to Zahony and Chop and is not far removed from the oil transloading sta-
tion at Koro.
5. Partial List of Kay Structures (Map a)
Structure Location
Reemrks
1. Railroad bridge Over Tisza River at Zahony
(48211N-2211E)
2. Railroad bridge Near Zahony
3. Railroad bridge North of Nyiregyhaza
(4758N-2143E)
4. Railroad bridge Nyiregyhaza
5. Railroad bridge
6. Railroad bridge
7. Three railroad
bridges
South of Buj (4806N-2138E),
on narrow-gauge line to
Sarospatak (4819N-2134E)
Near Gaya (4809N-2136E), on
narrow-gauge line to Saros-
patak
North of Balsa (4810N-2132E),
over Tisza River and branches
on narrow-gauge line to
Sarospatak
8. Railroad bridge Over Bodrog River on narrow-
gauge line to Sarospatak
9. Two railroad
bridges
10. Railroad bridge
11. Two railroad
? bridges
North of Satoraljaujhely
(4824N-2139E) on main line,
over branch of Bodrog River
Over tributary of Bodrog
River on main line to
Satoraljaujhaly
Over highway and Szerencs
River north of Szerencs
(4810N-2112P)
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3 spans at 83 meters
each; steel lattice
girder; dual gauge
(i.e., three rails)
15 meters long
Carries narrow-gauge
line over main line
to Zahony
23.8 meters long
17 meters long
17 meters long
Main bridge 204 meters
long; others 96 meters
long each
3 spans at 44 meters
each
25 meters long each;
line forks at this
point, one branch to
Kosice, the other to
Chop
20 meters long; adjoin-
ing highway bridge
26 meters and 18 meters
long each
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Structure
Location Re:narks
12.
Five railroad
Over Tisza and arms between Largest 670 feet, 3
bridges
(4807Nand Raka-steel spans over in
Tokaj -2124E)
maz (4308N-2127E) on important Channel; others: 240
circuit line Szerencs, Chop-feet, 3 steel spans,
liyiregyhaza steel lattice girder;
595 feet, 7 spans; 37
meters, single span;
and 320 feet, 4 spans
13.
Railroad. bridge
On. branch line Szerencs-20 meters long
Hidasnereti (4830N-2114E)
14.
Railroad bridge
On branch line Szerancs-270 feet long, 3
Hidasnezeti spans, over Hernad
River
15.
Three railroad
bridges
On alternate line Miskolc 15-20 meters long each
(14806N-2011.7E) -Kosice
16.
Railroad bridge
On main line Miskolc-340 feet long, 2 spans
Satoraljaujhely over Hernad River
17.
Railroad bridge
On in line Miskolc-16 Deters long
Satoraljaujhely
18.
Railroad. bridge
On main line Miskolc-Satoral-290 feet long, 3 spans,
jaujhely over Sajo River steel, concrete pier
19.
Railroad bridge
In Miskolc over Szenva River 30 meters long
on important line to Kazinc-
barcika (4815N-2038E)
20.
Railroad bridge
Over Sajo River on branch 330 feet long, 3 spans
line Mdskolc-Konjati (1483217-
2045E)
21.
Railroad bridge
Over Badva Elver on .branch 30 neters long
line Miskolc-Komjati
22.
Railroad bridge
On spur lime to Rudabanya 15 neters long
(4822N-2035E)
23.
Railroad bridge
Over Sajo River on spur 200 feet long, 6 spans
line to Rudabanya
24.
Railroad bridge
East of Kazincbarcika on 15 meters long
important line from Miskolc
25.
Two railroad
To either side of Vadna 50 iters long, single
bridges
(4816N-2033E); westernmost span, and 16 meters
and largest crosses Sajo long
River
26.
Railroad. bridge.
South of Putnok (4818N-50 neters long, 2
2026E) on line to Eger spans
(4754N-2022E) and. Fuzesa-
bony (4745N-2025E), over
Sajo River
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SECRET
Structure
Location
SECRET
Remarks
27. Railroad bridge
28. Railroad bridge
29. Railroad tunnel
30. Two railroad
bridges and two
tunnels
31. Railroad bridge
32. Railroad tunnel
33. Railroad bridge
34. Railroad bridge
35. Two railroad
bridges
36. Railroad bridge
37. Railroad bridge
35. Railroad bridge
39. Railroad bridge
40. Two railroad
bridges
41. Railroad bridge
42. Railroad bridge
43. Railroad bridge
Over Sajo River on important
spur line Bahreve (45I8N-
2021E)-Ozd (4813N-2018E)
North. of Ozd
South of Kirald (4815N-2024E)
on line Putnok (4818N-2126E)-
Ftzesabogy
North of Eger (4754N-2022E)
East of Eger railroad station
Between Miskolc (4806N,2047E)
and Diosgyor (4506N-2041E)
on important spur line
Over Pima River between Ftze-
sabony and Nezokovesd (4748N-
2034E)
East of Fuzesabony on line
to Debrecen (473IN-2139E)
At Porozlo (4739N-2039E)
over Eger River channels
Over Tisza River at Tisza-
fured (4737N-2045E)
At Tiszafured over alternate
channel of Tisza River
East of Ohat-Pusztakocs
(approx. 4736N-2058E)
West of BaImazujvaxos
(4736N-2120E)
Between Ohat-Pusztakocs and
Tiszacesege (4742N-2100E)
South of Polar (4752N-2106E)
near Folyas (47)48N-2108E)
North of Polgar
West of Kal-Kapolna (4744N-
2016E) on main line Hatvan-
Miskolc
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200 feet long, 2
spans, through steel
lattice girder
18 meters long
208 neters long
Bridges each 16-18
meters long; tunnels
62 neters and 114
meters long
15 meters long
1,263 feet long
15 meters long
22 meters long
One 930 feet long,
18 spans; one 260
feet long, 5 spans
916 feet long, 3
spans including 2
deck and 1 through
steel lattice girder
305 feet long, 6
spans
22 neters long
28 meters long
Approx. 20 neters
long each
17 neters long
18 meters long
25 meters long
Structure
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Location
Remarks
SECRET
44. Railroad bridge West of Kal-Kapolna on main
line Hatvan-Miskolc
45. Railroad bridge West of Kal-Kapolna on in 28 meters long
line Hatvaa-Miskolc
180 feet long, over
Tarna River
46. Two railroad
bridges
East of Vamosgyork (4741N-
1956E) on main line Hatvan-
Niskolc
19 and 30 meters
long, respectively
47. Railroad bridge North of Kal-Kapolna on secon- 30 meters long
dary line to Kisterenye
(4800N-1950E)
48. Railroad bridge Northwest of Farad (4755N- 16 meters long
2002E) on secondary line
Kal-Kapolna Kisterenye
49. Railroad bridge Between Salgotarjan (4807N- 15 meters long
1948E) and Kisterenye on
important line Hatvan-Incenec
(CzeChOslovakia)
50. No railroad South of Kisterenye on impor- 19 meters long each
bridges tant line Hatvan-Incenec
(Czechoslovakia)
51. Railroad bridge
North of Selypicukorgyar
(4746N-1940E) on important
line Hatvan-Iucenec (Czecho-
slovakia)
52. Railroad bridge North of'Selypiadkorgyar
on important line Hatvan-
Iucenec (Czechoslovakia)
53. Railroad bridge At Hatvan on important line 18 meters long
Hatvan-Iucenec 'Onedhoslovakia)
At Hatvan (4740N-1941E) on
main double-track line to
Satoraljaujhely crossing
Sogyva River
25 meters long
15 meters long
54. Two railroad
bridges
55. Railroad bridge
56. Railroad bridge
57. Railroad bridge
53. Railroad bridge
South of Hatvan on important
alternate line to Szolnok
(4710N-2011E)
Over small stream west of
Aszod (4739N-1929E) on main
line Hatvan-Budapest
South of Galgamacsa (4741N-
1923E) on important Budapest
cut-off
South of Vac (4746N-1908E) on
important Budavest-Vac-
Bratislava (Czechoslovakia)
main line
236
SECRET
20 meters long each
28 meters long
24 meters long
20 meters long
20 meters long
. Structure
Location
SECRET
Remarks
59. Railroad bridge
60. Railroad bridge
61. Railroad bridge
62. Railroad tunnel
63. Railroad bridge
64. Railroad bridge
65. Steam power plant
On branch line Vac-Dregely-
15a1pn1 (4803N-1903E)
On branch line Dregelypalank-
Balassagyarmat (4805N-1917E)
18 meters long
160 feet, 8 spans,
reinforced concrete
beans
On branch line Diregelypalank- 20 meters long
Balassagyarmat
On branch line Balassagyarmat- 158 meters long
Galgamacsa
On branch line Balassagyarmat- 16 meters long
Ipolytarnoc (4814N-1938E)
On branch line Balassagyarmat- 18 meters long
Ip.olytarnoc
Satoraljaujhely (4824N-2139E)
66. Steam power plant Szerencs (4810N-2112E)
67. H.E. power plant
Tiszalok (4801N-2125E). On
Tisza River at point of
junction with Trans-Tisza
Canal.
68. Steam power plant Nyiregyhaza (4758N-2143E)
69. H.E. power plant
70. Steam power plant
Tiszaluc (4802N-2104E).
On Hernad River near the
confluence with Tisza River
Tiszapalkonya (4753N-2103E)
71. Steam power plant KUrityan (4818N-2037E)
237
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1,200 kw. (1944).
Supplies Satoral-
jaujhelv. Fuel:
brown coal.
3,300 kw. (1944).
Industrial plant
of sugar refinery.
Fuel: brown coal.
12,500 kw. Nazi-
mum installed
capacity operable
only about 200 days
per year because of
river fluctuation.
4,700 kw. (1948).
Supplies Nyiregy-
haza. Fuel: brown
coal.
4,700 kw. (1947).
Supplies Tiszaluc
and nearby vicinity.
Planned for 200,000
kw. Construction
begun in 1953. Work
still in progress in
1957 with first power-
producing unit being
installed. Fuel:
brown coal fraraBorsod
basin.
2,400 kw. (1945). In-
dustrial plant of
steel mill. Fuel:
brown coal.
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Structure
Location
72.
Steam power plant
Eisznoshorvat(4818N-
2039E)
73.
Steam power plant
Barcika (4815N-2037E)
74.
Steam power plant
Berente -(4814N-2040E)
75.
Steam power plant
Liosgyor (4806N-
20111E)
76.
Steam power plant
Miskolc (4806N-
2047E)
77.
H.E. power plant
Tiszafured (4737N-
2045E). On Tisza
River
78.
Steam power plant
Ozd (4813N-2018E)
79.
Steam power plant
Belapatfalva (4804N-
2022E)
80.
Steam power plant
Egercsehi (4803N-
2016E)
81.
Steam power plant
Salgotarjan (480711-
1948E)
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SECRET
Remarks
SECRET
2,000 kw. (1944). Supplies
Disznoshorvat. Fuel: brown
coal.
8:000 kw. (1945). Supplies
Borsod coal mines. Surplus
output is transmitted to
Diosgyor steel mill. Fuel:
brown coal.
Rated at 200,000 kx.,
although producing only
160,000 kw. in 1956. Indus-
trial plant of chemical works
producing fertilizer and coke.
Also will supply power to
Budapest-Miskolc railroad
and other industries of
Kazincbarcika area. Fuel:
brown coal. One of the
largest power plants in
Hnngary.
32,000 kw. (1945). Indus-
trial plant of steel mill.
Supplies also magnesium and
cement works at Diosgyor,
oil refinery near Miskolc
and freight car plant at
Miskolc. Fuel: brown coal.
10,000 kw.
tion.
10,000 kw.
tion.
Under construe-
Under construe-
24,800 kw. (1944). Indus-
trial power plant of steel
mill. Fuel: brown coal.
4:000 kw. (1944). Indus-
trial power plant of cement
works. Fuel: brown coal.
2,000 kw. (1945). Indus-
trial plant of coal nines.
Supplies aJso local cement
works. Fuel: brown coal.
20,000 ki.r. (1952). Supplies
Salgotarjan, Paszto, Hatvan,
and Szolnok areas. Fuel:
brown coal.
Structure
Location
Remarks
SECRET
82. Steam power plant Nagybatony (4758N-
1950E)
83. Steampower plant Lorinci (4744N-1940E),
7 kms. north of Hatvan
and 200 U6 east of
railroad
239
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1,200 klir. (1945). Indus-
trial plant of coal mines.
Fuel: brown coal.
128,000 kw. "Matra" plant
(1954). Supplies Lorinci
and Budapest-Hatvan rail-
road. Fuel: brown coal.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002600010004-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002600010004-4
Structure
Location
72.
Steam power plant
Eisznoshorvat(4818N-
2039E)
73.
Steam power plant
Barcika (4815N-2037E)
74.
Steam power plant
Berente -(4814N-2040E)
75.
Steam power plant
Liosgyor (4806N-
20111E)
76.
Steam power plant
Miskolc (4806N-
2047E)
77.
H.E. power plant
Tiszafured (4737N-
2045E). On Tisza
River
78.
Steam power plant
Ozd (4813N-2018E)
79.
Steam power plant
Belapatfalva (4804N-
2022E)
80.
Steam power plant
Egercsehi (4803N-
2016E)
81.
Steam power plant
Salgotarjan (480711-
1948E)
238
SECRET
Remarks
SECRET
2,000 kw. (1944). Supplies
Disznoshorvat. Fuel: brown
coal.
8:000 kw. (1945). Supplies
Borsod coal mines. Surplus
output is transmitted to
Diosgyor steel mill. Fuel:
brown coal.
Rated at 200,000 kx.,
although producing only
160,000 kw. in 1956. Indus-
trial plant of chemical works
producing fertilizer and coke.
Also will supply power to
Budapest-Miskolc railroad
and other industries of
Kazincbarcika area. Fuel:
brown coal. One of the
largest power plants in
Hnngary.
32,000 kw. (1945). Indus-
trial plant of steel mill.
Supplies also magnesium and
cement works at Diosgyor,
oil refinery near Miskolc
and freight car plant at
Miskolc. Fuel: brown coal.
10,000 kw.
tion.
10,000 kw.
tion.
Under construe-
Under construe-
24,800 kw. (1944). Indus-
trial power plant of steel
mill. Fuel: brown coal.
4:000 kw. (1944). Indus-
trial power plant of cement
works. Fuel: brown coal.
2,000 kw. (1945). Indus-
trial plant of coal nines.
Supplies aJso local cement
works. Fuel: brown coal.
20,000 ki.r. (1952). Supplies
Salgotarjan, Paszto, Hatvan,
and Szolnok areas. Fuel:
brown coal.
Structure
Location
Remarks
SECRET
82. Steam power plant Nagybatony (4758N-
1950E)
83. Steampower plant Lorinci (4744N-1940E),
7 kms. north of Hatvan
and 200 U6 east of
railroad
239
SECRET
1,200 klir. (1945). Indus-
trial plant of coal mines.
Fuel: brown coal.
128,000 kw. "Matra" plant
(1954). Supplies Lorinci
and Budapest-Hatvan rail-
road. Fuel: brown coal.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002600010004-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002600010004-4
50.000
K 08ICE
SECOND EDITION-ANIS
-SECRET
'3
SHEET RI,49
Ams SERIES m5758
53
5
94
'6
2. 99
39
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