HISTORY OF THE SI REPORTING BOARD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00036R001000120030-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: December 1, 1944
• Content Type: REPORT

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1 December 1944
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HISTORY
OF THE
SI REPORTING BOARD
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TO: CS Historical Staff
From:
28 Feb 68
This document wail: unearthed in FI/INT files one gave it
to me for retention. It should be mad, a permanent record, maybe counted
as an hiatorical paper. kniwa about it and would like to
see it. ,Two more copies remain in files.
hinks that he probably write this paper, and it would have
been his linig logical function at the time to do so. Some of it
certainlY'reflects his style of writing I have some recollection--
rather v ue---about its compilation.
think several of usT?including
nd me---worked on parts of i1 and Lester pulled the whole
g together.
I have 'clipped to the last page a reconstruction of the persons who held
the positions on the chart. This was ehocked with who
verified the names I could rememberr:n:uppled some additional ones.
It was also checked with is probably the best source
of the missing names. S?ei.?h:;:i'retir ce---most recently from a
contract) but is still in town.
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HISTORY OP THE SI REPORTING BOARD
General Reflections
The SI Reporting Board in Washington and in the field
offices performs functions which are the logical results
of needs which were foreseen in some measure at the time
of its founding and also of needs which developed from the
expansion of SI activity. As the Reporting Board now
exists its functional services to SI are two:
1. To process, to evaluate and to disseminate
all intelligence procured by SI activity
in the field;
2. To advise the SI operational desks of an
expressed or presumptive need for the
acquisition of specific intelligence.
Processing involves the editing of documents into
proper form by the suppression of operational material,
which might endanger the security of an agent, by the elimi-
nation of duplicate reports and of intelligence which has
become outdated or is patently false.
Evaluation involves the creation of complete files on
all SI intelligence received against which the reports
officer can check the degree of reliability of any statement
of fact and the established reliability of source. The
Reporting Board has the right to request an opinion of
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evaluation on statements of fact from the Rikk Branoh, and
in cases where special information becomes necessary, the
Reporting Board tries to obtain information pertinent to
the final evaluation from all OBS Branohes or the other
Government agencies.
Dissemination involves the actual printing and
distributing of intelligence in its processed form to the
proper recipients and the establishment of sufficient
liaison with these recipients to enable the Reporting
Board to channel to them such intelligence as they may
require.
Directed Intelligence involves the reception by the
Reporting Board of such requests from Government agencies
and departments as can be channeled to the field and to
suggest to the operational SI desks the procurement of such
intelligence as would fill the needs indicated by a study of
intelligence records.
The performance of these Reporting Board functions
necessitates the closest collaboration between its reports
officers and the appropriate SI desks so that the security
of SI agents and the credit due to SI documents may be main-
tained.
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It is obvious upon reflection that this Reporting
Board aotivity as it has developed and is at present
exercised is divided into two overall typos of work:
1. The actual physical reproduction of the
reports for dissemination and transmittal
to various agencies with all the clerical,
printing and administrative work involved;
2. The more intellectual work which determines
the *valuation of the intelligence or
suggests the direction which future intelli-
gence should take.
Since the early days of SI when it became clear that a
separate section of SI would have to handl* the reports
obtained from the field, the Reporting Board has constantly
had four overall objectives in the maintenance and pursuit
of which recurrent difficulties have been met. The Board,
however, has at all times instinctively or deliberately
asserted the value of these objectives. They are:
1. Control over all disseminations of SI material
in respect to form and recipient;
2. Production-line processing of these disseminations;
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3. True evaluation;
4. Directed intelligence.
In the course of its history, then, the Reporting Board
has made its decisions and formed its policy with these four
ideal objectives in view. Objective 2 is naturally a
variable factor with reference to Objective 3, and the
maintenance of the beat balance possible between these two
has been a constant purpose. Objectives 1 and 4 also have a
common variable relationship since direction of future intelli-
gence is impossible if intelligence, Which has already been
received, has not been submitted to the Board and has not in
turn reached the customers who need it.
The early period of the Board extends from its founding
in Washington to the time of the creation of reports offices
in the field. This field activity divides the history of the
Reporting Board into its two great parts. In the first period,
the Reporting Board was founded, gradually adopted its policies,
as the needs appeared, and expanded to most them. At the end
of this phase, however, the flow of reports became so enormous
and reporting problems so intricately involved in the field
that decentralisation from Washington became necessary and the
later and mature phase of Reporting Board activity expanded
slowly in the creation of reports offices throughout the world.
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The Early Board, 27 March 1942 - 1 July 1943
In COI days, Mr. David Bruce gathered together a group
of experienced men to establish the Special Activities
Branch as SI was then called. Among than were Mr. F.L. Bolin,
Mr. Richard Southgate, and Mr. Hugh Wilson. :They were men
who had had distinguished diplomatic and business careers. In
March of 1942, SI was tremendously active with numerous
projects for obtaining secret intelligence both from future
SI sources and from existing Allied secret services abroad.
Both of these categories were eventually obtained, the Allied
secret intelligence first.
On 27 March 1942, it became apparent to Messers. Bolin,
Southgate and Wilson that some provision for the systematic
handling of this increasing flow of material would be
necessary. With this in mind they wrote to Mr. David Bruce:
"All of us who are accustomed to State Dopartment
procedure have been troubled by the genuine
danger of the present method of distribution Of
incoming material, and the handling thereof.
Furthermore, it has appeared to us that this
organization is growing with such incredible
rapidity - and will doubtless continue so to grow
that method and organization beoome more and more
important. Whereas, in its initial stages, an
organisation can be handled by one or two men
doing everything, this task becomes impossible
when an organisation swells to its present, or
SO
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even greatly increaeod future volume
It may be found advisable to sot up some
sort of supervision in the distributing
canter of outgoing material in order to
prevent duplication* contradiction* or
other troubles* which arise unless every-
thing flows through one channel."
Mr. Bruce took action upon these suggestions and on
7 April 1942* in a directive to S/ pointed out that SI
intelligence consisted or would consist:
1. Of reports procured from its own agents;
2. Of reports obtained by SI from secret
services outside SI.
He directed that the responsibility for disseminating
intelligence in Oleos 2 should rest with the Reporting Board.
The Reporting Board as constituted on 7 April 1942 consisted
of Mr. F.L. Bolin us Chairman* Mr. Richard Southgate and
Hugh Wilson.
The Reporting Board, however, felt* as it has always
felt* that some element in SI should have complete control
of all disseminations whether from SI or foreign secret
sources. Otherwise* correlation of intelligence obtained
from different areas or sources would be impossible* confirma-
tion of facts would rest on no sure basis and systematized
distribution to the proper recipients could not be
established.
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In point of fact, the need for control over the dissemi-
nation of SI source intelligence did not become appsrent
until sucll Intelligence began to flow in from the field.
Continued and systematic reception of intelligence from the
was not esteolished until
3 August 1942 and 1 October 1942 respectively. Intelligence
from
sources followed later.
On 21 September 1942, Mr. Bruce, persuaded of the necessity
of dissemination control, issued the following directive to
all S/ Geographic Desks:
"It is a function of the Reporting Board to
disseminate information obtained as a
result of the activities of SI. In order
to assure that all interested agencies,
whether other branches of OBS or other
government departments, receive information,
and in order to avoid duplication, all
Geographic Desks are directed to supply the
Chairman of the Reporting Board with any
information to be disseminated, or a copy of
all information disseminated directly by the
Geographic Desks, with a list of those to
wham it has been sent."
During the period from the founding of the Board to the
directive. of 21 September 1942 establishing control over SI
intelligence disseminations, the Board felt its way
tentatively toward methods which would create:
1. An efficient and rapid processing of intelli-
gence;
2. A precise system of evaluation.
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It should be emphasized, however, that these methods,
which were the nucleus of eventual processing and evalua-
tion, were created with a different purpose in view. In the
end they developed from their initial functions into the
mature systems which operated in the Board's later period.
The intelligence was of such proportion at this time
that the three members of the Board were able to evaluate,
disseminate, and record it themselves.
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The Board, however, felt that it was neoessarily a kind
of repository of the intelligence obtained by SI and, as such,
could in various ways b. of assistance to the SI Geographic
Desks. /t could, for example, call to the attention of the
African Desk information pertaining to Africa which had
cleared from the Spanish Desk for dissemination outside the
Agency. The SI Geographic Desks were so occupied with their
411 many activities in establishing agents in the field that the
Board believed they might wish to consult with man who had a
detailed teohnical knowledge of foreign countries from their
own background knowledge and from the intelligence being
obtained by SI.
The Board thought that this should ba a service to SI
alone. /t realized that the HU Branch of OSS by directive
devoted its attention and energies to research and the
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analysis of intelligence from all sources overt end secret.
R&A, however, was physically removed from SI and so busy
with the work required of it that it was almost impossible
for its offioers to foresee the needs that might develop
from any of the many SI projects. The Board did not have
than, and never has had, any intention of participating in
the field of R&A's jurisdiction. The Board, however,
realized that the SI desks often needed background advice,
and that When they asked for assistance they wanted it
quickly from men who were well acquainted with 91 projects
and SI security problems. El's activity has always been
directed to the speedy acquisition of recent intelligenoe
and to the immediate dissemination of such intelligence in
such form as to achieve the maximum of speed and the maximum
of accuracy at the same time. The prevailing atmosphere of
SI is more that of a newspaper office than a scholar's study
and the nature of the work could not make it otherwise.
Mors to assist the Geographic Desks in their projects
than to establish a system of editors and reports officers
advising the Reporting Board itself, the Chairman of the
Board, Mr. Bolin, acquired the services of Hr. Harold Coolidgo
as Secretary to the Reporting Hoard and on 6 May 1942
proposed to establish an office called the Reference Room
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under the jurisdiction of the Secretory to the Reporting
Board, which would contain s few men with background
knowledze of enemy or enemy-occupied countries.
In a memore;:idum of 2 July 1942 to Major Bruce, Belin
summarized the LotIvity of this now office:
"At the meeting of 6 May 1942# it was generally
sgreed that the Geogrrphic Desks were so over-
worked that they had not the time to study end
digest the material svnilable not only in R&A
but also In other aziencies of the Government
such as the Library of Congress, Stet. Department,
etc.
"On the other side of the picture, R&A officers
are far too buoy with the work requested of them
by the armed services of the Government to be
able to foresee the needs of SI and furnish it
material which we might desire. The need is so
great from both points of view that it was
decided to establish the Reference Room (so
called in order to indicate to RIAA that we were
not infringing on their 'research' bailiwick).
"It was originally planned to go fairly slow on
this Reference Room and only three men were
envisaged at the beginning. However, as
Coolidge indicates and as succeeding argument
demonstrates. the Reference Room has already
shown its usefulness.
"My concept of the Reference Room has peen a
double one. First, to bring into the organiza-
tion men trained in the studious approsoh to
questions in the expectation that after a
certain amount of general work in the Reference
Room, they would be better qualified to take
positions at the Geographic Desks than any non-
indoctrinated persons would be. The experience
of the past few weeks has shown that this concept
is already working out and that the men we bring
in readily find useful niches in the geographic
units.
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"The second concept, however, is to induct
into the Roferenoe Room a small number of
persons, men or women, Who are qualified
to find the answers to specific requests
for information which may arise from the
various desks. We would like to be in a
position to send a circular to the Chiefs
of the Geographic Desks saying that we are
ready to answer questions involving study
and research and that we are equipped to
tap material from the vast reservoir or all
the organizations of Washington for this
purpose.
"It would not be necessary for us to
discriminate between the two types of
personnel above. Their personalities,
abilities, and talents would quickly indi-
cate whether they should specialise on
operations or remain in the pool for the
answering of specific questions.
We find here the germ of the highly developed system
that was to come a year and a half later of:
1. The reports officers and editors dependent
an the Reporting Board in Washington, each
organised on a geographic basis to
correspond to the SI geographic operations
officers, each with a staff of editors and
assistants, elaborate files and maps, and
facilities for the evaluation of SI
intelligence;
2. The overseas reports officers with their
staffs and quasi-independent offices and
mechanical facilities for the printing of
lateral disseminations and the transmission
of intelligence;
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3. The training facilities for intended
overseas reports personnel used both
by the Reporting Board and Geographio
Desks.
It wps made clear at the staff meeting of 6 May 1942,
that each operations desk would have liked to have a
corresponding specialist in the Reporting Board's Reference
Room. It seemed to the Board, however, that the greatest
need then lay in the European Theater. By 1 August 1942,
four men had been selected: Dr. Ea'. Carroll for France,
Mr. Franklin D. Scott for Scandinavia, Kr. Dena Durand for
Germanylsand Mr. Walter Brown for Spain.
By 1 September 1942, two other service units besides
the Reference Room had been created by the Reporting Board
to aid the operations desks and the Reporting Board in
current background information: the Geographic Index of
Persons, under Mr. G.V. Cottrell and the Press Survey under
Mrs. Alice C. Clifford.
It was felt a year later that the service of the
Geoi;raphic index of Persona was of an historical nature and
more properly within the jurisdiction of R&A. It was, there-
fore, detached from SI and became MA's Biographical Records
;section.
The Reference Room undertook at this time also to
circulate to the interested SI Geographic Desks abstracts
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and catalogues of information procured from the researches
of R&A and agencies outside of OBS.
The Rei.,orting Board services then, as always since,
have been directed toward doing any taid all kinds of work
which would assist 8/ activity in any way. Some of these
services have attempted to fill a temporary gap and have
then been abandoned when the work wai done. Others met
lasting need and have continued. In them all, as well as
in the'Referencia Roam specialists, is the origin of the
ultimate ideal of all mature reports work: directed
intelligence Whioh can supply the operations officers and
ths field with a specific list of intelligence requirements.
In setting up procedure for the evaluation of intelli-
gence as to source and fact, the Board adopted from the
British system its letter and number system for the grading
of secret reports, and on 23 UN 1942, so informed the State
Department, ONI, G-2, A-2, SEW, the R&A Branch, and Colonel
Donovan. The other American agencies end departments also
agreed to conform to the system. Printing of the dim:am/no-
tions by ditto machines on stylized forma for consistency
was instituted, and a printing and reproduction unit under
Mrs. Ann S. Lesher and Mrs. Lilah Simmons set up by early
1943. Only ones ditto machine operated by hand was needed
then. In the later period of the Board, three hand machines
and one electric machine were necessary to print the
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steadily increasing volume of intelligence. Lists of the
intelligence requirements of OSS customers began to be
compiled for the proper and systematic distribution of
material.
In November 1942 Mr. Hugh Wilson resigned from the
board and was succeeded by Mr. F.L. Mayer. Mr. Mayer
resigned In February 1943 and was succeeded by Mr. Coolidge.
On 8 December 1942, Major hruce reaffirmed the vital
directive of 21 September 1942 and amplified it with the
following remarks:
"1. A large proportion of the material arriving
in SI must be distributed according to
commitments previously made and policies
currently in effect.
142.
There must be thorough ad prompt distribu-
tion.
"3. There must be simultaneous distribution
through established channels in order to
avoid criticism of giving preferred treat-
ment te any individual or agency.
"4. Grading of reports must be consistent.
"Iii view of the importance of these considerations,
it is believed that the best interests of SI
will be served by confining the dissemination of
SI material to the Reporting board as the only
unit currently informed on all these points. The
Geographic Desks are, therefore, directed to
arrange for the dissemination of all material as
promptly as possible through the Reporting Board
only The Reporting board will in all
cases welcome reoommeadations from the Desks for
evaluation and dissemination."
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During the spring of 1943, the Board obtained the
services:
1. In February, of Dr. Lester C. Houck as
Italian specialist and editor. The
need for capable handling of material
from this area had become very pressing;
2. /n March, of Mr. J.L. Lane as Middle
Bast specialist and editor;
3. In May, of Mr. Alton Childs as French
and Battle Order specialist. Mr. Childs
succeeded Dr. Ea. Carroll, who had
become SI Liaison Officer with the Battle
Order Branch of MID.
With the acquisition of these mon, the old concept of
a reference room of geographic specialists changed into the
present one of geographic reports officers. The Reference
Room itself was gradually dissolved during the spring and
summer, and separate offices were established and staffed
with editors and typists each under the supervision of the
reports officer.
This development was necessary because of the enormous
increase of SI intelligence flowing from Italy, France, and
the Middle East. A careful check on the documents was of
vital importance. Topical breakdown of the material was
essential for proper dissemination. Comprehensive files of
this topical breakdown were imperative for proper evaluation.
The reports officer in each unit assigned specific types of
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reports to specific assistants as the subject matter of the
reports was too different for one man to handle. Thus the
reports officer, in addition to policy matters for all
disseminations on Prance, might himself handle specifically
the French military reports, and assign the French political,
economic, and scientific reports to different assistants.
SI has always followed a geographie
breakdown. The Reporting Board paralleled the SI Operational
Desks with geographical reports officers but gave a topical
breakdown within the reports unit itself. The advantage so
far as Washington is concerned is obvious. The system, how-
ever, has never been rigid, In the stress of work, a certain
reports officer, because of the preponderance of military
operations in his geographic area, might, ipso facto, acquire
considerable knowledge of battle order in general. In that
case, he was often consulted by other reports officers about
military reports outside of his geographic unit.
On 1 September 1943, Dr. Lester Houck became the fourth
member of the Reporting Board.
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III
The Later Board, 1 July 1943 - 1 September 1944
The emergence of the field reports offices narks the
beginning of the period of the later Board. The theory
for the field reports officer coincides with the development
of the reports officer in Washington. The actual causes
which led to the founding of the field offices, however, are
two:
1. The establishment by the Army of theater
headquarters and the imminence of military
operations.
2. The creation of JICA and the necessity of
lateral distribution in the field.
When the Army established important theater headquarters,
immediate distribution of intelligence to these headquarters
was necessary. To relay the intelligence from Washington
caused en avoidable delay. The plans formulated in army head-
quarters for future operations required directed intelligence,
i.e., the reception by responsible officers of requests which
could be forwarded to field agents for immediate action.
Records on such intelligence had to be kept. Bxperionoe has
shown that unless an officer is in the field whose sole
responsibility is the dissemination of documents, the intellip
genes may be given a faulty distribution; it may not reach all
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of the proper recipients in the field and in Washington.
In the spring of 1943, J/CA, the Joint intelligence
Collection Agency of 0-2, ONI, and A-2? was created by order
of the Chiefs of Staff. =A was not en sgency for the
initial proeuring of intelligence, but a unit designed to
collect intelligence from the head field offices of ell
agencies and forward it to Waehington. o submit such
intelligence in row form to 'TVA in the field would, however,
have risked unnecessary exposure of 81 agents and would have
delayed tranemission to $I, Washington, considerably. There-
fore, control of SI intelligence which was to be submitted to
;ICA in tha field h5a1 to be e;:ercised by a reports officer.
At the some time, the advantages of lateral distribution
of intelligence between 038 field offices became epperent, In
addition to Washington, both London and Algiers, for example,
needed information an Francs es soon as possible because of
impending military operations from these bases. A reports
officerwas needed, therefore, in Algiers, Madrid, and London
to see that the proper number of copies, or photostats, or
microfilms should be sent to the various offices. He w'?
also needed to receive and forwerd to agents requests for
intelligence from customers in any area.
Consequently, on 18 JUne 1943, the Reporting Board, in
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conjunction with the Registry, suggested to Mr. Shspardson
in a memorandum that in the light of recent JICA objectives
and procedures it was clear that Reporting Board and
Registry personnel should be sent to the headquarters of
theater operations in Cairo, Algiers, and London in order to
assure document security, safeguard OSS sources, and prepare
the documents for photostat-dissemination by the JICA system.
On 9 July 1943, the JICA orgenisetion in the different
theaters was discussed in a meeting of geographic desk heads
and the Reporting Board.
It was agreed that hereafter all agencies of OSS should
send copies of their reports to the OSS headquarterm of the
theaters in which their jurisdiction lay in addition to send-
their revEIL.t.211$2292Inatsa. /n other words, OSS repre-
sentatives in France, Switzerland, Oermeny, the Low Countries,
Scandinavia, etc., would send their reports to London; those
411 in North Africa and Italy would send theirs to Algiers; those
in the Near East and Balkaole would send thein to Cairo. The
only lateral distribution would be from London to Algiers,
London to Cairo, Algiers to Cairo, or vice verse.
/4e .7zGh.V /7Y.3 /ive //Ago Gre o G47- .)12%dei 0 Ar'V4-
otAftp,ee-/r /2"ba .fe4,147,4ro- /30,4ee.,, ?
In accordance with these developments suitable man were
obtained by the Reporting Board to serve as field reports
officers and to set up reports offices in vital theater head-
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20.
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quarters. For several months before they were sent, these
men were ziven intensive training in reports work by the
Reporting Board and were thoroughly ,E;rounded in editing,
procedure, and administration before they left. The Board
has always emphasized this training course for the thorough
preparation of its officers in SI service abroad.
With this in mind the Board published on 30 August 1943,
its comprehensive Manual on Reports Practice and Procedure,
copies of which are in all field offices. All its personnel
abroad have been thoroughly indoctrinated in this Manual and
in actual work before leaving Washington.
The Board has felt that no one is ready for reports work
in the field who haa not actually worked on documents and been
responsible for them. Without this training essential
uniformity of procedure would be impossible and the ties
between the Washington Board and its field representatives
would be broken.
Reports officers should also have experience in office
administration. They should also have sound business sense.
The selection must, therefore, be made by the Board after care-
ful observation of, and reflection upon* personality and
abilities. In practice, in addition to its normal 'Work, a
reports office beers the burden of many projects actually
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irrelevant to its primary functions. Its reports officer
ad his personnel must have such esprit de corps in their
service to SI that they will give any assistance within
the widest scope of their abilities. They must e;ive that
assistence unstintingly and willingly.
During the period of the later Board two important
practices developed both in Washington and in the field:
1. The necessity of thorough and close liaison
between reports officer and those to whom
the intelligence is sent became more and
more apparent. Every effort was made to
further this liaison since only when such a
relationship exists cen the current needs
for intelligence be accurately assessed.
2. If this liaison work is properly performed
by, or accessible to, the reports officer,
directed intelligence becomes practicable.
Requests for urgent intelligence are
received, checked with available reports,
forwarded to the field and to the suitable
agent with every expectation of a reply
within as short a period of time as possible.
Within a year, therefore, the Reporting Board, ilud
established or dispatched the following man as its chief
reports officers:
Mr. T.S. Ryan on 10 May 1943 to Algiers
Mr. Horton on 18 September 1943 to London
Lt. Alfred Ulmer,USNR,on 27 October 1943 to Istanbul
Mr. Walter brown on 5 December 1943 to Madrid
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Lt. Frank Wisner; USTIR,on 15 December 1943 to Cairo
Lt. Harry Harper, USMCR,on 27 February 1944 to Cairo
Mr. Don Garden on 1 March 1944 to !Andy
Mr. Lloyd George on 6 July 1944 to !Andy,
Mr. Brown had been Spanish reports officer in Wa5hin6ton.
He Was succeeded in Washington by Mr. Donald Greer.
The Algiers reports office from its origin had a career
of great accomplishment under Mr. T.S. Ryan. The office
processed, disseminated locally to AFH,, and forwarded to
London and Washington the reports of the French chains
operating from Algiers and of the Italian chains clearing
through Naples. Extracts from this material had to be made
for daily cables to Washington and London. The Algiers
office was also one of the throe recipients of microfilms of
the original reports of the great French chains operating
from Spain and the office processed them for local and
immediate dissemination to AFM, not, however forwarding them
to Washington or London, since the material did not originate
through the Algiers office. By May 1944, the office contained
approximately 27 editors, typists and clerks, and processed
during that month 642 original reporta containing, of course,
many times that number of intelligenoe items. Mr. Ryan's
services in liaison and the briefing of agents were of greet
value. In October 1944 he dissolved the Algiers reports
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23.
office and loft Algiers with his staff to head the Caserta
reports office and to act as Chief Reports Officer MEMO.
The Cairo reports office had 83 its subsidiary the
Istanbul office. Lieutenant Frank Wisner, UST, after
organizing the office, proceeded to Istanbul on 25 May 1944,
and became Chief SI there. He, was followed on 27 May 1944
by Lieutenant Harry Harper, USMCR, who became head of the
Istanbul reports office. Lieutenant Alfred Ulmer, USNR,
returned from Istanbul to head the Cairo reports office
until 25 July 1944, when he proceeded to Algiers intending
to head a reports office in southern France, but with the
rapidity of military advances this latter plan was dropped
and Lieutenant Ulmer wns ultimately assigned to the Chief
or sI for central Europe. Lieutenant Ulmer was succeeded
in Cairo by Lieutenant (jg) Stephen Bailey, USNR. In May
1944, the Cairo office had approximate personnel of 14 and
processed 621 reports in that month.
Lieutenants Wisner, Ulmer, andBaileywere all singularly
successful in the liaison work to essential to the functions
of a reports office. The later important services of
Lieutenants Wisner and Harper to SI are wellknown and
treated elsewhere.
Madrid never has had more than the single reports officer;
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24.
Mr. Walter Brown. No editing or dissemination in the
literal sense took place except for the typing or micro-
filming in triplicate of the original reports of the Franco-
Spanish chains and the briefing of agents with requests from
Washington, Algiers and London. In May 1944, 661 original
reports on Prance and 44 on Spain were forwarded to those
head offices.
The London reports office became necessarily second in
size and importance only to the head office in Washington.
Mr. Philip Horton was extremely successful in maintaining
contacts with the British, AS well as with other agencies,
and in organizing the office according to business
standards. He faced capably all the urgent requirements for
dissemination techniques that arose during the invasion of
France from such reports as the WIT messages of the Sussex
agents. The office worked- long and well in assisting the
briefing of agents and in compiling answers to SHAM? requests.
The office processed 2,319 reports in May 1944, and during
the spring and early summer had an approximate personnel of
60.
The reports offices established in Italy serviced
Italian reports with the exception of the Bari reports office
whidh until June 1944 serviced Balkan reports and was
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25.
dependent organisationally on Cairo. It was set up in early
December 1943 under Lieutenant Michael G. Mitchell, US. In
June of 1944 the office processed 260 original reports and
had an approximate personnel of 6. By 1 September 1944 it
had expanded to a personnel of 15.
Reports on Italy proper cleared through the Algiers
reports office as long as part of AFH 4 was still in Algiers,
'i.e., August 1944. However, with the invasion of Sicily and
? Italy in the summer and early fall of 1943, small reports
offices had to be established to follow, the advanced echelon
of AFlitt; for the purpose of local dissertination. In tile
earlier days of the invasion the reports were given an initial
handling by small reports units within SI at Palermo and Naples
before they were forwarded to the Algiers reports office.
?
In February 1944 Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Torielli, FA,
was sent by the Reporting Board and General Magruder to
establish a small reports office near military headquarters,
then at Caserta. He was succeeded by Lieutenant James R. Barnes,
USNR, at this Caserta office in July 1944.
The Jurisdiction of the Bari reports office was extended
to the local processing of battle order reports from north-
eastern Italy in June 1944 because of the strategic W/T
facilities in Bari. The dependency of Bari on the Cairo reports
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26.
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office was transferred to the Algiers reports office and all
Bari material cleared finally through the Algiers office.
Mr. James R. Franklin set up a reports office in Rome
on 3 July 1944.
On 31 August 1944 Lieutenant Barnes left Caserta and
established a reports office in Siena.
Eventually in the early autumn of 1944 with the final
arrival of AM in Italy, a merger took place. The Algiers
reports office was abolished and Caserta was constituted on
16 October under Mr. Ryan as head reports officer, with
Rome and Siena as dependent offices, Siena to process order
of battle reports, Rome to process political and economic
reports. On 4 Novemuer Rome assumed an independent reports
office status. The Bari reports office was abolished. Much
of Barifs personnel was thereby traosferred to Caserta and
the Bari office became again mainly an SI operational head-
quarters and its Balkan and northeastern Italian reports
cleared through the Caserta reports office. In October 1944
296 reports were processed through the Siena office, 139
through the Rome office and 437 through Caserta, which now
represented the old Bari office as well.
The Kandy reports office under Mr. Lloyd Oeor,A, who
succeeded Mr. Don Garden, was still in the organizational
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stage during the summer of 1944 and had a personnel of 9.
During the summer and early autumn it processed 91 original
reports.
By the autumn of 1944 plans for ? reports office in
Kunming in Chine and in New Delhi in India were well advanced
and reports officers for these posts were being trained in
Washington.
In the autumn of 1944 the Reporting Board had a total
overseas personnel of 123.
Although sound reasons have developed for the separation
of jurisdiction in Washington of Reporting Board and Registry,
their work is closely connected and the juxtaposition of the
two sections remains imperative. In the field, however, the
completely separate jurisdiction of registry and reports
personnel has never developed in practice because the field
offices process a smaller number of reports which represent a
consistent type of intelligence and because the registry
personnel in the remoter field offices have been women whose
quarters, offices and routine work have had to be provided
upon their arrival by the reports officer in situ.
An interesting but nevertheless natural feature of the
field reports offices is that the characteristics of each
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28.
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office and of each office's reports vary slightly from the
others. The continued efforts of the Reporting Board have
suoceeded in creating uniformity of overall practice and
procedure in Washington and the field, but each field office
necessarily places emphasis on operational objectives, liaison
contacts and briefing according to the necessities of the
headquarters and the natural abilities of the reports officer.
Thr reports office in this respect will reflect the character
of the reports officer and the local needs. Thus the London
reports office has been especially skillful in liaison work
with.the British, the Cairo office in liaison and in briefing,
the Algiers and Madrid offices in briefing, Istanbul and Bari
in briefing and actual operations.
During this period of the development of the field
offices, the Reporting Board in Wvshington itself changed. On
7 March 1944, Mr. Gardiner S. Platt succeeded Captain Harold
?
Coolidge as the fourth member of the Board and administrative
RI-147, 407i* 4C--
officer. Captain Coolidge left tha,Board on a special RelooRrs
o Pc--
assignment to=fgemden. On 9 May 1944, Mr. Alton Childs became
the fifth member of the Board, remaininz, however, French
reports officer wilLIA he het been since the inception of
reports from Prance.
The geographic veporta units in Washington were themselves
increased to handle the great and vital now of intelligence
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from Europe before and after the invasions. Two new units
were created for Germany and the Far East. To head these
units as reports offioers, the services of 4r. G.L.L. 1.111ame
were obtained on 1 April 1944 for the Far East, and of
Dr. Walter Langsam on 22 May 1944 for Germany. Dr. Langsam
fulfilled the dual capacity of the SI German operations desk,
as well as German reports officer.
The Reporting Boar(' in Vasnington during the later
period was primarili oiJni;ovaek; Wiu porrewtin6 Lae last two
of its four overall objectives mentioned at the beginning of
this survey: true evaluation and directed intelligence, and
a steady advance was made toward both objectives.
On 23 October 1943 a committee headed by Colonel,Forgan
was created to consider evaluation procedure. On 11 Npvember
1943 the Reporting Board published a study called "The Problem
? of the Evaluation of Intelligence Reports", which concluded
with a suggestion
1. "That the Reporting Board should refer
to other branches of OSS for recommenda-
tion as to evaluation, redorts of an
economic and political nature on which
these branches of 033 are in possession
of background material or records which
would be of immediate value and immediate
use in tne evaluation of the report in
question;
v
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2. "That the Reporting Board should
give any recommendations received
the fullest consideration but
should retain responsibility for
the final evaluation."
Colonel ?organ's Committee dopted the recommendation and
as a result the Reporting Board acquired the right to ask
AWL for the submission of its opinion within definite
time limits on the content evaluation of political and
economic reports. Dr. S.A. Callisen was appointed Evaluation
Procedures Officer to accomi.lish the smooth working of tie
transmission of political and economic reports between SI mid
R&A.
The attempt to reach an accurate te:id thorough evaluation
did not stop here. The reports officers tried constantly,
when the need appeared, to check information against
authoritative records within OSS and in other agencies,
especially LID and ONI. This had to be done with a proper
regard for the time element. The Board has 0.msys insisted
that speed is the primary consideration in the dissemination
of intelligence and it has realized that intelligence
recipients prefer information in its raw form with
of learned comment and elaborate rewriting. Those
intelligence, however, do appreciate an
evaluation
a minimum
who use CI
of source
and content wllich will oe a.; Indicative c;uide to their own
judonent. Inte1li6enee work being of the nature that it is,
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a disseminated SI report often represents the most recent
intelligence available on the subject in Wasnington and the
carrect evaluation consequently must often depend upon the
reports officer's records of the most recent Si reports on
the subject,
To further thorough evaluation a compilation of the SI
agent files of the Desk heads, reports officers and Registry
was, made and sent to the various related field reports
offices in acctirdance with a directive from Mr. Shepardson
on 24 December 1943, which stated that "the Reporting Board
in Washington and the reports officers in the field must be
supplied with sufficient information about the sources known
to them by code name, number or other designation, to enable
them properly to evaluate the r(Torts."
Close coordination between the reports officers in the
field and Washington aided the development of the principles
of directed intelligence. Bimonthly progress reports were
instituted between tho field rodurts offices and 'i;ashington.
Evaluation of the a ents based on the agents' reports were
adjusted regularly F,;Id both unfavorable and favorable comment
from the recipients of SI intelligence on certain reports was
forwarded to the field so that suitable fiction culd be taken
with reference to ttio procuring agent. Requests for
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intelligence were immediately cabled or pouched to the field
so that an agent might know that he had discovered a useful
source of intelligence and wnich particulars were especially
needed.
For exanple, during the your before the Frencn invasion
the relations between the Reporting Board and the Battle
Order branch of MID were very ulose and fruitful as a result,
in great part, of the services of Dr. E.M. Carroll, the Battle
Order Liaison. Consequently, the Reporting doard not only
knew the receivers in the Pentagon personally but were also
able to obtain froui them daily requests for battle order informa-
tion and cable these requests to tne field after checking them
against the r,Torts officer's information of the day. Such
requests had been based on the SI reports of the preceding 24
hours. For the instruction of the agent the cables also con-
tained the conclusions of MID as to troop disiositions based
on his own report. The Washington reports officer was often
able to indicate to a Franco-Spanian acient, for example,
recent information from an Algiers or Swiss agent related to
his own report.
In reports on military installations reports officers had
long observed the early and faulty method of reporting, for
example, an ammunition dump as "3 miles down the dordeaux-
Toulouse road uenind Aie white farmhouse". The Reporting board,
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therefore, instituted a project for reporting enemy installa-
tions in France wy mep corinstes Grld overlays from the
field on 1 January 1944. It had been preceded in 1943 by a
similar system in Spain. The project necessitated the use
of 1/50000 scale mcps numbered to a master key with a
complete set of copies in the reports offices in London,
Algiers, Madrid and Viashington for simultaneous reference.
Sections of these maps were given to the appropriate
agents in Prance who customarily submitted overlmiy sketches
of enemy installetions on trensparent paper.
About 1 April 1944 the Reporting board adopted the
technique of disseminating installation intelligence by
coordinates rather than by reproducing the overlays. This
technique had the virtue of being the most accurate snd cheep
systen possible and of coincidint; with military flu navalnaval
411 practice. In April 1944 an index filing system of these
coordinates was established by the reports officers, which
provided a rapid and precise method for the processing and
evaluaLion of all installation intelligence. Unnecessary
duplication of inte1ll6cuce was thereby immediately apparent
and eliminated. by D-Day in France, for example, every recent
artillery, minefield and anti-aircraft installstion on the
southern coast ad on he Ltlantic coast from Hendaye to the
Pointe de Grave had been reported and the Reporting Board files
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contain thousands of installations pin-pointed by coordinates
to 1/b0000 scale maps.
At the end of the second period of the Board's develop-
ment, tie typical procedure and treatment governing a piece
of intelli6once was in accordance with the following
nypotaetical OW30:
The Battle Order Branch of MID has had independent
information on 2 June that the 9th Panzer Division has started
to move on 1 June from Nimes, France. This information is
then submitted during the afternoon to the French reports
officer in Washington by the Liaison. The reports officer
checks it against the reports received from Madrid, Algiers
and Bern on 2 June as recorded in his files which contain a
card for each unit of the German Army ever reported by SI in
France ano of all recent train movements in southern France.
He observes that the informntion is so far unreported to SI,
and that it is a likely move of the division since it nes been
carried as reforming at Nimes for many months. Reports of the
division at Nimes have been carried as A-1, B-1, G-1, 1)-1, E-1,
information, the source being variable, the information con-
firmed. A cable requesting information is then sent to the
reports officer in Madrid, Algiers and to Bern, who in turn
suggests to the operations officer that the appropriate agents
be briefed or radioed or written. Replies begin to flow in to
the various field offices on 3 June. The first report is
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received from Algiers by the reports officer in Wasnington.
The source is an Algiers a6ent who is carried as "A" accord-
ing to the agents file. The report states thnt the agent
has observed elements of 9 Panzer Division moving by motor
on the back roads north of Nimes on the night of 2 June. The
reports officer draws up the statement in concise form and
evaluates it as A-0. This evaluation indicates that SI has
no basis for an opinion on the truth of the report, that the
report is a reversal of the established position of 9 Panzer
Division so far as SI reports are ooncerned.
A caole is received from a seeond Algiers agent rated
as "B7 which reports that he has seen elements of 25 Panzer
Regiment at a town north of Nimes on 3 June. The reports
officer checks 25 Panzer Regiment in his cross-index file,
finds that it is one regiment of 9 Panzer Division and
evaluates the report b-3 indicating thnt the report is possible
and has previous confirmation. A report from a Swiss agent is
received. He is a "D agent, being a German whose reports
have occasionally tiown traces of being intentional or
unintentional German plants. His report, however, states that
the commissariat of 0 Panzer Division is at Montelimar at the
Hotel St. Jacques. The reports officer knows that the
commissariat of a division always moves first. He eaecks the
existence of the Hotel 3'4. Jacqtais end disseminates the informa-
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tion as D-2, indicating that the information is not only
possible out probable. Many reports- begin to flow from the
great Franco-Spanish chains. The best Franco-Spanish
military agent observes a great; train movement of 70 trains
through Montelimar on June. That information is A-2 since
it still not quite enough confirmed. However, a second
report derived through a "B" agent from a Gestapo official in
Montelimar reports the same troop movement. A Gestapo offi-
cial is necessarily "L:". The report is E-1 pnd the whole
movement up the Rhone of 9 Panzer will continue to be dissemi-
nated by the reports officer as confirmed. A report from an
agent placing 9 Panzer Division at Ninss on 19 June is
evaluated A-b or false. A re?ort that the movelaent la only a
partial movement is evaluated A-4 or doubtful since the reports
officer knows that 70 trains have been reported and that 70
trains carry a full armored division. The evaluation 5 is used
only for special eases since such reports would ordinarily be
eliminated from formal dissemination.
The work of the reports officer has only begun with the
dissemination of intelligence, however. All these reports have
to be ehtered in the individual agent's log for a periodic
review of each agent's letter rating: a "C" agent who for
weeks has sent in timely reports that are evaluated as 2 or 3
will be eventually raised to "B" as a result of his reports.
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An "A" agent whose reports have had several. 418 will be
lowered to "3".
In any dissemination, the reports officer nes to apply
definite time limits. These have been established by the
board after consultation with those who use SI intelligence.
Certain order of battle reports over a month old, for
example, are of no value. Repeated dissemination of intelli-
gence reporting an enemy 150mm. gun installed in concrete is
a waste of taxpayers money since it is confirmed in its con-
crete and is not likely to move.
The reports officer must reoognise "double sale" of
intelligence. An excellent agent maj feel thet he fulfils all
the qualifications of patriotism if he sells his information
after an interval of three weeks to a British or French agent.
Echange of british and French intelligence brings the WAMS
report to the reports officer's desk for distribution in
Washington by p:wtostat as Allied intelligence. Although it
has been said that duplication is unavoidable in intelligence
work the dangers of false confirmation require that such
reports snould be eliminated whenever possible.
In due course, the pouch repots containing the original
intelligence from which the cabled intelligence has been
abstracted by the field reports officer aro received in
Washington. The same procedure of dissemination, ci1OCifl of
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a6ent, and evaluation must apply to the pouch since 90 percent
has never been caciled. Reports on politics and economics must
be carefully compared with recent reports and trends. Aaitary
coordinates have to :As checked on maps, technical transla-
tions of blueprints must be made, and the proper disposition
made of e r:Aaltitude of such strange objects as a piece of
German copper wire, sand from a Normandy landing beach,
piece of soap from Cologne, a German soldiers passport,
photographs of the victims of German atrocity'.
During this encyclopedic flood of intelligence, the
necessary liaison with the recii.lents of SI intelligence add
current lists of their needs must be maintained by the reports
officers.
During 1943, 32,499 reports were disseminated by the
Redorting Board, each report averaging five intelligence
items.
On 4 January 1944, Hr. Shepardson established the policy
which should govern Si disseminated intelligence: that
emphasis should inoreasingly be placed on quality of intelli-
gence and less on quantity. However, the ectivity in 1944
was so great that, despite the strictest elimination of every
piece of duplication and of ell antiquated and inconsequential
reports, the Reporting Board by 24 November 1944 had processed
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54,862 reports representing approximately one half million
intelligence items suitably evaluated, appropriately
disseminated and completely recorded.
Ls the second period drew to its close the Roporting
Board suffered a grievous loss in the resignation of
Mr. elin and Mr. Southgate who throughout the ikoardfs career
had established its policy and maintained its efficiency. To
iotn of tAem the Isoard, indeed SI in 6anorui, is deeply
grateful and greatl:; indebted.
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