THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN OUR RECENT EXERCISE ON SOUTH ASIA. I ENCLOSED A COPY OF A MEMO WE PRODUCED AT THE END.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92T00306R000200020001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 24, 1987
• Content Type: LETTER

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Dear Mr. Blackwell:
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United States Department of State
Foreign Service Institute
1400 Key Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209
June 24, 1987
Thank you for your participation in our recent exercise on
South Asia. I enclose a copy of a memo we produced at the end.
Fred Hill
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United States Department of State
Foreign Service Institute
1400 Key Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209
To:
Through:
From:
Subject:
NEA - Richard W. Murphy
FSI - Charles Bray
FSI/CSFA - Hans Binnendijk and Frederic B. Hill
Diplomatic Exercise on South Asia
SUMMARY and CONCLUSION: The exercise confronted dramatically
the serious negative consequences for U.S. interests of the conflict
within U.S. policy between non-proliferation and Afghanistan. No
one expects the government of Pakistan to yield enough on the
nuclear issue to help us resolve that policy conflict, and the GOP
refused to do so in the exercise despite an aid cut-off.
The policy conclusion is, therefore, that we should seek to
redefine, with Congress, our non-proliferation policy before we
reach the point of being unable to certify Pakistani non-possession
of a nuclear device. The concept of non-weaponization was
introduced as a possible substitute for non-possession.
The Soviet Union stands to gain leverage in the region in the
event of a limitation or severance of the U.S. aid relationship.
Also, the Soviets are not willing to cooperate with the U.S. on
non-proliferation in the region as long as they gain from continuing
conflicts in U.S. policy.
Also, Pakistan may be prepared to withstand considerable
Soviet pressure for a settlement in Afghanistan, with or without
U.S. aid, but appears susceptible to a judicious mix of sticks and
carrots which would permit a prompt repatriation of the Afghan
refugees. END SUMMARY and CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION: As you know, the Foreign Service Institute
staged its fourth diplomatic simulation June 5 and 6, a three-part
exercise designed to examine policy options and probable responses
of the United States, the Soviet Union and key nations in South
Asia. The three moves of the game focused on diplomatic and
military developments in Afghanistan and the implications of further
advances towards nuclear weaponization by Pakistan and India.
The exercise was conducted with area experts in the United
States government - and a small number of outside experts - playing
the roles of leading decision-makers in the U.S., Soviet Union,
Pakistan and India. China and other international responses were
represented in Control.
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Basic presumptions of the scenarios were twofold:
1) continued Soviet pressure on Pakistan to seek a settlement in
Afghanistan which preserves Soviet gains as much as possible and
2)continued Pakistani advance towards development of nuclear weapons.
Neither the U.S. nor Pakistani teams made particularly
dramatic shifts in response to an escalation in Soviet diplomatic
overtures and military intervention in Pakistan. Despite the
paramount importance of finding a solution to its refugee problem,
the Pakistani team stood firm in the face of stepped-up subversion,
cross-border raids and an Afghan air strike on Kamra which destroyed
several F-16s. Pakistani leaders refused to take part in the
proximity talks until the attacks ceased (though negotiations -
which failed - were ordered by Control).
The failure to certify that Pakistan does not have a nuclear
device and a subsequent aid cut-off severely limited U.S. influence
in the region. The Pakistani team played off conflicting U.S.
interests on Afghanistan and non-proliferation in hopes of regaining
U.S. favor without giving ground on its nuclear program. Meanwhile,
the Soviet team was able to exploit U.S. conflicts and constraints
to pursue bilateral talks with Pakistan and promote - largely for
propaganda purposes - the idea of a nuclear free zone in the
region. The India team, which moved towards a covert nuclear
weapons program, generally supported Soviet initiatives. Citing
China's nuclear weapons, India declined Pakistani offers of a
nuclear standstill.
The predictive value of such exercises is limited, but several.
observations stand out.
OBSERVATIONS:
On the United States:
1. Dilemma in U.S. Policy: Pakistani leaders effectively
exploited the dual U.S. interest in Afghanistan and
non-proliferation and the executive-Congressional tension over an
aid cut-off; Soviet leaders made the most of the problems caused by
an aid cut-off and a conflict in U.S. interest in non-proliferation
and maintaining a strategic presence in the region.
2. Afghanistan remains U.S. priority: A solution in
Afghanistan that denies Soviet gains as much as possible remains a
more important objective than non-proliferation on the , sub-continent
- especially in light of the great difficulty which follows from
implementation of current U.S. law limiting aid to Pakistan in
certain circumstances. Developments in the game suggest that the
severity of developments in Afghanistan might be used to ease
Congressional constraints on Pakistan's aid despite advances towards
nuclear weaponization, including new definitions of key language.
3. Catch-22 in certification: U.S. legislation on Pakistan
not only poses the difficult task of certifying a negative, but also
places an administration in a weak position. To prevent a cut-off
of aid, it must gain assurances from Pakistan; to gain such
assurances, it must offer Pakistan some certainty of Congressional
action. A compromise is needed before circumstances overtake us.
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4. U.S. initiatives?: While the scenario posed a difficult
set of circumstances, the United States team appeared to be in a
vulnerable, and largely reactive, posture throughout the game.
The U.S. team undertook few initiatives on its own. Proposals
that were raised but rejected ranged from 1)appointment of a special
envoy on nuclear proliferation to 2)resort to the UN .Security
Council to 3)intervention - with India - to cripple Pakistan's
nuclear facilities. And U.S. responses were sometimes tentative.
For example, while the U.S. team embraced a Soviet proposal for a
conference on a nuclear free-zone, it did so only with the intention
of limiting it to the continent. The Pentagon's assertion that the
deployment of nuclear subs in the Indian Ocean can not be altered in
any way went unexamined.
On Pakistan:
5. Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons: The Pakistan team
demonstrated a consistent readiness to proceed towards development
of nuclear weapons, stopping short of any step such as a test which
would force a cut-off of U.S. aid. Pakistan appeared confident that
the U.S. team - both the executive and legislative branches - would
continue to adjust to steps towards weaponization as long as
Pakistan stopped short of a test.
6. Pakistan's posture on Afghanistan: Pakistan retains a high
threshold for conflict and internal tension in its search for a
settlement in Afghanistan. The Pakistani team remained resolute in
the face of a harsh Afghan-Soviet attack on Kamra (in retaliation
for the downing of an Aeroflot plane near Kabul) and refused to
budge for any offers that fell short of a settlement that would
enable Pakistan to repatriate the refugees to their homeland.
7. Likely security assistance requests: Pakistan made
generally predictable requests for U.S. assistance, including more
AEW aircraft. After the U.S. aid cut-off, Pakistan sought to
neutralize any abrupt Indian response by diplomacy. It also sought
funds from Saudi Arabia while awaiting a resumption of U.S. aid.
On the Soviet Union:
8. Soviet advantages: In the wake of a cut-off of U.S. aid to
Pakistan, the Soviet Union appears to hold more leverage in the
region than the U.S. Although many of the Soviet team's initiatives
on Afghanistan and non-proliferation were advanced for propaganda
purposes, actions by the Soviet team generated considerably more
attention and activity than U.S. initiatives. Bilateral talks
between Soviets and Pakistanis did make some progress.
9. Soviet dilemmas: Despite a clear desire to find a
settlement in Afghanistan, Soviet leaders were reluctant to make
major concessions to set the stage for an agreement. While Soviet
decision-makers singled out Afghanistan as a serious obstacle to
enhancement of the Soviet Union's international stature, they
conceded that several features of a proposal made to Pakistan
amounted to window-dressing (ie., readiness to form a loya jurga).
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On India:
10. Indian choices: The India team opted for a covert
nuclear weaponization program even before the exercise posed
developments which moved both India and Pakistan closer to
weaponization. China's nuclear weapons remained India's key
concern. While generally acting to maximize its position on the
subcontinent and minimize external influence, India generally
supported Soviet initiatives.
ATTACHMENTS:
Tab A: Notes of post-game discussion
Tab B: List of Participants and Roles
Tab C: Scenarios for Moves I, II and III
cc: Ronald I. Spiers
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