LETTER TO BOYD HOLLINGSWORTH FROM DAVID PEARLINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92M00732R000400060002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2014
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 30, 1989
• Content Type: LETTER

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/23: CIA-RDP92M00732R000400060002-6
Central Intelligence Agency
7:7 '
Abshington.D.0 20505
OCA 3785-89
October 30, 1989
Mr. Boyd Hollingsworth
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs, Senate
The White House ?
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. Hollingsworth:
I am enclosing for your information a copy of
a statement by Senators Hollings, Bradley, Danforth
and MUrkowski opposing the creation of a statutory
I.G. The statement has been added as an addendum
to the report of the Senate Intelligence Committee
on the fiscal year 1990 Intelligence Authorization
Bill.
Office of Congressional Affairs
Enclosure
Distribution:
OCA _Records
OCA/LEG Subject File
_
STAT
nprlaccified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/23: CIA-RDP92M00732R000400060002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/23: CIA-RDP92M00732R000400060002-6
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington.D. C 20505
Ms. Virginia A. Lampley
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director
Legislative Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
17th St. & Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506
Dear Ms. Lampley:
fA-1,4,4
OCA 3785-89h
October 30, 1989
I am enclosing for your information a copy of
a statement by Senators Hollings, Bradley, Danforth
and MUrkowski opposing the creation of a statutory
I.G. The statement has been added as an addendum
to the report of the Senate Intelligence Committee
on the fiscal year 1990 Intelligence Authorization
Bill.
Enclosure
Office of Congressional Affairs
Distribution:
OCA Records
OCA/LEG Subject File
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/23: CIA-RDP92M00732R000400060002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/23: CIA-RDP92M00732R000400060002-6
VIEWS OF SENATORS BRADLEY, DANFORTH, HOLLINGS, AND MURKOWSKI
We see no compelling need for or great value in a
statutory Inspector General (IG) at CIA, but we do see some real
risks and disadvantages. This legislation makes major
structural changes inside the CIA and would also change CIA's
relationship with Congress and the President. Yet the committee
held only one hearing on this issue, over a year ago, and that
hearing barely scratched the surface.
We remain unpersuaded that a statutory IG is appropriate
for the CIA simply because all other major executive agencies
have one. The CIA is not a typical line agency or department.
It deals with clandestine sources and foreign intelligence
services whose confidence is important. The DC/ must have clear
and sole control over dissemination of sensitive information.
A statutory IG represents a break with 42 years of
tradition in which only two positions at CIA have been appointed
by the President and subject to Senate confirmation, the
Director and Deputy Dircector of Central Intelligence. (In all
other executive branch agencies and departments, the IG is just
one of a sizable number of Presidential appointees.) A
Presidentially appointed IG at CIA would thus outrank all line
managers below the head of the agency and his principaI?aeputy,
including the Deputy Directors for Intelligence, Operations,
Administration, Science and Technology, and Planning and
Coordination.
We have a dim view of giving the CIA's Inspector General
more political status and bureaucratic clout than any of the
five Deputy Directors of CIA who are responsible for making the
agency work. It is bad management policy to elevate the
nay-sayers, inquisitors,.and evaluators -- i.e. management
inspectors, criminal investigators, and financial auditors
over the line managers. A statutory IG would inevitably mean
more bureaucracy, more regulation, more outside intervention,
when the real need is to make CIA more productive, more skilled
and more useful in confronting a variety of difficult national
challenges.
This action would set up a separate organization and
power base within the CIA, with a separate personnel structure,
separate lines of authority and communication. The result would
be the establishment of an "outsider" group within the CIA. For
this reason, DCI Webster has said that "the imposition of a
statutory Inspector General may actually prove to be
counterproductive to the effective inspection and investigation
process at CIA."
When Judge Webster became DCI, he initiated a series of
reforms to strengthen the role and functions of the office of
the CIA IG. Reforms are still underway, and DCI Webster has
pledged further improvements in training and staffing the IG's
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office. Last year, when the committee considered a statutory
IG, it endorsed the DCI's plan and deferred action on
legislation in order to give the DCI's initiatives time to take
effect. We believe the committee should continue to work with
DCI Webster in reforming the current CIA IG's office.
The committee's interest in this legislation is
purportedly due to its dissatisfaction with the performance of
the IG's office at CIA. Yet there has been no clear or
convincing diagnosis by this committee of a problem that can
only, or best, be solved by creating a statutory IG. The
committee has not conducted a review of the improvements to the
CIA IG under DCI Webster. Nor has the committee sought any
testimony from the current or previous Inspectors Generals in
the CIA concerning their performance or what is needed most to
improve it. Nor has the committee made recommendations about
how to further improve the IG, short of this legislation.
Indeed, the committee has only reviewed a tiny fraction of the
reports that the IG's office has produced since 1986. The
quality of work by the IG has been uneven, so far as we know,
but it seems to have improved significantly since Judge Webster
initiated reforms.
We therefore voted in opposition to the creation of a
statutory Inspector General at CIA.
- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/23 : CIA-RDP92M00732R000400060002-6