INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE, MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS VOL. 2

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 188
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 4, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Vol. 2
1r 3Ititifriftttrs t?itttir
Report of Proceedings
Hearing held before
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee
of the Committee on Armed Services
and
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences
INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE,
MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS
February 4, 1960
Washington, D. C.
WARD est PAUL
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
8-4266
18-4267
NATIONAL 8-4268
8-4269
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
A
BD CONTENTS
TESTIMONY OF: PAGE
General Mazwell D. Taylor
Former Army Chieg of Stafr
"
163
Ceneral Lyman L. Lemnitzex,
Amy Chief of Staff 252
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Cantor bdl
0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1_59
INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE,
MISSILES AND OTHER DEFLNSE PnOGRAMS
Thursday, Februarf 4, L950
'Ittd. StatG 3G,
Preparedness Investigating Waconnuli.:tee of the
Committeb on -.1:m,x] Sernnlcesz and
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,
Wash&rign'on, D. C.
The Committee and SUbcommittee me t3 pursuant to recess,
at 10:05 a.m., in Room 235, Old Senate Wfice BuildnIng,
Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (Chairman of the Committee and
Subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Preparedness Investigating Subcormittee:
Senators Johnson (Presiding), Stennis, and
Saltonstall.
Present: Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences:
Senators Johnson (Presiding), Stennis, Cannon,
Wiley, Martin, and Case (N.J.)
Also present: Senators Engle and Bush,
Edwin L. Weisl, Special Counsel Cyrus R. Vance,
Associate Counsel Kenneth E? BeLieu, Staff Director of
Space Committee and Preparedness Subcommittee.
Staff MeMbers, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:
Stuart French, Associate Counsel.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
160
bd2 Staff Members, Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences: Max Lehrer, Assistant Staff Director; Evezazd H.
Smith, Jr., Counsel; Dr. Olen P. Wilson, Chief Clerk; and
Dz. Earl W. Lindvelt, Assistant Chief Clerk.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
161
The Chairman. The Committee will come to order. Today
General Maxwell Taylor, former Chief of Staff of the Army,
now retired, will testify. He will be followed by General
Lyman L. Lemnitzer, current Chief of Staff of the Armycnow
retired, will testify. He will be followed by General Lyman
L. Lemnitzer, current Chief of Staff of the Army.
We in Congress have a very grave responsibility. The
Constitution provides that Congress has the power to provide
for the common defense and to raise and maintain military
forces and establish the rules and regulations for the govern-
ment thereof.
Congress can do this only if it gets timely and accurate
information on which to base its decisions.
each year Congress is requested to make decisions on the
military programs submitted. On these decisions, good or
bad, may well rest the fate of our Republic.
Congress must be candidly and fully advised by America's
senior military officials: else it cannot act wisely.
Testimony taken to date indicates many differences of
opinion among unquestionably patriotic and dedicated officials.
Our Committee hopes at least in part -- to be able to resolve
(:) some of these issues.
However, on one thing we all agree. It is this. The
(:) decisions we make now - this year - will cast America's future.
Upon these decisions will rest tomorrow's freedom of action.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd4
162
These decisions will not be taken lightly.
General Maxwell Taylor brings to the Committee a lifelong
background as one of the world's outstanding professional
soldiers. He most recently was Chief of Staff of the Army
and a Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He now appears
before the Committee as a private citizen, beloved by all who
know him and respected by the entire nation.
General Taylor, it is our custom to swear the witness.
Will you stand and be sworn, please?
Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, in the testimony you are about to
give, so help you God?
General Taylor. I do.
The Chairman. General Taylor, I want to personally thank
you for taking your time to come and appear before this
Committee. Normally it is our procedure to ask the counsel
to begin the questioning. However, if you have any remarks
or any prepared statement you would like to make and desire
to make it first, we will be glad to follow your recommendation.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
163
bd5 TprinnoNy or GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
(12) General Taylor. Thank you, M. Chairman.? I do have a
short prepared statement if it is agreeable that I read it.
The Chairman. Very well, proceed.
General Taylor. Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:
I appreciate the invitation to appear before this joint
committee and to express my personal views as a civilian on
our national military posture. To present these views I do not
intend to take the time of this committee with an elaborate
prepared statement.
Many of you have heard my testimony on previous appear-
ances as Chief of Staff of the Army, the position from which
(:) I retired on last June 30th. Perhaps some of you may have
read something of my writings on military strategy since my
retirement. In any case my views are of public knowledge and
I am prepared to answer for them. however to provide a basis
of departure for discussion, it may be useful to summarize the
principal points of my case as follows:
a. Important changes have occurred since 19459 and par-
ticularly since 1953, which require a complete reappraisal of
our national military policy. Such changes include the follow-
ing
(1) The placing of major reliance on weapons of massive
destruction has lost all justification in view of Soviet pro-
gress in atomic weapons and long-range missiles. It did not keep
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
164
bd6 the peace when we had a complete monopoly of atomic weapons.
It is obviously incapable of coping with the rising level of
CI) Communist provocation which is accompanying the rise in Soviet
military strength.
(2) Meanwhile the trend of relative military strength is
against us. Our manned bomber force is a dwindling asset.
Our long-range missile force is limited in size, uncertain in
reliability, and immobile upon exposed bases. We have no
anti-missile defense in being or in sight. There is no effec-
tive fall out protection for our civil population .
(3) The foregoing conditions indicate a decline in our
(.7) capability to deter deliberate general atomic war. This decline
has been accompanied by a continued neglect of the requirements
of limited or non-atomic war despite the increasing probability
of this form of challenge with the growth of Communist strength
and sell-confidence.
b. The required reappraisal of our policy which I mentioned
is made difficult by the inadequacy of our present strategy-
making machinery, notably the National Security Council, the
Department of Defense and the JCS organization. They should
be thoroughly overhauled with deliberation but unfortunately
(:) our present situation is urgent. It cannot wait upon complete
reorganization.
(:) c. We can take some immediate measures. We can improve our
readiness for limited war by better use of our existing resources.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
165
We can at least partially offset the missile gap by using
Jupiter as a mobile field weapon (as it was intended), by an
airborne alert for part of SAC, and by the initiation of a
simple fallout protection program for our civil population.
d. The long term measures are the more important ones
the rejection of a strategy of massive retaliation and the
adoption of one of flexible response; the determination of
how much is enough for al/ categories of operational functions;
the subsequent building of a small mobile and secure missile
force and a fully modernized Army and supporting services;
a revised structure for the military budget to show clearly
what it buys in terms of operational forces; and a new statement
of roles and missions to show then what we really mean by the
Army, Navy and Air Force.
For short and long term measures, there is need for decision
now. From about 1961 on the tide will begin to turn against
us -- unless we take heroic measures now. To change the
trend will require men; money and sacrifice. The alternative
is military inferiority and there is no living long with
Communism as an inferior.
The Chairman. In order to get the best organized presen-
tation possible, we have asked our distinguished counsel,
Mx. Weisl, to proceed with questioning for a period up to 45
minutes, and then each member of the committee will
ask any questions they desire during the 10 minute period
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
166
bd8 allotted to each member. I deeply appreciate your presence
and your statement,
Mr? Weisi. General Taylor in a publication issued
on January 19 you were quoted as follows:
"I believe now that America is facing a period of grave
potential danger. I have reached the reluctant but firm
conclusion that during the next few years the United States
will fall behind Russia as a world military power unless
heroic measures are taken now. We are falling behind the
Russians in our ability to wage all out hydrogen atomic war,
and in our ability to fight limited conflicts with conventional
arms."
(:) Is that quotation your view today?
General Taylor. It is, sir.
Mr. Weisl. General, we are constantly told that while
we may be behind the Soviets in certain areas such as the
number of ICBMs, the number of IRBMs, the modernization of
the ground forces, the number of submarines and so forth,
but then we are told that overall our forces are adequate.
Has the Department of Defense ever established on an
overall basis how much is needed to meet our commitments
(:) and to assure our security?
General Taylor. Before answering that, Mr. Weisl, I
(:) atould remind the committee that I retired on June 30. Since
that time I have been living largely out of the country.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd9
167
My knowledge of classified information ended when I ceased
to be an active officer, as it should. Consequently my res-
ponse will be largely if not exclusively based upon my know-
ledge and experience up to June 30.
Mr. Weis'. Very well.
General Taylor. I would say that we have had for a number
of years the unanswered problem of determining how much is
enough by category of force. By that I mean that we no longer
fight in terms or plan our. *warfare in terms of an Army, a
Navy and an Aix Force. Rather we think properly in terms of
certain functions to be performed.
For example, we must have obviously a strong atomic
deterrent force properly guarded against surprise attack. Those
forces are made up largely on the offensive side of the bombers
and missiles of the Navy and the Air Force.
They are defended by the interceptors of the Air Force
and the surface to air missiles of the Army. All of those
forces together constitute a single function, namely our
atomic deterrent capability.
In my judgment we should budget in terms of that force.
We have never determined first how big a force, how many
missiles, how many planes, how many bombs on target are really
necessary to set as a goal for these forces. And then further-
more as you know, we dont set up our defense budgets in such
terms. I have taken only one function as an example.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
168
bd10 The same comment would apply say to our antisubmarine
warfare forces, to what we call frequently our limited wax
forces, and so on. That is what I refer to as horizontal
planning and budgeting to determine how much is enough.
Mr. Weisl. Has any such plan ever been determined?
General Taylor. We have never set goals except in
the area of air defense, which could be considered means of
indicating how much is enough under what we are building.
Mr. Weisl. Have we ever developed any machinery to
match our commitments against our military capabilities?
General Taylor. NC, sir. I would say that I know of
no place in government where from time to time we tabulate our
(ID political commitments and ask ourselves the very pertinent
question, do we have the means to meet these commitments if
they fall due either singly or in combination.
When I was Chief of Staff, I had on my wall a chart,
a small table version of which I have in front of me, which
shows the United States military commitments around the world.
I think it is a chart that many of our leaders in
government should look at from time to time.
This chart shows that through our security pacts and our
bilateral arrangements we have military commitments of varyinej
forms to 45 different countries around the world. It is
a sobering reminder of what we might be called upon to meet.
I am reminded also that most of these commitments would
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
169
dll fall into what I call the limited war category, the area to
which we give the least of our military thought. That perhaps
only in the NATO area could we say that General Atomic War
is the primary danger. In the other areas we would be called
upon to meet initially at least a threat less than a general
war.
Nevertheless in its entirety it is a very impressive
list of requirements.
Mr. Weisl. Have we a plan to your knowledge or have we
had a plan since you were a member of the Joint Chiefs since
1955 to meet those commitments?
General Taylor. We don't do it from that point of view.
In other words, we don't take these commitments and add up
what they might require and take that as a point of departure.
Rather we tailor our forces to the means, largely the budgetary
means made availdble, and then by planning and doing the best
we can with what we have, we do formulate plans which could
meet these requirements, at least in a territorial sense.
Mr. eis1. In your opinion are these plans adequate?
General Taylor. Generally speaking they are as .good as
the means available can make them with one or two exceptions.
have never felt that we made all the necessary plans to form,
train and ship out limited war forces as rapidly as we
should.
This lack results from the absence of any headquarters,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
170
d12 any joint headquarters in the United States charged with
(:) readiness for limited war. I have said and many of my friends
do not agree with me that we should have a headquarters compar-
able to SAC, for example, with the same dedication to prepara-
tion for limited war as SAC does for general war.
Mr. Weisl. Do we have a plan to meet those commitments?
General Taylor. We have a plan to use our available-
resources if these commitments come due. Whether they are
adequate or not is very questionable. I don't think they are
adequate personally.
Mr. Weisl. Has the National Security Council or the
Department of Defense to your knowledge formulated a plan
to meet those commitments?
General Taylor. I would put it this way. The military
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is properly left to them to
formulate the military plans to meet contingencies. However,
there is no machinery in our government that I know of where
from time to time the Joint Chiefs are asked No suppose
commitment A, Y and Z fall due, what can you do about it"?
In other words, we don't consciously check on our capa-
bility.
Mr. Weisl. We have been told, General Taylor, that while
the Department of Defense and the various services have had
guidelines on expenditures, there really never was a ceiling
on the budget for expenditures. What is your view on that?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
171
Has there been a budget ceiling on defense expenditures?
General Taylor. I think that perhaps we are just playing
on words, Mx. Weisl. Certainly for practical purposes there
was a finite limit on what we could count upon, and each
year that amount was essentially the same.
often point out that the split between the services
was almost exactly the same for 4 years, 23% to the Army,
28% to the Navy, and 46% to the Air force, giving a suggestion
of a frozen pattern, which I don't think corresponded to the
changing world conditions.
Mr.Weisl. In your book which I understand was cleared
securitywise -- is that true?
General Taylor. No, that is not quite an accurate state-
ment. First I of course wrote this with a very close eye to
security. I think I have a qualified opinion on security based
upon my services as Chief of Staff. Then to check my judgment
I asked for the views of our intelligence people in the Army
with regard to security violations. I emphasize security as
opposed to policy, and the answer was they found
nothing which violated security. This was not a formal clear-
ance.
Mr. Weisl. In your book you state as follows and I quote:
The fact that there is a ceiling of around 40 billion
dollars on the defense budget is a reminder to each chief
that all military programs, however disparate in character,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
172
bd14 are in fact competitors for a fixed number of dollars.
(:)This consideration tends to color the attitude of indi-
vidual chiefs toward the program of sister services. It
(:) tends to make disinterested judgments more difficult than
would be the case if it were possible to form judgments without
such regard for fiscal consequences. The fixed defense budget
by accentuating the interservice struggle for funds has become
the prime cause of the service rivalry which is undermining
national confidence in our military programs."
Would you like to comment on that?
General Taylor. No I think unfortunately that that
statement is accurate. I am sure that each chief has always
(:) tried to sit in judgmenthmestly and dispassionately, but
know very well that we all think in terms of the effect on
the budget of decisions on new weapons, for example. I think
that explains to a degree why the Army and the Navy have
been very reluctant to support say Bomarc. I am equally
certain that that is one of the reasons why the Navy and the
Air Force have been reluctant to support Nike-Zeus, namely the
ultimate effect upon a fixed budget.
Mr. Weisl. In your judgment has the fixed ceiling on
(:) budget kept pace properly with changing world conditions?
General Taylor. Well, I would say, sir, without any
(:) analysis of our budget, that it is hard to believe that the
world has not changed in the last 4 or 5 years. Yet our
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd15
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
173
military budgets have been virtually the same within a
variation of one or two per cent in important items.
Mr. Weisl. Have you had an opportunity to discuss the
requirements of the military with the National Security Council?
General Taylor. each year there was a formal hearing on
the military budget before the National Security Council.
The various Chiefs and the Secretaries always made a rather
complete presentation of the problem and the Department
of Defense also showed what the budget carried with it. At
no time, however, was it ever looked at as I say horizontally
to determine really what operational forces would result from
this kind of budget?
Mr. Weisl. Please expand on that. Tell us about your
last meeting when you were chief of staff on the last budget.
You describe it in your book, I don?t want to take the time
to read it You tell the committee about it, when you meet
with the Security Council and what opportunity you had to
discuss the budget at that time.
General Taylor. I am afraid my memory now is a composite
of a number of meetings but there was never a great deal of
variation.
Usually the Department of Defense, the Comptroller, Mr.
McNeil, would present to the National SecurLty Council the
breakout of the defense budget really commenting on it in
auditor or comptroller-type language.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
174
bd16 Mr. Weisl. If I may be pardoned for interrupting you
I might read what you said in your book.
General Taylor. That would be betters sir. Then I will
be glad to answer any questions on the text.
Mr. Weisl. nOn December 3, 1958, the Joint Chiefs and
the Service Secretaries were invited to a stag dinner at the
White House. The guests of the President included Vice
President Nixon, Treasury Secretary Robert B. Anderson,
Budget Director Maurice Stens, Mr. Gordon Gray and
Devense Secretary Weil McElroy. We Chiefs had been given to
understand that the purpose of the meeting was to allow us
to discuss the problems of the new budget with the President.
However, it turned out to be quite otherwise. After an
excellent dinner in the main dining room, the President
led his guests to the Library for talk over coffee. We did
not take up budget specifics. Rather the conversation became
a discussion of general economic conditions, the problems
facing the Treasury, the need for greater team play onthe part
of the military chiefs in connection with the budget.
Secretary Anderson made a very able statement concerning the
importance of a balanced budget and a stable dollar. Several
officials exhorted the Chiefs to give greater weight to
economic factors and to assume joint responsibility for the
defense budget in the form in which it was about to go to
Congress, and after receiving something in the nature of a pep
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
/75
(:) bd17 talk, the Chiefs were allowed an opportunity to respond.
When my turn came,I didnot argue against the overall dollar
ceiling of the defense budget, but did express my opinion
that the planned use of funds therein would not get the most
defense for our money. It was the old case of a fixed
percentage division of the funds by services unchanged from
year to year.
"I repeated again the argument that the rapid technological
changes, the new weapons systems and the changing nature of
the Communist threat required a completely new appraisal
of our military requirements and the spending for them.
"No one took an open exception to these views, but
(:)
subsequent events showed that they had no effect. In the end
the 1960 budget followed the same pattern as the former ones."
Is that a correct statement of what took place?
General Taylor. Yes, sir. I think that was as I recall
when my memory was fresh the high points of this meeting.
It does focus ntte:atiOD on what to me is the most important
point of all, namely that we must take time out now to see
where we are going in national defense. I have ventured to make
a nuniber of suggestions on the directionit should go. Of
(:) course they are sincere opinions on my part. On the other
hand, no one man can suggest what really should be done.
(:) I am not sure of the merit of some of these individual
suggestions of mine, but I am sure of this onething. Now is
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
176
bd18 the time to reappraise our national strategy and not follow
the group pattern we have been following the past years.
Mr. Weisl. Now you stated that unless we take heroic
measures now, we will fall behind irretrievably, fall behind
the Russians in the future.
General Taylor. I am always impressed with the lead time
of defense budgets. Very few things can be done quickly.
The decisions we are taking this year, this year3s budget,
for example, will control the pattern and the capabilities
of our forces 2 3 or 4 years into the future.
In a sense, it mortgages the future. Hence I feel that
we must take these critical decisions now, even though the
crisis is not immediately on the doorstep perhaps.
Mr. Weisl. The critical decisions that are taken now
will affect the future one, two, three, or four years from
now, will they not?
General Taylor. Yes,sir.
Mr. Weisl. Will you please expand on that briefly?
General Taylor. Most of the decisions we are talking
ahout are either organizational in character or ffect the
equipment of our Armed Forces. Neither of these, either
organization or major heavy equipment can be changed quickly.
I think we are all aware of the time lag in such weapons
as missiles, as complicated aircraft. In the field of the
Army it takes time to constitute divisions, it takes time to
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
177
bd19 remodernize our forces. Consequently if we are going to change
our posture in the mid-term future, clearly we must make our
decisions and do something about it now.
Mr. Weisl. Our military plans depend to a large degree
upon our intelligence estimates, do they not?
General Taylor. Yes,sir.
Mr. Weld. Suppose we decide 6 months or a year from
now that we had underestimated Soviet capabilities or Soviet
intentions. Could we quickly change our military programs to
meet the revised estimates of the threat?
General Taylor. No. As I suggested in my previous
(:) answer, it would take time to do this, and every month that we
wait now is a month irretrievably lost in changing our posture.
Mr. Weisl. What is your concept of our deterrent force?
General Taylor. I am frequently struck, Mr. Weisl, with
the fact that we have confused our defensive thinking by using
certain general words in a limited meaning. For example,
you say our deterrent force. I suspect you refer to forces
designed to deter general atomic war. I would stress that
deterrence is a unit. It cannot be divided. In other words,
Owe must have forces which will deter both genera/ atomic
war and limited wars as well. Otherwise the uncontrolled
limited war may well grow into the great atomic war we are
all attempting to avoid.
You asked me what are our deterrent forces? I would
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
178
bd20 probably answer virtually all of our Armed Forces. In other
words, we have it divided generally into two groups, the
general war deterrent forces consisting of our strike
forces of SAC and of the Navy, and our defensive forces
representing air defense, and also a very important element,
our overseas deployments, largely Army forces. Now in the
deterrent forces for limited war, then we have again our over-
seas deployments plus those mobile reserves of the Army, Navy,
Marines and Air Force held here in the United States and
deployable to meet limited war situations.
Mr. Weisl. Are we at a serious disadvantage in intercont-
inental missile warfare under the present plans?
General Taylor. Again let me remind you, Mr. Weisi, that
I don't know what our figures are at the present time.
Mr. Weisl. As of June 30, 1959 when you retired.
General Taylor. I would say that we appeared to be facing
such an inferiority not necessarily from the point of view of
numbers. I tended in my own thinking to stress that numbers
in the missile business is far from the answer, far from
being the indicator of true strength. Numbers, of course, are
important, but equally important are question's of accuracy,
reliability and what I would call concealability. In other
words, lack of vulnerability to attack. I have always felt
(:) that we were handicapping ourselves by placing our reliance
on fixed missiles, because necessarily these bases, these
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd21
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
179
locations are known or will be known to the enemy, and
hence regardless of our numbers) we expose ourselves to needless
loss.
Mr. Weisl. In your book you state; General: and I quote:
"From what we know of the Soviet methods, we can count
upon their taking full advantage of concealment: dispersion
and mobility for their missiles. Under such conditions, it will
become impossible for our U. S. bombers and missiles to elimin-
ate the Soviet missile threat even by an anticipatory strike.
Thus a target system based upon attacking the Soviet missile
forces will offer little advantage during most of this time
frame. Our security against general atomic war can rest only
upon deterrence.
"There will be no purely military solotton capable of
eliminating the danger."
General Taylor. That was my opinion at the time and it
still is, sir.
Mx. Weisl. And it is still your opinion.
General Taylor. Yes: sir.
Mr. Weil. And you further state in your book: "As long
as the United States is dependent largely upon manned boeas,
the latter will be highly vulnerable to surprise strikes
upon the easily located airfields. A surprose attack by
ballistic missiles might well be followed by manned bombers:
possibly using low level attack techniques.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
180
bd22 "In such a disaster our civilian population would suffer
catastrophic losses, particularly from fall out for which
there has been no protection afforded on a nationwide scale."
Would you care to comment on that?
General Taylor. That is not a pleasant prospect, but I
think it is one we have to contemplate-.
Mr. Weisl. Have you recommended that precautions be
taken to prevent catastrophic destruction of our population?
General Taylor. In terms of civil defenses sir?
Mr. Weis].. Yes, sir.
General Taylor. We have considered various patterns of
civil defense, and my own position has been that we cannot
go overboard on this, simply because of the great expenses
involved and the need to apply most of our resources to offen-
sive or strictly military measures.
On the other hand, it becomes clearer and clearer to me
that some form of fallout protection is in fact a part of
our deterrent posture.
In other words, the evidence that our civilian population
is not completely vulnerable does have a deterrent effect, and
hence should be included in our military measures.
Mr. Weisl. In your book you further make the
following statement:
"I have been slow to accept the reality and the significance
of the so-called missile gap. Reluctantly I have concluded there
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
131
(:) bd23 is indeed such a gap which, in combination with other factors
which will be mentioned, has a most significant bearing upon
(:) our military security."
Do you still stick to that statement?
General Taylor. I would say that I was reluctant to
accept this fact of the existence of a missile gap because
instinctively based upon my military experience I think there
is always a tendency to build the other fellow up too big.
In other words, the intelligence frequently frightens the
commander, and I have tried to develop a resistance to
that possible danger.
(:) However, in view of the accepted figures on numbers
and the Obvious fact of concealment on the part of the Soviet
missile system, and the fact that our retaliatory force was
not being concealed or dispersed led me to conclude there
is a gap in the sense not just of nunbers but in the quality
of the opposing forces.
Mr. Weisl. The following statement was made to the House
Appropriations Committee last month, and I quote:
"Heretofore we have been giving you intelligence figures
that dealt with the theoretical Soviet capability. This is
(:) the first tile that we have an intelligence estimate that
says "This is what the Soviet Union probably will don.
(:) Therefore, the great divergence based on figures that
have been testified to in years vast narrows because we talked
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
182
bd24 about a different set of comparisons, ones that were based
on Soviet capability. This present one is an intelligence
estimate on what we believe he probably will do, not what he
is capable of doing."
Do you think as a military commander, meMber of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff based on your long experience, that that
is a sound way of measuring intelligence?
General Taylor. / am not unaware that this issue
has come up, Mr. Weisl, although / have not had access to the
facts and figures and hence cannot take a knowledgable position
on this issue. I will, if the chairman will excuse a rather
facetious story, say how it struck me when I read this in the
paper.
I was reminded of the absent-minded professor who went
into his class in June and passed out the examination papers.
Well, the children took a look at the questions and all let
out a guffaw. They said "Professor, these are the same
questions you asked last January." The professor somewhat
perturbed, however, caught his breath and said "Ah, but
children, this time the questions are the same but the answers
are different."
No, I must say I was raised in the school that was taughi;
to estimate enemy capability. Then as facts became available
narrow the field of capabilities in light of the intelligence
available.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
cbc125
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
183
Mr. Weisl. The conclusion reached from your book in the
area that I will now mention appears as follows, and you can
correct me if my statement is not proper:
"The weakness in the Joint Chiefs of Staff system
have left the planning of our military strategy to civilian
amateurs and the budget makers."
Wouldyou care to comment on that?
General Taylor. That is a compressed statement which
really I should comment on at length but I don't want to
take too much time of the committee.
I do think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff system,
and I share responsibility for its failure, by not reaching
clearcut military decisions or recommendations in many fields
have abdicated their authority. I have sympathized with
the Secretary of Defense in facing some of these very tough
issues with split military advice. '
Inevitably somebody has to decide these things. The
absence of a military decision is in itself a positive act
because it impels someone less qualified perhaps to take
the decision. It is to that situation which I alluded in that
particular reference.
Mr. Weisl. In your experience as a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, how many split decisions have there been on
vital issues?
General Taylor. 23 is the figure which I quote in the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
184
book which came from my own bookkeeping of the results of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff most of the time while I was a
member. I believe that went up to March of last year.
Mr. Weisl. There were 23 split decisions. And in those
split decisions did the Chairman usually decide with the
service that he came from?
General Taylor. I think the record shows that, in the
majority of the cases that he sided with, he was on the same
side of the issue as the service he was from .
Mr. Weisl. For instance you pointed out that the Army
was supported 3 times and rejected 20 times, the Navy was
suwoorted 13 times and rejected 10 times, the Marine Corps,
(:) which participated in only 11 splits, was supported 4 times
and rejected 7 times. The Aix Force, however, was supported
17 times and rejected 6 times.
The Chairman participated in only 21 splits. He supported
18, rejected 3, is that a correct estimate?
General Taylor. That is the tabulation which I kept,
yes.
Mr. Weisl. What would you do to change this system?
General Taylor. I debated long and hard I can assure
you, on that kind of organization might improve. One is
never sure When there is dissatisfaction with a given situation
how much depends upon organization and howmuch upon personali-
ties.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
185
(:) bd27 For example, the Joint Chiefs may be doing much better
for all I know since they changed the Army Chief of Staff.
(:) However, my conclusion was that no committee regardless of
membership, of personality, would cope with the problems being
thrown at the Joint Chiefs.
Committees can do certain things well as this committee can,
but on the other hand in the military business certain things
have to be decided by one man with complete responsibility.
Hence my conclusion was to divide the functions of the Joint
Chiefs, leaving with a committee those things which a committee
of wise experienced officers can cope with, and setting up
Ca defense chief of staff for those functions now performed by
the Joint Chiefs which were operational in nature.
In other words: we would split more or less down the mid-
dle the present functions, giving part to one man, a defense
chief of staff, and the others to a council which I call for
want of a better name, the Supreme Military Council of Officers,
four-star in grade, who aze either on their last
assignment or. are retired officers. They would be the advisory
group to whom the Secretary of Defense would turn for policy
advice, long range matters, comments on the budget in its
broad senses, whereas the single chief of staff, the defense
chief of staff would sit day by day,hour by hour with the Joint
Staff prepared to conduct military operations any place around
the world, and being a primary source of military requirements.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd28
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
186
In other words, he would be checking what these commit-
ments that I have just referred to mean in military terms,
and he would generate then the basic data for the initial
military budget.
Mx. Weisl. Your book states or I draw the conclusion,
and / asked you this before but I think it is important
to be, expanded a little bit, that the weakness has left the
planning of our military strategy to civilian amateurs and
the budget makers. That is a dangerous situation, isn't it?
General Taylor. It certainly is an undesirable one, but
again it results from the fact that the budget has to be made.
There is a certain date when it has to be at the printers.
Hence those decisions which have not been thought through
on military grounds have to be filled in by someone, usually
unqualified in military matters.
Mr. Weisl. Do I understand correctly your conclusion
or your opinion? We have 48 or 46 commitments around the world,
is that right?
General Taylor. There are 48 countries with whom we
have.
Mx. Weisl. 43 countries to whom we have military commit-
ments.
General Taylor. Yes.
Mr. Weisl. In one form or another anund the world. And
that we have no plan, no overall plan, to meet those commitments
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
0 bd29
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
187
if called upon to meet them. Do I understand that correctly?
General Taylor. I would phrase it differently, saying
that we do not establish the possible military requirements
to meet these commitments, and build our forces consciously with
the idea of these, that these commitments may fall due. I
would stress we do have plans to use those forces which we
have available today to the best of our ability if these
various contingencies occur. The contingencies however were
not considered in building up the forces.
Mr. Weisl. In other words, in building up your forces we
didn't consider the contingency of being called upon to meet
these commitments, is that correct?
General Taylor. We didn't start from requirements to
build our forces, no.
Mr. Weisl. We did not start from requirements?
General Taylor. No, sir.
Mr. Weisl. Isn't that a perilous situation, shouldn't
the United States be in a position when it makes a military
commitment to build up the requirements to meet those commit-
ments?
General Taylor. Certainly we should take time out from
time to time and see how our capabilities pair up against
the requirements or commitments. I don't suggest, I think
it would be unfeasible, to have enough forces in being to
meet every commitment assuming they occur all at the same time.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
188
bd30 Mr. Weisl. I understand that, but have we taken the
time out to see whether we have the requirements to meet
one or more of these commitments.
Genera/ Taylor. Not in a broad governmental sense,
no, sir.
Mr. Weisl. In your opinion have we done it properly
or adequately?
General Taylor. No, sir, I do not think so.
Mx. Weisl. How are we going to meet those commitments
if we haven't the machinery to have the requirements in time
to meet one or more of these commitments?
General Taylor. Well, I have suggested in some of my
writing that we do exactly what you propose, namely that the
defense chief of staff be charged with consciously matching
capabilities against requirements, and using that as the
point of departure for annually reviewing of our forces.
Mr. Weis].. And you have never been charged, the Chiefs
of staff have never been charged with that duty?
General Taylor. Not in the language which I use. I
wouldn't suggest for a moment, Mr. Weisl,, that the Joint
Chiefs don't think about it and talk about these things.
Mr. Wisl. I know you think and talk about it, but the
question is have you planned the requirements to meet those
commitments?
General Taylor. W have not built our forces specifically
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
189
(:) b431 to meet the requirements.
Mr. Weisl. Will you discuss our limited war capability
(2) briefly, General? We talk about an atomic and a nuclear war,
but the enemy may decide not to engage in that kind of a war,
to engage in a limited war or a nibbling war. Will you dis-
cuss whether we meet the requirements or plan the requirements
for those kinds of wars?
General Taylor. As you know, Mx. Weis', probably, I run
into a question which / cant answer, namely assuming that we
attain our present objective, and have such nuclear strength
so that the possibility of that kind of war is ruled out:
what then happens if a possible enemy decides that without
starting a nuclear war, he will wage conventional war, and
at an increasing scale.
At some point he is going to be able to fight a bigger
limited war than we can, and we have to back away and let him
win by default.
In other words, I have a strong feeling that we have
been perhaps fascinated by the horrors and terrible
possibilities of general nuclear war, and forgetting the fact
we can well lose our country and our stake in the world
by nibbling aggression increasing in size as the relative,
as the improbability of a deliberate nuclear war becomes
more and more remote.
Consequently it has seemed to me that we should look
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
190
632 at our limited war forces, which fortunately are also used
(:) in general war, and verify that they are modern in their
equipment, that they are mobile, that they are trained and
that we have rapidity of reaction, something which our present
organization does not provide.
So that I feel that a very definite gap exists,
first in the use of the forces which we now have available
for limited war, and secondly I question their adequacy when
I look at these 48 commitments around the world.
Mr. Weisl. We have had testimony from you and from other
capable and patriotic military men to the effect that the
Russian Army not only has a greater number of divisions
but that it has modernized its forces twice since World
War /I, that it has mechanized its forces, that it has
mobile forces, that their guns and their artiller and
their rockets outrank and outgun us, and that despite your
constant pleas year after year, year after year for the
modernization and the mobility and the mechanization of our
Army, such requirements have not been met.
Do you still stand on that or have I stated it not
adequately enough?
General Taylor. No, I would agree essentially with
what you say. Last year and the year before I urged that
C.) we embark upon a modernization program for our Army. I
stressedalso that there shouldbe a comparable modernization
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
191
(:) bd33 for the Air Force and the Navy and the Marines in order to
improve our readiness largely for limited war.
(:) In the case of the Army that would have called for
a five year program of about $3 billion a year for moderniza-
tion purposes. Actually we got less money last year for modern-
ization than that required simply to replace wear out and
obsolescence.
Mr. Weisl. I think too my time is about up I am told --
as a final question, / believe you have testified that instead
of finding out what we need for our overall defense posture,
we figure it out on the basis of how much does the Army get,
(:) what slice of the pie does the Navy get, what slice of the
pie does the Air Force get, but there is no overall planning
as to functions of all of these departments?
General Taylor. That is corrects sir.
Mr. Weisl. Will you explain it a little better than I
can?
General Taylor. We never look at our force, we never build
our forces or buy our forces in a budget sense in terms of
military function. Atomic retaliation, limited war capability,
antisubmarine warfare, continental air defense. We don't
case our books in that form. So as a result, I never do,
and I doUbt personally that anyone knew exactly what we are
buying with our budget.
Mr. Weisl. Then how can we constantly speak of this
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
192
bd34 overall adequacy when we have no overall consideration under
the budget?
General Taylor. That would be I would say an opinion
which only the Secretary of Defense could have who had
listened to all the 3 budgets in detail, and perhaps
himself had made the kind of estimate.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were neverlh the budget
making business in this sense. Hence the best we could do
would be to form a personal idea of what might be accomplished,
without having really an expert tri-service appraisal of
our military function.
Mr. weisl. Mr. Chairman, may we put General Taylor's
chart of our commitments, military commitments around the
world, in the record?
The Chairman. Without objection the chart will be
included.
Mile chart referred to follows:)
COMMITTEE INSERT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
193
bd35 Mr. Weisl. My time is up: Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Weisl.
I want to commend the members of the committee for
concluding his questions without interruption.
I think that all of us will elicit more information if
we follow an agreed upon procedure. Each member will have
not to exceed 10 minutes, and I hope that they can conclude
their questioning in less time, and I assure each member that we
will go around a second time if that maybe desirable.
General Taylor, as' / staved earlier, each year Congress
is called upon to make very important decisions affecting
our security. We cannot make these decisions unless we are
candidly and fully advised by the people in whom we have
great confidence. It was just a few years ago I remember
when we called upon General Eisenhower, who was then in retire-
ment.
He was one of those Generals that we asked to come back
and counsel with us when we were confronted with a recommen-
dation of the Secretary of Defense and Congress was concerned
about whether that recommendation was adequate or not.
/ remember upon that occasion Gener?1 Eisenhower 6s
testimony. This committee has great confidence in you and
you have a record of public service of which all Americans
are proud. We want to make it clear to the committee and to
the country that you come here today at our invitation in an
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
194
cjad36 attempt to serve the country through the Congress. I have
two or three very brief questions I want to ask you, General
oTaylor.
Do you have any doubts in your mind as to the intentions
of the Soviet Union toward the United States?
General Taylor. In terms of specific actions, yes, sir.
I don't know their intentions.
The Chairman. Do you have the feeling that we can afford
to let down our preparedness guard in the thought that perhaps
if they want to colonize us, they much prefer to colonize a
going concern rather than one they have destroyed, and there-
(2) fore we must be more concerned with economic warfare
than military preparedness.
General Taylor. No, sir.
I think our safety must be assured across the board.
The Chairman. Last year, General, you joined the other
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in signing a statement
which you will remember was presented to this committee, and I
should like to quote it. It says: "The Joint Chiefs of
Staff consider that the fiscal year 1960 proposed expenditure
figure of $40,945,000,000 is adequate to provide for the
C.) essential programs necessary for the defense of the nation
O for the period under consideration. They find no serious gaps
in the key elements of the budget in its present form, but
all have reservations with respect to the funding of some
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
195
bd37 segments of their respective programs."
Now later in testifying before this committee, General,
you listed the specific reservations you had to the budget.
I wonder since you listed those specific reservations that
you had on the budget before the committee if you ever had
ample opportunity to discuss with the President himself your
specific reservations to your specific budget.
General Taylor. I would say that before the National
Security Council in the annual review of the budget, I did
have ample opportunity to express my views on the military
budget, particularly the Army's part of it. It wasnot done
in specifically the format which responded to your request,
you will recall.
The Chairman. But that was done before the budget was
submitted to the Congress and you had opportunity to present
that to the council ad the President had opportunity to hear you
and to exchange viewpoints?
General Taylor. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Counsel refers me to page 73 of your
book in which you state: "Although this document supports the
Secretary of Defense it had been classified confidential by
the Chiefs and came to Congress, where it soon became a public
document. This boomeranged because a close reading of the
paper showed the Chiefs had not supported the '60 budget
at all but had stated in effect that the overall expenditure
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
/96
(:) bd38 figure could be adequate provided the funds were used pretty
much as they individually thought appropriate.
(2) Conceding only that nothing of importance had been
entirely overlooked in the budget they indicated reservations
about the adequacy of certain programs which being unspecified
in the memorandum soon became the subject of Congressional
query as to their size and as to their nature."
Earlier today, General, you said "The required reappraisal
of our policy is made difficult by the inadequacy of our
present strategic making machinery, notably the National
Security Council, the Department of Defense and the JCS
organization.
"They should be thoroughly overhauled with deliberation
but unfortunately our present situation is urgent. It cannot
wait upon complete organization."
How do you believe, General, each of these three organiza-
tions you mentioned, the Security Council, the Department of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be changed?
General Taylor. I would refer rather to the change of
the product with regard to the National Security Council. I
make the point in my writing that never was the guidance given
the Department of Defense in such specific terms that the
Chiefs really knew the kind of forces and the kind of military
preparedness the country, the Council really wanted. There was
a tendenc
YP inevitable perhaps in the kind of body such as the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
197
bd39 NSC is, to reach compromises in language, since paragraph
after paragraph of the guidance resulted from committee
work in which several departments were represented.
As a result, the Chiefs received a document which had para-
graphs which seemed to support my point of view, for example,
namely a strategy of flexible response and rejection of
massive retaliation.
Yet others could find paragraphs which seemed to refute
that. So a need for a precise guidance so that the Chiefs
really know what kind of forces the executive branch expects
them to provide is step number one.
Step number two is within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where
my suggestion is that the committee system can never solve
many of the problems now facing the Chiefs.
By dividing into a committee of men separated from the
service I think the broad term policy guidance could be
achieved. I think the kind of rapid decision implicit in
operational matters and affairs related to operations would
be met then by a single Chief of Staff. Finally I go back
again to the question of the budget within the Department of
Defense. Until the Joint Chiefs set goals which are approved
by the Secretary of Defense for the size of our functional
forces, we will never know exactly what we are buying. So it
is really those 3 points, sharpened guidance from the NSC,
a revision of the JCS system and a new kind of budgeting
would sum up my suggestions.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
(Dbd40
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
198
The Chairman. Have you read the legislation recently
introduced by Senator Symington calling for a single Chief of
Staff?
General Taylor. Only the newspaper accounts, sir.
The Chairman. Would you care to give your comments in
connection with your impression of the newspaper accounts?
General Taylor. No, sir. I would have to study that.
I believe that Senator Symington would really simply make
the present chairman a single chief; and retain the other
chiefs as a part of a JCS organization. / would think
that would retain some of the objectionable features of the
present system. I would prefer to have this council entirely
apart from the services to be the advisory elder statesmen
group assisting the Secretary of Defense.
must say I have answered you tentatively because I have
not studied the proposal.
The Chairman. General; when the 1960 budget was before
the National Security Council, did you just merely make a formal
presentation or did you have an opportunity to fully discuss
it, debate it and exchange viewpoints about it?
General Taylor. The services had an ample opportunity,
both the Secretary and the Chief of Staff, to read or give to
the Council anything that it wanted to say. However, the
defense budget is such a large and intricate affair that
these is very little discussion possible before a large committee
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
199
like the NSC. I think that is inherent in the nature of
a large gathering of this sort. I would say that the member
who came to the table without any background would have only
a very general impression of what the budget meant.
The Chairman. In addition to that opportunity, do you
believe that any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that had
serious reservations about his budget and felt that the secur-
ity of his country is involved would have ths slightest hesita-
tion to ask the President for an opportunity to review it
in some detail with him?
Genera/ Taylor. No, sir. The President always emphasized
the point that any chief who really had something on his desk
should come and talk to him.
The Chairman. so then really we can understand that the
military he of each service had adequate and ample
opportunity to present his views not only to the Council
but to the President individually if he so desired?
General Taylor. Yes, six.
The Chairman. And you have no doubt if they felt it
serious enough, that they would have had the courage to
ask for an appointment to carry through on it.
Genera/ Taylor. That is true, sir, unless as I felt
last year that the President by presentations to him understood
fully What the budget was.
Senator Bush. Will the Senator yield for one question
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
200
bd42 right in line of his thinking on this?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Bush. Under your conception of the Defense
Chief of Staff, General, you believe that in this way we
would point up what our requirements are sharper under that
type of system. But do you also think that it would result
in savings through the elimination of items that get through
under the present system?
In other words, would the defense chief of staff not
only be able to get some of the necessary things done
that you have pointed up so well, but also be able to cut out
some things and effect economies that it is very difficult
to do under thepresent system of divided authority?
General Taylor. I would certainly hope, Senator, that this
'Laing a better organization, we mould do all of our business in
a more efficient way. It would imply, however, the change
in budgeting, budget making also. Without that, many of the
fiscal advantages I am afraidwould be lost.
Senator Bush. But the budgetary revision would be implicit
inyour plan of a defense chief, would it not?
General Taylor. Not necessarily. The way I propose it,
yes, it is one of the 3 steps which I mould suggest as being
required, and all 3 together in a package.
Senator Bush. I see.
The Chairman. Now concluding, General, do you really think
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
201
bd43 that your presentation before the Security Council, accurately
describing it, is a full and adequate presentation of your
views and exchange of ideas between you and the members of the
(:) council instead of just a rather formal presentation?
General Taylor. Yes, sir, it was adequate.
The Chairman. General, our other officials admit that
the Soviets will have a decided superiority in ballistic
missiles during the next few years. Do you know whether the
Russians are working on an antiballistic missile system?
General Taylor. No, I do not.
The Chairman. What do you think would happen if the Soviets
now having an edge in ballistic missiles that they also have
an antiballistic missile system. Could they use this
system to practice atomic blackmail on us?
General Taylor. Yes, sir, anyone who gets an effective
missile defense, the side that gets it first certainly has
a very definite advantage both in a military and in a
psychological sense.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Bridges, Mr.
Saltonstall, Mrs. Smith, Mx. Wiley.
Senator Wiley. Yes, I have some questions. Under
paragraph one, you say "The placing of major reliance on
weapons of massive destruction has lost all justification in
view of Soviet progress in atomic weapons and long-range
missiles. It did not keep the peace when we had a complete
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
202
Cd44 monopoly of atomic weapons. It is obviously incapable of
swing with the rising level of Communist provocation which is
accompanying the rise in Soviet military strength."
I presume that from that paragraph you feel that there is
really no deterrence then?
General Taylor. I was making this point: That no matter
how much strength we have in the atomic retaliatory field,
we have never and probably never will be able to keep the
small peace.
We have had 18 limited wars more or less since 1945.
Most of that time or a good part of the time we were the only
nation that had atomic weapons, which is to me a pretty
(2)
good indication that that kind of strength does only one
thing.
It offsets retaliatory strength in kind on the other sideo
but does not assist in the limited war area.
Senator Wiley, From your language in paragraph 3 you
speak of the decline accompanied by continued neglect of the
requirements of limited or nonatomic war despite the increasing
probability of this form of challenge with the growth of
Communist strength and self-confidence."
Now my question is this: Do you think there is now any
evidence, not simply from the military but from every angle,
any evidence that Russia would be so foolish as to let the
balloon go up and get into a struggle which would mean the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
203
bd45 destruction of not only the contending parties but maybe
the race?
General Taylor. I have always said, sir, that I felt
that deliberately initiated general atomic war was highly
improbable. On the other hand o we certainly must maintain
our retaliatory capability to be sure that improbability
never disappears. But I am just as certain that the Soviets
are not going to give up provocative and aggressive measures
supported by military action short of general war.
Senator Wiley. Now in reply to Senator Johnson in speaking
about the overhaul, I got the impression speaking about the
overall, I got the impression that in the overall that you out-
lined that there should be one man in making the decision, the
Anal decision, is that right?
General Taylor. No, except inthis sense. The man to make
the final decision is the President or the Secretary of Defense.
Under our civilian control of the military, in which I
believe absolutely, inevitably a civilian at some point must
decide military subjects. The defense chief of staff to whom
I refer would be nothing but a chief of staff.
In other words, he would have no command powers, but would
report directly to the Secretary of Defense and perform the
functions normally implicit in the term of the Chief of Staff.
Senator Wiley. I was interested in the figures. Did I
get the right percentage, 23, 28 and 46% which you said was the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
obd46
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
204
pattern that has remained more or less static now for
years?
General Taylor. Yes, the balance going to the Secretary of
Defense.
Senator Wiley. In other words, the Navy was 23?
General Taylor. Army 23, navy 28, Air Force 46.
Senator Wiley. Now is it my understanding that you
feel that the change from the old style of war which you knew
as a boy to the war possibilities now under missiles and
atomic bombs and so forth has made some of the services subor-
dinate to what they were before?
General Taylor. No, sir.
Senator Wiley. What is your position?
General Taylor. My position is that the situation in the
world in the last four or five years is obviously changed.
The military requirements have obviously changed. Yet our
budget pattern shows no reflection of that fact. But even
if one doesn't agree with the changes which I have suggested
are necessary, I think it is very difficult to resist the
argument that some change has been necessary.
Senator Wiley. Of course you are speaking in your next
paragraph that we can take some measures. Now let's get at
that.
In other words, you suggest that what we should do by off-
setting the missile gap, using Jupiter as a mobile field weapon.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
205
bd47 I would like to know a little more about that.
General Taylor. / really suggest about four things,
which do not require much time. Most of the really important
measures will take several years to do.
One thing we could do is to use our limited war forces
which we have better.
We can organize them better. We can train them and
equip them better. That will not take much time. The next
is the Jupiter missile which was designed as a 1500 mile
mobile field missile. It has since had that feature removed
from it, but it still remains probably the most tested missile of
any range which we have.
/ consider that it could be used as a stopgap until we
get better intercontinental missiles. The other two measures
I suggest are better protection for SAC, which I think we
all agree is important, and also some form of fallout protec-
tion.
Senator Wiley. Tell me a little more about this Jupiter.
Where would you use them, in connection with any of our allies
or any of our bases, or on submarines or on airplanes?
Where would the missile be used?
General Taylor. I would first look to those places under
the American flag such as Alaska, let's say, or Okinawa.
Then I would talk to our allies who will accept the missile
which is not fixed. The fact of being fixed makes the missile
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
206
(:) bd48 very unattractive because it is bound to draw fire in time of
war.
C.) Without mentioning names in a public hearing, I think a
number of our allies of the rugged type I would say would be
quite happy to take a mobile field missile.
Senator Wiley. I got the impression in a general sense
that you felt that we should spend some more money to get more
fight, so to speak. In other words, we have got to tighten
our belts, is that your idea?
General Taylor. Yes, sir.
Senator Wiley. Now let's go into that, because I think
(2) that is very important. I think that if we are going to
tighten our belts, America should understand that we can't be
voting money over here on matters that are of secondary
consideration when it is a question you think of the very
safety of America, is that right?
General Taylor. Yes, sir.
Senator Wiley. How much do you think we should put into the
budget?
General Taylor. Thatis very hard to estimate, Senator,
just off the top of my head.
(:)
In my book I say I suspect we are talking in terms of
(:) a budget of 50 to 55 billion for the next five years. No one
could really know until all the services go into this thorough-
ly and do the kind of job required of it every year with a
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
207
military budget.
Senator Wiley. You say among other things that the long
term measures are the important ones: and that the rejection
of a strategy of massive retaliation and the adoption of
one of flexible response in determination of how much is
enough for all the categories of operational functions, the
subsequent building of a small mobile - I don(lt know who
is keeping time here but it seems to me that you are trying
to cheat me of a couple of minutes.
The Chairman. Senator: we will give you a couple of extra
minutes.
senator Wiley. You are so kind. That smile got me this
time too.
The subsequent building of a small mobile and secure
missile force and a fully modernized Army and supporting ser-
vices, a revised structure for the military budget to show
clearly what it buys in terms of operational forces, and
a new statement of roles and missions to show what we
really mean by Army, Navy and Air Force.
Now there is a statement that I would like to have you
really go into and let us know, because now at long
last someone is telling the Army, Navy and Air Force the
things that they should know, that America should know.
If there is waste, we want to find that out. If there can be
savings we want to find that out. If We can better them as
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
208
(:) bd50 an arm of defense, we want to find that out. Now you tell
us how?
(r.) General Taylor. Senator, I wrote a book on the subject
that sold for $4 at any book stand.
Senator Bush. The Congressional Library has it.
General Taylor. I heard the Senator's question. He wanted
to learn. Now what is your reply?
The Chairman. . I am really at a loss as to where
to begin in my reply.
The Chairman. I mean we didn't hear your reply there,
something about your book. What was it?
(2) General Taylor. I just facetiously, I hope the Senator
will excuse me, pointed out I have written a book on the sub-
ject that sells for $4 at any book stand.
Senator Wiley. Will you loan me the $4 and I will buy it
right now.
(Laughter.)
The Chairman. May I say to the meMbers of the committee that
may care to read it that the book is available, that committee
counsel has a copy. Go ahead.
Senator Wiley. How about my credit, is it any good?
General Taylor. Which one of these points shall I take
up first, Senator?
Senator Wiley. Well, if you will go to page 2, sub-
section D, "Long term measures are more important" and 30
C
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
209
bd51 forth, "rejection of the strategy of massive retaliation" and
so forth.
What 1 am getting at is that we need a bill of particulars.
Generals don't mean anything. What we need is a bill of
particulars so that the various branches of the Armed Forces
will know what your judgment is and we know, because I per-
sonally am much impressed with what you said and I feel it is
important that we get the benefit of your long-range judgment.
General Taylor. 1 will answer briefly then one by one or
comment upon these phrases which I have used in this paragraph.
My overall thought is that we have relied on massive retalia-
tion as really the cornerstone of our military strategy since
19450 but with the growth of the Soviet atomic and missile
power, that no longer has any meaning other than to offset
the weapons in kind of the Soviet Union.
That if we are really going to deter ware we must
think also of deterrence across the board, so that we are
just as able and competent to cope with challenges short of
general war as we axe with general war itself.
Senator Wiley. You used the words "Heroic phrases", that
is what I am getting at.
Mx. Weisl. Heroic measures.
Senator Wiley. Heroic measures?
General Tay/or. That, Senator, I used that phrase to
emphasize my feeling of urgency, that we should get going now.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
210
bd52 We should do these immediate measures which I tabulate
mder paragraph (c) above and get on with the business of
moving down the line in accordance with the suggestions of
paragraph (4).
They are heroic in the sense that we can't do business as
we have been doing it in the past.
A definite change has to be made in our thinking and
in our procedures.
Senator Wiley. I think that is all.
The Chairman. Senator, you consumed 3 additional minutes.
Senator Stennis, you are recognized for /0 minutes.
Senator Stennis. General Taylor, something that / have
been impressed with, I am glad you are pointing out that we
have these commitments to 48 different nations, and I know
with a great many of them we can hardly expect any reasonable
appreciable assistance from them .
But as to some of them, and particularly those that are
getting back on their feet, that are already back on their
feet, what isyour judgment as to whether or not they should
not be called on now for greater support in men or in
money, materiel? Give us your thought on that. There is not
time to go into detail.
General Taylor. Certainly we cannot achieve our objectives
in this world without our friends, without our allies. In the
military field: it is improper and shortsighted to talk only
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd53
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
211
in terms of our U. S. assets. Many of these countries which
you know well, Senator, do make a material contribution to our
overall military strength, others for various reasons a lesser
one.
I would say our general strategy must be predicated upon
the continued existence of strong friends, and by that token--
Senator Stennis. I take that as a start, but what could
be done toward getting down to something more along the
lines of weapons coordination?
I know that the Army did quite a bit as I recall with
say the rifle, just the ordinary rifle, interchange of
weapons, interchange of parts, a common denominator for
ammunition?
General Taylor. Tbs.
Senator Stennis. Now what could be done along that line
in missiles, say, ground to ground missiles? I understand
that we are supporting 32 different types and kinds of
missile programs.
General Taylor. We ought to simplify it as you suggest,
as we know what the lame ducks area we should scratch them off
the list. There is a constant purifying process to which
our missile program should be submitted a and I also endorse
your suggestion, your implied suggestion, that insofar as
possible, we ought to standardize with our allies on weapons.
We all concede the principle, but practically as you
know it has been quite difficult to carry out.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
212
bd54 Senator Stennis. In carrying that on further, I find
that there is very little mutual activity or coordinated
activity in the field of basic research with our allies
that are capable of carrying on such work, highly capable.
In skills and techniques they exceed us in many respects.
From what little investigation I have made, there is practically
no coordinated activity or sharing of talent or sharing of
money costs or materiel.
Perhaps this is altogether out of your field, but do you
know of any practical suggestion that could be made along that
line?
General Taylor. No. I agree certainly again with
your principle. I am not an expert in the field. You can get
a much better witness than I am on this subject.
Senator Stennis. It seems to me that so much more could
be done than is being done with reference to some basic
planning for cooperation. It is well 'Co say we must have
allies, we must support them and we must stand together.
But I think this is a long range proposition and we have
got to plan for 50 years or more. Many of these nations
cannot share this cost, responsibility, but many can, do you
know of any suggestion? I hardly know where to turn for some
one that could make practical suggestions along this line?
General Taylor. I am afraid I don't have anything. As
you know, the services, many of them, do have overseas research
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
213
b455 and development offices which are supposed to be in contact
with the best minds of our allies.
Senator Stennis. On the Armed Services Committee we have
these many different missile programs that come before us for
approval of funds. I get it in military construction.
We have to set up different factories, and then when they get
to the next stage we have to set up different kinds of shops
to prepare all these missiles, and that calls for living
quarters and all for the men and support of various kinds,
and each of the services have an appreciable amount of their
money going in for those separate respective programs. Then
some of them are marked down and they have to be and should
be when they &w et come through. Is there any way that that
could be coordinated, and avoid having to provide funds from
the ground up, so to speak, for each of these separate programs?
General Taylor. No. I think we should use overseas
indigenous manpower perhaps faster than we have in the past.
We do encounter difficulties with atomic weapons, difficulties
which perhaps should be looked at. But I quite agree with your
suggestion that most of these weapons which we are giving
our allies, there are people there who can be trained to
man these weapons, and we. should withdraw as soon as
practicable.
Senator Stennis. Your suggestion here, I have a growing
realization as a member of this committee that something must
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
214
bd56 be done to get into the system of the Joint Chiefs. It is not
(:) as you point out a matter of personality or individuals.
It is the system that must be changed to meet these prOb-
(:) lems. Now you suggested this supreme military council.
I had to leave and that is the reason I want to be sure I get
your main point.
They could be composed of experienced military men at
the high level who were either retired or to a degree with-
drawn from that service, there, their last assignment I believe.
General Taylor. That3s right.
Senator Stennis. And just what function now would they
perform?
General Taylor. They would take over all of the
committee type advisory functions which the Joint Chiefs
now have. The Chiefs are asked a tremendous nuMber of
quastions of this nature.
For example, on disarmament, what should be the position
of the Secretary of Defense on disarmament, that kind of thing.
That should be the long range strategic posture of our country.
In other words, each year the Joint Chiefs now wrestle with this
paper, the strategic posture of the United States. That is
susceptible to discussion, to debates to adjustment of point
of view of the nature of any good committee function, so that
long-range policy, long-range advice, overall comments
upon force structure, budget and so forth would come from
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
C
And those things that have to be done now on the minute
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1,15
bd57 this group of I call them military wise men for lack of a better
name.
(:) in time a3 war by a single man, those functions would be
taken away from the Joint Chiefs.
A committee no matter who they are, how good they are,
can't cope with this kind of thing.
Senator Stennis. My time is about up. This military
council, would they take a part in what a layman calls the
war plans, formulation of the war plans?
General Taylor. The actual plan would be drawn up by the
Chief of Staff, the Defense Chief of Staff in consultation
with his overseas commanders.
(:)
He would submit this plan to the Secretary of Defense
presumably through this council. So that you would get
their overall review, not in a nitpicking sense but from the
strategic point of view.
Senator Stennis. Now I missed altogether the other
prong of this 2.(d) plan that you brought out. You had the
supreme military council. Then did you say you would have
a single Chief of Staff?
General Taylor. Single Chief of Staff and revise the
(2) budget making procedure in accordance with the so-called
horizontal budgeting.by functional forces.
(2) Senator Stennis. Wb )would take care of that? That was the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd58 I didn't hear that.
(:) General Taylor. It Still remains the responsibility
C
216 '
of the Secretary of Defense. But I would say it would be built
up differently as I visualize it with the requirements
coming from the field forces through the defense chief of
staff. That would be the starting point.
Senator Stennis. / have thought about it many times.
A young man goes to the Academy say at 18 years of age and
spends the rest of his time in that service until he reaches
the chief of staff level and is charged with the responsibility
of sponsoring the cause of that service.
I just know it is contrary to all the principal elements
of human nature for him to be able to just take that cap
off when he got down to the last step and be impartial
and think solely in terms apart from his military service.
I dont think it can possibly be done and should not be
expected even though you make a mighty good effort at it.
Did you say now that with these 48 countries that we have
commitments to, that there is really no plan of carrying
out those commitments that has been formulated?
General Taylor. No, sir I wouldn't suggest there is no
plan. Really the point I have been making is that we do not
build our forces with an eye to being able to meet these
(2) commitments. We rather build our forces and then look at
our commitments and decide how best we will use what we have
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
217
bd59 got, whereas 1 would say the starting point should be the
(:) other way.
Senator Stennis. The starting point should be at the
bottom.
(:)
General Taylor. That's right.
The Chairman, Senator Martin?
Senator Martin. General, I haualistened to all you have
said very carefully but I am still not clear how you would
centralize this recommendation of power in decisions that are
handed up to the Secretary of Defense on the matter of budget
making on the one hand and on the matter of strategy or plan-
ning, either military strategy or planning new weapons
and their use.
(:)
In whom would you place that, General, for the entire defense
picture?
General Taylor. There is no question either the Secretary
of Defense and he in turn undoubtedly on the major issues
would carry them to the Commander in Chief, the President.
Senator Martin. I have reference to the step below the
Secretary of Defense. Would the Secretary of Defense bring
in these recommendations from the various branches of the ser-
vices?
General Taylor. No, that would be his Chief of Staff,
the Defense Chief of Staff acting in the name of the Secretary.
Senator Martin. A civilian?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd60
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
218
General Taylor. No, sir. He will be a four or five
star officer acting for the Secretary of Defense. He will
get the recommendations from the field commanders, consolidate
them, put in his own recommendation and then pass the whole
thing for decision to the Secretary.
Senator Martin. One defense chief of staff to cover
Army, Air Force and Navy, and Marines?
General Taylor. Not within the United States, but
in the overseas commands. In other words, the operational
forces. You would still have presumably a Secretary of the
Army, a Secretary of the Navy and a Secretary of the Air
Force. But taeir job has nothing to do with operations.
They create the forces which they are directed to create by the
Secretary of Defense.
Senator Martin. Your centralization there has to do with
overseas matters?
General Taylor. Operational matters. That would include
some forces in the United States such as our continental
air defense, our missiles on site ancr'our limited war forces
who are awaiting transportatioloverseas.
Senator Martin. That organization had reference primar-
ily to strategy and planning and division of responsibilities.
General Taylor. That is correct, operational activities.
(:) Senator Martin. Yes, operational activities. Now that is
quite apart then from budget problems.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
219
bd61 Genera/ Taylor. Yes.
Senator Martin. Do you have an idea of the same type of
centralization on budget problems?
General Taylor, Ho. The end process would be essentially
what it is now, namely the Comptroller of the Departmenh of
Defense putting together a budget, but he would put it
together under certain directives of the Secretary of Defense,
which in turn would reflect insofar as the money in sight permit-
ted the recommendations of the military commanders who have the
responsibility for meeting these commitments we have been
talking about.
Senator Martin. Each of the services would clear through
this Chief of Staff of Defense to coordinate matters and present
to I would call him a budget chief of staff now.
General Taylor. The budgetary action would flow from 2
directions into the Comptroller and the Secretary of Defense.
One through the Defense Chief of Staff whouould collate all of
the operational requitement% how much Army, Navy and Air
Force do you need in Europe: how much do you need in the Paci-
fic? On the other hand, the Department of the Army, Depart-
ment of the Navy Department of the Air Force also have
billions which are now generated by the need to develop and
train these forces.
So you would really have two streams of requirements to the
Secretary of Defense, one from his chief of staff and the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
220
bd62 other from his three secretaries.
(:) Senator Martin. Then the domestic matter and budget
making primarily come through the three secretaries?
(:) General Taylor. That is correct.
Senator Martin. Who is their principal source of consul-
tation under them within the arms of which they are secretary?
Is Defense satisfactory in that?
General Taylor. They have their chief of staff, chief
of Naval operations and so on.
Senator Martin. I am very much interested in your plans
in operational work, but this matter of budget making and
decision as to who gets what to do and how much, that
(:) comes squarely on our doorstep here in Congress.
I don't ever expect to cross the path of any tactical
decision maker in the Armed Forces, but I have to pass a
matter of judgment as a member of the Senate on almost every
decision made in the matter of cost and expansion of
particular new weapons, missiles and new ships, new submarines
and whatnot, and there I have to follow pretty closely the
Change that you recommend. You think the present organization
is adequate and satisfactoryin that field?
General Taylor. Within the United States insofar as the
Departments are concerned, what I would hope, what I am
suggesting would make it easier for Congress to see specifically
What kind of forces the dollars would generate which you
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd63
0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
223.
approve.
Senator Martin. Yes. Now in the missile, the intercon-
tinental ballistic missile field, do you call that a domestic
affair or is that overseas operations?
General Taylor. I would say first to decide how many
we need, how much is enough, is very definitely a military
problem. Then how much we actually provide becomes a matter
of common sense. Do we have the money for the maximum number
or is there some lesser number we can get by with.
Senator Martin. Now who is the man I am going to
look to for that common sense?
General Taylor. Again the Secretary of Defense will
have to make his decision insofar as he can decide with regard
to his initial budget. Then the budget will come over
here and you gentlemen will ask some very pointed questions.
Senator Martin. There have been some very serious questions
raised here on this budget and how far we are going to goo
and 1 want to know the channel through which this has
all come up to us, because of the heavy problem on my doorstep
right now.
That is all.
Senator Stennis. Thank you. Next on ourlist is Senator
Engle. Senator Engle, you have 10 minutes.
Senator Engle. General/ I am glad you are here.
congratulate you on your testimony. I regret your leaving
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
222
bd64 the military.
(2) I think it is a great loss to the nation. I am glad you
are back here to help us with reference to these organizational
(:)problems particularly. I would like to say to you that I
agree with you 100%. I would like to ask you this question:
If there was a disposition to put the kind of reorganization
that you have in mind into execution immediately, can we do it
under the provisions of existing law, that is the Reorganization
Act of 1958 or is additional legislation needed?
General Taylor. I would be reasonably sure, that
additional legislation would be required. I have not studied it
specifically from that point of view.
(2) Senator Engle. You would particularly have to do it I
take it with reference to the change of function of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the establishment of this group of senior
officers would act as the wise men, as you call them.
General Taylor. Yes, I am sure it would require a law
because we are changing the status of the present chairman.
We are also really eliminating the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
presently constituted.
Senator Engle. It would be my impression that there are
(:) a lot of things that can be done under the Reorganization Act
of 1958 such as unifying certain of the supplying service
(2) organizations, the doctors, the lawyers, the military attaches
to foreign embassies,, the Chaplain service and all of those
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
223
that could be presently done under existing law.
Would you agree with that?
General Taylor. I am not sure. I would just point out
that those things really are on the fringes of this major
strategic reorganization.
Senator Engle. Now I observed that in mentioning the
type of division that you would make so fax as functions
and missions are concerned, you mentioned atomic war, limited
war, and antisubmarine and continental air defense, those
four.
Is that about the breakdown that you would have so far as
functions and missions is concerned?
General Taylor. Antisubmarine warfare, strategic move-
ments, particularly strategic airlift I believe cover it.
Senator Engle. Was there any particular reason for stating
them in that order?
If you had to establish a priority and eventually we
have to establish priorities with reference to what we are
going to do first and why we think it is first, how would
you establish the priorities that we need now?
General Taylor. / have a rather detailed discussion
or priorities in the book which I have written. I would
say that generally speaking I establish a concurrent priority
in the offensive and defensive strike force for retaliation,
and at the same time those forces necessary for counter-
attrition, the limited war force which we have to have at
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
224
bd66 the same time Now everything elser deciding how much is
(:) enough to provide reasonable deterrence in those two fields,
is the first requirement. Other things are going to be neces-
(:) sary.
0
You have to have some antisubmarine warfare forces in case
our deterrents fail. We are going to have to have some
air defense of the United States in case our deterrence fails.
We are going to have to have some civil defense. But those
things which are provably a part of our deterrence of general
or limited war are our first priorities.
Senator Engle. You would put the retaliatory strike
force plus the capabilityof waging limited war on an equal
basis of priority?
General Taylor. That is correct.
Senator Engle. And the others would come second or third
in whatever order we could manage them?
General Taylor. That is correct.
Senator Engle. That raises a question that has often
intrigued me: and perhaps from your experience you can tell
us how they do it. How do they determine how much of the money
is going to be put in the retaliatory strike force, how much
in the limited war forcer how much in antisubmarine and how
much in Continental air defense?
How are these arrived at? How do they get these percentages
in this budgetwise?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
d65 67
225
General Taylor. Generally speaking they don't do it
that way. That is one of my points of which I am critical.
I think we should cast our budget in just those terms.
Now we have a hearing on the Army, what does the Army require,
and the Secretary of Defense spends many, many hours just
talking with the Army. Then in the next two or three weeks,
he examines the Navy and the Air Force. But those cate-
gories of forces to which more than one service makes a
recommendation we never isolate those and look at them as
a composite and ask ourselves is that enough?
Senator Entle. Let me ask this question. We know that
the Army has a retaliatory strike capability in the intermediate
range ballistic missile. We know that the Navy has --
General Taylor. Excuse me, that has been given to the
Air Force. The Army does not have an intermediate ballistic
missile at this time. The Jupiter was built by the Army but
turned over to the Air Force.
Senator Engle. I assume that sooner or later the Army
will have some kind of missile capability. It doesn't have
it now. And we know that the Navy has some off their carriers.
We know about the intercontinental ballistic missile and
SAC. Now does anybody sit down and add up what everybody
has in the way of retaliatory strike capability and
put it all in one cluster so that we can say that 20%
of the budget or 14 or 15% of it or umpteen billion dollars
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
226
bd68 is going into strike capability?
(:) General Taylor. I used to do that with my staff for
my own guidance. It has never been done officially by the
(:) Secretary of Defense nor been reported to the Congress in
those terms so far as I know.
Senator Engle. The budget isn't presented to Congress
on the basis of functions and missions but on the basis of how
much the Navy gets, how much the Army, the Air Force?
General Taylor. That is correct.
Senator Engle. And you protest that procedure?
General Taylor. I say we can never really know what we
are buying if we deal on that basis.
(:) Senator Engle. Because you will be overbuilt in one
section and underbuilt in another, wil1 you not?
General Taylor. That is correct.
Senator Engle. I observe that you make a point of
the necessity of action, and I think this is something the
country doesn't generally understand, and if you agree,
I will ask you if you agree with me that the decisions we make
this year set the premise for what we can do two years from
now?
General Taylor. Even farther, from 2 to 4 years
from now.
Senator Engle. If we don't make these decisions now
to do this, when we get to '61 or. 062, the time will have
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd69
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
227
gone by and we simply will not be able to do those things
that would be necessary even if at that time we determine they
should be done?
General Taylor. That is correct.
Senator Engle. Thank you.
Senator Stennis. Senator Case?
Senator Case. General, it is good to have you back and
see you.
/ wonder if you could discuss a little bit this matter of
limited war which has always been a very baffling kind of thing
for me. To state it quickly, nobody could possibly disagree
we ought to have the capacity to fight limited wars if wars are
going to be limited because all out wars would be destructive
of everything.
But what do you mean when you say limited, limited as to
objective, limited as to the kind of operations that are con-
ducted, bombing or not bombing cities, limiting yourselves
to the enemy's forces directly or something in between,
limited as to the size and type of resources, and then how do
you. limit it?
Who agrees that it is going to be limited? Donut you
have to have both sides in on an operation? 1 am not in any
way suggesting a disagreement with you, because all my
emotions and my instincts and all come out to meet what you
are talking about I think.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
228
bd70 But when I try and put it down intellectually, I find
(:) a difficulty In this, and I find great difficulty in deciding
how you decide where you end your preparation for a limited
war, how large forces are and how much are you going to try
and police the world in every capacity.
wish you would talk 'a little bit about this, because
these things I think have to be met in some fashion, otherwise
WG could agree in general but have no guide as to particulars.
General Taylor. You are quite right in suggesting that
definitions are extremely important in these considerations
and arguments over definitions have been almost interminable
in military circles in the Pentagon.
(:) General war is normally accepted in our discussions
as being unlimited atomic war between the United States and
probably some of its allies versus the Soviet Union and
some of its allies.
It contemplates this international exchange which could
well be said is not war at all but international suicide.
Certainly this kind of war does not meet our historic concept of
a war being an extension of political activities by other means.
So here anything short of this general holocaust in my
thinking is limited war.
Hence it accommodates a great variety of military
operations different in size, different in Objective, and differ-
ing in scope.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1429
The Korean War of course was a limited war under this
definition. One of the great questions which arises when one
contemplates all the vast gamut of possibilities in the limited
war field is what about atomic weapons?
Will they play any part at all? That is very difficult
to answer. Certainly I would say in the tense world wherl we
have megaton weapons in both camps there is going to be great
:reluctance I think to use atomic weapons, even tactical small
atomic weapons initially.
On the other hand, we cannot afford not to equip and
organize our Army forces, our Marine forces particularly,
with a view to their possible employment. So that it has
been a problem with us who are responsible for these decisions
to have what is called an either/or capability.
In other words, to fight with strictly conventional
weapons or to utilize atomic weapons.
The danger of using atomic weapons in limited war
growing to unlimited war as you imply is very great. No one
can say that it may not develop in that way. The greater
danger in my judgment is to become paralyzed by fear of
genera/ war to the point we will not meet boldly and resolutely
these lesser challenges which certainly will be presented
to us by the other fellow. So that a strong visible readiness to
respond is an important part of our overall national deterrent
posture.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
230
bd72 I am not at all sure I have answered all the points you
(:) are raising.
Senator Case. I think as fax as anyone possibly could in
(:) the time, you have answered them and I think answered them
extremely well. But the point, I think you come in the end
to the point that / really wanted to make, that what we are talk-
ing about is not fighting a war but deterring it, limited
as well as unlimited.
General Taylor. That is the great justification for
all of our military efforts. They should all contribute
to deterrence, but in general and limited war.
Senator Case. An aspect of that that you touched on in
(:) your book, and briefly in your statement, was this matter
of bomb shelters.
General Taylor. Fall out shelters.
Senator Case. Yes, which I take it you do limit to shel-
ters against fall out as opposed to blast or fire or the other
effects.
How wide a program do you think is desirable in this
area? Would it cover the whole population, would it cover
civilians, individuals or industry or both, cities? Would
you attempt to do anything about this, and would you
comment particularly on the question on what it would look like
in the world or how adverse an effect, if an adverse effect
there would be, on our stature as a world power among our
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
231
bd73 allies as well as the enemy if we went into this thing in a
big way?
General Taylor. All of those are very pertinent questions.
In the first place / would say that we cannot afford a
vast program nor should we suggest the nation live like moles
in cellars. On the other hand, very light protective shelter,
a little thought in the construction of our houses will give
a very high percentage protection against fall out,
Which is the mass destroyer in case of atomic attack.
I donut think it would have adverse international effects.
We know that the Soviets have been giving a great deal'of
thought and a considerable amount of construction in this
field.
would think it would simply indicate the seriousness of
our preparation and our readiness to meet the enemy. It is
convincing proof of our determination rather than a suggestion
of timidity.
Senator Case. Thank you very much, General.
Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. Senator Cannon?
Senator Cannon. General, it is really a pleasure to have
you here before the committee. I think very highly of your
ability and / know that you are doing a great service to
our country in appearing here and giving us the benefit of your
views.
? Referring to your statement in paragraph 1 you state:
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
232
bd74 "The placing of major reliance on weapons of massive
(:) destruction has lost all justification in view of Soviet
progress in atomic weapons and long range missiles."
(:) Now certainly if this situation did not keep the
peace when we had a complete monopoly of atomic weapons,
as we arrive nearer to a condition of atomic or nuclear
parity9 then it is much more less likely to act as an effec-
tive deterrent for small war type of operations that you
referred to, is that true?
General Taylor. That is my point of view.
Senator Cannon. And certainly then if we directed our
efforts toward only the position of obtaining nuclear
parity where we thought we were deterring nuclear attack
and had all our eggs so-called in one basket, we would be
in a very unfortunate position indeed.
General Taylor. I agree.
Senator Cannon. Now in your second paragraph you stated
"Meanwhile the trend of relative military strength is against
us."
Now do you base that in part on the fact that we have
consistently cut down our military forces, we have refused
to take steps to adequately modernize the forces in accordance
with the recommendations of our military leaders, and we have
not proceeded at a rapid pace with the development of our
missile capability?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
233
b475 General Taylor. We have had and have today a tre-
emendous military strength represented in our manned bomber
force, unfortunately I referred to it I believe correctly
(:) as a dwindling asset. Meanwhile we have not come along
rapidly enough in the transition from bombers to
truly effective missiles. I emphasize reliability, accuracy,
effectiveness on the part of the missile system. Hence
the advantage we had in the general war field is tending to
disappear.
Meanwhile we have deliberatelyzestrained our preparations
to meet limited war. We have made no effort either to match
in numbers or in qualities of equipment the known strength
(:) of the Soviets, so that in combination I think it is
fair to say the trend is downward.
Senator Cannon. From your book and from the statements
attributed to you: I am sure that there is no doubt in your
mind but what there is a missile gap presently existing between
us, between the United States and the Soviet Union.
General Taylor. If you will allow me to define missile
gap as being something other than purely a difference in
numbers of missiles: because the missile is really, it should
be regarded as a part of a missile system which includes
accuracy, reliability, early warning services, protective
devices and so on.
Also relative exposure is a serious factor in so-called
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
234
bd76 missile gaps.
(2) So when I take the position that this is indeed a reality
or soon will become ones I am thinking of all of those factors.
Senator Cannon. Now I note that you comment on the fact
that our long-range missile force is limited in size and
certainly reliability and immobile on exposed bases.
General, is there any doubt in your mind but what the
Russians do have missile bases and concealed bases about
which we know nothing at present?
General Taylor. ItliTak it is fair to assume that. To say
one knows it, I would be hesitant to say because there are so
many gaps in our knowledge.
(:) Senator Cannon. But it certainly is a reasonable
assumption based on the informatbn we do have available is
that true?
General Taylor. It is.
Senator Cannon. I take it that it is one of your
contentions, as brought out by your statement and your
comments that it is veryimportantihat we have disposal and/or
mobility and concealment, sir, is that correct?
General Taylor. It is.
Senator Cannon. And we have nothing insofar as our missile
posture is concerned because one can read every day in the
papers every place that we have or will have missiles
in the future?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
235
General Taylor. That, is unfortunate.
Senator Cannon. Now General, you commented, you noted
3 steps that we could take to partially offset the missile
gat, and you mentioned using Jupiter as a mobile field weapon
as it was intended.
What is the status of the Jupiter at present?
General Taylor. I have not had a chance to check in the
last 6 months exactly where the Jupiter is. The Army
expended a tremendous effort in making this weapon operational.
It was then turned over to the Air Force, and a squadron was
organized at Huntsville with tremendous speed and effort.
It had a very fine report on the squadron, however, there were
great delays then in deciding where this weapon should go.
I am not sure whether we were making it available and
I should say to some of our overseas allies, but meanwhile
we were directed to take out the mobility feature so it had
to be a fixed weapon. That apparently dampened the
enthusiasm of our overseas allies and it has not moved yet.
What the status of negotiations are now frankly I don't know.
Senator Cannon. And there is no doubt but this weapon
has a great capability as a mobile weapon?
General Taylor. It is really the most reliable, the
most tested weapon we have, because of that fact plus its
potential mobility, it offers us a formal stopgap in this
period.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd78
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
236
Senator Cannon. Now having had personal knowledge of your
recognition of and interest in the problem of airlift since 1943,
T wonder if you would comment on the problem of airlift insofar
as the Army r your own field; is concerned?
General Taylor. Airlift is one aspect of the limited
war problem. We will necessarily have most of our forces
available for limited war in the United States.
There will be some in our overseas deployment; but the
backbone of our strength will be home. The need to get to
the spot threatened as rapidly as possible is very obvious.
If we don't get there in time. the subsequent job may be much
more difficult and much more costly. So that shortness of
reaction time is one important aspect of limited war readiness.
That means of course that our troops, large parts of them should
move by air. An airlift should be organized like the fire
department so there is a minimum time after ringing the bell
before the planes get in the air. Hence we need
quality, we need quantity and we need Joint coMbined exercises
to develop this capability.
Senator Cannon. Do you think that this problem has
been exploited in the past? And when / say problem, do you
think we have met the reauirements that you have indicated
we need?
General Taylor. I do not.
Senator Cannon. And would you recommend that we take
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
237
bd79 affirmative steps and in the immediate future, to remedy
(:) that?
General Taylor. It should be one of the steps included in
(2) our limited war measures.
Senator Cannon. Thank you.
Senator Wiley. Mr. Chairman, I have a question.
Senator Stennis. Senator Wiley.
Senator Wiley. I have to leave anyway. I heard you use
that phrase "sterilize by fear". I got from that that you felt
that America must see to it that from the standpoint of
her thinking and her approach to this problem, she must
not go off the deep end in her thinking and become not
(2) sterilized but paralyzed.
Now, you spoke about deterrence. You gave us the military
deterrence. Are there other deterrents now that as an ex-
military man and now, what are you, a businessman--
General Taylor. Of sorts.
Senator Wiley. Yes, of a sort. Peddling books, is that
the idea?
General Taylor. No, six. I am making light, hoping I can
cast some light upon the world.
Senator Wiley. I am not inquiring as to what the return
is on the book, you see, but this is the point that I want
to drive at, because to me at least the matter of these other
deterrents in the mind of Khrushchev is something he weighs.
0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
238
bd80 For instance* the attitude of 200 million Russian people.
(:) Do you think they want war?
General Taylor. No, sir.
(.r.) Senator Wiley. What do you think of the attitude of the cap-
tive nations? Does he know their attitude, like Poland,
what might happen if war came? Is that a deterrent?
General Taylor. Your point is the reluctance or abhorrence
of war on the part of mankind?
Senator Wiley. I'm talking about the captive nations,
using Poland as an illustration.
General Taylor. No nation wants war, sir.
Senator Wiley. Yes, but the effect upon his internal
(:) ability now. We are talking about someone that wants to let
the balloon go up. What do you think of the effect of our
allies? Eruope, all our NATO. Do they constitute a deterrent?
General Taylor. Their strength is certainly a part of our
strength, and depending upon their effectiveness they add to
our deterrent strength.
Senator Wiley. Are there any other deterrents you can
think of?
General Taylor. I go back to your first point which
think should be developed,. namely that there is a moral aspect
to deterrence on our part, that we have to present to the
(:) outside world the aspect of a cool calm determined nation,
not going to be stampeded or paralyzed by fear.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1 239
bd81 Senator Wiley. Have you any judgment at all as to
how much the Russians and the Communists Chinese love each
other?
General Taylor. I have nothing to contribute.
Senator Wiley. Do you think there is any danger there of
a differences and that that might have some deterrent proclivities
General Taylors, It might but I have no evidence.
Senator Wiley. I might say that some years ago when one
of the American newspapermen right after the war came over
here, I was privileged to interrogate him, and I asked him About
the line. He said that at that time the Kremlin was
fortifying its line toward the Chinese, strengthening it.
Instead of taking down the forts they were increasing them,
putting in Armed Forces.
What I am getting at now is your analysis of these deter-
rents that we have got to think about when we go ahead and
make these additional deterrents in the military line.
Have you any other that you might think of?
General Taylor. No. I would certainly agree with you
that deterrence is not strictly military, that there are
moral and political aspects of great importance.
Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Weis'?
Mr. Weisl. General, in replying to Senator Johnson's
question about the opportunity which you had to present your
views to the National Security Council, I am sure you did not
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
240
bd82 want to leave the impression that you were satisfied with
(:) the decisions or the answers that you got?
General Taylor. No.
(:) Mr. Weisl. To your presentation?
General Taylor. That is correct.
Mr. Weisl. ?Because I want to put in the record some
of the statements you have made in that connection: and I qaote:
"In the National Security Council, the follow up is often
defective."
And you further stated: The National Security Council
has not come to grips with the fundamental defense problem,
and has failed to produce clearcut guidance for the Armed
(:) Forces". Is that correct?
General Taylor. Yes, in my judgment.
Mr. Weisl. In connection with the shelter program that
we discussed, may / call your attention to the testimony
before this committee of Governor Rockefeller?
He strongly urged that this country develop an extensive
shelter program: pointing out that this was one of the main
deterrents to an attacks because if the enemy believes that
we have sufficient shelters to survive an attack, an extensive
(:) shelter program will be one of our principal deterrents.
Do you agree with Governor Rockefeller's view?
(:) General Taylor. I certainly feel that it has a deterrent
aspect. I am also impressed, however, by the fact that we
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
241
bd83 must balance our efforts in this field againstthose to Obtain
more direct military strength.
Mr. meisl. And in that connection the Gaither report which
we were denied access to, we talked to some of the members
of the Gaither report, and they contended that they advocated
a similar shelter program.
Now you testified before this committee on several
occasions as to the vita/ urgent necessity of immediately
trying to develop the Nike-Zeus, an antimissile missile
system, and as a result of your testimony, the Congress
appropriated $137 million for end products or pre-production
products, and also large sums for modernization of that research
and development program.
Now none of the $137 million has been used and a part
of the modernization has not been used. Can you explain why
that has happened, sir?
General Taylor. No, an active witness would be much more
prepared to explain that. I have read of this and of course
/ consider it most regrettable that we have not
pushed forward in modernization and Nike-Zeus field.
Mr. Weisl. What would happen if the Russians developed an
antimissile missile before we did?
General Taylor. They would have a very important military
and psychological advantage.
Mr. Weisl. That is all.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
242
bd84 Senator Stennis. I want to get back to something I
(:) mentioned a while ago just briefly, General.
I am not trying to take you out of your field/ but
Cr.) it seems we all agree, government officials agree, both
military and civilian, that we do have this missile gap.
I don't know of much -- we say the /C8Ms I don't
know of much that is being done about it in the way of trying
to step up, really step up production of we will say the
Atlas, which seems to be the foremost one.
Convair, which is the manufacturer of this missile,
as I understand it they are just running along on a 40 hour
week, one shift. I think that it could certainly be stepped
(:) up just as a practical proposition by doubling the shifts
or working overtime. Now isn't that correct? I would advocate
that that much could be done, and do it immediately.
General Taylor. Frankly I don'tknow the possibilities
of increasing production. The Air Force experts had better
give you testimony on that, sir.
Senator Stennis. It certainly makes common sense. You
don't see any obstacle or anything of that kind in its
path now, do you?
(:) General Taylor. I don't know whether there are technical
production problems.
(:) Senator Stennis. Now getting back to the matter / was
talking about a while ago, about the possibilities of having an
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd85 interchange of these rockets and boosters to keep then
from baying to finance, maintain and operate so many different
systems, could you give us any suggestions along that line
about the interchangeability of the rockets, of the
parts of these various weapons?
General Taylor. No, thus far as you know, we have
generally pioneered in this field.
There hasn't been much available overseas. I'm quite
sure that is going to change. For example, the Army has
been quite interested and has procured a number of French
antitank missiles. We should have no pride in authorship,
and if we find a foreign product which is good and ready, we
should use it.
There is a great advantage in saving research and
development costs. Our allies, I am sure, recognize that, and
from their point of view have been utilizing our market quite
extensively.
Senator Stennis. Getting it back here to home though,
I amthinking about an interchangeability as between one weapons
system and another or one rocket and another, and one missile
and another after these reach the operational stage.
Couldn't there be some uniformity of boosters or parts?
General Taylor. At the time of the great argument over
the future of the Jupiter missile, I proposed to the Secretary
of Defense that we adopt the concept of a national arsenal.
z43
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
244
In other words, any service that has a good idea and a
capability of producing a weapon should be allowed to go ahead
and produce it.
Then it would be placed figuratively speaking into the
national arsenal. Any user, any other service who has a need for
it in the light of its roles and missions can reach into that
arsenal, take it out and use it.
I still think it is a good concept and I believe
that is what you have in mind.
Senator Stennis. Yes. Thinking somewhat in terms of that,
I notice here the cost of the missiles alone, we are going to
have quite a few of them operational, the cost of the misales
alone just for one year is astronomical already.
General Taylor. That is why it is so important to know
now how much is enough. What is our goal? Why do we need 10
or why do we need 100 or 150 or whatever the number happens
to be?
Senator Stennis. Yes, Well I can visualize one group of
nissi/es for one type of missile costing 4 to 5 or 6, 7 or
billion dollars per year.
General Taylor o just to keep up. I mean that is based
on actual figures, just to keep the supply line going and keep
up the numbers.
That is just for one single missile as I say.
Now something must be done, we talk about planning four
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
245
bd87 years ahead, and that is necessary.
(171. But it seems to me that something must be done now in
planning ahead on a question of that kind.
Otherwise this cost is going to mushroom and become so
astronomical that it can well undermine: really undermine
the soundness of the free enterprise system.
General Taylor. The only encouraging factor from a
fiscal point of view I would say is the fact we really donut
need many of these if they arexeally good, if they are
accurate and you are sure of getting on target.
In other words: the vastly increased warheads we have
available reduces the actual number required, but it is up
to us to decide what is the required number.
Senator Stennis. Yes. Well I think that is certainly
a good comment there. But if we just keep on building and we
are rather frantic about it now: these different types and
kinds, 2 ICBMs now and intermediate range, and then of
course you have to have battlefield and tactical, air to
ground and ground to air and air to air and all, why as I
say, it is going to run into many, many billions of dollars
and I have a figure in mind where it could be just to
(:) supply the missile alone now, without the launching pads and
the operations or anything else, to supply an annual
crop you might say of these missiles would run anywhere
4:) from 5 to 8 or $9 billion for one alone.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
246
bd88 Do you know where we should go to try to impress someone
with the idea of making plans now to use a fewer number of
the types and al/ and therefore, reduce the cost?
General Taylor. I am afraid / will just repeat myself,
Senator, and say my only solution is to make the military
come up with an engineering kind of estimate of how much
you need.
We are building our structure of defense without
knowing what the factors of safety are. 12 you were an
engineering company you would go broke operating on that basis.
Senator Stennis. You had a practical solution there of an
arsenal.
General Taylor. 1 think it is a concept, sir, that gets
away from the idea of the pride of ownership, that the Air Force
or the Army will only fire a missile built, designed and so on by
the Air Force, by the Army or by the Navy.
Senator Stennis. / yield to counsel.
Mr. Weisl. General Taylor, I omitted to advise you also
that Governor Rockefeller in his testimony before this commit-
tee completely supported your position both on thebudget
and on the organization or reorganization of the Joint Chiefs
of staff system.
General Taylor. I am happy to hear it.
Senator Stennis. Senator Martin?
Senator Martin. General Taylory in your colloquy with
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1 247
d89 Senator Wiley you e timated 1 believe a new military budget
or defense budget of about 50 to 55 billion per year for the
next 5 years.
General Taylor. That was very much of a shotgun estimate,
yes.
Senator Stennis. Was there any shelter provisions such
as you discussed with Mr. Weisl a moment ago included in that
budget?
General Taylor. Wit was not.
Senator Stennis. It is all military hardware and military
personnel?
General Taylor. That is correct.
Senator Stennis, And did you attempt to break that increase
in defense budget down by categories?
General Taylor. No, only very roughly, based upon ex-
perience in the past. I knew about what it would imply in terms
of Army expenditure and applied corresponding factors to the
other services.
Senator Stennis. Now in your colloquy with Senator Stennis
on the matter of one ballistic missile, it was described
by the Senator as possibly going to as much as 5 to 8 billion
dollars. Did you have in mind that as included within
your estimate of a 50 to $55 billion budget?
General Taylor. No, sir. I don't know exactly the
numbers and the missiles that Senator Stennis had in mind.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
? 248
bd90 I did not specifically throw in an item of that nature,
(:) although the missile programs would be included.
0
Senator Stennis. Do you have at hand and available for
us any approximation of the breakdown of your 10 to 15 billion
dollar budget?
General Taylor. No, I did not, sir.
Again it was just an experience figure, and I emphasize
it was really a shotgun estimate. I don't think it is too
far off. Actually if we continue to spend at the same percentage
of our gross national product as we are spending now, which
is between 8 and 9%4 we are going to be in this 50 to 55
billion area within say 3 or 4 years anyway.
Senator Martin. And any unusual or extreme increase in
cost of a single missile or maybe 2 missiles would have to
come in addition to your estimates then.
General Taylor. I would think if we really streamline
our requirements, that is decide again how much is enough in
terms of missiles on target, we axe going to cut down the number
of missiles which we need rather substantially.
do think there will be other collateral expenses such as
target acquisition and protection measures which would be
added on top.
Senator Martin. That is an important point. You are
(2) looking for some saving by cutting down expenditures now being
made to help hold that increase down to 10 to 15 billion dollars.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
249
b691 General Taylor. That is correct. / think there are
excesses in our expenditures at the present time.
Senator Martin. That is all.
Senator Stennis. Senator Case?
Senator Case. NO questions: thank you: Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stennis. Senator Engle?
Senator Engle. No, thank you.
Senator Stennis. Senator Cannon?
Senator Cannon. General, do you take a parochial view
toward our defense problem?
General Taylor. I really dont know what that means.
The parish seems to be getting larger all the time.
Senator Engle. At least there is more people in it,
let's put it that way.
Senator Stennis. Genera/, would you like to make some
other points? Maybe we have aroused your thinking on some
point but didn't ask the specific question. Do you have
something you would like to cover?
General Taylor. No, sir. I think the questioning has
been very complete and I am very happy to have the chance to
respond to your questions.
Senator Stennis. We certainly want to thank you, Generale
for coming here. I think you occupy, I know you occupy a very
unique position following such a distinguished military career
from the battlefield to the Chief of Staff of the Army and
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd92
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
250
having such fine practical knowledge and experience,
and then to be willing to come here and really just take the
bark off the tree and show us3 go right down the line as you see
these things: it is a very valuable service to the committee
and I think to the American people.
Your testimony here as well as what you heive said before is
very impressive and I think very valuable, and I think the
tree will bear fruit, not today or tomorrow but in the course
of time as we have plans for the future.
We especially thank you.
General Taylor. Thank you.
Senator Stennis. I want to say too for the record I may
not get to be here this afternoon. I could be away next week.
I think we owe aspecial debt to Mr. Weis/ and Mr. Vance here
for their very fine services.
I'm sure the Chairman will express that/ but I wanted
to express it too.
Gentlemen: the committee will take a recess until 2 O'clock
this afternoon at which time we will hear General
Lemnitzer who is Chief of Staff of the Army, it will be an
open session..
(Whereupon: at 1220 p.m. the hearing was recessed until
2:00 p.m. of the same day.)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
: I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
_ _
bd93 efae2
/VA'
251
AFTERNOON SESSION 2:10 p.m.
Mlle following members are present Senators Stennis,
Young; Cannon, Saltonstall, Wiley, Martin and Case.)
Senator Stennis. May we have quiet, please? The Committee
will come to order. This afternoon we are very glad indeed
to hear General Lemnitzer Chief of Staff of the Army, and
then his testimony will conclude the hearings for this week.
General, the regular procedure here for our committee is
to ask all our witnesses to be sworn.
Would you please stand? Do you solemnly SWeal: that
your testimony here will be the truth; the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Genera/ Lemnitzer. I do.
Senator Stennis. General, as I have said, we are beset
with considerable uncertainty this afternoon so far as rollcall
votes are concerned, which means we may have several interruptions
of your testimony: which will be unfortunate ? but except for
the inconvenience to you, it won't weaken your testimony
one bit. We are especially glad to have you here, sire
and unless there is objection, do you have a prepared statement,
General?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
252
bd94 TESTIAONY OF GENERAL LYMAN L. LEMNITZER
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF
Genera/ Lemnitzer. No, I do not. I understood that the
committee preferred not.
Senator Stennis. We are not expecting you to have one,
so unless there is objection by the committee we will adopt
now the usual procedure until changed by the committee, which
is to allow the counsel 45 minutes to open the hearings and
then we will proceed, each Senator, for 10 minutes.
Weisl?
Mr. Weisl. General Lemnitzer, may I call your attention
to a review of the book that is published in a magazine called
"The Army" in the February 1960 edition, and 14hich magazine
is published under the auspices of the Association of the
United States Army, are you familiar with that?
General Lemnitzer. I am.
Mr. Weisl. This review is written by Mr. Herbert E.
Stringer, who when he wrote this review was on the staff of
the Army Operations Research Office of the Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity. Are you familiar with the Army Operations Research Office
of the Johns Hopkins University?
General Lemnitzer. Yes, I am.
Mr. Weisl. The Army uses that?
Genera/ Lemnitzer. A great deal.
Mr- Weisl.
In a review of that book he stated as follows:
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
253
bd95 And I quote:
4r,
"Our current ability to fight limited wars is in serious
doubt according to Dr. Moryan Sterne and yet with a stalemate
in nuclear arms, this is emactly the sort of situation which
is most likely to develop. Here it is suggested because of
our inability to cope with the limited wars which nibble
away at territory and alliances, if we feel that success
can be gained only by using nuclear and thermonuclear
warheads, we may be the ones to bring on the big war. How
ironic this would be if our nickle and dime economizing forced
us into an all-out war because we didnat have the political
guts to amply finance limited war forces. Since its inceptions
each year has seen cuts in the strategic Army coxps, ignoring
of pleas for adequate airlift, and little or no funds for
modernizing the Army."
Would you care to comment on that statement?
Genera/ Lemnitzer. It is quite a broad statement, Mx.
Weisl.
don't know what the author means by our ability to fight
limited war is in serious doubt. There is no doubt in my mind
right now that we could do a very good job, probably not to
the degree that some of us would like to be able to fight a
limited ware but he seems to write our capability of fighting
limited war completely off the fields and with this / do not
agree.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1 ?
254
bd96 We have a considerable capability of fighting limited
war. There are certain areas in which I would like to see
bolstered up, but on the whole I say we have a capability.
Now your question or the statement raises the issue
that the Army has been attempting to focus attention on for
some period of time.
In the Army's efforts to focus attention on limited war,
the unfortunate impression has been gained in a good many
circles that the Army's role is limited to limited ware and with
this I strongly disagree.
The Army has in my opinion the same capability to perform
its applications in general war, limited war and indeed the
cold war.
I feel strongly that the Army would be called upon to
perform the same types of missionse probably differing in de-
tail in a general wax, in which there was a thermonuclear
exchange. But after those exchanges, someone must go into the
areas and gain control of land areas and the people who inhabit
those areas. And that is the primary Army role and mission in
wax.
I don't think that there is much doubt about the Army
being in the forefront of the capability and the type of
forces that would be used in limited war. I think the role
of the Army in cold war is all too frequently overlooked. I feel
strongly that our deployments overseas at present play a vital
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
za5
bd97 role in the conduct of the cold war. Our forces in Germany,
the Seventh United States Army with its five divisions,
constitute a very important segment of the NATO shield forces.
Our two divisions as a part of the United nations Command
in Korea are also a vital part of that force.
So on the whole I don't know what other questions are
raised by that quotation that you made, but I have attempted
to give my views on the general pattern of war. I would
like to add this: In the Army's effort to focus attention
on limited war, which has proven to be the most likely type of
war since the close of World War II: there has also been the
erroneous impression gained in many people's minds that the
Army has been opposed to massive retaliation, retaliatory
concept.
-I have been rather closely associated with the Department
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1952, andI can
say with personal knowledge that the Army has always supported,
strongly supporte4 the building up of a retaliatory force as
soon as we knew that our potential enemy had mastered the
development of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.
We regarded this and we agreed with the other services
that this was a very vital part of the capability which we
must have in the interest of our own security.
Mr. Weisl. Do you believe in the concept of an airborne
alert?
General Lemnitzer. I believe in the concept of the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
ZDO
airborne alert: but the problems that are raised in connection
with it, and I have been following thm hearings which have been
held here and I know what tie issues axe, I believe in the
concept of an airborne alert, but as to when to go on
an airborne alert and how to go on it and the degree to
which we do go on it axe the issues, and I would prefer to
discuss the details of those in executive session.
But I would like to make it clear right now that I am
opposed to going on airborne alert under the circumstances
and in thD situation that exists today.
Mr. Weisl. But you are not speaking about the future?
General Lemnitzer. No, I am not speaking about the
future.
Mr. Weisl. Do you agree with the principle enunciated
by this book reviewer that if we neglect our limited war
capabilites, we might start a nuclear war, be the cause of
starting a nuclear war?
General Lemnitzex I think it would be a very serious mis-
take to neglect our limited war capabilities. This I feel very
strongly about. I feel that by having limited wax, a limited
war capability, and a good one, and the means to exercise
that capability promptly is one of the very best ways
know of keeping a limited war limited and avoiding it getting
out of hand and generating into something on the order of a gen-
eral war.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Mr. Weisl. We have had testimony by General Taylor
and others that the Russian Army has been modernized twice
since World War IX, that it is highly mechanized, that it
is highly mobile, that it has rockets, artillery, tanks,
guns of a modern nature, and some witnesses, I refer specifi-
cally to General Gavin's testimony, that this' equipment can
outrank and ourgun ours.
Would you care to comment on that?
General Lemnitzer. We do know that the Russian Army has
been completely re-equipped with modern weapons at least
once throughout its entire structure since World War 11.
The degree to which it has been re-equipped after that initial
equipping with newer and more modern equipment than was used in
World Wax II, I think cannot be dealt with by a general
statement yes or no. I think in some cases they have been,
in others they have not. They have high priority divisions
just as we do, Mr. Weisl, and they are petting the emphasis
on their high priority divisions.
Now when we get into the field of saying that they have
rockets, missiles, artillery that can outrank us, in some
cases I think this is a correct statement.
In others, I don't think it applies. I think you have
to get down and make the comparison weapon by weapon to
compare the characteristics of theirs vis a vis the
Characteristics of our own.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
258
bd100
Mr. Weis].. Would you like to discuss specifically
those instances in open session or would you prefer to do that
in closed?
General Lemnitzer. I would prefer to do it when we are
discussing detailed characteristics because I think here
I would be giving vital information to a potential enemy.
Mr. Weisl. In what areas do you believe that the limited
war capabilities of the Army need bolstering?
General Lemnitzer. One of the principal problems con-
fronting the Army is modernizing, and by that I don't want
to give the impression that the Army does not have modern
equipment: because it has. It has somexcellent equipment.
Some of its equipment is better than that I feel in the hands
of the Soviet forces.
Our problem is in the field of the rate of modernization.
Our research and development programs have developed in my
opinion some of the finest military equipment that can be
used in limited war. Our principal problem is to take those
prototypes which have passed throught the research, and develop-
ment tests and evaluation tests and translate them into equip-
ment in thehands of troops.
We are devoting the maximum part of the Army's budget that
we can, and still maintain balance overall, to this end. But
we do have good equipment in the hands of our forces, such as
STRAC, and more new equipment coming out of our research and
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
development that is particularly adapted for and usable in
limited war.
Mr. Weisl. Congress last year added funds to the budget
..br the Army modernization. Are these funds being fully used?
General Lemnitzer. The answer to your question is noe
would like to tell you how the funds have been used so that
it may be clear as to why I give the answer no. The total
amount of money that was appropriated by the Congress over
and above that which was in the 1960 budget amounted to 382.6
million dollars. Now 164.2 of these funds are being used to
cover a deficiency in the funding of the fiscal yar 1960
direct obligational program of the Department of the Army, which
totaled about 1.372 billion. This deficiency resulted from
the Office of Secretary of Defense Funding program as a
result of assets which failed to materialize, but these assets
were beyond the control of the Army to have any influence on
it.
might explain what 1 mean by that.
Under the Mutual Security Program, the Army provides some
of its equipment right out of its inventory to assist our allies.
We are normally reimbursed for that equipment so that we can
replenish our inventories. The total amount of assets which we
felt we should get did not materialize, and 164 million of the
382 were used to coves that particular deficit. $43.4 million
of the total of 382 will be used for modernization. This
amount will be used to increase the Army's fiscal 1960
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
260
direct obligational program and it will be used in our so-called
PEMA budget which is the Procurement of Equipment and Missiles
Army. $175 million of the 382 has been placed in reserve
by the Bureau of the Budget for future contingencies. That
gives the complete status of the total amount appropriated
by the Congress in the Fiscal Year 1960 budget.
Senator Stennis. What was the last figure?
General Lemnitzer. $175 million.
Mr. Weisl. Has been put in reserve?
General Lemnitzer. Has been placed in reserve by the Bureau
of the Budget for future contingencies.
Mr. Why hasn't the Bureau released that when
it was the clear intent of Congress to use that money to mod-
ernize your Army?
General Lemnitzer. I can't answer that. You will have
to ask the Bureau of the Budget.
Mx. Weld, Did you protest against the reserving of that
limey/ not using it for modernization?
General Lemnitzer. We have requested on a number of
occasionss but we have been informed of the decision and we ac-
cept it.
Mx. Weisl. Are you satisfied with the rate of moderniazation
of the Army?
General Lemnitzer. NO, I dsn't think it is normal for
anyone in my particular position to be satisfied with the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
261
bd3 rate.
Mx. Weis].. I know that.
General Lemnitzer. And I would like to see the rate
increased.
Mx. Weis'. is it just because you would like to see it
or is it because as the responsible Chief of Staff of the United
States Army, you think it is urgent that it be increased?
Genera/ Lemnitzer. I would like to see the mte of
modernization increased. I would like to have the most modern
Army throughout the entire structure that our new resourceE
that is the types of equipment which we have developed, will
produce.
(:) Mr. Weisl. isn't it more than a statement that you would
like to have it? Don't you feel that you ought to have it and
that kis urgent that you have it?
General Lemnitzer. Yes, I think that is almost a
synonymous statement. Certainly i'd like to have it because
/ think we need it.
Mx. Weisl. At our last hearing last year, when the 1960
Fiscal budget was presented? your predecessor, General Taylor,
had certain reservations. Specifically he had reservations
(:) as to the speed of the Army modernization and the size of
the Army modernization, and the antimissile missile Nike-Zeus
program, the personnel strength of the active Army and reserve
(:)
forces, and the Army's surface to air missile program.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
262
Those were his reservations. Those were his Objections
to the budget provided for the Army.
Would you like to comment on that?
General Lemnitzer. I will answer the question. I
mentioned modernization generally already. We regard it as
one of our most pressing problems. I understand the problems
which are involved in making more resources available to the
Army for this purpose. So / won't dwell any more on moderni-
zation.
It is a very important part of our program and what we
are trying to do.
Mr. Weisl. Do you have reservations on Army modernization
in fiscal budget 1961?
General Lemnitzer. I wouldn't express it as a reservation.
We prepare a program. We submit it, and the people who have
the responsibility of making the allocations of resources
throughout the Defense Department have their problems to
consider, and I accept the decisions that they have made
with respect to modernization.
Mr. Weisl. I know that you accepted the decisions, but did
the decisions meet your requirements?
General Lemnitzer. The decisions did not meet what we
recommended, and I would say that we, established the
recommendation on the basis of what we thought was required.
Now with respect to the anttmissile missile, this is a
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
263
very controversial subject. There are differing views on it.
Insofar as the specific details are concerned, I think here
again I would like to discuss the details in executive
session.
I can say in open session here that the problems with
our antimissile missile, the Nike-Zeus, is primarily in the
field of technical problems, whether or not the Nike-zeus
can or cannot do certain things, whether it will meet all the
requirements that Nike-Zeus is being brough along for.
So it is in the technical field now that the primary differences
of opinion prevail.
The scientists available to the Department of the Army
and a great many of the scientists who have made evaluations
have differing views on this, and those who have to make the
decisions as to how fast to proceed with Nike-Zeus consulted
them all and made the decisions on the basis of the overall
recommendations.
Now I would like to shift to the military side of an
antimissile missile.
I don't believe that anyone, anyone who has even the
most elemental understanding of the problem of the ICBM era,
I don't think anyone could not fail to comprehend the importance
of having an effective antimissile missile such as the Nike-
Zeus.
Now as to why this is important from a military point of
view, except the Obvious one that we would like to shoot
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
264
down as many incoming missiles if we are ever subjected
to a missile attack, I think that is Obvious.
The more detailed military reasons I would like to
discuss in executive session. However, yesterday we had our
fourth successful Nike-Zeus missile firing at White Sands:
and it was a very successful one. It pertained only to the
nissile. / would not want to give the impression that I
was talking about the entire Nike-Zeus easpons system. But
this is a very: very gratifying thing to those of us in the
Army and all the scientists and industrialists who are working
on this problem.
So we are moving ahead.
I think I should say here in open session that Nike-Zeus is a
going concern. The prOblen at present relates to how
fast we shall go: and I would like to make it clear to the other
members of the committee we are moving at the fastest possible
speed in the research and development field. The differences
of opinion which have arisen in the consideration of this:
which is incidentally one of the most difficult technical
problems ever undertaken by this or any other country, is
whether or not we will move into the field of what we refer to
as pre-production.
That is whether we should invest money now in developing
the kinds of machines that can make some of the equipment
which we presently know will be required to produce a Nike-Zeus
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
265
bd7 missile system.
Mr. Weisl. Generale were the requirements that you
recommended for the speedy development and researching of the
Nike-Zeus complied with?
General Lemnitzer. / am not clear as to what you are
after in this.
Mr. Weisl. I mean did you ask for more money than was
given to you for the research and development of Nike-Zeus?
General Lemnitzer. I presume you are talking about the
Fiscal 61 budget?
Mr. Weisl. Yes.
General Lemnitzer. The facts are that we asked for $323
million for research and development. We had a total of
$287 million approved. In order that you may comprehend,
however, what the difference is, the difference lies primarily
in the field of training.
The authorities who, the proper authorities Who made the
decisions in this casee considered that inasmuch as we were
not yet going into production or pre-production on Nike-
Zeus, that funds should not properly be allocated at this
time for training purposes.
Mr. Weisl. Did you agree with that?
General Lemnitzer. No, we recommended that we do go into
the training field, because we thought that there could be
a good many things learned in the early days of the program.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
266
We could Obtain valuable training information that would
guide us in our later training which we would have to go
into sooner or later.
Mr. Weisl. After the Congress heard or was aware of the
need for the Nike-Zeus, in the fiscal budget of 1960, $137 million
was provided for those pre-production facilities, and we
understand none of that money has been used, even though it
has been appropriated.
General Lemnitzer. That $157 million is in research and
is a part of the $175 million which / mentioned earlier.
Mr. Weisl. Why wasn't the $137 million that was appropria-
ted and recommended by the Army used?
General Lemnitzer. Because the decision was made not to go
into preproduction.
Mr. Weisl. Do you agree with that decision?
General Lemnitzex. We recommended that we go into
preproduction.
Senator Stennis. Themis some confusion about these figures.
Well, when you say $137 million you mean the Nike-Zeus
funds of $137 million, is that correct?
Mr. Weis. Yes, sir.
Senator Stennis. You disagreed with that decision?
General Lemnitzer. I prefer to put it on the basis that
this is what we recommended. We believed in it.
Senator Stennis. Don't you think it is urgent and
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
267
essential or was urgent and essential that the money
be used so that if you made the break through you would be
ready to produce?
General Lemnitzer. If we didn't believe in it we would
never have recommended it.
Mr. Weisl. You do believe in it now too?
General Lemnitzer. Yes.
Mr. weisi. Have you requested that money be released?
General Lemnitzer. We have.
Mr. Weis'. as that been denied?
General Lemnitzer. Yes, it has.
Mr. Weisl. By whom?
General Lemnitzer. We were informed by the Department of
Defense.
Mr. Weisl. Would you consider it a most serious situation
to the security of this country if the Russians could come
up with an antimissile missile before w do?
General Lemnitzer. I would say it would be most serious,
most serious.
Mr. Weisl. Would you care to discuss in open session
whether the Russians have been working on an antimissile
missile?
General Lemnitzer. I think I should discuss the details
in closed session.
I would say this. / cannot believe that they are not
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
268
bd10 working on such a system.
Mr. Weis'. Do you believe in the same way that General
Taylor testified e that the budget should be on a functional
(:) basis rather than on a vertical basis.
General Lemnitzer, I don't know what General Taylor
testified. I know what you mean when you talk about the
functional budgets and / would discuss it in terms since
don't know what General Taylor said, I would be prepared to
answer you on what my understanding of what the functional
budget is. My understanding is that the money would be
allocated to functions within the Defense Department.
By that 1 mean there would be a certain percentage of
(:) the total defense budget would go to our massive retaliation
function.
There would be another segmextof it that would go to our
air defense function, and so on. There are different people
who break the functions down into different segments, but
those two are quite clear, and I think illustrate what we
are talking about.
We have looked at this in the Department of the Army
and have felt that this would be a desirable approach, but
there would have to be a considerable amount of overhaul
and changing of our present fiscal procedures, the procedures
(2) particularly.
Now I believe since the Army originally raised this
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
269
bdll question that there has been a number of steps that have
been taken toward this end.
I believe both in the Defense Department, as a matter of
fact indeed within the Army itself, that we are able now to
give a better answer to how much momey we are devoting to
given functions. X am not advocating the overhauling of
our fiscal procedures for the strict adoption of a functional
budget. I would think that we would do well if we were
proposing to move into this area, to take some clearcut area
such as air defense: for example? and try it out, and then
from the experience gained determine the size of it: the
magnitude of the changes which would be involved in the
governmental fiscal structure in order to attain the
objectives.
mr. Weisl. What is the 1961 fiscal budget based on a
functional basis or on a vertical basis? so much for the
Army, so much for the Navy, so much for the Air Force?
General Lemnitzer. It was broken down as is required by
the Congress. Each service presents its own budget and was
broken down Army, Navy and Air Force. But / do know that
within the Defense Department they are able to inciate how
much of the Armes budget goes to air defense, for example,
and how much of the Air Force and Navy budget goes to the
same function.
Mr. Weisl. And it was really done on a vertical basis
, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
270
bd12 and not on a functional basis?
(:) General Lemnitzer. Not strictly on a functional
basis. It followed the pattern that fits our fiscal organi-
zation and procedures.
Mr. Weisl. General Taylor testified that one of the
reasons for interservice rivalry and the battle fox a slice
of the pie was this: He said there is a budget ceiling
fixed, and that each year after year the Budget Director or
whoever it is, the Department of Defense says Air force
gets 21%0 Army gets 14%, Navy gets so much per cent. As a
result of this, it causes this interservice struggle for funds
for their individual services, and results in the loss of
(:) confidence by the public in the efficiency of the operations
of the Devense Department.
Do you agree with that?
General Lemnitzer. In the first place, the percentages
you mentioned are not correct.
Mr. Weisl. I didn't have them before me. But he said the
percentages had been about the same each year.
General Lemnitzer. The percentages indeed have been
the same for the past 5 or 6 years.
(.7) Mr. Weis'. Even though modern warfare crosses
service lines.
General Lemnitzer. Yes, of course it crosses service
lines, but I would like to say we have felt in the Army with
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
271.
bd13 the changing pattern of warfare that the service percentage
allocations that were proper in 1954 should vary to fit the
technology and the developments in warfare: with special
emphasis as / pointed out before, the Army felt possibly
that it could use and should have more in the field of raising
our limited war capability.
Now this is our fiscal system, six.
Each of the services have the organization and they are
set up around the world to handle their fiscal procedures
and prepare their budgets and also to implement those budgets
as they are approved.
So if you are going to change that, you are going to have
to change some of the basic structures not only of the Defense
Department but of the individual services.
would like to say I do not see for a moment why if each
service makes an honest effort to get as much resources
as it can to accomplish its assigned missions and functions,
why it should then generate any loss of confidence in anybody's
mind.
I feel that there is no difference involved here than there
is in business. Everyone likes to have the best, the most
effective and efficient organization that they can get.
And so it is with those of us in the service.
think we would run pretty poor organizations if we
weren't pressing to get as much resource so that we could
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
272
bd14 have the best Army, Navy or Air Force.
Odon't for a minute see why this should generate any lack
of confidence in our military structure.
Mr. Weis)... / am sure that s so, and there was no intent
to criticize the Army or the Air Force or the Navy for asking
for as much as they could get.
General Lemnitzer. But the charge is frequently made,
sir.
Mr. Weisl. General Taylor testified that the reason that the
charge is frequently made is that when there is a difference of
opinion among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to the
statistics, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs usually decides in
favor of that service from which he came, and he gave illus-
trations, which I won't repeat, with whidh you are undoubtedly
familiar.
And he said the general public says, "Well, my God, if
these fellows caret agree among themselves, and if the
chairman who is supposed to be the arbitrator in most cases
sides with the service from which he came, is that the right
way of doing business or running any business?"
General Lemnitzer. There are a lot of ifs in that
question, but 1 think I know what you are getting at.
The Charge is made that there are differences of
opinion in the Joint Chiefs, and indeed there are. I just
don't see how any group of men that is confronted with the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
273
bd15 complexities of our present military problem could fail to
have differences of opinion. I am not so much concerned
with differences of opinion in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
It will be a sorry day for this country when there aren't
honest open differences of opinion.
Mr. Weisl. I am sure everyone agrees with that.
General Lemnitzer. But here again you get into the field
where the Joint Chiefs are criticized for having differences of
opinion on very far-reaching questions.
Mr. Weis], Not at all.
General Lemnitzer. Yes, it is.
Mx. Weisl. Not as far as the committee is concerned.
The criticism that was leveled was not leveled by us. It was
leveled by General Taylor v your predecessor, and he said
that the facts show that there have been so many split
decisions where there was a difference of opinion, and that
the eiidence tended to show that the Chairman, who was supposed
to be the arbitrator, in most cases decided with the
service from which he came, and he produced statistics to
prove that.
And he said that is the reason that a suspicion exists
that the fellow is supposed to be the arbitrator and doesn't
arbitrate but decides in favor of the service from which he
came, and to which he goes back after he finishes his term
with the Joint Chiefs.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
274
bd16 General Lemnitzer. I am not sure you have stated the
(:) premise accurately. I don't regard the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as the arbitrator. He is the presiding officer
(:) and he engages in the discussions with us. He like we have to
fall back on his own experience. And I know that there are
those who are advocating somewhat of a different system.
Someone makes the Chairman the final authority when
there is a difference of opinion in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. With this I would not agree.
Mr. Weisl. This is what General Taylor says in his
book:
"Thus, the Chairman has come to be a sort of party whip;
(:) charged with conveying the official line to the Chiefs, in
the hope and expectations that they will be guided thereby in
their actions. The debate usually became a heated dialogue
between the Chairman and me", referring to himself,
"in which neither succeeded in persuading the other."
General Lemnitzer. I would like to move it up to the
present time and my own experience as Chief of Staff. I do not
regard General Twining and I am sure he doesn't regard
himself as I think you said the party whip.
(:) Senator Wiley. Heart hear.
Mr. Weisl. Those are the words that General Taylor
(:) used, not I.
General Lemnitzer. I don't regard General Twining and
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
-476
I'm sure he doesn't regard himself as the party whip.
Just what occurred during the period that General Taylor is
referring to, I was not present and so I can't answer. It is
definitely, however, net the situation that prevails today with
General Twining as the Chairman.
Mr. Weisl. Who was the Chairman when General Taylor was
there?
General Lemnitzer. Admiral Radford.
Mr. Weisl. Was General Twining also the chairman when
General Taylor was there?
General Lemnitzer. For part of the time, yes.
Mr. Weisl. Then he cites 23 splits during the period
in which General Taylor served, and in all those splits, the
Army was supported 3 times and rejected 20 times. The Army
didn't have a chairman of the Joint Chiefs, did they?
General Lemnitzer. Not during that period. The Army
did have a chairman, General Bradley, General of the Army.
Omar Bradley was the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
Senator Wiley. That really disproves the statement then.
You said that Bradley and the rest of them whipped them
into line.
Mr. WeisI. This wasn't Bradley. Bradley was not the chief.
Senator Wiley. I see.
Senator Stennis. Proceed.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
276
General Lemnitzer. I'm sure that the record that you
read in General Taylor's book is the correct record of the
split papers and the way that decisions went.
I happen to have been with General Taylor during a part
of that time? and it was of course disappointing and discourag-
ing to us to have the record go this way. I think it is
understandable.
Mr. Weis 1. Yes. Now may I change the questioning a bit?
As you know the President on January 14 submitted to
Congress a plan providing for the transfer of the development
operations divisions of the Army Ballistic Agency to the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
What is the Army's position concerning this transfer?
General Lemnitzer. I think I can give you the attitude
of the Army on this transfer by reading --
Senator Stennis. Excuse mer counsel has used up his
time. It appears to the Chair that this testimony and par-
ticularly this question we are coming to is of vital importance.
It is new, and if we could just waive the rule as to him and
let the general proceed.
Senator Young. May I give him the 10 minutes alloted to
me?
Senator Stennis. Al]. right. We perhaps had better
follow the regular routine. Do you want to make a unanimous
consent request?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
277
Senator Young. I request that counsel may have my 10
minutes.
Senator Case. I object to that. I think counsel ought
to have as much time as he needs.
Senator Stennis. Let him proceed indefinitely. All
right, that will be done by unanimous consent. Thank you.
General Lemnitzer. I think the answer to your question
can best be summed up in the press release which Secretary
Brucker and I made on the 21st of October at the time the
decision was announced, and I would like to read it.
"The President's decision to ask Congress to approve
the transfer of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency's development
operations division to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration is intended to preserve this team as a
national asset for the national good, and as such the Army
wholehartedly supports the decision. We will male every effort
to effect the transfer as smoothly, efficiently and with as
little disruption as we effected the transfer of the jet propul-
sion laboratory at Pasadena, California, from the Army to the
Aeronautics and Space Administration early this year. The
objective is to effect the transfer without losing a day in
our important national space effort. At present there are
very few details worked out, and we will collaborate closely
with NASA and the Department of Defense to work them out as
rapidly as possible."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
278
We have made great progress along that line since. Going
on to the announcement:
"It is with a great deal of pride in the Army contribution
to the nation's space effort that we turn over this portion
of the Army ordnance missile command to NASA. Under NASA
we are sure this magnificent and loyal group of men, headed
by Dr. Wexner Von Braun, will turn in many more firsts in the
missile and space age to the credit of the United States
and the free world."
Mr. Weisl. Thank you. Will the Army be able to continue
to discharge its responsibilities in the development of its
missile systems if the Development Operations Division of the
Army Ballistic Agency is transferred to NASA?
General Lemnitzer0 lies, we feel that we will, and
fox this reason. In working out the cooperative agreement
on which we made a great deal of progress, there are provisions
which will make the Dr. Von Braun team or the development
operations division available to the Army for such assistance
as they can provide.
They will be responsive, still responsive not only to
the Army's requirements, but to the Navy and Aix Force as
well, if they have any.
Mr. Weisl. Have any problems developed thus far in
conjunction with this transfer to VASA? Has there been any
disruption of Army programs and so forth?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1279
bd22 General Lemnitzer. So far as I know, there hasn't been
(:) an hour's disruption.
Mr. Weisl. -There is a resolution before the Congress
(:) proposing to make this transfer effective immediately.
Is it feasible to male actual transfer to NASA of all facili-
ties, personnel and funds immediately?
Genera/ Lemnitzer. As we testified yesterday, it is not
feasible to make the transfer effective immediately. Such a
transfer involving so much millions of dollars and so many
people/ there are some 4200 involved, will require time and
we have worked out a plan, which I am prepared to give this
committee if they wish it, to effect a smooth, effective and
(:) efficient transfer, but the transfer will n)t be completed
until about July 1. This is completely acceptable to the
Department of the Army, Department of Defense and NASA. We
feel that this is the logical way of doing it.
Now insofar as this particular legislation is concerned, there
is one facet which is important. You are dealing with 4200
men- and women at Huntsville: and as long as this legislation
remains in the air, so to speak, and until Congress?
either goes along with the transfer in accordance with the
President's recommendation or not, there is a degree of
(:) uncertainty in their minds as to where they stand.
In this respect: the earlier this matter is settled,
(:) the better.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
280
bd23 From a practical viewpoint, the completion of the
transfer, the phasing of all of this equipment and the
change-over in management is going to take until
about Ally 1 anyway.
Mr. Weisl. Then do you favor the resolution that has been
introduced by the Congress to transfer these services immediate-
ly?
General Lemnitzer. In answer, Secretary Brucker and I
testified yesterday we have no objection to it.
Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, when would the transfer be
effective in the ordinary course, if no action were taken
by Congress?
Mr. Weisl. March 13.
General Lemnitzer. March 14. But it is not so much
the actual transfer. What I am trying to explain here is
from the practical point of view the transfer cannot be
made on any given date. It more or less will be in process over
a period of days, weeks and months.
Senator Stennis. You refer to the physical transfer.
What you would like to see though is to get the matter
settled, so that the uncertainty will be removed?
General Lemnitzer. I would say that the settlement of
this matter is important, from the viewpoint of the 4200
individuals who are involved. This great national asset
there has been a great deal of uncertainty as to what is going
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd24 to happen to it: and I feel that the sooner the matter is
settled as an issue, the better.
Mr. Weisl. Did the joint Chiefs of Staff make any
recommendation on whether to proceed with the Nike-Zeus
281 \
program?
General Lemnitzer. Yes: six.
Mx. Weisi. What was the recommendation?
General Lemnitzer. It was a split recommendation. The
Army was for going ahead with the pre-production in Nike-
Zeus. The other services were opposed.
Mr. Weisl. So it was 2 to one against it?
General Lemnitzer. That is correct.
(:) Mr. Weisl. Was it the .Secretary of Defense who froze
the $137 million for Nike-Zeus pre-production or the Bureau of
the Budget?
General Lemnitzer. After having technical evaluations made
by groups of scientists: after hearing our discussion and
presentation and those of the other services, he decided not
to go into production, and the funds were put in reserve.
Mr. Weisl. Who decided it?
General Lemnitzer. The Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Weisl. Thank you.
(:) Senator Stennis. Apparently we are going to have a vote:
but back on this matter of the transfer now: you spoke very
eloquently, General:, 1 thought, with reference to the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
282
b25 wholehearted support of the Army in the transfer and
(:) also I was watching your words closely, you gave it your
wholehearted support in future operations.
(:) General Lemnitzer. Yes, sir.
Senator Stennis. Now you are pledging not only yourself
and your present associates but you are pledging all
the Army to just such a sentiment as thats is that correct?
General Lemnitzer. Yes, that is correct.
Senator Stennis. I commend you very highly because I
know that this is not a small matter.
It has been in the debating stage for years within your
circles. Now I have been there for the first time in the last
60 days, and as I get it now you have 4500 people, personnel/
most of Whom are located at Huntsville?
General Lemnitzer. And Cape Canaveral we have a few.
Senator Stennis. And the uncertainty that you refer to
there is not a dissatisfaction/ not any backbiting about it,
but it is just to make certain what the situation is going
to be where they are going to actually do the dayps work,
and items of that kind, is that correct?
General Lemnitzer. That's right.
It will settle what their futures are going to be.
Senator Stennis. Yes, and these are career people many
of them are. Some are scientists and engineers and of that
type.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
283
bd26 Senator Stennis. I'm sorry, we will have to take a
(:) recess now for the purpose of going to vote.
We expect to return immediately and ask you some more
(:) questions.
(Short recess.)
Senator Stennis. May we have quiet please? I had asked
just two or three questions and I shall certainly confine
myself inside the total of 10 minutes and we will continue on
then as rapidly as we can with the 10 minute limitation
so as to get to the different Senators.
General, I had mentioned the transfer of authority and
your very Rine wholehearted support by the Army in the
transfer and the wholehearted support in the operations/ and you
(:)
said you had pledged not .only yourself but the Army as a group,
and I commended you very highly fox that.
You do not anticipate any entangling trouble in this
transfer? The only thing you axe concerned about now is just
bo make certain so that the personnel will understand where
they are going and who they will be responsible to, and kindred
matters?
denerai Lemnitzer. That is correct. We have a deep
interest in the personal welfare and the future of this
(:) organization, every one of them.
Senator Stennis. If you will permit me to go just a little
(:) further, because in the Space Committee this time this project
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bil27
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
284
will be involved in the authorization bill for the money on
the Appropriations Committee. Of course those funds now
will have to be authorized and appropriated in the MASA
program.
Now is there going to be any involved complicatione there
about certain supporting services that you have rendered here-
tofore, I mean that the Army has rendered heretofore to the
project, and is there a clearcut dividing line established
already for Fiscal 61 as to those funds?
General Lemnitzer. No, we don't think so, for the reason
that in the cooperative agreement which we are working out
in detail, and we have had experience in this regard since we
transferred the jet propulsion laboratory -- so we do have
etis background of experience.
This cooperative agreement will provide for certain
supporting services which the Army will provide Redstone,
because there is no intention to move the facility or the
people out of there.
Naturally the Army, since it runs the overall installation,
will be called upon to provide certain services such as
foundry services, perimeter security, utility services,
and we have worked out an arrangement whereby they will
reimburse us for the cost of those services.
Senator Stennis. So it won't involve cross lines in the
appropriations under that plan?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
as
bd28 General Lemnitzer. I don't think so.
(:) Senator Stennis. There is some question about which
service will occupy certain buildings down there. Have those
(:) matters been considered, and do you think they have been
straightened out?
General Lemnitzer. I am sure they are. The main office
building we are going to both occupy until NASA can make the
arrangements which it desires.
Senator Stennis. All right now about the airlift for the
Army, it is a matter of concern to many, I am sure it is to
you. I believe in quick striking power. I am a small war
man in a way, because I think that those matters are going
to vex us a long timer trotible spots,whether it is war or
(:)
not, like Lebanon. I know there is a good deal of concern
about your not having -- just what airlift do you have for
your men and material on a quick call?
Do you have enough now, and is the arrangement satis-
factory for you to take care of a divas ion, we will say?
Would you hit the main points and then give your comment?
General Lemnitzer. Unless you define specifically the
number of troops and the circumstances under which they would
move and where they would move, you can't answer this cate-
gorically yes or no.
I would like to attempt to give a picture of where we
(:) stand in this regard.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
286
bd29 The Army considers that emergencies can occur, possibly
(:) will occur which would require the economic movement of any
of forces ranging from a battle group in the order of about
(:) 7 to /500 or 1700 men to two divisions. This is the general
magnitude of the problem. Now you have asked about a division.
Our available airlift assets are distributed worldwide at
present. If circumstances permitted an alert of these forces
so that they could be concentrated where we wanted to lift our
troops from, if we had ample warning: I believe that we
could assemble -- I say we. It is the responsibility of the
Air Force to provide this airlift.
I think the Air Force could assemble airlift to move
the major part of the combatant elements of that division
with its , with most of its equipment. There is certain types
of equipment which we have in a division are too big for air-
lift and would come along following by sealift.
That is the first area of difficulty, whether we have
this warning. If we don't have the warning, it is going to
take time to assemble this aircraft. We feel in the Army
that if we had more lift available, we would have greater
flexibility: and we probably would have greater resources
available here in the United States to move our forces, so this
is the issue.
Senator Case. Would it be appropriate to ask the
length of time required to assemble the aircraft?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
z87
General Lemnitzer. This would depend upon the number
of aircraft that would have to be assembled for a division:
I don't know. My estimate wouldle up to the order of up to
a weeks 5 dayso to assemble the aircraft to lift a divisions
that is what I'm talking about now.
Senator Stennis. Tell us what you mean by being avail-
able? Does that mean standing by ready for that, or is it
being used for something else and you have got to convert?
General Lemnitser. It is being used for training purposes
and we require a considerable amount for thats and they also
have their training activities within the Air Force.
Now this is one of the troublesome points in this field:
when an emergency arises which requires the movement,
the rapid airlift of a division to a given area of the
worlds it normally generates other airlift requirements.
If the Army has to move some remote part of the world
and go into combat, it needs air support. I am talking about
reconnaissance, close air supports fighter bomber support.
What I am saying is that the tactical Air Force also has a
considerable airlift requirement. And the if you do have an
emergency which causes this kind of a movement to be required,
you may have to want to regroup part of your strategic air
command. They also should take up positions in readiness,
depending upon the nature of the situation.
The very emergency which generates the requirement to
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
288
bd3/ move Army forces requires simultaneously the requirement to
(:) move other forces.
Senator Stennis. Perhaps the Navy might call on you
(:) about the same time for some airlift.
General Lemnitzer. That is true. And I don't like to
answer a question on that basis, but I am attempting here to
show you the complicated nature of the problem, and if we
had greater resources, we would have greater flexibilities,
and we would have more assuredness that we would have the
lift to move promptly the forces which we feel might be
moved.
Senator Stennis. And then you can make your plans on how
(:) to anticipate various emergencies better, if you had this
assurance?
General Lemnitzer. We do make these plans.
Senator Stennis. I know you do, but if you had more
assurance of more airpower, it would give you a wider latitude
in making plans.
General Lemnitzer. It would be a greater degree of our
assuredness of our getting the airlift in the time that we
mould like to get it. Now I mould like to say this. Our
strategic Army Corps is ready for an immediate movement.
By that I mean in the matter of an hour. The leading elements
of our divisions that are on a standby basis, the 101st
Airborne Division at Fort Campbell and the 82nd Airborne
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd32
C
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
409
Division at Fort Bragg, the Fourth Division at Fort Lewis,
Washington have alert units which are ready to move in the matter
of an hour.
Senator Saltonstall. Would the Senator yield for a
question?
Senator Stennis. On the subject? Allright.
Senator Saltonstall. 1 think I know your answer, General/
you don't want the Army to have a separate airlift of its
own as opposed to the Air Force. You are satisfied with the
present arrangement if you can get enough planes and get
them quick enough, ts that right?
General Lemnitzer. That is correct. The Army is
definitely not recommending taking over the function of provid-
ing tactical and strategic airlift.
Senator Stennis. My time is virtually up. You may
proceed on that same subject matter if you want to.
Senator saltonstall. Mr. Chairman/ that is the only
question I wanted to ask. I have a few others, but will you
finish?
Senator Stennis. On this airlift you have made this
clearer than I have heard it before. There is no question
of command here or anything of that kind. This would be
air power that would be in the Air Force's 'control, but
what you want is capacity, and assured capacity under most
circumstances?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd33
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
290
General Lemnitzer. We are interested in capacity. We
amalso interested in modernizing airlift I guess the Army
is for modernizing all of our Armed Forces but we are
particularly interested in modernizing also0 I think my
description here would be incomplete if I didn't make this
comment: The ideal situation from our viewpoint would be
to have a given nuMber of air units earmarked and readily
available for an emergency upon which we knew we could count
in case of an emergency.
Now the concept of handling of our airlift requirements
for the reasons that I have just indicated is that the alloca-
tion of airlift to move, for example, the Strategic Army
Corps, the Tactical Air Force, Strategic Air Command, the
Navy or Maxine Corps is held in a pool, and the allocation
will be made bythe Joint Chiefs of Staff or recommended to
the Secretary of Defense on the basis of the situation then
existing.
Now you can see that this puts an element of doubt
in availability, depending upon the situation.
Senator Stennis. But now considering our worldwide
commitments and in making your plans, you need the assurance
that under most any circumstances you could get enough air-
lift to transfer at least a division, is that correct,
a minimumof a division?
General Lemnitzer. We set our sights a bit higher.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1 291
bd34 From a battle group to 2 divisions is our estimate that
(:) we would feel better if we had that airlift available.
Senator Stennis. And you would want that to be available
within a few hours or not over two days ox just what period?
(:)
General Lemnitzer. A matter of days, a few days; the
fewer the better.
Senator Stennis. May / illustrate? In the Lebanon
situation the Army was up in North Italy, some of your units as
I recall. They came down later and some 3 weeks later. Now
that might have been a part of your plan in that case. But
should it have been a part of the plan for the Army to go
in there, you would have wanted that within a matter of
hours in that case, would you not?
General Lemnitzer. We had it available in a matter of
hours, and I would like to explain the situation, because
many mistaken interpretations have been given to it that the
Army did not arrive in there until a considerable period
later.
The Army moved from Germany into Adana, Turkey, in a
matter of hours, but the situation that developed upon the
landing in Lebanon did not require their presence, but
they were within a very few miles from the area, and if
(:) required they could have been moved right on in there in a
O matter of hours.
Senator Stennis. By airlift?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd35
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
292
General Lemnitzer. By airlift.
Senator Stennis. All right. Senator Saltonstall?
Senator Saltonstal/. General, I didn't hear all of your
testimony this morning because I was listening to your co-
partner, Admiral Burke of the Navy.
General Lemnitzer, General Taylor was on this morning.
I am a newcomer. I arrived at 2 Welock.
Senator Saltonotall. Let me ask you this following up
what Senator Stennis asked, and then I have just one or
two questions.
One thing that always made we uncertain about the airlifts
of course the Army gives it a very high priority. The Air
Force gives a lower priority. The Aix Force as I understand
will move their strategic, their SAC logistics before they
expect the Army to be ready to move itself.
Now have you worked out any scheme or are you satisfied
with the present arrangements there in case there is a general
war that you would get sufficiently high priority in moving
the division so that you would get it where you were ordered
to go at a proper time?
General Lemnitzer. Under present concepts, we don't have
a final answer on this. This will be determined by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. I should say this, however,
(:) within the Strategic Air Command, they have a certain
amount of what refer to as organic airlift.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
293
bd36 It is a part of the air wings. But whether or not their.
priority from available troop carrier and MATS type of air-
lift was made available would also rest in the hands of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This would not be a unilateral decision made by the
Strategic Air Command or indeed by the Air Forces because this
whole pool will be allocated by the joint Chiefs of Staff.
Senator Saltonstall. So it is an overall decision
of which the Army would be just one part?
General Lemnitzer. That is correct.
Senator Saltonstall. New Mr. Vance tolls me that you
stated that you are satisfied with the new space set up, so
I won 7t go into that.
I had that down to ask you.
General Lemnitzer. We so testified yesterday. We did
not recommend this one, but I read the statement that
Secretary Brucker and I put out at the time the decision
was made, and we are supporting it wholeheartedly and we
are expediting the transfer.
Senator Saltonstall. And are you satisfied with the budget
arrangements and the position of Secretary Gates with
relation to the Nike-Zeus?
General Lemnitzer. This question was discussed earlier
here, sir.
Senator Saltonstall. I understand that it was.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
294
bd37 General Lemnitzer. I explained that there is a difference
of opinion on this. It is primarily in the field of technical
evaluation of whether or not the Nike-Zeus is now ready to go
into production or pre-production: getting ready for
production.
This is where the area of controversy comes in. I pointed
out that from a military point of view, and in the light of
what has been discussed before this committee: the desirability
of having an effective antimissile missile of the Nike-Zeus
type: there can be no doubt about that from the military
point of view.
So this decision: the Secretary heard the various
evaluations made by groups of eminent scientists. There were
differences of opinion within the scientists. He heard our
views, those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he made the
decision that we would not now go into preproduction as the
Army recommended. And we accept that decision.
Senator Saltonstall. The problem thatSenator Stennis
and I and others on the Appropriations Committee face every
year, as I see it, is to balance the top priorities between
defensive weapons and the top rpriorities between r
offensive weapons, and the great problem is to decide how
much to put into defense when we have got these overall
problems of offense, of building up the Strategic Air Force,
the missiles: the new procurement of the Army and so on.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd38
C
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1z95
That as then I see it is the overall problem that is
concerned with the Nike-Zeus.
Do you agree with that?
General Lemnitzer. The statement of the problem, yes, I
do. There are those who advocate devoting practically nothing
for defense. I yield to no man in my interest in and
advocacy of offense; but any offense, particularly with
our philosophy and our general concept, democratic principles
and so forth, I feel that under these circumstances we have
to have sufficient defense to insure that we are not knocked
out by a surprise attack.
So what I am saying is that of course, there must be
a balance between offense and defense. We have to have a
reasonable defense unless we are going to strike the first
blow, which I don't think we are going to do. So we must have
a reasonable defense in order to assure that we are not going
to be overwhelmed by a surprise attack.
Senator Saltonstall. I will try to put this in this simple
form, and maybe I oversimplify it. Axe you satisfied as the
Chief of Staff of the Army with the present method of making
top decisions?
General Lemnitzer. With the present system and organization.
Senator Saltonstall. And the Chiefs of Staff and the set-
ting up of an overall general in an area and those top drawer
decisions?
- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
296
General Lemnitzer. I am. I am. I think we have a
decision making mechanism that can work and does work0
realize that there have been criticisms that we may have
been slow in circumstances, and since I am a part of this
decision-making mechanism, I should say that some of the
decisions are not easy ones to make, and require a great deal
of detailed and ekhaustive study to be sure that we are making
the right one, because in this business if you make a wrong
decision, it maybe irrevocable.
Senator Saltonstall. And you do not think that there is
too much wasted time and wasted effort and too much indecision
or too many people involved. / would say with a smile that
I see your assistant has put a little prepared statement in
front of you. If you want to read that into the record, we
will be delighted to hear it.
General Lemnitzer. Those are my notes that I wrote up
on this before I came up here, but I don't need to read them.
Here we get into the matter of degree, most people are
heartily in favor of a quick decision so long as it goes their
way. I guess I am one of those. But I don't believe
that this is an area of quick decisions at the national level.
You have to make quick decisions in the field, you have to
make quick decisions in combat. But at the national level
I think that these decisions can be handled by the mechanism
which we have.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1497
bd40 I would be the last one to say that this mechanism
is functioning perfectly. I think we are improving it every
day.
Senator Saltonstal. Listening to the Army last year,
and listening to the Army this year, would you as the new
Chief of Staff, the principal problem of the Army is so fax
as the Congress is concerned, threefold. One, the procurement
of new weapons and sufficient funds.
Two, sufficient Ma0 to take care of your needs in your
camps, shingling and care of equipment.
Three, the question as to whether we are going ahead
fast enough with the Nike-Zeus. Those are the three principal
problems that the Army is concerned with, am I correct?
General Lemnitzer. These are three of our principal
problems, yes.
Senator Saltonstall. Those are top priority?
General Lemnitzex. The question of strength I would add to
it, fortunately this year the Army is not being reduced
in size, the active Army, and for this we are very happy.
Senator Saltonstall. And so far as organization or
changing of organization and that sort of things in listening
to you, you are satisfied with it?
General Lemnitzex. I am not satisfied entirely with it.
I think this is a proper organization for this country. I think
that improvements can be made in its functioning.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
298
bd41 I think one of the best steps that have been made
(1.1) recently is the directive in which Secretary Gates is promptly
informed of any differences of opinion in the Joint Chiefs
(:) of Staff, and he sits in with us and discusses these problems,
instead of permitting them to lie unsolved.
I think this is a very great step forward. I think what
you are getting at, is the question of whether this reorganiza-
tion which we went through as a result of legislation a year
ago, whether we should change this organization.
I don?t advocate it. I don t think that this organization
has had an opportunity to shake down and function in all
umpects. It takes months and months to put together the
joint staff Which support the Joint Chiefs under their new
responsibilities.
I would hope that there would be no attempts to reorganize
until this one has been really tested and tried, and I think
that we can do better than we are doing now and it is just
a matter of time.
We have in the military, at least in my service, a
saying that order, counterorder, order, disorder. I say
in the field of reorganization, organize, reorganize and if
you reorganize too much you get disorganization.
Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, my time is up.
I would ask one more question.
Senator Stennis. By unanimous consent you may.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
299
bd42 Senator Saltonstall. Your former command if you will
or responsibility was with foreign aid to a great degree.
Now this year for the first time we have put the mutual
assistance defense appropriation or military appropriations
over in the defense budget.
But we have left them as I understand it as a separate
appropriations to come in as a separate appropriation
and not to be included inthe overall $41600,000,000 or whatever
is the correct figure.
I would like from both your knowledge of the past and
your present knowledge to inquire whether you think that is
a good method?
If we are going to put mutual assistance defense into
the military budgets should it not be included in the overall
military expenditures and not be kept as a separate item
about which the Congress can debate separately?
General Lemnitzer. The recommendation to have the
military assistance side of the Mutual Security program
transferred to teh Defense Department was I believe a
recommendation of the Draper Committee* and I agreed with it.
Now you are asking the question as to whether or not
the money which is expended under the Military Assistance
program should be included in the defense budget. I recommend
against it for this reason: We have just been talking about
the advantages of functional budgets, and I think it is very
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
300
bd43 much better that everyone, both in the Defense Department,
in the Congress and throughout the country can see these two
amounts in their proper perspective rather than to mix them
Up.
I think that we would have some of the same problems
that we have and which were referred to here during the
discussion of the functional budget. I think Mr. Weisl
this is a good example, the functional budget on the
Mutual Security side should be kept separate.
The money that is being expended by our own Armed Services,
the Army, Navy and Air Force are separate entities and
I so recommend.
Senator Stennis, Senator Young?
Senator Young. General, shortly before we recessed to answer
a rollcall as X understood it, correct me if I am wrong, you
testified that you would hate to see the time when there would
not be differences of opinion expressed in the meetings of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. I judge from that, that you do '
believe that it is desirable for military officials to develop
and present their own ideas in the conference?
General Lemnitzer. I certainly do.
Senator Young. Reading in the New York Times of today
a transcript of President Eisenhower's news conference
on domestic and foreign matters, / note that in answer to
a question of Roland Evans of the New York Herald Tribune,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved ForRelease2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd44 the question is, so I don't take it out of context,
(:) will read the question:
"Mr. President, you mentioned the word deterrent in
your answer to that last question. Yesterday General Power
(:)
301
said that our deterrent of heavy bombers cannot be properly
safeguarded unless it is put on a full air alert. You
discussed this with us before,but in view of General Power's
testimony yesterday, would you give your view on that question?"
To which the President answered:
"No, there are too many of these Generals have all sorts
of ideas."
Well, General, you don't concur in that view, do you,
that boo many. Generals have all sorts of ideas?
Genera/ Lemnitzer. I think the problem here, Senator,
is where you discuss these. ideas and how and to whom they are
presented.
Senator Young. Yes. Well, in other words, to put it
more plainly, do you from your previous answers -- isn't it
a fact that you do believe that differences of opinion among
the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that differences
of opinion do not necessarily indicate parochial viewpoints?
And May I say I am a humble fellow from Puckerbrush
Township, Erie County, Ohio, and I wouldn't use the word
parochial in that connection. I would probably use the
word narrow or restricted. But regardless of that, will you
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
302
bd45 please answer my question?
(:) General Lemnitzer. I am not quite sure what the question
is.
(:) Senator Young. The question was very plain, very plain.
Do you believe that differences of opinion necessarily
indicate parochial viewpoints?
General Lemnitzer. / feel that military officers should
express to the proper authorities the views which they hold
regarding the responsibilities which they hold. That is how
I would answer that.
Senator Young. Coming right down, you said "That is
how I would answer the question". So, General, coming right
down to yourself, you do not consider military problems from
a parochial standpoint, do you?
General Lemnitzer. I hope I do not, Senator.
Senator Young. That is all.
Senator Stennis. Thank you.
Senator Saltonstall. Would the Chairman yield for one
observation, for clarification?
Senator Young. I dont have the floor. I surrendered
the floor.
(:) Senator Saltonstall. Would it be proper to add "with
tact"?
(:) Senator Stennis. Senator Wiley?
Senator Wiley. I want to compliment you, General.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1 303
I have listened with profit. See if I can briefly get
what I think your position is.
As fax as limited war is concerned, we are in an
adequate position to take care of it.
General Lemnitzer. I couldn't answer the question in
those terms. I think the test of time will determine our
our adequacy. I would say that we do have a considerably
limited wax capability, and I would like to emphasize here that
this is not only an Army responsibility. It is a responsibility
similarly of the Navy and the Air Force. I say that this country
has a considerable limited war capability. In certain areas
I would like to see our capabilities reenforced. We have
discussed the influence of airlift on that. So I am not
answering your question with respect to adequacy, because
I think the real test of adequacy is in the future when we deter-
mine what we may get into.
senator Wiley. Yes. It depends upon the size of the
limited war, but we have demonstrated since the last war any
time there was limited war we were there Johnny on the spot
weren't we?
General Lemnitzer. That is correct.
Senator Wiley. Now, in relation to an all out ware
there is a very serious question whether anybody or any nation
is adequate, is that right?
General Lemnitzer. I think it is pretty well understood
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd47 that in the case of a general war in a thermonuclear
C
304
exchange all nations will suffer heavilye very heavily.
Senator Wiley. Now that in your judgment has been the
chief deterrent in relationto the Kremlin?
Why hasn't it shot the works?
General Lemnitzer. Well, I would not be in a
position to answer that categorically, but I think one Cf
the reasons is the strength of this country and our allies.
I am speaking of overall strength and I am not speaking
only of military strength. I am speaking of eo)nomic strength,
the determination to use our strength if it is challenged.
Senator Wiley. You mentioned allies. Do you think a
matter of 200million Russian people who don't want war
figures in the matter at all in the minds of the leaders of
the Kremlin, who constitute about 6 million out of the 200
million?
General Lemnitzer. I take it that you mean do the rank
and file of the Russian people have the same influence on the
decision to go to war that our people have?
Senator Wiley. Then there is the other problem --
General Lemnitzer. I merely asked a question. I am
not sure what the question was. I understood your question
to be as to whether I regarded the rank and file of the
Russian people to have the same influence in this question
of going to war that way the people in the free world doe
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
305
bd48 where most of the countries at least are democratic countries.
Is that the question?
Senator Wiley. Well, that is one side of it. The other
question is what influence the attitude of the Russian people
now is and we know that there is considerably more. freedom
than there was, and what the attitude of the people themselves
would have as a deterrent.
General Lemnitzer. I am not able to evaluate the influ-
ence ow the deterrent effect of the attitude of the Russian
people.
As a general statement I don't think that in communist
controlled areas that the influence of the people is as
great at the national level as it is throughout the free
world.
Senator Wiley. Do you think that they have the information
as to what an all out war would mean to Russia?
General Lemnitzer. No, sir.
Senator Wiley. What do you think in the nature of a
deterrent is the attitude of the so-called captive nations
people? And I think there is 100 million of them. What I an
trying to get at is a complete picture why we havent gotten
into a war and will the same thing operate to keep us out of
a war, or will Khrushchev, for some reason or the other,
let the balloon go up.
I want your judgement not only as a General but as a man
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
306
bd49 of good judgment outside the military who knows the facts of
(:) life.
General Lemnitzer. Well, I think there are a good many
(:) factors involved and my opinion is probably not worth any
more than anyone else's in this regard, except I do feel that
military strength is a very important factor, a
very important factor.
I think the damage that might be done to what the Soviet
Union has been attempting to do since the revolution in 1917,
the destruction that would fall on all of their accomplishments
to date to a degree the attitude of their people -- I
happen personally to feel that the rank and file of the Russian
people don't want war any more than any other people. I
think it is a combination of all of these factors.
Senator Wiley. The combination of all of those plus the mil=
itaxy deterrent that you mentioned creates in your opinion:
does it, a real deterrent?
General Lemnitzer. Yes, I think it does.
Senator Wiley. Now considerable time was spent in
relation to the differences between the Army, Navy: Aix
Force and Chief of Staff. As I understand it, you are men
(:) of independent judgment. You stick by your guns, and then after
you have agreed on a conclusion: that is the conclusion of the
(2) group, is that it?
General Lemnitzer. No: I would state it in somewhat
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
307
bd50 different terms, our situation is that each of us present
our honest frank opinions to our superiors. We argue our
cases and points of view vigorously. We make the strongest
possible presentations we can, but those in proper authority
who have to make the decisions, having heard our presentations,
have to make a decision.
And when they make a decision, we accept it and we carry
it out and we do the very best we can with the resources
that are made available to us.
Senator Wiley. You have accepted then the decision of
those who have the overall decision to make?
General Lemnitzer. The overall responsibility to
made these decisions, yes.
Senator Wiley. And then you play ball as a team?
General Lemnitzer. Yes, we do.
Senator Wiley. Now let's assume that you have, as you
had some time ago in Lebanon-- for general rules let's take
the Pacific. If you had a fracas there you would have some
one who is the head of the Air and someone who is head of the
Navy and someone who is head of the Army forces, but by and
large there is an overall commander of the three, is there not?
General Lemnitzer. There is. Admiral Felt is Commander
in Chief Pacific and under Mg command he has 3 components,
Army, Navy and Air Force. / was the unified commander in the
Far East from 1955 to 1957. I was commander in chief Far East
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
bd51
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
308
and :mender In Chief United Nationsl Command and I also had
three components. Any operations conducted in that area
then or in the Pacific now would have been handled, would
have been under my direction up until 1957, and would now be
under the direction of Admiral Pelt.
This is what we cal/ a unified command.
Senator Wiley. In such a case you are all one team.
You aren't 3 teams?
General Lemnitzer. Without a dolibt.
Senator Wiley. And I think that is the thing that I want
to get out to the country, so they don't get the idea that there
is a disintegrating process in our Armed Services.
There is the same independence of thought there that you
have on the floor of the Senate, and you know the Senators
don't agree on everything. You notice that too, donet you?
General Lemnitzer. I have heard that, six.
But in the Pacific I would like to say, or anywhere
where we have a unified command, there is no such thing as
a ground war, a Naval war or an Air war. In those unified
command areas the services are mutually supported.
Senator Wiley. I think there is one thing that someone said
to me we shouldbear in mind, and it will only take a minute
or so. That nothing is static in life, and that includes the
method of war.
The old war of a few years ago, the tactics and everything
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
309
bd52 have been changed. And as a result it has, from the
standpoint of percentages, out the Army not in an inferior
(:)
position, third instead of at one time the Army was first.
(:) General Lemnitzer. / have never regarded services as being
first, second and third. It depends entirely upon the task
that has to be done.
In some instances there may be a greater requirement
for Naval or Air Forces, others Army or Navy forces and so
forth.
But the Mutual cooperation is required in modern warfare,
and I heartily agree with you that things are not static.
They are dynamicrand I dont believe that in the history
of military forces there has been a greater revolution in
(2) technology than thenDhas occurred in the last decade, and it
is up to those of us who hold our positions as the heads of our
respective services to change our organizations, our equipment,
our tactics, our methods, our doctrines to meet those new
and challenging requirements.
Senator Wiley. What I had in mind was not 1, 20 3 but
the figures show that you are at the lowest end of the cash,
is that right?
General Lemnitzer. Yes. This has been the pattern for the
(2) last 7 or 8 years. I will say since the Korean Wax. Since
then this has been the pattern.
Senator stennis. Thank you, Senator. As I understand
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
310
d53 the necessities of modern technology and modern improvements
(:) and advancements bring about this unified command to which you
refer, and that is definitely a part of your pattern now of
(:) opwerations?
General Lemnitzer. That is true, but this situation also
occurred I would say, began during World War II, and
during the Korean War.
Senator Stennis. It just strikes a layman that if this
is so necessary in carrying on a war, then why in preparing
for it is it so necessary to have separate services?
General Lemnitzer. Well, I think it would take some time
to answer the question, but I still think that 3
separate services are highly desirable, you can have one service.
This is possible. I -think it has been tried in various nations
in the past. It has never succeeded. I donut think it is
the optimum way to deal with this problem of national security.
I think the division between the services is a perfectly
natural one, one to fight on land, the Army; one to fight on
the surface of the sea, over it and underneath it, the Navy;
and in the air, the Aix Force,
Senator Stennis. Why is it necessary to have a separate
service? I was referring more to a unified command in all
of this preparation than I was a totally unified service.
General Lemnitzer. But we do have unified commands. The
basic concept of our present structure is the unified command
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1 311
bd5554 system.
would say it reaches the Washington level. The Defense
Department is a unified command in every sense of the word,
but that does not make valid the blending of the three
services into a single whole.
think that you are raising the problem of morale,
tradition and all of these other intangible things.
Senator Stennis. What impresses us here is to try to
consider and set a figure separately for the Navy, for the
Army, for the Air Force. Now is the budget prepared on the
basis of a unified command?
General Lemnitzer. Not strictly, but I don?t believe if
diet fls
(:)
you had a single service you would eliminate any prOblem.
think if you had one service, you would still have the vexing
and troublesome problems trying to decide how much for land
warfare, how much going into our missile programs, O&M and
so on. I think that the allocation within the total amount,
the problem would still remain.
Senator Stennis. I don't want to infringe on Senator
Cannon's time.
will come back to this perhaps.
Senator Cannon?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
312
AFTERNOON SESSION
Senator Cannon. Thank you, MP. Chairman.
General, we ,know you are concerned about moderniza-
tion of the Army, and, of course, as you know, Congress did
earmark certain funds for use in modernization.
Now I understand that you have testified that the Army
protested the decision of the Bureau of the Budget in with-
holding some of these funds that were earmarked for use in
modernization, is that correct?
General Lemnitzer.. I wouldn't use the word "protest".
We asked for the funds. We made a strong case we felt for
them. Our request was not approved, but we didn't I would
say protest; complain.
Senator Cannon. You didn't complain. You just asked
for them and didn't get them?
General Lemnitzer. That's right.
Senator Cannon. But at the time you asked for them,
you felt they were very necessary, is that correct?
General Lemnitzer. We did.
Senator Cannon. Now do you believe that these funds
are of such importance to our national security that new or
perhaps stronger efforts should be made to dislodge these
funds from the contingency fund?
General Lemnitzer. Well, of the funds that you refer-
red to, Senator Cannon, only 175 remain available in reserve.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
313
think that is what you referred to.
We would like to get those funds. We have asked for
them, and we probably will make another attempt to get them.
Senator Cannon. I dont think that quite answers my
question, General. The question was do you think that these
funds and the use for which they are intended are of such
importance to the national security that new or perhaps
stronger efforts should be made to dislodge these funds from
the contingency fund? I am thinking of not only of your own
efforts but efforts on behalf of the Congress.
General Lemnitzer. We need these funds for moderniza-
tion of the Army, and as we have justified before various
committees of the Congress, we have made a strong case for
our modernization program. We need these funds.
Senator Cannon. And in your opinion they are very im-
portant to our national security?
General Lemnitzer. Yes, insofar as they will improve
the capability of the Army to accomplish its mission, yes.
Senator Cannon. Now, General, assume that we go Ahead
for the next two or three years at the rate we are moving
at the present time, now I am talking about our military
programs and recognizing the fact that Russia was the first
to hit the moon, they may have more missiles that us, they
have a more modern army, a more modernly equipped army, a
larger army, a greater rate of economic growth, they will
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
314
graduate some 2 and a half times more engineers this year
than we do, do you have an opinion as to whether or not our
relative positions would be the same two or three years from
now?
General Lemnitzer. Well, if the premise is upon which
you based your question materialized, obviously there will
be a change in the relative positions. I am not clear that
I get all the implications of your question.
Senator Cannon. The essence of the question is this.
At the rate we now plan to progress for the next two or
three years, and assuming these other factors which we know,
is it your opinion that our relative position would still be
the same at the end of say two or three years from now, or
is there likely to be a greater difference in the present
relative positions?
General Lemnitzer. Are you speaking solely of the
military?
Senator Cannon. I am speaking solely of the military.
General Lemnitzer. Assuming that we carry out the pro-
grams that we have within -- I presume you are referring to
some of the programs within the fiscal 1961 budget?
Senator Cannon. That is correct, General.
General Lemnitzer. I think in certain areas they will
improve their positions vis-a-vis our own. In cthers we
will.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
315
But regardless of those programs, I presume that the
premise is that we will continue at about the rate that we
have in our 161 budget, and they will go about the way they
are going now.
Senator Cannon. That is correct.
General Lemnitzer. I feel that if these programs are
carried out that we are talking about, that we will have the
capability of deterring the Soviet Union from general war,
and I believe that we will have a substantial capability of
meeting any limited war ithin the period that you are talk-
ing about.
And if deterrence, if that degree of deterrence fails,
that there isn't anything that the Soviet Union can do that
will not bring massive destruction upon them during that
particular period.
This is why I testified before the various committees
of Congress that I have been before, and I believe we are
reaching the era of mutual deterrence in the field of the
types of big missiles, bomber aircraft and so forth that we
have been talking about.
Senator Cannon. Then I take it that the summary of
your statement there is that we would not necessarily have
to proceed any faster than we are proceeding at the present
time.
General Lemnitzer. If we proceed faster it would
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
316
probably -- it would lower the risk. There is a certain
amount of risk in this all the way along. This is true.
I dont believe that anyone can give a categoric answer
on it as to what we should have done until the period has
expired and we see what happens. That is the real test
whether we have done enough or not.
Senator Cannon. And the reason, for example, that you
ask for modernization in the Army is to attempt to lower
that risk, to lessen the risk.
General Lemnitzer. To lessen that risk, yes.
Senator Cannon. Thank you very much, General.
Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. Senator Martin?
Senator Martin. General, the $175 million we discussed
earlier this afternoon that was placed in reserve by the
Bureau of the Budget, was that the 1960 fiscal year funds?
General Lemnitzer. Fiscal 1960, that is correct.
Senator Martin. And there is some question about the
funds for the fiscal year 1961 also?
General Lemnitzer. Well, this would be presently be-
fore the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate.
did not know and I hope that there is no possibility of
them being cut.
Senator Martin. I did not mean cut by Congress. I got
the impression that had been cut in process coming through
from the Armed Services.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
jt-6
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
317
General Lemnitzer. Well, only in this respect, Senator:
that we submitted -- I think this is true for all services --
submitted requests for recommendations for funds over and
above that which we got. This is correct.
Senator Martin. That is a perfectly normal function,
at least as long as I have been aware of the functioning of
the army and other armed forces. I believe that is custom-
ary to have each branch of the service recommend what they
would desire for maximum efforts, and then of course that
is scaled down from time to time by those higher up in the
echelons of defense.
General Lemnitzer. We develop our plans on the basis
Of doing the best possible job and, usually, and, it is
normal, as you say, it is normal that the request that we
make for funds be reduced to fit the over-all availability
of resources, yes.
Senator Martin. I am not as worried about the cutting
of requests before the grant but after they are appropriat-
ed by Congress to have then set aside in reserve, after you
have more or less counted on having those funds available. .
I am afraid sometimes the possible impact of that 1On-
(:) certain projects. For instance, on Nike-Zeus. Do I under-
stand that that might be slowed up a bit by this setting
aside of funds in reserve?
General Lemnitzer. We would hope In the Nike-Zeus that
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
318
jt-7 we get the full $287 million which we have asked for, be-
cause we feel very strongly since what we do in the field of
Nike-Zeus is going to depend to a considerable extent upon
the tests which we are presently setting up in the Pacific,
any reduction of funds will stretch that test out, and we
feel very strongly that we can't afford to loose a day in
this budget.
Senator Martin. That is the cause of my concern ex-
actly. Now will this placing in reserve of the $175 million
of the 1960 fiscal year funds slow up the Nike-Zeus develop-
ment?
General Lemnitzer. Yes, in this sense. As I pointed
out, $137 million was appropriated by Congress to go into
pre-production, to make the necessary arrangements to pro-
duce such things as transistors, which have to be produced
in large quantity. We recommended this amount primarily
for the purpose of saving time.
Senator Martin. The Nike-Zeus is still a part of the
Air Defense Command, isn,t it?
General Lemnitzer. There are no operational units yet
for Nike-Zeus, but it is invisioned that Nike-Zeus most cer-
tainly will be employed by the Commander-in-Chief of the
North American Air Defense Command under his direction.
Senator Martin. Now the Air Defense Command is within
your jurisdiction
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
319
General Lemnitzer. In my jurisdiction as a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is a unified command, Senator.
It is under the command of General Kutter, and he has an
Army, Navy and Air Force component that is very much like
the rest of our unified command.
What I am saying is that it is not specifically within
my area of responsibility as Chief of Staff of the Army.
Senator Martin. Are the other functions of the Air
Defense Command within your jurisdiction?
General Lemnitzer. No. I see what you are getting at.
The Army component of General Kutterts command comes
within my particular area of responsibility. In other words,
this is the surface to air missiles which are employed by
the Army Air Defense Command, which is a component of the
over-all, and this is our principle area of responsibility.
The interceptor-side of the Air Defense Command, the warning
side are functions of the other services.
Senator Martin. Now the functional approach that you
described not long ago is illustrated here by pulling to-
gether all this Nike-Zeus for the different services into
the operation of one command?
General Lemnitzer. Yes, I believe if we adopted a fun-
ctional budget along the lines of a concept which has been
expressed repeatedly, that the Nike-Zeus would come within
the Air Defense. I presume at that time it would be made
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
320
operational, and then it would not only be the Air Defense
Command. It would be the Air and Missile Defense Command.
Senator Martin. Yes. You have a missile defense fun-
ction. You have a Nike-Zeus special function. I am a little
bit puzzled as to how far we take this functional approach.
General Lemnitzer. Well, maybe I can clear that up.
The present title of the command is the Air Defense Command
because up until the present time, and for some period in
the future, the principle threat, as a matter of fact the
only threat; has been tae manned aircraft. That is why we
call it the Air Defense Command.
At such time as we put operational units into it that
are to shoot down missiles, it would be mores' properly titled
the Air and Missile Defense Command.
Senator Martin. They are two separate functions there
in that one package.
General Lemnitzer. That is right. That would seem to
be reasonable to me, yes.
Senator Martin. You have quite different functions go-
ing after the missiles with the anti-missile missile than
going after manned aircraft.
General Lemnitzer. The function is air missile defense,
to defend this country and I will say they are pretty much
parallel missions.
Senator Martin. Now looking ahead, have you made an
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
jt-10
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
321
estimate of your plans for your own command in its process-
ing on up through the 1961 budget? Is that all completed?
General Lemnitzer. Yes, it is. We made our plans for
fiscal year 1961. We based our budget on it and submitted
it, and that is before the Congress now.
Senator Martin. And that has come through th budget?
General Lemnitzer. Through the Defense Department,
,
through the Bureau of the Budget, and was presented in the
Presidents Budget Message.
Senator Martin. This 175 million that was put in re-
serve, is that a part of the new budget or do you consider
that a carry-over?
General Lemnitzer. If it is not released for use dur-
ing this fiscal year, it will probably be carried over into
the fiscal year 1961, and would thereby reduce the require-
ment for new funds for fiscal year 1961.
Senator Martin. If it is washed out, then you would
have just a little larger need for the new year.
General Lemnitzer. This is right.
Senator Martin. That is, of course, the function here
in Congress that we have had under discussion for some little
time as to whether we should wash out and make all new for
the year, or to let those stay as standing and take new ones
and make them cumulative.
General Lemnitzer. I understand.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
322
jt-11 Senator Martin. Al]. you care about is whether you get
money to keep these projects going. I for one dont want
to see the Nike-Zeus slowed up any. I saw enough of it in
my tour last spring that I do not want to see that particu-
(:) lar project slowed up. That is why I asked the question.
General Lemnitzer. Thank you, sir. We do not.
Senator Martin. That is all.
Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Weizl, we are back to you, sir.
CANT-2 Mr. Weizl. General Lemnitzer, we have in the record
a chart showing that we have approximately 48 military com-
mitments around the world. General Taylor testified that
no requirements have been set out to meet those commitments.
(:) I want to ask you this question.
When we make a military commitment, are the military
people consulted about it?
General Lemnitzer. Generally, yes.
Mr. Weizl. Always?
General Lemnitzer. I would say now they are. I canft
say categorically that the 48 number is correct, and whether
they were consulted in every instance. This I do not know.
But I would say, generally speaking, I would say yes.
Some of these commitments may have grown out of other
commitments or treaties that were not specifically initiated
for military purposes.
0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
323
jt-12 Mr. Weizl. Are tha military asked whether they have or
will have the resources to need those commitments?
General Lemnitzer. Not specifically in those terms,
Mr. Weizl.
Mr. Weizl. In what terms are you asked?
General Lemnitzer. In the case of NATO, which is one
of our principle military commitments, of course this is
woven into the fabric of our 870 thousand strength for 1961,
which we are talking about, our over-seas deployments, and
indeed it goes through the whole fabric of the Army V s plan
and program for fiscal 1961.
Mr, Weizl. You are not saying that your 870 thousand
strength is used for NATO, are you?
General Lemnitzer. No, but a substantial portion of it,
nearly a third is used for NATO.
Mr. Weizl. Apart from NATO, are you consulted about
these commitments around the world?
General Lemnitzer. Since I have been Chief-of-Staff,
I know of none that we were not consulted about.
Mr. Weizl. Has there been any since you have been the
Chief-of-Staff that you were not consulted about?
General Lemnitzer. Not that I know of.
Mr. Weizl. Would you know about them?
General Lemnitzer- Well, you dont know what you dont
know about, and so I cant give you an authoritative answer.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
jt-13
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
324
Mr. Weizl. Do you know about any that you were not
consulted about?
General Lemnitzer. No, I do not.
Mr. Weizl. Do you have the capability today as meeting
the 48 commitments that we have around the world?
General Lemnitzer. If we had to honor them all at one
time, I think the answer is obviously no.
Mr. Weizl. How many could you honor at one time?
General Lemnitzer. It all depends on what they were.
Mr. Weizl. General Ridgway stated that we couldn,t
honor one limited war commitment.
General Lemnitzer. Well, I just don,t believe it was
stated quite in those terms, because a limited war -- we
have, for example, I can invision a limited war requirement
of say one battle group, and with a small air support, pos-
sibly small navy support. This we could honor.
Mr. Weizl. Could you honor a Korean War and a Taiwan
War today, if it was limited?
General Lemnitzer. I will take the Korean War. I am
more familiar with it. If there was an outbreak of hos-
tilities in Korea, yes, we could.
Mr. Weizl. Suppose there was an outbreak of hostilities
in Korea and some other place similar to Korea?
General Lemnitzer. This would present problems. I see
what you are getting at. You are referring to the fac that
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
325
jt-14 crises are not likely to occur singly.
We may have several of them at the same time, and this
is true, and this is the question that I raised during our
air-lift discussions, and that also pertains to availability
of forces, ready availability of forces. This is why we have
reserves, however. This is why we have reserves, with the
hope that we can meet more than one commitment at the same
time.
Mr. Weizl. That is a hope.
General Lemnitzer. Well, it is a fact that up until a
given point, and then you have got to spell it out in more
precise detail.
Mr. weizl. Do you wish to make any further statement
about the position we would be in if there was a mutual nu-
clear deterrence, and we had to resort to limited war, con-
sidering our capabilities and our equipment and our divisions
and our mechanization compared to China, Russia and the rest
of the Soviet Nations.
General Lemnitzer. Well, as I indicated earlier in my
testimony, I feel myself that we are well approaching the
period when both the Communist and the Free World may have
acquired a virtual and destructible nuclear capability.
If this is so, if this premise is so, and I happen to be
one who feels that it is, I feel this renders more likely than
as to the liklihood for limited-type wars.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
326
For this reason the Army is putting a great deal of em-
phasis, not the sole emphasis but a:great deal of emphasis,
on our readiness and preparation for limited war. It is for-
tunate that insofar as the Army is concerned, the forces which
have the capaibility for limited war also have the good capa-
bility for general war.
So when this situation obtains, if it does, and I feel
that it will, it could bring about what we have sometimes
characterized as the equivalent of a strategic nuclear dis-
armament.
Therefore we feel we must always have as a vital part of
our military power an invulnerable strategic nuclear deter-
rent, and then I feel that we must also have the type of
forces to deal with the types of warfare less than general
warfare.
And under such circumstances, it seems to me the most
likely form of conflict may well involve the use of integrat-
ed land, sea and air forces in the modernized, yet basically
traditional roles.
Mr. Weizl. And what we do today for modernization and
mechanization and ability would determine what we would have
when that time comes, if it does come. You cantt make those
decisions at a time when limited war comes, nor do we know
when limited war will come. 'snit that true?
General Lemnitzer. This is correct. It may happen very
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
327
jt-16 quickly. But your comment about what the decisions made to-
day not being applied until years ahead is definately true.
Their decision today, as for example on the 1961 budget, will
(:) really provide the means for furnishing the men, manpower
and equipment, the :training several years in advance up to
as far as 1962, 1963 or 19640 in some instances perhaps as
late as 1965.
Mr. Weizl. And you consider it urgent that .we make the
decisions today, and not dilly-dally and wait until next year
or the year after or the year. after.
General Lemnitzer, Well, I think decisions are being
made today, Mr. Weizl.
Mr. Weizl. I mean enough decisions. Of course decisions
are being made, but Senator Gannon questioned you and tried
to get you to answer these questions frankly.
General Lemnitzer. I attempted to answer them
Mr. Weizl. I am sure you do want to answer them frankly.
General Lemnitzer. This is correct.
Mr. Weizl. I um not intimating that you dontt. Are we
getting enough modernization, enough mechanization, enough
anti-missiles Zeus urgency and capability now, so that when,
(:) as and if when one of these wars come, we will have enough
insurance to protect ourselves against it.
(:) General Lemnitzer. As I pointed out, we would like to
have more. We would like to have had more. We can do a
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
328
better job with more people.
But in recognition of the over-all problem, I go back to
what I have said before: that we are moving ahead, and I
dont know of any decisions in my area of responsibility that
have not been made. Now some of these decisions have been
contrary to my recommendations, and that is what you are get-
ting at.
Mr. Weizl. General, I know that in the area of your
responsibility, you are doing everything that you can in that
area with what you get to do it with.
What we are trying to find out is whether you get enough
to do it. Enough to give this country protection, ample pro-
tection against being licked or having casualties or having
more people killed than ought to be killed. That is the
question we are trying to get. It isn,t enough to say "I
would like to get more".
General Lemnitzer. But what specific decision are you
referring to?
Mr. Weizl. On modernization, on airlift, on national
guard, on all of these problems.
General Lemnitzer. We have got decisions.
Mr. Weizl. I mean were the decisions sufficient to give
you the satisfaction that you can do your job properly to pro-
tect the lives of our people, if limited war comes?
General Lemnitzer. As I pointed out before, the decisions
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
jt-l8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
329
were not what we wanted in every case. That is the best I can
do.
Mr. Weizl. Very well.
Senator Stennis. General, there are a few more questions.
Perhaps you dont understand why we go back to this moderniza-
tion money so much, but I will give you a little background
on that.
Last year before you became Chief-of-Staff, General Taylor
made a very impressive statement before the Appropriations
Committee. He had stated the same points prior thereto be-
fore the Armed Services Committee.
It was so impressive and so convincing that the Appropri-
ations Committee, there is quite a round when they marked up
the bill. The bill finally emerged with this extra money,
and I know about the intensity of all of us.
I dont mean there were any gaggers out or anything like
that, but it was touch and go there for days. Then the money
was approved and emerged out of the conference, whatever dif-
ference there was.
It not only had this modernization of the Army, but it
had the question and the date on it, there was the ques-
tion -- of putting in something for the Air Lift. Well, the
Air Lift was dropped out in the discussions.
Nike-Zeus was in this discussion, and it survived for
this money that you mentioned. Modernization of the Navy was
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
330
in all ,41 these rounds in the Appropriations Committee. The
extra money for missiles, particularly Atlas missiles and
some other kinds of missiles, and finally settled on just
missiles. That is the way it is written in the bill, that
the President could transfer a great deal of this.
Mixed up in all of this was the carrier, the question of
the carrier. The President had recommended one. There was
the question on the nuclear carrier. Now the actual hard
money survived for Nike-Zeus, and modernization of the Army,
that particularly in your case.
General Lemnitzer. That is right.
Senator Stennis. Based upon this strong showing you
made of the absolute necessity for it.
Now after all of that battle, why we come back here and
make inquiry and you have been given only about $36 million
or some figure in that, rounded-out figure like that.
General Lemnizer. 432 sir.
Senator Stennis. 43, and we had this up in the Armed
Services Committee two or three days ago, and I thought the
word came in after you were around there the next day, that
this money had been released. Senator Russell thought that.
I am going into these details now to explain why we keep
bringing this up. You need not check further as there is no
conference necessary. Just let me finish my statement and it
will all clear up.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
331
Senator Russell and I talked about it, that they releas
this money for modernization, and we were pleased about it.
Well, when you made the positive statement here this
morning, I was satisfied that we were mistaken, we had gotten
some wrong information, so I checked with him at noon, with
Senator Russell, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee,
and he went and called the staff and found that it had clear-
ed the Department of Defense, according to our information.
But the Department of Defense had approved the release
of this money for you, is that correct? Well, I will ask you
the question later.
The information -1 have now is that it has cleared the
Department. of Defense, and now it is held up though by the
Budget Bureau, and you dont have the money.
am not stopping here, but my question is here we are,
we were told all of these things, honestly told it, and we
took your side and fought for the money and all of that, and
now here all of these months later, if it was necessary and
essential then, the facts haven,t changed, why aren't you
fighting harder for this money now?
General Lemnitzer. I think the confusion occurred for
this_ reason. We were discussin the $382 million which we
have just discussed here.
Senator Stennis. Yes.
General Lemnitzer. The categoric statement was made that
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
332
jt-21 $175 million was placed im reserve by the Bureau of the Budget.
As I recall the circumstances, Secretary Brucker was in-
formed just before the conclusion of the meeting that we have
placed a request for more modernization money, and it had
cleared the Department of Defense to the tune of $149 million.
Senator Stennis. Yes.
General Lemnitzer. 141.9.
Senator Stennis. Well, you can forget the figures. Just
ram them out and lets go.
General Lemnitzer. This cleared the Defense Department.
The next day when we were back, it had been approved by the
Bureau of the Budget.
I think the confusion arose in the minds of many of us
who were at that hearing that this 141.9 was a part of the
175 and I am told that it is not.
Senator Stennis. This is a different 140-odd million
dollars there?
General Lemnitzer. This is correct.
Senator Stennis. I am not complaining about the con-
fusion. I am complaining about the fact that this matter is
held up now, and if it is so essential and so needed, as you
said it was, and I know you were honest in it and are honest
now, why canft something be done about it to get on with this
job, this vital and essential job of modernizing your weapons?
As I said, I am a small war man or trouble-spot man. I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
333
jt-22 believe that that is the way things are coming.
General Lemnitzer. There is no one more interested in
getting this 175 million, Senator Stennis, than the Army. I
would like to emphasize that. We want it. We need it.
But I also said that It was presently set aside, and
we haven,t gotten it. We may make another attempt.
Senator Stennis. Senator Martin said this morning, I
think we should studiously avoid staying out of technical
decisions of the military, I mean the Senators. But we are
told on other matters that you gentlemen recommend certain
things and that is the assurance that the administration
relies on you in those ways, and that makes the country safe.
Now herets a matter that we can understand. We don,t
know much about missiles, at least I dont, but here is some-
thing that I can understand, your need for the more modern
rifles, more modern tanks and other essential ground-fight-
ing equipment, and you urged on us, and I know you have been
urging elsewhere, but still it is turned down.
It seems to me that that calls for an explanation by
the administration, just to be told that you men are wrong
and that this money is not needed.
General Lemnitzer. Senator, I know that you know what
the procedures are and what the organization is for the funds.
Senator Stennis. I am not blaming you personally, but I
think it is a very serious question involved here on a matter
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
334
that everyone agrees on is so essential and so necessary,
General Lemnitzer. I think we have dune the best we
can on this matter. We may try again.
Senator Stennis. Well, you were just talking about these
commitments so we have a probability of being called on from
more than one place.
You just feel now that your ground army is not equipped
to meet the situations, is that correct? That doesn,t dis-
count your army to say that, if you see it that way as to
your weapon needs.
General Lemnitzer. We would be better equipped with
this 175 million. I wouldn,t want to give the impression
to this Committee that the Army canet carry out certain com-
mitment, because it can and will. We can do it better with
more modern equipment, as I have attempted to state here
this afternoon.
Senator Stennis. I :now you would do your best, but it
is just unthinkable that you would have to go up against bet-
ter weapons than you have yourself.
Now with all the money that we spend, and I am not talk-
ing about the Army spending the money now, I mean with all
the resources we have, the know-how, the technology and every-
thing, it is just unthinkable that we would have to go up
against someone else that had better weapons, better equip-
ment, and therefore we would be at a disadvantage to that
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
335
jt-24 extent.
(:) Now this money is available and appropriated, and the
taxpayers have paid it in, you might say. Now just who is
(:) holding it up? Is it the Director of the Budget, Mr. Stans?
That is where the funds are locked, is it not?
General Lemnitzer. I don,t know who the individuals
are, but it has been placed, the best information I can give
you is that it has been placed in reserve by the Bureau of
the Budget.
Senator Stennis. That is what I said. The Department
of Defense approved it. That is correct, isn,t it?
General Lemnitzer. Now we are getting mixed up on the
two amounts of money again. We talked about the 175 that
has been placed in reserve by the Bureau of the Budget.
What I have said is that the 141 million which causes
the confusion before was approved by the Department of De-
fense, it has been now released by the Bureau of the Budget,
but that 141 million is not a part of this 175 that is still
in reserve.
Senator Stennis. Yes. Well, that is where your modern-
izatIon money comes from, isnit it?
(1) General Lemnitzer. This is' true.
Senator Stennis. That is held in reserve.
General Lemnitzer. This is correct.
Senator Stennis. I just want to know where the money is.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
336
As I understand it, it is held up by the Civilian Bureau of
the Budget, not the Bureau of the Budget of the Department
Defense but the Presidents Bureau of the Budget.
General Lemnitzer. By the Bureau of the Budget. We
dont have one in the Department of Defense. That is the
Comptroller.
Senator Stennis. I meant it is not held in any way there.
Now do you know whether the President has personal knowledge
of this matter or not? I doubt that he does.
General Lemnitzer. This I do not know, Senator.
Senator Stennis. You dont know about it?
General Lemnitzer. This I do not know.
Senator Stennis. I am not trying to raise the point that
some mother ls son is going out into battle unprepared. I
donit try'to put it that way.
But it is virtually a fact of life as I understand it,
if you dont have these modern weapons with their fire-power
and all of the new things that go to make them more effective
and quicker in action and particularly the tanks that I know
you have so high on your priority list, so it does leave us
in that position, that we cannot give double assurance.
General Lemnitzer. Maybe I can explain the 175 million
in term which I know will be very understandable to you. If
this $175 million were released to the Army, as I understand
it, it would require 175 million more in new obligational
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
337
t-26 authority than is presently in the fiscal year 1960 budget.
Senator Stennis. In the 1960 budget, 1960 budget?
General Lemnitzer. In the 1961 budget. This is right.
(:) Senator Stennis. Does that mean now that you cant spend
the money
.01t
General Lemnitzer. I am told by my budget advisor here
that if this money was released, it would require $175 million
more in new obligational authority in the fiscal /961 budget.
Senator Stennis. Now there are two interpretations to
that that come to my mind. One is that if you release this
175 in order to judiciously spend it, you have got to have
another 175 to put it in the proper kind of and effective pro-
gramming.
The other possibility is that we just hold this mnney
until the next budget year, and then we will spend it and
thereby hold down the 1961 budget that much for something
that is needed now.
Now which is the correct interpretation of those, General.
General Lemnitzer. The latter.
Senator Stennis. The latter?
General Lemnitzer. That is right.
Senator Stennis. Alright, that means then that there is
an admitted) known and urgent need that you have recognized7
that the Congress has recognized, the money has been put up,
but never the less it is being delayed until next year, the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
jt-27
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
338
next fiscal year, is that correct?
General Lemnitzer. That is correct.
Senator Stennis. Well, it is a very sad fact, it seems
to me, particularly when it pertains to these elemental,
fundamental and essential weapons, many of which you have put
in the hands of the individual soldiers, isntt that correct?
General Lemnitzer. Is includes those, yes.
Senator Stennis. It includes those, and then it includes
tanks?
General Lamnitzer. Yes, there would be tanks with part
of this money.
Senator Stennis. These battle-field helicopters and
these little planes that impressed me so much, are they in
there too?
General Lemnitzer. Some of them.
Senator Stennis, Well I am really surprised to see these
facts hanging here just as they are. I think if I may sug-
gest it, it seems to me, General, that even though you have
done your best so far, that you are under obligation, especial-
ly to continue to press for this essential and needed money
for these particular purposes, and I hope that you do, and I
believe you certainly have the backing of the Committee that
knows about these facts, and I believe the entire Congress.
I just think it is your duty to press forward in every
way that you possibly can. I tharkyou very much for your
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
339
jt-28 very complete explanation of it.
(:.!) General Lemnitzer. I thank you.
Senator Stennis. I have one other question. Senator
(ID Cannon, you are next.
Senator Cannon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
have no questions. I just want to make an observation.
I appreciate very much the Chairman developing this
thought, because it was the thing I was trying to get at
earlier in questioning the General, and the Chairman has
brought it out in a very fine manner.
I say this: that I think it is a very serious matter
to be concerned about when we find that the military part
of this country is being determined by the Bureau of the
Budget and not by the people who are charged with that re-
sponsibility.
Thi" bears out what the General has testified to now,
it bears out the testimony that we received this morning, that
these guidelines are laid down and actually are military
things that are determined by the Bureau of the Budget and
the lines that are set through the Executive Department.
I just go back to the testimony that was presented to
this Committee yesterday wherein some of the problems involv-
ing the military end were explained to this Committee, and the
(11) witness stated that the fault was not with the legislative
branch in the slow-up of a lot of these programs, but the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
340
fault was that we had too many people in the Executive Branch
of the Government, and I certainly subscribe to that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. Senator Martin?
Senator Martin. General Lemnitzer, you have brought us
some very valuable information, and I do admire your attitude
throughout. I think you have tried to give us a picture of
what you think you need, and you have taken what you can get
in the right spirit, and you will continue your efforts to
get what you think you need.
General Lemnitzer. Thank you, sir.
Senator Stennis. May I add too to what Senator Martin
and Senator Cannon have said. This gives us a very direct
relation and contact with the problem that you are up against,
and gives us a better understanding of what your efforts mean
and how frustrating it is to you.
comnend you very highly for the fight that you are
making, you, and your staff and others, and I certainly hope
that you press forward on this matter and get this progran
started.
Now I have one or two other questions here. You spoke
of a possibility of explaining something further in executive
session. Was there something that you wished to bring up in
Executive Session, General?
General Lemnitzer. No. I thought that perhaps the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
34/
Committee might want to bring it up and develop it further;
but no
1.0.?
Senator Stennis. What was that point? We had discussed
one thing
General Lemnitzer. There were two points, on the air
lift and the other one was on the Nike-Zeus.
Senator Stennis. Yes. Well, I would very gladly like
to hear you further on either of those.
May I ask you this. Can you tell us in open session
about the development of the pushing of missiles? As I re-
call, that is one that you have emphasis on in your thinking,
and do you find any restrictions on a speedy development?
General Lemnitzer. We regard Pershing as one of our
most important missiles. It will be the field armyts support
missile.
It will take the place of our first large missile, the
Red Stone but it will have the advantage of being much
smaller, much more responsive in that it uses solid propel-
lants: and it will give us some of the range, some addition-
al range over that of the Red Stone missile.
It is one of our highest priority projects. It is mov-
ing on schedule, and we aim to keep it that way.
It is being developed, as you know, by the Martin Com-
pany and we are looking forward to getting this into the hands
of our Red Stone units to replace that rather large and bulky
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
342
jt-31 missile, but still a good one, that will provide a much better
field army support weapon.
Senator Stennis. This is the situation where you al-
ready have the squadrons, you have the field training behind
and the crews ready, I call it crews, I donTt know what you
call it. You just want to supply them with this battle-type
missile?
General Lemnitzer. This is right.
Senator Stennis. Alright. Now do you have this in pro-
duction? I dontt know.
General Lemnitzer. No, it is not. It is still in the
research and development stage, and it will soon move into
the test and evaluation stage.
I think you were getting at the problem that we faced
some years ago, Senator Stennis, on being restricted to 200
mile range.
Senator Stennis. Yes.
General Lemnitzer. This is what you referred to. When
Secretary McElroy authorized the Army to proceed with the
Pershing Missile as the replacement for the program, there
were only two limitations put on it, that it was not the ex-
ceed 10,000 pounds in weight, that is to give it mobility in
the field, and that it use solid propellants.
Senator Martin. What was that last point?
General Lamnitzer. And it use solid propellants.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
343
jt-32 Senator Stennis. That is the Pershing that you are talk-
() ing about?
General Lemnitzer. That is correct.
(:) Senator Stennis. Now you are already in the development
stage?
General Lemnitzer. Yes, we are. We expect to launch
the initial prototypes of Pershing in the not-too-distant fu-
ture. As a matter ? of fact, some of the construction at Cape
Canaveral is being developed along that line.
Senator Stennis. This is in line with the ultimate in
your ground weapons in being ready to the end on that level.
This is the one that you are relying upon, is it, the Pershing?
General Lemnitzer. This will be our longest range mis-
sile, and put us in a much more favorable position to deal
with an enemy which has missiles that outranges presently.
the Red Stone.
Senator Stennis. Well, I think it is so vital to have
what I call these battlefield missiles. That is the way
describe them.
Does this IC1000 pound limitation -- is that proving a
hindrance to you or what?
General Lemnitzer. No, it is not.
Senator Stennis. So it is working out alright on that
scale?
General Lemnitzer. So far it has.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1
344
Senator Stennis. Could you tell us what pounds are in-
volved?
General Leanitzer. Well, we are going right up to the
10,000 pounds, and we are attempting to squeeze every yard
of range out of that that we can, and it will be considerably
more than that of the Red Stone.
Senator Stennis. Before we have an Executive Session,
lets see if there is anything else. Alright, we will have
to ask our visitors now, even though we have been glad to
have you here, to retire please. We will have a short
Executive Session.
(Whereupon at 5:10 p. m. the Committee went into Execu-
tive Session.)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP91-00965R000601230001-1