UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS 1945 - 1967

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
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UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967
VIETNAM TASK FORCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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VI. C.*
SETTLE ENT OF THE CONFLICT
Negotiation. I 07 - 1968
HISTORY OF COETACTS
_ _ . . . . . _ . _ _ _ . _ .
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VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS, 1 67-196P)
This book contains statements and messages exchanged between
the U.S. and the DRV on negotiations, primarily in the form of
closely head prvate communications. It is in three parts:
--The Setting: A description of the intermediaries and the
altitude of the DRV.
--Conditions for "Talks": Conditions for meeting laid down
by the two sides.
--Settlement Terms: Proposals made by the two sides on a
final settlement of the war.
1. Troop Withdrawals
2. Free Elections
3. Who Represents SVN in the Govern-
ment and in Negotiations
4. Reunification
5,0 International Guarantees and
Inspection
6, Cease--Fire
The last two sections each contain a summary, followed by- the
references cited in chronological order.
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TILE SETTING
I. INTRODUCTION
Since mid-1964, there was a halting but gradual diplomatic move-
ment by both NVN and the U.S. toward a negotiated settlement. Hanoi
had been insisting previously on U.S. withdrawal from SVN, acceptance
of the Four Points as the only correct solution, the NLF as the sole
legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese people, and a perma-
nent as well as unconditional cessation of U.S. action against NVN,
prior to beginning either talks or negotiations. In other words, Hanoi
was demanding that the U.S. make all the requisite concessions before
the two sides even sat down at the table. By mid-1967, it seemed clear
that the only condition for talks was the cessation of U.S. bombardment
? and all other acts of war against NVN. While the U.S. repeatedly main-
tained the position of either "unconditional discussions" at any time,
or de-escalation, or both, it too gradually modified its stand. By the
end of 1967, the U.S. no longer pressed for a virtually immediate with-
drawal of North Vietnamese forces or for "assurances that infiltration
has stopped." The San Ratonio formula was a recognition that the war
in the South might continue at about the present rate, even if negoti-
ations were in process.
Diplomatic differences were narrowed to the point where though
there will be real disputes at the bargaining table, initial contacts
leading to negotiations could readily begin. All these diplomatic moves
served as a quiet backdrop to the war in Vietnam itself. The fighting
# .in South Vietnam stepped up as both sides increased their force 3
and ambitions. The U.S. bombardment of North Vietnam escalated a,; new
targets were struck throughout 1967.
1I. THE INTERMEDIARIES
From the close of SUNFLOVER in September 1967 until President
Johnson's dramatic speech of March 31, 1968, diplomatic activity to
bring the opposing sides to the conference table was carried on essen-
tially through five different and sometimes overlapping channels:
First, there was the Rumanian track (to become "PACKERS" in
December 1967) which extended from October 1966 through February 1968.
Periods of intensity in this tract were January 1967, October and
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November 1967, and December 1967 through January 1968. Private
exchanges in this track were being confirmed by public statements on
both sides.
Second, the Government of Sweden ,("ASPEN") played a continuing
though minor role from November 1966 through February 1968. Swedish-
DRV contacts were intense in November of 1966, February 1967, with
contacts occurring throughout the ;whole 1967-68 timeframe.
Third, there were infrequent and low-key contacts between the
Norwegians and the DRV ("OHIO") which lasted from June 1967 through to
March of 1968. There was not much activity in OHIO, since we preferred
to use other channels, but the key messages in this channel were passed
in June 1967 and March 2968.
Fourth, there was a contact in Paris ("PENNSYLVANIA"), with great
intensity and frequency of exchanges in September and October of 1967.
Private exchanges in this track were being confirmed by public statements.
Fifth, the Italian-DRV track ("HILLY") was seemingly being con-
sidered a prime channel by both sides. in February and the beginning of
March 1968. This was the last contact prior to President; Johnson's
speech of March 31, 1968.
? The difference in the quality of reporting and intermediation in
these tracks is, in retrospeFt, quite pronounced. Since very few
written messages were exchanged, we were 'continually relying on the
ear, predilections and prejudices, of the intermediary. Since all the
inLermediaries, in one way or another, had a definite interest in the
success of their role as well as in bringing the opposing sides to the
conference table, all transmissions from them have to be viewed with some
skepticism. All of their efforts seem to focus on one issue-the cessa-
tion of U.S. bombing. It must be assumed that in addition to good
offices and good will, all of these intermediaries wanted us to stop
the bombing. Since Hanoi was apparently representing to them that (
nothing else could occur unless the bombings were stopped, they tenaed
to take this declaration as a given. All were, in one way or another,
'wary of the, spread of the war, international tensions, and especially
of the'imPadt of the war on their domestic policies.
The'Rumanians constantly pressured us on the bombing issue. At
one time, they were claiming they had received the "signal" from Hanoi
in response to Goldberg's UN speech in the fall of 1966. (Goldberg
had stated that Hanoi only needed to give "an indication as to what
BYwoulddD in response to a pytor cessation of bombing by the U.S.")
Later, they admitted that they had received no specific "signal." The
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Rumanians were quite frank about admitting tha6 they were only inter-
ested in the stopping of the U.S. bombing. They accepted that the
two sides were now far apart, but argued that once they sat down at the
table "then the other nations desirous of seeing an end to conflict
would try to push the two sides together." Terms of final settlement,
they believed, should not be discussed before the bombings stopped
since it would only drive the parties further apart. The Rumanians
were also saying that they did not blame. either party for the Vietnam
situation, and that they were only interested in a peaceful settlement.
It seemS- from hindsight that the Rumanians were very poor reporters:
they did not pick up distinctions such as talks, negotiations, and settle-
ment terms; and they repeatedly claimed that the DRV wanted to talk directly
with us; and, after all signs pointed in the opposite direction, they were
still representing Hanoi's demand fora U.S. bombing cessation as both
unconditional and permanent. It is likely that Hanoi did not take the
Rumanians seriously. Despite these indications about the Rumanians, two
GOR envoys were used by the U.S. to transmit and receive messages during
the crucial December 1967 through February 1968 period. Ambassador Suu
(in Hilly) laughed when d'Orlandi suggested that serious exchanges were
taking place through the Rumanians.
The Swedes were more active over time than any other intermediary--
and produced the least amount of information. The important poinl, to
note about the Swedish role was that the Swedes seemed to have more
ready and frequent access to the DRV (both in Hanoi and in Warsaw) than
any other nation. The Swedes were unabashedly anxious to be the successful
go-between. On May 9, 1967 they even went so far as to say that they
would "take responsibility for a position which 5heyi felt convinced
about." In other words, they were willing to be a broker as well as a
message carrier.
The whole Swedish role was very much dominated by their domestic
politics: there were frequent press leaks on GOS-DRV contacts; Vietnam
policy war frequently and vituperatively discussed in the Swedish Parlia-
Aent; 1,he.Russell War Crimes Tribunal began to hold its hearings in July
1967; and the COS kept hinting about establishing consular relations with
Hanoi. Swedish GVN relations began to strain, and in the spring and sum-
mer of 1967, Sweden reduced the level of its diplomatic representation in
Saigon. Finally, on November 4,.1967, the COS publicly denounced U.S.-
Vietnam policy.
The U.S., because of the above, never put much stock in the. Swedish
messages, and this track never became an important one.
The Nonregian role was not treated with great importance by Washing-
ton, and the track was never a very active one. Nevertheless, in retro-
spect, the exchanges between the DRV Ambassador and Peking (Loan) and
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the Norwvgian Ambassador in Peking (Algard) were probably the most
reliable of all. Algard seems to have been a careful note-taker, and
his messages look like he was using Hanoi turns of phrases. Many of
the points' made by Algard were subsequently borne out by other contacts
and by public DRV statements.
Because Norway, unlike Sweden, was not visibly more friendly to
the DRV than to the U.S., Hanoi did not seem really comfortable in
activating this channel into a major one. On November 2, 1967, Loan
hinted to Algard that Norway's role was "not neutral" and that Norway
was "indirectly involved." Norwegian domestic politics were, like those
in Sweden, vehemently anti-American on the Vietnam issue, but this never
seemed to get in the way of objective Norwegian Government reporting.
Unlike the Swedes, the Norwegians did. not press us hard. on the bombing
issue.
The exchanges among the PENNSYLVANIA participants (two unofficial
Frenchmen, Mai Van Bo and Henry Kissinger) seemed to have been handled
with great care and accuracy. While the two Frenchmen, Marcovich and
Aubrac, were clearly committed to getting the U.S. to stop the bombing,
there is no evidence that their reporting, or message carrying, was
adversely affected. Kissinger for the U.S. handled the play with consum-
mate skill, clarifying points and making interpretations that could lead
to a continuing dialogue. Both Hanoi and Washington treated this channel
as a major one, and yet little was accomplished except the clarification
of the U.S. "no advantage" formula. This clarification was to be lost, in
subsequent reformulations of the U.S. position on "no advantage."
The Italians were old hands at playing the role of intermediary.
Their role in MARIGOLD had been respected by both sides. They were not
pushy about interposing themselves between Hanoi and Washington and always
stood ready to break off contacts if the U.S. so desired. It is important
.to remember that in Kialy the North Vietnamese sought out d'Orlandi
(according to d'Orlandi) and not the reverse. The Killy contacts were
between d'Orlandi and the DRV Ambassador in Prague, Suu. It is also
important to remember that d'Orlandi had a very special view about the
role of intermediation. Unlike all the other go-betweens who were inter-
ested almost solely in a cessation of U.S. bombing, d'Orlandi's approach
was to focus on terms of final settlement. Only when the future of
South Vietnam could be foreseen, d'Orlandi argued, would the two sides
'sit down and genuinely and seriously negotiate.
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III. NORTH_VIETMVESE STRATEGY
It has always been clear that insofar as Hanoi is interested in
negotiations, it is only as another way of achieving its objectives.
Since the earliest months of 1966, party leaders in Hanoi have been
preparing their people for a "fight and negotiate policy." Captured
documents have reaffirmed the prevalence of this policy.
Hanoi frames its strategy in terms of two stages: "decisive
victory" and "final victory." "Decisive victory" is defined in terms
of breaking the U.S. will to persist -- namely, when the course of war
in. the South reaches a "deadlock." The U.S. recognition of this "dead-
lock" and its willingness to negotiate on Hanoi's terms then would be
? tested at the bargaining table. Moreover, when negotiations are in
process, Hanoi says that it would create "another front" with which to
"disintegrate" South Vietnamese armed forces and exacerbate "contra-
dictions" within the Saigon Government and between U.S. and Saigon.
"Final victory" could come when all Vietnam was effectively under Hanoi's
control.
Seen in this light, Hanoi's failure to assure military reciprocity
for a bombing cessation in advance of talks could be (a) a matter of
principle, as they assert, or (b) a question of strategy -- that is, a
test of U.S. will to persist, or (c) simply a tactic, a way of concealing
their willingness to retreat until convinced that the U.S. has made its
best offer.
Hanoi's designing of the three stages of bargaining (talks, nego-
tiations, settlement) can be viewed as part of this same fabric. Each
stage is so constructed that it depends on the successful completion of
the preceding stage. Hanoi recognizes its own morale problem and does
.not want to risk creating expectations of a settlement-, until it is
pretty sure that the settlement will accord with its objectives.
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THE U.S. AND DRY CONDITIONS_FOR:TALKS" COWERGE
As of_SUNFLOWER (February, 1967), the DRV position on conditions
for "talks" with the U.S. had been conveyed as follows:
(1) Publicly, Trinh had said, "It is only after the uncon-
ditional cessation of US bombing and all other acts of war against the
DRY that there could be talks between the DRV and the US." (Trinh
interview with Burchett of 1/28/67, as broadcast in English by Radio
Hanoi.)
(2) Privately, in writing, the DRV said, "The unconditional
cessation of bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV being
materialized, the DRV could then exchange views with the US concerning
the place or date for contact between the two parties as the USG pro-
posed in its message handed over on January 10, 1967." (DRY Aide-
Memoire given us in Moscow, 1/27/67, in Hanoi's "unofficial translation"
into English. This replied to our Aide-Memoirc suggesting exchanges on
"the possibilities of achieving a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese
dispute.")
(3) Kosygin privately told the British (they said) on 2/6/67,
that he had been in direct contact with Hanoi and could confirm that
Hanoi would talk if the bombing stopped. He repeated this in essence
Thompson
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Thompson in Moscow on 2/18/67. (See London 6316, 2/7/67, and Moscow
3562, 2/18/67.)
Our position was that we would enter talks without conditions, or
we would stop the bombing in return for some reciprOcal'act of military_
restraint but that we would not stop bombing simply in exchange for talks.
After SUNFLOWER, the two sides bounced varying formulations back
and forth, eventually inching toward each other. The U.S. position remained
.essentially unchanged until August 25, 1967,. when the San Antonic formu-
6
lation waS privately passed to the DRV. The meaning of this proposal
seems to have been obscure to Hanoi. Several later messages passed in
clarification varied among themselves, and the DRV persisted in seeing
"conditions" attached to the San Antonio formula, making it unacc ptable
by Hanoi '.s lights. The U.S. was probing to see if Hanoi understood our
"assumption"; and this probing was apparently interpreted by the DRV as
asking advance assurance that the "no advantage" would in fact be tater?,
a condition. By the end of KILLY (3/1/68), however, when d'Orlandi (as
he reported) warned that "if bombing stopped and .talks began, assaulting
Khe Snub, invading or trying to detach the two northern provinces of SVN,
launching a second wave of attacks against one or more. cities or, creating
a sensation with something else like an assault on Camp Carrol, would sink
the whole thing," DRV Ambassador Su gave his "personal" view: "From the
moment the two sides meet, it was obvious no such thing could happon."
(Rome 4593, 3A/68.)
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At this point Hanoi probably felt it had replied affirmatively and
officially to the "prompt" and "productive" conditions. (In public state-
ments, the DRV .had indicated that talks could begin "as soon as" the
bombing and all other acts of war stopped, and that the subject of the
talks would be "questions related to a settlement of the Vietnam problem
on the basis of the 195/1 Geneva agreements on Vietnam....also questions
which could be raised by either side.") Assuming Su was accurately
reported, it had also gone part of the way on "no advantage," though
not so far as to acknowledge it had troops in the South or to give us
an official pledge against which we could allege violations, resume
bombing or break off talks.
In early April, Hanoi indicated its representative at the contact
would have ambassadorial rank and would be empowered to agree on a date,
place and level for "formal talks" after the bombing cessation. In the
event, the DRV representative Xan Thuy, has ministerial rank and his
proposed contact with us in Paris has been described by Hanoi (in English)
as "formal talks."
What follow are the major statements, public and private, made by
the two sides since SUNFLOWER.
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DRV (6114/67). The DRV Ambassador to Poking, Ngo, told the Norwegian
Ambassador there that the cessation of U.S. bombing is the only condition
for their coming to the conference table.
OSLO 4531 to SeoState (SECRET-EXDIS), 14 June 1967:
"2. FolloWing is my informal rendition Algard's report,
transposed ffOm ,first'to third person:
"3. Ambassador MgO underlined strongly North Vietnamese
Govt disposed toward negotiations. At same time they were deeply
mistrustful of Americans',intentions in Vietnam. Steady escala-
tion and sending of new-troops indicated Americans had intention
of staying permanently in Vietnam.
"4. Ngo underlined North Vietnamese Govt imposed only -one
condition for negotiations, namely that bombing of North Viet-
nam-be stopped. Clearly having in mind the Chinese, he -went
to lengths to underline that speeches from other quarters which
5mposed other conditions Including full American withdrawal from
South Vietnam did not RPT not reflect North Vietnam Govt's thought.
On North Vietnamese side one' gave decisive weight to stop in bomb-
ing because thiS was viewed as respect for North Vietnamese
sovereignty and such a respect was an absolute condition for,
coming to conference table, but was also the only condition.
When they had come to conference table, North Vietnam position
would be very flexible. 'We, are,' Said Ambassador Ngo, 'ready
for very far reaching compromises to get an end to the war.',
Ambassador Algard -noted that recently one had impression that
North Vietnamese side Was :cooler toward negotiations. Ambassa-
dor Mgo denied this strongly. He said that formerly when North
Vietnam showed an interest in negotiations Americans had taken
such interest as a sign of weakness and with results of str nger
escalation. This was background. against which one must judge
'some recent speeches on North Vietnamese side. Provided there
would be a stop in bombing, North Vietnam was ready at any time
for negotiations and far reaching compromises.
U.S. .(6/20/67). The U.S. repeated that it required "at least some
private assurance of appropriate reciprocal action by North Vietnam.".
State 213389 to Oslo (SECRET-EXDIS), 20 June 1967:
? '2.c. Expressed Concern that U.S. intends to stay perma-
nently in Victri'A is of intdrest. We assume GOU is fully aware
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of our repeated statements of intent to withdraw and most speci,
fically the precise wording used in the Manila Communique, which
your should furnish them.
"d. Discussion of cessation of bombing of only condition
for talks fits with other private readings as well as Trinh-
Burchett interview and appears to us highly plausible.
"c. USG accepts that 'cessation' of the bombing of the
North and military action against the North is only NVN condi-
tion for holding talks. NVN has referred to cessation being
on 'unconditional' basis: What is meant by this? (Purpose
here is to clarify whether there may be any distinction between
usual NVN statements that bombing must be stopped 'indefinitively
and unconditionally'.--which we have construed to mean perma-
nently -- and occasional other statements that stoppage of bomb-
ing must merely be 'unconditional.' We ourselves have assumed
that no difference is intended between these two formulations,
but direct inquiry could be useful in nailing this down.)
"d. Assuming that NVN condition calls for, in effect,.
permanent cessation of bombing, USG positionremains as it has
been stated throughout and particularly by Ambassador Goldberg
in September 1966 at UN and by Secretary Rusk in January. U.S.
view is that cessation of bombing, without at least some private.
assurance of appropriate reciprocal military action by NVN,
would create situation of major military advantage to-NVN and
would not be conducive to fruitful talks. USG has put forward
several general suggestion for timing and nature of NVN recipro-
cal actions, and President's letter to Ho contained one specific
proposal that added the element of stopping of reinforcement
by USG in the South. Canadian proposal ofApril called for link
between cessation of bombing and restoring demilitarized status
of DMZ under effective supervision, but Hanoi rejected this.
What is present Hanoi view on these proposals, or do they have
any other suggestion to make?
DRV (7/27/67). Pham Van Dong told Aubrac and Marcevich (PENNSYLVANIA)
that the DRV would settle for a de facto stoppage, though it preferred a
public statement.
"Now I shall talk to you about negotiations and.
solutions. We have been fighting for our independence
for four thousand years. We have defeated the Mongols
three times. The United States Army, strong as it is,
is not as terrifying as Genghis Khan. We fight to have
peace at home; we have no wider aims. We have made
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clear our position in our four points and in the interview
of January 28, 1967. [Pham Van Dong did not explain
what this interview was; Aubrac and Marcovich did not
know, nor do 1.7 We are ready to talk at any time
provided that actions against the North are unconditionally
ended. I want to repeat what 1 said yesterday: we are
willing to settle for a defacto stoppage." Marcovich
interrupted to ask whether he correctly understood that
no public acknowledgment of an end of bombing was needed.
Pham Van Bong replied that he would prefer a.public
statement, but would settle for a de facto cessation
ffhere was disagreement between Aubrac and Marcovich
about the meaning of de facto cessation. Aubrac thought
that a bombing pause could be followed within a few days
by an invitation to negotiate; Marcovich was of the view
that Hanoi might want a more formal--though secret--
assurance:7
U.S. 0125/67). The "no advantage" formulation was passed to the
DRV via Kissinger and Mai Van Bo in Paris. (PENNSYLVANIA)
Messrs A and M met with Bo in Paris to inquire
why their visas had not been received. Bo
told them it was too dangerous to visit Hanoi
due to the bombing. M and A then informed Bo
they had assurances in that respect, without
identifying the nature of the assurances, which
would be effective until September i.
Messrs M and A then presented the US message
as set forth below to Bo for the first time.
He read it with interest and observed-that it
was "clearly significant". Bo queried them
about the significance of para. 2 of the message.
He was informed that it expressed US doubt that
the existence of US/DRV discussions could be
kept secret if bombing ended, and Bo recognized
that this would be a problem Bo was impressed
and was told that the message was authorized by
top levels of the USG. M and A gave Bo a
written description of their contacts with
Kissinger. Bo agreed to cable the message to
Hanoi and to report their desires to visit Hanoi
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to discuss the message. BC) believed a reply
.should be available by August 29.
The English text of the message given to Do
in both French and English is as follows:.
"The United States is willing to stOp the aerial and naval bom-?
.bardment of North Viet-Na17.1 with the unders!r.anding .that this will-lead.
promptly to productive discuss ions between representatives Of the U11::
-Sfates and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam looking toward a
resolution of the issues between thep, .Vhile.discussions proceed
.either with .public Imowledge or secretly., - the United ? States . .
.A.2ould assume that the Pa.-Jlocratic Republic of Viet-cam vould?not
take _advantage of the bombing cessation. ? Any such move on the
. part of the Democratic Republic of Viet-am would obviously be
inconsistent with .the movement toward resolution of the issues
-11,e:oecen the United States and the Democratic Republic of.Viet-Nam
.vhich the discuss,ions are intended to achieve,.
. . . The United States is prepared to enter into-discussions
either openly or secretly. It would seem, however, that a
..total Cessation of the bombing is inconsistent with. 1:eeping
secret. the fact .that discussionsare taking place. Accordingly,
.the Democratic Republic of Viel-iThm may prefer to consider the. ?
.altf,2rnative of a cutback in ..t.1.1,.e magnitude- or scope of the bombing
hlc secret.discussions arc in progress.
:Thc?United States is -ready to have. immediate .private contact
vith-the Democra.tic Republic of Viet-riam to explore the above
approach or ,any s.uggestions. the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.
might wish :to .propose in the same direction."
DRV (9/11/67). A nurber of new, sensitive DRV targets were struck
on August 21-22, 1967, but restrikes and strikes near Hanoi were sus-
pended on August 24 as a gesture of goodwill. The DRV reacted negatively,
however, to both the gesture and the "no advantage" proposal, terming
them threatening, conditional, etc., in line with the general DRV objec-
tive of removing the bombing as a bargaining blue chip for the U.S.
(PENNSYLVANIA.)
:In response to a phone xe(luest- from Bo at
6:0Q p.m. (Paris time) , September 10'
MarcovIch called on Do at: 9.:!30 a.m. After
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an exchange of pleasantries Do handed to 14.the
' 'following.text of Hanoi's official reply to the
August 25 faessage: .
?
"The'essence of the Arnvican proposi? tions
is the stopping of the bc.abing under conditions.
The American bombing of the Democratic Republic
of Viet-Nam is illegal. The United States an;
.should put an end to the bombing and cannot poEei
conditions.
? "The American message hes been co:amunicated
after an escalation of the attacks against Hanoi
and under. the threat (aLenance) of continuation
of the attacks against Hanoi. It is clear
that this constitutes an ultimatu-1 to the
Vietnamese people.
_Gov6rnI,Iont of'th DcmoCratic.
Republic of Viet-Nam energeticlUy rejects
the. American propositions.
?
Theposition of the Government of the .
Democratic Republic of Viet-N,va is that the
United States shN.ild cease definitply and
without conditions the bombing and all
other acts of war against the Democratic '
Republic of Viet-N,,,m. It should withdraw
American troops and satellites from South
Viet-Nam, recognize the National Liberation
Front of South Viet-Nam and let the
Vitnalese people themselves regulate their
Internal affairs. It is only after the un-
conditional stopping by the United States of
.the bombing and all other acts of war against
the Dep.,ocratic Reptiblic of Viet-Nam, that it
?
would be possible to engage in conversations.
_
-(unofficial_ translation)
Po told M to give the text to Kissinger and
added that "as soon as there is a reply" M
should co:a-ilunicate with ho.at.any time of day
or night. When M urgEd Ho to meet Kissinger, '
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ho said "give the message to Kissinger and ?
when 'the reply is here we shall se-about .
meeting". In commenting .on the text ,of. the ?
DRV message ho made the following,:statement:
? ?
? . . .
The bombing of'llanoi at the same tine as the
sending of the (August 21) message constitutes
a pressure. . Stopping of the bombing along with
tie threat of a renewal has the character of an
ultimatum. (Paris 3097).
?
U.S. 19A(1/67). We protested that the DRV must, have misunderstood
_
"
the 8f25/67 message, as it contained neither conditions nor threats. We
merely wished to confirm that a bombing cessation would lead promptly to
productive discussions leading to peace. We did not ask the DRV to reply
to the "no advantage" assumption. (PENNSYLVANIA)
M and A met with Bo for over an hour, starting
at noon. A, who did most of the talking at the
meeting with Bo and kept the notes, reported '
on the meeting, ho greeted A end M affably and
'offered them ho said Ho had charged
laim with inquiring about the health of A's
family. A then handed to ho in a sealed
envelope French and English texts of the
following US message:
September 13, 1967
"The USG,1
30-.-Oves that the September 11
mes3age from the DRV may be based on a mis-
understanding of the American proposal. of
;August 2:5. The American proposal contained
'ineither conditions nor threats and should .
not be _rejected on these grounds.
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.
"It, has been the understandIng of the
ATSG that .the DR V0 would be 1,,11 I n2-, promptly
to engage in productive discuss5ons leading to
peace when there was a cessation of aerial and
? naval bombardment. The USG sought to confirm
this fact in its proposalwhich the DRV has in
.front of it.
?
As a- demonstration of its -:good faith and.
in order to create. the best atmosphere for
the consideration of its proposal the US
voluntarily undertook not to bomb Hanoi from
August 25 .onward - the day on which its prodosal
was subMitted. to Hanoi. This restraint has been
maintained-without time limit even though
activities by oppbsing forces in the south have
.in 'fact been stepped up since August 25
e .
"The August 25 proposal of the USG remains
?open." (END OF MEUAGE)
. ? .
. . .
A told Ho he did not know the content of The
message but described it as "conciliatory",
a word Which BQ made him write down.? Bo. did
' not open the envelope'in M and A's.presenee.
A asked Bo about the significance of the AFT? .
September 14 Hanoi story (State 38031), 'quoting..
"reliable sour.ces"?as indicating that talks woul
.start threp or four: weeks after a bombing
. .
cessation, and' A shbwed BO Paris press stories
based on the APP report. Bo replied that the
three-to four-week interVal between the .end
of bombing and the. beginning of negotla.tions
was
'an ? invention. of journalists". ? He. noted-
that'PhaM -Van Dong 's statement had given no
ground far the time period mentioned?in the
.newspapers.: .?
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, . . ,
U.S....j9/2511. We ask Hanoi to confirm our understanding of U.S./
DRV differences: We are willing to stop bombing if Hanoi confirms that
this will lead p,-omptiy to productive negot;Lations; Hanoi has implied,
but not confirmed, that this would be the result. (PENNSYLVANIA)
M called on Bo at. 8:30 a.m. and read to Bo the
followin five point message from Kissinger:
"(1), )? 'will transmit .to the appropriate
Vashin3.ton officials later today the message ?
, you (Bo) gave M yesterday. (2) I see no point
in trading charE',es and countercharges about
,
pis: activities.. In fact Washington h-Ds offered
to ,stop 'bombing based on the assumption it
. mould lead to prompt, productive taiks. That
offer remains op'en. It was made sincerely.
?" If accepted, there will be no need to discuss
escalation or bombing problems. (3) The
exchange indicates that WaShington and Hanoi
have great, difficulty understanding each
other's thought proe'esses. This makes direct
?-usinav contact essential. intermedior:les, no
matter how ?trustworthy, are not satisfactory
?-substitutes. (() American military actions
during the past month reflect in part the
extreme secrecy with which Washington has
?'handled this exchange. The USG has considered
it: unwise to change decisions made prior to the
-r -report of: lq and A's trip to Hanoi, except in
regard to bombing 'Hanoi itself, because it:
-wanted to keep the circle of awareness of this
exchan,e as span as possible fo avoid premature
public debate. (5) The :difference in the pb5i-
tions of the two governments could be sua-_-lariz
a's follows: Washington has indicated its
readiness to stop bombing and has only aslKed
to confirm its understanding ot
view that this would lead protly to pro-
ductive negotiations. Hanoi has implied that
.an end of bombing would in fact have this restOt
? If this is indeed thel vie or both governnts,
the re,,,ainins obstacles to direct talks can be
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C.
overcoale. I am certainthat thc above eorreetl.:
reflects US views. Could B6 confirm that it
. also reflects the view of Hanol".
M-said Bo's response to the foregoing message
was 'favorable: M then questioned Bo about
U.S. (9/29J67). The President speaks at San. Antonio, publicly
confirming the "no advantage" formulation and noting that it had been
given repeat6dly to Hanoi.
"As we have told Hanoi time and time again, the heart of
the matter is this: The United States is willing to stop all
aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will
lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course,
assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would
not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation."
(President's remarks in San Antonio before the National
Legislative Conference.)
DRY (1012/67). Marcovich, after taking careful notes on Mai Van Bo's
_
comments, described Trinh's 1/28/67 statement as a "solemn engagement to
talk after the unconditional end of the bombing." Two days later, Do
denied using the term "solemn engagement'" to which Marcovich took strong
exception. (PENNSYLVANIA)
. following tinci meeting and atter a flight
:to Rome where he discussed the message in
Afr.oirlibme mailed it by
special delivery air-post .to Kissinger in
Boston late on October 2; The text of the
note received by Kissinger ?f0110\
"The position of the RDVN remains alWays
the-same; If the United States really
:wished .to talk, .let them stop first without
;:cOnditions the bombardment. of the territory
of Che RDVN'.
?
:"Starting from that poSition there are.
several eventualities: ?
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(a) A public declaration by the Government
of the United States about the cessation.
This declaration could take place either
before or after the cessation.
(b) - An official declaration but non-public
preceding the Cessation of the bombardment.
This declaration could be communicated by
the channel K/A-M (officieusement)-not
quite officially, and after this indication
it can be transmitted officially by an
accredited person.
(c) An end of bombardment without preceding
official declaration followed by an official
but not public communication of the Govern-
ment of the United States.
"Eventuality (a) would represent a public
declaration replying ta that made on the 28th
of January by. M. Trinh, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the RDVN, which constitutes a
solemn engagement to talk after the uncon-
ditional end of bombing. This public declara-
tion would be followed by the transmission of
an official text by an accredited person.
U.S. OV8J67). We offered to set a date for stopping the bombing
and a date and place for beginning discussions if the DRV indicated it
would enter promptly into productive discussions on U.S./DRV issues.
M and A called on Boat 9:00 a.m. Paris
time and spent al hours with him. As in
the past Bo was cordial to his visitors
throughout the meeting.
M and A handed the written portion Of the
message from Kissinger to Bo, which Bo read
closely. M and A then read to Be Kissinger's
four "oral points," and Bo wrote them down
carefully in his own notes. (M and A.did -
not leave with Bo- the "oral part of the
message,) The written message and oral points
are as follows:
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"M should tell B that K would be authorized
to deliver to B in writing the following:Message
whenever B is prepared to meet with him
-officially or unofficially:
'The United States Government under-
stands the position of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam to be as follows:
That upon the cessation by the United
States of all forms of bombardment of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
without expression of condition, the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam would enter
promptly into productive discussions with
the United States. The purpose of these
discussions would be to resolve the issues
between the United States and the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam.
'Assuming the correctness of this
understanding of the position of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the
United States Government is prepared,
in accordance with its proposal of
August 25, to transmit in advance to
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the
precise date upon which bombardment of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would
cease and to suggest a date and a place
for the commencementof discussions.'
"In addition M should convey to B the
following oral points from K:
"1. K believes that this understanding
is consistent with B's statements of
October 4, as reported by M, and with the
proposal of the United States Government
of August 25.
"2. When B meets with K, K would also
be prepared to state the precise date on
which the cessation of bombardment would occur
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and to give the suggestions of. the United States
with respect to the date and site of the dis-.
p_issions following the ce.s.satioh of bombardment,
and K would be authorized .to receive the views .
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with respect
to these and other modalities.
K noted that the Democratic Republic .
. of Vietnam had not commented on .observations by
the United States Government on August 25 with
respect: to secrecy of the fact of discussions.
between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and
the United States Government.,
"4; K observed that ofn_cialS of the United
States Government: had taken note of a reduction
of military activities' in the vicinity of the
demilitarized zone. Undoubtedly, the Democratic
Republic. of Vietnam had noted the absence in
recent weeks of aerial bombardment in the
immediate vicinity of Hanoi."
, Bo told M to tell Kissinger how much Be
appreciated K's pe-zsonal efforts. Be then
dictated to M and A the following short
nessage of acknowledg:lent to Y:
I '
"M and A have passed the note from K to .
B. In case B will, have a reply to make,
he. will make it through this channel."
Gio/12/67).. The San Antonio formula was explained to t'e
SWede:s. filio advantage" was not a "condition" but a "self-evident descrip-
tion" of what would constitute good faith. They were asked to find out
if Hanoi would agree to a degree of restraint that would compromise a no
advantage situation in return for stopping the bombing.
STATE. 54361 to Alaembassy Stockholm (SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
12 -October 1967.
"4. Daring this conversation the Secretary made a.
number of observations on the main points raised by the
Foreign Minister's paper. We would, have nothing to add
to his comments at this time beyond reaffirming the impor-
.tance of. eliciting any additional details on Foreign
Minister Trinh's remark to Ambassador Petri in June that
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Hanoi 'understood.' the importance the United States
attaches to reciprocal action on the part of North Viet-
namese in connection with a halt in the bombing. We
not Ambassador Petri's view that some concrete act of
reciprocity can be expected after the cessation of the
bombing,. ,even if Foreign Minister Trinh gave no precise
indication that Hanoi was considering taking such a step, and
we would of course always be keenly interested in any new
evidence which Ambassador Petri might obtain from North
Vietnamese officials which would bear out his view.
. "5. Since the Secretary's conversation with Foreign
Minister Nilsson, President Johnson in his speech of
September 29 has set forth our willingness immediately to
stop aerial and naval bombardment of'Horth Viet-Nam when this
will lead promptly to productive discussions. As the Forel
EiinisGer will have seen from this speech, as well as from
Ambassador Goldberg's September 21 speech at the United
Nations, we are interested in two points -- whether there
would be productive discussions, and whether we could
reasonably assume that Hanoi would not take advantage of a
bombing stoppage. The latter point has not been posed as
a 'condition,' but rather as a self-evident de:scription of
a state of affairs that would evidence good faith on both
sides. Foreign Minister Nilsson may note that the desired
!no advantage' situation would require restraint from Hanoi,
but this night fall shorl, of total cessation of arms dispatch
and infiltration to South Viet-Nam. If Hanoi were prepared
to consider such a cessation, a balanced arrangement, not only
stopping the bombing but also cessation of reinforcement
by United States and others; would be possible. But
there remains the possibility that Hanoi might.be pre-
pared to agree to some lesser restraint, in return for
stopping the bombing only, thst could comprise an
effective 'no disadvantage' situation.
. "6. If Ambassador Petri could elicit any precise
information on Hanoi's position concerning these points
during his forthcoming visit to Hanoi, this could be of
the greatest iuportance. As the Secretary remarked at the
conclusion of the conversation, we would hope that we could
? be inforined.in advance.of the timing of Ambassador Petri's ,
next visit to Hanoi so that we might consider whether we could
submit any additional points to make during his discussions
with North Vietnamese officials."
LUSK (drafted by Isham)
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DIN (1q/37/67). Through the PENNSYLVANIA channel, Bo gave us a
written message changing the verb "could" (Trinh's 1/28/67 interview)
to "can." He also indicated the DRV took "productive" to mean that
the U.S. insisted on discussing SVD in U.S./DRV exchanges.
"M" saw.Bo, expressed hope to keep the channel open, and handed
"M" the following message:
?
V-Actually the U.S. has been following a policy of
escalation of an extremely serious nature. In these
conditions the U.S. proposals of peace are double-faced.
At a time when the U.S. is pursuing a policy of escalation
itre ca,nnot-receive. Kissinger, nor comment on the American
proposals transmitted through this channel.
"The position of the Government of the DRV is perfectly
clear: it is only when the U.S. has ended without, condition
the bombardment that discusions can take place."
"M and Bo discussed what 'the conditions' were in the U.S. pro-
posal. M said he thought that the U.S. meant that we wanted a
guarantee of serious discussions when we used the word 'productive.'
.Bo said the DKV thought that by use of the word 'productive' we
meant that, we wanted to talk about objectives in the South also,
since discussions could not be fully productive without, this subject
being considered. ,k)
DRV (10120/67). Burchett reported the DRV would offer nothing
"except talks for a cessation of the bombardment. lie stressed the
distinction between "talks" and "negotiations," without making clear
what the dIfference would be. He quoted Trinh as saying the talks would
be "meaningful," but whether they would be "fruitful" or "productive"
would depend on the U.S.
, The following article by Wilfred.Burchett waF.3:read in Washington
..on'this date:
"Hanoi, North Vietnam. AP - There is no possibility of any talks
or even contacts between Hanoi and the U.S. government unless
the bombardment and other acts of war against North Vietnam
. are definitively halted.
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"This is the position stated to me during conversations
in the last few days with Premier Pham Van Deng, Nguyen Day
Trinh, foreign minister and deputy premier, and other high-
ranking government and party leaders.
? . "Hanoi is in no mood for concessions or bargaining
and there is an absolute refusal to offer anything --
except talks -- for a cessation of the bombardment. The
word /tressed is 'talks,' not negotihtions. .
"Euring an informal talk, hew.ever, Trjnh repeated
that statement to this corr spondc,nt last January 28
that talks could start if the ;7'' :-Jing was halted -- still
held good. He said there could be-'meaningfull talks.
Whether they would be 'fruitful' or 'productive' depended
on the United States.
U.S. (11h/67). The Russians were told that we would stop the
bombing if they could tell us that the DRV would stop its infiltration.
MemCon, dated Nov 3, 1967 (approved in S: 11/8/67) (SECRET/NODIS)
Part II of IV
Subject: Vietnam
Participants: U.S.
The Secretary
Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Undersecretary
John M..Leddy, Assistant Secretary for EUR
Malolm Toon, Country Director, SOV
USSR
V. V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Yuri N. Chernyakov, Minlster-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Igor D. Bubnov, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
."THE.SECRETARV said we had no problem, with this at all. The Soviets,
however, must be perfectly clear on one fundamental point. We will con-
tinue to oppose the spread of world revolution by force. With regard to
Vietnam the Secretary saw no need for a conflict of interest between the
United States and the Soviet Union. It was important, that the Soviet
recognize that we have a vital interest in what happens in South Vietnam,
just as we recognize that the Soviets have an interest as to what happens
in North Vietnam. We arc prepared to stop the bombing now if the Soviet
Union can tell us that the North Vietnamese will stop its infiltration."
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.1J,S,L(11/23/67). The Swedes were given. Mustrations of DRV actions
that would run counter to the "no advantage" assumption. They were
asked to seek clarification from the DRV.
7. The third point relates to the understanding of a
'Ina advantage' situation, as described in the President's Son
Antonio speech and in my October 6 message to ybu in connection
with a bombing cessation and the start of talks. One way to
clarify this is in terms of questions that I emphasize are
illustrative of examples only. What would happen with respect
to the flow of supplies and men into South Viet-Nam and to
positions directly threatening South Viet-Nom? For example,
if following a cessation or limitation of bombing, there was
a marked .increase in the flow of trucks southward; if a new
NorLh Vietnamese regiment were to appear; or if we saw a
massive increase in the flow of supplies just to the north of
the 1/4Z, we would be negatively impressed. Similarly, to take
another example, we would want to know what would happen with
respect to the three North Vietnamese Divisions now in the area
bf the Demilitar.ized Zone which have been employed as part of
offensive operations against our forces south of the rmz.
Would artillery located north of the demarcation line be employed
against our forces? And, if so, yould we be expected not to
bomb these artillery positions? .
"8. These questions are, of course, not easy ones to
answer. Nevertheless, ye believe they are central to an
accurate understanding of what is involved on both sides. We
would be grateful for any clarificat'ion that you might ,be able
to obtain through your contacts with North Vietnamese repre-
sentatives on these matters."
U.S. (12/27/67). The Russians gave their understanding of San
Antonio as requiring Hanoi to agree in advance to a de-escalation of the
conflict before the bombing would stop. Harriman corrected them, drawing
attention to the WIZ as a special problem, however.
MamOon',. Dated December 27, 2967 (SECRET/NQDIS)
TIME: 12:45 to 3:45
PLACE: 3038 N Street
Participants: Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin
Ambassador at barge W. Averell Harriman
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,
. . . . (3) I stated that the San Antonio formula was certainly
a reasonable one and went as far as the US Government could be expected
.to go. I-asked whether his Government could inform us why it had been
rejected by Hanoi and also whether the Soviet Union had a practical
alternative suggestion. He asked some detailed questions regarding the
San. Antonio formula. I repeated what I had told him in my last .converia-
tion, 'Productive discussions' did not, as Hanoi had interpreted it,
mean a guarantee of favorable conclusion, but considering our Korean
experience, we wanted assurance that talks would be serious and in good
faith and in an attempt to find an agreement.- He told me that his Govern-
ment had gained the impression that the President's statement 'We would,
of course, assume that while discussions proceed North Viet-Nam would not
take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation' meant that Hanoi
would have to agree in advance to a de-escalation of the conflict. I stated
that this was not true. 'Taking advantage' meant what it said, namely,
that Hanoi would not use the advantage of no bombing to send more supplies
and reinforcements to the South than were now getting through. . I also
referred to the DMZ as a special problem. They were using artillery, and
our bombing of the gun positions and other bases just north of the DMZ
was a tactical operation which would have to continue unless there was
mutual restraint in that area which we thought would be the best solution.
"Dobrynin said that he would inform his Government, but underlined
that both his Government and Hanoi believed that Hanoi had interpreted
the San Antonio formula, taken in connection with other statements, to mean
that Hanoi would have to agree in advance to some sort of de-escalation of it
operations if we were to stop the bombing."
P.1-y(1?"22/S1).. Tri'enh, ';speaking pubiicly, changes the verb from "could"
to will talk.
, On pecembcr_25 Trinh spoke at a Mongolian reception. The substance .
of his talk was b"roadeast by Hanoi VNA in English on January 1. Je stated
in part:
"The stand of the Vietnamese people is quite clear. That
is the four-point stand of the DRV Government and the political
program of the NFLSV. That is the basis for the settlement of
:the Vietnam question.
'"The U.S: Govelmment has unceasingly claimed that it wants.
to talk with Hanoi but has received no response. If the U.S.
Government truly wants to talk, it must, as was made clear in
.our statement on 28 January 1967, first of all stop unconditionally
the bombing and all other acts of waragainst the DRV. After.
the United States has ended unconditionally the bombing and all
other acts of war against the DRV, the DRV will hold talks with
the United States on questions concerned.."
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?
DRV_PPI/68). The Swedes were told of DRV concern that "no
advantage ".would "leave our brothers in the South unprotected."
STOCKHOLM 662 to SecState (SEC1*,T, NOD1S 'ASPEN),
January 4, 1968. Ref: Stockholm 649.
Oberg saw Charge Vu Bach Mai (Oberg's spelling)
Dee 21 and handed over paper described Para 2A. Paper had been
translated into French; illustrative examples Para 7 State 73693
were also given in English.
"4. NVN Charge raised three points which Oberg on
instructions refused to discuss saying that Swedes had
this paper from US aide and that Swedes not competent '
go beyond what was in paper.
'5.. Three points NVN Charge raised were:
A. Did Swedes have any suggestions on how to
describe bombing:pause? ,c)
B. On question or flow of material 5n no-advantage
'situation Charge said 'we cannot leave our brothers in the South
unprotected.' It was not clear to Oberg whether he was referring
to NIP in South Vietnam or to supplies to IIVN troops north of
DMZ. (Oberg commented that in his contacts NVN representatives
never referred presence NVN troops in South .Vietnam.)
C. On question seriousness of negotiations Charg
said this was unclear to him. In any negotiation both sides
started from positions "fidely apart a.nd with quite different
aims. In such' cases there would be different interpretation.
of 'serious or productive.'"
.DRV (y5/68). The Rumanians reported that Tinh made clear to them
that the condition for talks was an "unconditional" but not "permanent"
bombing cessation. They also claimed that the DRV would not insist on
U.S. acceptance of the 4 Points as the basis for negotiations; each side
would come with its own views.
"Material in Auptation marks was read slowly and -carefully by
Macoyescu.
"Here is the answer to the question that you asked 1.41. Harriman.
From this point on there is a passage which in the text is in quota-
tion marks.
n mnp OTPODMP i\inT)T
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'We affirm the following.. If the USG really wants
discussions with the Government of the DRV it should first
'unconditionally cease bombing and any other act of war
.against aAfter the unconditional cessation of all
bombing and of any other U.S. act of war against the DRV and
at the end of an appropriate period of time the government
of the DRV will enter into serious discussions with the USG.'
?
"While he was reading this paragraph I sto-Oped him and told him
comrade Minister when I mentioned cessation I said final and uncon-
ditional. Trinh looked at.me and reread the sentace. I said I
mentioned 'final and unconditional cessation. He reread the
sentence again. I interrupted for the third time. May I under-
( Stand you are no longer speaking of final cessation. His answer ..,
was that publicly we may continue to mention it Lit with a view
to negotiations. What I have said is our position.
"I asked him whether the Government of Romania is authorized
to pass this communication to the USG. He Said yes. He repeated
it but he said to retain spirit of the message."
Harriman paid that the Trinh pablic statement was much the sane as
the M & I message, but that the M & I statement placed more emphasis on
the acceptance of the four points as a basis of negotiations. M said that
he did not establish any connection between his visit to WaShington,
unknown to Hanoi, and the Trinh public statement. Harriman argued that
"there must be some connection." M responded that he did not believe
:Mere was a contradiction between. the .two messages:
?
"In the public statement it says the basis for negotiations
is the four points, but in private conversation they stty we will
come with this basis but the U.S. side, we expect, will come
with its own point of view. They especially said this."
Harriman then auestioned whether it was the DRV view that discussions
will be fruitful only if we accept their four points. M responded:
"That is not the impression I gained from my discussions.
They will come with their claims but would have to negotiate on
what the U.S. puts forth. They said this specifically."
With respect to the Marling of discussions, M said that Trinh stated
there could be no contacts "as long as U.S. acts of war. continue)...
but as soon as bombing and other acts of aggression against North Viet-
namese cease, we are prerared to receive anybody...." Trinh added: "We
shall consider these contacts as normal diplomatic activities. The
American representative will be received by OUT diplomats at their suggestion.
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Harriman questioned further on the timing, specifically as to the
meaning of "after a suitable length of time." Here, M retreated to the
DRV t(12d--"the,appropriate and ne.cessiry period of time." M explained
? this as a period in which
? ?????,.
"t'ney will try to test (I don't know by what means) the
sincerity of your intentions?your wish to have discussions.
I could not deduce the period, but I do not think it will be
too long. If an understan7ding.is reached that'yo.0 stop, .at a
certain established period, discussions, not negotiations,
will take place."
M then read from a document:
"As long as the US acts of war go on we cannot have
any contacts with them. As soon sq- they cease the bombings.
and discontinue the acts of aggression we shall be prepared
to receive any person, even a representative of the United
States, who may wish to make known to us the American point
pf view or to get informed on our viewpoint. We shall regard
these future contacts as normal diplomatic activity. The
American representatives will be received by our representa-
tives at the former's suggestion."
-x-
"1. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has communicated to
the United States Government this statement of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam position:
'If the United States Government really wants dis-
cussions with the Government of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam it should first unconditionally cease bombing
and any other acts of war against the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam. After the unconditional cessation of all
bombing and of any other Uniet,ed States act of war against
'the ,Democratic Republic of Vietnam and at the end of an
appropriate. period of time the Govern-aent of the Democratic
.Republic of Vietnam will enter into serious discussions with
the United States Government.'
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DRV (1/16/68). Bo says that talks would begin "after a suitable
time folloMng" the halt of attacks, and that the two parties would
then meet to agree on the level and scope of their talks.
I ?
, DUES 2's THE HALTING OF THE BOMBING IS-CLEAR BUT 'WHAT DOES "THE
CESSATION OF ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DEMOCR-ATIC.R.EP6BLIO
OF VIE': NAME" MEAN TO YOU?
?
AN-.9 THE CESSATION) OF ANY mILITARY ACTION THAT VIOLATES THE
SOVEREiGNTY AND Or- ..CH5 DEMOCRAET'IC?FiEVOBLIC OF
,
VIETiFAiu
DUES 3s fN WHAT WAY MUsT THE 'AMERICAN COVE ANNOUNCE THE END' OF THE
BOMBING?
ANS 2 THE US GOVT THIS Of THE
BOMBING AND OF ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR THROUGH A-DECLAR-A.TION OR-IT
MAY mAke-UsE OR ANY OTHERFRCEDURE?CLE?OFESTABLiSING:ITS
DUES- 4s HOW MUCH TIME WILL 'ELAPSE BETWEEN HE END OF THE 6.0i16ING
AND THE .OPENING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS?
ANS 2 THE TALKS WILL BEGIN AFTER A SUITABLE TIME FOLLOWING THE
UNCONDI.TIONAL HALTING OF THE BOMGING XND 'ACJ.-OTHER AcTs- or WAR
AGAINST THE DRVNo
?,?????- .
DUES Ss AT WHAT LEVEL IN YOUR OPINION, ARE .THESE NEGOTIATIONS JO
BE HELD AND WITH WHAT QUESTIONS ARE THEY TO DEAL?
_ .
ANS2 FULL THE UNCOND1TINAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND OF ALL .0THER
HE DRVNp THE TWO PARTIES WILL-MEET IN -ORER
TO REACH AGREEMENT ON SUCH QuE-STIONS0
,
(Emphasis Added)
Clifford defined the "no advantage" assumption to
th Senatermcd Services Committee as assuming the enemy "will continue
to transpert the normal amount of goods, munAtions, men, to SVN."
"SENATOR (STROM) THURMOND: When you spoke of negotiating, in that
case you would be willing to have a cessation of bombing. I pre-
sume that that would contemplate that they would stop their mili-
tary activities, too, if we would be expected to have a cessation
of bombing.
r: 22
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"A- No, that is not what I said. I do not expect them to
stop their military activities. I would expect to follow the
language of the President when he said that if they would agree
to start negotiations promptly and not take advantage of the
pause in the bombing.
"Q. What do you mean by taking advantage if they continue
their military activities?
"A. 'Their military, activity will continue in South Vietnam,
I assume, until there is a cease fire agreed upon. I assume that
they will continue to transport the normal amount of goods, munitions,
men, to South Vietnam. I assume that we will continue to maintain
our forces during that period.' So what I am suggesting is, in the
language of the President, that he would insist that they not take
advantage of the suspension of the bombing.
"Q. How would you keep them from taking advantage if we had
a cessation of bombing?
"A. There is no way to keep them from taking advantage. If they
state they are going to refrain from taking advantage, and then
refuse to do so, then they have not met their agreement, and the
conditions for the negotiations have failed.
"Q. And then, if they did violate that, you would favor then
resuming bombing, I would presume.
"A. I would assume we would have no alternative. If they djd
not meet their obligations or we do not meet our obligations, then
I assume there is absolutely no sense in negotiating. It would be
a useless task. To negotiate there has to be good faith if any
result is to be achieved and if, during the negotiations, bad faith
is evidenced then there is no need to negotiate."
DRV_(2J8j68). Trinh defined the questions to be raised in "talks"
as "questions related to a settlement of the Vietnam problem on the
basis of the 1951i Geneva agreements on Vietnam. They are also other
questiOns' which could be raised by either side." This blurred, possibly
erased, the distinction that may have existed earlier between "talks"
and "negotiations." He also said talks would begin "as soon as" the
U.S. "proved" it had stopped attacks.
"Question: In your 29 December 1967 speech, you stated in part:
After the unconditional cessation of the bombings and all other
r cro
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0
acts of war against the DRY, the DRV will hold talks with the
United States on relevant problems. What do you mean by relevant
problems?*
"Answer: They are questions related to a settlement of the
Vietnam problem on the basis of the 1954 Geneva agreements on
Vietnam. They are also other questions which could be raised
by either side
"Question: It has been subsequently clarified that the talks can
begin after an appropriate time following the unconditional cessation
of the bombings and all other acts of war against the DRV. Could ,
you clarify further the meaning of appropriate time?
?
"Answer: The talks will begin as soon as the United States has
proved that it has really stopped unconditionally the bombings
and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."
,
U.S. W17i68) . The Swedes were asked to explain the San Antonio
_
formula to the DRV. "Productive" was defined as "serious exchanges"
in which either side could raise "any matter." Attention was called
to the Tet offensive, as casting doubt on Hanoi's intentions, but it
was not labeled a breach of "no advantage."
"The U.S., cons, stent with President Johnson's statement
of April 7, 1965, remains willing to enter into talks without
preconditions at any time.
-"The U.S. position on the cessation of the bombardment of
North Viet-Nam is set forth in President Johnson's September 29,
1967 speech in San Antonio. As the President said: .
. 'The U.S, is willing to stop all aerial and naval
bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this will lead promptly
to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that
while discussions proceed, North Viet-Nam would net, take
advantage-othe :bombing cessation or limitation.'
"The U.S. is not assuming that North Viet-Nam will cease its
support to its forces' in the South. On the contrary, as Secretary
of Defense designate Clark Clifford testified before the. Senate
Foreign Relations CommitLee, we assume that until a.cease fire ?
is agreed on, Hanoi 'will continue to transport the normal amount
of goods, men and munitions.'
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- "in setting forth its assumption, the U.S. is not betting a
condition but attempting to make clear to Horth Viet-Nam that
any cessation of U.S. bombing followed by actions by Hanoi taking
advantage of the cessation (such as an increase by Hanoi of its
infiltration of men and supplies or attacks in the area of the
DMZ) would constitute such bad faith on Hanoi's part as to make
Continued U.S. forcbearance impossible.. If Hanoi, by taking
advantage, forces the U.S. to resume bombing the possibilities of
a negotiated solution would drastically recede. Under such
c-ircumstances calls for intensified U.S. nilitary action would
increase and the possibility of another halt in the bombing would
be low. The U.S. is trying to ascertain whether Hanoi appreciates
this vital fact and fully understands the importance the U.S.
attaches to the no-ad-vantage assumption.
"At San Antonio the President, in addition to setting forth
his assumption, stated his. rLadiness to stop the bombing when such
action would lead 'promptly to productive discussions.' 'Productjve
discussions' are serious exchanges in which either side will be ,
able to put forward for full consideration in good faith its posi-
tion on any matter. 'Prompt' of course refers to a willingness by
Hanoi to begin discussions with the U.S. immediately after cessation
of bombing. '
"It is worth noting that Hanoi is unwilling to give a clear
response to questions as to the length of time between a U.S.
bombing cessation an% the beginning of talks. If. Hanoi were
serious in desiring talks then surely .its response would have
been one of unequivocal readiness to begin immediately.
"The U.S. evaluation of Hanoi's current position takes into
account lianoi's actions as well as its words. The unprecedented
offensive against most of South Viet-Nara' s urban centers, which
Hanoi treacherously launched in the midst of the traditional Tet
holldays, causing widespread civilian casualties and suffering,
was made notwiLhstand'ing the fact that we were still exploring with
Hanoi its position through diplomatic channels, and that we had
exercised restraint in bombing targets in the immediate vicinity
of Hanoi and Haiphong. ? In this context, we cannot but. weigh
Hanoi's words with great skepticism and caution. Thee actions
carry a harsh_political message.
? "The U.S. favors every effort to obtain clarification of Hanoi s
position. We shall continue to evaluate all information and to
pursue every possible avenue which promises to bring us closer to
the resolution of this coAflict through serious. negotiations."
(State 117383)
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U.S. (2/20/68 'The Norwegians were asked to convey the same message
as the Swedes,? .
"The US, consistent with President Johnson's statement of
April 7, 1965, remains willing to enter into talks with5ut -
amended State 1187127 preconditions at any time.
"The US position on the cessation of the bombardment of
North Viet-Nam was set forth in President Johnson's September 29,
1967 speech in San Antonio. As the President said:
'The US is willing to stop all aerial and naval
bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this will lead
promptly to productive discussions. We, of course,
assume that while discussions proceed, North Viet-Nam
would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or
limitation.'
The US is not, assuming that North Viet-Nam will cease its
support to its forces in the South.. On the contrary; as.Secre-
tary of Defense designate Clark Clifford testified before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we assume that until a cease-
fire is agreed on, Hanoi 'will continue to transport the normal
amount of goods, men and munitions.'
."In setting forth its assumption, the US is not setting a
condition but attem-eting to make clear to Korth Viet-Nam that any
cessation of US bombing followed by-actions by Hanoi taking
advantage the cessation (such as an increase by Hanoi of its
infiltration of men and supplies or attacks An the area of the
DMZ) would constitute such bad faith on Hanoi's part as to make
continued US forebearance impossible. If Hanoi, by taking
advantage, forces the US to resume bombing, the possibilities
of a rigotiated solution would drastically recede. Under such
circumstances, calls for intensified US military action would
increase and the possibility of another halt in the bombing
would be low. The US is trying to ascertain whether ITnnoi
appreelates this vital fact and fully understands the importance
the US 'attaches to the. no-advantage assumption.
? "At an Antonio the President, in addition to setting forth
his assumption, stated his readiness to stop the bombing when
such action would lead 'promptly to productive discussions.'
'Productive discussions' are serious exAqvnges in which either
side will be able to put forward for full consideration in good
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;faith its position on ally matter. 'Prompt' of course refers
to a willingness by Hanoi to begin "'scusions w5-ch the US
jmmeiately after cessation of bon' ng.
"It is worth noting that Hanoi is unwilling to give a
clear .response to questions as to the length of time between
a US bombing cessation and the beginning of talks. If Hanoi
wore serious in desiring talks then surely its response would
have been one of unequivocal readiness to begin immediately.
"Tho US evaluation of Hanoi's current position takes into
account Hanoi's.actions as well as its words. The unprecedented
offensive against most of South Viet-Nam's urban centers, which
Hanoi treacherously :launched in the midst of the traditional
Tet holidays, causing widespread civilian casualties and
suffering, was made notwithstanding the fact that we were
still exploring with Hanoi its position through diplomatic
channels, and that we had exercised restraint in bombing
targets in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong. In
this context, we cannot but weigh Hanoi's words with great
skepticism and-&atjon. These actions carry a harsh political
message.
. _
"The US favors every effort to obtain clarification of
Hanoi's position. We sha21 continue to evalluate all information
and to pursue every possible avenue which promises to bring us
closer to the res',..j.ution of this conflict through serious
negotiations."
(State 118092)
DRV (2/21V68). "All other acts of war" was defined to mean that
"no airplanes were permitted to fly over DRV territory.
11
?
."Mr.? chwA, repeated the statement of hi Foreign Minister
of January 1967 and of the 29th of December 1967. He thus
repeated that negotiations would :begin as soon as the United
.States had proved that it has stopped all bombardments and
all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of -
Vietnam, He specified 'all other acts of war' to mean that
'no air:Olanes were permitted to fly over.DRV.territory and no
naval vessels were to have their guns Or other weapons' directed
against DRV territory after that had been done, the Democratic
'Republic .of Vietnam would negotiate with the Unitod States
about relevant questions. The Ambassador in this connection
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also referred to Foreign flinister Trinh's statement of the 8th
of February 1968, to the effect that the Vietnam conflict had
to be solved on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreements and that
? negotiations could begin as soon as the United States had shown
that it would stop the bombardments of North VietnaM and all
other actions of war against the DEV. He mentioned a delay of
some three weeks 'or less'."
? (sToonform
DRK_(3/1/0.8)- DRV Ambassador Su told d'Orlandi that his "personal
/lewil-as there would be no assault on Khe Sanh, etc., etc., once the ,
itwo sides had begun to talk.
D'Orlandi met with Meloy and Davidson to report on his March 1
meeting in Prague with Ambassador Su. D'Orlandi asked Su if he were ready.
to answer the question concerning the period of delay between the stopping
of the bombing and the first,. U.S. Hanoi meetings? Su responded rather
lamely that he thought this contact had come to an end and, therefore, he
was not able to supply a preciseLanswer. "He could state that the matter
of a date would be no problem. The real problem was San Antonio."
D'Orlandi said that he had dictated LO Su the first portion of the
Davidson NemCon of theFebruary 28 meeting to the North Vietnamese, but
the North Vietnamese did not c=ent on this.
The most, important point that Su made in these talks was wi"th respect
to "no advantage." Although he said .he was speaking personally, it is
, highly doubtful that he would have said the following without specific
instructions:
"....D'Orlandi then told Su that if bombing stopped and
talks began, assaulting KIK: Saab, invading or trying to detach
the two northern provinces of South Viet-Kam, launching a second
wave of, attacks against one or more cities or creating a sensa-
tion with something else 1;1.ke an assault on Camp Carrol, would
sink the whole thing. ,'Su replied that, speaking personally and
not on instructions, such thing would be out, that from the
moment the two sides meet it was obvious no such thing could
hapPen. (I questioned d'Orlandi abc-_-.t this remark of Su's and
d'Orlandi replied that while he took no notes he is certain this
is the sense of what Su said.) D'G clmdi told Su that whatever
he or Su thought of the effect of beabing, it is a fact that
the US Government and US public opinion considers bombing of the
North a most important weapon and that no President could give
away such a weapon while something terrible was happening either
in the my, or the South. Su did not respond to this comment.
D'Orlandi also remarked that it might be necessary for him to go
to Hanoi to receive assurances directly from the top and again Su
did not reply." ?
28 . 120:[) SliAMET rODIS
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DRV (3/10/68). Trinh gave Norwegian Anbassador Algard to under-
stand that the DRV did not require the U.S. to accept its 4 Points
"beforehand" (apparently before negotiations) though the DRV would
insist on them as the "foundation for a political resolution of the
conflict" at the talks.
OSLO 3570 - Summary of Ambassador Algard's visit to Hanoi, March 3-10:
"7. The Foreign Minister underlined also that blie North Vietnamese ,
4-point prgra;11 must be the'founda-lion for a political resolution of the
_
_
conflict. Apart from what concerned the stopping of the bombing and
cessation of the acts of war against Korth Vietnam, he,did not set
matters forth in such a way that the United States beforehand must' accept.
the-entire 11-point progre:A. He ilia not say anything on the point of
time for American withdrawal but said that was a question which must be
handled at the conference table. Nor would he say anything on how the
reunification problem would be settled nor how long it would take but.
he repeated that first there must be a political solution in South
Vietnam and referred to the NLF program which assumed a separate South
Vietnamese state for the immediate future. Insofar as it concerned a-
political solution for South Vietnam, the Foreign Minister repeated the
North Vietnamese position that this was a question which must be dis-
cussed with the NLF and that Hanoi cannot speak on behalf of South Vietnam.:
He underlined very strongly that recent events in South Vietnam had shown
that the regime in Saigon was totally without political basis but at the.
same time events made clear that there was a possibility of cooperation
between the NTT and other political groups. However he did not go into
detail on this point." (Emphasis added)
DRV.(4/8/68). Toinh, in his interview with Collingwood, repeated
, DRV'atLacks'on reciprocal restraint as the condition for a complete
bombing halt. He specified that the DRV representative at the contact
to complete the bombing hall; would have Ambassadorial rank and would
be prepared to reach agreement on "the date, place and level of the
formal talks" between the DRV and U.S.
"Question: President Johnson said that 'even this limited bonbing
of the north cQuld come to an early end if our restraint is matched
'41110, by restraint in Hanoi.'. Would your government be willing to make
such a move?
?
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?
"Answer: The Democratic Republic of Vietnam is an independent
and sovereign country SOYC 10,000 cubs away from the United States,
and has done no harm whatsoever to it. The unwarranted U.S.
bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is an impudent act
of aggression. The United Slates must bring it to an end.
"To ask for 'reciprocity' as a condition, or 'restraint' as
a price, is nothing but a trick to blur the distinction between
the aggressor and the victim of aggression. The United States has
shown no 'restraint' in using its huge war machine against a small
country, and still demands that we should show 'restraint' and should
not exercise our sacred rights to defend our fatherland. This is.
pure nonsense."
? ? ?
"Question: In its 3 April statement, your government declared'its
readiness to appoint its represe4ative to contact a U.S. representa-
tive with a. view to determining with the American side the uncondi-
tional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war
against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam so that the talks may
start.' Mr. Minister, what will.be the rank of your representative?
When and Where will he make contact with the U.S. representative?
When and where will the formal talks between the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam and the United States start, and at what level?
Answer: A representative with ambassadorial rank of the Government of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is ready to make contact with a
representative of the U.S. Government in Phnom Penh or in' another
place to be mutually agreed upon. In the course of this contact, the
American side will specify the date when the unconditional cessation
of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam will become effective; then the two sides
will reach agreement on the date, place, and level of the formal talks
between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States."
. .
?? DRV..(5/3/68). The DRV appointed Xuan may as its representative
to enITY-"T-6:6-n-611-taiks " with the US in Paris.
... the DRV Government is of the view that :the formal
talks between Hanoi and Washington should be held immediately
The DRV Government has decided to appoint Minister Xuan Thuy
as its representative to enter into formal talks with the U.S.
Government's representative,. to determine with the U.S. side
the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all
other acts of war against the DRV, and then hold talks on
other problems of concern to the two sides."
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SETTLEMENT TERMS
1. Mutua] Withdrawal
Summar
The U.S. position on withdrawal of forces is clear and, yet,
leaves us with a great deal of flexibility. We have said in the
.14 Points (1/3/66) that "we want no U.S-bases in Southeast Asia,"
.and that "we do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam
after peace is. assured." In other words, the U.S. is on record as
:being committed against keeping its forces in South Vietnam when peace
is restored. The U.S. record is also clear in insisting on mutual
withdrawal of forces. In the 4 Points which were passed to the DRV
in Rangoon (PINTA 2/16/66), we stated that discussions should consider
"appropriate means, including agreed stages, for the withdrawal of .
, military and quasi-military personnel and weapons introduced into
South Vietnam or North Vietnam from one area to the other or into.
either area from any other outside source.. .and the regrouping and
redeployment of indigenous forces." U.S. flexibility on withdrawal
is bUilt into its "until peace" qualification.- In the Manila Declara-
tion (10/25/66), we stated that allied forces "shall be withdrawn, after
close consultation, if the other side withdraws its forces to the north,
ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus snbsides. Those
forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six
months after the above conditions have been fulfilled."
The DRV ham always given the principle of U.S. withdrawal top
billing. Pham Van Dong directly told us (PENNSYLVANIA 7/25/67) that
the end of the war mean "a withdrawal of U.S. forces." In the 4 Points,
for example, Hanoi states:. "The US Government must withdraw from South
Vietnam US troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dis-
mantle all US military bases there, and cancel its military alliance
with South Vietnam." Hanoi has, hoWever, displayed increasing flexibility
on the timing of U.S. withdrawal. Recent statements indicate- that they
would be prepared for us to stay until a political settlement in the
south had been achieved. Hanoi's hooker on this issue is similar to
those other matters on which it has evinced flexibility (reunification
and. free elections), namely, that this isan issue of secondary importance
compared to the crunch point on who governs in the south. Tactically,
then, Hanoi is likely to present an initial hard front on this matter and
then "give in" in order to gain concessions on the central issue of power
in .the
mrp,. :presence in South Vietnam
Hanoi has repeatedly denied the presence of regular PAVN forces
or even North Vietnamese volunteers in South Vietnam.- These public
denials are important to Hanoi for several reasons: the denials
reaffirm their propaganda about the war being essentially a South Viet-
namese affair fought by the South Vietnamese themselves, that is a
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civil war. The denials may also have been tied to their anti-U.S.
bombing campaign, allowing them to maintain that the U.S. was committing
aggression against the north without the north committing aggression
against the south. Also, at this time, Hanoi has an interest in not
making itself out to be a liar for all these years. As Par as we know,
they have even been telling the Russians that they do not have regular
forces in the south. In other words, this fiction has assumed propa-
ganda and leverage value which Hanoi will not give up easily.
While Hanoi's public record on this issue has been consistent,
there have boon two private slips in which they wore on the verge of
admission. The first occasion was in the XYZ contacts when Bo did
not deny DRV troop presence in South-Vietnam (8/18/65) or even that they
325th EVA division was in South Vietnam--although he claimed that "it
was not then engaged in military operations" (9/3/65). After the XYZ
contacts had ended, Bo said there wereno regular troops in Saigon, but
northern volunteers might have joined the Viet Cong (11/27/65). The
second occasion of near truth telling came during the MARIGOLD contacts,
Lewandowski asked us(11/1)/66),- regarding the offer at Manila concerning
the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam on the condition that the troops
of North Vietnam would withdraw, and, he said, "North Vietnam, of course,
doesn't admit that they are there at all.. Later in the. 10-Point
MARIGOLD formulation (11/30/66), the 8th Point read: "In this regard the
US is prepared to accept DRV modalities on the cessation 5f bombind and
not require the DRV to admit infiltration into South Vietnam."
Would the DRV withdraw?
_ . . , _ . _ . . . . _ _ . _ . _ _
When played off against the public statements of denial, these private
statements provide a hint as to how the DRV might handle this is-sue..
The fiction of no presence will be maintained, but it will not be allowed
to stand in the way of actual North Vietnamese troop withdrawals should
the conditions be appropriate. In all likelihood, however, these with-
drawals will be de facto, unannounced, unilaterally made -- and not ?
necessarily back into North Vietnam itself. The more likely stopping
place Am their way home from South Vietnam would be the Laotian Panhandle.
The furthest Hanoi ever went on dealing with this issue was again in the
XYZ contacts. BeCause Bo did not deny EVA troop presence in South Vietnam,
he was able to agree with the principle that troop withdrawals would have
to .be mutual, balanced and phased (8115/65). Bo reaffirmed his agreement
to thiS Principle (8/18/65), but the denied any such agreements (9/3/65).
What emerge is the link between North Vietnamese troop withdrawals
and their control of the south. When Lewandowski .asked us about the
Manila withdrawal formula (11/14/66), the tie was clear: . "...does tbis
condition mean the U.S. withdrawal depends on control by the present.
South Vietnamese government of territories not now under the control
of Saigon?" 1IanO-1 will ask us this question again, and depending upon
our answer will decide to withdraw or not.
mop FWCP-PM NnT)Tq
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Timing -- the DRV view on the timino. of U.S. withdrawal.
As the DRV began toplay out its. diplomatic hand over the last two
years, it has .become increasingly flexible -.on When it would like the
U.S. to leave. Do told us that U.S, withdrawal was a "technical problem"
(11/16/65). Lewandowski said that they could take place according to
a "reasonable guarantee" (6/27/66). Loan told Algard OHIO, 8/16/67)
that the timing "was not -a decisive question." In this connection,
Lewandowski pointed out the agreement on withdrawal of French troops
as an example. He added that the Americans "would have to accept the
political situation in South Vietnam as it is, as De Gaulle did in
Algeria." All this does not mean that Hanoi will leave the issue open
to principle. One of Lewandowski's 10 Points (MARIGOLD, 11/30/66) stated:
"The U.S. does not desire permanent or long-term milite-y presence in '
South Vietnam." The most forthcoming of all DLV statements on this
issue was the one made by Phamyan Dong (PENNSYLVANIA, 7/25/67):. "Some
US troops would have to stay Lin South Vietnaq.until the end of political
settlement," This probably Means that the U. S. forces would be allowed
to linger on as long as they did not interfere with the process of political
settlement.. Indeed, the continued presence of. U.S. troops in South Vietnam
during this period could add legitimacy to the new government.
Non-Intervention
The DRV also wants to get some guarantee in principle that the U.S.
will refrain from intervening in Vietnam after a political Settlement -
has taken place. In the )1- Points, Hanoi states that the U.S. "must end
its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam," and that
during the period pendiE reunification, the two zones must refrain from
entering into any military alliances with .foreign countries and there
must be no foreign military bases, troops, or foreign military personnel
in their respective territory.
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2. Self-Determination: for SVN: Free Elections?
r-
t_ Isimmary
The main parties to the war agreed. early on the principle of self-
determination for the people of SVN It s endoTsed, inter alia, in the
first NLF program (2/11/61), President Johnson's Johns-Hopkins speech
(4/7/65), the DRV's 4 Points (4/8/65) and the Gliff's )1 Points (6/22/65).
:The Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic and. Peace Forces (ANDPF) is
for it, too (./26/68)._ But the different sides have different ideas about
how the people of SVN should express their will. The U.S.. and the GVN
prefer the electoral processes of the current Constitution, whereas they
and NIS want to scrap. that Constitution and set up a new electoral
: authority. The ANDPF has not stated a formal position on the Constitution,
but is clearly opposed to the GVN as the country's electoral authority-.
.Everyone no doubt suspects that the outcome of elections will be determined
- by who runs them. Thus to a large extent, the waris now being fought over
who .shall run future elections, making the apparent agreement on "self-
determination" illusory. In addition, while both sides have expressed
- themselves favorably about elections, neither is irrevocably committed
to elections as the only means of self-determination.
*Pi
The 4 Points ()-/8/65) call only for self-determination "in accordance
with the program of the IIF-without any foreign interference.'" When these
Points were first publi-thed, the NIF program (issued 2/11/61) called for
tr-
overthrowing Diem and substituting a coalition. government as one phase,
apparently the first, in bringing about "progressive democracy," including
L,. a-new constitution and elections. .
Later in 1965, Mai Van Do stressed self-determination' as the "one
basic premise" that would permit all other problems to be. solved (XYZ,
7/16/65), but he subsequently amended this to say that self-determination
through elections would only be possible after U.S. military withdrawal
(XYZ, 1/27/66). As he explained, "How can elections be held in a country
over which no authority is exercised?" (xyz, 5/6/66) He was probably
not worried about the mechanics of holding elections. More likely, he
felt the electoral authority would determine the outcome.
?? ?
These stands were repeated by Trinh (to the Swedes), who said he
wanted a coalition government and general elections (ASPEN, 11/11/66).
Nare
When Lewandowski was probing us. on settlement terms (MARIGOLD, 11/1)1/66),
he asked, "In case of a cease-fire, would the US be prepared to withdraw
from the combat areas and not interfere in the creation of a _new government
in Vietnam?" He also 'wanted to know if the Manila withdrawal provisions
depended on GVN control of areas not then under its control and whether
we would declare our willingness to accept the Geneva and ICC machinery
in "bringing peace to Vietnam," perhaps including inspection of an election.
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.? . ? ?
(
De was no doubt searching for a formula under which N1,10 authority
could be eiercised prior to U.S. withdrawal. When he formulated his
10 Points (MARIGOLD, 11/30/66), he indicated our willingness to "accept
the participation of 'all' in elections and the supervision of these
ielectiens by an appropriate international body." If, as the Poles and
Russians claimed, the DRV was willing to enter discussions on this basis,
they may have been willing to see elections of this sort before U.S.
withdrawal. Who would run the elections, and how,voald be subject to
legotiation--as, therefore, in DRV eyes would be the probable outcome.
When the new 1NLF Program was issued, just after the election of
Thieu, Ky and the lower house, it lists first the goal of abolishing
the "puppet administration," the "puppet national assembly," and their
'constitution. It called for "free general elections," for a new natiohal
.assembly that would work out a new constitution, and for the establish-
ment of a "national union democratic government." While it does not
, specify the order in which things are supposed to happen, it is clear
enough that abolishing the GVN and its constitution would have to come
before new elections, etc. In the list of objectives, new elections and
the new constitution also come beforq establishing the coalition govern-
ment. Perhaps this hints that the issue is negotiable (9/5/67).
However, at the end of February 1968, the DRY position expressed to
Fanfani by Ambassador Su was: Hanoi wanted "absolutely free general
elections. To insure liberty of vote, it was necessary to constitute a
government with very broadly based participation" (HILLY, 2/23/68).
The ANDP2 Program attacks the Gva as a "lackey administration," calls
for Betting up a coalition 'government and speaks of the future political
regime in SVN as a "republic" with "just and honest ;elections." Again
the sequence is not crisply specified, but the program seems to call for
setting up the coalition government as a condition necessary to "winning
back national sovereignty." This would make it a condition for ending
the war--something to be negotiated or won on the battlefield, rather
than the outcome of an electoral process (4/25/68).
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The Legitimate Representative of SVA: GVN or NLE?
?
Summary.
As noted in the previous section, elections as an impartial way of
deciding who shall govern avN may -not solve the problem. The composi-
tion of the government may have to be negotiated or decided in battle.
A prime war aim of the communists is establishing legitimacy for the
NLF, while undercutting that of the GVN. The GVN is fighting to bolster
its authority, while destroying that of the RIF. Thus "who shall govern
SVN" is what the war is all about, and "who shall represent SVN" in
negotiations is one round in the battle.
As opposqd to the principle of "self-determination," the issue
of who shall- represent SVN--at the conference or in Saigon--is one on
which almost no agreement has been reached between the U.S. and DRV.
Essentially, each side has insisted on the legitimacy of its party in
SVA, denied the legitimacy of the other's, but offered a way for indiv-
iduals from the other's party to enter political life by "reconciling"
themselves. . The communists are probably prepared to go beyond this,
accepting three- "political- tendencies" (right, neutral and left) as
theoretically co-equal, in exchange for our agreeing that a new govern-
ment be formed by the "tendencies"--after the model of the 1962 Agreements
on Laos.
The DRV and NLF.
- -
From the outset, the comrmanists' carrot has been their willingness
to see "non-communists" included in the government or at the conference
table. The unpalatable part has been their insistence on a role for the
NLF and no role for the GVN as an institution;
In June 1964, Pham Van Dong insisted to Seaborn, "The Laos pattern
of 1962 should serve as a guide for SVN." There should be a coalition,
including the NLF. When Seaborn said the NLF might dominate Dong said
only, "There is no reason to have such fears."
. In' his. statement embodying the 4 Points, Pham Van Dong said the NLF
was "mare and more recognized by...world opinion as the sole genuine
representative of the SVN people" (4/8/65). The following January, Ho Chi
Minh said, "If the US really wants peace it must recognize the ELF as the
sole genuine representative..." (1/24/66). This public stance was softened
in various private communications passed subsequently, but never to the;
extent of conceding legitimacy to the GVN.
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- The DRV rebutted the U.S. 14 Points (Rangoon, 1/31/66) by rejecting
the legitimacy of the GVN: asking the NLF to "lay down its arms and
ask amnesty" amounted to maintaining a "puppet regime" in Saigon.
In Lawandowski's first overtures (MARIGOLD, 6h9/66), he repre-
sented the communists as askingonly that the NLF "take part" in negoti-
ations--"t'hey are not to haveany monopoly"--and said that Hanoi- did
"not want to interfere with the SVN Government," - though "we would like
someone other than Ky." Later he suggested a coalition government made
up mainly of "sensible SVN politicians" with men "on the fringe" from the
"right and the left, "the so-called NIF," in one or two "unimportant .
ministries" each" (MARIGOLD 9/18/66). This too is after the Laos pattern.
(Souvanna's neutralists with 11 ministries, Boun Oum vjth 4 and Souphan6vong
with )T.)
Much the same proposition came to us through the Swedes (ASPEN,
11/11/66).
Burchett, claiming to reflect the views of senior DEV and ELF
officials, reported that Ky and Thiea would not be acceptable in a
coalition, but "some members of their cabinet or...previous Saigon ?
governments" might be. The communists considered "negotiations between
Hanoi and the Ky government" as "an impossibility." Ky and his top
supporters were expected to emigrate (2/10/67).
In July 1967, Pham Van Bong repeated that the coalition could be
"broad" and could include members "du gouvernement fantoche et cadres
d'armee fantoche." He said the ELF need not participate in negotiations--
as long as the issues do not concern SVN (PENNSYLVANIA, 7/25/67).
The latter point was repeated through the Norwegians in August -
(OHIO, -8/16/67). But in the end, the Americans Would "have to accept
the political situation in SVN as it is, as de Gaulle did in Algeria-"
"The question of representation was of ?great importance" 8/16/67).
Later, the Norwegians were asked to find out if the U.S. was "willing to
accept the I:no-ration front as a political factor" (OHIO, 8/21/67).- The
Norwegians _took this to mean as a "factor in preliminary talks, actual
negotiations (and) in a post-settlement situation." They also conveyed
to us the DRV's desire for a "non-communist" coalition government in SVN.
(The.DEV.indicated to them that it considered the ELF "non-communist" too.)
intei'Iocutor's. Itolic gave the iMpression". that members .of the ON
would be acceptable, although this was not made explicit; the North.Viet-
namese did concede that the ON "was a political factor in SVN. (9/8/67).
This too is in the pattern of the Laos settlement,. in which representation
at the conference finally devolved upon three political "tendencies" .(right,
neutral and left), which ultimately became the three elements of a coalition
government.
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' Last February, .DRV Ambassador Su told the Italians that there
should he a "very broadly based" government, "excluding only 'war
ariminals' (undefined)lr(KILLY, 2/23/68). .
As late as March, the Norwegians were told again that a political
solution for- SVN "was a question which must be discussed with the NLF
and Hanoi cannot speak on behalf of SVN."
The ANDPF Program denounces the GVN as a "lackey administration" and
says the NLF "cannot be excluded from the settlement of all problems
in SVN. We advocate contacts with the NLF...." But it offers, apparently
acting alone, "to discuss these problems with the US government" ()i./25/68).
This is possibly intended as a face saving way for the U.S. to begin
negotiations with the communists without according status to the NLF.
The ANDPF?may also offer. the "neutralist" political tendency from which
a solution after the Laos pattern could be fashioned: NLF members on the
left; AN= in the middle; selected GVN members on the right.
The GVN
a
Throughout, the GVN has insisted upon its sole right to. speak for
SVN. Its 4 Points state, "the Hanoi Communist regime must dissolve all
the puppet organizations it has formed. in SVN under the names of 'Front ?
for the Liberation of the South,' 'Liberation Radio' and the 'Peoples
Revolutionary Party' (6/22/65). Thieu's current position is that the
GVN and Hanoi are the parties' to the war. If there are to be negotiations,
they should be the protagonists with no role for the ELF. His prime objec-
tive is clearly to win ecognition for his government from Hanoi, without
our according any further status to the IMF. Although the present GVN
constitution excludes communists and "pro-communist, neutralists" from the
electoral process, Thieu has accepted the principle of "one man-one vote,"
and agreed to meet with individuals 'wholeave the NLF, but he would not -
accept the NIP itself as a "political entity" (Bunker's Meet the Press
interview, 11/19/67).
The U;C. .
Our position has been. consistently that the NLF had no role "as of
right" in SVN and that we would not guarantee 'a role for it before
elections, bacause to do so would be. contrary to free determination.
Individual Members of the NIP, however,' 'could participate in the political ?
process in SVN (XYZ, 9/8/65; Rangoon, 2/16/66). Should the DRV -decide
to negotiate, "the Viet Gong would not have .difficulty being represented
and haying their views, presented" (U.S. 14 Points, 1/3/66; Goldberg, 2/10/67).
We drew attention to the internationally recognized status of the GVN
argued that the GVN's National Reconcilation Program offered a route by
which individual members of the NLF could participate in the "normal
political processes of SVN" under GVN auspices (Manila Communique, 10/25/66;
Goldberg, 2/10/67).
0
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Several episodes may have zuggested to the DRV some elements
or "give" in our position: Gullion'.s instructions stated, "At most,
the future of the MF should be a matter for discussion, not something
settled in principle -before negotiations begin" (xM, 8/15/65).
iLewandowsld's.10 Points, accepted by us ".subjeCt to important differences.
of interpretation" said, "the present status quo in avN would be changed
in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently
:opposing the policy of the US in avN" (MARIGOLD, 1a/30/66). Goldberg
(.1/2/67) told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the U.S.
IIwould-not stand in the way of groups, including the ?NUF," being invited
to appear before the UN Security Council. The U.S. privately indicated
;to the UN Secretariat that visas would be issued for such a group if .
certain clarifications were obtained; the latter, however, were apparently
not forthcoming and no visas were actually issued. In his March 31 spoqch,
President Johnson said, "there may come a time when South Vietnamese-.-
on both sides--are able to work out a way to settle their own differences.
by free political choice rather than by war."
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)1. Reunification
Summary
The U.S. position on reunification of Vietnam can be separated
into what we have been saying publicly and what we really want. Pub-
licly, the U.S. 111 Points (173/66) state:
"10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be
determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;
"11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be nonaligned
or neutral if that be their option;"
The U.S. position is perhaps more accurately stated .in the Manila
Communique (10/25/66):
"The Government and people of South Vietnam deplore
the partition of Vietnam into North and South. But this
partition brought about by the Geneva Agreements of 1954,
however unfortunate and regrettble, will be respected
until, by the free choice of all Vietnamese, reunification
is achieved."
President Johnson has gone even further (4/7/65) when he said that "our
objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from
attack." Our preference is clearly for the continued separate existence
of South Vietnam, but the impression of our public statements has been
that we favor reunification through free Vietnam-wide elections after
aggression has ceased.
The North Vietnamese position appears forthcoming and appears similar
to the impressions of our own public statements. They have indicated that
they would not press for reunification, that reunification could be deter-
mined well in the future by free decision of all the Vietnamese people,
and that the interim state in South Vietnam would be non-socialist and
*neutral. . Hanoi can afford to make their reunification position look ,
appealing because it is really a secondary issue. 'their position is and
they will press for a political solution in South Vietnam favorable to
them, and then let the. issue of reunification take care of itself -- in
a -Ume ipriod. when U. S. interests will not be humiliated..
What is the DRV position?
There are several statements in the 4 Points which bear on this
issue: (a) "The USG must.. .dismantle all U.S. military bases /in SVN7,
and cancel its military alliance with SVN".; (b) "Pending the peaceful
reunification or Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided
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ip,:to two zones...."; and (c) "The. peaceful. reunification of Vietnam is
to be settled by the'Vietnamese people in both zones, without any
foreign interference."
In June 1964, Pham Van Dong told Blair Seaborn that reunification
is a "drame national, fondamental." He added, somewhat inconsistently,.
that neutrality for SVN, and by implication reunification, would be
something for the people of SVN to decide; he did not "prejudge" the
outcome. More recently (PENNSYLVANIA 7/25/67), Pham Van Bong said that
Hanoi goals for South. Vietnam were "independence, democracy, peace, and
neutrality.".
What do these General statements add WO to in operational terms? When? -
On the timing of reunification, the DRY has given a range of statements
including, "no hurry" (XY7, 7/16/65), "indefinite postponement" (OHIO 8/16/67),
"until South Vietnam is ready," Ti.(:) or 20 years" (Burchett 2/11/67). But,
as the Swedes informed us (ASPEN 11/11/66), Trinh said to them that it is
necessary to create such conditions as will permit a move in the direction
of reunification. In other words, reunification, according to the DRV need
not occur at any specific or early time, but that it will happen at some
future point must be assured by present decisions. These decisions basically
seem to revolve around a political settlement in South Vietnam. As Loan
told iagard (OHIO 3/3/67), "first there must be a political solution ih
South Vietnam." At first glance, Hanoi's position on reunMeation looks
like a compromise. Indeed, Hanoi has been playing it up as a compromise,
indicating that postponement of reunification is at variance with the 1954
Geneva Accords which cal.ied for reunification within- two years of settle-
ment, i.e., 1956. The hooker, of course, is that the realization of reunifi-
cation in the future is merely a corollary of other points, mainly control
of the government in the south, and need not be fought for in its own terms.
How and by Whom.?
Lewandowski (MARIGOLD 11/14/66) spoke of reunification by free deter-
Thinatign, adding that this could take the form of either a referendum or
an eleetiOn. While he did not spell out this issue, apparently a referendum
would be a Vietnam-wide single issue vote on reunification. By elections,
he could have meant that reunification would be decided on a government to
government basis (the DRV with the new South Vietnam government), each
govelrnMent having been chosen by ."free elections.". In ,support of the .latter
method, Pham Van Dong stated (PENNSYLVANIA 7/2,5/67): "Once the war in.. the
South is settled,.we shall discuss with the South .and find the, best means."
Additionally, and to confuse the issue further, virtually all the DRV -state-
ments on this issue stress that reunification is to .come through free :
determination "by the people in both zones" (the 4 Points). This is thd
wording of the 1954 Geneva Accords, and it means that the people of South
Vietnam alone will not decide the matter, that the people in the north must
have their say as well. By this country-wide vote formula, it is likely
that even a solid majority vote in SVN against reunification would be oyer-
taken by the near unanimous vote for reunification in North. Vietnam.
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A final and related.qtalifier is that the free decision on reunifica-
tion-must.be without foreign interference. Presumably, this is to convey
the DRV belief that no outsiders can or should be present in Vietnam when
the decisionon reunification is being made:
Nature of interim state in South Vietnam?
The DRV has used three elements to define what the Government of
south Vietnam would look like pending' reunification. First, Hanoi has
Jescrrbed it as neutral in the "Cambodian manner" WARIGOLD 9/18/66).
.This implies independence, but more reliance on Asian and particularly
.Asian communist influences. Cambodian neutrality is not noted for being
ympathetic to the U.S., nor is it noted for knuckling under to China or
;North Vietnam. Cambodia has also renounced SMO protection. Hanoi
has also described this government as beinf "non:pocialist." After talking
.1./.3_th the DRV leadership, Burchett .(2/11/67) said that Hanoi thought of ?
itself as a "socialist country and a member of the socialist world but
without military alliances or foreign military: bases, militarily but not
politically neutral," and thought of the south as "non-socialist and
neutral militarily, politically, and diplomatically."_ In a very revealing
statement (PENNSYLVANIA 7/25/67), Phr.4m Van Dong Said: "Some people think
we want to iMpose socialism on the south. We are convinced that the NLF
will not make such an error." It isimportant to recall, however, that
the communists consider- the NLF to be "non-communist," a front of diverse
political groupings. The third element has been the implication that there
need be no change in the foreign affairs of the interim South Vietnam
government (MARIGOLD 6/27/66). Such a statement would imply that South
Vietnam could continue under western alliance protection and that the
government would be able to receive aid from all countries. This element,
reported only in the first'MARIGOLD contact-, is in contradiction with the
first element emphasizing neutrality. Except, perhaps, for the aid
provision, it is! probably nothing' more than a come-on.
What do these Statements add un to?
They seem to mean that Hanoi understands that the U.S. has a definite
stake. in South Vietnam, and that even in the future would not take happily
to the appearance (or the reality?) of South Vietnam being absorbed into
the communist bloc. When Pham Van Doug said that "the NLF will not make
such an error," he probably meant that they understood the importance in
U.S. eyes of appearances. The DRV must get its way, but it is saying that,
it 1Ll not';do so in a way that will threaten western interests.
Relation of Interim South Vietnam government to DRV?
_
Burchett (2/11/67) even gives us a glimpse of how Hanoi views
relations between the two interim zones or governments. He says: "For
regulating north-south relations, there would be a type of general assembly,
presumably nominated by the respective parliaments to handle questions
important to both zones, such as, trade, post and telegraph, inter-zonal
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travel, including sports and cultural exchanges. The assembly, in
fact, would have some resemblance to the inter-German council, an
idea bejng tried out by the West German social democratics as a means
to handle current practical problems between East and West Germany.
This idea goes back as far as 1955, when the DRV Introduced the proposal
for the Fatherland Front.
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5. INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AND INSPECTION
This has always been a very real and important issue to the U.S.
and the GVN on the one hand, and kind of a non-issue to Hanoi on the
other hand. In the four points which we handed to the DRV in Rangoon
(PINTA 2/16/66), we stated.: "Strict compliance with the military
prov:LsrLons of the Geneva Accords must be achieved in accordance with
schedules and appropriate safeguards to be agreed upon in the said
discussions or negotiations." Dater, in the Manila Communique
(10/25/66), it was stated that: "The people of South Vietnam, mindful
of their experience since 1954, insist that any negotiations leading
.to the end of hostilities incorporate effective international
guarantees. They are open-minded as such guarantees can be applied
,and made effective."
There are four DRV statements on this subject:
First, Pham Van Dong has stated (SEABORNE 6/18/64) tit
"as far as the ICC is concerned, we are very glad to have you ,here.
Dut don't put too many items on the 'agenda, don't give yourself
-too much work to do."
Second, Lewandowski asked us (MARIGOLD 11/14/66): "In the
case of.a cease-fire and negotiations, would the U.S. be ready to use
the Geneva Agreement and the machinery of the International Commission
in bringing peace to Vietnam, and if so, would the U.S. publicly
declare its intention to this effect?"
Third, in Lewandowski 's ten points (MARIGOLD 11/30/66), the
fifth point states: "The U.'S. is willing to accept the participation
of 'all' elections and the supervision of these elections by an
appropriate international body."
Fourth, Su told d'Orlandi (KENT/Y. 2/23/68):? "Both parties
felt that problem of guaranteeing an agreement was increasing to
,decisive importance." According to d'Orlandi, Su seemed to categorically
Occlude the UN as a guaranteeing agency and Panfani and Su agreed
that the 'ICC was not in a position to guarantee anything.
These statements do not add up to Much, but they are suggestive
'of the DRV' S willingnesi to compromise on a.point that theyknow
is important to the U.S. -- as in the case of many other issues, so
long as it does not detract from the central issue of who controls
the government in the South. Hanoi's opposition:to?the UN is wellknown.
and of long standing, and they would probably object to UN supervision.
The problem of North Vietnam and Communist China not being members
of the UN would seem to preclude the UN's playing a role. Similarly,
the DEV has evinced no affection for the ICC. However, the DRV has over
mnp cap.o.pronhvnnTf.1
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the years continued to report violations of the Geneva Accords to
the ICC, and because of the importance which the DRV aLLaches to the
Geneva Accords, would not ljlely take a stand against a future ICC
role. In all probability, nevertheless, Hanoi would not itself propose
.the ICC. It is also doubtful that they would accept an enlarged and
strengthened ICC proposed by us. The possibility remains of an ail-
Asian supervisory body established on an ad hoc basis to deal with
Vietnam, but we have no evidence that Hanoi would be receptive to this.
As long as the DPV feels assured that their control in the South
is becoming a reality or is a reality, they are not likely to quarrel
seriously over inspection and guarantee machinery.
19 TOP_SECRIT NOtIS
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6.. CEASE-FIRE
Although Hanoi has repeatedly stated;.and:we have assumed all
!along, that the DRV will adopt a fighting-while-negotiating strategy,
-there is some chance that they will take the initiative in proposing
cease-fire once negotiations are underway.
. We have had two hints on this possibility. The first came from
Lewandowski (MARIGOLD 11/1)i/66), when he asked the following questions.:
"In case of a cease-fire, would the United States be prepared
to withdraw from the combat areas and not to interfere in the
creation of a new government in Viet-Nam? The question of how
the new government of Viet-Nam will be formed will certainly
arise.
"In case of a cease-fire, would the United States Undertake
not to interfere in peaceful progress toward unification of
Viet-Nam?if the people so wish, whether by referendum or by
election?
"In the case of a cease-fire and negotiations, would the
United States be ready- to use the Geneva Agreement and the
machinery of the international Commission in bringing peace
to Viet-Nam, and if so, would the United States publicly declare
its intention to this effect?"
The second indlcatJon.came from the very reliable Algard Loan
exchanges OHIO 2/10/68). Loan said that."Haaoi presupposed (assumed)
that the military operations be stopped while negotiations are being
conducted . . ."
Hanoi's interest in a cease-fire does not mean that they. would be
- interested in a genuine-cease-fire. More likely, as in the case of
Laos-, they will pursue a strategy of negotiate-cease fire-fight-cease fire-
.fight,-breaking the ground rules whenever they believe it appropriate.
Hanoi's possible interest in a cease-fire has a readily determinable
purpose. If agreed to by us, it would give the NIP unchallenged
authority in the areas it now controls. Such civil administration
arrangements as may be made (as in the period following the 1954 '
Geneva Accords) would allow the NIP to develop local coalition govern-
ments.
The U.S. is on record publicly as favoring a ceasefire. The U.S.
Fourteen Points, for example, state: "A cessation of hostilities -could
be the first- order of .business at a conference or could be the subject
of preliminary d is c us s ions . "
President Johnson has made repeated and unqualified statements
about our willingness to accept a cease-fire.
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SENBORN MISSION TO UANOI.,_JUNEA,15)64
? (EXCERPTS)
Seaborn Report on Initial Visit to Hanoi:
Call on PM Pham Van Bong
"7. Pham Van Bong opened remarks by saying we must learn to
-oexist and to find solution to problem which has wracked Indochina
:or 25 years. But just solution is only way to provide stability.
What just solution means in DRVN is, as President Ho Chi 14inh has
explained (A) USA withdrawal (B) peace and neutrality for SVN in
"ambodian pattern in accordance with programme of Liberation Front
iehich must participate in determinationofVietnam as result of
'negotiation when SVN ready for negotiation."
? ? ?
"10. In separate tel without 'Bacon' restrictions I shall report
in greater detail PM's comments on Laos situation. Essence of his
remarks was (A) only viable solution as return to status quo ante
, April coup d'etat and Govt. of National Coalition as per Geneva
Accord of 1962 (B) necessity of convening 14 nation conference to
achieve this result and (C) essentiality of no RPT no American
interference in Laos. He said DRVN was very worried by step-up of
USA military activities in Taos and complained of URNbverflights of
DRVN territory and of commando raids across border. He denied that
PLUN had sent 0,TE units UNQTE across border to aid Pathet Lao but did
not RPT not specifically. deny my earlier statement that USA was aware
DRVN were helping Pathet Lao and Viet Cong. with men, arms and material."
"14. I said I was interested to hear from him that as a condition
for restoring peace SVN should become neutral as a first step prior
to reunification. He stopped me and said he had. not RPT not referred
to neutrality as a first step only. whether .SVN would continue neutral.
wbuld depend upon people of SVN. He did not RPT not prejudge. As for
Liberation Front 17. said I realized it represents a certain force in
SVN,. though not RPT not in my view all people as the propaganda asserted
nor even Majority. He did not RUT not demur at this downgrading. I
said I appraCiated that the .Front woUld.have? to participate .should a ?
coalition ever emerge. My fear however was that coalition would soon
be taken over by Front as had happened in .other countries and that
other rep elements would suffer or be ousted. I'M merely said there
was no RPT no reason to have such fears."
"15. I.then asked whether PM appreciated fully that.USA's continued
acceptance of obligations towards allies in SVN had implications which
extended far beyond Southeast Asia and related to USA determination to
1
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t. ?
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resist guerrilla subversion in Asia, Africa and Latin-America? PA
laughed and said he did indeed appreciate it. A USA defeat In SVN
would in all probability start a chain reaction which would extend
much farther, but USA should understand that principles and stalces'
involved were just as high for Liberation Front in SVN and its sup-
porters and this helped to explain their determination to continue
to struggle regardless of sacrifice."
2
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SEAMEN MISSION TO HANOI jUNI-P, 18 964
(EXCERPTS)
Remarks of Prime Minister Pham Van Bong
Scaborn? Hanoi, June 18 1964
? ? ?
"President Ho Chi Minh has explained what we mean by a just
solution. First it requires an American withdrawal from Indochina.
Secondly it meansthat the affairs of the South must be arranged
by the .people of the South. It must provide for the participation
of the Liberation Front. - No other group represents the broad wishes
of the. people. The programme of the Front is the best one possible.
There must be peace and neutrality for South Vietnam, neutrality in -
the Cambodian manner. Thirdly, a just solution means re-unification
of the country. This is a tdrame, national, fondamental' . But we
want peaceful reunification, without military pressures. We want nego-
tiation .'-round a table. There must be sincere satisfaction with
the arrangement for it to be viable. We are In no hurry. We are
willing to talk but we shall wait till SVN is ready. We are a
divided people, without even personal links across the dividing line
"The United States must show good will, but it is not easy for
the USA to do so. Meanwhile the war intensifies. USA aid may increase.
in all areas, not only for the SVN army but in terms of USA army per-
sonnel as well. l suffer to'see the war go on, develop, intensify. Yet
our people arc determined to struggle. It is impossible, quite impos-
sible (excuse me for saying this) for you Westerners to understand the
force of the people's will ?to resist and to continue. The struggle of
the people exceeds the imagination. It has astonished us too.
? "'Since the fall of the Ngo brothers, it has .been a 'cascade'.
The prospect for the USA wad its friends in SVN is 'sans issu: . Rein-
forcing the Ehanh army doesn't count. The people have had enough.
The SVN mercenaries have sacrificed themselves without honour. The
Americans are.not loves, for they commit atrocities. How can the
. .
people suff? such exactions and terror?"
. . .
"Let mc. stress, insofar as the internal situation in SVN is
concerned, the realistic nature of the Libeation Front's programme.
It is impossible to have a representative government which excludes
?
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the Front. The idea of a government of national coalition 'fait
boule de niege' in the South. The Laos pattern of 1962 should serve
as a guide for SVN.
?"As for Laos, we are not reassured by the USA role. We must
return to the '62 Geneva Accord. The present government of Laos is
'fantoche'. Souvanna Phouma, who is no better than a prisoner of the
unitary, has acted like a coward; His 'present goverpment provides
no solution.
"We do not send units to the Pathet Lao. We do not demand more
than a return to the situation which existed prior to the April coup.
But there must be no American Interference in Laos. There are daily
incursions of our air space across the Laotian border by overflights
of military aircraft and by commando units bent on sabotage."
? ? ?
"A new conference of the fourteen parties is necessary. Restora-
tion of peace and neutrality for Laos are impossible otherwise. There
is little utility in the Polish proposal. Only the 14-nation conference
is competent to deal with the Laos sauation.
"To return to Vietnam, it is a question of a 'guerre a outrance'
which the USA won't win in any event, or neutrality. He had not (as
I had suggested) referred to neutrality as a first step only. Whether
SVN would continue neutral would depend upon the people of SVN. He
did not prejudge the issue.
"The DRVN realize that the 'loss' of.SVN for the Americans would
sot off (what Was the atomic expression?) *a chain reaction which would
extend much further. The USA is in a difficult position, bec.ause
Khanh's troops will DO longer fight. If the war gets worse, we shall
.suffer greatly but we shall win. If we win in.the South, the people
of the world will turn against the USA. Our people will therefore
accept the sacrifice, whatever they may be. But the DRVN will not enter
the war!
"If the war were pushed to the North, 'nous sommes un pays soci-
aliste, vous savez et le peuple se dresseral. But we shall not force
the USA,. we.shall not provoke the USA.
"As far as the ICC is concerned, we are very glad to have you
here. But don't put too many items on the agenda, don't give yourself
too much work to do."
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PMSIDENT jOBVSON, "PNTTERN FOR PENCE IN SOUTEEAST ASIA,"
AD;:t1:1-.1
(EXCERPTS)
? ??
"Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its
freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves?only that the
people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in
their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objec-
tive, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary."
? ? ? ?
"These are the essentials of any final settlement.
"We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful
settlement in Viet-Nam.
"There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion
or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or
in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their
strengthening with new ones,
"We have stated this position over and over again 50 times and
more to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready with this purpose
for unconditional discussions.
"And until that bright and necessary day of peace we will try
to keep conflict from spreading. We have no desire to see thousands
die in battle?Asians or Americans. We have no desire to devastate that
which the people of North Viet-Nam have built with toil and sacrifice.
We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we
can command. ,
"But we will use it
"The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associ-
ate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development.
We would hope that North Viet-Nam would take its place in the common
effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible."
"For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion-dollar
American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And
would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet
.Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror
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Igr-3g4.111-MOITITG=q11
DRV FOUR POINTS
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
"...The Unswerving policy of the DRV Government is to respect strictly
the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to implement correctly their
basic provisions as embodied in the following points:
"1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people--
peace, independence, sovereignty, unity,. and territorial integritY. Accord-
ing to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must withdraw from South
Vietnam U.S..troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle
all U.S. military bases there, and cancel its military alliance with South
Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in SounT"
Vietnam. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must stop
its acts of war against- North Vietnam and completely cease all encroachments
on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.
"2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is
still temporarily divided into two zones the military provisions of the 1954
Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected. The two zones
must refrain from entering into any military alliance with foreign countries
and there must be no foreign military bases, troops, or military personnel
in their respective territory.
"3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South
Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the NFLSV
without any foreign interference.
"4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the
Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference. .
"This stand of the DRV Government unquestionably enjoys the approval
and support of all peace and justiee7loving governments and peoples in the
world. The government of the DRV is of the view that the stand expounded here
is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem.
"If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for
the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam people, and it will be possible to
consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern
of ple. 1954 Geneva conference on.Vietnam."
"The NFLSV, the mobilizer and organizer of the patriotic forces in South
Vietnam, the leader which has taken the people to ever greater victories, is
now controlling three-fourths of the territory and two-thirds of the popu-
lation of South Vietnam. It has ever higher international prestige and posi-
tion, and is being more and more recegnizA by foreign countries and world
public opinion as the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnamese
people."
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EXTRACT OF SPEECH BY SOUTH VSETNAM
FOREIGN HINISVR THAT') VAN DO
?
June 22, 1965
iAlui VAL; DO'S j'VH?
?
. ' 1. Since the present war in Viet-Nam was provoked
by Communist aggression and subversion, -first of all,
it is important that subversive and military activiies
undertaken, directed and supported by. outside forces
against the independence and liberty of the people of
South Viet-Nm-mast cease. The principle of non-
interference in the internal. affairs of the two ,oarts--
principles declared,. in the Geneva Accords of 195T+ as
well as by international morality -- must be respected.
Consequently, the Hanoi Communist regime must dissolve
all the puppet?organizations it has formed in South Viet-
Nam under the. names. of "Front for the Liberation of the
South," "Liberation Radio" and the "People's Revolu-
tionary Party." Also it must withdraw from South Viet-
Nam troops, political and military cadres it had illegally
introduced into South Viet-Nam.
2. South Viet-Nam must be left alone, to choose and
shape for itsself its own destiny in accordance with
established democratic processes without any intervention
of whatever form and whatever source. Obviously these
could be realized only when the aggression initiated by
the Hanoi regime is ended and its intimidation. campaign
against the South Vietnamese people decisively suppressed.
? 3. Only when aggression has ceased, and only then, it'?
will be possible for. the Government of the Republic of
Vietnam and. for nations which provide it with, assisance?
to withhold. defensive military measures on the territory of
South Viet-Nem and outside its borders. Such measures are
presently necessary for defending the territory of South
VietLNam against Co:mmunist aggression. Besides, the
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam is ready to ask
these friendly countries. to withdraw their military forces
from South7Vietnam. -However, it shall reserve its right .
to *.6ake.all.mesures to restore .orde:r and law o1. the entire
territory of. South-Viet-Nam and to assure security for the
people of South Viet-Nam as well as the right to call again
for foreign assistance in case, of renewed aggression. or ?
renewed threat of aggression. ?
4.. Finally; the independence and liberty of the Viet-
namese people must be effectively guaranteed.
. -
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PRESIDENT JOHNSON "PRESS CONFERENCE "
July, 1:1:965
(EXCERPTS)
"What are our goals in that war-stained land?
"First, we intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be
defeated by force of arms or by superior power. They are not easily
convinced...."
"Second, once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent
solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable.
"We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the
battlefield to the conference table. I have stated publicly and
many times, again and again, Amcricars willingness to begin uncon-
ditional discussions with any government at any place at any time...."
...we do not seek the destruction of any government, nor do we
covet a foot of any territory, but we insist and we will always insist
that the people of South Vietnam shall have the. right of choice, the
right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the south, or
throughout all Vietnam under internation4 supervision, and they shall
riot have any government imposed upon them by force and terror so long
as we can prevent it."
8
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- U.S. -DRV CONTACTS ("XYZ" FOUR POINTS)?,
August 6 1965
The following was given to Mai Van Do on August 6, 1965:
"Point I- The basic rights of the Vietnamese people to peace, -
independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity are recog-
nized as set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954. Obtaining compliance
with the essential principles in the Accords is an appropriate subject
for immediate, international discussions without preconditions and sub-
sequent negotiations. Such disaussions and negotiations should consider,
among other things, appropriate means, including agreed stages, for the,
withdrawal of foreign military and quasi-military personnel and weapons ?
from South and North Viet-Nam; the dismantling of foreign military
bases in both areas; the cancellation of military alliances in contro-
vention of the Accords; and the regrouping and redeployment of indigenous
forces. ?
"Point II - Strict compliance wi.th the military provisions of the
Geneva Accords must be achieved in accordance with schedules and appro-
priate safeguards to be agreed upon in the said discussions and subsequent
negotiations.
"Point TIE - The internal affairs of South and North Viet-Nam mast
be settled by the South and North Vietnamese peoples themselves in
conformity with the principles of self-determination without any foreign
interference.
"Point 1V - The issue of reunification of Viet-yam must be decided
peacefully, on the basis of free determination by the poples of South
and North Viet-Nam without foreign interference."
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U.S.--DRV CUPTACTS ("XYZ" YOUR POTTS)
' Mai Van Bo Statements Durino*."XYV," Contacts
During these contacts, Do did not deny DRV troop presence in
SVN (8/18/65), or even that the 325th EVA Division was in SVN, but
claimed it was not then engaged in military operations (9/3/65).
After the XYZ contact had ended, Bo said there were no regular
northern troops in SVN but, that northern volunteers might have
joined the Viet Gong (1/27/66).
Because Bo did not deny NVA troop presence in SVN,. he was able -
to agree with the principle that troop withdrawal would have to be -
mutual, balanced, and phased (8/18/65). Bo reaffirmed his agreement
to this principle on 8/18/65, but then denied any such agreements on
9/3/65.
On the timing of U.S. troop withdrawals, Bo, at first, said that
this would be a "technical problem, as easily solved as with the French
in 1954," and that it could take place over 2 or 3 years" (7/16/65).
Bo also said that the final settlement should see troop withdrawals
completed (8/i8/6). At the end of these contacts, Eo was insisting
that U.S. troops must, leave before elections were held (9/3/65).
After the contacts were over, Bo told a French journalist: "It
contemplates three stages--in the first stage, the U.S. would agree
en the principle, of their departure before the South Vietnamese
settled by themselves their problems, which cannot be resolved so
long as a foreign army is on their national territory. The second
stage is that of negotiation. The third is departure." (5/6/66)
With respect to self-determination, Bo had said to Dantov that
this was "the one basic premise" needed for a .solution to the. Vietnam
problem. (7/16/65). Later, Do seemed to be arguing that the Vietnamese
will be left to solve their problems through elections only after the
Americans have left (1/27/65). Much later, Do told a French journalist
(5/6/66): "HOW can elections be held in a country over which no
authority-fs exercised?" Did he mean the exercise of authority is ?
decisive in the electoral process? No doubt. In which case, the clues
-
tion of who should organize the elections--the NLF with DRV help, or
the GVN with U.S. help--would.be the real issue.
The U.S. position throughout the contacts was that the PF had
no role "as of right" in South Vietnam (9/8/65) and would not guarantee
a role for it before elections because to do so would be contrary to
"free determination." Individual members of the ]TF could participate
in the political process. At most, the future of the XL& should be
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F/
0
0.L
L..
NINV
7itior
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a matter for discussion, not something settled in principle before
negotiations began (8/15/65). In the event of a cease-fire, it was
the U.S. intention to hisist on the OVNI.s right to operate throughout
SVN (9/1/65).
With 1:'espect to reunification, both the U.S. and Do agreed (8/6/65)
that it come about "on the basis of free determination." Bo said that
the DRV was in a hurry to see reunification accomplished (7/16/65).
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UN1 STLES FOURTEEN POLNTS
?
January 3 1066
1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis
for peace in Southeast Asia;
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or any part
-thereof;
34 .We would welcome "negotiations without pre-conditions" as the
17 nations put it;
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson--
pat it;
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business
at a conference or could be the subject of preliarAnary discussions;
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points
which others might wish to propose; (4
7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia;
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after
peace is assured;
9. We support free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South
Vietnamese a government f their own choice;
10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined
by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;
.11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned or neutral
if that be their option;
12.. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic
reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North
Viet-Nam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be
prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;
' 13. .The 'President has.said."The Viet Cong would not have diffi-
culty being represented and having thair views represented if for a
moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think
that would be an insurmountable problem."
14.
We havesaid publicly and privately that we could stop the
bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not
been the slightest 'hint or suggestion from the other side as to what
they would do if the bombing-stopped.
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?
DRV AIDE uPT11TA-r"\ "
january. 3-1 0C-)6
RANGOON 392
"Text of Aide remolre referred to in Frabtel 391 as follows: Quote
am .forwarding to you the statement attached herewith made by the spokes-
ran of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic Repub=lic of Vietnam dated
.7'Inuary 4, 1966 regarding the so-called 'Peace-efforts' rude recently by
he United States.
"With regards to the 14 points and the subsequent statements of the
nited States Government I hold that the American authorities still refuse
i6o recognise the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese and people
'namely peace independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity
Ayf Vietnam as 'stipulated by the 1954 Geneva agreements of Vietnam.
"The United States Government states that withdrawal of its troops
from South Vietnam will be effected only under American terms, that means
1 the United States refuses to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam.
"The United States Government states th,.t it seeks no military bases
in South East Asian countries but on the other hard says it has to fulfil
its commitments with the S.E.A.T.O. Bloc.
"The United States Government says it respects the right to self-
determination of the South Vietnamese people on condition that the South
Vietnam National Front for Liberation lay down arms and be granted amnesty
that means the United States tries to maintain a puppet regime in power
countering the South Vietnamese people, does not recognize the South
Vietnam National Front for Liberation as the sole genuine representative .
of the entire South. Vietnamese people and will not engage in 'negotiations
with the Front. The United States Government refuses to accept Point 3
.of the )1-point stand of the government of the Democratic Republic. of Vietnam,
that amounts to American rejection of all the four points.
? 'Concerning the 4-point stand of the Government of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam. . I beg to quote the above-said statement of the
spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:
'A political settlement of the Vietnam problem can be envisaged only
when. the United States Government has accepted the 4-point stand of the
Government of the Democratic Republic" of Vietnam, has proved this by -
actual deeds, has stopped unconditionally and for good its air raids ?
and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam..
"1 am .ready to listen to what the Ambassador may wish to expound
on the United States position."
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9101) MIWP NnnTS
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MARIGOLD TEN POINTS AND RETATED CAMPS
September-DPcember 1066
Saigon 6280 (to Secnate), S/Nodis, 18 September 1.966
"1. D'Orlandi had a meeting with Lewandowski Friday. night.
It started as a social affair on D'Oriandi's invitation and on
Lewandowski's initiative became a discussion of the war. Acording
to Orlandi, Lewandowski said the following:
. . .
"5.- If the Americans ever really cared, they should especially
concentrate on Pham Van Dong's fourth point concerning 'who is to
speak for South Vietnam.' This does not mean that Hanoi would be
trying to ram the Viet Cong down OUT throats. We could consider
the setting up of a coalition government the bulk of which would be
made up of 'sensible South Vietnamese politicians. To preserve
appearances you could have 'on the fringe' men from the 'right' in .
one or two. 'unimportant ministries' and from on the 'left' fill one
or two 'unimportant ministries with the so-called NLF.'
"6. D'Orlandi -- this is unthinkable. If this is what you
want to talk about, it is better for us to stop the talks.
"7. Lewandowski asked whether D'Orlandi realized that what he
meant to say was that this would be the last step not the first.
"8. D'Orlandi said: What would be the ultimate goal? If it
is to have the Viet Gong in the Government of Viet Nam, I won't even
submit such a proposal to Ambassador Lodge.
t-
;
119. LewandowsRi said that is not at all what he meant to put to
D'Orlandi. Mainly, the ultimate aim wovld be: make of South Vietnam
. a second Cambodia.'
"10. D'Orlandi said that makes more sense, it least worth
talking. about.
"11. Lewandowski said: 'But I don't believe the Americans really
wish to talk. They are trying to do two things at once: military
escalation grouped with political proposals. You can't do both. So .
long as they won't make up their minds, we can't do anything. We must
wait until November.'"
LODGE
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TEXT OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE MA-
NILA SUMMIT CONFERENCE, MANILA, THE PHILIPPINES
INTRODUCTION
11. In response to an invitation from the President of the Republic
of the Philippines, after consultations with the President ofthe Repub-
lic of Korea and the Prime Ministers of Thailand and the Republic of
Vietnam, the leaders of seven nations in. the Asian and Pacific region
hr.,d a summit conference in Manila on October 24 and 25, 1966, to
coAsider the conflict in South Vietnam and to review their wider pur-
pOses in Asia and the Pacific. The participants were Prime Minister
Harold Holt of Australia, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic
of Korea, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines, Prime Minister Thanom
Kittikachorn of Thailand, President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United
States of America, and Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime
-Minister Nguyen Cao Ky of the Republic of Vietnam.
BASIC POLICY
. 2. The nations represented at this Conference are united in their
determination that the freedom of South Vietnam be secured, in their
resolve for peace, and in their deep concern for the future of Asia and
the Pacific. Some of us are now close to the actual danger, while others
have learned to know its significance through bitter past experience.
This conference symbolizes our common purposes and high hopes. .
3. We are united in our determination that the South Vietnamese
people shall not be conquered by aggressive force and shall enjoy the
inherent right to choose their own way of life and their own form of
government. We shall continue our military and all other efforts, as
firmly and as long as may be necessary, in close consultation among
ourselves until the aggression is ended.
4. At the same time our united purpose is peace--peace in South
Vietnam and in the rest of Asia and the Pacific. Our common commit-
ment is to the defense of the South Vietnamese people. Our sole de-
mand on the leaders of North Vietnam is that they abandon their
aggression. We are prepared to pursue any avenue which could lead
to a secure and just peace, whether through discussion and negotiation
or through reciprocal actions by both sides to reduce the violence.
5. We are united in looking to a peaceful and prosperous future for
all of Asia and the Pacific. We have therefore set forth in a separate
declaration a statement of the principles that guide for common
actions in this wider sphere.
6. Actions taken in pursuance of the policies herein stated shall be
in accordance with our respective constitutional processes.
PROGRESS AND PROGRAMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE MILITARY EFFORT
7.. The Government of Vietnam described the significant military
progress being made against _aggression. It noted with particular
gratitude the substantial contribution being made by free world forces.
1?White-lloase'press release dated Oct. 25, 1966.
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8. Nonetheless, the leaders noted that the movement of forces from
North Vietnam continues at a high rate and that firm military action
Nori and free world support continue to be required to meet the threat.
The necessity for such military action and support must depend for
its size and duration on the intensity and duration of the Communist
aggression itself.
9. In their discussion, the leaders reviewed the problem of prisoners
of war. The participants observed that Hanoi has consistently re-
fused to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red
Cross in the application of the Geneva Conventions, and called on
Hanoi to do so. They reaffirmed their determination to comply fully
with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War ?
Victims, and welcomed the resolution adopted by the Executive
Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies on October 8, 1966,
calling for complicanc with the Geneva Conventions in the Vietnam
conflict, full support for the International Committee of the Red
Cross, and immediate action to repatriate seriously sick and wounded
prisoners of war. They agreed to work toward the fulfillment of this
resolution, in cooperation with the. International, Committee of the
Red Cross, and indicated their willingness to meet under the auspices
of the ICRC or in any appropriate forum to discuss the immediate
exchange of prisoners.
PACIFICATION AND REVOLUTION DEVELOPMENT
10. The participating governments concentrated particular attention
on the accelerating efforts ofthe Governments of Vietnam to forge a
Nov social revolution of hope and progress. Even as the conflict continues,
the. effort goes forward to overcome the tyranny of poverty, disease,
illiteracy and social injustice.
Ll. The Vietnamese leaders stated their intent to train and assign
a substantial share of the armed forces to clear-and-hold actions in
order to provide a shield behind which a new society can be built.
12. In the field of Revolutionary Development, measures along the
lines developed in the past year and a halt will be expanded and in-
tensified. The training of Revolutionary Development cadres will
be improved. More electricity and good water will be provided.
More and better schoold will be built and staffed. Refugees will be
taught new skills. Health and medical facilities will be expanded.
13. The Vietnamese Government declared that it is working out a
series of measures to modernize agriculture and to assure the cultivator
the fruits of his labors. Land reform and tenure provisions will be
granted top priority. Agricultural credit will be expanded. Crops will
be improved and diversified.
14. The Vietnamese leaders emphasized that underlying these
measures to build confidence and cooperation among the people there
must be popular conviction that honesty, efficiency and social justice
form solid cornerstones of the Vietnamese Government's programs.
- 15. This is a program each of the conferring governments has
reason to applaud recognizing that it opens a brighter hope for the
people of Vietnam. Each pledged its continuing assistance according
to its means, whether in funds or skilled technicians or equipment.
Nair They noted also the help in non-military fields being given by other
countries and expressed the hope that his help will be substantially
increased.
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ECONOMIC STABILITY AND PROGRESS
16. The Conference was told of the success of the Government of
Vietnam in controlling the inflation which, if unchecked, could
undercut all efforts to bring a more fulfilling life to the Vietnamese
people. However, the Vietnamese leaders reaffirmed that only by
constant effort could inflation be kept under control. They described
their intention to enforce a vigorous stabilization program, to control
spending, increase revenues, and seek to promote savings in order to
hold the 1967 inflationary gap to the minimum practicable level.
They also plan to take further measures to insure maximum utiliza-
t )n of the Port of Saigon, so that imports urgently needed to fuel the
military effort and buttress the civil economy can flow rapidly into
Vietnam.
' 17. Looking to the long-term future of their richly endowed country,
tl 3 Vietnamese representatives described their views and plans for the
building of an expanded postwar economy.
18. Military installations where appropriate will be converted to
this purpose, and plans for this will be included.
19. - The conferring nations reaffirmed their continuing support for
Vietnamese efforts to achieve economic stability and progress. Thailand
specifically noted its readiness to extend substantial new credit
assistance for the purchase of rice and the other nations present
reported a number of plans for the supply of food or other actions
related to the economic situation. At the same time the participants
agreed to appeal to other nations and to international organizations
committed to the full and free development of every nation, for further
assistance to the Republic of Vietnam.
20. The representatives of Vietnam noted that, even as the Con-
ference met, steps were being taken to establish a new constitutional
system for the Republic of Vietnam through the work of the Conr.
stituent Assembly, chosen by so large a proportion- of the electorate
last Month.
21. The Vietnamese representatives stated their expectation that
work on the Constitution would go forward rapidly and could be
completed before the deadline of March 1967. The Constitution will
then be promulgated and elections will be held within six months
to select a representative government.
22.- The Vietnamese Government believes that the democratic
process must be strengthened at the local as well as the national
level. The Government of Vietnam announced that to this end it
will begin holding village and hamlet elections at the beginning, of 1967.
23. The Government of Vietnam announced that it is preparing a
program of Ndtional -Reconciliation. It declared its determination to
open all doors to those Vietnamese who have. been misled or coerced
into casting their let with. the Viet Cong. The Government seeks to
bring them back to participate as' freemen in national life under
amnesty and other measures. Former enemies are asked only to lay
down their weapons and bring their skills to the service of the South
Vietnamese people.
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24. The other participating. nations welcomed the stated expectation
of the Vietnamese representatives that work on the Constitution
110e will proceed on schedule, and concurred in the conviction of the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Vietnam that building representative,
constitutional government and opening the way for national recon-
ciliation are indispensable to the future of a free Vietnam. .
Noe
TIE SEARCH FOR PEACE
25. The participants devoted a major share of their deliberations to
peace objectives and the search for a peaceful settlement in South
Vietnam.- They reviewed in detail the many efforts for peace that have
been undertaken, by themselves and other nations, and the actiOns of
the United Nations and of His Holiness the Pope. It was clearly
understood that the settlement of the war in Vietnam depends on
the readiness and willingness of the parties concerned to explore and
work out together a just and reasonable solution. They noced- that
Hanoi still showed no sign of taking any step toward peace, either
by action or by entering into discussions or negotiations. Nevertheless,
the participants agreed that the search for peace must continue.
26. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam declared that the
Vietnamese people, having suffered the ravages of war for more than
two decades, were second to none in their desire for peace. It welcomes
any initiative that will lead to an end to hostilities, preserves the
independence of South Vietnam and protects the right to choose their
own way of life..
27. So that their aspiratiOns and position would be clear to their
allies at Manila and friends everywhere, the Government of the ?
Republic of Vietnam solemnly stated its views as to the essential
elements of peace in Vietnam:
(1) Cessation of aggression.--At issue in Vietnam is a struggle .
for the preservation of values which people everywhere have
cherished since the dawn of history: the independence of peoples
and the freedom ofjn.dividuals. The people of South Vietnam
ask only that the aggression that threatens their independence
and the externally supported terror that threatens their freedom
be halted. No self-respecting people can ask for less. No peace-
loving nation should ask for more.
(2) Preservation of the territorial integrity of South Vietnam.--
The people of South Vietnam are defending their own territory
against those seeking to obtain by force and terror what they have
been unable to accomplish by peaceful means. While sympa-
thizing with the plight of their brothers in the North and while
disdaining the regime in the North, the South Vietnamese people
have no desire to threaten or harm the people of the North or
invade their. country. .
(3) Reunification of Vietnam.--The Government and people of
South Vietnam deplore the partition of Vietnam into North and
South. .But this partition brought about by the Geneva Agree-
ments of 1954 however unfortunate and regrettable, will be
respected until by the free choice of all Vietnamese, reunifica-
tion is achieved:
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()) Resolution of internal problems.--The people of South
Vietnam seek to resolve their own internal differences and to this
end are prepared to engage in a program of national reconcilia-
tion. When the aggression has stopped, the people of South
Vietnam will move more rapidly toward reconciliation of all
elements in the society and will mOve forward, through the
democratic process, toward human dignity, prosperity and
lasting peace.
(5) Removal of allied military forces.--The people of South
Vietnam will ask their allies to remove their forces and evacuate
their installations as the military and subversive forces of North.
Vietnam are withdrawn, infiltration ceases, and the level of
violence thus subsides.
(6) Effective guarantees.--The people of South Vietnam, mind-
ful of their experience since 1954 insist that any negotiations
leading to the end of hostilities incorporate effective international--
guarantees. They are openminded as such guarantees can be
applied and made effective. '
28. The other participating governments reviewed and endorsed
these as essential elements of peace and agreed they would act on
this basis in close consultation among themselves in regard to settle-
ment of the conflict.
29. In particular, they declared that Allied forces are in the Re-
public of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression
and its government requested support in the resistance of its people
to aggression. They shll be withdrawn, after close consultation, as
the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration,
IOW and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be with-
drawn as soon as possible and not later than six Months after the
above conditions have been fulfilled.
%we
. CONTINUING CONSULTATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING NATIONS
30. All the participants agreed that the value of a meeting among
the seven nations .had been abundantly demonstrated by the candid
and thorough discussions held. It was further agreed that, in addi-
tion to the close consultation already maintained through diplomatic
channels, there should be regular meetings among their Ambassadors
in Saigon in association with the Government of the Republic of
Vietnam. Meetings of their Foreign Ministers and Heads of Govern-
ment will also be held as required.
31. At the close of the meeting, all the visiting participants ex-
pressed their deep gratitude to President Marcos and to the Govern-
ment of the Republic of the Philippines for offering Manila as the
conference site, and expressed their appreciation for the highly efficient
arrangements.
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mnn CJ1DODVM -
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SWEDISH7DRV,CONTACTS (ASPEN)
(Excerpts from Rusk-Nilsson MemCon, November 11, 1966)
? ? ?
"II. The Swedish Ambassador in Peking, Mr. Petri, recently
visited Hanoi and had a conversation with the Foreign Minister of North
Vietnam, MT. Trinh.
"a) Mx. Trinh strongly emphasized that the North Vietnamese
Government aimed at a political solution of ?the Vietnamese conflict,
not a military one. Mr. Trinh said that two conditions must be ful-
filled in order to bring about .a climate for negotiations, which could
lead to a political solution.
17 The bombing of North Vietnam must be put to an end,
without any conditions and definitely.
2. The PNL must be accepted: by the US Government as one
of the spokesmen for the South Vietnamese people and, .
as Mr. Trinh expressed it, the most valid one.
"If both these Conditions were fulfilled and the US Government thus
took what he called '.an appropriate attitude' then, Mr. Trinh said, 'we
know what we will have to do'.
"It should be adde6 that, in this connection, the question of a time-
table for the withdrawal of US troops was not raised.
"-b) As to the possibility of a final settlement oP the Vietnamese
conflict, Mr. Trinh said that - in addition to the withdrawal of US and
other foreign. troops - both the Hanoi Government and the FRI had the
following requests:
1. The creation of a national coalition government founded on
a very broad basis and including all political and religious
groupings as well as all social classes -genuinely desiring
to achieve national independence.
General.electIons in an'atmosphere of freedom.and democracy.
3. Although no immediate reunification was envisaged, it was
necessary to create such conditions in South Vietnam as to
permit a move in the direction of a future reunification of
North and South Vietnam.
"Mr. Trinh reiterated .that. if the US Government gave proof of good-
will, they would find that 'the Vietnamese side know what they had to do'."
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MARICOLD TN POINTS AND RELATED CABMS,
Sep,6ember-December?1_19-
Saigon 10856 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 14 November 1966
"1. I met Lewandowski at D'Oriandi's apartment t 3:00 p.m.
Saigon time.
"2. ...on the eve of his visit to Hanoi.... He had four questions,
as follows:
a. 'Regarding the offer at Manila concerning the withdrawal
of U.S. forces. from Viet-Nam on the condition thatthe troops of North
'Viet-Nam would withdraw (and, he said, North Viet-Nam, of course,
v? doesn't admit that they are there at all), does this condition mean
the United States withdrawal depends on control by the present South
Vietnamese Government of territories not now under the control of Saigon?'
b. 'In case of a cease-fire, would the United States be pre-
pared to withdraw from the combat areas and not to interfere in the
creation of a new government in Viet-Nam? The question of how
the new government of Viet-Nam will be formed will certainly arise.
c. In case of a cease-fire, would the United States under-
take not to interfere in peaceful progress toward unification of
Viet-Nam if the people so wish, whether by referendum or by election?'
d. 'In the case of a cease-fire and negotiations, would the
United States be ready to use the Geneva Agreement and the machinery
of the International Commission in bringing peace to Viet-Nam, and if
so, would the United States publicly declare its intention to this effect?'
"3. I said that there were questions which I would have to refer
to the U.S. Government, and that I would do so and provide answers as
soon as I could."
. . .
LODC..H:
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MARIC,'OLD TEN POIWS AND RETATNO CLBLES2..
...-2ptember:December.?,_1966
?
. :Saigon 12247,,TS/Nodis, 30 November 1966 ?
"Lewandowshi summarized the 10 points to Lodge as follows:
"(I) The U.S. is interested in a peaceful solution through
:negotiations.
"(2) Negotiations should not be interpreted as a way to negoti-
ated surrender by those opposing the U.S. in Vietnam. A political
!negotiation would be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all
the problems, having in mind that the present status. quo in SVN must
be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties
: presently opposing the policy of the U.S. in SouthVietnam.
11(3) The U.S. does not desire a permanent or a long-term mili-
tary presence in SVN.
S
"()1.) The U.S. is willing to discuss all problems with respect
to the settlement.
11(5) The U.S. is willing to accept the participation of 'all'
in elections and the supervision of these elections by an appropriate
international body.
11(6) The U.S. believes that reunification should be settled by
the Vietnamese themselves after peace and properrepresentative organs
are established in SVN.
11(7) The U.S. is prepared to abide by a neutral South Vietnam.
11(8) The U.S. is prepared to stop bombing 'if this V7ill facilitate
such a peaceful solution.' In this regard the U.S. is prepared to accept
'DRV modalities on the cessation and not require the DRV to admit infil-
tration into SVN.
11
(9) .The U.S. will not agree to 'reunification under military
pressure.: ,
11(10) The U.S. twill not declare now or in the future its acceptance
of North Vietnam's 4 or 5 points.'
"Lewandowski asked if these 10 points were a proper formulation of
the U.S. position. Lodge said that they seemed to be in Order, but that
the matter was of such sensitivity and importance that he would have to
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refer the points back to Washington for approval. Lodge added, however,
that he saw two difficulties right off. First, he suggested changing
Point 2 to read 'would' instead of 'must.' 'Second, he questioned the
phraseology in Point 8 -- 'if this would facilitate such a peaceful
solution.'
"Lewandowski insisted that his statement was a serious proposition
based on conversations with the 'most respectable government sources in
Hanoi. '. Later Lewandowski admitted that rham Van Bong was the source
and that he had the 'Presidium behind him.'
"Lewandowski stated: 'I am authorized to say that if the U.S.
are really of the views which I have presented, it would he advisable
to confirm them directly by conversation with the North Vietnamese
Ambassador in Warsaw.'
"Lewandowski said that there was a vital need to move quickly
because (1) there was a danger of a leak and that secrecy was essential
for Hanoi; and (2) that delays would Live those 'working against a
solution' time to 'put down the clamps on talks.'"
_
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ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, UNITED
STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO TIE UNITED NATIONS,
AT A SPECIAL CONVOCATION AT HOWARD UNIVERSITY,
WASHINGTON,. D.C., FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1967 Lxcerpt7
Our effort to open the door to peace in Vietnam has been con-
tinuous. In recent weeks public attention has been focused on this
effort by an unusual number of statements, reports and events:
pronouncements by the governments involved, appeals by world
leaders including Pope Paul and Secretary General Thant, new stories
and interviews with various personalities--and the perplexing events.
in Mainland China. Right now we are in the midst of another pause
in the fighting, the Lunar New Year Truce. Thus this may be a good
moment to assess the present -Status of our efforts for peace.
In such an assessment, a responsible official, must in all that he says,
in public, avoid damaging the hopes for progress through private
diplomacy. But in a free society he must also accept the inescapable
responsibility to keep the public adequately informed. It is difficult
to deal on both levels at once but it is essential to do so as well as
we can.
Let me begin, then, by recalling the basic American peace aims in
Vietnam. These aim have been stated many times by President
Johnson and other responsible spokesmert of the United States.
They have been stated over a span of two years, but the ebb and flow
of the military situation during that time has not made them any less
valid as guidelines for peace negotiations. We do not subscribe to the
false notion that a strong military position obviates the desirability
of seeking peace through negotiations. Today, therefore,- I wish to
review the essence of these American aims.
The United States seeks a political solution in Vietnam. We do not
seek the unconditional surrender of our adversaries. We seek a settle-
ment whose terms will result not from dictation, but from genuine
negotiations--a settlement whose terms will not sacrifice the vital
interest of any party. In the words of the Manila Communique:
"The settlement ofthe war in Vietnam depends on the readiness and
willingness of the parties concerned to explore and work out together
a just and reasonable solution." As President Johnson said a week
1 U.S. mission to the United Nations press release No. 13, dated Feb. 10, 1967.
24-
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ago here in Washington: Such a solution "will involve . . . conces-
sions on both parts."
We are not engaged in a "holy war" against communism. We do
not seek an American sphere of influence in Asia; nor a permanent
American "presence" oa ny kind--military or otherwise--in Viet-
nam; nor the imposition of a military alliance on South Vietnam.
:We do not seek to do any injury to Mainland China nor to threaten
any of its legitimate interests.
We seek to Assure to the people of South Vietnam the affirmative
exercise of the-right of self-determination?the right to decide their
own political destiny free of external interference and force and
t' rough democratic processes.- In keeping with the announced South
Vietnamese Government's policy of national reconciliation, we do
not seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people
from peaceful participation in their country's future. We are pre-
p fed to accept the results of that decision whatever it may be.. We
support the early consummation of a democratic constitutional
system in South Vietnam, and -welcome the progress being made to
this end.
. As regards North Vietnam, we have no designs on its territory,
and we do not seek to overthrow its government whatever its ideology.
We are prepared fully to respect its sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity and to enter into specific undertakings to that end.
We believe the reunification of Vietnam should be decided upon
through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and the South
without any outside interference; and the results ? of that choice also
will have our full support.
Finally, when peace is restored we are willing to make a major
commitment of money, talent and resources to a multilateral coopera-
tive effort to bring to all of Southeast Asia, including?North Vietnam,
the benefits of economic and social reconstruction and development
which that area so sorely needs.
These, then, are the peace aims of.the United States. They parallel
the objcctives stated by the South Vietnamese Government at Manila.
Our aims are strictly limited and we sincerely believe they contain
nothing inconsistent with the interests of any party. Our public
pronouncements of them--both in Washington and at the United
Nations--are solemn commitments by the United States.
Our adversaries--have also placed their aims and objectives on
the public record over the past two years. The major statement of
these aims is the well-known four points of Hanoi, which I will sum-
marize without departing too much from their own terminology.
The first point calls for recognition of the basic national rights of
the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and
territorial integrity.. It. also calls for the cessation of all acts of war
against the North; the ending of United States intervention in the
South; the -withdrawal of all United States troops, military personnel
and weapons of all kinds, the dismantling of American bases and the
cancellation of what they term the United States "Military Alliance"
with South Vietnam.
The United States would not find any essential difficulty with a
reasonable interpretation of any of the terms included in this point.
Our Chief concern is what it does not include: namely, that North
Vietnam also cease its intervention in the South, end all of its acts
of war against the South, and withdraw its forces from the South.
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Such a requirement is obviously essential to the "peace" to which
this first point refers.
Now. The second point relates to thQ military clauses of the Geneva
agreements. It provides that, pending the peaceful reunification of
Vietnam, both the North and the South must refrain from joining
any military alliance; and that there should. be no foreign bases, troops
of, military personhel in their respective territories.
LHere again, the only real difficulty is the omission of any obligation
on the North to withdraw its military forces from the South--although
the Geneva Accords which established the demarcation line in Vietnam
forbids military interference of any sortby one side in the affairs of
t'e other, and even goes so far as to forbid civilians to cross the
demilitarized zone.
The third point calls for the settlement of the South's internal
affairs "in accordance with the program of the National Liberation
F: mt for South Vietnam." This point, of course, was not a part of
the Geneva Accords at all. It introduces a new element which I shall
discuss later in this analysis.
, The fourth point calls for the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, to
be settled by the people of both zones without any foreign interference.
We have no difficulty with this point as was indicated in my speech
to the General Assembly on September 22.
There has apparently been added a fifth. point--put forward and
repeatedly endorsed by both Hanoi and. the National Liberation
Front since the enunciation of the four points in April 1965. This
fifth point was stated by.Ho Chi Minh in January 1966 when he said
that if the United States really wants peace, it must recognize the
National Liberation Front as the "sole genuine representative" of
the people of South Vietnam, and engage in negotiation with it..
This, like the third of the "Four Points," introduces a new element
Which was not part of the Geneva Accords.
Now, from this brief summation of our aims and those declared
by Hanoi, it is clear that there are areas of agreement and areas
of disagreement. Recent public statements by Hanoi have been
helpful in certain aspects, but how great the disagreements are is
still uncertain because the stated aims of Hanoi still contain a number
of ambiguities. I would like todiscuss some of these ambiguities
because they relate to very consequential matters.
There is ambiguity, for example, on the role of the National Libera-
tion Front in peace negotiations. I have already noted the statement
of Ho Chi Minh and other spokesmen for our adversaries who have
said that we must recognize the Front as "the sole genuine repre-
sentative of the South Vietnamese people, and negotiate with it."
If this means that we. are asked to cease our recognition of the Gov-
ernment in Saigon and deal only with the Front, insistence on this
point would imperil the search for peace. For the Front has. not been
chosen by any democratic process to represent the people of South
Vietnam. Nor has the Front been recognized by the world community.
It is pertinent to recall that more than 60 nations recognize the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Vietnam in Saigon, whereas none recog-
nizes the .National Liberation Front as a government.
On the other hand, some public statements seem to call for the
Nee National Liberation Front to be given a place or voice at the negotiat-
ing table. If this were the position of our adversaries, the prospects
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would be brighter; for President Johnson, as long ago as July 1965,
said that "the Viet Cong would not have difficulty in being repre-
sented and in having their views presented if Hanoi for a moment
decides that it wants to cease aggression." He added that this did not
seem to him to be "an insurmountable problem," and that "I thiAk
that couldbe worked out."
A further ambiguity relates to the role of the National Liberation
Front in the future political life of South Vietnam. Hanoi asks that
the affairs of South Vietnam be settled "in accordance with the Toro-
gram of the National Liberation Front." Our adversaries, in their
various comments on this point, take no notice of the internationally
recognized Government of South- Vietnam or of the steps which the
South Vietnamese leaders have taken, and have currently under way,
and the institutions they are'now creating, for the purpose- of providing
their countrywith a constitutional and representative government.
Nor would their statements seem to leave any place for the South
Vietnamese who have participated in and promoted such steps. Such
an interpretation would pose serious obstacles to a settlement.
However, some claim that what the National Liberation Front
really seeks is no more than the opportunity to advance its program
peacefully along with other elements and groupings in the South in
a free political environment.
We have already made it clear that wb do not wish to exclude any
segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation
in their country's future and that we support a policy of national
reconciliation endorsed by the South Vietnamese Government in. the
Manila Communique. Indeed, as Secretary Rusk said in an interview
last week, if the Viet Cong were to lay dawn their arms, Ways could be
found to permit them to take part in the normal political processes
in South Vietnam.
Further ambiguities arise concerning the question of foreign troops
in South Vietnam. What does Hanoi mean by "foreign troops?"
They .clearly include in this term the forces of the United States and
other countries aiding the South, but they have never admitted the
presence of their own forces in the South. Of course, a one-sided with-
drawal by our side would not lead to an acceptable peace. All external
forces must withdraw, those of Hanoi as well as ours, if peace is to be
achieved.
There is ambiguity also in Hanoi's position on the timing of the
withdrawal of external forces. Do our adversaries consider withdrawal
of forces as a precondition to negotiations, as some of their statements.
imply? If so, this again would raise a serious obstacle to progress. But
if they look on withdrawal of forces as a provision to be incorporated
in a settlement this clearly could be worked out. The United States
and its allies are already onrecord in the Manila Communique that
their forces "will be withdrawn . . . as the other side withdraws its
forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus
subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not
later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled."
Further, we have indicated our willingness to join in a phased. and
supervised withdrawal of forces by both sides.
Next, there is ambiguity in Hanoi's position on the cessation of
bombing of North Vietnam. At times their public statements have
demanded that the bombing be ended unconditionally, without any
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reference to a possible response from their side. On the other hand
quite recently a spokesman of Hanoi said that "if, after the definitive
I Iwo' and unconditional cessation of the bombardments, the American
Government proposes to enter into Contact with the .gorth Viet-
namese7 Government. . . . this proposal will be examined and
studied." And just this week we have seen a further statement, in an
interview by the North Vietnathese Foreign Minister, that cessation
of the. bombings "could lead to talks between North Vietnam and the
U.S." Many of their statements, insisting that the bombing cease
have also contained other expressions, such as that the American
military presence in South Vietnam be completely withdrawn and
that the "Four Points" of Hanoi must be recognized and accepted as
"the" basis--or possibly as "a" basis--for settlement of the conflict.
This creates an additional ambiguity as to whether Hanoi means to
add still other prenegotiating conditions.
The positibn, of the United States on this bombing question has
been stated by a number of Administration spokesmen, including me
at the United Nations. The United States remains prepared to take
the first step and order a cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam
the moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step
will be answered promptly by a tangible response toward peace from
North Vietnam. In his letter of February 8 to His Holiness, Pope Paul,
President Johnson said:
'NW
I.
. . . I know you would not expect us to reduce military action unless the
other side is willing to do likewise. We are prepared to discuss the
balanced reduction in military activity, the cessation of hostilities or
any practical arrangements which could lead to these results. We shall
continue our efforts for a peadeful and honorable settlement until they
are crowned with success.
Some analysts contend that our terms of settlement should be more
precisely defined. But it is very difficult to be more precise in advance
of negotiation and. particularly in light of the substantive ambiguities
on the other side. But whatever questions may be raised, they should
and can best be resolved in discussions between the parties who have
the power to resolve them. For our part, we stand ready to negotiate
in good faith unconditionally to resolve all outstanding questions.
The United States approach to negotiations is flexible. We and our
applies do not ask OUT adversaries to accept, as a pre-condition to dis-
cussions or negotiations, any point of ours to which they may have
objections. Nor do we rule out the discussion of any points of theirs,
however difficult they might appear to us. We are willing to discuss
and negotiate not only our own points but Hanoi's four points and
points emanating from any other sources, including the Secretary
General of the United Nations.
It remains to be seen whether our adversaries share this concept of
negotiations. As I have already pointed out, their various public
declarations of peace aims have often been coupled with statements
that the goals they put 'forward must, for example, be "accepted" or
"recognized" as the "sole basis" or "the most correct basis" or "the
only sound basis" or "the basis for the most correct political solu-
tion."
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Such statements contain still further ambiguity--in one sense the
most fundamental of all, since it relates to the concept of negotiation
itself. Do these statements mean that Hanoi is willing to enter ne-
gotiations only if there is an assurance in advance that the outcome
will be on their terms and will, in effect, simply ratify the goals they
have already stated? Such an attitude would not be Conducive to
peace and would make the outlook for a settlement bleak indeed.
If, on the other hand, North Vietnam were to say that their points
are not pre-conditions to discussions or negotiations, then the prospects
should be more promising.
Our negotiating approach would permit each side to seek clarificat-
tion of the other side's position. It does not require the acceptance in
advance of any points, least of all those whose meaning may be in
need of clarification. .We do not ask that of Hanoi--and progress
toward a settlement will be facilitated if Hanoi does not ask it of us.
In this situation, how can we best move toward a settlement?
One essential early step is to analyze the positions of all parties in
order to ascertain whether there is some element or some kernel com-
mon to all. Many students of the subject have pointed to one fact
which may prove to be such a kernel--namely, the fact that both
sides have. pointed to the Geneva Agreements' of 1954 and 1962 as an
acceptable basis for a peaceful settlement.
But I must add quickly that this does not necessarily indicate a
real meeting of the minds, because of doubts that all sides interpret
the Geneva Agreements in .the same light. Hanoi has said that the
essence of the Geneva Agreements is contained in its "four points."
But the fourt points would not put Hanoi under any restraint or
obligations in its hostile activities against the South, which the Geneva
Accords. explicitly prohibit. Besides, as I already pointed out, these
points insist that the South's future be regulated in accordance with
the program of a group which was not referred to in the Geneva
Accords and did not even exist when they were written, and in any
case, if the Geneva Accords were to serve as a basis for settlement,
it would obviously be necessary to revitalize the international ma-
emery which they provided for supervision--which is presently
operating under severe limitations; to incorporate effective interna-
tional guarantees; and to update other provisions of the Accords
which on their face are clearly out of date.
-Despite these problems of interpretation, it can be said that if the
meaning of the Geneva Agreements were accepted as a matter for
genuine negotiations, then the constant reference to thgse agreements
by both sides would be more than a verbal similarity; it would be a
significant and hopeful sign of the prospects for settlement.
? From all this .analysis, there emerges one basic and practieal
question, and it is this: How are all these apparent obstacles to a
settlement to be overcome?
The first and essential pre-requisite is the will to resolve them--
not by unconditional surrender or by the dictation of terms, but
through a process of mutual accommodation whereby nobody's
vital interests are injured, which would be a political solution. Speaking
for the United States. Government, I affirm without reservation the
'Nee willingness of the United States to seek and find a political solution.
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The next question, then, is by what procedures such a political
settlement can be reached. One well-tested and time-proven way is
the conference table. President Johnson has repeatedly stated our
readiness to join in a conference in Geneva, in Asia, or in any other
suitable plade. We remain prepared today to go to the conference
table as soon as, and .wherever, OUT adversaries are prepared to join
UST
here is also a second procedure by which to pursue apolitical
settlement: namely, private negotiations--either by direct contact
or through an intermediary. There is much to be said for this private
method, for amn. a situation as 'grave as this, with its complex historical
.qcground and its present political cross currents, it would be exceed-
ingly difficult to negotiate in a goldfish bowl.
I therefore affirm that the United States Government stands ready
to take this route also toward a political settlement. And we give our
a..surance that the secrecy and security of such private explorations
wOuld be safeguarded on our side. Of course we do not and should
net ask that freedom of expression be curtailed in the slightest degree.
Nevertheless?as that conspicuous champion of free expression, Dr.
Erwin D. Canham, recently reminded us--no one's credibility ought
suffer because of what is better left unsaid under such circumstances.
- Let me quickly add. that at this juncture I do not want to raise
any false hopes by this remark. I am simply stating a principle which
is inherent in the concept of the secreby and security of private
explorations.
Such then is my analysis of the I)roblems involved and the methods
to be employed in seeking a negotiated solution of the Vietnamese
Niro, conflict. Nor should we overlook the possibility that negotiations
private or public, might be preceded or facilitated by the process of
mutual de-escalation or a scaling down of the conflict without a
formally negotiated ceasefire. This, of course, would be welcome on
our part.
It is. altogether possible, too, that there will be no negotiations
culminating in a formal agreement; that our adversaries will sooner
or later find the burden of the war too exhausting and that the conflict
will gradually come to an end.
Perhaps this will indeed prove to be the outcome. But our most
respected military authorities have cautioned us not to expect that
this will happen quickly, and that we must face the possibility of a
long struggle. Surely, if there is any contribution that diplomacy can
make to hastening a just and honorable end of this struggle, we cannot
in all conscience spare any effort or any labor, day or night, to make
that contribution--no matter how difficult and frustrating the effort
may be, or how many false starts and failures and new beginnings it
may entail.
As students ofhistory know, one obstacle to a negotiated end of
any war can be psychological. The frame of mind appropriate to
fighting and the frame of mind appropriate to peacemaking are by
nature very different. And yet a stage inevitably comes when both
these seemingly contradictory efforts must go on side by side.
Name
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4\lany citizens, viewing this complex dual process, are likely to be
Nue
confused ? and distressed by what se'ems like an inconsistency in their
leaders' policies. Some complain that the talk of peace suggests a
weakening of our resolve and of our will to win. Simultaneously others
complain that the continued military effort suggests an attempt to
bring the adversary to his knees, to break his will--and thus casts
doUbt on the sincerity of our will to peace.
The great difficulty of achieving peace should serve to remind us
that there are substantial conflicting interests at stake which stub-
bornly resist solution; that peace cannot be bought at any price, nor
, real. conflicts of purpose be waved away with a magic wand. By
the same token, the ferocity of war should not be an incitement to
hatred but rather a stern discipline--a reminder of the imperative
du-1-7 to define responsibly the limited interests for which our soldiers
fight and which a peace settlement must protect.
1 The effort to make such a responsible definition, and to carry it
? through the process of peace negotiations, is "piled high with diffi-
culty." A genuine meeting of the minds may never be wholly achieved.
It is unlikely that terms of settlement for this stubborn conflict can.
be found which would be wholly pleasing to either side. But it is in
our highest national interest that an acceptable, livable solution
Should be found.
Lt no one suppose that patriotism, which .is so inspiringly displayed
on the battlefield, is not also present at the negotiating table. All our
recent Presidents have testified to our country's dedication to negotia-
tion as a means of peacefully bridging difference.
President Eisenhower said in 1955, on the eve of the first Summit
Conference with the Soviet leadership:
NOW
Noe
We shall work with all others so that peaceful and reasonable negotiations
may replace the clash of the battlefield.
President Kennedy, in his Inaugural Address, said:
Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to
negotiate.
An President Johnson has summed up the true value of negotiation
'as follows:
To negotiate is not to admit failure. It is to show good sense. We
believe that collective gargaining is working as long as parties stay in
negotiation. Only when bargaining breaks off do we speak of failure. And
so also in foreign policy. There, too, the rule of law and the resort to
the bargaining table are the hallmarks of success.
An to these words the President added specifically:
This rule applies without qualification to Vietnam. We shll count it
a mark of success when all the parties to that dispute are around a conference
table. We Americans are experienced in bargaining; we have nothing to fear
from negotiation. And we Americans know the nature of a fair bargain; none
need fear negotiating with us.
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I am sure all three of these Presidents would agree today that the
effort to discover through negotiation, the common ground on which to
build a just and honorable peace, is worthy of our most sincere and
dedicated efforts.
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WRITER GIVES PLANS OF HANOI AN VIETCONG FOR
FUTURE VIETNAM
The Associated Press asked Wilfred Burchett, an Austra-
lian Communist writer, to report the strategy of Hanoi and
the Vietcong as he had been able to discern it in his trips
to Vietnam. Burchett has often been a Communist spokesman
in Korea, Vietnam and Germany. .
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Feb. 10 (AP)--How Hanoi and the Viet-
cong view a future Vietnam which might emerge out of any negotiated
settlement was revealed in a series of talks I recently had with top
Vietnamese leaders of North Vietnam plus Liberation Front (Vietcong)
representatives in Hanoi and talks last August.with the Front's
president, Nguyen Huu Tho, whom I met for the fourth time in his
jungle headquarters in South Vietnam.
The general idea is that Vietnam as such must be an independent
country without any foreign presence. Reunification is a long-range
project realizable only in the far distant future, Which Vietnamese
loaders in the North and Liberation Front leaders in the South
privately agree may be 10 to 20 years away.
Meantime, the North would remain a Socialist country and a-mem-
ber-of the Socialist world but without military alliances or foreign
military bases, militarily but not politically neutral. The South
would be non-Socialist and neutral militarily, politically and diplo-
matically.
The seeds for all this are provided for in North Vietnam's four-point
plan enunciated by Premier Pham Van Dong in April; 1965, and
acceptance of which until very recently had been thought in Washing-
ton to be a precondition for talks.
But in Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's replies to my questions,
in which he said talks could start if bombings stopped, it was made
clear that acceptance of the four points was not posed as a precondition,
and far less was withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam made
a prior condition, as seems to have been though over a long period
in Washington.
The formula used by Foreign Minister Trinh was that the "four-
point stand and correct attitude the government of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam enjoy were sure of even stronger approval and
support from all peace--and justice--loving peoples and _governments
the world."
That this is not being posed as a precondition is one of the most
important of the clarifications in the Foreign Minister's statement.
But if Washington took a long, hard look at the four points one
top Vietnamese official- said, it would find they entail important
concessions compared to the Geneva agreements.
The latter provided reunification by 1956, with theassumption that
the pro-Communist Vietminh would rule over the whole country.'
1 From the Washington Post, by Wilfred Burchett, Feb. 11, 1967.
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The four points, which neatly dovetail into the five-point plan of the
National Liberation Front, were specifically formulated, according
Now' to the same official, to facilitate American disengagement. While the
plan Contains nothing contrary to the Geneva agreements, it makes
an important concession the indefinite postponement of reunification,
'halts the spread of communism south of the 17th Parallel, and accepts
certain restrictions on the sovereignty of the North.
'
[he Geneva agreements of July 21, 1954, which partitioned Viet-
nam along the 17th Parallel, provided for unification elections by
July 20, 1956. However,- the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam
spurned any such vote.
[ham Van Dong's four points of April, 1965, included: (1) With-
drawal of all U.S. military forces from South Vietnam and an end
tO all acts of war against the North; (2) No foreign military. alliances
fe-'7 either North or South; (3) Settlements of South Vietnam's internal
a: :'airs in accordance with the program of the National Liberation
Front; (4) peaceful reunification without foreign interference.7
What type of regime could the North and the Liberation Front
accept in the_South? The Liberation Front considers it is in a strong
ehought position militarily and politically to have a "decisive place
and voice" in any settlement of the Southern half of the problem.
In fact, as the Front's_ President Nguyen litu Tho told me last
August, he envisages that a "broad coalition government of national
union" could be formed which, while excluding personalities like
Generals Nguyen 'Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu, the present
Premier and President respectively, would not exclude some members
of their cabinet or others who served in previous Saigon governments
'Aso' far back, even including that of Diem.
Such a government must be irrevocably committed to an autone-
Mous South Vietnam independent and neutral. But explicit in the
Liberation Front and the North's five and four points is that inde-
pendence means withdrawal of all U.S. forces and the dismantling
of bases.
J.S. officials in Washington examined with interest the Communist
viewpoint as reported by Burchett, John Hightower of the Associated
Press reported.
[he officials said Communist acceptance of the idea of a long-term
non-Communist regime in the South was an interesting indication of
flexibility, Hightower reported.
.[he plan for a coalition government in the South was also viewed
with interest, but the United States was pictured as being unwilling
to accept any such coalition that included "a decisive place and voice"
for the National Liberation Front. The U.S. view is said to be that
participation in South Vietnamese political lite by individual Vietcong
leaders who would be loyal to an independent government would be
acceptable, but not participation by the ELF as an organization]
- The Front's leaders, including those of the Marxist Revolutionary
Party, insist that although they would carry out the distribution of
land--this has already been done in areas administered by the Front--
they do not intend the collectivation of land or the socialization of
industry and commerce. They would accept aid from the West and
East, protect existing foreign interests, and would accept foreign
NSF
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?)
L/
?
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investments to help rebuild and develop the country when this did not
infringe national sovereignty:
In this connection it is interesting to note that Nhan Dan (The
People)--which is North Vietnam's Pravada--commenting on the
Foreign Minister's statement on the possibilities of talks, seven times
mentioned the term "peace ,and independence" as defining the Viet-
namese main aims, but net a single mention .of socialism. This fact
is notedby foreign diplomats in Hanoi. This certainly does not imply
any intention of abandoning socialism in. the North, but does mean
that the emphasis is on national aims, which do not foresee a Socialist
regime for the South. And "socialism for the north, Democracy in the
South" was the title of speech.by Le Duan, secretary of the North's '
Communist Party, early in January.
A few months ago a bureau of the National Liberation Front was
established in Hanoi--housed in the repainted, refurnished former
American consulate.
Unlike other .diplomatic missions it is not accredited to the govern-
ment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but in careful political
distinctions is called the "representation of the National front for the
liberation of South Vietnam in North Vietnam."
The- desired implication of this, as carefully explained by gray-haired
NLF central committee member Nguyen Van Tien, who has the
"representation," is that it is a "concrete image of reunification" with
the clear implication of South and North enjoying equal status. .
When I asked if there was not a contradiction between the North's
stated aims of "defending the North, liberating the South and re-
unifying the country," the Front's program of independence and
neutrality, and his own statement that reunification is nearing, he
.said "no" and then gave the clearest exposition of how the North and
South- asrepresented by the Liberation Front--viewed the future
of North and South relations if the war ended and the Front was the
dominant element of a government in the South.
? His views are summed up as follows:
North and South Vietnam remain autonomous in internal and foreign
affairs. The North would remain Socialist and a member of the So-
cialist bloc. The South would be neutral, unallied to any blocs. Each
.
would have its own foreign ministries and own diplomatic representa-
tives abroad. The Front already has over a dozen de facto embassies
abroad.
For regulating North-South relations, there would be a type of
general assembly, ,presumably nominated by the respective parlia-
ments to handle questions important to both zones such as trade, post
and telegraphs, interzonal travel, including sports and cultural ex-
changes. The assembly in fact would have some resemblance to the
inter-German council, an idea being toyed with by the West German
Social Democrats as a means to handle current practical problems,
between East and West Germany.
The question of negotiations between Hanoi and the My government
in Saigon is seen as an impossibility. The latter is considered as repre-
senting no, national interestS or any section of the population and
would die a natural death the moment serious negotiations started.
It is assumed Ky and a handful of his top supporters would make
suitable dispositions, as so many of their predecessors did, for a com-
fortable exile. But it is also considered that national reconciliation is!
entirely possible with personalities and groups less engaged, if they
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are prepared to take a clear stand on the question of complete national
independence. On that belief everyone is adamant. Ho Chi Minh
told a group, including myself, ."the United States is offering us the
choice of colonial slavery or .victory. Obviously we fight till the end."
,Another personality, in replying to a question whether North Viet-
nam-is prepared to offer anything in exchange for an American with-
drawal, shrugged his shoulders, laughed and said:
"What do they want?
"Do they want us to invite into the North 400,000 Chinese, 4o,000
North Koreans and a few thousand Cubans and then propose their
withdrawal as a counterpart for withdrawal of the United States
and her Allies from the South? Is that what they are after?"
35
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NORWEOTAN-DRV CONTACTS (OHIO)
, _ _ _ _ _
OSLO 4531 to SecState (SEC1ET-EXDTS),14 June 1967:
Loan underlined North Vietnamese Govt imposed only one condi-
tion for negotiations, namely that bombing of North Vietnam ,be stopped.
Clearly having in mind the Chinese, he went to lengths to underline
that speeches from other quarters which imposed other conditions including
full American withdrawal from South Vietnam did not RPT not, reflect
North Vietnam Govt's thought. .0n North Vietnamese side one gave decisive
weight to stop An bombing because this was viewed as respect for North
Vietnamese sovereignty and such a respect was an absolute condition for
coming to conference table, but was also the only condition. When they
had come to conference table, North Vietnam position would be very flexible.
'We are,' said Ambassador Loan 'ready for very Car reaching compro,Ases to
get an end to the war.' Ambassador Algard noted that recently one had
impression that North Vietnamese side was cooler toward negotiations.
Ambassador Loan denied this strongly. lie said that formerly when North
Vietnam showed an interest in negotiations Americans had taken such
interest as a sign of weakness and with results of stronger escalation.
This was background against which one must judge some recent speeches
on North Vietnamese side. Provided there would be a stop in bombing,
North Vietnam was ready at any time for negotiations and far reaching
compromises."
.?.
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TISSINCER-B0 CONTACTS (PEEPSYLVANTA)
.. ?
( ?
( .11=e?
July - October 1067
; L
Second Meeting with Pham Van .Dong. July 25, 1967. Present: Aubrac,
garcovich, Pham Van Deng, Tech, ? note-taker.
"Pham Van Dong resumed:. 'Ending the war for us has two meanings:
1) An end of bombing which is permanent and unconditional; 2) A withdrawal
,of United States forces. We like the formula of President de Gaulle.'
Yarcovich interrupted to 'say that it was not realistic. Pham Van Dong
,greed :and said that he realized that some U.S. troops would have to stay
yuntil the end of the process of political settlement. He added: 'We do'
.;not want to huMiliate the U.S. Lenin did not like war but fought when
:necessary. As Lenin we are Communists.'
"'Now let in :speak of U.S. policy and the ELF. We should have had
unification in 1956. The period 1956-59-was a political fight. It saw the
mutual assistance pact between the U.S. and Saigon and the introduction of
U.S. staffs. This led to the formatifOn of the ELF. The second period,
1960-64, saw a disintegration of the U.S. position lo which the U.S. responded
by 'special' mar. suppose he meant 'special forces' war] In 1965, the
United States started a 'limited' war which lasts until today. At the same
time the ELF has expanded its activities from the country into the cities
and from inside Vietnam to the outside. Our position is: North Vietnam is
socialist and wants to remain so. As for the South, our goals are national
independence, democracy, peace and neutrality. Some people think we want to
impose Socialism on the South. We are convinced that the ELF will not make
such an error. The ELF -envisages a broad -coalition government, including all
significant groups and religions-Without_consideration ofmpast_a.ctivities:
fantoche.
including members du gouvernement fantoche s diar
et cadrem&?
_ . . . . _ . _ _ _ , . .
.rewated the underlined wordsj The pssential.thing is to :forget the past. ?
? "'As for unification we recognize that the important first step is
a .political settlement of the South. We agree not to push things toward -
unification. Once the war in the South is settled, we shall discuss
With the South and find the best means. Our people are magnificent.
?l 'Peace. would have been easy for the U.S. three years ago. But
with every year the political situation worsens. We do not like secret. ,
negotiations, but we recognize their necessity in this situation. As
long as the issues do not concern South Vietnam, the ELF need nob partici-
pate. However, we do not believe that the United States is ready for a
settlement.' Then turning to Aubrac he asked: '0,ue veulenb les Americains?'"
These statements were confirmed by Bo on October 9, 1967?after persist-
ent requests by the U.S. through M & A for confirmation. Bo said: "He who
does not say 'no' agrees."
nri
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NORT,'IEGIAN.-DRVCONTACTS(011I9)
pno 664 to SecState (SECRET-EXDIS), 16 August1967
1
.fl ....AMbIDan then discussed the assumptions for the starting of
negotiations and repeated the position that an absolute, but. the only,
condition for negotiations was a Cessation of the bombing by Americans.
He again pointed out that this was a question which involved the sov-
ereignty of North Vietnam. It would be to admit the existence of a state
of war if North Vietnam accepted to QUOTE respond UNQUOTE in the form of
ja corresponding reduction of forces. In this connection I stated that '
' it was probably not RPT not certain that an official deelaration.by North'
, Vietnam on the extent of a possible QUOTE response UNQUOTE was assUmed.
: A confidential communication indicating what the North Vietnamese intended
! to undertake might be sufficient. Amb Loan said that unsuccessful negoti-
ations would be worse than no RPT no negotiations at all. The opening of
negotiations would create a wave of optimism throughout the world, and a
possible breakdown might lead to conequences which would be difficult to
foresee, It therefore appeared desirable to assure, prior to the starting
of negotiations, that they would yield results. The possibilities for a
favorable result would thus have to be clarified to a certain degree in
advance. If negotiations were started, the North Vietnamese attitude would
be flexible, as the Amb had stated previously, and the North Vietnamese
were prepared to enter into. far-reaching compromises. But as he did not
RPT not possess exact in;Pormation, he was not RPT not in a position to
indicate in concrete terms, where this willingness to compromise would
express itself on the North Vietnamese side. He did, however, mention the
North. Vietnamese attitude with regard .to the demarcation line during the
Geneva negotiations as an example of North Vietnamese readiness to com-
prvise. Furthermore, he said,. North Vietnam had already made known a
? .very significant concession, based on a realistic evaluation of the .situ-
ation. The Geneva agreement stipulated that Vietnam should be unified
within two years. Our objective today, he said, is considerably lower.
. The question of unification is postponed to an indefinite point of time.
in the future. North Vietnam is today ready toaccept a separate South
Vietnamese state which is neutral and based on a coalition govt. Such a
govt could have connections both with East and West and accept assistance
from counries,that might wish to give such assistance The Amb stated
that the time of the withdrawal of the American troops was not RPT not
decisive question. In this connection be pointed to the agreement on
the withdrawal ofthe French troops. However, the question of repre-
sentation was of great importance. On this point the Americans would
have to accept the political situation in South Vietnam as it is, as
de Gaulle did in Algeria. North Vietnam could not RPT not negotiate.
on behalf of the South Vietnamese. Amb Loan finally said that he appreci-
ated the contact established with the Norwegian Embassy, and that he
would like it to be maintained.,.."
-c) rpm) PROPW91-
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NORNEGiAN-DRV CONTACTS (OHIO).
?
OSLO 722 to SecState (SECRET-EXDIS), 21 August 1967:
"2. ...Loan asked if Algard willing to accept invitation to Hanoi.
Algard promised early reply. Loan gave no RFT no direct reaction to our
previous communication. He again underlined the question of the cessa-
tion of bombing, national sovereignty and dignity, but at the same time
test the sincere will of the Americans to negotiate._ However, interested.'
in concrete information about what is meant by LU.S1 QUOTE flexible as,
to form and nature of some corresponding restraint UNQUOTE in above men.;.
tioned telegram, Point B. .0,oal-j said .American recognition national
self-determination decisive point. Concretely he asked us find out if
USA willing to base possible negotiations on this principle and willing
accept liberation front as political factor...."
?
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NORWEGIAN-DRV CONTACTS (OHIO1
OSLO 1063 - Meeting on Friday, September 8 .
?? . ? ? ?
"5. LIG-cope:17 sought clarification of Loan's comments on the role
of the Ele, specifically. whether 'political factor' meant as a factor in
preliminary talks, actual negotiations, or in a post-settlement situation.
Algard said his impression was that Loan meant all three stages. I then.
elaborated on the extent to which we recognized the ELF as a political.
factor in a post-settlement situation and/or the ways they might partici7
pate in negotiations. We cannot recognize them as a goernment or as the
'sole representative for the people of Vietnam. In the last analysis,. we
believe the ELF question should be resolved in South Vietnam by the various
elements there. We will be prepared to accept anything which the Govern-
ment Of South Vietnam is ready to accept.. It will be troublesome if in
the preliminary negotiations the ELF must participate in every stage. ?
We need clarification on this point. Algard said he was not quite sure,
but he had the impression that the North Vietnamese divided the problem
into questions affecting relations between Hanoi and the U.S. on the one
hand, and South Vietnamese problemson the other. Loan had stressed that
Hanoi could not speak for the ELF on matters affecting South Vietnam.
Algard said Loan had not been more specific on this point,"
"7. On the question of 'non-communist South Vietnam,' I said that,
if indeed Loan had said they would accept a non-communist South Vietnam
and had said so under instructions, this was probably the first time this
formula had been used. Algard said Loan had stressed that Hanoi was
willing to accept a non-communist government. which was a neutral govern-
ment, and which would have relations with both East and West and received
.aidofrom both sides. Subsequently, at a reception on the day before
Algard left, Loan had said that Hanoi recognized the fact that they had
to live for some years to come in a Vietnam which would have two different
social and political situations.
"8. Loan had not explained what he meant by a !coalition government'
and, in fact, used the terms 'coalition government' and 'non-communist
government'..almo.st interchangeably without giving an indication as to the
possibietructure of the government,' political grouping, etc.. He had
not stated that they would accept representatives of the present South
Vietnamese Government, but his tone gave the impression that they would.
In fact, Loan had said he deJ-2p1y disliked the South Vietnamese Government
but, nevertheless, it was 'a political factor' in South Vietnam. (Algard
cautioned that in considering the tern 'non-communit government' Loan
has indicated from time to time he does not consider the NUE' communist.)
Loan told Algard he envisages a government with communist participation
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but which is not communist-controlled. Loan had repeated his remarks
about a non-communist government directly to Algard in French at a
subsequent casual meeting, again using the ithrase 'non-communist.'
"9. I raised the question concerning Loan's commant that the
matter of the U.S. withdrawal was not decisive. Algard said Loan had
referred to the Geneva Agreement in this context using the example
of the withdrawal of French troops which, he said, had been no problem."
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MIANSAN-DPAT COITTACTS (PACKJRs)
January 5, 1968 - Harriman-Macovesca Memorandum of Conversation:
The following statements were made by Trinh:
"'The basis for settlement of the Vietnamese issue is provided
by the four points of April 8, 1965; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
subsequently issued its January 28, 1967 statement. This is our posi-
tion of principles on which no concession is possible.'"
? ? ?
"'We are not against discussions but any discussions should take
place according to principle. As soon as discussion engaged in, our
attitude will be serious and responsible but it depends on attitude of
the U.S. whether such discussions are fruitful.'"
?
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1 I ,
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iii
L.
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kORWEGTAq-DRV CONTACTS (OHIO)
OSLO 3275 to SeeState (SECRET-NODIS), 10 February 1968: '
"2. ..../Toag said that Hanoi presupposed (assumed) that the
'..Llitary operations be stopped while negotiations are being con-
ducted...."
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ITAIII.AN-DRV CONTACTS (KEW)
? -
Pebruarv-Yarch 1068-
February23,_1968-- Excerpts from Meetlng of D'Orlandi-Su.-
....Both parties Celt that problem of guaranteeing an agreement
was increasing to decisive importance. Su seemed to categorically
exclude the UN as a Guaranteeing agency and Fan rani and Su agreed that
the ICC was not in position to guarantee anything."
"(i) Su stated that declared and also real aim of Hanoi was to
have absolutely free general elections. To insure liberty of vote,
it ,was necessary to constitute a Government with very broadly based
participation excluding only 'war?crithinalsi (undefined). There was
discussion of various South Vietnamese personalities as possible members
of a Government. Su would raise a name and d'Orlandi would coyment.
Su generally did not reveal his opinion but Ky was obviously unacceptable
to him."
?
?
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OSLO 3570 - Summary of Ambassadol- Algard's visit to Hanoi, March 3-10:
"T. The Foreign Minister underlined also that the North Vietnamese
4-point program must be the foundation for a political resolution of the
conflict. .Apart from what concerned the stopping of the bombing and
ressation of the acts of war against North Vietnam, he did not set
ters forth in such a way that the United States beforehand must accept
the entire )-point program. He did not say anything on the point of
time for American withdrawal but said that was a question which must be
andled at the conference table. Nor would he say anything on how the
i..eunification problem. would be settled nor how long it would take but .
he repeated ?that first there must be a political solution in South
Vietnam and referred to the NLF program; which assumed ? a separate South
:Vietnamese state for the immediate future. Insofar as it concerned a
;political solution for South Vietnam, the Foreign Minister repeated the
North Vietnamese position that this was a question which must be dis-
cussed with the NUJ' and that Hanoi cannot speak on behalf of South Vietnam.
;He underlined very strongly that recent events jAl. South Vietnam had shown
Hthat the regime in Saigon was totally without political basis but at the
same -Brie events made clear that there was a possibility- of cooperation
between the NLF and other political groups. However he did not go into
detail on this point."
. . .
?
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- NORWEGIAN-NORTH VIETNAMESE CONTACTS, JUNE 1967 - FEBRUARY .1.968
q_ NW
June 1-1_2 1967 ? - Meeting No. 1
OHIO began, in effect, with a transmission by Ambassador Tibbetts
of a conversation in Peking on 1 June between Ambassador Ole Algard,
Norwegian Ambassador to Peking, and the North Vietnamese Ambassador to
Peking, Ngo Loan. Norwegian Foreign Minister Lyng gave the substance
of the Algard-Loan conversation to Tibbetts., Despite some very interest-
L,? ing and important statements made by Loan, this cable and subsequent
cables for several months were EXDIS and were not given a code name.
Loan stressed four points to Algard: (1) NVN fear that the U.S.
intended tostay permanently in Vietnam; (2) that Hanoi had only one
condition for negotiations (Sic), namely the cessation of U.S. bombing;
(3) that when Hanoi came to the conference table, it "woui_d be very
flexible," and is "ready for very far-reaching compromises to get an
end to the war"; and (4) that Hanoi felt it was able to cope with almost
any U.S. military activity with its own resources -- except for direct
occupation of all North Vietnam.
11?NW
1
1
Algard expressed concern about North Vietnamese treatment of U.S.
prisoners. Loan said that formal recognition of these men as anything
but "war criminals" would "legalize American participation in the war."
OSLO 4531 to SecState (SECRET-EXDIS), 14 June 1967:
"2. Following is my informal rendition Algard's report,
transposed from first to third person:
"3. Ambassador Mgo underlined strongly North Vietnamese
Govt disposed toward negotiations. At same time they were deeply
mistrustful of Americans' intentions in Vietnam. Steady escala-
tion and sending of new troops indicated Americans had intention
.of staying permanently in Vietnam.
r- ?
Num,
"4. Mgo underlined North Vietnamese Govt imposed only one
condition for negotiations, namely that bombing of North Viet-
nam be stopped. Clearly having in mind the Chinese, he-went
to lengths to underline that speeches from other quarters which
imposed other conditions including full American withdrawal from
South Vietnam did not RPT not reflect. North Vietnam Govt's thought.
On North Vietnamese side one gave decisive weight to stop in bomb-
ing because this was viewed as respect for North Vietnamese
sovereignty and such a respect was an absolute condition for
coming to. conference table, but was also the only condition.
When they had come to conference table, North Vietnam position
would be very ?flexible. 'We are,' said Ambassador Mgo, 'ready
for very far reaching compromises to get an end to the war.'
Ambassador Algard' notedthat recently one had impression that
North Vietnamese side was cooler toward negotiations. Ambassa-
dor Mgo denied this strongly. He said that formerly when North
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Vietnam showed an interest in negotiations Americans had taken
such interest as a sign of weakness and with results of stronger
escalation. This was background against which one must judge
t- some recent &pooches on North Vietnamese side. Provided there
Iwould be a stop in bombing, North Vietnam was ready at any time
for negotiations and far reaching compromises.
r-
I 1.
f
"6. Amb Mgo said he hoped developments would not RPT not
take such form that North Vietnam must ask for foreign, and in
first instance Chinese, help. That was one thing that they would
do _their utmost to avoid. To question under what conditions
would North Vietnamese Govt feel forced to ask for help, he said
that beforehand one could not RPT not determine fixed criteria.
He said however that an. American invasion of North Vietnam in
itself would not RPT not necessitate foreign help. North Viet-
nam had an army of 400 thousand men which would be capable of
mastering such a situation. Amb Algard had impression that
only danger of direct occupation of all North Vietnam would
force North Vietnamese Govt to ask foreign help. It was plain
Amb Mgo considered it very important to clarify North Vietnamese
position on question of foreign help."
TIBBETTS.
June 20, 1967
State responded with an expression of interest and a desire to have
,the Norwegians continue the contact. Noting the, four major points in the
'first Algard-Loan conversation, and admitting that -Loan's statement that
bombing was the only condition for talks, was "highly plausible," State
suggested Algard react as follows: (1) ascertain the authority with which
Loan. spoke; (2) stress the Manila Communique in general terms in response
to Loan's fear of the U.S. intending to stay permanently in Vietnam; (3) .
ascertain whether North Vietnam was. insisting on a permanent bombing cessa-
tion; ()j-) stress the U.S. view that the bombing cessation must be accom-
panied by "at least some private assurance of appropriate reciprocal
action by North Vietnam"; (5) indicate that the Geneva Accords of 1954
could be a basis for settlement and try to probe Loan on the compromises
envisaged by NVN.
State 213389 to Oslo (SECRET-EXDIS), 20 June 1967:
"2.c. Expressed concern that U.S. intends to stay perma-
nently in Vietnam is of interest. We assume CON is fully aware
of our repeated statements of intent to withdraw and most speci-
fically the precise wording used in the Manila Communique, which
you should furnish them.
"d. Discussion of cessation of bombing as only condition
for talks fits with other private readings as well as Trinh-
Burchett interview and appears to us highly plausible.
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e. Key passage appears to us to be reference to NVN
position being 'very flexible' and NVN being 'ready for very
far-reaching compromises.'
."f. Statements on NVN view of U Thant likewise seem
plausible, although GON may be interested that we had strong
indications NVN was displeased with U Thant's latest initiative
, being launched aftet NVN had apparently given negative, reaction
in Rangoon meeting.
g. References to NVN reluctance to seek Chinese help
are highly interesting. We are not repeat not ourselves sanguine
that NVN would not call for Chinese help in event of U.S. in-
vasion, but report of Loan position remains extremely interest-
ing-as indicating depth of NVN reluctance.
"h. We are particularly appreciative of Algard remarks
on U.S. prisoners in NVU, which we believe hit exactly right
note.
"3. On basis of this evaluation, we believe it would be
extremely useful for Algard to have further conversation with
Loan. This could be through special meeting or chance encoun-
ter, and we would see no problem with special meeting, since
we surmise Loan remarks were intended to elicit some reaction
and that NVN would have assumed that we would be informed.
"4. Points we suggest Algard make would be as follows:
'a. Earlier comiersation reported to USG, and GON has
reviewed U.S. views on matters stated. Both GON and U.S. assume
that Loan was speaking with authority. (This could be so put
as to elicit any contrary indication.)
'Tb. From conversations with USG GON is clear that USG
fully understands NVN concern as to whether USG intends to stay
permanently in Vietnam. From discussions with USG over long
period,- GON is convinced that USG is totally sincere in repeated
statements that it would seek no permanent military presence
or bases in Vietnam once settlement is reached, and that USG
and other nations assisting SVN meant just what they said in
Manila Communique. (We would prefer that this portion of
message be left in this general form. It is possible that Loan
would pick up elements of Manila statement, such as requirement
of withdrawal of both 'military and subversive' forces. If
this question should arise, Algard might say that it is GON
understanding that U.S. is referring to regular NVN military
forces but also to personnel originally from South who accepted
move to NVN in 1954 ..and were thereafter sent back to South.
Algard might say that he would be glad to get further clarifi-
cation on this point if desired.)
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JjJLO
"c. USG accepts that 'cessation' of the bombing of the
North and military action against the North is only NVN condi-
tion for holding talks. NVN has referred to cessation being
on 'unconditional' basis: What is meant by this? (Purpose
here is to clarify whether there may be any distinction between
usual NVN statements that bombing must be stopped 'indefinitively
and unconditionally' -- which we have construed to mean perma-
nently -- and occasional other statements that stoppage of bomb-
ing must merely be 'unconditional.' We ourselves have assumed
that no difference is intended between these two formulations,?
but direct inquiry could be useful in nailing this down.)
"d. Assuming that NVN condition calls for, in effect,
permanent cessation of bombing, USG position remains as it has
been stated throughout and particularly by Ambassador Goldberg
in September 1966 at UN and by Secretary Rusk in January. U.S.
view is that cessation of bombing, without at least some private
assurance of appropriate reciprocal military action by NVN,
would creat situation of major military advantage to NVN and
would not be conducive to fruitful talks. USG has put forward
several general suggestions for timing and nature of NVN recipro-
cal actions, and President's letter to Ho contained one specific
proposal that added the element of stopping of reinforcement
by USG in the South. Canadian proposal of April called for link
between cessation of bombing and restoring demilitarized status
of DMZ under effective supervision, but Hanoi rejected this.
What is present Hanoi view on these proposals, or do they have
any other suggestion to make?
He. USG naturally particularly interested in Loan remark,
that NVN would be flexible and prepared for compromises.. Basic
USG position is that settlement could be based on Geneva Accords
of 1954, and USG would be prepared an any time to talk. directly
.or indirectly about all the elements of such a settlement, in-
cluding any aspects NVN wished to. discuss. If Loan could. at
least indicate areas in which NVN envisages 'compromises,' this
might be helpful in furthering better understanding of positions.
Would the areas of possible compromise include the timing and
sequence of actions related to withdrawal of forces on both
sides, for example? Would they relate to position of NLF in
the South? USG has consistently taken position that NLF can-
not possibly be regarded as 'sole legitimate representative'
of SVN and has also made clear that it oannot accept third of
Hanoi four points, for which it finds no warrant in Geneva
Accords of 1954? Is Hanoi suggesting its position on these
points is now flexible? (Purpose of this inquiry is of course
to feel out the key _question of what Loan had in mind. If we
knew the area Loan was referring to, a most fruitful exchange
of views might then become possible, and we would of course be
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?
prepared to discuss these issues in depth with GON.) In this
connection, USG has made it clear to GON that it. too is prepared
to discuss realistic compromises, viewing the matter of an ulti-
mate settlement from the standpoint of the Geneva Accords of
1954. USG has repeatedly noted NVN statements likewise express-
ing approval of Geneva Accords of 1954, and areas of common ground
of compromise might well be found within this framework.
"f. We would leave it to Algard whether to raise the sub-
ject of prisoners again. We would have nothing to add to his
excellent presentation, and it may be that he should merely say
that his previous remarks reflected GON view, and that he would
be interested inanything Loan might have to say to him on this
subject. (We think representations on prisoners can be more
effective coming, as they did in first conversation, from view-
point of GON itself, and that USG support might if anything be
less helpful in explicit form.)
,flg. We would not repeat not suggest Algard try to reflect
any USG views on conditions of Nvil calling for Chinese help.
If this topic should come up, Algard might express clear GON
understanding that USG has repeatedly said it does not threaten
NVN territory or regime and has no objective other than permitting
SVN to determine its own future without external interference."
KATZENLACH (Drafted by W.P. Bundy)
:June 29) 1967
Tibbetts reported that after his first conversation with Algard, Loan
had left for' Hanoi, and that he was not expected to return to Peking until
August. Algard was going back to Oslo for further instructions.
August 5-16) 1967 - Meeting No. 2
The second meeting between Algard and Loan carried both dialogue and
substance forward. Algard made it plain that he was informed of U.S. views,
and Loan said that he would report to Hanoi- Loan did add, however, that
he was prepared to comment "from a personal nature." This may indicate
that Loan's standing in party circles is quite high and secure.
After reiterating the two main points of the first meeting (bombing pause
is the only condition for talks and flexibility and compromise once talks
begin), Loan made several interesting observations. He said that every time
NVN "had previously shown willingness to negotiate, it had been misunderstood
in the U.S. and seen as a weakness. The consequence...each time 5einj
a new escalation on the American side." In this respect, he noted that
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BUDI
world opinion was against the U.S. and that negro riots in the U.S. were
part of this overall picture.
Loan emphasized a very new element in Hanoi's thinking. He said that
"unsuccessful negotiations would be worse than no repeat no negotiations
at.all...lt therefore appeared desirable to assure, prior to the starting
of negotiations, that they would yield results." As a sign of Hanoi's
flexibility in this regard, Loan gave examples of compromise: (1) re-
unification could be "postponed to an indefinite point of time in the
future"; (2) "NVN is today ready to accept a separate South Vietnamese
state which is neutral and based on a coalition government"; and (3) that
the timing of the withdrawal of U.S. troops is not a decisive issue.
There was some question as to whether Loan used the phrase Trion-
-communist" when describing this South Vietnamese state. It subsequently
turned out that he had.
Loan expressed a desire to maintain the contact.
OSLO 664 to SecState .(SECRET-E)cDIS), 16 August 1967 (Section 1 of 2):
"3. ....When North Vietnam had previously shown willingness
to negotiate, it had been misunderstood in the U.S. and seen as
a sign of weakness. The consequence had each time been a new
escalation on the American side. It was obvious that North
Vietnam did wish to reach a peaceful solution, but the military
situation was from the North Vietnamese viewpoint very favora-
ble, and there was no RPT no reason for North Vietnam to let
itself be forced into negotiations. QUOTE Sooner or later we
will win this war UNQUOTE, he said. QUOTE We know how to
fight, and UNQUOTE, he added with a smile, QUOTE We are not
RPT- not any Middle Eastern nation UNQUOTE. He also pointed out
that the American position was weakened by the pressure of world
oopinion on the U.S. and by the internal problems of the Ameri-
cans, particularly the recent race riots which he considered
had a direct connection with the resistance of the American ne-
groes against the war in Vietnam- In this connection he recalled
that the French did not RPT not lose Vietnam at Dien Bien Phu,
but in Paris. However, even if North Vietnam did not RPT not feel
herself under pressure, militarily or otherwise, to enter into
negotiations, it was of course realized that it would be of
benefit to end the war, and he underlined that the previous
declarations on willingness to negotiate, provided that the
bombing be stopped, remained valid."
Section 2:
....Amb Ngo then discussed the assumptions for the start-
ing of negotiations and repeated the position that an absolute,
but the only, condition for negotiations was a cessation of the
bombing by Americans. He again pointed out .that this was a
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question which involved the sovereignty of North Vietnam. It
would be to admit the existence of a state of war if North Viet-
nam accepted to QUOTE respond UNQUOTE in the form of a corres-
ponding reduction of forces. In this connection I stated that
it was probably not RPT not certain that an official declaration
by. North Vietnam on the extent of a possible QUOTE response
UNQUOTE was assumed. A confidential communication indicating
what the NorthVietnamese intended to undertake might be suffi-
cient. Amb Ngo said that unsuccessful negotiations would be
worse than no RPT no negotiations at all. The opening of ne-
gotiation S would .create a wave of optimism throughout the world,
and a possible breakdown might lead to consequences which would
be difficult to foresee.' It therefore appeared desirable to
assure, prior to the starting of negotiations, that they would
yield results. The possibilities for a favorable result would
thus have to be clarified to a certain degree in advance. If
negotiations were started, the North Vietnamese attitude would
be flexible, as the Amb had stated previously, and the North
Vietnamese were prepared to enter into far-reaching_ compromises.
But as he did not RFT not possess .exact information, he was
-not RPT not in a position to indicate in concrete terms where
this willingness to compromise would express itself on the North
Vietnamese side. He did, however, mention the North Vietnamese
-attitude with regard to the demarcation line during the Geneva
negotiations as an example of North Vietnamese readiness to
compromise. Furthermore, he said, North Vietnam had already
made knowna very significant concession, based on a realistic
evaluation'of the situation. The Geneva agreement stipulated
that Vietnam should be unified within two years. Our objective
today, he said, is considerably lower. The question of unifica-
tion is postponed to an. indefinite point of time in the future.
North Vietnam is today ready to accept a separate South Viet-
enamese state which is neutral and based on a coalition govt.
Such a govt could have connections both with East and West
and accept assistance from countries that might wish to give
such assistance. The Amb stated that the time of the with-
drawal of the American, troops was not RPT not a decisive
question. In this connection he pointed to the agreement on
the withdrawal of the French troops. However, the question of
representation was of great importance. On this point the
Americans would have to accept the political situation in
South Vietnam as it is, as de Gaulle did in Algeria. North
Vietnam could not RPT not negotiate on behalf of the South
Vietnamese. Amb Ngo finally said that he appreciated- the con-
tact established with the Norwegian Embassy, and that he would
like it to be maintained 11
TIBBETTS.
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AuFust 18, 1967
State responded matter-of-factly to the second meeting between Algard
and Loan. While there seemed to be many provocative statements made.by
Loan, State's analysis said that except for the point about talking in ad-
vance of negotiations in order to assure that the negotiations are success-
ful, everything else was old hat. Further explanation on this talks-
negotiations point was needed.
State also began to grapple with the thorny problem of North Vietnamese
reciprocity for U.S. bombing pause. The cable said that the U.S. was "flex-
ible as to the form and nature of some corresponding restraint." In other
words, Hanoi need not make a formal declaration of reciprocity. A bone
was thrown in to the effect that we would discuss at a very early stage
recognition of North Vietnamese sovereignty.
State 23083 to Oslo (SECRET-EXDIS), 18 August 1967
We have read with -greatest interest Ambassador Algard's
full report of his August 5 conversation with North Vietnamese
Ambassador Loan. For most part, vdewS expressed by Loan do not
represent substantive change from known Hanoi positions,-e.g.
seeming flexibility on such matters as timing of U.S. withdrawal
and reunification coupled with unbudging insistence that U.S.
accept NLF-type coalition and apparently recognize and negotiate
with NLF on Algerian parallel. This of course goes to heart
of matter, whether NLF is to be permitted dominant role in south,
and Loan's comments add nothing to what we already know on this
score.
"2. Nevertheless, one passage of report we find of consider-
able interest, namely, Loan's conclusion that if 'negotiations'
were begun and broke down,. this might lead to consequences which
Mould be difficult to foresee, and that it would therefore appear
desirable to assure in advance that negotiations would yield
results. Loan's -subsequent. statement that 'the possibilities for
a favorable result would thus have to be clarified to a certain
degree in advance' represents perhaps clearest indication that .
we have had thus far that Hanoi might be interested in preliminary
secret, private discussions in order to explore outline of possi-
ble -settlement.
"3. We think it important to clarify this point without
waiting for response from Hanoi to Loan's report of August 5
conversation. (We note Loan's expression of doubt on August 15
that he would receive any reaction.) We would therefore propose
that Algard be instructed to contact Loan right away and take
following line:
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(A) Norwegian government has noted Loan's observation that
unsuccessful negotiations would be worse than no negotiations
at all and that it is desirable to explore in advance all possi-
bilities to that negotiations could yield results. The Norwegian
government has reason to believe that the USG is prepared to con-
sider practical means to avoid this difficulty, if in fact it
arises, and to explore all possibilities that exist for favorable
outcome of negotiations. Norwegian government would be inter-
ested in learning Ambassador Loan's views on this.
(B) In this connection, with respect to Ambassador Loan's comment
. that cessation of bombing was question involving sovereignty of
North Vietnam, and that if North Vietnam agreed to responsive
action it would have to admit existence of a state of war with
U.S. Norwegian government believes that this issue does not in
view of USG represent insuperable obstacle. USG has never sought
any formal declaration by North Vietnamese government as to what
it might do in response to bombing cessation and has always made
clear that it was flexible as to form and nature of some corres-
ponding restraint On this point also. Norwegian government be-
lieves USG could furnish assurances as to recognition of North
Vietnam sovereignty and that this question should be subject
for preliminary secret discussions mentioned above."
RUSK (Drafted by H. Isham)
In Oslo 693, Tibbetts clarified Loan's "non-communist" statement.
Tibbetts reported: "Algard said Loan had spoken of a separate South Viet-
namese state which would be neutral in foreign affairs and of. which coali-
tion govt would be non-communist and that Loan clearly assumed such govt
would not. repeat not be communist dominated, even though it would have
Viet Cong participation."
State responded on the same day in 23631, saying that "We have heard
the s'Nme noise before," but would be interested in .seeing if Algard could
elicit "specifics on safeguards against eventual. communist domination."
August 21, 1967 - Meeting No. 3
Loan invited Algard to come to Hanoi for further discussions. The
Norwegians recommended Algard's accepting the invitation. Loan also showed
interest in what the U.S. meant by being "flexible" on "some corresponding
restraint."
OSLO 722 to SecState (SECRET-EXDIS), 21 August 1967:
"2. ...Loan asked if Algard willing to accept invitation
to Hanoi. Algard promised early reply. Ngo gave no RPT no direct
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reaction to our previous communication. He again underlined the
question of the cessation of bombing, national sovereignty and
dignity, but at the same time test the sincere willof the Ameri-
cans to negotiate. However, interested in concrete information
about what is meant by QUOTE flexible as to form and nature of
some corresponding restraint UNQUOTE in above mentioned telegram,
Point B. He said American recognition national self-determination
decisive point. Concretely he asked us find out if USA willing
to base possiblenegotiationson this principle and willing accept
liberation front as political factor. Repeated that Hanoi accepts
non-communist coalition govt neutral in foreign affiars. Grate-
ful early reply invitation Hanoi. Desirable consultations in
Oslo before possible trip. UNQUOTE.
TIBBETTS.
August 22 - September 15, 1967
Ambassador Algard returned to OSlo from Peking, and on September 8
and 13 met with Chester Cooper. to receive further instructions. In this
meeting the Norwegians. stressed that they "would not in any sense serve
as a mediator." Cooper queried Algard-on a number of points. .First,
Algard said that it was his impression that Loan intended the NLF role
as a "political factor" in all stages of negotiations. Cooper said that
it would be troublesome to have the NLF represented at the preliminary
negotiations. Algard said that he had the impression that NVN divided
the negotiations into questions "affecting relations between Hanoi and
the. U.S. on the one hand and South Vietnamese problems on the other."
Secondly, on the "non-communist issue," Algard said that Loan stressed
Hanoi's recognition of the need to live with two different social: and
political situations "for some years to come." Third, Loan saidthat the
present GVN was "a political factor" in SVN, implying that there would
have to be dealings With it.
Cooper indicated to Algard that we would be "prepared to indicate
near the beginning of negotiations and in detail our conception of the
final settlement."
There was much .discusSion about obtaining a visa to Hanoi for Algard,
and general acceptance that some considerable delay would be entailed.
State Memorandum from S/AH - Chester L. Cooper for S/S - Benjamin H.
Read, dated September 15, 1967, Subject: Report on Conversations
in Oslo with Mr. Jacobsen of the Norwegian Foreign Office and
Ambassador Algard, Norwegian Ambassador to Peking:
"A. Meeting on Friday, September 8 (sent as ()sib 1063)
"5. I sought clarification of Loan's comments on the
role of the NLF, specifically whether 'political factor' meant
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as a factor in preliminary talks, actual negotiations, or in
a post-settlement situation. Algard said his impression was that
Loan meant all three stages. I then elaborated on the extent
to which we recognized the NLF as a political factor in a post-.
settlement situation and/or the ways they might participate in
negotiations. We cannot recognize them as a government or as the
sole representative for the people of Vietnam. In the last analy-
sis, we believe the NIP question should be resolved in South
Vietnam by the various elements there. We will be prepared to
accept anything which the Government of South Vietnam is ready
to accept. It will be troublesome if in the preliminary hego-
tiations the NIP must participate in every stage. We need clari-
fication on this point. Algard said he was not quite sure, but
he had the impression that the North Vietnamese divided the problem
into questions affecting relations between Hanoi and the U.S.
on the one hand, and South Vietnamese problems on the other.
Loan had stressed that Hanoi could not speak for the NLF on
matters affecting South Vietnam. Algard said Loan had not been
more specific on this point.
"7. On the question of -'non-communist South Vietnam,'
I Said that, if indeed Loan had said they would accept a non- .
communist South Vietnam and had said so under instructions, this
was probably the first time this formula had been used. Algard
said Loan had stressed that Hanoi was willing to accept a non-
communist government which was a neutral government, and which
would have relations with both East and West and received aid
from both sides. Subsequently, at a reception on the day before
Algard left, Loan had said that Hanoi recognized the fact that
they had to live for some years to come in a Vietnam which would
have two different social and political situations.
- "8. Loan had not explained what he meant by a 'coal-
.ition government' and, in fact, used the terms 'coalition govern-
ment' and 'non-communist government' almost interchangeably
without giving an indication as to the possible structure of the
government, political grouping, etc. He had not stated that
they would accept representatives of the present South Vietnamese,
Government, but his tone gave the impression that-they would.
In fact, Loan had said he deeply disliked the South Vietnamese
Government but, nevertheless, it was 'a political factor' in
South Vietnam. (Algard cautioned that in considering the term
'non-communist government' Loan has indicated from time to time
he does not consider the NLF communist.) Loan told Algard he
envisages a government with communist participation but which is
not communist-controlled. Loan had repeated his remarks about a
non-communist government directly to Algard in French at a sub-
sequent casual meeting, again using the phrase 'non-communist.'
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"9. I raised the question concerning Loan's comment
that the matter of the U.S. withdrawal was not decisive. Algard
said Loan had referred to the Geneva Agreement in this context
using the example of the withdrawal of French troops which, he
said, had been no problem.
"10. I asked about the statement Loan had made to the
effect that if negotiations failed .it would be worse than no
negotiations at all. Algard said this had been a rather sudden
statement by Loan who had not elaborated further.
"11. I said we had thought it might be useful to have
a type of pre-negotiation negotiation which would create the
setting and mood and clear away some of the problems; Jacobsen
said this would give them no trouble. Algard said it would de-
pend on where the preliminaries ended.
"14. In response to questions, I dealt at some length
on our recognition of the problem of 'face' for North Vietnam.
I said we can go fairly far, but there are North Vietnamese troops
in South Vietnam (we have North Vietnamese prisoners as well as
documentary evidence); they must get out and their departure must
be monitored. This would be a matter for the negotiations phase
rather than for Algard to deal with. We are very flexible as to -
how the negotiations should proceed, whether in secret or public
view, and also flexible as to level and, within limits of security
and communications, place. The problem of withdrawing military
forces is extremely complicated and will present great difficulties
for the North Vietnamese if they refuse to acknowledge their
presence in South Vietnam. But so long as they get out and we
are sure they getout, Hanoi can deal with its 'face' problem.
15. Algard said it seemed that we were thinking of two
#
phases, the first to establish the conditions of negotiations,
the second the negotiations themselves; his mission would be in
the first phase. I said that we are prepared ?to indicate near
the beginning of negotiations and in detail our conception of
the final settlement. In effect, we are prepared to settle first
and negotiate later. Hanoi knows pretty much already from our
public statements what we will agree to, including our willing-
ness twaccept self-determination within South Vietnam and for
Vietnam as a whole. We are ready to have the people of South
Vietnam decide the extent to which the NLF participates in its
government.
"B. Meeting on Wednesday, September 13 (sent as Oslo 1087)
"7. Algard said his Swedish colleague in Peking is con-
vinced that there is a marked divergence between Hanoi and the NLF,
ler
1
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to which I replied that there may, of course, be natural
differences of view between North and South and long-time combatants
as opposed to more recent reinforcements, but this did not change
the basic factor of North Vietnamese control. Algard said that
in Peking the Viet Cong representative apparently had very few
contacts with the Vietnamese Embassy which could, of course, be
part of the pretense."
State 35015 sent on 9 September indicated that further study was re-
quired of the Norwegian conversations. State also indicated some concern
about Cooper's remarks to Algard with respect to his impending trip being
"construed as an insurance related to our bombing of Hanoi." Tibbetts
responded in Oslo 1079 of 11 September that the insurances given Algard
were vague and that there was no problem with respect to commitments on
U.S. bombing while Algard would be in Hanoi.
State responded to both Oslo conversations with instructions to bold
off on the "immediate pursuit of OHIO channel" since USG was now in "indirect
channel of communication to Hanoi." Responding to Cooper's suggestion on
rejecting theMARIGOLD ten points, State suggested, instead, confining
Algard's future- comments to the North Vietnamese to points previously made
by Loan and to the reciprocity issue.
STATE 36328 to AmZmbassy Oslo (SECRET-NODIS), 12 September 1967,
Ref: State 35015; Oslo 1063, 1087:
"1. As you can surmise, developments in another area
have caused us to hold off in giving you instructions on
message that Algard might take. Weighing delay and possi-
ble GON feeling that we have lost interest, we now believe
you should inform them in utmost confidence that indirect
channel of communication to Hanoi opened up following
Algard's last contact, and that we are now pursuing cer-
tain inquiries through that channel. Response is _so far
negative, but we are continuing to probe, and therefore
frankly feel immediate pursuit of Ohio channel could be
embarrassing to Algard and ourselves. Please request
Algard to notify us as soon as he has heard from his post
in Peking re travel permit to Hanoi, and advise him that
we will then give him most meaningful, timely message
we can then devise in light of all developments up to
point of his departure.
"2. In conveying this message, you might add that,
sLnce Hanoi is of course aware of the indirect channel
currently in use, it would be our best guess that they
will hold off in giving Algard his visa. In short, they
will probably be playing a waiting game just as we are.
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"3. You should make clear that this reflects no
decline- whatever in our interest in developing the Algard
channel. As sophisticated diplomats, they must realize
that this kind of duplication of channels can arise in
a situation of this sort, and that it then becomes unwise
to attempt duplicate .channel. At same time, other channel
is tenuous and may break down, and this among other factors
prevents us from describing to GON what exactly is being
discussed.
"4. FYI. Provisionally we are negative on inject-
ing the Polish Ten Points, which Hanoi has never taken up
in any way. We are more inclined to think that any use-
ful message through Algard will confine itself to the ?
subjects, other than reciprocal action for bombing, on
which he has had faintly interesting comments from Loan.
But we are holding our fire completely until we see how
the next few days develop. End FYI."
Tibbetts responded in Oslo 1132 of 13 September, saying that the Nor-
wegians understood the sensitivity-andwould wait for further instructions
from Washington.
Oslo 1366 of 28 September and Oslo 1407 of 30 September dealt with .
the problem of Algard's returning to his post in Peking. It was learned
that Ambassador Loan had departed Peking for Hanoi on 7 September and had
returned to Peking probably around 29 September. Loan had not as yet
given any indication regarding the authorization of Algard's visit to
Hanoi, nor did he give any sign of interest on substantive matters. In
the meantime, a Norwegian journalist indicated that he suspected Algard's
return to Peking might have something to do with North Vietnamese contacts
and a Vietnam. peace settlement.
?
3 - 17 October 1967
State (47603) responded to Oslo 1366 and 1407 on 3 October. The gist
of the message was that USG desired that Algard stay on in Norway until
at least the end of that week, giving "further time both to see whether
Hanoi follows up in providing visa, and to permit us to weigh other indi-
cations of Hanoi's attitude that might emerge following President's speech
of September 29 and other developments.
Bovey replied in Oslo 1457 on 3 October that there would be no diffi-
culty in Algard remaining at least to the end of the week. Some problems
were also raised with respect to communications between Oslo and Peking. ,
It was decided that communications were not adequate for rapidity or security.
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On 5 October, Bovey sent Oslo 1503 which repeated. that there were no
further developments on the Algard trip to Hanoi, and that Algard felt
he should not delay his return to Peking. Algard's intention was to
leave Oslo on 19 October unless he hears otherwise regarding authoriza-
tion to visit Hanoi. In this same cable, Bovey reported that the Nor-
wegian Charge in Peking passed the following message: "During absence
Loan in .September NVN Embassy Peking had stated that Hanoi still inter-
ested in contact and Algard did not RFT not think this was merely casual
L,
remark." Algard explained Hanoi's inaction regarding his visit in terms
of increased U.S. bombing in NVN.
r-
L.
On 9 October in Oslo 1567, Bovey reported the following message
from Norwegian Charge in Peking:
. "2. Begin text Ambassador Ngo emphasized in a
long conversation today that a visit to Hanoi for the
time being is not RFT not in question, because of the
American escalation. The North Vietnamese Ambassador
stressed in particular that Hanoi views with distrust
all American peace proposals and that Hanoi cannot
RPT not be forced to negotiate. A visit can be possible
only after cessation of the bombing. The Amb indicated
that further contact in Peking would be unwise for all
parties, and mentioned possible contact Hanoi-Washington
via the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. End text."
Algard, therefore, decided to depart for his post on 12 October.
On 10 October, State 51536 reported that U.S. still regarded an Algard
trip to Hanoi as constructive, and that "we are interested in obtaining
elaboration of mention by Loan of possible contact Hanoi-Washington via
Soviets as well as other aspects of Loan's remarks to Charge." Bovey
responded in Oslo 1597 on 11 October that State 51536 had been received
and executed.
October 18, 1967
On 16 October, Algard transmitted further details onconversation
between Norwegian Charge and Loan.
OSLO 1739 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), 18 October 1967,
Ref: Oslo 1567 and 1597
"2. Begin Msg Amb Ngo used the expression
QUOTE insecure to both parties UNQUOTE regarding a
continuation of exchange of views in Peking. The
reference tb the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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was clearly intended to give a hint to alternative
possibilities for contact. The general tenor of Amb
Ngo's statement gave the impression, on the other
hand, that Ranoi for the time being is not RPT not
very interested in making contact. End Msg."
November 2 1967
The Norwegians handed Bovey a further elaboration of recent despatches
from Peking. One point that emerged clearly was Loan's questioningof.Norway's
role as a middleman in negotiations, implying that the Norwegians were
r ally bartering for the Americans. Loan also gave the Norwegians to
uiderstand that. Hanoi would not negotiate under present circumstances,
especially the U.S. bombings... Loan added that Peking was an "insecure"
place for contacts, and that Moscow would be more desirable.
OSLO 1903 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), 2 November 1967,
Ref: Oslo 1739
"1. FonOff (SecGen Hoye and Desk Sandegren)
handed me evening Nov one translation or (A) despatch
dated Oct 18 from Amb Algard in Peking and (B) enclo-
sure thereto which is Norwegian Charge's fuller report
of his talk with Loan Oct 10, mentioned ref-tel.
A. QUOTE enclosed is a note of the 11th
October, 1967, on the conversation between Secretary
of Embassy Tangeraas and the Amb of North Vietnam
the 10th Oct, 1967; in Peking. Amb Ngo'.s remarks
seem to indicate not RPT not only that a harder atti-
tude on the question of peace negotiations in general
is evident in Hanoi, but also that the desirability.
of using Norway as a middle-man has been reconsidered.
While Ngo as late as the 19th August expressed full
confidence in the Norwegian government in this matter,
it is now beingssaid that Norway is QUOTE indirectly
involved END QUOTE. The Amb also used, in a different
context, the term QUOTE American satellite countries
UNQUOTE, but it was not RPT not clear whether this
referred to Norway as well... .Observers in Peking .
-agree that the North Vietnamese attitude towards nego-
tiations for peace has hardened, while at the same
time believing that a struggle concerning the future
line in this question presently is taking place within
the party leadership in Hanoi. It is being pointed
out that the intensification of the American bombing -
attacks probably has strengthened the more extremist
group, led by Le Duan and Truong Chinh. - In the summer
the impression was that this group was in a weaker
position, as a consequence of the death of
General Thanh UNQUOTE.
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B. QUOTE Having received the Ministry's
instructions the 6th October, I immediately contacted
Ngo, Who, however, did not RTT not receive me until
the 10th October. I began by asking if there was any-
thing new with regard to the time for the planned
visit of Amb Algard to Hanoi. I said that we would
appreciate it if we could receive a reaction if possi-
ble within the next day, as. Mr. Algard planned to
return to Peking the 14th Oct if the visit only could
take place later. I emphasized that Algard was ready
to postpone his departure if a visit could take place
in the near future.. Ngo replied that the situation
in Vietnam had totally changed in the course of the
last few months,. since he last law Mr. Algard. The '
reason was the American bombing of North Vietnam and
the general escalation of the war. He underlined that
Hanoi is stronger militarily and that American losses
constantly increase. The frequent peace feelers from
the American side via American-QUOTE satellite coun-
tries UNQUOTE is now being viewed with suspicion and
considered as attempts to lure Hanoi into a trap.
Ngo stressed that because of this a visit by Mr. Al- -
gard was not RPT not desirable for the time being.
If a visit had taken place not it could do more harm
than good as far as a future solution was concerned.
Ngo asked if I knew the contents of Mr. Algares in-
structions and he aPpeared very interested in this.
I replied that I was not RPT not informed of the con-
tents and that I assumed they would be ready only
immediately before the visit takes place. I empha-
sized that Algard, for this, reason, later would have
to return to Oslo for consultations if the visit did
not RPT not take place in the immediate future. Ego
then said that US has no RPT no business at all being
in Vietnam and. that one 'should rather .attempt to in-
fluence Washington to initiate cessation of the bomb-
ing and a military de-escalation, which can lead to .
a solution, than constantly to exert pressure on
Hanoi. To this I replied that the Norwegian govt
was interested, indeed that negotiations would start,
which of coursp did not RPT not presume that a solu-
tion should tax. unilaterally' the interests of Hanoi.
Ngo answered that he was aware of the Norwegian posi-
tion on the Vietnam question, but he added that Norway
was not RPT not neutral, but QUOTE indirectly involved
UNQUOTE....When I was about to leave, Mr. No said
that further exchange of opinions in Peking was QUOTE
insecure for both parties UNQUOTE and that Hanoi had,
in other places, contacts able to convey messages,
if further contact is desired. He mentioned the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign kffairs in Moscow as
one of these contacts."
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November 14, 1967
In Oslo 2033, Tibbetts reported that Norwegian politics might compli-
cate.and compromise the OHIO track. It seemed that in a recent visit of
Prime Minister Lyng to Poland, be and Rapacki exchanged information about
negotiations contacts. Lyng claimed that Rapacki had told him "in great
detail about the Polish effort 'on U.S. behalf' to open contact in Decem-
ber 1966." In reply, Lyng said that the Norwegians had also unsuccess-
fully tried to open contact. Jacobsen brought to Lyng's attention, in
the meantime, that "Algard channel not RFT not so dead as FonMin seemed
to believe, since on November 9, the ?day Lyng left for Poland,a message
had been received from Algard stating that Loan had expressed interest .
in continuing discreet contacts.with Algard (as well as telling Algard he
had been Satisfied with Mr. Lyng's speech in the UN)." Tibbetts feared
that Lyng might' be tempted to use the Norwegian contact as "a possible
easy way out of domestic difficulty over foreign policy." Tibbetts asked
State authorization to tell Lyng that "we consider this channel too im-
portant-to create prejudice against it." On 14 November in State 69391,
State concurred in Tibbett's request. on 16 November in Oslo 2120, Tibbetts
said: "Estimates are that government will survive debate with narrow margin
despite pigheadedness of some liberals.a. So maybe Lyng will relax for time
being."
December 14) 1967
Loan sought out Algard on two occasions in early November. Loan's
message was simple -- American escalation meant that there was no purpose
in Hanoi negotiating at this time.
OSLO 2501 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), 14 December 1967,
Ref: Oslo 2083:
"1. There follows text fuller report received by
FonOff by pouch from Amb Algard Peking re further con-
tacts with NVN Ar.a) Loan (Ngo). This report, which is
dated Nov 10, expands info already given by under Secy
Jacobsen (para four reftel) to Amb Tibbetts Nov 14.
QUOTE Some time after my return to Peking I met Amb Ngo
at a reception and had an opportunity to exchange a few
words with him. The Ambassador regretted that my trip
to Hanoi could not RFT not take place, and he maintained
that the American escalation of the air war the last
few months had confirmed that the distrust of. the
North Vietnamese with regard to the intentions of the
Americans wa8.jUstified. There was for Hanoi no RP!
no purpose in negotiating under these circumstances.
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Amb Ngo approached me during the reception at the Soviet
Embassy Nov 7. He let it be understood that he rather
.wished that our contacts continue, in a discreet manner,
that is, that we exchange points of view when meeting
accidentally at receptions and similar .occasions.
Without stating it directly, he let me. understand
that there would be other days after this one and
that our contacts then could prove to be useful.
UNQUOTE
"2. In conveying this report Desk Officer Sande-
gren called my attention to phrasing which indicated
that Loan appears to have taken initiative on both
occasions and that on second he seems to have sought
Algard out.
"3. Norwegian FonOff regards second- Loan apprach
Nov 7 and implications of last sentence, however de-
viously conveyed, as hopeful indication NVN desire
not RPT not to close down circuit entirely. Sandegreh
said expression QUOTE days after this one UNQUOTE
implies in Norwegian that better days may lie ahead."
BOVEY
Janually 4 1958
OSLO 2727 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), 4 January 1968,
Ref: Oslo 2501:
"1. Ansteensen called me on January 4 to give me
the following translation of a cable sent by GON Amb
to Peking January 3, 1968.
"2. QUOTE A representative of the Embassy of
North Vietnam yesterday (January 2) said to Ambassa-
dor Algard that the Foreign Minister's speech on
December 29, 1967 contained 'new elements.' He
declined to make further comments, but woul&send
the complete text as soon as it was received in
Peking, 'as it will be of interest to the Norwegian
Government.' Letter follows. UNQUOTE"
TIBBETTS
January2.2 1968
OSLO 2789 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), 9 January 1968,
Ref: Oslo' 2727:
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"1. Ansteensen gave me January 9 following two
texts: First text is ti-anslation of pouched report
dated January 4 from Ambassador Algard in Peking
amplifying report sent by cable reftel:
'At a Cuban reception on 2nd inst. a younger
staff member of the North Vietnamese Embassy approached
me and asked if 1 had heard that the North Vietnamese
Foreign Minister Nguyen Trinh.had made an important
speech on December 29, 1967, in the Mongolian Embassy
in. Hanoi. I replied that I had heard over the radio
the Agence France Presse report on the speech, but,
as far as I understood; Some uncertainty was prevail-
ing as to whether the French correspondent had under-
stood the speech correctly. The said staff member
stated that the North Vietnamese Embassy not yet had
received the full text of the Foreign Minister's
speech. Nevertheless, he could say that the speech
contained QUOTE new elements UNQUOTE He declined
to make further comments, but would send me the com-
plete text as soon as it was received in Peking,
QUOTE as it certainly will bei, of interest to the
Norwegian Government UNQUOTE.
"2. Second text is the translation of a cable
received by Foreign Office from Ambassador Algard in
Peking dated January 3:
'The said representative of the North Viet-
namese Embassy confirms that AFP's (Agence France Press)
account of the Foreign Minister's speech is accurate.
North Vietnam is prepared to undertake genuine talks
as soon as the bombing ceases. The word QUOTE perma-
nent UNQUOTE has consciously been omitted. He expressed
disappointment with the fact that so far there had
been no American reaction. He saw this as a demonstra-
tion of lack of will to negotiate.
'East European sources are confident that
there is now RFT now a genuine North Vietnamese will
to negotiate. They refer to the fact that China,
dug to her internal situation, is not RFT not in
a position to exert decisive influence on Hanoi.
East European sources likewise distrust the Ameri-
can intentions:"
February.10,_ 1968
Loan once again invited Algard to come to Hanoi, and, he also indicated
a desire to send an NVN representative to Norway. Loan also introduced
a very new element into the play: "that Hanoi presupposed (assumed) that
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the military operations be stopped while negotiations are being conducted."
OSLO 3275 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), 10 February 1968,
Ref: Oslo 2930:
"1. Boye and Ansteensen called me in morning
February 10 and passed me following message from
Algard in Peking received late February 9 in Oslo:
"2. QUOTE Ambassador Ngo who has just returned
from Hanoi today (February 9) conveyed a message from
the Foreign Minister that Algard would be welcome
Hanoi whenever convenient. He emphasized that the
visit should take place at earliest possible time.
Amb Ngo also requested that a Vietnamese representa-
tive, presumably an ambassador in Eastern Europe,
should visit Norway. Algard asked for further details
concerning the character of this visit and emphasized
that Norway is only interested to assist in establish-
ing possible contact between the combatant parties.
Ngo promised details and stated that the visit was
not RPT not intended as propaganda. Ngo emphasized
that last week's events had not RPT not Changed Hanoi's
desire for negotiations and that the Foreign Minister's
statement of Dec 29, 1967 was still valid. He said
that Hanoi presupposed (assumed) that the military
operations be stopped while negotiations are being
conducted. Cable soonest whether in principle North
Vietnamese representative welcome in Oslo. Suggest
I leave Peking February 14 for consultations Oslo.
UNQUOTE
1t3. Doye said with respect to foregoing that if
US Govt feels Norwegian Foreign Service can be of any
help in establishing contacts with Hanoi, they are
prepared to do so but, of course,- GON does not RPT
not want to mess up anything which may be in progress.
If USG considers it desirable, GON prepared to ask
Algard to come to Oslo for consultations with a US
rep either from Embassy or from Washington in middle
of February. Algard could then be asked to proceed
to Hanoi as soon as possible although GON will have
to think hard as to what would be appropriate cover
story for such visit at this time. As regards pro-
posal for arranging a journey to Oslo for some North
Vietnamese rep, further info will be passed on to
USG as soon as received from Norwegian Embassy Peking
as indicated Algard's tel, but in meantime GUN would .
appreciate any views and comments USG might have on
this subje.ct. Norwegians standing by for earliest
possible reply from Washington."
TIBBETTS
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Februax_iy 19, 1968
The Norwegians informed Tibbetts that the North Vietnamese Ambassa-
dor in Moscow might be planning a trip to-Norway as well. (OSLO 339)4)
Februp4:y1_20__? 1968
In the event of the North Vietnamese Ambassador's visit to Oslo,
State sent the following explanation of "no advantage" for use by the
Norwegians. The explanation of "no advantage" stressed our desire "to _
ascertain whether Hanoi appreciates he consequences of taking advantagli
and understands the importance the U.S. attaches to the 'no advantage'
assumption."
"The US, consistent with President Johnson's statement of
April 7, 1965, remains willing to enter into talks with5ut -
amended State 11871Z preconditions at any time.
"The US position on the cessation of the bombardment of
North Viet-Nam was set forth in Pesident Johnson's September 29,
1967 speechin San Antonio. As the President said:
'The US is willing to stop all aerial and naval
bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this will lead
promptly to productive discussions. We, of course,
assume that while discussions proceed, North Viet-Nam
would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or
limitation.'
"The US is not assuming that North Viet-Nam will cease its
support to its forces in the South. On the contrary, as Secre-
tary of Defense designate Clark Clifford testified before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we assume that until a cease-..
fire is agreed on, Hanoi 'will continue to transport the normal
amount of goods, men and munitions.'
"In setting forth .its assumption, the US is not setting a
condition but attempting to make clear to North Viet-Nam that any
cessation of US bombing followed by actions by Hanoi taking
advantage of the cessation (such as an increase by Hanoi of its
infiltration of men and supplies or attacksin the area of the
DMZ) would constitute such bad faith on Hanoi's part as to make
continued US forebearance impossible. if.Hanoi, by taking
advantage, forces the US- to resume bombing, the possibilities
of A negotiated solution would drastically recede. Under such
circumstances, calls for intensified US military action would
increase and the possibility of another halt in the bombing
would be low. The US is trying to ascertain whether Hanoi
appreciates this vital fact and fully understands the importance
the US attaches to the no-advantage assumption.
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"At- San Antonio the President, in addition to setting forth
his assumption, stated his readiness to. stop the bombing when
such action would lead 'promptly to -productive discussions.'
'Productive discussions' are serious exchanges in which-either
side will be able to put forward for full consideration in good
faith its position on any matter. 'Prompt' of course refers
to a willingness by Hanoi to begin.discussions with the US
immediately after cessation of bombing.
"It is worth noting that Hanoi is unwilling to give a
clear response to questions as to the length of time between
a US bombing cessation and the beginning of talks. If Hanoi
were serious in desiring talks then surely its response would
have been one of unequivocal readiness to begin immediately.
"The US evaluation of Hanoi's current position takes into
account Hanoi's actions as well as its words. The unprecedented
offensive against most of South Viet-Nam's urban centers, which
Hanoi treacherously launched in the, midst of the traditional
Tet holidays, causing widespread civilian casualties and
suffering, was made notwithstanding the fact that we were
still exploring with Hanoi its position through diplomatic
channels, and that we had exercised restraint in bombing
targets in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong. In
this context, we cannot but weigh Hanoi's words with great
skepticism and caution. These actions carry a harsh political
message.
"The US favors every effort to obtain clarification of
Hanoi's position. We shall continue to evaluate all information
and to pursue every possible avenue which promises to bring us
closer to the resolution of this conflict through serious
negotiations."
(State 118092)
Februly 231 1968
The Norwegians reported that they had heard nothing further about
the North Vietnamese Ambassador's visit to Oslo. A Swedish radio report
said. that he was returning to Moscow from Stockholm. (OSLO 3446)
February 2, 1968
Boye and Ansteensen informed Tibbetts that on February 23 Loan again
approached Algard concerning the latter's visit to Hanoi and suggested
the date of February 29. (OSLO 3)-64)
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March 1, 196a
i Jacobsen infotmed Tibbets that Algard had left for Hanoi by plane
on February 29. The U.S. had not been consulted prior to Algard's
departure. Jacobsen offered domestic politics as the explanation of
the need for the Algard trip. (OSLO 3570)
April 5, 1968
' Following is a summary of Ambassador Algard's visit to Hanoi,
1/1 ?ch 3-10:
"5. Foreign Minister Trinh reiterated that his speeches
of December 29 and February 2 still were valid. He considered
these speeches to be an answer to the repeated American demand
for a clarification whether the North Vietnamese would be willing
to have negotiations if the bombing and other acts of war against
North Vietnam should be stopped. It was now up to the Americans
to take the next step but because Of the reaction up to now the
Foreign Minister concluded the United States was not interested
in negotiations.
"6. The Foreign Minister discussed the San Antonio formula
and said it could not be accepted even in the somewhat diluted
form which the new Defense Minister Clifford had given in his
meeting with the Senate. The North Vietnamese insist that there
must be a distinction between the attacker and the attacked and
acceptance of any form of reciprocity would be inconsistent with
North Vietnam's sovereignty. I remarked in this connection that
in and for itself it was understandable that the Americans would
view with disquiet a situation where negotiations could result in
a serious change in the military positions of strength. Even if
the North Vietnamese side could not accept any form of reciprocity,
I said I assumed they already had laid out what policy they would
follow in practice when it concerned the question of suspending
acts of war under eventual negotiations. The Foreign Minister
answered that would depend on the Americans' position. Negoti-
ations must not lead to a change in the relative positions of
strength?to the advantage of the Americans. He was not willing
to develop this point further.
"7. The Foreign Minister underlined also that the North
Vietnamese 4-point program must be the foundation for a political
resolution of the conflict. Apart from what concerned the stopping
of the bombing and cessation of the acts of war against North
Vietnam, he did not set matters forth in such a way that the
United States beforehand must accept the entire 4-point program.
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He did not say anything on the point of time for American with-
drawal but said that was a question which must be handled at
the conference table. Nor would he say anything on how the
reunification problem would be settled nor how long it would
take but he repeated that first there must be a political
solution in South Vietnam and referred to the NLF program
which assumed a separate South Vietnamese state for the immedi-
ate future. Insofar as it concerned a political solution for
South Vietnam, the Foreign Minister repeated the North Vietnamese
position that this was a question which must be discussed with
the NLF and that Hanoi cannot speak on behalf of South Vietnam.
He underlined very strongly that recent events in South Vietnam
had shown that the regime in Saigon was totally without political
basis but at the same time events made clear that there was a
possibility of cooperation between the NLF and other political
groups. However he did not go into detail on this point.
118. Both Foreign Minister Trinh and his civil servants
underlined that Hanoi desired a political solution of the
conflict. At the same time they asserted that if the Americans
did not want negotiations, Hanoi was in a position to continue
the war indefinitely and they were convinced that eventually
they would gain a military victory.
"9. ....It was clear that Hanoi because of the military
advances in the South now felt that politically their position
had been strengthened." (OSLO 4120, Sections 1 & 2 of 2)
April 5, 1968
Algard sent a second report on his visit to Hanoi-. This one dis-
cussed the leadership in North Vietnam.
"Labels 'Hawk-Dove' are said to be no longer valid within
the top leadership. Up until late autumn of 1967 it was said
but without identification of individuals concerned -- that
inside top leadership there were two lines of thought about
continuing the war. Today it appears such is not the case.
The reason is said to be both the American escalation of last
autumn and the military victories in the South. The common
denominator now believed to predominate is supposed to be
nearer the Hawk standpoint than the Dove's." (OSLO )-.127)
April 5,_1968
Algard met with Loan in Peking.
"Loan said even though still fearing American initiative
was political maneuver with eye on world opinion and internal
situation USA, and even though strong bombing still continuing,
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Hanoi in any event had chosen to treat it as genuine peace
initiative and depart from fundamental position not rpt not
to negotiate so long as bombing proceeded. He strongly
emphasized Hanoi ready for real negotiations if USA really
desires them. Hanoi's latest reaction was proof of will to
negotiate and to compromise." (OSLO 4133)
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SWEDISH - NORTH VIETNAMESE CONTACTS, OCTOBER, 1966 - 1968
November 11, 1966
The first exchange in the Aspen track came on 11 November in a
meeting between Secretary Rusk and Swedish Minister- of Foreign Affairs
Nilsson. Nilsson informed Rusk of Swedish contacts- with the DRV in
Warsaw and in Hanoi. Both contacts with the DRV dealt with "creating
a climate favorable to negotiations." The DRV contact in Warsaw called
r-
for: (1) "an unconditional and. unlimited stop of the bombing of Viet-
namese territory, North as well as South Vietnam:" (2) "the FNL must be
regarded as a legitimate party to negotiations." He added that "no mill-
; tary actions should be undertaken in the DM anda "process of evacuation'
of allied forces should be begun." The Hanoi contact, also talking about
a climate for negotiations, listed two conditions that appeared. a little
softer than the Warsaw counterpart: (1) "the bombing of North Vietnam
must be put to an end, without any conditions anddefinitely:" (2) "recog-
nition of the FNL 'as one of the spokesmen for' the South Vietnamese people:"
in addition, the Hanoi contact, Mr. Trinh, described additional matters for
"a final settlement": coalition government, general elections, and eventual
steps toward reunification.
In response, Secretary Rusk indicated that "we could not impose a
coalition government on the south." Ee also said that: DRY insistence
on a permanent end to the bombing represented "an increased demand on their
part and we must have something in exchange for a permanent cessation."
As a way out of the reciprocity dilemma, Secretary Rusk suggested a process
of deescalation by mutual example rather than final agreement. Rusk also
recognized the difficulty of proceeding with bargaining at initial stages
because "Hanoi was hesitant about discussing the first step until they saw
how the negotiations would end."
Department of State Memorandum of Conversation (TOP SECRET,
NODIS, ASPEN), dated November 11, 1966, Subject: Swedish
.Diplomatic contacts with North Viet-Nam. Participants -
United States: Secretary Rusk; Leonard Unger (Dep Asst Secy);
David McKillop (EUR/SCAN);- Heyward Isham (EA/VN). Sweden:
Minister of Foreign Affairs Torsten Nilsson; R. Hichens-Bergstrom
(Dir of Political Affairs,. Foreign Ministry);- Hubert de Besche
(Ambassador to United States); J. C. S. Oberg (First Secretary,
Pol. Div., Ministry of For. Affairs).
"After preliminary exchange of greetings, Foreign Minister
Nilsson read a report of two recent conversations between Swedish
diplomats and representatives of North Viet-Nam which took place
in Warsaw and Hanoi (The text of this paper is attached).?
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(TEXT)
- "The Swedish Government has, since 1965, on its
own initiative, been in contact, in various places,
with representatives of the National Liberation Front
of South Vietnam and also with representatives of the
Hanoi Government. Those contacts have been kept secret
and they have been taken for the only purpose of ob-
taining general information on the views of the 'other
side' in Vietnam.
"I. Some weeks ago a representative of the Swedish
Foreign Ministry met in Warsaw a senior member of the
North Vietnamese Embassy there. During their conver-
sation the North Vietnamese diplomat made some remarks
which seemed to differ somewhat from the official state-
ments issued earlier by the Hanoi Government regarding
the possibilities of creating a climate favourable to
negotiations.
!'According to the North Vietnamese diplomat, the
US Government must give 'tangible proofs' of its willing-
ness to negotiate. In rebly to a question asked by the
Swedish diplomat what such proofs should amount to, the
North Vietnamese answered that such proofs should, first
of all, be: an unconditional and unlimited stop of the
bombing of Vietnamese territory, North as well as South
Vietnam. Furthermore: no military actions should be
undertaken in the demilitarized zone and a process of
evacuation of allied forces should be begun. Finally:
the FNL must be regarded as a legitimate party to _negoti-
ations.
"The North Vietnamese diplomat said that his remarks
could be transmitted to the US Government, while adding
that the official North Vietnamese standpoint on the
question of negotiations was made clear in Premier Pham
Van Dong's speech of April 8, 1965, i.e. the so-called
four points. The North Vietnamese diplomat also mentioned
that his Government appreciated this contact with Sweden.
He hoped that this channel would remain available.
"II. The Swedish Ambassador in Peking, Mr. Petri,
recently visited Hanoi and had a conversation with the
Foreign Minister of North Vietnam, Mr. Trinh.
"a) Mr. Trinh strongly emphasized that the North
Vietnamese Government aimed at a political solution of
the Vietnamese conflict, not a military one. Mr. Trinh
said that two conditions must be fulfilled in order to
bring about a climate for negotiations, which could lead
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Nise
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to a political solution.
1. . The bombing of North Vietnam must be put to
an end, without any conditions and definitely.
2. The FNL must be accepted by the US Government
as one of the spokesmen for the South Vietnamese
people and, as Mr. Trinh expressed it, the most
valid one.
"If both these conditions were fulfilled and the US .
Government thus took what he called 'an appropriate attitude'
then, Mr. Trinh said, 'we know what we will have to do'.
"It should be added that, in this connection, the ques-
tion of a time-table for the withdrawal of US troops was not
raised.
"b) As to the possfbility of a final settlement of
the Vietnamese conflict, Mr. Trinh said that - in addition
to the withdrawal of US ahd other foreign troops - both
the Hanoi Government and the FNL had the following requests:
1. The creation of a national coalition government
founded on a very broad basis and including all
political and religious groupings as well as all
social classes genuinely desiring to achieve
national independence.
2. General elections in an atmosphere of freedom
and democracy.
3. Although no immediate reunification was envisaged,
it was necessary to create such conditions in South
Vietnam as to permit a move in the direction of a
future reunification of North and South Vietnam.
Trinh reiterated that if the US Government gave
proof of goodwill, they would find that the Vietnamese
side knew what they had to do'.
"What characterized the two talks referred to was, in
the view of the Swedish participants, the moderate tone in
which the views of the North Vietnamese side were conveyed."
(END TEXT)
Having read the paper, the Foreign Minister summarized the
salient points of what DRV Foreign Minister Trinh had told
Ambassador Petri in Hanoi: North Viet-Nam preferred a political
to a military solution and was interested in .a climate favoring
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a political settlement provided certain conditions were ful-
filled; withdrawal was not specifically mentioned; the National
Liberation Front was described as one of the spokesmen for the
South Viet-Nam people although the. most valid one. Regarding
the possibility of reaching a final settlement, the ULF and
Hanoi supported the formation of a National Coalition Government
in South Viet-Nam founded on a breed basis including all political
and religious groupings as well as all social classes generally
desiring to achieve national independence. Moreover, conditions
should be created permitting moving in the direction of future
re-unification....
....The Secretary went on to note that there were one
or two positive and one or two negative elements in' what had been
told to the Swedish representatives. On the positive side,
Hanoi's .interest in a political rather than a military solution
represented a small step forward.
"....After all this, Trinh had sent him an invitation to
come see him; Petri had not ased to be received by Trinh. While
there was no discussion of conveying Trinh's remarks to the United
States, neither did Trinh say Petri could not do so and he empha-
sized the importance of maintaining secrecy. The Swedes inter- .
preted Trinh's attitude as a tacit indication that his remarks
could be conveyed to the United States.
"The Secretary, continuing his commentary on Trinh's remarks
said the missing element was what Hanoi would in fact do on the
military side. At least 19 regular North Vietnamese regiments
were in the South and three North Vietnamese divisions were in
the DMZ and north of it. They could attack our Marines at any
moment. If we committed ourselves to stop bombing permanently,
we must know what would happen on the ground militarily. We
could not possibly make a commitment on the ground unless we knew
what Hanoi would do with those 19 regiments. Trinh had used the
phrase, 'We know what we will have to do' in the event their
conditions were accepted. The Secretary said we Would want to
know what that phrase means.'
....Ambassador Petri had observed to Trinh that if the two
conditions were fulfilled, the North should follow suit. Bergstrom
did not indicate whether there had been any camnent to his remark.
"The Secretary said that Hanoi had denied, even to the
Soviets, that they had troops in the South. However, we must
have corresponding action on the ground; we could not be, children!
in this matter. As to the role of the Front, we knew who their
leaders were including North Vietnamese Generals in the South
using a variety of names. The Idberation Front is Hanoi. Some
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southern individuals with other associations were included
in the Front, but they had no influence. When Trinh said
the Front.was,the most valid. spokesman for the South Viet-
namese people and that the situation must be consistent with
moving toward reunification, he was expressing Hanoi's political
objective of permanently unifying the country on a Communist
basis. We were prepared to have South Viet-Nam decide on a
solution through elections but'So far Hanoi was not prepared
to do so. The Secretary said we could not impose a.coalition
government on the South;- we could not turn our men around and
start them shooting in the other direction to impose a coalition
government. If the South Vietnamese people were to decide on
this it was up to them and we would abide by the result, but a
coalition would not be imposed by our arms and our power....
....The Secretary added that the other side had made
clear we must end the bombing permanently, since they insisted
that a suspension would imply an ultimatum. This represented an
increased demand on their part and we must have something in
exchange for a permanent cessation.
"The Swedish Foreign Minister noted that they had contacts
with the Front or Hanoi in Algiers, Warsaw, Moscow and Hanoi
as well as Peking. The Secretary noted that the only serious
interlocutor was Hanoi - not the Front. The Secretary said that
we did not discount the importance ?of any third party channels.
In past crises, we never kncw which channel would be important.
In this case, we did not know whether Hanoi would say something
important through the Swedes rather than through someone else....
"The Secretary went on to say that the Eastern European
countries would probably be Interested in settling for the status
quo ante at the 17th Parallel but on account of Poking, were un-
able to move forward. We are prepared, he said, to accept the
Communist world's interest in North Viet-Nam if they are prepared
to accept our interest in the South. Until Hanoi abandoned its
objective of seizing South Viet-Nam, there could be no peace. It
was as simple as that... .The Secretary continued that two things
were vital: (1) Hanoi must abandon its attempt to seize South
Viet-Nam by force, and (2) the people of South Viet-Nam must
have a chance to decide what government they want and to express
their views on reunification without being subjected to force by
the North....We had suspended bombing in the DMZ to see if there
would be any response, but there was none and the ICC had been
denied access to the area under the North. Nevertheless the
Trinh statement could be important if we had more precision.
"Ambassador Unger called attention to the reference by the
North Vietnamese in Warsaw to 'no military action being undertaken
in the demilitarized zone'. He suggested, and the Secretary agreed,
that this was also a point on which the Swedes might make further
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soundings in Hanoi. We were certainly ready to see the zone
truly demilitarized and would welcome an end to violations of it
by North Viet-Nam.
"The Foreign Minister mentioned possible differences of
opinion between the Front and Hanoi and pointed out that all
elements of the Front were not Communists. The Secretary
responded there was no problem about contact with the Front;
the South Vietnamese were able to communicate with its repre-
sentatives. South Viet-Nam could take care of the indigenous
problem through reconciliation and bringing the dissidents back
into the body politic. .United States troops had only. entered .
when North Viet-Nam regulars had come down. If the Swedes were'
in the same position, they would not accept a ceJlition govern-
ment thus imposed on them.
....The Secretary noted three channels to Hanoi: the
direct one through which little was said because of Hanoi's fear
of Peking; the channel through Moscow to which we attach impor-
tance because of Moscow's attitudes and influence -- but here
again Hanoi was probably afraid of Peking; and finally a channel
through a third party, which could be Sweden. But, he continued,
this represented perhaps 50% of the question; the other 50% was
the possibility of resolving the problem by defacto action on
the ground in the pattern of the Greek insurrection and the
Quemoy-Matsu crisis. Ho Chi Minh might prefer to pull back
troops rather than enter negotiations, calculating that Americans
might; go home and could not come back, although, the Secretary
said, we can get back faster than they can. We would be pre-
pared to try this route. There need be no confessions that they
have 19 regiments in the South.
"In response to an analysis by the Foreign Minister of
Hanoi's problem, the Secretary noted that we had reports from
Eastern European sources that confirmed this precisely: Hanoi'
feared the effect of negotiations on the morale of the Viet Cong
and Hanoi's present leaders feared that they could not survive
a failure to achieve their objectives. However, the Secretary
said on this we cannot help them; they are in places they have
no right to-be.
"Further, on the point of gradual de-escalation, the Secre-
tary said that since January we had made clear our interest in
responding to actions on the ground -- what we call a process
of 'mutual example' -- without evoking thus.far any interest
on Hanoi's part. If Trinh's phrase pointed in the direction of
positive Hanoi response, this could be important.
As to' Trinh's own alignment in the regime as between hawks
and doves, Mr. Bergstrom commented that the French considered
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him pro-Chinese but that Ambassador Petri did not have
.that impression.
"The Foreign Minister asked whether it would be necessary
to specify how long we would halt the bombing. The Secretary
said that under our system the press and Congress would force
us to answer this question. A permanent bombing halt would
require a very important reciprocal action. AMbassador Unger
commented that Trinh's remarks implied some readiness to discuss
now not only conditions for negotiation but also the terms of
an eventual settlement. The Secretary agreed that Hanoi was
hesitant about discussing the first step until they saw how the ?
negotiations would end. He indicated that another reason for
keeping further inquiries on the basis of a Swed-sh-DRV dialogue
was to avoid having to bring Saigon into the picture, which we
were disinclined to do at this stage.
"The Secretary suggested as a technical point it might not
be wise to pursue the dialogue with Hanoi through other capitals.*
In order to protect Trinh's position if thereare divisions within
the leadership it was important not to have communications from
abroad available to too wide a group in Hanoi. Foreign Minister
Nilsson agreed with this suggestion. The Secretary emphasized
the importance of examining very carefully all indications bearing
on Hanoi's position but as he had told the press on another occasion,
we could only negotiate with those who could stop the fighting. -
If we entered into too great detail on our conditions for settle-
ment, the other side would just put that in their pockets and then
propose to. split the difference. We were not worried about real
southern insurgents -- 16,000 of them had defected this year ?
but the Northern. Generals must go home. We would even be prepared
to give them a villa on the Riviera'
".....Responding to a final question from the Foreign Minister
about -Hanoi's difficulty of believing that the United States -
could abandon such expensive United States bases, the Secretary
pointed out that the United States' capacity in this regard should
not be underestimated. We had built roads in India, over the
hump, and Alaska during the war which we had never used, and we
had demobilized 100 divisions after World War II. In the last
five years we had closed 600 bases. As the President had said,
we had no intention of leaving OUT soldiers in South Viet-Nam as
tourists.
"Following the general conversation, Ambassador Unger
privately mentioned to Minister Nilsson and Mr. Bergstrom our .
concern over reports that Ambassador Petri had spoken rather -
openly about his contacts in Hanoi. They agreed and said that
recently they had twice communicated with Petri_and instructed
him to treat this subject with maximum discretion.".
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November 18, 1966
As a result of the Rusk-Nilssbn meeting, State cabled Stockholm
on "points for clarification."
STATE 88128 to Amembassy STOCKHOLM (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),.
18 November 1966.
111.
"2
? ? ?
'1. What. does the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister
intend that his government would do when he says 'We know what
we will have to do'ff.e., if US stops bombing of NV? ? Mr. Trinh'
named two conditions which the United States must fulfill to bring
about a climate for negotiations. It is understood of course that
if those conditions were fulfilled, negotiations could promptly
be undertaken, but since the fulfillment of those conditions would
represent significant steps for the United States, what would be
the reciprocal actions by North Viet-Nam? It is encouraging to
know that the North Vietnamese. apparently recognize this reciprocity
but it is essential, if their position is to be accurately evalu-
ated, to know what it is that they recognize they 'will have to do'.
'2. What .is the significance of the FNE being charac-
terized, as Mr. Trinh puts it, as 'the most valid' spokesman for
the South Vietnamese people? What is this intended to convey con-
cerning the status of the FNL vis-a-vis other spokesmen?
With reference to the question of reunification,
Mr. Trinh referred to the necessity of creating conditions in
South Viet-Nam 'to permit a move in the direction of a future
reunification'. The conditions in South Viet-Nam as Mr. Trinh
himself implied- would grow out of general elections held in an
atmosphere of freedom and democracy. Would Mr. Trinh not envisage
that the question of unification would be resolved at that time
in accordance with the mandate given a new government by the
people through those general elections?
'4. If Mr. Trinh should mention the point raised by.
the North Vietnamese representative in Warsaw, namely that no
military actions should be taken in the demilitarized zone',- Mr.
Trinh might be asked whether this is intended to be in effect a
proposal for the strict observance of the Geneva Accords in the
demilitarized zone north and south of the demarcation line with
the full functioning of the ICC throughout the zone.'"
"6. There was some substantive discussion of the issues
which might arise in Petri's next conversations in 'Hanoi, it being
understood that this exchange was between the Swedes and ourselves
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Nime
and not for discussion in Hanoi. Unger mentioned Goldberg
formula's reference to private and other assurances about a
response to bombing cessation and illustrated the kinds of
de-escalatory actions by Hanoi which we would take to be appro-
priate responses, Such as a cessation of infiltration, a reduc-
tion of the level of military activity and/or terror in South
Viet-Nam or some troop withdrawal from South to North. In
response to further Swedish probing unto what would come next
after these first steps toward de-escalation and their mention .
of a possible ceasefire, Unger said it was not possible without
knowing more of Hanoi's views, to carry the process farther.
We would hope that once a beginning has been made it would
be possible to establish some mode of communication with Hanoi
to arrive at some understanding of the next phases of de-escalation,
although it was not to be ruled out that this might proceed by
mutual example. He also. made clear our recognition of the prob-
lem.of face for Hanoi and our readiness to consider ways to meet
with problem. With reference to the fourth point in the "Points.
for Clarification" Unger emphdaized that we were suggesting this
be raised only if the North Vietnamese themselves refer to the
DMZ problem. He. added that it would always have to be understood
that any arrangements that might conceivably be worked out for
the DMZ would have to provide for a reasonably reliable means of
detecting and dealing with violations; we could not agree to
putting American and Vietnamese forces in jeopardy exposed to
surprise action by the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong."
RUSK (Drafted by Unger)
November 28 thru December 21) 1966
0n-28 November, Parsons cabled' State, in Stockholm 641, :saying that
"Swedes will not repeat not be ready talk with me before mid-week at
earliest."
On 29 November, responding to State 88128 with Stockholm 652 Parsons
said that in amplifying aide memoire "there was no doubt at all in Petri 's
mind that Trinh meant and expected what he had said would be passed on to
US." Petri also wanted to qualify that when Trinh used the phrase "most
valid spokesman" with respect to NLF, that these were not Trinh's precise
words, but the meaning. Petri also emphasized that he could not draw Trinh
out on meaning of his "we know what we will have to do" statement. Also,
on 29 November, in Stockholm 653, Petri confirmed the contents of the memo
transmitted to Secretary Rusk on 11 November. The intention was that Petri
return to Hanoi by way of Peking about 10 December.
On 30 November, in Stockholm 659, Parsons added a piece to the
previous conversation with Petri in Stockholm 652. This was that: "also,
Petri had not repeat not put in his reports, Trinh had shown 'good deal
of understanding that problem of face existed also for US."
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On 3 December, State (STATE 96326) queried about ?cryptographic .
facilities for Petri, and worriedabout public speculation on Petri's
"frequent visits to Hanoi." State added: "This will also bear on question
of when we bring GVN into picture, something we do not contemplate for
pr6sent."
1
On 5 December Bergstrom and Parsons met once again.
STOCKHOLM 681 to SecState (TOP SECREI, NODIS, ASPEN),
December 6, 1966. Ref: State 96236.
"3. As Swedes feel there is no denying they have been
in touch withus at Fon Minister level, formula arrived at
in -Petri's instructions is for him to describe what he tells
Trinh as 'impressions', perhaps 'general impressions' formed
by Nilsson in Washington. Precise formulation has to be
left to Petri's discretion. However, he is enjoined to be
most careful not to say he is speaking at our request or
conveying message from. us. Bergstrom says Petri will also
take 'great care not to affect any American interest in a
negative way.'
"4.. On substance,- primary point of interest for Petri
to emphasize is that Nilsson felt we were interested in
finding road to political solution and that this road not
closed. Petri is not to volunteer any suggestions or
attribute any to us. However, he will try hard to ascer-
tain what- response there would be from Hanoi's side. if US
should?as mentioned in first of our points--stop bombing
North Viet-Nam. Here again exact formulation will depend
on Petri's judgment in light circumstances of talk, but
was assured he will try to cover points on which we need
more information.
"5. If Petri concludes- Trinh does not want to react
at time, he is not to press but merely say that he would
be at Trinh's disposal at any time."
PARSONS
On 9 December, in. Stockholm 702, Parsons reported that Oberg, Foreign
Ministry-Officer in Charge of Asian Affairs, indicated that the British
-EMbassy was probing for information once again. On 10. December, in Stock-
holm 707, Parsons reported that Trinh was at a Communist Party meeting in
Budapest and was not expected in Hanoi until the 19th It was agreed that
Petri should wait for Trinh to return to Hanoi rather than intercepting
him en route. On 10 December, in State 100645, State agreed on holding the
line against British probes and on waiting for the Trinh return to Hanoi.
On 21 December, in Stockholm 739, Parsons reported- that Bergstrom had.
informed him that Petri had not yet been granted an entrance visa to Hanoi.
Petri could not explain the delay.
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January 11, 1967
On 11 January, in State 116773, State wanted Bergstrom to query
Petri on the latter's assessment of recent Hanoi efforts to increase
pressures for unilateral bombing halt. State also wanted to know if
Petri felt there was any connection in the delay in obtaining his visa
and recent U.S. bombings.
January 13, 1967
Word had been received from Petri that Hanoi wanted him to come to
North Vietnam as soon as possible. Because of the delay, the GUS had
decided on its own to reactivate its Warsaw channel.
Bergstrom questioned Parsons on whether a declaration on Hanoi's
part to negotiate would lead to a U.S. bombing stop.
STOCKHOLM 822 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
January 13, 1967. Ref: State 116773.
"4. Late on 12th word cSthe from Petri that North Viet-
namese wanted him come to Hanoi by January 16. He had replied
in accord his instructions on giving Stockholm adequate lead-
time that he could not make it before 19th. This response has
today been approved here.
"5. In meantime, not having heard from Hanoi, GUS decided
-reactivate Warsaw channel which they had earlier avoided so as .
not to cross wires. (Response to my query why was so vague as
to lead me believe second and third rationales paragraph 3 above
weighed more with Swedes than Bergstrom admitted.) Bergstrom
said Oberg of Ministry had this week been sent Warsaw renew
his contact with North Vietnamese representative there. (This
is first disclosure to us of this previously tightly held channel
to DRV and it is interesting to note Swede is regular FonMinistry
official.)
"6. ()berg's instructions signed out by Nilsson were to
pave way for Bergstrom himself proceed Warsaw about 16th to explore
situation. Now that Petri has his visa, Ministry today has hastily
instructed Oberg not to make contact in Warsaw, but it is not yet
known whether he had already done so. In any event Bergstrom will
not now go there next week."
"8. One question which Bergstrom put to me for referral
Washington was whether a firm, or at any rate more precise,
declaration on Hanoi's part of its willingness to negotiate
could lead to a bombing stop. On this point, I described
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Department's impressions of Bong's prepared statement to
Salisbury. Bergstrom is of course thoroughly familiar With
Hanoi's obvious tactics in seeking obtain unilateral cessation
of .bombing but there is lingering disposition to hope Dong
statement is significant."
PARSONS
January 17, 1967
Bergstrom reported on an Oberg contact in Warsaw. The North Viet-
namese contact told Oberg: (1) "'A final and unconditional cessation
of the bombing was an absolute and indispensable prerequisite in order
to pave the way for negotiations. As soon as the bombings had ceased,
the North Vietnamese GOVT was prepared to take all peace offers from
the American Government under consideration;" (2) The four points
were not a precondition for negotiations but only a foundation for negotia-
tions; (3) the NLF problem could be disposed of "through recognition on
the part of the Americans of the right of the Front to take place at
the negotiation table;" ()) Reunification was an internal matter to be
settled "after the restoration of the peace."
STOCKHOLM 831 (CC) to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
January 17, 1967. Ref: State 118951,
"3. Oberg (knowledge of his identity as source should
not rpt not be revealed) has reported from Warsaw (para 5
Stockholm 822). His visit there required no special rationale
as North Vietnamese reps had agreed he would take contact from
time to time. As this visit was pre-arranged, Hanoi rep had
had time to inform his principals and in ()berg's opinion had been
carefully briefed by them. At outset ()berg's contact, who was
second-ranking man in Hanoi representation, said door was always
open to Oberg and then proceeded to give following as Hanoi's
position. Text in sub-paragraph below is Bergstrom's translation
from (berg's -Swedish message except where Oberg incorporated
Hanoi reps exact words in French:
'A final and unconditional cessation of the bombing was
an absolute and indispensable prerequisite in order to
pave the way for negotiations. As soon as the bombings
had ceased, the North Vietnamese Govt was prepared to
take all peace offers from the American Government under
consideration ('pret a considerer toutes offres de paix
de la part des Americaines quelles que soient'). A bomb-
stop was essential. On the other hand, the four points
of Hanoi were no 'precondition' for negotiations but only
une base a la negotiation'. The contents of the four points
could always be discussed at the negotiation table.'
(Comment by Oberg: 'Contact man gave the impression of
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being authorized to express himself in the way he did.)
The question of FNL could be solved, for instance, through
recognition on the part of the American side of the right
of the Front to take place at the negotiation table. The
question of reunification was an internal matter, which
could be solved later on between North and South Viet-Nam
after the restoration of peace.' (Comment by Oberg:
'Generally speaking, the contact-man this time gave the
impression of considerable flexibility as to Hanoi!s
position in regard to the contents of a possible negoti-
ation if only a climate could be created which rendered
negots possible.')
"4. Although Hanoi rep in Warsaw was aware of Nilsson's
visit to U.S. in November, he did not rpt not ask Oberg about
any talks with U.S. officials and latter did not rpt not refer
to Nilason's talks with Secretary and Vice Pres in any way.
"5. Oberg also explained to DRY man that when he had pro-
posed Bergstrom also Visit War.paw to meet Hanoi reps, GUS had
not rpt not known that Petri was about to visit Hanoi. Now
that this visit was to take place (which was obviously already
known to Warsaw Hanoi rep), there seemed no need for Bergstrom
visit Warsaw now....
"& ()berg's report has been repeated to Petri in Peking,
with comment that GOS will be interested to learn if Trinh
parallels exactly Warsaw Hanoi reps statement to Oberg."
PARSONS
January 20, 1967
In Stockholm 8117, Parsons reported that "Oberg found FNL rep LTn
Warsaw7 both knowledgeable and intelligent. There was 'mutual briefing'
on previous Swedish contacts with FNL reps at Algiers and Moscow...."
State queried on the same day (State 122506) on more information about
Swedish-VIF contacts in Algiers and Moscow.
January 26, 1967
In Stockholm 868, Parsons reported that a Social Democratic afternoon
tabloid had revealed from authoritative sources that: "Ambassador Petri
during his talks With the .Hanoi Government and the FNL 'is naturally also
seeking to send sentiments and views' concerning the proposals for peace
negotiations."
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January 27.2 1967 ?
In Stockholm 870, Parsons cabled that Petri had returned to his
post in Peking and had only sent a brief telegram on his Hanoi talks.
lathe meantime, ParsOns noted press publicity continued and was
?
prbbably designed "to serve democratic political needs of social demo-
crats."
pruary 2,- 1967
In Stockholm907, Parsons indicated that the Swedes seem to be
getting "a bit nervous about their Aspen role now." Bergstrom did not
."VR it to wind up "looking foolish." Bergstrom also indicated that Petri's
report was not sufficiently precise and that the Foreign Ministry was
waiting for a full written report before passing it on to the U.S.
BSrgstrom did say that the brief telegram from Petri contained "nothing
spectacular." Bergstrom added, however, that 'there were one or two
possible signs.'
?
Bergstrom . avoided answering questions about Swedish contacts with the
NLF. Bergstrom's remarks, however, indicated some sympathy for the NLF.
Along this same line, Bergstrom threw out the thought that .Sweden might
be interested in establishing consular relations with Hanoi, but then
back tracked when pressed on this point.
"4. When I asked Bergstrom substance and timing of
Swedish-NLF contacts in Algiers and in Moscow, he replied that
his memory not sure enough to attempt answer without having records
available. He agreed without much enthusiasm to revert to. this
later. In the meantime all he could recall was that contact in
Algiers began about August 1965, at time when many people looked
toward NLF as perhaps authoritative source for bringing war to
end. (Under circumstances I did not challenge this to me strange'
statement.) Now however it was more apparent that Hanoi was
focal point and so there was less interest in NLF contacts.
Wachtmeister, new Ambassador in Algiers, had seen NLF repre-
sentative, but not with any prescribed mission.
'5. Given frequent de facto contacts in Hanoi and need
for channel to handle Swedish medical and other relief assistance
to North Viet-Nem, Bergstrom 'would be tempted' to recommend
establishment consular relations were it not for 'German prob-
lem' I said if this happened, he might also have an 'American
problem' on his hands. He then backtracked, saying that he had
no thought of recommending this to Minister...."
PARSONS
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*ow.
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TO - AUDIO
February 7 1967
Still not having passed on the substance of exchanges in Hanoi and
Warsaw, the Swedes suddenly asked "if appropriate American could be
available at Stockholm or possibly Warsaw in utmost secrecy to talk with
Hanoi representative during TET talks while bombing suspended."_
STOCKHOLM 926 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
February 7, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 910.
"1. After having met with Foreign Minister Nilsson on
reports from Petri in Peking and Oberg -again in Warsaw Belfrage
and Bergstrom sent for me ten p.m. Stockholm time Seventh.
While emphasizing their information was difficult to evaluate
perhaps insubstantial, they inclined to believe Hanoi had moved
quite a bit towards real desire for 'contact' (as distinct from
negotiations) with American official qualified to talk.
"2. As possibility of 'contact' apparently linked to TET
truce which limited, so they understood, to four days beginning
February 8, it was of utmost urgency to know if appropriate .
American could be available Stockholm or possibly Warsaw in utmost
secrecy to talk with Hanoi representative during TET truce while
bombing suspended. Bergstrom is proceeding Warsaw Thursday the
ninth to explore situation further and also so as to be in posi-
tion relay any American reaction to information which he and
Belfrage gave me tonight and which I am reporting in message.
to follow this one.
"3. I can not evaluate how seriously we should take this
but there is no doubt Swedes privy to Petri and Oberg reports
think Hanoi may be in earnest provided there is face saving
formula, Whether Hanoi is in earnest about (1) seeking peace,
(2) prolonging TET bomb pause or (3) searching for basis on
which to negotiate, Swedes could not say. However, they pre-
pared send Bergstrom to Warsaw anyway and first point on which
they hope to have immediate answer is whether we can get some-
one here or to Warsaw during TET truce. If so_they think they
will be in position to find out if Hanoi could and would also
authorize -someone (probably their Warsaw Ambassador) to be
available for contact during truce.. . ."
PARSONS
That same evening, the Swedes finally passed on Petri's report and
the report of ()berg's recent and unreported crash mission to?Warsaw.
While admitting that the Petri-Trinh talks "did not yield much," the
Swedes felt there were same encouraging signs. Most important in their
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- JAN-W.14J
minds was the indication from the Warsaw contact that the North Vietnamese
"was apparently willing to have a direct contact with U.S. even without
knowing how long bombing was suspended (so long as this not announced)."
The -Swedes apparently felt that this position in Hanoi was a Sufficient
response to the President's policy of talking "whenever we can get other
side to do so."
Petri's contacts with Trinh in Hanoi did not yield much by way of
clarifying the four State queries (the four queries in State 88128 of
18 November 1966). Trinh talked about the FNL being "a spokesman" or "the
spokesman."
STOCKHOLM 927 to SecState (TOP SECRhT, NODIS, ASPEN),
February 7, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 926.
"2. In Hanoi, Petri-Trinh talks 'did not yield much..'
Trinh was bitter about alleged intensification of war since
October.and emphasized unconditional bomb stop was prerequisite
to anything else. There could be no preconditions-to bombstop.
This was closest Petri got to answer to point 1 set forth in
State 88128 for clarification 6f meaning Trinh's cryptic remark
we know what we will have to do'
13. Trinh encouraged Petri to think Swedish effort for peace
was laudable. He did so with apparent but not explicit recog-
nition Swedes had been in touch with Washington. On Point 2
Trinh said merely FNL could be 'a spokesman' or 'the spokesman'
for South Vietnamese people. Petri did not raise Point -3 on
reunification. He thought answer to query in final sentence
was 'yes' but that it would have been useless to press Trinh
.on this. Point 4 on DMZ which contingent on mention by Trinh
did not come up.
1:4. After Petri returned-to Peking about January 25th Hanoi
charge there sought him out and drew his attention to Trinh's
statement to Australian journalist Burchett that talks could take
place as soon as bombing stopped. Petri told Charge's US wanted
some indication first that Vietnamese willing deescalate war..
Hanoi Char6 replied such request from Americas would appear to
make bomb stop conditional and would therefore be unacceptable.
"5. When this word reached Ministry some days ago Foreign
Minister decided send Oberg back to Warsaw. On taking contact
Oberg was received not by subordinate as before but by North
Vietnamese Ambassador, a change which Swedes though significant.
Oberg told his superiors on returning to Stockholm this evening.
that it was clear Warsaw Ambassador was fully briefed on Petri's
recent visit to Hanoi as he had been on earlier one. He said he
t,
_told Ambassador that since he had been received at higher level
his principals would'be willing to send Bergstrom to Warsaw.
Ambassador replied in French this would be 'suitable.' Accordingly
Foreign Minister has told Bergstrom proceed (as reported Stockholm
926).
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"6.. Crux of ()berg's talk in Warsaw was possibility that TET
stand down- in military operations might provide opportunity for
contacts between Hanoi and USA organized by and in presence of
Swedes. Place not mentioned but Swedes assumed Warsaw, Stockholm,
even third capital possible Oberg get impression that if bombing
was in suspense even for an unspecified period, Hanoi would want
to have contact with us. However, if we announced bombing would
stop for four days only, Hanoi would not agree to contact. (Thus
possibility if any may be foreclosed). It was clear to Oberg that
it was intended that this message should reach us.
"7. In thinking foregoing over Swedes said they impressed .
that (1) Hanoi has moved Warsaw contact to a higher level and (2)
Hanoi Warsaw .Ambassador evidently interested in Pierican contact --
if face can be saved all. around. When I remarked it did not appear
Hanoi had met our view that some signal must first be given as to
what Hanoi weuld do if we stopped bombing .Swedes replied that was
true but on other hand' Hanoi was apparently willing to have a
direct contact with us even without knowing how .long bombing was .
suspended (so long as this not announced). Maybe, Swedes conceded,
Hanoi only maneuvering to get bombing stopped by diplomatic maneuver
but they thought Hanoi's situation might have become such, especially
given China. situation, that their desire for contact with us was
genuine. This is what led Swedes to ask if when Bergstrom met
Hanoi Ambassador in Warsaw he could say US was also prepared to
send representative to make contact in utmost secrecy..
In this context Belfrage cautiously observed Hanoi has
never told Swedes it would be Willing to talk with us if bomb stop
not explicitly unconditional; it has merely shown some signs of
interest in talking if we did not put an explicit date on resumption
of bombing. 'Belfrage concluded that he understood President had
said that our policy was to talk whenever we could get other side
to do so. I reminded him of distinction between 'unconditional
discussions' on one hand and some prior private or public indication
of what. Hanoi would do if we stopped bombing on other hand (State
130520 Circular)."
PARSONS
February 8, 1967
State wanted clarification on statement from Warsaw contact suggesting
a desire for preliminary contact during TET and the statement to Petri that
unconditional bombing was a prerequisite to anything else. State also
wished Bergstrom to explore military reciprocity. On the point of the
readiness of the U.S. representative, State said that the U.S. would be
prepared to respond to "talks without conditions."
STATE 133671 to Amembassy STOCKHOLM (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
February.8,. 1967. Ref: Stockholm 926, 927.
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L.
'tor
r-
Now'
L,
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. "1. It is not clear on the basis of info Lation reported
reftels precisely what DRV Ambassador in Warsaw told Swedes which
gave them impression that Hanoi might have real desire for
contact with American official qualified to talk during Tet truce
period. As reported by Swedes, Hanoi would not agree to contact ?
if we announced bombing would stop for four days only, and we have
already announced (and presume Hanoi aware of it) that duration of
Tet truce would be for 96 hoUrs, with implication bombing could
resume thereafter. Nevertheless we certainly wish. to leave no
possibility Unexplored and, while recognizing domestic political
pressures which may lead Swedes to grasp at straws, we accept as
you do their good faith in passing this information along. We
therefore suggest you convey following to Foreign Ministry, bearing
in mind we are not sanguine anything can in fact be worked out in.
connection Tet truce and we do not wish to seem to be urging
Warsaw trip on Bergstrom:
a. We are most grateful for these recent reports of
Swedish conversations with DRV representatives in Hanoi and
Warsaw. We think Bergstrom visit and talk with DRV Ambassador
could be useful in clarifying DRV position. Among points on which
he cOuld seek further precision are relationship between DRY
Ambassador's statements to Oberg suggesting desire for preliminary
contact with US representatives during four-day Tet truce and DRY
Foreign Minister's statement to Ambassador Petri that unconditional
bombing halt was prerequisite to anything else. Bergstrom could
emphasize his conviction that US remains prepared for secret
discussions at any time, without conditions, and such discussions
might cover whole range to topics relevant to peaceful settlement.
b. In connection with finding mutually acceptable
basis for initiating preliminary talks, Bergstrom could express
opinion that some reciprocal restraint to indicate tint neither
side intended to use the occasion of the talks for military
advantage would provide tangible evidence of good faith of all
parties in prospects for negotiated settlement.
c. As to Swede's specific question Whether appro-
priate American official could be available Stockholm or possibly
Warsaw in utmost secrecy to. talk with Hanoi representative during
Tet truce, US would be prepared to respond immediately and posi-
tively to any serious indication of Hanoi interest in having
talks without conditions.
d. Bergstrom should know that decision on duration of
Tet truce and arrangements for carrying it out were made some,
time ago. If press stories refer to 96 hour period because of
information given out earlier pursuant to these decisions and
arrangements, Ranoi would have no basis for charging that US
had disregarded suggestion made February 8 to Swedes in Warsaw.
That suggestion was known in Washington well after our position
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NW.
1,; vow
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on duration truce had been made public in Saigon. We trust
Bergstrom will bear this fully in mind in case DEV Ambassador
takes that line."
RUSK
February 9, 1967
The Swedes indicated that although they had nothing tangible to go
on, they wished to pursue the contacts. They Were pegging what optimism
they had on the DRV statement to the effect that Hanoi will talk if the
bombing stopped. unconditionally.
STOCKHOLM 934 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
February 9, 1961. Ref: State .133671.
"2. Bergstrom had time only to say that Swedish impression
based on admittedly tenuous evidence but, as described 927,
sufficiently impressive to lead them to actions which they have
taken, namely, report to me and sending Oberg back to Warsaw
eight to make appointment for Bergstrom there ninth (which is
-to be at 9 P.M. Feb 9), Warsaw time, presumably to allow
Ambassador time obtain further instructions from Banc)* He
added possibly there has been wishful thinking by Petri and
Oberg, but nevertheless Swedes felt they should act as they have
"3. Belfrage in,accordance his usual caution, began by saying
7 that only formal statement -DRV Reps have Made to Swedes on talks
is to stress their willingness if unconditional bomb stop. He
too said evidence tenuous, but they were encouraged by progression.
from Trinh's opening attitude in Hanoi Jan 23 which,was harsh
c-
and terse to point' reachedin Warsaw sixth when Amb 'jumped at'
proposal meet with Bergstrom. Belfrage said initially on 23rd
Trinh said in. effect 'since our Oct talk whatever you said to
Americans led them to intensify bombing and war.. Later he was
somewhat mollified and in end Petri was launched by Vice Minister
and urged to come- back again. Then came North Vietnamese Charge's
unsolicited approach to Petri in Peking which struck Swedes
as possibly more a sign of interest in talks than in propagandizing
them with Burchett article. Finally, as Petri's contacts incon-.-
elusive, the decided send Oberg to Warsaw where higher level. and
? interest in pursuing subject brought Swedes to present position.
wrigiv
Belfrage asked if Bergstrom definitely could say American.
could come during Tet truce or after and I referred him text para C:
EEFTEL adding that trouble to get talks was not repeat not with US]
but Hanoi. I also reiterated per para B Bergstrom could emphasize:
his conviction U.S. prepared for secret discussion at anytime with-
out conditions. We then had some discussion of mechanics and agreed
that if Bergstrom receives impression tonight that leads him to take
responsibility of urging an American should come at once, Bergstrom
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should via Ministry send me flash report to this effect.
added that if he were to to urge without firm assurance that
a DRV Rep would duly be made available to talk, 1 personally
thought Washington would, if willing at all, have to opt for
Stockholm where American visitors presence could probably be
kept secret...."
PARSONS
Belfrage indicated that we should be prepared for sudden contact.
STOCKHOLM 935 to Sec State (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
February 9, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 934.
"1. Belfrage telephoned me in guarded terms message
received six P.M. local time Feb. 9 from Warsaw where
Bergstrom has already had meeting with DRV representative.
. "2. He said message said DRY showed interest and
expected give reaction February 10. Oberg will remain to
receive reply while Bergstrom returns here morning of 10th.
It Obvious DRV rep is consulting Hanoi.
"3. Impression gained was that if reply is affirmative,
Warsaw is likely be favored over Stockholm as locale. How-
ever, this, like nature of reply itself, 'very doubtful' and
Belfrage cautioned against optimism. However, he thought we
would be well-advised have 'someone on starting line' as idea
had been certainly not repeat not turned down."
PARSONS.
February 11, 1967
Bergstrom returned ? from Warsaw, leaving Oberg in case a follow-11:p was
needed. Parsons got the impression that Bergstrom had not fully communicated
the U.S. position.
STOCKHOLM 940 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
February 11, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 935; State 133671.
"2. Bergstrom confirmed DRV ambassador took his
approach seriously and said he would communicate at once
to Hanoi. Ambassador had Deputy with him who intervened
from time to time with usual ?Hanoi line but Ambassador
himself did not indulge in arguments and was matter-of-fact.
"3. Bergstrom said he stressed point set forth in
Para C State reftel and also closely related point in last
sentence Para A. Thus he believes it entirely clear to
Hanoi reps that US would respond positively at once if
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there were Hanoi desire for 'contact.' Bergstrom said he
stressed idea of 'contact' rather than negotiation...."
"5. Bergstrom said that while he had well in mind sub
stance Para D State reftel, question of charge of bad faith
did not come up and so this never seemed germane to his dis-
cussion with DRY Ambassador. As Bergstrom also remarked that
he did not emphasize all the other points in reference Message,
I suspect he touched only lightly on substance Para B State
reftel on reciprocal restraints during truce which must have been
over 4o hours old, by time of his talk...."-
PARSONS
February 12, 1967
0
STOCKHOLM 941 to SecState (TOP SECREI, NODIS, ASPEN),
February 12, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 94o.
IL_ "1. Oberg called Bergstrom from Warsaw February 12 to
report that when he went to say goodbye at DRY embassy he
was urged to stay although apparently with no promise of an
answer. Bergstrom on own authority, authorized Oberg remain
Warsaw until February 13.
"2. Bergstrom also authorized Oberg to tell DRV Embassy
that Americans had asked 'if there was any news. Bergstrom
had cleared this gambit with Nilsson but not repeat not with me
"3. -Bergstrom aware risks in international phone call from
Warsaw but he believes caution plus pre-arranged signals have
masked game."
PARSONS
February :13, 1967
STOCKHOLM 944 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
February 13, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 941.
"1. About noon 13th Bergstrom told me Oberg in Warsaw
has had no reply yet from DRV.
?
"2. GUS has authorized .Oberg remain over Tuesday.
"3. FonMinister has also authorized him to tell DRV
Ambassador that should latter wish to see Bergstrom again,
Minister would be willing to make him available."
PARSONS
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STOCKHOLM 948 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
February 13, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 944; State 133671.
"1. In talks with Bergstrom over week end and again
today we went over several points connected with his Warsaw
visit reported Stockholm 940.
A. He showed me his record of briefing he had
received from me before leaving for Warsaw early 9th (Stock-
holm 934) which was based on State reftel. From this I am
satisfied there could have been. no misunderstanding of US
position by Swedes on this first occasion when, as Bergstrom
pointed out, Swedes could acknowledge they were a thorized
transmit our views.
B. BergstroM thought it best in Warsaw not to
emphasize 96 hour Tet truce period in Connection Para C
State reftel.
C. Contrary to my e6rlier understanding he did,
however, remind DRV ambassador in accordance Para D that
sequence of events was such that press references to already ?
settled 96 hour period could provide no basis ?for any Hanoi
charges of bad faith in regard to February 6 -suggestions to
Swedes in Warsaw. I am quite sure he did this on his own
initiative rather than because DRY Ambassador took any such
line.
D. As I suspected, Bergstrom did not discuss Para B
State Reftel (reciprocal military restraint during any pre-
liminary US-DRV talks) because he felt it would merely touch
off standard DRV recriminations."
PARSONS
February 15, 1967
STOCKHOLM 961 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
February 15, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 948.
r.
"1. Belfrage and Bergstrom remained behind when FonMin
Nilsson left after lunch at residence Feb 15 to discuss possible
future contacts between Swede's and DRY Embassy Warsaw.
"2. Swedish position is now that Oberg instructed remain
Warsaw until morning Feb 17 when he is to tell DRV Embassy he
must return Stockholm for personal reasons but that Bergstrom
or he available return Warsaw on short notice should DRV ask.
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- "3. After probing without success for any information
from us on Kosygin-Wilson activity re Viet-Nam, Bergstrom then
outlined Swedes' estimate present situation:
A) Swedish contacts with DRY apparently independent
of other channels US may have available;
B) Because Bergstrom did not repeat not mention
'bomb stop' or 'bomb pause' at any time in his talks with DLTH,
Swedes do not consider that either end Tet cease-fire :or
resumption US bombing DRY has estopped their channel from
further possible use;
C) Swedes therefore feel free make ofier availability
set forth para 2 above;
D) In addition, Swedes would want feel free at some
time in future to return to DRY in Warsaw saying that Swedish
appreciation US position such that Swedes on own initiative (not
on our behalf) would ask if DRY has anything to say, and
E) Swedes would at that time ask if DRY still interested
preliminary contact with us on generallines originally set forth
Stockholm 926.
"4.I replied that 3 D and 3 E went beyond my current
instructions in so far as availability US official is concerned.
"5. In giving detailed account atmospherics of his talk
with DRY Ambassador, Bergstrom raised point of whether or not
DRY were under- necessity checking with FNL before replying to
Swedes. Questioning of. Bergstrom elicited that Swedes see
problem that DRY may be interested in US-DRY contact without
prejudice to FNL political position or FNL political and military
activity South Viet-Nam. Belfrage at this point offered that
he woUld think such contact would be 'of interest' to us.
6?I replied that Secretary's statements seemed clear that
we want to talk to Hanoi and added we considered FNL not inde-
pendent Hanoi.
"7. Only other operational problem arose earlier in lunch
when Nilsson pointed out that he must face foreign affairs council
Feb 16 when he expects to be asked specifically what COS has done
to .get peace in Viet-Nam and when question may well be put in
terms of what Petri has done in Hanoi. Despite some constitutional
risks in not being frank, Nilsson proposes disclose nothing of
Aspen operation. I reiterated our position that strict secrecy
'has been and continues essential in order not damage any possible
Abbr.
prospective channel-for peace."
PARSONS
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t
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February 16, 1967
State indicated no objection to the Swedes renewing their offer of
availability to return to Warsaw on short notice should the DRV ask. ,
State, however, had a number of problems on substance.
STATE 138786 to Amembassy STOCKHOLM (TOP SECRE1, NODIS, ASPEN),
February 16, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 961. 1
....In connection with question raised paragraph 1. b.
State reftel (reciprocal restraint during preliminary talks . .
as tangible evidence of good faith), you should explain to Bergstrom
that this observation was not restricted to effort to arrange talks
during Tet truce, but has general applicability as means of
creating favorable atmosphere for holding of talks. On. the other
hand agreement on reciprocal restraints is not intended by us
to be a precondition to talks.?
"(c) We wish to avoid linking any US/DRV contacts with
explicit or Implicit understanding, as suggested by Swedes,
that DRV would be speaking for itself, not for NLF. As you ,
correctly pointed out, it is our position that Hanoi is ultimate
center of power and decision-making relative to settlement; should
Hanoi decide to have Unconditional bilateral talks with US,
including discussions of matters which nominally fall within
purview of Front, this would be problem for Hanoi to handle.
It should he noted that Hanoi in its campaign to exchange
permanent bombing halt for indication of vague bilateral talks
has itself not mentioned participation or role of Front. We
see no reason to introduce this subject gratuitously.
"(d) We remain interested in keeping Swedish channel open
and are grateful for efforts of Swedes thus far in probing Hanoi's
intentions. Continued secrecy is of course mandatory if this
channel is tb have continued usefulness. We trust Swedes will
not jeopardize their potential role as mediators by any considera-
tions of temporary political advantage."
KATZENBACH
February 18, 1967
STOCKHOLM 970 to SecState (TOP SECRh14 NODIS, ASPEN),
February 18, 1967. Ref: State 138786.
"1. At Noon 17th I briefed Bergstrom on contents teftel.
"2. Ori Para C,.Bergstrom seemed at first to interpret this
as indicating we would not object to Swedes volunteering to DRV
Ambassador that NLF could come independently to talks with us.
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said that from final two sentences of Para C, it was quite
clear Swedes should not do so on our behalf. He then asked
if we would object in event Hanoi Amb should take initiative
in seeking to bring FNL rep with him to any talks which it
might be possible to arrange. I replied that in my opinion we
would not object should DRV in effect sponsor FNL rep as
participant."
PARSONS
February 22 thru March 8, 1967
State (STATE 1)42081) approved the line the American Embassy was taking
in Stockholm on clarifying NLF participation and on discouraging another
Swedish effort to communicate with the DRY in Warsaw. State believed that
the DRY was stalling; On February 23, in Stockholm 994, Parsons reported
that on leaving Warsaw on the 17th Oberg had already made a firm appoint-
L. for himself for March 1. If the DRY representative at the March 1
meeting raised the subject of a Bergstrom visit, Oberg was to be non-committal.
On March 8, in Stockholm 1045, Parsons reported that Oberg was returning.
*we from Warsaw and that "nothing Important transpired" in the contact.
leer'
March 112_1967
STOCKHOIM 1069 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
March 11, 1967. Ref; Stockholm 1045.
111. Late Tenth Bergstrom reported:
A. ()berg's trip Warsaw March 1-3 had been Under-
taken despite some doubts as to wisdom of going at all and
with strict instructions to listen and not exert any Swedish
pressure at all. .
B. Oberg gained impression Hanoi Rep under
similar wraps. In any event no real dialogue developed.
C. Hanoi rep asked if Bergstrom was in Warsaw.
D. Both Hanoi rep and Oberg were reluctant to
refer to contacts during Tet truce.
E. Hanoi rep asked for briefing on Swedish
internal political situation on which he showed himself
knowledgeable. He also asked especially about Riksdag
discussion on possible recognition of DRY. (Nilsson dis-
couraged this).
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G. Hanoi rep extremely bitter in word and
manner at resumption US bombing plus mining coastal waters,
naval and trans DMZ shelling. He said this prime example
us bad faith just when Trinh through Burchett had paved
way for entering on talks with US.
H. It was agreed keep channel open for future
and Hanoi rep professed great gratitude for Swedish efforts.
"4. Bergstrom commented bit ruefully on report Italian
Foreign Minister had publicly claimed he had had private
channel to Hanoi too. He added that when he visits Rome
next week he would be careful in any discussion with Italians
if Vietnam came up. He wondered if Italians had had valid
channel. I said I didn't know."
PARSONS
March 18, 1967
STATE 158220 to AmeMbassy STOCKHOLM (TOP SECRET, NODIS,
ASPEN), March 18, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 1069).
"1. At next appropriate occasion you should express
our appreciation for latest word on Swedes Warsaw talks,
noting continuing Importance of keeping contact secret
notwithstanding sterility of latest phase since one can
never foretell when this channel might usefully be
reactivated...." .
RUSK (drafted by Isham).
April 13, 1967
STOCKHOLM 1.187 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
April 13, 1967.
"1. During call on SecGen Belfrage 13th, I asked if
there had been any ASPEN developments. He said no, but
he has accepted invitation Polish Vice Minister Winiewicz
to visit Warsaw May 8-13. Ministry now considering whether
Belfrage should attempt contact Hanoi ambassador just to
see if latter has anything to say and how he says it.
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.112. Later FonMin Nilsson volunteered that if US has
any proposal to make through Swedish channel, DOS remains
-ready to pass it along to Hanoi representative."
PARSONS
April 14, 1967
STOCKHOLM 1199 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NOD'S, ASPEN),
April 14, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 1187.
"2. Bergstrom said that it now probably that .Belfrage
would be asked to contact Hanoi representative in Warsaw
next month and, if so, it would be useful to have 'something
tangible in his-baggage',...
"3. Bergstrom said GOD would probably send Petri to
Hanoi again in May or June to learn what he could.
"4. Continuing in speculative vein, Bergstrom said
that Nilsson thought there was only one card left for.
Swedes to play. On own responsibility they might say
privately to Hanoi they were convinced from their contacts
with Americans that Hanoi would do thus and so, Swedes
confident such and such would happen on American side'.
GOD, however, could not come up with any specifics on
'thus and so' and 'such and such'. They therefore uncer-
tain if or how they could proceed, but they did feel.
Hanoi had some confidence their good faith. Minister
himself might find it possible to seek meeting with Trinh.
Bergstrom then said it would be useful to know if we sax
any possible opening or had any ideas on such a give-and-
take process for which Swedes would in effect be guarantors
of genuineness of proposals."
PARSONS
April 18, 1967
STOCKHOLM 1219 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
April 18, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 1199.
"1. During discussion at residence April 16 about
Foreign Minister's announced intention reduce level Swedish
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diplomatic representation in Saigon, Bergstrom commented
on anomaly of fact that this announcement made only 24 hours
after he had talked April 14 with Ambassador Parsons about
possible next steps in Swedish Warsaw initiative on Foreign
Minister's instructions. He left impression that Foreign
Minister's statement or at least its timing had taken pro-
fessionals in Ministry by surprise.
"2. In follow-up talk April 17, Bergstrom speculated
that one possible effect of Swedish action might be to
increase Hanoi's receptivity to Swedish efforts promote
peace negotiations, Bergstrom commented that now 'Hanoi may
listen to us more' (Stockholm 1207). In this connection,
Foreign Minister quoted in Svenska Dagbladet April 18 as
saying in reply question: 'We have not offered to appear
as mediator but rather to negotiate contacts which could
lead to mediation.'"
cc
CAMERON.
April 22, 1967
With some Swedish pressure for a new U.S. move on negotiations,
State responded to the effect that the U.S. Stands on the President's letter
to Ho, the President's Nashville speech and Secretary Rusk's 9 February
press conference.
State also showed dismay at the fact that the COS could not renew,
accreditation of its ambassador to the GVN.
STATE 180598 to Amembassy STOCKHOIM (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
April 22, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 1187, 1199.
"I. We are not sanguine about possibility of giving
Belfrage something 'tangible in his baggage' for his visit
to Warsaw next month. Hanoi does not now seem interested
in discussing tangibles, as witness. its treatment of offer
contained in President's February 8 letter to Ho, and seems
unwilling to consider any offer short of US acceptance of
the Trinh-Burchett formula. Swedes are of course familiar
with our position on that formula (President's Nashville
speech,. Rusk February 9 press conference)
"3. In meantime, we cannot refrain from expressing
our disappointment over apparent GUS decision not to renew
accreditation to GVN of Swedish Ambassador Thailand after
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:?.19
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present incumbent departs. Our views on this development
are contained in separate message but in your discretion may
be drawn upon in this channel. In particular, considering
Stockholm's 1219 just received, you should convey our skepticism
over Bergstrau's remark that now 'Hanoi may listen to us more.'
Any increased Hanoi receptivity to Swedes as a result of this
action in our judgment is likely to be marginal. In fact, if
Swedes should appear over-eager to sell GVN short, Hanoi's -
most likely reaction would be to toughen its position regarding
Swedish mediatory efforts, not to moderate it."
Excerpts from RUSK NtWS CONFERENCE on Vietnam, February 9,
1967, as recorded by The New York Times.
"There's been a good deal of discussion in recent days
about the prospects for peace in Vietnam.
"President Johnson has pressed for peace in Southeast
Asia in capitals all over the world, over and over again.
"We've made it clear that tTe want no bases in Southeast
Asia, and do not wish to retain United States troops in Viet-
nam after peace is assured.
"We have affirmed our full support for free elections in
South Vietnam, to give the South Vietnamese a government of
their own choice, and have stated that the question of reuni-
fication should be determined by the Vietnamese through their
own free decision.
'We have emphasized that we would much prefer to. use
our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast
Asia rather than war and that peace could permit North Viet-
nam to partici) ate in a regional- effort to which we would
be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars.
"On the military side, we have on two occasions stopped
the bombing of North Vietnam.
"In May, 1965, a pause was limited to five and a half
days, because it was rejected by the principal Communist
capitals during the first three days.
'At the beginning of 1966, there was a cessation for
37.days--a period much longer than had been indicated might
produce some constructive results.
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."It elicited no response other than the continuation,
of the movement of men and arms into the south, and an
assertion that Vietnam must be settled on Communist terms.
"We must know the military consequences of such a military
action on our part. They must not expect us tO stop our mili-
tary action by bombing while they continue their military
action by invasion. No one has been able or willing to give
us any information on this subject.
"We 'ye been trying in every way known to us to invite
and to engage in such talks.
"Unfortunately, I cannot report to you today any tangible ?
forward movement in this direction.
But all channels remain open and are being utilized.
"Our Objective in Vietnam is and always has been a
limited one. A South Vietnam able to determine its own
future without external interference. I need hardly repeat
that this and this alone is our objective, but for the
benefit of members of the press who may not be fully familiar
with all our statements,- I am today making available points
we made last year under 14 different headings annotated to
reflect developments in 1966.
"These are, and remain, not in any sense preconditions
for discussions but rather statements of the elements which
we 'believe could produce peace in Vietnam.
"Let me say quietly and sincerely to all capitals on the
other side, let good sense take charge for all of us in
this situation. Recognize the necessity for elementary
reciprocity."
QUESTIONS
"Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the 14 points that were
put out a year ago. Would you say that the atmosphere or the
climate for peace negotiations has improved in any way since
that time, particularly since the conflict in China has become
so intense?
"A. It's hard to judge atmosphere, because what we really
must count upon is specific, tangible indications of a readi-
ness to move toward peace.
"So what the atmosphere really will amount to turns upon
whether we can in fact engage the other side at points where
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we and they, together, can move this matter toward the
conference table or toward a peaceful settlement.
"Q. Mr. Secretary, you have talked about the need
to recognize the principle of elementary reciprocity. Since
so much of the current discussion seems to hang on this,
sir, could you give us some idea of whether by this you
mean a specific promise to negotiate if we stop the bombing
or specific military action?
"A. Well, I have pointed out in my statement that we
cannot stop our military actions involving the bombing while
they continue their military actions of invasion.
"I think some elementary reciprocity is required and
common fairness would require that if there is an interest
toward peace that both sides help move toward it because
you can't stop .this war simply by Stopping a half of. it.
"Q. Here's another question, Mr. Secretary. Are there
any contacts or discussions of any kind going on to extend
that four-day cease-fire in the seven-day cease-fire they
say they're going to honor?
"A. Well, Prime Minister Ky has indicated some time ago
that he would be prepared to discuss with the North Vietnam
authorities the question of that cease-fire.
"This is something which can be discussed, which can be
looked into, but I could not give you any details today as
to whether or not there are discussions pointing in that
direction. There are some difficult operational questions
about that.
"Q. Mr. Secretary, a year ago, you recall, we offered
to maintain our bombing pause if the other side would only
come to talk. In fact we sent convoys around the world
looking for some signal from Hanoi of a willingness to talk.
Why is it that now we are unwilling to make such an offer
during the current pause?
"A. Well let me point out that the other side is not
talking about a pause. The other side is demanding an uncon-
ditional and permanent cessation of the bombing.
"Now that is a very significant military step for us. to
take; and unless it is accompanied by military action on
their part, dt would create a situation in which they would
be safe and secure and comfortable while sitting there
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sending their men and their arms down the Ho Chi Minh Trail
and across the 17th parallel to attack South Vietnam.
"Q. Is it the shift in position on Hanoi's side in the
terms for the bombing cessation that has caused the shift in
r- our position?
"A. Well, there's no shift in our position. In the sense
that we are prepared to take up political questions through
political channels. We are prepared to deal with military
4 matters as military matters. And we are prepared to discuss
with the other side what action each side might take of a
military character that would move this matter toward peace."
NNW
Secretary Rusk said that the CoMmunist side is waging a "systematic
campaign" to bring about a permanent cessation of U.S. bombing "without
any corresponding military action on their side." He rejected the
January 28 Trinh formulation that stopping the bombing could lead to
talks. The U.S., he declared, is not prepared to end the bombing in
exchange for some "formless" possibility of talks. Before the U.S. will
take such a step, he emphasized, "we must know the military consequences."
March 15, 1967
President Johnson's Nashville Speech.
The central element of this speech was the President's statement
that "reciprocity must be the fundamental principle of any reduction in
hostilities."
"Our Position Today," by Lyndon B. Johnson, President
of the United States, Delivered before the Tennessee -
Legislature, Nashville, Tennessee, March 15, 1967.
"Now this brings me to final point: the peaceful and just
world that we all seek.
"We have just lived through another flurry of rumors of
'peace feelers.' Our years of dealing with this problem have
taught us that peace will not come easily. ?
"Theproblem is a very simple one: It takes two to nego-
tiate at a p,eace table, and Hanoi has just simply refused to
consider 'coming to a .peace. table.
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"I don't believe that our own position on peace. negoti-
ations can be stated any more clearly than I have stated it
many times in the past--or that the distinguished Secretary
of State, Mr. Rusk, or AMbassador Goldberg, Or any number
of other officials have stated it. in every forum that we could
find. But I do want to repeat to you this afternoon and
through you to the people of America the essentials now lest
there be any doubts:
- "The United States representatives are readyat any time
for discussions of the Vietnam problem or any related matter,
with any government or governments, if there is any reason
to believe that these discussions will in any way seriously
advance the cause of peace.
Ne are prepared to go more than halfway and to use any
avenue possible to encourage such discussions, and we have done
that at every opportunity.
"We believe that the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962
could serve as the central elements of a peaceful settlement.
These accords provide in essence that both South and North
Vietnam should be free from external interference, while at
the same time they would be free independently to determine
their positions on the question of reunification.
"We also stand ready to advance toward a reduction of
hostilities without prior agreement. The road to peace
could go from deeds to discussions, or it could start with
discussions and go to deeds.
"We are ready to take either route. We are ready to move
on both of them.
"But reciprocity must be the fundamental principle of any
reduction in hostilities. The United States cannot and will
not reduce its activities unless and until there is some reduc-
tion on the other side. To follow any other rule would be to
violate the trust that we undertake when we ask a man to risk
his life for his country.
"We will negotiate a reduction of the bombing whenever the
Government of North Vietnam is ready, and there are almost
innumerable avenues of communication by which the Government
of North Vietnam can make their readiness known.
"To this date and this hour there has been no sign of
that readiness. Yet we must and we will keep on trying.
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."As I speak to you today, Secretary Rusk and our repre-
sentatives throughout the world are on a constant alert.
Hundreds and hundreds of quiet diplomatic conversations free
from the glare of front-page headlines, of the klieg lights--
these conversations are being held and they will be held on
the possibilities of bringing peace to Vietnam.
"Governor Averell Harriman, with 25 years of experience
in trouble-shooting on the most difficult international prob-
lems that America has ever had, is carrying out my instructions_
that every possible lead, however slight it may first appear, from
any source, public or private, shall be followed up.
"So let me conclude by saying this: I so much wish that
it were within my power to assure that all those in Hanoi
could hear one simple message--America is committed to the
defense of South Vietnam until an honorable peace can be.
negotiated."
April 25-26, 1967
In Stockholm 1266, Cameron cabled that he had given Bergstrom
the text of the Secretary's press conference and the President's Nashville
.speech. On April 26, Cameron cabled (Stockholm 1273) that Bergstrom
and Oberg "seem more inclined than earlier .to accept possibility that
Swedish action on its representation in Saigon now followed by lack of
effective action on 'Russell tribunal' would cause Hanoi toughen its
position 8nd make their efforts establish useful contacts more difficult."
The Swedes, nevertheless, placed increased importance on Delfrage's May '
visit to Warsaw- and said:that "it now even more essential fox -Sweden to
make every effort explore possibilities 'on other side.'"
May 9, 1967
Nilsson-Quang Thu (NVN Ambassador, Bucharest) Conversation.
Nothing new in this contact. Thu merely reemphasized the January 28
Trinh position and Hots letter to the President. The Swedes, however,
showed a strong disposition, as they have done before, to playing very
active role in bringing the two sides together.
STOCKHOLM 1353 (CC) to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
May 9, 1967.
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f
"3. Thu said he had read encouraging reports of Russell
Tribunal meeting Stockholm and that he appreciated GOS atti-
tude toward Viet-Nam issue. This attitude not only expressed
in press but had been shown by Petri talk in Hanoi with Trinh
and Bergstrom's talks in Warsaw.
"4. Nilsson explained Swedish desire explore if in some
way Sweden could help produce contact between warring parties.
"5. Thu stated NVN position is based on Trinh-Burchett
four points and Ho Chi Minh correspondence with President.
It would be, he said, simple to organize a contact if US
would without conditions finally and definitely stop its
bombing of North Viet-Nam. US would gain prestige in eyes of
world. (At this point, Bergstrom said his notes were not
clear, but he believed Thu said "We don't want the Chinese".)
In any event, Thu concluded that West must understand that after
centuries of fighting invaders, such as Chinese and.French,
Vietnamese people will in the end win however big Military
effort US makes.
"6. Nilsson said he did not believe in military solution
but in a political solution which must start somewhere. Thu
said it must startwith bombing stop. Nilsson said he. under-
stood this, but asked was a contact or a dialogue in present
situation at all .'thinkable' if North Viet-Nam did not give any
sign, even the smallest, which US could seize upon? If Sweden
could be of any use, Nilsson concluded, it would be at disposal
both parties.
"T. Nilsson then explained that theoretically speaking he
could conceive of situation under certain ,circumstances where
Sweden might even take responsibility for a position which it
felt convinced about. For instance, if Sweden were convinced
of it, GOS might say that if the South would do one thing, the
North would do another.
"8. Thu concluded that he appreciated Nilsson good will
and-he would carefully and immediately report talk.
"9. Bergstrom also told us that Belfrage trip Warsaw
put off for another ten days or so."
CAMERON
May 10 thru May 18, 1967-
? On 10 May, in Stockholm 1372, Cameron cabled that there may be a serious
problem of maintaining the secrecy of the Swedish contacts in Warsaw. Swedes
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public position on this was to be that the "GOS wanted to be informed of
Hanoi's position on war in Vietnam." The North Vietnamese EMbassy in
Warsaw was evincing some alarm about publicity. The reporter who had the
story was told that publication "would severely limit possibility for
Sweden to be helpful in contributing to peace....
. As an interest aside, Bergstrom asked Cameron, without pressing it,
what he could tell him about the Lewandowski affair. The Hightower
story had recently broken.
On 12 May (Stockholm 1382), Cameron reported that Swedes had been
successful in at least temporarily halting the publication of the story.
On 17 May, in Stockholm 1405, Oberg reported that the only matter
of substance raised in his talk with his North Vietnam contact on May 9-11
was with respect to the 20 April U.S. bombing of Haiphong. The North
Vietnamese contact said this represented a "new stage in war." According
to Oberg, Belfrage planned to fallow up his Bucharest talk when he arrived
in Warsaw. On 18 May, State responded (STATE 197584) that the Swedes should
continue these contacts, divorced from domestic political considerations,
and that they should continue to explore- and clarify Hanoi's attitudes.
May 272 1967
Belfrage-North Vietnam Ambassador, Warsaw Conversation, May 18, 1967.
Nothing new emerged from this contact. The North Vietnamese Ambassador
resisted any thought of reciprocal action from Hanoi. The Swedes warned
of an intensification of the war.
STOCKHOLM 1463 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODTS, ASPEN),
May 27, 1967.
"1. Foreign Ministry Secretary General Belfrage asked
DM to come see him .late afternoon May 26. Bergstrom also
present most of talk.
"2. Belfrage said he wanted give us run-dawn on his talk
with NVN Ambassador in Warsaw May 18 which Belfrage said had
taken place in friendly, quiet atmosphere. Because nothing new
had come out of this conversation he had not called us earlier.
"3. Belfrage said he told NVN Ambassador that he came with
no message. He explained that GOS appreciated opportunity main-
tain contacts with Hanoi through NVN Ambassador.
"4. According Belfrage, NVN Ambassador had repeated well
known Hanoi position. NVN Ambassador said U.S. bombing in north
must cease before there could be 'contacts, talks or negotiations.'
NVN-Ambassador commented that U.S. talks peace but intensifies
the war. He alleged U.S. not sincereabout negotiations and
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cited President's letter to Ho as evidence. NVN Ambassador
asserted it not reasonable for U.S. to ask reciprocal action
from Hanoi; aggressor and victim could not be treated alike.
He told Belfrage NVN would resist.all aggression.
"5. Belfrage said NVN Ambassador seemed particularly
interested in possible effect of increasingly critical inter-
national opinion on U.S. policy in Viet-Nam. Belfrage
acknowledged to him that perhaps international opinion was ?
becoming more critical of U.S. Viet-Nam policy. However, he
said it was Swedish assessment that effect of this development
on U.S.. policy determination should not be overemphasized.
Belfrage said he made this point several times. He told NVN
Ambassador Swedes thought that very large U.S. majority was
behind President Johnson's policy. He also told WIN Ambassador
that since there seemed to be a deadlock in U.S. and. BVN posi-
tions on negotiations, it was Swedish impression that intensi-
fication of the war could be expected."
"10. Belfrage said he had also discussed the Viet-Nam war
with.Rapacki and Winiewicz.- Poles emphasized necessity for
U.S. to stop bombing in North before talks could take place.
Poles also speculated that Hanoi did not understand realities
U.S. political situation. AccordircBelfrage, Poles said they
feared that. escalation of war might bring in Chinese. Bergstrom
injected at this point that Yugoslav Foreign Minister currently
on visit to SWeden had doubted Chinese intervention unless China
itself was touched."
HEATH.
June 20, 1967
STOCKHOLM 1518 to pecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
June 20, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 1463
"1 Oberg (Far East Desk FonMinistry) informed us
June 20 that Petri departing Peking for Hanoi June 21 or
22. He will remain Hanoi until June 21, probably then
returning directly to Peking prior to home leave in
Sweden from early July until September.
"2. Petri had originally requested NVN visa May 29,
explaining he wanted be able bring back latest information
"VT TS - NODIS
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L.
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to Stockholm. He was told June 15 that he could not
be received until 'late July.' On June 19 he was told
by NVN Embasay Peking that he was 'welcome at any time,
in fact right now.'
FonMinistry instructed Petri June 20 that there
was nothing new to say to NVN after Warsaw and Bucharest
conversations, but Petri was to listen to anything NVN
wished to. say or to have him report. These instructions
in accord Petri's own estimate that present time not ripe
for any initiative, according Oberg."
BEATH
June 23, 1967
STATE 215754 to Amembassy STOCKHOLM (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
June 23, 1967.j Ref: Stockholm 1518.
"2. FYI. NVN Ambassador in Peking recently approached
Norwegian Ambassador stressing Hanoi's readiness for 'com-
promises' if negotiations began on basis bombing halt. NVN
Ambassador said he would be making similar approach to
Swedish and Danish colleagues. Without revealing source you
might have opportunity to ascertain whether Petri was in
fact approached along these lines."
KATZENBACH
July, 6, 1967 -
PARIS 244 to SecState (SECRET, NODIS, MARIA THREE),
July 6, 1967.
"3. getri7 met the Soviet Ambassador to Hanoi, Mr.
Tcherbakov, with whom he has some personal ties. He said
that he obtained from him some interesting revelations
regarding the respective influence of the Soviet Union and
China in North Vietnam. While carefully maintaining a
balance between the two communist giants, North Vietnam
relies above all on the Soviet Union. Since Mr. Kosygin's
visit in 1965, the- Soviet Union has promised and furnished
Important, massive assistance on a steady basis. The increased
prestige gained by the Soviet Union because of this assistance
has, according to Mr. Icherbakov, even helped the USSR to
gain. the support of the North Korean Communist Party which has,
since then, drawn progressively further away from China. This
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prestige -continues .to exist among the North Vietnamese
leaders despite the 'Chinese Clan' within the Workers'
Party. Sooner or later the Soviet Union wants-to elim-
inate any kind of North Vietnamese dependence on China,
even if this can only be achieved at the price of estab-
lishing a 'national communism' (in North Vietnam). I trans-
mit these statements-with the usual reservations.
"4. Whatever influence the Soviet Union and China
might, have, the DRV will under no condition accept the
dictation of decisions by these countries in its present
conflict with the US. Mr. Petri drew this conclusion as
result of his contacts with North Vietnamese leaders."
BOHLEN
July 12, 1961.
STOCKHOLM 063 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NOD'S, ASPEN),
July 12, 1967. Ref:. State 215754
"1. Oberg (Far Eastern Desk FonMinistry and currently
aide to FonMinister) gave Plocouns run-down on four Petri
dispatches from Peking on evening July 11 at meeting set
by ()berg. -Despatches dated between June 28 and July 1 and
received in Stockholm morning July 10....
"2. First despatch covered visit to Hanoi which ended
June 27. Petri met DRV FonMinister Trinh and. Deputy Huang
Van Lo (phonetic). At separate interviews both told Petri
-that January statement to Burchett remained DRV position
on negotiations, i.e., bombing of North and.'other acts of
war' must be stopped before talks could begin. Trinh added
that Ho letter to President remained 'road to peace.'
"3. Trinh expressed appreciation of Bucharest talks
(Stockholm 1358) and of Belfrage's 'good' talk in Warsaw
(Stockholm 1463). Trinh also said Russell proceedings in
Stockholm were 'appreciated'by DRV; Petri reported he made
no comment on this last.
"4. Petri told Trinh that he understood that January
statement to Burchett was still valid, and Petri added.
that when bombing stopped, it was important that DRV take
some lpractical step' which could be 'noticed in Washington.'
Trinh did not comment but said he 'understood this way of
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thinking.' Trinh concluded that DRV interested in keeping
open channel to Swedes. Petri who was under instructions
to 'keep a formal line' reciprocated DOS interest in con-
versations with DRV.
?
"5. -Petri's evaluation of foregoing is 'there is no change."
July 13, 1967
? STATE 6375 to Amembassy STOCKHOLM (CONFIDENTIAL, LIMDIS),
July 13, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 065.
"1. Would appreciate your clarifying as soon as possi-
ble with Oberg following points on his conversation with
North Vietnamese representatives at Stockholm Viet-Nam
Conference:
a. Did Nguyen Minh Vy employ term-bombing
'pause' rather than 'cessation', and if so was his use of
this term consistent throughout conversation? If he blurred
distinction between temporary pause and permanent uncon-
ditional cessation as stipulated by DRV Foreign Minister
Trinh January 28, does Oberg think this was by accident
or design?
b. In saying that unconditional bombing stop
is not necessary and all that was needed was 'proof of good
faith', did Vy in ()berg's judgment mean to imply that proof
of good faith could take forms other than unconditional
bombing stop?
c. What was date of ()berg's conversations, and
did .he see two reps separately or together? Why did he
discount significance of their comments?
d. Does Oberg know whether DRV or Front delegates
took similar line with other foreign contacts in Stockholm
inasmuch as our reports indicate uniformly hard line charac-
terized their Statements?
e. Does Oberg have any confirmation of reports he
'cited that conference had been threatened with a split between
NLF and DRY reps on conditions for negotiations?"
? ? ? ?
RU SIC
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July 14, 1967
STATE 7393 to membassy STOCKHOLM (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
July 14, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 063.
"1. We note that Petri makes no particular mention
in his recent dispatches of having had conversations with
North Vietnamese Ambassador Loan. From other sources
we understand Loan was anxious to talk with all Scandinavian
representatives in Peking... .Knowing Petri's reputation for
thorough and meticulous reporting and his good contacts with
many Communist representatives in Peking,. we are somewhat
surprised that by now we have not had some reports froM him
? on Loan."
RUSK (drafted by Isham)
July 15, 1967
Oberg-Vy Conversation.
Oberg clarified Vy's remark to the effect that the word "pause"
was used intentionally throughout the conversation. The North Vietnamese
also told Oberg that negotiations could begin "very soon after a bombing
pause" and that the duration of the pause need not ba announced by the
U.S. in advance. Oberg also reported that rumors of differences between
the NLF and the DRV were being bandied about town.
STOCKHOLM 071 to SecState (SECRET, EXDIS), July 15, 1961.
Ref: State 6375.
"1.
July 11
Oberg gave us July 14 following clarification his
remarks:
A) Vy began by quoting Trinh-Burchett January 28
conversation using term 'permanent unconditional cessation'.
Then Vy switched to term 'pause' and used latter term through-
out conversation. Oberg thinks term 'pause' intentional.
Oaah said negotiations could begin 'very soon after
bombing pause' and duration of pause need not be announced in
advance.
B) Oberg has no indication that say 'US act of
good faith' other then bombing stop would be acceptable to DRV.
C) Date of interview July 11. Vy and Oanh were
together. Oberg feels that their comments were not expressing
a change in policy but in 'nuance' (his word) which might be
more personal than official. He does not take their statements
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, Imre
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to be a signal.
D) Oberg knows of no similar conversation with other
foreign contacts.
E) Oberg has no confirmation of split but heard around
town of disagreement between NLF and DVN over preconditions
for negotiations with FNL taking harder line."
"3. vy and Oanh expressed fear US will bomb Red River
Delta dams during rainy season causing 1 to 1.5 million dead
plus additional 500 thousand refugees. Bombing would be
blamed on mistake but would really be by design because US
has run out of military targets in NVN. Even such losses
would not weaken NVN resolve. Oberg said hehad spoken to
General 'Big' Minh a few years ago who had cited same figures.
Oberg passed Vy-Oanh prediction to Swedish Foreign Minister
Nilsson who made no comment."
HEATH
July 18, .1967
STOCKHOLM 083 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
July 18, 1967. Ref: State 7393.
"Oberg told Embassy officer July 18- that he was not . .
aware any recent conversations between DRV Ambassador Loan
and Swedish Ambassador Petri. ? In next few days Oberg will
have opportunity check this point with Petri who is in
'Sweden on leave. Oberg will then get in touch with us.".
HEATH
? July 20, 1967
STOCKHOLM 094 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
July 20, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 083.
"Oberg told us July 19 that DRY Ambassador Loan made
a courtesy call on Petri on June 1, but according Petri
nothing repeat nothing of interest was discussed. Petri
told Oberg that Loan called upon Norwegian and Danish
Ambassadors about the same time."
HEATH.
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72
L..
NeilV
t Ntirl
11
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August 1, 1967
The Swedes began to push two lines of thought: (1) that the DRV
had softened its position on talks and was not now demanding a public
U.S. statement that the bombing cessation be unconditional; (2) that
Hanoi was no longer using intractible language on the issue of reciprocity,
but was stating that they "understand" the U.S. position.
STOCKHOLM 116 to SecState (TOP SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
August 1, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 094.
1. In a call August 1 on Oberg at Foreign Ministry
abOut.another matter, Oberg raised subject of Viet-Nam..
He said that in recent talks with Petri (who is in Sweden
on leave) an attempt had been made to assess significance
Petri's last talks in Hanoi. Oberg said Swedes think they
have detected that North Vietnamese may have shifted their
position somewhat concerning preconditions for 'talks' which
might lead to negotiations. Oberg was Imprecise in explaining
this shift and he turned aside repeated efforts to clarify
his language.
"2. Oberg said that Swedes do not believe that DRV demands,
public statement by U.S. that a bombing stop is unconditional
for such a stop to lead to 'talks.' The U.S. could let Hanoi
know this privately.
"3. In respect to U.S. demand for DRV reciprocity, for
bombing stop, the DRV position has softened somewhat, he
said. Whenever Swedes explained U.S. demand for reciprocity from
DRV in the past, Hanoi answered 'why should we reciprocate,
we are not bombing Washington. In recent talks, however, North
Vietnamese told Petri they 'understand' U.S. position on recip-
rocity. Oberg said Swedes interpret this to mean that DRV
might be prepared take reciprocal action in a way U.S. would
understand but not in a way which would cause DRV lose face
publicly."
? ? ?
HEATH
h, mm ?m, ?m
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I 23
Nare
L.
L.,
F'
vow
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September 27,. 1967
Rusk-Nilsson Conversation. Memorandum of Conversation (Sent
USUN 10)6), Subject: The Secretary and Swedish Foreign Minister
Nilsson's Discussion Regarding Vietnam, Wednesday, September 27,
1967, 3:30 P.M. USUN. Participants: U.S.: The Secretary,
Mr. Glitman (notetaker), Mr. Clement (Interpreter); Foreign:
Foreign Minister Nilsson, Ambassador deBesche, Mr. Bergstrom
(Director- General for Political Affairs, MFA), Mr. Oberg
(Chef de Cabinet)
' -
Mr. Nilsson called at his request. He said he preferred
to open the conversation by reading the attached paper con-
cerning recent Swedish contacts with Hanoi, because the sub- ?
ject was important and required precision.
ATTACHMENT QUOTE.
I. Since we last met a year ago,,the Swedish
Government has been in contact with the North
Vietnamese Government through new visits to
Hanoi made by the Swedish Ambassador in Peking,
Mr. Lennart Petri, as well as through frequent
meetings in Warsaw between Swedish diplomats
sent from Stockholm and representatives of the
North Vietnamese Embassy there. Earlier this
year, in connection with an official visit to
Romania, I myself had a conversation with the
North Vietnamese Ambassador in Bucharest about
the whola Vietnam issue. These contacts have been
of an informative character and have mainly aimed
at keeping the Swedish Government continuously
informed about Hanoi's views on the conflict in
Vietnam.
11. In Hanoi, as well as in Warsaw, representatives
of the North Vietnamese Government have referred
to the interview of January 28 this year, granted
by the North Vietnamese Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Nguyen Duy Trinh, to the Australian
journalist Wilfred Burchett, where Mr. Trinh said
that talks could take place between North Vietnam
and the United States provided the bombing of -North
Vietnamese territory and all other acts of war
against North Vietnam are ended unconditionally
and definitely.
In Warsaw, on September 7, the North Viet-
namese Ambassador told a Swedish diplomat that
"North Vietnam desired to start talks with the
United States." He added "that such contact could
take place as soon as the bombing of the North had
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stopped and the North Vietnamese Government
had been convinced that the cessation of the
bombing was unconditional and definite." The '
Ambassador added that "this he could assure with-
out consulting his Government."
During Ambassador Petri's latest visit to
Hanoi in June this year, the North Vietnamese
Foreign Minister Mr. Trinh confirmed that "North
Vietnam was prepared to begin talks with the
United States if the bombing and other acts of
war against North Vietnam were stopped, but net
previously."
On his return to Peking 8 few weeks ago,
Ambassador Petri got in touch with the North
Vietnamese Charge' d'Affaires there. Yesterday,
the North Vietnamese Charge d'Affaires in Peking
said to Ambassador Petri, acting upon instruction,
that the declaration of Foreign Minister Trinh
of January 28 was still valid: preparedness for
talks but only after unconditional and definite
cessation of American acts of war against North
Vietnam. He added that the United States claimed
they desired peace and negotiations but were,
instead, increasing the escalation of the war.
III Although, Of course, there can be no certainty
in matters of this kind, it is my feeling that
the North Vietnamese Government is, in fact,
seriously interested to engage in talks with
the U.S. Government. Therefore, a cessation of
the bombing might be a decisive step towards a
negotiated solution of the conflict in Vietnam.
I am fully aware that the U.S. Government has
always requested some form of assurance that a
cessation of the bombing be followed by some
reciprocal move from the other side-: Mr. Trinh
said in Hanoi to our Ambassador that he under-
stood-the importance the U.S. Government attaches
to the question of reciprocity. Even if no
precise reciprocal step has been indicated during
Ambassador Petri's talks in Hanoi, his view is
that some concrete act of reciprocity can be
expected after the cessation of the bombing.
IV. After his last visit to Hanoi, AMbassador Petri
has a general impression that Hanoi is expecting
an intensification of the war from the American
side and prepares for a lengthy war.
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NIMPF
V. It is my intention to instruct Ambassador Petri
? to make a new visit to Hanoi. I would, of course,
highly appreciate any information or clarification as
regards the situation in Vietnam that you would care
. to give me.
ATTACHMENT END QUOTE
"Following Nilsson's presentation the Secretary said
he had been particularly interested in the sentence which
stated that North VietNamese Foreign Minister Trinh had
told Swedish Ambassador Petri that Hanoi understood the
importance the U.S. attaches to reciprocal action on the
r-
part of North VietNam in connection with a halt in the
bombing. He asked whether Mr. Nilsson could provide any
further details on this point.
"Mr. Nilsson said he had already asked Ambassador Petri
for more. details but Petri had replied he did not believe
.he could obtain specific details. However, Petri said he
was absolutely convinced Hanoi would take reciprocal steps
if the US stopped the bombing.
"The Secretary said the US also has contacts with Hanoi
and it is the U.S. impression that reciprocal action would
not follow upon a cessation of the bombing. Indeed, the
U.S. has never succeeded in Obtaining a specific statement
regarding what steps Hanoi would take if the U.S. stopped
the bombing. Moreover, captured North VietNamese documents
talk of a fighting/negotiating strategy. The U.S. could
not accept an arrangement under which it stopped the bombing
and negotiated while North VietNam negotiated and continued
fighting.
"The question of reciprocity is vital. The U.S. had
said it would take the first step but it could not accept
a permanent and unconditional cessation of the bombing
without knowing what steps Hanoi would take. Hanoi, he
added, in response to Mr. Nilsson's question, had indi-
cated a halt in the bombing must be accompanied by a clear
statement that it was permanent.
"No one, the Secretary said, has been able to tell
us what Hanoi would do if we stopped bombing. Indeed,
the U.S. has not found anyone who can even tell us if
their view would change should we take this step. Would
Sweden, he asked support us if we stopped bombing and
Hanoi continued the war?
"Sweden is a small country Mr. Nilsson replied. How-
ever, Sweden would ask Hanoi to begin negotiations and to
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take reciprocal action of the U.S, stopped bombing. Sweden
wants to see the war ended because it is disturbed that the
U.S. has.suffered a loss of good will in Scandanavia and
because it is concerned over the deterioration in relations
between the U.S. and the USSR caused by the war.
r-
"No one wants peace more than President Johnson the
Secretary replied,?but the U.S. cannot purchase a temporary
improvement in relations by abandoning its commitments.
The issue involves more than VietNam for it also embraces
; Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and Korea. The fundamental
point in the matter, he continued is that the U.S. maintains
the same standard of fidelity in the Pacific as it does in
NATO. We have no master race theory which permits us to
be loyal in Europe and disloyal in Asia.
t. ?
"The alternative to the maintenance of our commitment,
the Secretary said, is isolationism. The same senators who
oppose U.S. involvement in VietNam also oppose U.S. presence
in Europe and interest in theMdddle East.
- "The Secretary said he appreciated Sweden's interest
in attempting te bring an end to the VietNam war. The
Swedish paper merited a considered written reply. His
comment during the discussion regarding the points raised
In the paper should not, therefore, be taken as definitive
and repeated to Hanoi. The Secretary said he would have to
consult with the President- but he hoped he could respond
before Mr. Nilsson returned to Sweden on October 7.
"The Secretary also suggested the Swedish Government
provide the U.S. with three or four days advance notifica-
tion of Ambassador Petri's next trip to Hanoi, since the
U.S. might be able to provide the Ambassador with some
useful information- Mr.. Nilsson said AMbassador Petri's
next visit to Hanoi would probably take place in October
or November. The Swedish Government would give the exact
date to the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm. Mr. Nilsson noted
that Hanoi had shown an interest in using the Swedish
channel for communicating with the U.S. and said he hoped
Sweden could continue to play a useful role in this regard.
"The conversation ended on the same note of cordiality
which had marked its entire course."
October 12, 1967
? On 6 October, Secretary Rusk approved a response to the conversation
'gime
in the form of a written message delivered to Nilsson before his departure
on 7 October. The key element in this written message was an elaboration
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177
Iwo
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and explanation of the meaning of the Ban Antonio formula. The message
made clear that "no advantage" has Irlot been posed as a 'condition,' but
rather as a self-evident description of the state of affairs that would
evidence good faith in both sides-" No advantage...would require
restraint from Hanoi, but this might fall short of total cessation of
arms dispatch and infiltration into South Vietnam." It should be noted
that this interpretation of "no advantage" was not the same as the one
given to the Rumanians on 1 November. This latter transmission talked
about "not increasing," and added the ho "attack /of7 forces from north
of the DMZ." The "no advantage" message to the Swedes was one, in a series
of many different explanations of the San Antonio speech.
STATE 54361 to Amembassy Stockholm (SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
12 October 1967.
"4. During this conversation the Secretary made a
number- of observations on the main points raised by the
Foreign Minister!s paper. We would have nothing to add
to his comments at this time beyond reaffirming the impor-
tance ,of eliciting any additional details on Foreign
Minister Trinh's remark to Ambassador Petri in June that
Hanoi 'understood' the importance the United -States
attaches to reciprocal action on the part of North Viet-
namese in connection with a halt in the bombing. We
note Ambassador Petri's view that some concrete act of
reciprocity can be expected after the Cessation of the
bombing, even if Foreign Minister Trinh gave no precise
indication that Hanoi was considering taking such a step, and
we would of course always be keenly interested in any new
evidence which Ambassador Petri might obtain from North
Vietnamese officials which would bear out his view.
"5. Since the Secretary's conversation with Foreign
Minister Nilsson, President Johnson in his speech of
September 29 has set forth our willingness immediately to
stop aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this
will lead promptly to productive discussions. As the Foreign
Minister will have seen from this speech, as well as from
Ambassador Goldberg's September 21 speech at-the United
Nations,.we are interested in two points whether there
-would-be productive discussions, and whether we could
reasonably assume that Hanoi would not take advantage of a
bombing stoppage. The latter. point has not been posed as
a 'condition,' but rather as a self-evident description of
a state of affairsthat would evidence good faith on both
sides. Foreign Minister Nilsson may note that the desired
no advantage' situation would require restraint from Hanoi,
but this might fall short, of total cessation of arms dispatch
and infiltration to South Viet-Nam. If Hanoi were prepared
'141110V to consider such a Cessation, a balanced arrangement, not only
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stopping the bombing but also cessation of reinforcement
by United States and others, would be possible. But
there remains the possibility that Hanoi might be pre--
pared to agree to some lesser restraint, in return for
stopping the bombing only, that could comprise, an
effective 'no disadvantage' situation.
"6. If Ambassador Petri could elicit any precise
information on Hanoi's position concerning these points
during his forthcoming visit to Hanoi, this could?beof
the greatest importance. As the Secretary remarked at the
conclusion of the conversation, we would hope that we could
be informed in advance of the timing of Ambassador Petri's
next visit to Hanoiso that we might consider whether we could
submit any additional points to make during his discussions
with North Vietnamese officials."
RUSK (drafted by isham)
c*,
October 26, 1967
STOCKHOLM 423 to SecState (SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
October 26, 1961. Ref: State 54361.
"1. At lunch at my residence October 26 Nilsson
and Bergstrom told me that latter had. returned from
Warsaw October 23. In Warsaw Bergstrom had seen North
Vietnamese Ambassador and had conveyed to him summary of
Swedish presentation to Secretary Rusk (State 5)4-361) and
summary substantive points of Secretary's reply (State
5418)1-). In addition Bergstrom gave summary Swedish
impressions US attitudes.
"2. Bergstrom said dominant impression he got from
North Vietnamese in Warsaw was that they wanted to find
face saving formula which will allow them to come to
negotiating table.
"3. Bergstrom said North Vietnamese Ambassador
?showed definite interest in clarification of 'no disadvan-
tage' situation. In one and a- half hour conversation North
Vietnamese Ambassador returned continually to this point.
Bergstrom said he felt diffident about attempting an
explication of this point and therefore did not go very far."
"6. Nilsson said Petri would probably be going to
Hanoi this .fall. Foreign Minister promised let us know
in advance."
HEATH
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ver,
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November 41 1967
A Bergstrom-Heath conversation on three successive days did much
to cloud the Swedish role. Bergstrom tried to argue that recent Swedish
government denunciations of US policy in Vietnam did not inpair the
Swedish negotiating role, but, in fact, strengthened it. He tried to
explain recent GUS actions as Sweden's way of extricating sinking U.S.
prestige in the world over Vietnam and avoiding further U.S. escalation
along the Chinese border. He added that his government "are convinced
NVN interested in negotiations or at least talks preliminary to negoti-
ations." On instructions, Bergstrom pressed very hard for a Nilsson
interview with President Johnson. He warded this effort off strongly.
STOCKHOLM 456 to SecState (SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN), 3 Sections,
November 3., 1967 (rec'd 0332 4 Nov 67) Ref: Stockholm 423.
Section 1
113. Bergstrom then repeated his impression of keen
North Vietnamese interest in clarification 'no disadvantage'
situation as evidenced NVN Ambassador in Warsaw (Stockholm
423). Bergstrom said FonMin Nilsson would therefore like to
discuss clarification with Secretary.
"4. Nilsson was thinking in terms of going back to UN
soon for week or ten days, ostensibly for UN reasons but
really to go from there to Washington, if appointment could
be arranged with Secretary...."
"6. At November 1 meeting... .Bergstrom then said that
he, FonMin and PriMin had reviewed November 1 history of
their contacts with NVN (i.e. Aspen history) and agreed latest
Warsaw conversation most hopeful. They are convinced NVN
interested in negotiations or at least talks preliminary to
negotiations. Therefore Nilsson was requesting appointment
with Secretary (through de Besche) and he repeatedly said
PriMin would like, me to personally arrange for Nilsson an
appointment with President for two reasons:
A) This would convince North Vietnamese that they were
receiving latest US position from highest authority;
B) The President might make a more liberal clarification
of US conditions than Secretary Rusk.
"7. Upon inquiry as to timing of proposed visit, he
insisted it must .be prior to their Poland and Moscow visits.
I replied I must be frank?while the decision obviously was
not mine, I personally felt that for President Johnson so
soon after PriMin, FonMin and party's bitter denunciations
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f'.
L.
Noe
Nom"
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1
of USA and PriMin's public association of Swedish Govern-
ment with North Viet-Nam (NLF) seemed to me incompatible
and possibly could be used either for their political
advantage and our resulting disadvantage in their 'balancing
act' of on the one hand catering to our enemies by abusing
us and immediately thereafter proving to our friends in
Sweden and the world thatthey must be all right after all
because their FonMin had been .received by our President
at White House...."
Section 2
111. Next morning November 2 Bergstrom called and said
he had just reported our latest conversation and they decided.
not to rush things but would now have de Besche see if Secre-
tary were available in 'next several weeks' for discussion
with Nilsson. On other matter (i.e., Presidential appointment)
they thought I should wait and they would call me when they
had appointment with Secretary. He indicated concern Secre-
tary not think 'they were trying to go round State to
President.'
"12. This morning, Nov 3, Bergstrom telephoned again
and said 'they' had talked with de Besehe again last night,
that Secretary Rusk had kindly agreed to see FonMin Nilsson
on date not yet determined probably around Nov 13 or 1)1, that
Bergstrom and Nilsson were leaving for UN Tuesday, Nov 7,
returning in time for the Polish and Moscow trips, that upon
reflection they had concluded it best Cor FonMin to request
directly of Secretary Rusk that he arrange appointment with
President Johnson, and that therefore my further helpfulness
in that regard would not be needed...."
Section 3
"13. Comment:- A) I have strong doubts about meaningful
response from North Vietnamese through Ambassador in Warsaw.
(B) I am also aware that while Swedes profess to want to keep
(1). their criticism of us on Viet-Nam and (2) their negoti-
ation efforts in separate watertight compartments, this would
not be possible in case of high level Washington visits....
(C) I am also Somewhat concerned over vagueness of exact NVN
'interest' in these 'clarifications.'"
"16. However, I assume Department does not want to
allow any possibility for peace in Viet-Nam to go unexplored
and therefore I recommend that if possible the Secretary agree
to see Nilsson and offer him such clarifications as may be
possible....
"17. I think we should not seek to involve the President
in this exercise at this time...."
HEATH
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NW-
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November 7,- 1967
STATE 66424 to membassy Stockhoim-(SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
November 7, 1967. Ref: Stockholm 423, 456.
"1. We think that you took exactly right line in
speaking frankly to Dergstrom,...You should know that de
Besche, under instructions, told us and White House that
you had recommended to Nilsson that he call on the Presi-
dent. This distortion your views did not succeed.
Appointment will not rptnot be made. However, Secretary
will receive Minister at 12:15, November 15."
RUSK (drafted by Isham)
November 21,, 1967
STOCKHOLM 511 to SecState (SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
November 21, 1967.
"1. Oberg reports he is going to Warsaw November 24,.
as Bergstrom apparently told Assistant Secretary Bundy
November 18.
"2.Ob&rg, Bergsirom and Nilsson due in Moscow November 26."
HEATH
November 234 1967
FonMin Nilsson met with Secretary Rusk on 16 November. He recapi-
tulated recent contacts in Warsaw, adding that the North Vietnam
Ambassador had remarked that a "new element" may have been introduced if
the President's "no advantage" formula indicated that the U.S. was dropping
its demand for reciprocity.
In this cable, which is a. response to the Nilsson memorandum, U.S.
set out three basic elements for getting talks started: (1) "any contact
at any :time without any conditions"; (2)"contacts accompanied only by
a modest and unpublicized reduction in the level of areas of bombing";.
(3) the San Antonio formula
In thiS message, State also inquired into three general areas of
Hanoi's position: (1) the public description of a bombing cessation;
(2) the nature of the talks that would follow; (3) Hanoi's understanding
of "no advantage," Illustrative examples of "no advantage" were given,
and special emphasis was addressed to the DMZ situation. It seemed clear
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that State was asking two things: .(1) Did Hanoi understand what the U.S.
meant by "no advantage?" and (2) What would Hanoi do to demonstrate that
understanding?
STATE 73693 to Amembassy Stockholm (SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
November 23, 1967.
"1. - During November 16 meeting with Secretary,
Nilsson presented memorandum recapitulating what Swedes
had already told you about October 22 discussions in
Warsaw between Bergstrom and North Vietnamese Ambassador.
Nilsson added no new details except for North Vietnamese
Ambassador's remark that 'new element' might have been,
introduced if formulation on 'no advantage' indicated
elimination of reciprocity. In addition, Nilsson passed
on subsequent comment by North Vietnamese Embassy Warsaw
official on October 28 who said intensification of bombing
in Hanoi area had affected general atmosphere in negative way,
while at same time Stating that what was said during October 22
conversation 'continued to be relevant.'"
following message to Nilsson from
....The .observations which follow
Bundy, with my approval, told
November 18.
"3. Please convey
Secretary: BEGIN TEXT
will summarize what Mr.
Ambassador Bergstrom on
"4. There are three basic elements in our position with
respect to getting talks started. . Consistent with the
President's statement of April 7, 1965, we are prepared to
have any contact at any time without any conditions. Second,
we are prepared to consider at any time possible contacts
accompanied only by a modest and unpublicized reduction in
the level or areas of bombing. We would be impressed by some
corresponding action on the other side, but this is not to be:
understood as imposing a condition. Third, there is the
President's San Antonio proposal to which. I referred in my
message of October 6. In addition, there are three points
which call for clarification.
5. First, how is a cessation of bombing to be described
publicly, and what is to be the private understanding of this
term? On the basis of Hanoi's position as formulated in the
January 28, 1967 interview of Foreign Minister Trinh with .
Wilfred Purchett, we are bound to interpret Hanoi's terms as
requiring that the cessation be permanent and be characterized
as permanent It would be useful to know whether this is
what Hanoi means or whether there is some other condition
attached.
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"6. The second point turns on the nature of any talks
tat might take place following such a cessation, however defined.
What degree of assurance would there be that talks would actu-
ally take place? How soon would they take place following a
bombing cessation? How serious or productive would they be?
Our own viewpoint on these questions is clear: We would expect
our representatives to sit down somewhere for hard discussions
of the main issues covering all points the other side wished
to discuss.
"7.
The third point relates to the understanding of a
no advantage' situation, as described in the President's San
Antonio speech and in my October -6 message to you in connection,
with a bombing cessation and the start of talks. One way to.
clarify this is in terms of questions that I emphasize are
illustrative of examples only. What would happen with respect
to the flow of supplies and men into South Viet-Nam and to
positions directly threatening South Viet-Nam? For example,
if following a cessation or limitation of bombing, there was
a marked increase in the flow of trucks southward; if a new
North Vietnamese regiment Wre to appear;- or if we saw a
massive increase in the flow of supplies just to the north of
the DMZ, we would be negatively impressed. Similarly, to take
another example, we would want to know what would happen with
respect to the three North Vietnamese Divisions now in the area
of the Demilitarized Zone which have been employed as part of
offensive operations against our forces south of the DMZ.
Would artillery located north of the demarcation line be employed
against our forces? And, if so, would we be expected not to
bomb these artillery positions?
"8. These questions are, of course, not easy ones to
answer. Nevertheless, we believe they are central to an
accurate understanding of what is involved on both sides. We
would be grateful for any clarification that you might be able
to obtain through your contacts with North Vietnamese repre-
sentatives on these matters."
(Drafted by Isharn)
December 9, 1967
Oberg indicated ?to Cameron that the "Swedes would probably back us
if Hanoi failed respond bombing halt, although ?berg talked in terms 6-8
weeks grace period for Hanoi response." Oberg told us this, and that he
would be going to Warsaw to meet the DRV Ambassador in a week's time. ----
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t ?
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f
STOCKHOLM 585 to SecState (SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
December 9, 1967.
"1. Oberg (FonMin's aide) told EMbOff Dec. 8 he leaving
for Paris Dec. 10 Council Europe Ministerial Meeting and fr.om
there going Warsaw Dec. 15 or 16 to meet DRV Ambassador who is
now in Hanoi.
"2. Oberg plans give DRV Ambassador verbatim examples
no-advantage situations outlined Secretary's reply to
Nilsson paper (State 73693).
"3. Oberg summed up Swedish view DRV attitudes:
A) DRV expects levelling Hanoi, Haiphong; bombing,
dikes and invasion NVN; plans made for movement government
from Hanoi.
B) DRV really has no expectations US elections will
change anything;
C) Swedes still see split between DRV and NFL, with
specific point being absencq, reunification plank in NPL's new
programs first phase.
"4. In Moscow (reported Stockholm 580 and being amplified
in follow-up telegram) Soviets were persistent in stressing
Hanoi's independence.
"5. Oberg repeated point made pare 2 D) Stockholm 580 that
Swedes would publicly back us if Hanoi failed respond bombing
halt, although Oberg talked in terms of 6-8 weeks grace period
for Hanoi response:
"6. Petri not rpt not planning go Hanoi in immediate
future unless something worthwhile develops...." .
CAMERON
December 21, 1967
STOCKHOLM 590 to SecState (SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
Ref: Stockholm 511.
"To complete record, Oberg (FohMin's aide) told EmbOff
Dec 8 that his meeting with DRV Ambassador in Warsaw Nov 24
was 'routine contact.' DRV Ambassador did re-state his
interest in 'no advantage situation.' Oberg did not have
Secretary's reply to Nilsson's paper (State 73693) giving
examples of 'no advantage situation' at that time."
CAMERON
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January 3, 1968
Bundy-de Besche Conversation.
I'
I I Be Besche indicated to Bundy that the North Vietnamese Charge said
he would promptly pass the illustrative examples of "no advantage" to
Hanoi. He also asked for Bundy's interpretation of the 29 December 1967
Trinh statement. Bundy indicated there was in fact a change from "could"
,
tp "will," that there might be a change in talking about the bombing
luse as unconditional rather than permanent, but that this was not clear,
?f- and that Trinh was still silent on "no advantage," and Trinh's emphasis
i
, on the 4 points and the NLF program still indicated hard line.
STATE 93140 to Amembassy Stockholm (SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
January 3, 1967.
*se'
72. ....Nilsson has instructed Oberg to travel to
Warsaw (probably January )4) to obtain exact text of statement
from North Vietnamese. Foreign Office queried whether US
desired to transmit any questions at this time or otherwise
seek clarification of Trinh statement.
"3. In reply Bundy said that while we were obviously
interested in obtaining any clarification of what might
underly Trinh statement, choice of available channels and
timing of their use required greatest possible care and
precision in order to avoid creating confusion. Moreover,
it would in any event be difficult to frame careful and
precise questions in short time remaining before ()berg's
departure for Warsaw. At, this juncture, Bundy said, we
r" would not therefore there be inclined to ask GOS to put
any specific questions to North Vietnamese which could be
construed as coming from us. Bundy said he would check this
with Secretary and be in touch with de Besche; this position
was later confirmed and de Besche informed. Bundy noted that
the Swedish Government could of course seek any clarification
on its own behalf. Be Besche accepted this and promised to
keep us informed.
"4. In response to de Besche's request for interpretation of
latest Trinh statement, Bundy commented:
(a) use of verb 'will' in context of talks was plainly
a change from previous Trinh formulation of Icouldl;
(b) use of term 'unconditionally' rather than
'permanently' or /definitively' could be construed as a more
gentle formulation, although it was not yet possible to draw
any clear conclusions on this point, particularly because of
the reference in the latest statement to the January 28, 1967
Trinh interview which with accompanying Hanoi commentary posed
condition of permanent cessation;
?
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(c) Trinh remained silent on issue of mutual
restraint or 'no advantage', although Bundy noted one
would not necessarily expect this to be covered by public,
statement; and
(d) Hanoi's basic hard line reflected in.Trinh's
emphasis on Hanoi's Four Points and NLF political program
as the basis for Viet-Nam solution.
"5. In short, Bundy commented that questions eontained
in Secretary's memorandum to Nilsson remained highly relevant.
"6. Foregoing drafted before receipt of Stockholm 662.
Oberg's detailed report of conversation with North Vietnamese
Charge is most useful 'and it appears clear that Foreign Office
is not yet providing de Besche with as much detail as Oberg
is conveying directly to us in Stockholm.
"7, We would in any event prefer that Oberg or his
superiors be authoritative spree of such reporting."
RUSK (drafted by Isham)
January 4, 1968
Report on Oberg-Warsaw Talk of December 21-22, 1967.
Before describing his conversation in Warsaw, Oberg said that
verbatim- examples of "no advantage" situations as outlined in State 73693
have been given to the DRV Ambassador without comment. Obergalsonoted
that during Nilsson's recent visit to Moscow, the Soviets were no longer
urging the Swedes to play an intermediary role. The Swedes -inferred from
this that the Soviets were pessimistic about chances for peace.
In response to illustrative examples of "no advantage" the DRV
Charge made three points. (1) How would the bombing pause be described?
(2) "We cannot leave our brothers in the South unprotected;" (3)- What
would productivity and seriousness of negotiations mean? His second
point indicated that either he had not understood the "no advantage"
formula or that he was referring to the NLF rather than NVN troops.
STOCKHOLM 662 to SeeState (SECRET, NODIS, ASPEN),
January 4, 1968. Ref: Stockholm 649.
"3. Oberg saw Charge Vu Bach Mai (Oberg's spelling)
Dec 21 and handed over paper described Para 2A. Paper had been
translated into French; illustrative examples Para 7 State 13693
were also given in.English.
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"4. NVN Charge raised three points which Oberg on
instructions refused to discuss saying that Swedes had
this paper from US aide and that Swedes not competent
go beyond what was in paper.
"5.- Three points NVN Charge raised were:
A. Did Swedes have any suggestions on how to
describe bombing pause?
B. On question of flow of material in no-advantage
sitUa7tion Charge said 'we cannot leave our brothers in the South
unprotected.' It was not clear to Oberg whether he was referring
to NI' in South Vietnam or to supplies to NVN troops north of
DMZ.- (Oberg commented that in his contacts NVN representatives
never referred presence NVN troops in South Vietnam.)
C. On question seriousness of negotiations Charg
said this was unclear to him. In any negotiation both sides
started from positions widely. apart and with quite different
alms.. In such cases there would be different interpretation
of 'serious or productive.'"
"7. ()berg's general impression vide from fact that paper
had been well received was that Charge seemed much more relaxed
than Ambassador and much less dogmatic. He also seemed much
better informed on conditions in US and seems to have no illusions
that election year *would make any difference or that American
domestic differences over Vietnam would seriously influence
policy.
In Jan 2 conversation Oberg did not mention any
further Swedish move at this time presumably because Foreign
Ministry thinks NVN may comment on paper. However, Oberg
called Jan 3 to say he was returning to Warsaw Jan 4 on Foreign
Minister's instructions to attempt to get clarification and
text Trinh statement on Hanoi radio. Be Besche being instructed
inform Department of this and to say that Swedes do not consider
it connected to Aspen operation."
CAMERON.
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February 16J968
The Swedes Wormed Heath that they were expecting a visit from
the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow. The North Vietnamese
Ambassador was scheduled to arrive in Stockholm on February 20.
(STOCKHOLM 877)
YAoruary lZ4_1968
The Swedes were given the same private statement of the U.S. position
as had been given to the Norwegians to use in their talks with the North
rietnamese Ambassador to Moscow.
"The U.S., consistent with President Johnson's statement
of April 7, 1965, remains willing to enter into talks without
preconditions at any time.
"The U.S. position on the cessation of the bombardment of
North Viet-Nam is set forth in President Johnson's September 29,
1967 speech in San Antonio. As tae President said:
'The U.S. is willing to stop all aerial and naval
bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this will lead promptly
to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that
while discussions proceed, North Viet-Nam would not take
advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation.'
"The U.S. is not assuming that North Viet-Nam will cease its
support to its forces in the South. On the contrary, as Secretary
of Defense designate Clark Clifford testified before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, we assume that until a cease fire
is agreed on, Hanoi 'will continue to transport the normal amount
of goods, men and munitions.'
"In setting forth its assumption, the U.S. is not setting a
condition but attempting to make clear to North Viet-Nam that
any cessation of U.S. bombing followed by actions by Hanoi taking
advantage of the cessation (such as an increase by Hanoi of its
infiltration of men and supplies or attacks in the area of the
DMZ) would constitute such bad faith on Hanoi's part as to make
continued U.S. forebearance impossible. If Hanoi, by taking
advantage, forces the U.S. to resume bombing the possibilities of
a negotiated solution would drastically recede. Under such
circumstances calls for intensified U.S. military action would
increase and the possibility of another halt in the bombing would
be low. The U.S. is trying to ascertain whether Hanoi appreciates
this vital fact and fully understands the importance the U.S.
attaches to the no-advantage assumption.
59 TS - NODIS
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"At San Antonio the President, in addition to setting forth
his assumption, stated his readiness to stop the bombing when such
action would lead 'promptly to productive discussions.' 'Productive
discussions' are serious exchanges in which either side will be
able to put forward for full consideration in good faith its p05?-
tion on any matter. 'Prompt' of course refers to a willingness by
Hanoi to begin discussions with the U.S. immediately after cessation
of bombing.
"It is worth noting that Hanoi is unwilling to give a clear
response to questions as to the length of time between a U.S.
bombing cessation and the beginning of talks. If Hanoi were
-serious in desiring talks then surely its response would have
been one of unequivocal readiness to begin immediately.
"The U.S. evaluation of Hanoi's -current position takes into
account Hanoi's actions as well as its words. The unprecedented
offensive against most of South Viet-Nam's urban centers, which
Hanoi treacherously launched in the midst of the traditional Tet
holidays, causing widespread- civilian casualties and suffering,
was made notwithstanding the fact that we were still exploring with
Hanoi its position through diplomatic channels, and that we had
exercised restraint in bombing targets in the immediate vicinity
of Hanoi and Haiphong. In this context, we cannot but weigh
Hanoi's words with great skepticism and caution. These actions
carry a harsh political message.
"The U.S.- favors every effort to obtain clarification of Hanoi's
position. We shall continue to evaluate all information and to
pursue every possible avenue which promises to bring us closer to
the resolution of this conflict through serious negotiations."
(State 117383)
February 20 1968
Petri suggested that he visit Hanoi on February 22 and his Foreign
Ministry had given approval. The Swedes said there was nothing special.
about the date or the visit, merely that "it was time for him to go to
Hanoi again.' Cameron suggested that the Swedes defer the Petri/Oberg
trip to Hanoi until after the North Vietnamese Stockholm visit.
(STOCEHOLM 883).
February 23, 1968
Foreign Office Political Director Wachtmeister told Heath that he
believed the North Vietnamese Ambassador's "main purpose for Stockholm
visit was to impres Swedes with North Vietnam's 'self-confidence' in its
position." (STOCKHOLM 896) ?
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February 24 1968
Foreign Minister Nilsson sent Heath a "short account" of his talks
with the North Vietnamese Ambassador. The Ambassador, Mr. Chan, elab-
orated on the Trinh statement of December 29.
"Mr. Chan repeated the statement of his Foreign Minister
of January 1967 and of the 29th of December 1967. He thus
repeated that negotiations would begin as soon as the United
States had proved that it has stopped all bombardments and
all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam. He specified 'all other acts of war' to mean that
no airplanes were permitted to fly over DRV territory and no
naval vessels were to have their guns or other weapons directed
against DRV territory after that had been done, the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam would negotiate with the United States
about relevant questions. The Ambassador in this connection
also referred to Foreign Minister Trinh's statement of the 8th
of February 1968, to the effect that the Vietnam conflict had
to be solved on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreements and that
negotiations could begin as soon as the United States had shown
that it would stop the bombardments of North Vietnam and all
other actions of war against the DRV. He mentioned a delay of
some three weeks 'or less'."
(STOCKHOLM 901)
K, TS - NODIS
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VINVAlASNN3d
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
? Office of
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
August 2, 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE
EYES ONLY PARTICIPANTS .
FROM: S/AH - Chester L. Cooper
SUBJECT: Visit to Hanoi by Two Unofficial
French Representatives
Early in June a small group of Pugwash participants
met in Paris to discuss the situation in the Middle East and
Vietnam. Representatives of the group came from the Soviet
Union, the UK, France and the US. The American participants
were Kissinger, Doty (Harvard), and Feld (HIT). As an
outgrowth of this discussion, one of the Franch participants,
Marcovich of the Pasteur Institute, and Kissinger (with the
knowledge and endorsement of the Soviet participant) agreed
that it would be useful for Marcovich to proceed to Hanoi for
the purpose cf sounding out the North Vietnamese on their
views toward negotiations, and to presentunofficially the
Phase A - Phase B formula which had been discussed in general
terms at the Pugwash session. Marcovich was to be joined by
a M. Aubrac, an official of FAO who knew Ho Chi Minh
personally (Ho had stayed in Aubrac 'S home during the 1946
negotiations with the French). De Gaulle was made aware of
the trip and interposed no objection on the condition that
the two Frenchmen were acting "unofficially".
Marcovich and Aubrac arrived in Hanoi by way of Phnom
Penh on July 21. They left Hanoi on July 26 and returned to
Paris via Phnom Penh. Kissinger saw them "within hours of
their return to Paris".
During their stay in Hanoi Marcovich and Aubrac had
two conversations with Pham Van Dong and one with Ho Chi Minh.
They were also shown a hospital, some damaged dikes and other
evidence of American"aggression". They were given a bamboo
surgical kit (which they said was developed to meet the
TOP SECRET - NODIS
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shortage of steel surgical instruments), a propaganda film
on American bombing and some pellets from "anit-personnel
bombs". (Arrangements are being made to get these to us.)
?
Attached are Kissinger's notes describing the sessions
between the two Frenchmen and the Vietnamese officials.
The material preceding the notes of the conversations ( pages
1 - 11 of Kissinger's notes) is a lengthy background dis-
cussion and a chronology of the trip.
Several interesting points effierge from the conversation
with Pham Van Dong.
I. Dong's reiteration of the offer to negotiate soon
after a bombing cessation and, in particular, his statement
that the cessation need only be a "de facto" one. (pp 12 and 16)
2. Dong's statement to the effect that they would be
prepared to negotiate secretly with the U.S. on matters directly
affecting North Vietnam and that the NLF need not be present.
(p 17). In subsequent sessions in which the political
problems of South Vietnam were to be discussed the NLF would
have to be present. (p.13).
3. Dong's recognition that, "some U.S. forces would have
to stay until the end of the process of political settlement".
(1) 16).
4. Dong's statement that the NLF envisaged a "broad
coalition government" which would include members of the
present GVN. (p. 17)
5; Dong's statement that Hanoi would not"push things
toward unification" until after there was a political settle-
ment. (p. 17)
6. Dong's sense of optimism about the eventual outcome (p.15)
The conversation with Ho is more interesting in terms of
color and mood than in terms of substance.
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An analysis of these conversations and some possible
follow-up actions will be the principal matter for discussion
on Thursday,. August 3, in Governor Harriman's office. It
is hoped that participants will have an opportunity to read
the attached before the meeting.
Chester L. Cooper
ATTACHMENT: As stated
cc: Mr. Rostow
Gov. Harriman
Mr. Sisco
Mr. Warnke
Mr. Habib
Mr. Read
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"vow
?
?t?so,
III. CONVERSATIONS WITH PRAM VAN DONG AND .HO
A. Meeting with Pham Van Dong, July 24, 9 a.m.
B. Meeting with President Ho, Afternoon, July 24.
C. Second Meeting with Pham Van Dong.
r)TE: These conversations are drawn from reports by
Aubrac and Marcovich within hours of their return to
Paris. Quotations are direct quotes as they appeared
in Aubrac's notes made during the meeting. The cornier-
tions are reported in the order in Which they occurred.
A. Meeting. with Pham Van Dong July 24, 9. a.m. Present
Aubrac, Marcovich, Pham Van Dong, Tech (Minister of
Health), note-taker.
? Pham Van Dong opened the meeting by saying that
be was happy to see Aubrac and Marcovich. The visas
had been given on the, basis of Aubrac's reputation,
therefore, it was up-to Aubrac to present his ideas.
Aubrac then described the background of the trip to
Hanoi as sketched in Part I. He said that he would
.report to me and I would report to the U.S. government.
.Marcovich continued by outlining-as a Private idea the
two-part proposal: 1) an end to U.S. bombing, 2) coupled
with an assurance by North Vietnam that "le taux des
approvisionment ne serait pas accru a la faveur de cette
arrte." Aubrac interrupted to say that the control
problem would have to be solved and Hanoi should make
proposals. Pham Van Dong replied that he. had been
.wondering when that issue would be raised. Marcovich
said that part of the control might be through overflights
for reconnaissance purposes. Pham Van Dong said: "This
is our country. We cannot discuss the /problem in this
manner." Pham Van Dong added: "We want an unconditional'
end of bombing and if that happens, there will be no
further obstacle to negotiations." Aubrac asked what he
meant by unconditional. Pham Van Dong replied that
North Vietnam could not negotiate while being bombed.
Aubrac asked whether Pham Van Dong wanted an official
declaration that the bombing had stopped, or would he
be satisfied with a de facto end of bombing. Pham Van
Dong replied that a de facto cessation would be acceptable.
Aubrac asked whether there should be some delay between
the end of bombing and the beginning of negotiations.
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Pham Van Dong replied: "This is not a problem."
Aubrac asked what channels should be used. Pham Van
"Dong replied: "This is not a problem but it should be
someone authorized by both parties." He then went on
to say iniial negotiations could be on those matters
affecting the U.S. and North Vietnam as principals.
When issues affecting South Vietnam were raised, the NLF
would have to be present. 27:ubrac and Marcovich had the
impression that the scenario envisaged by Pham Van Dong
involved an end of U.S. bombing to be followed within
a matter of days by the opening of negotiations under
acceptable auspices/
Pham Van Dong then said that he thought that the
next escalatory step would be a bombing of the dikes.
All preparations had been made to mitigate the consequences,*
but the human suffering would be severe. Be asked Marcovich
and Aubrac to help influence world opinion against
such a stop. Aubrac replied that their usefulness depended
on not joining any propaganda effort. However, they
might talk to the papal mission in Paris about the
problem.
Pham Van Dong then closed the meeting with a
little speech: "You see, dear fr.iends, that the problem
is very Comolicated. You may think your travels are
useless. In fact you have given us much to think about.
I will see you again and we will talk again."
-AUbrac and Marcovich were struck by Pham Van
Dong's insistence on the complexity of the problem, as
well as by the fact that in neither conversation did he
mention Communist China.
Tech remained behind. He joined Aubrac and Marcovich
at lunch and told them that the two-step botIbing proposal
should be discussed officially rather than "informally.
B. Meetina with President Ho, Afternoon, July 24.
Present: Ho; Aubrac, Pham Van Dong, Tech and note-
taker.
Aubrac said that what struck him immediately was .
how old Ho had become. He was dressed in a Chinese gown
and walked with the aid of a cane. However, his
intelligence was unimpaired; his eyes still had their
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. ?
Nroof
9.`
L
NW
old sparkle. He seemed to enjoy playingthe role of a
grandfather-figure, not -concerned With details. Aubrac
had brought as a gilt a little colored stone egg. Ho
gave threepresents in return: silk for Aubrac's daughter,
some books and a ring made of metal from the 2000th
U.S. plane claimed to have been Shot down over Vietnam.:
He remeMbered the first names of all of AUbrac's three
.children.. After speaking about Aubrac's family for about
15 minutes; Aubrac said: "Mr. President do you know
why I have come?" Ho answered "Yes." Aubrac asked. .
whether he had any comments. Ho replied by saying that
he did not like the phrase "peaCe in Vietnam." It -gave
an impression- of moral equivalence between the United
States and North 'Vietnam; in fact the U.S. is the aggressor
and must be condemned. Ho praised De Gaulle for under-
standing this Aaist:7,nction. Moreover the details of
negotiations were in the hands of Pham Van Dong. Ho
then added: "Remembers many peoplehave tried to fool
me and have failed. I know you don't want to. fool me."
He then turned the conversation back to family matters.
He expressed regret that Aubrac had sold the house
where he had stayed twenty-one years ago. "Where shall
I live when I next come to Paris?" He then asked whether
he would be welcome in Paris, but. avoided the question
of whether he wanted an invitation.
He terminated the conversation after fifty minutes
and was escorted from the room by Tach. Pham Van Dong
walked with Aubrac to his car. He said that "we try to
spare President Ho as many details as we can. He is an
old man; we want him to live to see his country unified."
He told Aubrac that he was thinking about their conversation
of the morning. He moved up the next day's appointment
by an hour to allow more time before Aubrac's and
Marcovich's departure in the evening.
C. Second Meeting with Pham Van Don. Present: Aubrac,
Marcovich, Pham Van fang, Tach, note-taker.
The meeting consisted of a talk by Pham Van Dong
speaking from notes. Aubrac reported that the talk went
something like this: "Dear friends. Our conversation
yesterday was very useful. If you want to understand
the problem in Vietnam, I advise you to read the book
by Morris West called The Ambassador. .&either Aubrac
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rAftpo' .
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L
nor Marcovich knew of the existence of this book./ We
are facing a problem which is at the same time very
simple, very complex and of great importance for the
world. It is simple because it concerns the freedom
of a people. It is complex because many considerations
are involved. It is of great importance because it has
volved so many peoples. We have come to the opinion
that the U.S. government is tying to solve the problem
within its present limits. LAubrac and Marcovich took
this to mean that Pham Van Dong was convinced that the
I .S. was not in Vietnam as a prelude to an attack on
Chinaj We also think that the.U.S. government is trying ?
to get a clear picture of the present position. Our
view is this: U.S. power is enormous and the U.S..
government wants to win the war. President Johnson is
suffering from a pain and this pain is called South
Vietnam. We agree that the situation on the battlefield
is decisive; the game is being played in South Vietnam.
Frdm the newspapers we see that some people want to confine
the war to the South. However, the White House and
Pentagon seem determined to continue the war against the
North. Therefore we think that attacks on the North are
likely to increase. We have made provisions for attacks
on our dikes; we are ready to accept war on our soil.
Our military potential is growingbeeause of aid from
the USSR. and other Socialist countries. ZAubrac and
Marcovich pointed out that this was the only time a
Communist country was mentioned by name in the two
conversations extending over five hours. Aubrae and
Marcovich also felt that Pham Van Dong was eager to
give the impression that the situation was under controlj
? As for the situation on the battlefield, it is
improving all the time. The dry season was good and the
wet season will be better. The Marines are in difficulty.
The United States is forced to replace its well-trained
troops by ever-younger soldiers. We fight only when we
choose; we economize on our resources; we fight only for
political purposes.
For example, news from Saigon suggests that Ky
.J.s considering moving his capital because it is no longer
safe. This is true. We could easily step up our actions
inside the city. But we take only those actions which
have political meaning and which economize human lives.
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?
"Now I shall talk to you about negotiations and
solutions. We have been fighting for our independence
for four thousand years. We have defeated the Mongols
three times.. .The United States Army, strong as it is,
is not as t'errifying as Genghis than. We fight to have
peace at home; we have no wider aims. We have made
clear our position in our four points and in the interview
of January 28, 1967. LTham Van Dong did not explain
what this interview was; Aubrac and Marcovich did not
know, nor do IJ We are ready to talk at any time
provided that actions against the North are unccnditionally
ended. I want to repeat what I said yesterday: we are
willing to settle for a de facto stoppage." Marcovich
interrupted to ask whether he correctly understood that
no public acknowledgment of an end of bombing was needed.
Pham Van Dong replied that he would prefer a public
statement, but would settle for a de facto cessation.
671.iere was disagreement between Aubrac and Marcovich
about the meaning of de facto cessation. Aubrac thought
that a bombing pause could be followed within a few days
by an invitation to negotiate; Marcovich. was of the view
that Hanoi mightwant a more formal--though secret--
assurance/
Pham Van Dong resumed. Ending the war for us
has two meanings: 1) An end of bombing which is,
permanent and unconditional; 2) A withdrawal of United
States forces. We like the formula of President de Gaulle."
Marcovich interrupted to say that it was not realistic. ?
Pham Van. Dong agreed and said thathe realized that some
U.S. troops would have to stay until the end of the
process of political settlement. He added: "We do not.
want to humiliate the U.S. Lenin did not like war but
fought when necessary. As Lenin we-are Communists."
"Now let me speak of U.S. policy and the NLF. We
should?have had unification in 1936. The period 1956-39
was a political fight-. It saw the mutual assistance
pact between the U.S. and Saigon and the introduction
of U.S. staffs. This led to the formation of the NLF.
The second period, 1960-64, saw a disintegration of the
U.S. position to which the U.S. responded by 'special'
war. LI suppose he meant "special forces" warj In
1965, the United States started a 'limited' war which
lasts until today: At the same time the N-LF has exoanded
its activities from the country into the cities and from
inside Vietnam to the outside. Our position is: North
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Vietnam is socialist and wants to remain so. As for the
South, our goals are national. independence; democracy,
peace and neutrality. Some people think we want to
impose Socialism on the South. LWe are convinced that the
NTJF will not makesuch an error.H The NT.F envisages a
road coalition government, including all significant
groups and religions without consideration of Past activities
including members du gouvernement fantoche et cadres
-01arm6e fantoche. repeated the underlined words/
The essential thing is to forget the past.
"As for unification, we recognize that the importantl,
first step is..a political settlement of the South. We
-agree not to pushthings toward unification. Once the
War in the South is settled; we shall discuss with the
South and find the best means.- Our people are magnificent.
"Peace would have been easy for -the U.S. three
years .ago.- But with every year the political situation
worsens. We do not like secret negotiations, but we
recognize their necessity in this situation.j As long as
the issues do not concern South Vietnam, the NLF need
.not participate. .However, we do not believe that. the
.United States is ready for a settlement." :Then turning
to Aubrac he asked: "Q.e veulent les Americains?"
Aubrac answered that he had been convinced by me
that the U.S. wanted an honorable Settlement and that
an end to bombing could be envisaged provided it was
not used as a breathing space to step up the war in the
South. .,-This led to a discussion of the meaning of the
term reinforcement.7 Pham Van Dong again stressed that
an end of bombing would lead to negotiations. Marcovich
said that if negotiations go on any length of time, the
problem of reinforcement is serious. Pham Van Dong replied:
"If the Americans stop bombing and we understand that
they are willing to talk there is no question of delay."
Pham Van Dong then told Aubrac and Marcovich that
they could communicate with him through Bo or Sung in
Paris. Aubrac and Marcovich said that they would inform
him of the U.S. reaction.
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On August 11, 1967, the President approved the following message
and asked that Dr, Henry Kissinger use M and A to convey it to Pham
Van Dong:
"The United States is willing to stop the aerial and
naval bombardment of North Vietnam if this will lead
promptly to productive discussions between representatives
of the U.S, and the DRV looking toward a resolution of the
issues between them: We would assume that, while discussions
proceed either with public knowledge or secretly, the DRV
would. not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limita-
tion. Any such move on their part would obviously be incon-
sistent with the movement toward resolution of the issues
between the U.S. and the DRV which the negotiations are intended
to achieve."
Dr. Kissinger was given the following additional instructions:
"You should say further to Messrs. Marcovich and Aubrac
that the United States is prepare'd to negotiate either openly
or secretly. It would seem, however, that a total cessation
of the bombing is inconsistent with keeping secret the fact
that negotiations are taking place. Accordingly, the DRV may
prefer to consider the alternative of a cutback in the magni-
tude or scope of the bombing while secret negotiations are in
progress.
"The U.S. Is ready to have jmmediate private contact
with the DRV to explore the above approach or any suggestions
the DRV might wish to propose in the same direction."
TOP SECRET - NODIS
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rttosol
Auo.ust 17 1967
F
I r
I
L
TOP SECRET/NODIS/PENSYLVAIIIA
Revised and supplemented after
review by Kissinger September 8,
1967.
Pursuant to USG instructions, Henry Kissinger
met for 5 hours with Messrs. Aubrac and Marcovich
(hereinafter A and /v1) in Paris at the latter's
house. Kissinger repeated Washington's under-
standing of liana A's conversations in Hanoi
on July 24 and 25, and M and A confirmed these
interpretationsviththe already reported difference
between them that A thought that an end to bombing
would be enough to start US/DRV talks, while ,11
thought some secret communications between
US and DRV might be necessary before talks
started. Mr. Kissinger followed his instructions
and handed A and M the message which he requested
them to take to Hanot. In answer to a question
Kissinger stated that the message reflected the
views of the Sdcretaries of State and Defense
and:had been approved by Piesident Johnson.
During the discussion Kissinger made the
following points:
. (1) The phrase "take advantage" refers to "any
- increase in the movement of men and supplies
into the south";
(2) The phrase "productive" discussions indicated
the determination to avoid extended Korean-type
negotiations during unabated military operations;
(3) The bombing pause might make it impossible
to keep the fact of negotiations secret for
more than three -weeks at the outside, though
we could of course guarantee secrecy as to
their substance. I Therefore it might be desirable
to conduct preliminary talks while tonnage,
geographic or sorty limitations or reductions
L. in the bombing occurred, with a complete end
of the bombing when final negotiations took
place. But the choice of secret or open
talks was up to Hanoi; and
lorri
(4) The decision to add new targets was made
before informatiOn of A and M's Hanoi discussions
had l'eacliecii Wz,-.2hington-and in the absence of
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TOP SECRET/NODIS/PENNSYLVANTA
meaningful negotiations the intensity of
violence was likely to continue to rise.
Debate of specific escalation was futile since
the offer included stopping bombing all together.
AugUst 17,
1967 -
;
August 17,
1967 -
August 18,
1967 -
A and M suggested substituting another phrase
for the word "if" in the first sentence of
the message. They said that they were persuaded
that a trip to Hanoi would be useful and proceeded
to discuss mechanics of travel. At the end
of the conversation A and M asked whether some
restriction would be placed on the bombing of
Hanoi for reasons of personal safety and to
show good faith. See Kissinger memcon.
Kissinger cabled the Department suggesting
elimination of the word "if" in the first
paragraph of the message and its replacement
by "with the understanding that" and this
authority was granted Paris 1997, 2017 and
2034, 2074; State 2312 and 22969. Other minor
changes in Frencp text were agreed to in the
same messages.
M and A requested an appointment with DRV Rep
Sung, which was granted on 20 minutes notice.
Sung was cordial and said he had been instructed
to transmit messages from A and M to Hanoi.
When M and A requested visas for Hanoi, however,
Sung said he had no instructions concerning
visas and would refer the requests to Hanoi.
Mr. Kissinger met with M and A at M's house in
the morning, and the latter reported on their
meeting with Sung on the evening of August 17.
Kissinger told A and M that 'Washington accepted
their language change and a further minor
modification was suggested.. The rest of
the conversation concerned technical problems of
visas, travel costs and A's scheduled two-weeks
leave. A code was; agreed to between Mr. Kissinger
and A and M to cover certain likely requests
for clarification or debriefing. A and M. stated
they had not talked to the Elyses or to
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August lq;_, 1967 -
August 18, 1967 -
August 192 1967 -
;August_191_1967
anyone else and Mr. Kissinger urged continuing
secrecy. .
Mr. Kissinger met with M and A in the afternoon
to introduce Mr. Chester Cooper in case he should
have to pick up the contact in the future and
to give a greater formality to the message.
See Kissinger memcon.
M and A sent their first message to Hanoi
requesting visas to travel to the DRV during the
week of August 20.
Mr. Kissinger met Messrs M and A for the fourth
time the morning of August 19 at the Pont Royal
Hotel. Mr.. Cooper was present part of the
time. As instructed by Secretary McNamara
Mr. Kissinger told M and A "that effective
August 24. there would be a noticeable change
in the bombing pattern in the vicinity of
Hanoi to guarantee their personal safety and as
a token of our good will." There was no mention
of exact distances. Mr. Kissinger said these
orders were "generally good for 10 days." When
M and -A asked whether this was an ultimatum,
Kissinger replied that we would hardly talk
of an ultimatum when we had offered to end
bombing altogether.
During the early evening of August 19
Mr. Kissinger met again with Messrs. M and A at
the Pont Royal Hotel. After further discussion
between Mr. Kissinger and_Secretary McNamara,
Mr. Kissinger said that he wished to make
clear that the restrictions on bombing in the
immediate vicinity of Hanoi would end
September 4,. M. and A indicated that they were
well impressed with US seriousness and considered
the US offer very meaningful. They stated
they thought it essential to take-the text of
the message to Hanoi themselve8 and present it
with background information. They reviewed
a cable which they had prepared to send to
Hanoi through the DRV Mission in Paris if Hanoi
rejected- their visa applications or if no answer
had been received by August 22.
?
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.?. .
August 21 1967 - 1.1 phoned Kissinger in Paris on the evening of
,
August 21 to tell him of Hanoi's refusal of their
(- visa application. Mr. Kissinger told them to
I pass the message which he had discussed with them
on August 19 to Hanoi through the Paris DRV
Mission if the answer to their first telegram
? remains negative. See Kissinger mem con.
i ;August 21, 1967 - Messrs. 11 and A gave the DRVNission the second
t . message urgently requesting visas to travel to
,
Hanoi with an important message. See Kissinger phon
conversations with Messrs M and A. _
_
. *re
Augiist 22 1967 - Mr. Cooper informed the Department that A and 11
got a turn down on their initial visa request
and had Sent an urgent appeal by telegram.
August 25 - Messrs A and Mpet with Bo in Paris to inquire
why their visas had not been received. Bo
told them it was too dangerous to visit Hanoi
due to the bombing. M and A then informed Bo
they had assurances in that respect, without
identifying the nature of the assurances, which
would be effective until September 4.
Messrs M and A then presented the US message
as set forth below to Bo for the first time.
He read it with interest and observed that it
was "clearly significant". Be queried them
about the significance of para. 2 of the message.
He wsinformed that it expressed US doubt that
the existence of US/DRV discussions could be
kept-secret if bombing ended, and Bo recognized
that this would be a problem. Be was impressed
and was told that the message was authorized by
top levels of the USG. Mand A gave Bo a
written description of their contacts with
Kissinger. Bo agreed to cable the message to
Hanoi and to report their desires to visit Hanoi
to discuss the message. Bo believed a reply
should be available by August 29.
The English text of the message given to Bo
in both French and English is as follows:
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?
?' ?
"The United States is willing to stop the aerial and naval bom-
bardment of North Viet-Nam with the understanding that this will lead
promptly to productive discussions between representatives of the Unirc
-States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Elam looking toward a
resolution of the issues between them. While discussions proceed
'either with public knowledge or secretly, the United States
would assume that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam would not
take advantage of the bombing cessation. Any such move on the
part of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam would obviously be
inconsistent with the movement toward resolution of the issues
beweeen the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam
which the discussions are intended to achieve.
The United States is prepared to enter into discussions
either openly or secretly. It would seem, however, that a
total cessation of the bombing is inconsistent with keeping
secret the fact that discussions are taking place. Accordingly,
the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam may prefer to consider the
alternative of a cutback in the magnitude or scope of the bombing
while secret discussions are in progress.
The United States is ready to have immediate private contact
with the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to explore the above
approach or any suggestions the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam
might wish to propose in the same direction."
:According to M and A Bo's cable to Hanoi after transmitting the
above message in English and French texts, noted that texts were
confirmed by Cooper and that both Kissinger.and Cooper had stated
they were prepared at a very high level of the USC and approved by,
the President. A message sent to Hanoi also included the following
' points which had been made by Kissinger accordino, to M and A:
(a) The US is handling this problem confidentially and requests
l'aanoi to do likewise; - -
(b) The US is particularly interested in :the possibility that
' :the DRV envisages direct secret discussions;
(c) The attacks ?IA...the dikes were accidental;
? .
(d) The US requested message to be brought to the attention of
TIT1171.,m Van Dong as soon as possible';
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cIPPIN.Y--CivIA
(e) The US is ready to submit the information in the message
directly and secretly by special representative. Vientiane, Moscow
or Paris were suggested as possible sites; and
(0 The US would continuo to utilize the Kissinger -AM channel
if Hanoi wishetL
In addition, /I and A said that the August 25 message stated that
"for personal assurances of safety and to establish authenticity,
bombing attacks in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi" would stop for
ten dabs, beginning August 24. Finally, M and A urged that they -
,
be permitted to come to Hanoi as requested by Kissinger, to provide
-additional information.
?
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Aug-List 29. 1967 - Bo told Messrs. M and A that he had not
received a response but expected a reply.
on August 30. .
August 3Q,_196 - Bo told M and .A that there had been a."technical
break in communications with Hanoi" but Bo
expected a reply by COB August 30 and he
assured M and A that their message was being
taken very seriously.
_.?
Augut3l967 Aubrac visited Bo, who told him that he still
had no answer to the August 25 message, but he
had heard from Hanoi rejecting Mand A's August 21
appeal of the turn down of their visa applications.
Bo stated that his government noted unfavorably
that the receipt of the August 21 message coincided
with the escalation of bombing of the North with
Hanoi as, its objective. Under these conditions
it is impossible for the DRV to grant visas to
permit M and A to carry the August 25 message to
Hanoi. 'Then Aubrac told BO of his intent to
return to Rome on September 2, Bo asked him to
stay in Paris until September 5, particularly
slice M was out of town for a short while.
. .
,
Sut el
ember 1 1967- returned to Paris.
Sgptember 2, 1967- M and A visited Bo who repeated his comments
of August 31. A indicated that M's return
should permit A to leave for Rome on September 3
but Bo asked him to stay until September 5 since
a message from Hanoi could arrive at any time.
Bo asked M to make sure that nothing "happened
to Hanoi in the next few days." Bo said he
would talk to M and A again on September 4.
?
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? TQP: SFC,D":110DIS/YIVANTi'
%me September M and A say Bo after receiving information
from Mr. Kissinger that the bombing pattern
around Hanoi would remain in effect three
days longer. They told Bo that the bombing
pattern around Hanoi was extended for another
72 hours through September 7. Bo received
this information "icily", but asked M and
A again not to leave town because Bo still
had not received an answer.
Spptembpr_4,19.67 - Bo told M and A that he still had no answer
from Hanoi. Bo indicated that an answer would
have been simple if it hadn't been for US
bombing actions on August 21, 22 and 23. Bo
told M and A to come back on September 6. A
told Bo that he planned to go to Rome and Bo
- raised no objections.
September. 6_, 1967
Sept ember
Aubrac returned to Rome.
- Bo told Ilhe still had no answer and again
referred to the fact that M and A's second
cable urgently requesting visas arrived in
Hanoi on a day when the city was hit particularly?
hard.
?1967 - After conversations with Mx. Kissinger and A
and a phone call from A with Bo, M called on
Bo after receiving an appointment 15 minutes
after it was requested. M told Bo the USG
was "standing by - waiting for an answer".
M said the atmospheredurin-.; the convers-tion
uas friendly and relaxed and Bo said several
times that he hoped M and A's efforts would
work out better than past efforts by others.
When Bo was itiformed (incorrectly) that
Kissinger would be in Paris on the weekend
of September 16, Bo iaid on his own initiative
that he would ask the DRV immediately for .
authority t? see Kissinger.. When M saia he
did not know whether Kissinger would be authorizec-
to see Bo and suggested that Bo might want to see
sopeone'less close to the USG, such as Bernie
Feld, Bo rejected th2 suggestion and said he
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Stptcmber 3,_1967:r wanted to have authority to see Kissinger
(cont'd) so that a direct conversation between Bo
and Kissinger would be possible. Bo said
he still had no answer from the DRV to the
USG message: Bo again cautioned "strictest
secrecy" regarding the contact and M gave him
this assurance.
"When M told Kissinger of the preceding
conversation, Kissinger asked M to call ?
Bo to inform him that Kissinger would be
in Paris on September 9 to correct the
information he had given him earlier. M
reported back that he had called Bo later
on the afternoon of September 7 to correct
the dates of Kissinger's Paris visit.
September_y-8,_1967 Kissi_nger came to Washington to discuss
his meeting with M this coming weekend at
Paris and possible meetings with Bo.
Nr. Kissinger left Boston on evening flight
for Paris on September 8.
At 11:00 a.m. EDT on September 8, Kissinger
phoned A in Rome from Washington to ask A to
return to Paris while K was there.
SPt01)2ber.8.,_.1-967 M visited Bo and told Bo of Kissinger's request
today that A return to Paris. M told Bo that
A and M vouched for K, but if Bo wanted
additional reassurances Millienshikov (Vice
Chairman of the Soviet Academy of Science and
President of the Supreme Soviet of the
Russian Soviet Republic) could come to Paris
to verify the origin of the mission. Bo
rejected this proposal and said the existing
M/A-K channel was satisfactory. Bo cautioned
about the great need for secrecy. In response
to Bo's question, M said K planned to be in
Paris for about 10 days. Bo said if there were
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September
(Cont' d)
TOP SECI,ET/NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA
1967, - no bombing of Hanoi "something could well
happenP during that period (Paris 3070).
Kissinger arrived in Paris in the morning,
just before Anbrac who returned from Rome
at K's request. After a conversation between
K, M and A (Paris 3070) A called Bo to
arrange an appointment for A and M, which was
set for 4:00 p.m. Paris time. At the meeting
with Do, the latter told A and M he had been
instructed by Hanoi to keep in close touch
with A and M, and Bo was available to A and
M at any time. M told Bo that Kissinger had
been in touch with senior USG officials,
later identified as the President, Secretary
Rusk and Secretary McNamara, who were "growing
impatient with the absence of any response from
Hanoi". Bo asked if Walt Rostow had cleared
the message and A and M had not heard his
name mentioned by Kissinger. M reported that
Washington did not know whether the (August 25)
message had ever been received in Hanoi. To
this, Do replied that his government accepted
the message as "absolutely authentic" and "it
was being studied now in the light of developing
conditions". Bo added that A and M must
recognize the DRV situation is quite complex.
M urged Bo to meet Kissinger and Bo replied
that he had not yet received authorization to
talk to Kissinger, but that he was in effect
talking to Kissinger now through A and M. In
response to a question, A told Bo that Kissinger
had indicated a desire to" discuss some matters
with Bo privately without the presence of A
and M,and.A recommendedaprivate meeting,
although M urged that M and A be present. Bo
5piptc:K.0?crc. 9 190
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SeptgAer_9?1967 - was noncommittal but said if a meeting
1
(Cont7d) with Kissinger was arranged through any
other channel he would let M and A know.
Bo then said "what I really want to know
is whether the (August 25) message is still
valid". A and M assured him that it was but
repeated Kissinger's statement about US
restiveness with respect to the long delay
in Hanoi's response. 1.1 and A told Bo -
they were personally convinced by Kissinger
that the August 21-23 bombings were un-
related to the August 25 message. Bo asked
ahnuty the "McNamara line" (barrier) and said
'Hanoi viewed it as "political action to make.
the separation of brothers permanent". Mviewed
it as "an alternative to bombing". Bo hoped
A would not return to Rome and again stressed
secrecy. .(After checking with K, A re-
turned-to Rome to be on call.)
September 11, 1967 - In response to a phone request from Bo at
6:00 p.m. (Paris time), Sunday, September 10,
Marcovich called on Bo at 9:30 a.m. After
an exchange of pleasantries Be handed to M the
?' following text of Hanoi's official reply to the
August 25 message:
"The essence of the American propositions
? is the stopping of the bombing under conditions.
The American bombing of the Democratic Republic
of Viet-Nam is illegal. The United States an3
should put an end to the bombing and cannot pose/
conditions.
"The American message has been corhmunicated
after an escalation of the attacks against Hanoi
and under the threat (menance) of continuation
of the attacks against Hanoi. It is clear,
that this constitutes an ultimatum to the
Vietnamese people.
*TOP SEbRET/NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA
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'
.SeTterdbgr_ll, 19_67 -,"The Government of the DemoCratit"
(Contfd) Republic of Viet-Nam energeticaly rejects
the American propositions.
Wm,
'
i ?
...!?.The position of the Government of the --
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is, that the
United States should cease definitly and
without conditions the bombing and all
other acts of war against the Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam. It should withdraw
American troops and satellites from South'
Viet-Nam, recognize the National Liberation
Front of South Viet-Nam and let the
Vietnamese people themselves regulate their
internal affairs. It is only after the un-
conditional stopping by the United States of
the bombing and all other acts of war against
the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, that it
would be possible to engage in conversations."
(unofficial translation)
Bo told M to give the text to Kissinger and
added that "as soon as there is a reply" M
should communicate with Bo at any time of day
or night. When M urged Bo to meet Kissinger,
Bo said "give the message to Kissinger and
when the reply is here we shall see about
meeting". In commenting on the text of the
DRV message Bo made the following statement:
. ? .
. ? . :
"The bombing of Hanoi at the same timeas the
Sending of the (August 21) message constitutes
a pressure. Stopping of the bombing along witty
the threat of a renewal has the character of an.
ultimatum.". (Paris 3097),_
TOP_S E CUT, /NQDTSIPEN73
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?moreSeptcmber 13. 1967 - M met for 35 minutes with Bo on short
notice at noon. Pursuant to revised
Departmental Instructions to Kissinger
(State 35967 and 36554) which K discussed
with M in part at breakfast on September 13
(Paris 3242), M handed Do the following
message from K in a scaled envelope:
"I have a reply from the USG to the
Hanoi message which was received on Monday
(September 11). I have also been given
a' Commentary on this message. Because of
the importance of the United States reply and
because the commentary refers to other
discussions with Hanoi which we have promised
not to reveal I have been instructed to deliver
it personally. I am available for a meeting at
any time and any place which is convenient
to Mr. Mai Van Bo."
L.
L
r
Bo asked Mwhether he had seen the message
from K. M said he had not, and Bo did not
show the message to M. In response to M's
urging that Bo see K, Bo said "because of
the continued threat of bombing Hanoi which
has the character of an ultimatum, a direct
meeting with Kissinger cannot take place."
M asked what assurances Hanoi wanted. Bo
replied that this was a US problem. M asked
whether contacts through the WA channel
should continue and Bo replied "definitely
yes. We consider that we wish to continue
talking- through this channel." Be said he
would accept any communication open or
sealed through this channel, specifically
including any such message from Kissinger.
Bo- --reiterated "We
want to keep this channel open". In reply to
a question Be said that as long as M was in
Paris he saw no need for A to return from Rome.
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Bo then tuimed to the (September 11) bombing
of Haiphong. He said that bombing within
one kilometer of the center of town in effect
meant attacking populated areas. He did not
establish any relationship between the bombing
of Haiphong and the sending of any message in
the N/A channel, Bo emphasized to M Pham Van
Dong's view that the DRV would continue
fighting no matter how badly it was bombed
even if Hanoi was totally destroyed. He
referred M to the Schoenbrun September 10
television program as evidence of Hanoi's -
determination to continue fighting (Paris 3288
and 3257).
September TA, 1967 M saw Bo at noon. In accordance with in-
structions to Kissinger (State 36927 approving
Paris 3257) which Kissinger discussed with him
on the morning of September 14 (Paris 3329)1 M
handed Bo the following message from K in a
sealed envelope:
"Hanoi's attitude with respect to the
kind of restraint we have employed in this
channel is baffling . If we bomb near Hanoi
we are'accused of bringing pressure. If we
voluntarily and without any suggestion from
Hanoi impose a restraint on our actions and
keep this up without time limit we are accused
of an ultimatum. In fact, the American proposal
contained neither threats nor conditions and
should not be rejected on these grounds".
Bo did not open it but said he would study it
later. He asked whether it contained the
principal message, and M said K had asked for
instructions about whether the principal
message could be transmitted through A and M.
Bo asked whether M was sure there was a message
and Bo said he was certain there was and that
K would receive instructions soon. M then read
to Bo from his handwritten notes containing
the following official explanation:
NOD (S_Zi SEC..nF.T /-PENN_SX1,V1)_N?T
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"The enclosed paper contains Washington's
view about the significance of the restraint
in the Hanoi area and the unconditional
nature of our message of August 25."
then gave Bo. Kissinger's "personal"
explanation as follows:
"The enclosed declaration in my judgment
erases the possibility of any charge that we,
are proceeding by ultimatum."
Then as arranged with Kissinger (Paris 3329),
M gave BO the following "official" comment
from Kissinger:
"Washington does not consider the attacks
of September 11 as escalation. The attacks
closest to the center of Haiphong were in an
area which had been attacked three times
previously, most recently on June 26.
Mr. Kissinger is prepared to give more detailed
clarifications".
M then added Kissinger'spersonal" comment:
"(A) Bo should remember that the number
of officials aware of the current exchange of
views is very small. This makes it very
difficult to reverse decisions taken prior
repeat prior to the decision to send the
message of August 25 and maintain secrecy.
(B) It seems more useful to seek a solution
to the present situation than to debate about
how we got there. Hanoi should remember that
the U.S. message of August 25 offered to end
the bombing and all other acts of war against the
DRY in circumstances which the United States
Government considers not to involve conditions
but which rather repeat statements made by Hanoi.
If Bo wants clarification, I stand ready to
give it."
NODISPEOP SECRET irLi\INSYLVANTA
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M also gave Bo Kissinger's concluding
personal" comment:
"The present exchanges can be useful if
they enable both sides to gain a clearer
understanding of the issues before them. I
must point out, however, the concern expressed
to me by high officials in Washington that too
often these communications are one-way streets."
M agreed to Bo's request that he leave his
notes containing the above commLats for Bo
to study and Bo would return them on the
morning of September 15.
M mentioned that at some point the Elysee would
have to be informed but Bo replied "The fewer
people know about this the better." M again
said he hoped Bo and Kissinger would be in
direct contact soon (Paris 3383;.3329; and
(French text)'- 3415).
September l6, 1967 Kissinger met for about two hours with M and A,
immediately after A's return from Rome on the
morning of September 16. K told M and A he was
authorized to give them the sealed message from
Washington for delivery later in the day to Bo
and turned over the massage to them. K
cautioned M and A not to tie the continuation
of their channel to K's presence in Paris but
suggested thatthey ask Bo about Bo's views on
how to continue the channel thereafter. K
reminded M and A that the US is prepared to talk
on an official level at any mutually convenient
place. M and A indicated their xdllingness to
continue on the present basis and reluctantly
agreed to hand sealed envelopes for delivery to
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September
NODTS/TOp_SECR_ETIPENSY4VANIA
Kissinger to an Embassy officer (later
specified as Wanner) after K left Paris,
although they indicated a preference for
communicating with K by ordinary mail or
telephone.
K urged M and A not to permit Bo to gain
any misimpression that he had a future
assurance from the USG against bombing in
the Hanoi area and M and A promised to leave
no ambiguity on this point. Kissinger asked
M and A to make the points with Bo that (a) the
US has consistently attempted to phrase its
proposals in conciliatory and realistic
language, but the replies from Hanoi have
not been responsive and have not addressed
key elements of the US proposals; and (b) the
failure of Hanoi to deal with US proposals
and the interjection of outside elements, such
as specific military actions, have raised
doubts in the minds of US officials about the
willingness of Hanoi to enter into productive
discussions (Paris 3492).
16,1967 M and A met with Bo for over an hour, starting
at noon. A, who did most of the talking at the
meeting with Bo and kept the notes, reported
on the meeting. Bo greeted A and M affably and
offered them drinks. Bo said Ho had charged
him with inquiring about the health of A's
family. A then handed to Bo in a sealed
envelope French and English texts of the
following US message:
September 13, 1967
"The USG believes that the September 11
message from the DRV may be based on a mis-
understanding of the American proposal of
?
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? NODIS/TOP SECRET/PENNSYLVANIA
August 25. The American proposal contained
neither conditions nor threats and should
not be rejected on these grounds.
It has been the understanding of the
USG that the DRV would be willing promptly
to engage in productive discussions leading to
peace when there was a cessation of aerial and
naval bombardment. The USG sought to confirm
this fact in its proposalwhich the DRV has in
.front of it.
"As a demonstration of its good faith and
in order to create the best atmosphere for
the consideration of its proposal the US
voluntarily undertook not to bomb Hanoi from
August 25 onward - the day on which its proposal
was submitted to Hanoi. This restraint has been
maintained without time limit even though
activities by opposing forces in the south have
?in fact been stepped up since August 25.
"The August 25 proposal of the USG remains
open. 't (END OF MESSAGE)
A told Bo he did not know the content of the
message but described it as "conciliatory",
a word which Bo made him write down. Bo did
not open the envelope in M and A's presence.
A asked Bo about the significance of the AFP
September 14 Hanoi story (State 38031), quoting
"reliable sourees" as indicating that talks would
start three or four weeks after a bombing
cessation, and A showed Bo Paris press stories
based on the AFP report. Bo replied that the
three-to four-week interval between the end
of bombing and the beginning of negotiations
was "an invention of journalists". He noted
that Pham Van Dong's statement had given no
ground for the time period mentioned in the
newspapers.
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TOP S ECRETpTopisji)
?
A asked Bo whether there was any utility
in the continuation of the M and A channel
and wondered whether they should now
withdraw. Bo replied that M and A had been
received as friends and they were "not at
the end of the tether" because of the
continued validity of the channel. Bo
said: "We trust you and you trust Kissinger.
What you have been doing is useful ... You
see you have produced results. There was a
message to us from the USG which we
accepted. We replied, to be sure, negatively.
This week we have had two brief communications
and today a formal message, so you are being
useful." Bo again referred back to the fact
that their visa request had been turned down
because it had been made concurrent with the
bombardment of Hanoi and to he let them come
to Hanoi at that time "would have discredited
us and ultimately you".
M again urged Bo to see K, and Bo asked a
number of questions about K's plans for the
coming week. When M suggested he could
arrange coffee for K and Bo at a private
residence, Bo said "Let me think about how
best to arrange a meeting and I will let you
know. I will call you as I called you last
week."
When M mentioned reporting to the Elyse? if
the present effort failed, Bo said again that
the M and A channel is "not at the end of its
usefulness. I see no need to bring anyone
else in. Complicated matters may take some
time to mature and become more complicated if
too many people intervene."
When M asked whether Dzu, runner-up in the
SVN Presidential campaign, would be acceptable
to the NLF in a more broadly based government,
Be said that Dzu was a "heel", however, and
'there were many reasonable people in the south,
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TOP SEGgET/NODISPENNSYLVANIA
including high-ranking military officers."
When A asked about Thieu, Bo replied that he
did not understand a man who got himself
elected "on the basis of inviting foreigners
to bomb his compatriats", but A was struck
by the relative mildness of his comment.
When asked about the political situation in
the US, M and A said that the main line of
American foreign policy would not change no
matter who won in 1968, unless it was Reagan
in which case "there would be a greater
possibility of escalation than of peace
overtures." ,Bo seemed surprised.
Bo returned M's handwritten notes of a meeting
of September 14 and said they had been useful
but he had studied them sufficiently.
(Paris 3501)
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Scp:tember
.-embei- 20 1967
:otember 20j967
Aubrac called on Bo for five minutes
on the way to the airport on the
morning of September 18. (A is leaving
for Rome and will be back on September 20.)
At K's request, A told Bo that Hanoi's
response need not be confined to any one
particular channel. A suggested the
following possibilities: (a) a personal
meeting between Bo and K; (b) a message
in a sealed envelope via A and M to K;
*(c) an open message via A and M,as 1Tanoi's
note of September 11; (d) a message to be
given to a US official in Paris or elsewhere;
(e) any other channel that seemed appropriate
to Hanoi. Bo replied: "There will be (si(;)
answer. Things may seem to move slowly.
In fact, they are moving at their 'normal'
speed for exchanges of this kind". (Paris
3536)
George Brown received message dated September 19
from Secretary Rusk informing him of the .t.ts
of the US messages of August 25 and September 13
and the DRV.message of September 11. Brown will
pass on information to Prime Minister Wilson
only. .(State 39656; London 2126)
A returned to Paris from Rome and phoned Bo
to suggest jokingly that Bo have dinner with
K. Bo laughed and said he was still without
instructions. (Paris 3765)
7.7Ttember 21, 1967 - A and M met with Bo for .an.hour-and-a-half
starting at noon. M read to Bo the following
message from K, which he left with Bo at Bo's
request:
"I am leaving Friday evening to give
a speech in Hannover Sunday. I plan
to return to the US on Sunday. If before
Saturday evening you know that there will
be a reply from Hanoi either Sunday or
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Monday, please inform M and I shall
return via Paris.
. "Washington is still standing by
for an answer to its message of. .
September 13.
"We have noted your interest in the
A & M channel and we are ready to'.
continue it.
"I remain available at Cambridge
to receive message either directly
or through A & M. If desirable, I
could come to Paris to receive messages
directly or through A & M either in
sealed envelope or openly.
. "Alternatively, Washington is ready
to send an official to receive any
message either directly or through
A & M in a sealed envelope or not."
In response to a question M told Bo that
the text of the message had been agreed
by K. Bo replied, according to A's notes:
"This channel is very conveniert for us.
If I have a reply before Saturday evening
(9/21) I shall call you (M). I shall also
be in touch with you afterwards as soon as
I hear something but you should be aware of
the mood Hanoi has expressed in our Foreign
Ministry statement of September 19". (Ed.:
the DRV ForMin statement was a detailed
complaint about US bombing in the area
immediately above the 17th parallel.) Bo
also mentioned the bombardment of Haiphong,
but briefly and without conviction according
to A.
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r
_
ftrri
When M urged Bo to see K, Bo replied that
he could see private Americans at his
discretion, but he could not see any
American who spoke for the USG or reported
directly to the USG without Hanoi authori-
zation, which. he had not received.
Bo added that Hanoi is reluctant to talk
under duress with any officially connected
American. Bo said "the Americans are playing a
double game?on the one hand they are offering
us peace; on the other they increase their
bombing." At the same time Bo repeated his
desire to keep the Pennsylvania channel open
and said "he will accept a communication at
anytime. He will be in touch as soon as
he has anything to say.. .we want you (A and M)
and Kissinger to continue."
M showed Bo the text of the draft report
(Paris 3804) he intended to give the glysee
if the channel failed or was publicized and
told Bo of K's desire to delete the text of
the US and DRV messages; a point which Bo
agreed upon. Bo said if the report was given
to the Elysee, it should be made clear that
it was not done at Bo's request or instigation.
(Paris 3803; Paris 3765)
??_eptember 2.21967 M saw Bo and gave him the following message:
? "Washington is still waiting for an
answer to its message of September 13.
The offer of August 25 as further explained
in the message of September 13, remains
open. At present Washington has nothing
further to-say." (Paris 3908)
When M delivered this note, Bo saw him only
briefly because he was tied up with Columnist
Joe Kraft. Bo said that he still had no
instructions and if he had something he would
get back in touch with M. (Kissinger/Read
9/24 telecon)
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ImeSeptember
. . . . . .
DISPATCHCO
1967 OCT 10 i.Q 50
?riol
Bo called M at 1300 and asked M to come over.
M met with Bo for more than an hour starting
at 1800. Bo read the following message to
M, which M took down in his own- notes. aid
read back to Bo to check for accuracy:
I. The Whole world 'knows that the US has
pursued a constant policy of escalation
against North Vietnam.
2. After Hanoi was bombed, US planes hit
CamAa and Haiphong. As regards
Haiphong, US planes have LDmbed it
several times in a row and very violently
attacked the DMZ and Vinh Linh Province.
"3. As' a result every one agrees that .
the bombing has been intensified in recent
weeks:
114.. Washington's explanation about the
bombing of Haiphong cannot be received.
5. These are the circumstances under
which you have suggested contacts with
Kissinger. I accept your expression
of confidence in Kissinger, but at the
moment when US is increasing its es- "
calation, it was not possible for me
to see him.
"6. Turning to more general topics,
have spoken to you of the two-faced
policy of the US.
"7. What has happened has confirmed me
in that opinion)for the attitude of the
US exhibits all kinds of contradictions.
It is possible to highlight this by a
few examples:
(a) Together with the message of
August 25, Kissinger has let me
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know through you as intermediaries
that the US has stopped bombing of
Hanoi for 10 days; then for 72 hours,
and now the US tells us that the
bombing of Hanoi is suspended without
time limit. What do you think of
the assertion that the USG of its own
free will has suspended the bombing
without setting a time limit?
(b) In fact what has happened is the
stopping of bombing of Hanoi but the
intensification of bombing elsewhere_
as in Campha, Haiphong and Vinh Linh
Province, where the bombing has the
character of extermination and systematic
destruction.
(c) To say that by stopping of bombing
of Hanoi the US has wanted to create
better atmosphere is not true.
"8. With respect to the August 25 message, the
essence of the US position is to offer to
stop bombing with conditions. In a message
delivered by sealed envelope the US has
replied that the offer is without conditions
while asserting that the message of
August 25 is still valid.
119. As far as you and A are concerned, I
have received you any time you have requested.
I listen to you. I accept messages from you.
I transmit them. I report fully to Hanoi.
I call you when I have something to say.
I believe that this demonstrates our good will
sufficiently. However, as I have pointed
out earlier, we have no illusions about
American policy. What do you think of all
this?" (end of message)
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?
When Bo asked M for his reactions, M said that:
? (a) M would state his own personal view that
each US message had been accompanied by
? deescalation. With respect to Haiphong, M said
he knew only what K had told him, which was
confirmed by the press reports--that US attacks
had concentrated on communication links, not on
systema-LiTactifOtown itself. Nevertheless,
M agreed that American actions had made discussions
more complicated.
(b) M thought that the USsuspension" of
bombing of Hanoi, first -for ten days, then
72 hours, then without time limit, reflected
contradictions in American approach to the
Channel.
(c) M asked whether a reversion by the US to
the "level of bombing in early August" would
permit initiation of dkcussions. On the last
point .Bo replied that his Prime Minister had
already answered that question".
Finally,. M asked Bo to ascertain from Hanoi whether
Hand A had correctly understood Pham Van Dong's
remark to M and A in July, which M read to Bo from
A's notes. (ihe portion of the exchange is found
on pages 12-13 arm 16 of the Kissinger memorandum
of August 1, 1967 . --in which
Dong is reported to have indicated that delay
following a de facto cessation would not be a
problem and that talks should be conducted by
Persons authorized by both sides.) Bo said that
Dong's reported statements to A and 6differed from
the public position ofhis governmene,rriBo would
send the exchange to Hanoi to ask if it were a
true representation or Dong's position.
Bo again enjoined them to use greatest secrecy.
(Source:.Kissinger/Read 9/24 telecon)
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ilik.rAybcilber 25, 1967 M called on Bo at: 8:30 a.m. and read to Bo the
following five point message from Kissinger:
'(1) I wIll transmit to the appropriate
Wasnington officials later today the message
. you (Be) gave M yesterday. (2) I see no point
in trading charges and countercharges about
past activities. In fact Washington has offered
to stop bombing based on the assumption it
would lead to prompt, productive talks. That
offer remains open. It was made sincerely.
If accepted, there will be no need to discuss
escalation or bombing problems. (3) The
exchange indicates that Washington and Hanoi
have great difficulty understanding each
other's thought processes. This makes direct
US/DRV contact essential. Intermediaries, no
matter how trustworthy, are not satisfactory
substitutes. (LL) American military actions
during the past month reflect in part the
extreme secrecy with which Washington has
handled this exchange. The USG has considered
it unwise to change decisions made prior to the
report or' M and A's trip to Hanoi, except in
regard to bombing Hanoi itself, because it
wanted to keep the circle of awareness of this
If exchange as small as possible to avoid premature,
public debate. (5) The difference in the posi-
tions of the two governments could be summarized
as follows: Washington has indicated its
readiness to stop bombing and has only asKed
to confirm its understanding ot Hanoi's
view that this would lead promptly to pro-
ductive negotiations. Hanoi has implied that
an end of bombing would in fact have this result:
If this is indeed the view or both governments,
the remaining obstacles to direct talks can be
overcome. I am certain that the above correctly
reflects US views. Could Bo confirm that it
t.
also reflects the view of Hanoi."
M said Boss response to the foregoing message
kvas favorable. M then questioned Bo about
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SeRtember'.3(11_,J967
Num,
what Bo had meant in their conversation of
September 23 when Bo had said that his Prime
Minister had already answered M's question
about whether US/DRV talks would be possible
if the US cut bacK to the level of bombing
of early August. Bo replied that the DRV
Prime Minister had made clear publicly that
there could be no formal discussions between
the US and the DRV as long as any level of
bombing continued in the North. Bo added,
however, that preliminary discussions between
Bo and Kissinger might not fall under such
prohibition, and Bo said that he would let
M know in a few days whether such preliminary
discussions would be possible.
(Source: Kissinger/Read 9/25 telecon)
Mand A called on Bo at 9100 a.m. on September 30
and spent two hours with him. The atmosphere
was friendly and cordial throughout and Bo gave
them tea.
M and. A told Bo that they had been in touch with
K, and K had had further discussions with his
Washington friends. Mand A noted that K and the
USG had put a proposal and questions to the DRV
through the Bo channel to which there had been
no substantive responses. The US August 25th
offer witnout conditions remained open. M and
A noted that K's Washington friends were
inte2sted in learning whether Bo had received
an answer to the point Bo had raised on September 25
about the possibility of "preliminary discussions."
Bo replied that he had an answer to the latter
point. Bo said that he could not talk directly
to a US validated individual even in a preliminary
way because "too much had happened since July."
(M and A got the impression from Bo tnat he
feared that "preliminary discussions" would simply
be a ruse on our part to get into substantive talks
with the DRV while the bombing continued.)
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When Bo referred again to the "conditions"
contained in the US position, M and A asked
him to point out what conditions he was.
referring to. Bo said in the first paragraph
of the US August 25 proposal the words "with
the understanding that" really amounted to a
condition on our part, as did the words
"productive" and "prompt". He indicated there
were other complications with the proposal.
M and A referred to the forthcoming sentences
in President Johnson's Septcmbr 29 speech which
repeated US willingness to stop the bombing
"when this will lead promptly to productive
discussiOns"onthe assumption that the DRV would
"not take advantage of the bombing cessation
or limitation" during the discussions. Bo said
he had not had 'a chance toEtudy the President's
speech, but he was glad that they had brought this
portion of the speech to his attention, because
the French press headlines made the US position
sound conditional.
They discussed the Viet-Nam statements in the
U.N. debate to date, and Bo said the DRV was
highly displeased with George Brown's speech
but pleased with the French and Canadian statementE
in New York. Bo added jocularly that he
"claimed some credit" for the French position.
Since Fl and A did not know the content of the
French or Canadian positions and Bo did not
elaborate, there was no discussion about what
features of the GOC or OF pOsitions Bo was
referring to.
Bo expressed the thought that the'present political
trend" in the US was favorable to the DRV.
At one stage of the discusSion M.and A found the
opportunity to underscore the point that the US
had made no commitments regarding its future
'actions_
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pctober 2, 1967 7
A asked whether Bo had received an answer to the
September 23 inquiry, regarding the accuracy of
A's notes of his discussion in Hanoi with Pham
Van Dons on the point that there would be "no
question of a delay" between the end of bombing
and talks both sides "knew how to meet each
other." A again vouched for the care and accuracy
of the notes of his conversation with Dons. Bo
said he had not had an answer to this inquiry
wha,ch he had made on September 23, but he
expeeted`an answer early next week. Bo did say
that if tnere was a halt in the bombing "Kissinsel:
should put on his hat and come to Paris immediate-
ly." When A and M asked for clarificatLon of the
conflicting reports of the DRV position regarding
the delay between a bombing halt and talks as
reflected in September 26 AFP column and a
September 28 Le Monde article, Bo said he hoped
that the answer he would get from Hanoi to the
question regarding the Dong/M and A July exchange
would clarify this issue.
Mand Bo arranged to meet again on Wednesday,
October 4. Bo repeated the point he had made
before: he was availaUe at any time to M and A
to talk to them, meet with them, discuss matters
with them, and report to Hanoi on their.dis-
cussions. He said he would advise them as soon
as he had received anything from his government.
On his own initiative M went to see Bo on the
afternoon of October 2 and spent an hour and a
half with him. M said that he had sought the
appointment to pass on information received
from K that morning that indicated growing
impatience in Washington and the feeling on the
part of Ms Washington colleagues that they had
received almost nothing from Hanoi through the
Nand A channel. It was decided that a message
should be sent to Kissinger, and M stated that
he took elaborate notes on which to base the
message, which was put together in final form
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by M following the meeting and alter a flight
to Rome where he discussed the message in
detail with Afrom-Rime they mailed it by
special delivery air-post to Kissinger in
Boston late on October 2. The text of the
note received by Kissinger follows:
"The position of the RDVN remains always
the same. If the United States really
wished to talk, let them stop first without
conditions the bombardment of the territory
ot the RDVN.
"Starting from that position there are
several eventualities:
(a) A public declaration by the Government
of the United States about the cessation.
This declaration could take place either
before or after the cessation.
(b) An official declaration but non-public
preceding the cessation of the bombardment.
This declaration could be communicated_by
the channel K/A-M (officieusem,,,nt)-not
quite officially, and after this indication
it can be transmitted officially by an
accredited person.
(c) An end of. bombardment without preceding
-official declaration followed by an official
but not public communication of the Govern-
ment of the. United States.
"Eventuality (a) would represent a public
declaration replying to that made on the 28th
of January by M. Trinh, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the RDVN, which constitutes a
solemn engagement to talK after the uncon-
ditional end of bombing. This public declara-
tion would be followed by the transmission of
an official text by an accredited person.
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"Eventualities (b) and (c) reflect the
propositions of M and A as they result fupm
their understanding of their conversation
in July in Hanoi with the Prime Minister.
A.confirmation is expected soon." (End of
message)
As explained by letter from M, point (a) in the
above message was written entirely by Bo as well
as the preamble. Points (b) and (c) were written
on M's suggestion but practically controlled and
re-read phrase by phrase by Bo. The point about
the non-public declaration maE also discussdd
at length. M and Bo also discussed the word
officieuse" and agreed that it was a term
applying to-a person mandated by the Government
of the United States. According to N , Bo
said "on several occasions" that Trinh's
February 28 speech constituted a "Solemn engage-
ment': by the DRVbefilemorld opinion, and a public
declaration by the US would be a reply having the
same character of commitment.
Bo told M to be sure to report to Bo immediately
by phone- what Kissinger's reactions to the mes-
sage were. (Sources: M's October 2 letter to
K; Kissinger/Read 10/4, 1 p.m.; telecon.)
October EL, 1967 (p.m. - At K's request M took the "message"- ?received in
the- mail. by Kissinger to Boon the-aftemoon
of October 4 to seek confirmation of paragraph
(b). Bo read the document and then said:that
he had still Tot received word from Hanoi about
the accuracy of M and A's understanding of his
July talkwith Pham Van Dong, so Bo could not
.comment at this time on the formulation of
-eventualities (b) and (c).
r
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Bo did confirm the accuracy of the opening
paragraph of the communication, the formulation
of eventuality (a) and the paragraph of
description of eventuality (a), exce-ot Bo said
he had not used the words "solemn engagement".
II took strong exception with Bo, saying that
M's own notes and clear recollection ot their
October 3 conversation on this point were very
clear. M said to Bo that if he (M) was capable
of such misunderstanding M's usefulness was at
an end. Bo energetically denied that M's utility
was at an end and expressed the view that the
channel was of definite continuing utility. Bo
and M discussed what phrase should be used in
place of "solemn engagement" without reaching
a firm conclusion. (Source: Kissinger /Read 10/4,
1:00 p.m. telecon)
,Jctober 4, 1967 (later - After a full discussion with K, M called Bo
p.m.) to say that K's reaction to the last M/Bo
conversation was that Bo's backing away from
the phrase "solemn engagement" would be viewed
in Washington as a serious substantive change.
He also passed on K's view that it would have
been better to receive no communication then
one in which a key point had been retracted.
Bo instructed M to come over and see Bo
immediately. (Source: Kissinger/Read 10/4,
4:00 p.m., telecon)
' October 4 1967 (late
evening)
1
?
M visited Bo and spent an hour and a half with
him at approximately 2230-2400 Paris time. M
told Bo of K's views of the serious reactions
in Washington to the change of the text which
K had received this morning, and he asked Bo
to review that text again with -him. Again
Bo confirmed the accuracy of the opening
paragraph of the earlier text and the accuracy
of the statement of the first eventuality ("A
public declaration by the Government of thd
United States about the cessation. This
declaration could take place either befor&
or after the cessation.") Bo said since he
had not heard from Hanoi about the M and A
conversation there in July he could not :
comment on the other two eventualities which
were mentioned in the message K received this
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TUIJri
??111.4
morning. Bo would not discuss further
his renegging on the words "solemn
engagement" or the paragraph in which
those words appear.
r-
Bo then said that he wanted M to send a
message to K which would come as close as
possible to eventuality (b) in the communi-
cation K received in the mail. M wrote out
the text in French and read it through with
r- Bo three times to assure its accuracy. M
also did an English translation for Bo.
Message fradM to K:
?
"After having discussed with Bo and
after having obtained confirmation of his
country's position regarding the eventuality
of talks you should know that if the US
really wants to talk it is necessary first
to stop without conditions the bombing and all
other acts of war against the DRV. I have come
to the conclusion, recalling also a previous
conversation in the presence of A, that the
scenario could be the following: The Government
of the United States would send a first message
through our channel (K/M-A) announcing
unequivocally the unconditional cessation of
bombing. Once this has been effectively
realized, a second message still through our
channel might suggest the opening of the ?
dialogue at a date and site proposed by you.
If you and your friends agree on such a
scenario, let Bo know this agreement through
a written message which I will then transmit
to Bo. I do not know if What I say is appropriatc
you know this better than I."
M said the last sentence of the message was,
added when Bo told M to end with something
"friendly and conciliatory". Bo told M he would
stand by to get K's reaction (Source: Kissinger!
Read 10/4, 8:30 p.m. telecon)
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October 8 1967 -
1967 OCT 10 :IS 53
al= THE ?
SECIZIARY OF DEFENSE
M and A called on Bo at 9:00 a.m. Paris
time and spent 11/2 hours with him. As in
the past Bo was cordial to his visitors
throughout the meeting.
M and A handed the written portion of the
message from Kissinger to Bo, which Bo read
closely. M and A then read to Bo Kissinger's
four "oral points", and Bo wrote them down
Carefully in his own notes. (q and A did
not leave with Bo the "oral" part of the
message.) The written message and oral points
are as follows:
"M should tell B that K would be authorized
to deliver to B in writing the following message
whenever B is prepared to meet with him
officially or unofficially:
?
'The United States Government under-
stands the position of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam to be as follows:
That upon the cessation by the United
States of all forms of bombardment of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
without expression of condition, the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam would enter
promptly into productive discussions with
the United States. The purpose of these
discussions would be to resolve the issues
between the United States and the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam.
'Assuming the correctness of this
understanding of the position of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the
United States Government is prepared,
in accordance with its proposal of
August 25, to transmit in advance to
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the
precise date upon which bombardment of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would
cease and to suggest a date and a place
for the commencement of discussions.'
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In addition M should convey to B the
following oral points'from K:
111. K believes that this understanding
is consistent with B's statements of
October 4, as reported by M, and with the
proposal of the United States Government
of August 25.
"2:' When B meets with K, K would also
be prepared to state the precise date on
which the cessation of bombardiaent would occur
and to give the suggestions of the United States
with respect to the date and site of the dis-
cussions following the cessation of bombardment,
and K would be authorized to receive the views
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with respect
to these and other modalities.
"3. K noted that the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam had not commented on observations by
the United States Government on August 25 with
respect to secrecy of the fact of discussions
between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and
the United States Government.
"4. K observed that officials of the United
States Government had taken note of a reduction
of military activities in the vicinity of the
demilitarized zone. Undoubtedly, the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam had noted the absence in
recent weeks of aerial bombardment in the
immediate vicinity of Hanoi'."
Bo told M to tell Kissinger how much Bo
appreciated K's personal efforts. Bo then
dictated to M and A the following short
message of acknowledgment to K:
"M and A have passed the note from k to
B. In case B will have a reply to make,
he-will make it through this channel."
M suggested that Bo add a sentence saying that
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Bo' was studying the message but Bo refused.
Bo then said on first reading of the written'
note from K, it seemed to him that all that
appeared after the opening phrase stating
US willingness to stop the bombing without
conditions did in fact constitute conditions.
In particular B characterized as "conditions"
the words' "prompt", "productive" and "in
accordance with the proposal of August 25."
M and A said that the latter phrase really
meant that neither side should take advantage
of a standdown of bombing while US/DRV dis-
cussions were in process, as stated in the
August 25 proposal and the President's San
Antonio speech. In this regard M and A
mentioned specifically that serious hostilities
in the DMZ wo01d make productive talks impossible.
(M and A noted that Bo made no
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Vere
rejoinder to the point about the DMZ
in the oral message from K or when they re-
ferred to the DMZ at this place in the
conversation.)
M asked what Bo's response would be if the
words "prompt" and "productive" were taken
out. BO replied that if this happened he
would have to refer back to his government
before answering.
Bo read the third oral point in K's message
as referring back to the portion of the
August 25 message which referred to the
possibility of partial limitations of actions
against the DRV because of the difficulty
of keeping discussions secret after bombing
stopped altogether. Bo said this was
"clearly unacceptable".
Bo also referred to the "usual American
double game"---that on September 29 or 30,
US planes hit a school in Haiphong, killing
30 children.
M and A underscored to B the new features
in the Kissinger message. (Sources: State
49772 and Kissinger/Read 10/8 telecon)
October 9, 1967 - On his own initiative M called on Bo for an
hour early on the afternoon of October 9,
1967. M told Bo that K had made three
principal points in his phone discussions
with M and A following the latter's October 8
meeting with Bo:
(1) The message given to Bo from K
on October-8 had been prepared with great
care. It represented an important and
detailed suggestion about bringing about
discussions to resolve US/DRV differences
following a cessation of bombing.
(2) As K's Washington colleagues con-
tinued ?to note, there had been a virtual
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6
absence of considered responses from
Hanoi to US proposals in this channel
to date.
(3) K is holding open the possibility
of coming to Paris next weekend (as A and
M had urged him to do) but K's decision on
making the trip will be influenced by what
we get back through this channel during
this week.
?
Bo professed surprise that K or M and A saw
anytUng new in the October 8 message, and M
pointed out to Bo that for the first time
in the October 8 message the US was offering
to provide a specific date for the
cessation of bombing.
M pressed Bo for an answer to the inquiry
Bo had informed M and A earlier he was
sending to Hanoi regarding confirmation of
the July conversations with Pham Van Dong
regarding the delay between a stopping of
the bombing and talks. Bo replied with a
French idiom which translates as follows:
"Who does not say 'no', agrees".
Bo mentioned unidentified French reports
charging new US air attacks on Hanoi and
other reports about the concern on the part
of the diplomatic community in Hanoi of
possible strikes against dikes.
Bo took careful notes of the points made by
M and said that if K came,- to Paris next
weekend he (Bp) would be available all day
Saturday and Sunday to see M and A. (Source:
Kissinger/Read 10/9 telecon)
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October 10-11, 1967
Kissinger received a phone call from "Yr who pleaded with "K"
to come to Paris this weekend. "K" advised against his returning
to Paris at this time in order to continue to maximize pressures
on Bo to get something back through the channel. (Kissinger/Read
telecon.)
"K" phoned "M" on 11 October to say that he would return to
Paris as soon as it becomes clear that Hanoi will not respond to
the channel. "K" made three points to "M": (1) that he would
not come to Paris this weekend; (2) that the past U.S. messages
to Bo are clear and speak for themselves; and (3) Washington has
nothing further to say. (Kissinger/Read telecon, 11 October).
October jj967
"M" saw Bo, expressed hope to keep the channel open, and handed
the following message:
17m11
"Actually the U.S. has been following a policy of
escalation of an extremely serious nature. In these
conditions the U.S. proposals of peace are double-faced.
At a time when the U.S. is pursuing a policy of escalation
we cannot receive Kissinger, nor comment on the American
proposals transmitted through this channel.
"The position of the Government of the DRV is perfectly
clear: it is only when the U.S. has ended without condition
the bombardment that discussions can take place."
"M and Bo discussed what 'the conditions' were in the U.S. pro-
posal. M said he thought that the U.S. meant that we wanted a
guarantee of serious discussions when we used the word 'productive.'
Bo said the DRY thought that by use of the word 'productive' we
meant that we wanted to talk about objectives in the South also,
since discussions could not be fully productive without this subject
being considered.
"Bo asked M if K was coming to Paris this weekend, and when
M informed him that K and A would both be in Paris, Bo said that
these were 'positive factors' and indicated satisfaction."
(Kissinger/Read Telecon, October 17, 1967).
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October 191_1967
."K" was given guidance for his discussion with "M" and "A"
These Were viewed as talking points exclusively for use with
"M" and "A".
"1. From the time of your opening discussions with M.
tonight, you should make it entirely clear to him that
Washington considers that the DRV has rejected the forth-
coming USG proposals to bring about an end to the bombing
and prompt and productive US/DRV discussions with no advantage
being taken by the DRV on the ground. You should indicate
that we base this conclusion not only on the negative DRV
message of Oct. 17 but also upon Hanoi's negative public
statements, and, most importantly, upon renewed DRV hostile
actions in the vicinity of the DMZ....but it should be your
objective from the start to indicate that the patience of
your Washington friends is running out and that they feel
that Hanoi has been unwilling to respond on any significant
point."
"2....
"g. You should emphasize that when the DRV messages
in this channel of September 11, September 23 and October 17
are analyzed they show that the DRV has been unwilling at
any time (1) to indicate in this channel or otherwise that
for its part it will engage in discussions with the US even
if the bombing had stopped in accordance with US proposals;
or (2) to make any substantive counter proposal on how to
proceed to discussions leading to peaceful settlement of
differences.
"h. Note that on this date, October 19, a Reuters
dispatch from Hong Kong indicates that 'North Vietnam today
rejected the American offer for a conditional bombing pause
in return for peace talks' as offered by President Johnson
on September 29 and repeated by Secretary Rus.k at his October 12
press conference...."
"3. In reviewing this channel with M. and A. you are
authorized to show to them the text of the September 13 USG
message and other messages which you sent during your last
visit in Paris which they have not yet seen.
"4. Without requesting M. and A. to see Bo, which we
assume they will promptly do to report your mood of discourage-
ment and concern, you should indicate interest in learning
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what .essential differences Bo (not M. and A.) could find,
if any, with the main points in your review of the channel.
L. "5. If pressed, you are authorized to state that the
US proposals do remain open at this time but that you are
r- not empowered to speak about future US views or actions."
(State 56516 to Amembassy Paris, 19 Oct 67).
r-
October 20, 1967
"K" had the following conversations with M. & A. on this date.
They added up to a stalemate in the channel.
"M. met me at the airport in a state of advanced
euphoria. According to him, the last message from Bo
made all the frustrations worthwhile. When I asked
him for the cause of his optimism, he called attention to
the distinction between escalation and bombing and the
change of tense in the last sentence. I quickly disillu-
sioned him. I said that the issue was really quite simple.
If Hanoi wanted to negotiate it should be able to find some
way of expressing this fact by means other than subtle
changes in tense and elliptical references full of double
meanings." (Amembassy Faris 5472 to State.)
"A. replied that he did not think it was quite fair
to charge Hanoi with failing to respond completely. They
had given up the demand for a public declaration that
bombing would stop. Their last message was much soberer
than the first and said nothing about the withdrawal of
American forces from SVN. Nevertheless he thought it
urgent that he and M see Bo as soon as possible. I said
that the decision was up to him as long as it was clear
that the USG had nothing to say. If they met Bo they
should understand. that four points were of particular
concern to Washington: (A) that a bombing stop be fol-
lowed by prompt negotiations, (B) that these negotiations
not be indefinitely delayed, (0) that no advantage would
be taken on the ground, (D) the special situation along the
DMZ." (Amembassy Paris 5507 to State.)
"....A then wrote down the following phrases and asked
me about my reaction: 'The bombardment and other acts of
war against the territory of the DRV are the sole obstacle
to meaningful negotiations. As soon as the bombing ceases,
negotiations can begin.' A. said that he was prepared to
put his personal position with Ho behind these phrases.
I replied that while I could not speak for the US Government
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these phrases would be a big step forward. The DMZ problem
would still have to be dealt with. (I had not seen the
Burchett interview reported in your 57)498 then).
"I left M's house at 2030 and returned to my hotel to
await word about the appointment with Bo. At 2130 A.
called in great distress that Bo had refused to see them.
We agreed to meet at 2230. The following is their report
of the conversation. A did the talking and M. listened on
the extension and took notes.
"A: We would like to see you urgently.
"Bo: There is nothing new to say. The situation is
worsening. There is no reason to talk again.
"A: There is repeat is something new and very important.
"Bo: Repeated word for word the same phrase as before.
"A: There is something very important - perhaps the
most important juncture of our exchanges.
"Bo: Repeated word for word the same phrase but then
added: What is the important matter.
"A: It has to do with the meaning of the last sentence
-of your last message and the sequence with which steps have
to be taken.
"Bo: Our position is perfectly clear. We stand on the
Trinh interview with Burchett of January 28. Bo then repeated
word for word the original phrase."
(Amembassy Paris 55)45 to State.)
October 2o1967,
The following article by Wilfred Burchett was read in Washington
on this date:
"Hanoi, North Vietnam AP - There is no possibility of any talks
or even contacts between Hanoi and the U.S. government unless
the bombardment and other acts of war against North Vietnam
are definitively halted.
"This is the position stated to me during conversations
in the last few days with Premier Pham Van Dong, Nguyen Duy
Trinh, foreign minister and deputy premier, and other high-
ranking government and party leaders.
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"Hanoi is in no mood for concessions or bargaining
and there is an absolute refusal to offer anything --
except talks -- for a cessation of the bombardment. The
word stressed is 'talks,' not negotiations.
"During an informal talk, however, Trinh repeated
that his statement to this correspondent last January 28 --
that talks could start if the bombing was halted -- still
held good. lie said there could be 'meaningful' talks.
Whether they would be 'fruitful' or 'productive' depended
on the United States.
"The mood of Hanoi is one of toughness and confidence.
Although leaders expect Hanoi and Haiphong will probably
be destroyed and that the war may last many more years,
they feel the worst is behind them, that the daily bombings
are absorbed into the country's organism.
"Despite the air assault on Haiphong and intensified
attacks on bridges along the rail link with China, traffic
continues to move out of Haibhong almost normally over
pontoon bridges, and the rail link with China is still
functioning, although occasionally halted for a day or two.
Many tens of thousands of Chinese are working along this
line and elsewhere, keeping rail and road communications
open and repairing bridges."
"It is repeated at every level that total independence
with complete American withdrawal from South Vietnam is the
unalterable aim of the Hanoi government and the Liberation
Front for South Vietnam. They are prepared to fight 10 or
20 years to achieve this, and life is being reorganized on
this basis.
"Hanoi denies that this means export of communism to the
South and insists it agrees with the Liberatjon Front that the
South should remain a separate entity with a neutral, non-
Socialist regime as advocated in the recently published new
political program of the front, having its independent entity,
with reunification a very long-range, step by step process."
October 22, 1967
Bunker was informed by Bundy that the PENNSYLVANIA track "came
to a negative conclusion on Friday, with opposing party refusing even
to accept further contact with intermediaties. We ourselves read
this, in conjunction with concurrent publication of Burchett article
mcm Q70AVM
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t- from Hanoi (sent to you septel) as clear indication that Hanoi
rejects the San Antonio/UN formula and appears to be thoroughly
dug in at least for the time being." (State 58070 to Amembassy
Saigon.)
=
L.
Ambassador Bohlen reviewed PENNSYLVANIA and made the following
suggestion:
....For example to the communist mind for us to insist
that talks must be 'productive' means that we would already
have determined how the talks should come out and would
r-
amount to the acceptance of an American solution to the talks
before they have even "begun. Since no one can possibly tell
f" whether the talks would be productive, I would recommend that
i= this and any other qualification be dropped. A sjmple state-
ment to the effect that as soon as a date and place have
been agreed upon for a meeting we would cease all aerial and
naval bombardment of North Vietnam should be sufficient."
October 23, 1967
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ROMANIAN-NORTH VIETNAMESE CONTACTS, OCTOBER 1966 - NOVEMBER 1967
October 22, 1966
Ambassador Goldberg had a series of conversations with Romanian
Foreign Minister Manescu in late October. The thrust of Manescu's re-
marks was that a U.S. bombing cessation was necessary to create a "better
climate" for negotiations. Goldberg responded with a new bombing formula
to the effect that Hanoi only needed to give "an indication as to what
5-7 would do in response to a prior cessation of bombing by the U.S."
Goldberg emphasized the importance of the words "indication" and "prior."
USUN New York 1777 to SecState (SECRET-RODIS),
22 October 1966, Refs: USDN's 1764 and Deptel 69440:
"4. Said (reftel) 'Me would welcome from Hanoi
through your good offices -- if that is their desire,
as it is ours -- or, if not, through any other channel
of their choosing, an indication as to what North
Vietnam would do in response to a prior cessation
of bombing by the US. Goldberg then repeated this
statement. Manescu then in4uired what Goldberg con-
sidered new in this statement compared to past posi-
tions. Goldberg said words chosen carefully, that
he did not want to assert anything was new but that
he presumed most important word is 'indication.'
Manescu, stating he needed to understand precise mean-
ing, then inquired 'are you ready, then, to cease
bombing in return for an indication?' Goldberg replied
that significance was that we not asking for advance
agreement but rather a statement through a trusted
intermediary as to what North Vietnam would do if
US following suggestions by Manescu and others to
cease bombing. Manescu remarked 'this means that
QUOTE indication UNQUOTE has to have a certain con-
tent.' Goldberg replied 'we do not believe we can
specify the contents in advance, as that would sug-
gest we imposing conditions. We merely say we will-
ing consider sutpending bombing if we receive encour-
aging indication. Of course, if nothing is going to
follow, and the war is continued by North Vietnam
as now, US will not suspend bombing.' Manescu then
stated: 'Vietnam question very important, very sensi-
tive. Smallest misunderstanding in this regard could
have consequences no one desires. War in Vietnam
does not cause victims only in Vietnam. No misunder-
standing or misplaced words can be allowed. It may
not be possible to have another mtg prior to my de-
parture since I am leaving Oct 26 or 27, so this
may be final talk. When I said that cessation of
bombing can create better climate for solution, I
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did not put that forward as a personal opinion. The
answer I am taking to.Bucharest is the following.
QUOTE On the basis of an indication by North Vietnam,
you would consider cessation bombing. In answer My
question as to what indication should consist of you
said iT they go on with war, you would nbt cease
bombing UNQUOTE.' Goldberg clarified this by empha-
sizing: 'If they go on with the war as they are going
on with it now.' He added 'an indication of value to
US would have to demonstrate a desire to move toward
peaceful .settement. -I cannot define it further. I
would rather say QUOTE We are willing to take a step
toward peace if they are willing to take a step toward
peace UNQUOTE. We understand you think cessation
bombing by US would create better climate. We want
to know what step by them would create better climate.
We do not say what this step should be .because we
feel this. would be badly received. Steps can be
later discussed.' Manescu observed that when Romani-
ans discuss 'problem of Vietnam among themselves, they
realize US has its honor and prestige to consider in
approaching a solution. 'Please take into account
that other party has same Consideration.' Goldberg
replied that we had chosen words, to take that into
account. He emphasized the word 'prior' stating we
were not asking for 'prior' move by Hanoi, such as
removing its 19 regiments from South Vietnam prior to
US suspension of bombing. We had deliberately indi-
cated US would make 'prior' move if we got indica-
tion as to what would follow from North Vietnam
after prior suspension of bombing by US. Manescu
then concluded by making special appeal for discre-
tion and agreeing that any inquiries about meeting
would be met with statement that discussion concerned
matters on agenda of UN of common concern to both
parties.- Goldberg assured Manescu that as far as
US concerned he would share contents of discussion
only with Secretary and President..."
GOLDBERG
On the same day, Acting Secretary Katzenbach saw Italian Ambassador
Fenoaltea at the latter's request. The Ambassador repeated the Romanian
message. It should be noted that Katzenbach's explanation of the response
which the U.S. desired from Hanoi differed from the Goldberg explanation.
Katzenbach said that the U.S. would want to know "in specific terms,
publicly or privately, what response would be forthcoming."
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STATE 71460 to .AmEmbassy Manila, Manila TOSEC 52,
22 October 1967:
"1. ...Romanian Ambassador had informed Italians
that, after careful analysis of Vietnam situation-and
on basis of their various contacts, Romanian govt had
concluded that if US were to suspend bombing of NVN
without any time limit or conditions 'appropriate
and positive reaction would not be lacking.'....
112.. Acting Secretary said that'US position
on bombing cessation is as stated by Goldberg. Act-
ing Secretary noted that it was difficult to know
who was speaking for Hanoi, if they were actually
able to speak for Hanoi, and furthermore what speci-
fic response to bombing cessation would be. -Acting
Secretary expressed some skepticism regarding Romanian
approach and suggested that Italian Foreign Minister
might push. Romanian' Ambassador hard on what specific
response US bombing suspension likely to be. Acting
Secretary pointed out that USG could not turn bomb-
ing of NVN on and off lightly andthat we had to
know in specificterms, publicly or privately, what
response would be forthcoming. ..."
KATZENBACH (Drafted by R.H. Miller, FE/VN)
January 23) 1967
Returning by train from the "annual hunt," Ambassador Davis was called
in for a late night conversation by the Romanian President, Council of
State, Chivu Stoica, and Foreign Minister Manescu. They told Davis that
they were now giving him the "signal" which the Americanshad long awaited
from Hanoi. Davis requested permission to follow up this conversation.
BUCHAREST 892 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS),
23 January 1967:
115. Discussion then turned to Vietnam. and we
went over familiar ground with difference this time,
which may be important that Manescu (Stoics. let Manescu
conduct almost all conversation on Vietnam). In con-
text of referring to necessity of cessation bombing
North Vietnam in order that peace talks could begin
said 'you always say you must have signal as to what
would happen. What I tell you is the signal.' I
probed as deeply as I could asking specifically whether
this was based on recent contact with North Vietnamese.
Manescu refused to be drawn out insisting that Romanians
had contlnuous contact with them and that Romanians
convinced information or 'signal' he had given me
was accurate. He specifically requested I convey
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this information to Washington. At one point during
this dialogue Stoica intervened to emphasize that
I should note Romania did not seek to blame either
party for Vietnam situation; they were interested only
in peaceful settlement of problem. Romanians realized
US prestige involved but Vietnamese had problem with
'face' too. At another point both Stoica and Manescu
responded in negative to my question whether import
of what they telling me meant Romania offering to
mediate...."
DAVIS
January 25, 1967
State gave Davis authorization to follow up his conversation.
Davis' instructions stressed the need for "concrete" reciprocity
from Hanoi. Examples of reciprocity were also given: infiltra-,
tion and reduction of incidents in South Vietnam. Goldberg's UN
speech of 22 September was stressed as authoritative.
?
STATE 125269 to AmEmbassy Bucharest (SECRET-NODIS),
25 January 1967, Ref: Bucharest 892:
"3. However, it must be made clear to the Romani-
ans that the United States could in no event stop the
bombing in return for mere agreement to talc since the
stopping of our bombing would improve Banoi's military
position and expose our troops to the dangers of in-
creased DRY infiltration and military action. The
Secretary's conversation with Manescu on October 5,
1966 emphasized this lack of reciprocity in an exchange
of no bombing for talks. Therefore, the reciprocal
response required from Hanoi must be concrete and one
that gave promise of setting in motion a true process
of dc-escalation. Actions relating to infiltration
appear to be those which would have greatest promise.
A significant reduction in the number of Viet Cong
attacks and incidents of terror while important and
to be considered, would be somewhat less satisfactory
since such actions could be resumed easily whereas
reduction or stoppage of infiltration automatically
reduces Viet Cong capability.
"4. You should also state that the US is not
thinking in terms of a written and categorical state-
ment by Hanoi of what it will do if we stop bombing.
We appreciate the difficulty Hanoi might find in ad-
mitting openly or even in an indirect message to us
what they are doing. But, particularly after the
failure of last January's bombing pause, we cannot
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accept simple statements that 'something'
We must have some substantial information
ble source of Hanoi's position. We would
In advance, a reasonably accurate picture
meaningful, discernable, responsive action
would happen.
from a relia-
want to have,
of what Hanoi's
would be.
"5. You should also point out the possibility
raised in Ambassador Goldberg's UN speech of September 22
of a stopping of bombing 'prior' to the other side's tak-
ing 'timely' responsive action providing we had received
assurances, private or otherwise, that the other side
will take such action. That speech remains an authori-
tative statement, of the US position.
"6. You should assure the Romanians of the serious-
ness of the US undertaking, spelled out in the Manila
Communique, to withdraw its troops from SVN within six
months after the fulfillment of the stated conditions.
"7. You should try to find out whether the 'signal'
relates to Hanoi's willingness to begin negotiations if
the bombing stops, or whether it relates to responsive
reciprocal actions as described above. You should also
continue your efforts to determine the extent to which
the 'signal' comes from Hanoi as well as the precise
details of the 'signal.'
"8. If the Romanians are at all forthcoming, you
should ask them to tell Hanoi that the US is prepared
at any time to hold direct and discreet talks with Hanoi."
RUSK (Drafted by 'D.I. Davidson, EA)
January 28 1967
Davis met with Manescu to emphasize Washington's feelings on reciprocity
and to inquire further about the "signal." Manescu admitted that he had
no specific knowledge for this signal.
BUCHAREST 913 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS),
Ref: State 125269:
28 January 1967,
"2: ...I wanted to mention two important points:
(A) United States could in no event stop bombing in
return for a mere agreement to talk. Secretary Rusk
emphasized in his conversation with the FonMin on
October 5 the lack of reciprocity in an exchange of
no bombing for talks; (B) the reciprocal response
requested from Hanoi must be concrete and one that
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gave promise of setting in motion true process of
de-escalation. I then asked if Manescu's statement
concerning the 'signal' related only to Hanoi's
willingness to talk if bombing stops or whether it
related to some responsive reciprocal actions by
Hanoi.
"4. I then asked if Manescu could tell me whether
his statement to me on train had been based on any new
information or recent contact with Hanoi, i.e., some-
thing new, say in the period between his October talk
with the Secretary and now. Correctly speaking, he
replied, no, but it was based on all information and
developments which Romanian government had noted."
DAVIS
January 31, 1967
Davis met with Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu and Secretary General
Ceausescu. Ceausescu said he was not clear on what guarantees U.S. wanted.
The DRV, he said, "wants Ly.s. bombing cessatiorg as a deliberate decision
of U.S. itself." Cessation of bombing, Ceausescu concluded, had to be
the first step. The second. step, according to Ceausescu, was recognition
of the NLF, for "it not possible for DRV to speak on behalf of NIP." In
an important addition, Ceausescu said that "leaders of DRV do not wish to
have intermediaries but would like to talk directly with you." .
BUCHAREST 925 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), 31 January 1967, '
Ref: Bucharest's 913:
Nov
- "5. I then went. beyond these points made with
Manes en on January 28 and in accordance with State
125269 said US not thinking in terms of written and
' categorical statement by Hanoi but we must have some
substantial information from reliable source of Hanoi's
position and reasonable accurate picture of what
Hanoi's responsive action would be to cessation bomb-
ing.
"8. Ceausescu said US referred to wanting guar-
antees or assurances but he was not clear what guar-
antees US wanted. DRV does not require cessation
of bombing As something forced on US but wants this
as deliberate decision of US itself. This would in
no way affect prestige of US but on contrary strengthen
that prestige. Must also think of Hanoi's prestige.
If US looking for honorable solution why not give
other side opportunity for honorable way out. In
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summary, Ceausescu concluded, his view was first step
must be unconditional cessation of bombing.
"9. Second was problem recognition of NLF.
Negotiations with Hanoi not alone sufficient and it
not possible for DRV to speak on behalf on -NLF.
Romania believed political solution must be found...
"11. Ceausescu replied he could not foresee but
under present circumstances 'I cannot obtain' assur-
ances which US seeks. He not do so but it was his
firm belief that cessation bombing would smooth way
to negotiations.. .At this point he made only remark
which I would consider of possibly new significance.,
Ceausescu said 'insofar as I know, leaders of DRV
do not wish to have intermediaries but would like
to talk directly with you. Intermediaries tend to
get things mixed up and DRV does not like intermedi-
aries.'
"12. ...In accordance with paragraph 8 State
Tel .125269 I said US is prepared at any time to hold
direct and discreet talks with Hanoi and if Romanian
government felt it possible we would appreciate their
telling Hanoi this.. .They would tell Hanoi this..."
DAVIS
February 1967
1967
Davis summarized the current status of the Romanian track.
BUCHAREST 932 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), ? 1 February
1967, Ref: Bucharest's 925:
72. We neither expected nor received any hint
of change in Romanian position, i.e., first step
toward peaceful settlement should be unconditional
cessation of bombing of North. But it is perhaps
noteworthy that his references to recognition and
negotiations with NLF and withdrawal of US troops
-were not as categorical as expressed in WarsawFact
declaration on Vietnam of last July to which Romania
had affixed its signature. Moreover, though declin-
ing in any respect to actas intermediary., he did
tell us on his own initiative Hanoi preferred to
talk directly to US and he assented to -convey to
Hanoi that US prepared to have direct and discreet
talks."
DAVIS
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NODIS
October 25, 1967
On no notice and several weeks after his return from Hanoi, Prime
Minister Maurer called in Davis for a Vietnam discussion. Maurer began
by recalling his.conversations with Secretary Rusk and President Johnson
during the time of the extraordinary General Assembly session. He stressed
the President's central point -- the South Vietnamese being able to decide
their own destiny, i.e., "if they want to adopt communism, let them or
vice versa; if they wish to unify with. NV, let them or vice versa." The
'hrust of Maurer's position was contained in a two-point proposal: (1) "US
lust stop, immediately, unconditionally, and once for all bombing NVN;
.and (2) "NVN must declare its agreement to start negotiations...." Maurer
assumed that "talks would start with armed action in SVN continuing." He
.dded that "military actions can cease only when both sides find satisfac-
Gory political solution." Maurer explained that Hanoi's willingness to -
istart negotiations was tied to President Johnson's acceptance of the Geneva
'Agreements of 1954 as a "real basis for discussions." Davis asked Maurer
'whether Hanoi accepted the principle of the South Vietnamese deciding their
,own destiny, and Maurer responeded in the affirmative.
Ambassador Davis asked Maurer whether the President's San Antonio
speech made any impact on his discussion in Hanoi, and Maurer replied that
the speech was available but that the official text was not received by
Hanoi at that time. Arguing that .NVN did not really have many troops in
the South, as the whole US approach to NVN infiltration asserted, Maurer
said that the President's no advantage Formula is not based on reality
and cannot be followed by NVN." Not fully understanding the formula,
Maurer said that Hanoi could not stop supporting whatever troops it had
in the South.
Maurer stressed that this was, indeed, a propitious time to get nego-
tiations started, that the Soviet Union and Hanoi were in agreement with
the information he had just passed on to Davis. Maurer concluded with a
very interesting approach to the problem, saying that the two sides were
indeed far apart, but once both sides were at the table, "then the other
nations desirous of seeing an end to conflict would try to push two sides
together."
BUCHAREST 604 to SecState (SECRET-EXDIS) 25 October,
1967
"3. ... He summarized these views-, which he pre-
sented to Hanoi, as follows: world wants to see end of
VN war, not only public opinion but governments.
There was unity in USG on Vietnam question. Witness
his separate conversations with President and Secretary
Rusk, and he described to North Vietnamese USG position
as outlined by them. Romanians believed that under
present circumstances prospects were opening up for '
discussions with possibility discussions leading to
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peaceful solution. Certainly solution would not come
immediately after- sitting down at negotiating table.
But if talks conducted in constructive and realistic
fashion- with aim to provide Vietnamese people right
to decide their own destiny: to take into acCount-dig-
nity and -prestige of each state and to create conditions
for -establishment of normal relations and stability
between VN and US, then possibility solution existed....
"4. Maurer then said that after this exposition
to Hanoi leaders, they discussed possibilities of
starting negotiations. Maurer had explained Romanian
position as follows: ? US must stop immediately, un-
conditionally, and once for all bombing NVN; NVN must
declare its agreement to start negotiations ?ith US
on elimination of conflict. Certainly at this time
armed action in SVN would not cease. It is one thing
to mobilize and demobilize a force such as US has in
SVN. US could leave within three days and come back
again within three days. But 'if popular forces in
SVN demobilized, then remobilization would require
much more time. So talks mould start with armed action
in SVN continuing. Aim of negotiations would be to
put an end to these armed actions. They would cease
effectively when discussion would lead to mutually
acceptable decisions and details could be discussed
further.
"5. At this point, I broke in to ask whether
Maurer was saying that initial discussions would
center on cessation of military actions to be followed
by political discussions.
6. PrimeMin replied he did not separate these
questions then or now. Military actions can cease
only when both sides find satisfactory political
solution. As long as no guarantees existed that
SVN could decide its own destiny, there was no reason
for them to put aside weapons. So, Maurer continued,
he had requested North Vietnamese friends -to declare
categorically that, in case bombardment ceased uncon-
ditionally and forever, they would be willing to
start negotiations because US position as explained
to him by President Johnson and Rusk for a solution
within framework Geneva Agreements of 2_954 provided
real basis for discussions.
"7. According to Maurer, Vietnamese replied
in a sense which essentially agreed with Romanians;
i.e., if. bombardment ceased, they would be prepared
to enter negotiations. To my question whether Vietnamese
would state readiness to negotiate before or after
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bombardment ceased, Maurer replied he did not dis-
cuss details: it was possible Vietnamese could make
this statement before or after; this was up to them.
"8. Maurer commented that his discussions with
North Vietnamese had covered many aspects, but he
would emphasize only those of interest for US to
know.
"A. They had reviewed capacity of North
Vietnamese resistance in case war goes on. From
all points of view, military economic, political and
social, 'I can tell you NVN can carry on long-term
struggle.' This affirmative NVN assertion well known
throughout world.
"B. North Vietnamese leaders are aware they
cannot and could not try to humiliate US. Discussions
should be conducted in such way so that actual recog-
nition of South Vietnamese people to decide on destiny
should have agreement and support of US. Besides,
North Vietnamese do not lock upon settlement of SVN
problem as necessarily leading to immediate reunifi-
cation. It would depend upon what SVN would decide.
"D. In sum, Maurer asserted that he found
in NVN 'position much more rational than we found
year ago in talks of much same content.' He assorted
this position was not determined by diminultion NVN
military capacity; it was no secret fighting capacity
of NVN growing and would continue to grow because of
more important aid from socialist countries. -
9, Maurer then said he would like to add some
other aspects as he saw them in conjunction his desire
to put at disposal of US the most complete information
possible to help USG with its judgment. Remarking
he was not telling US a secret, he said that to a
great extent the hard stand of Hanoi was influenced
by the hard line of China. In Romanian view, this
Chinese influence in Vietnam at present moment 'from
war viewpoint' is diminishing....
"12. At this point, I asked whether NVN had
accepted this principle of full liberty SVN people decide
own destiny. Maurer replied 'yes -- absolutely yes.'
He asserted that from their common discussions there
emerged quite clearly acceptance principle SVN should
decide own destiny and indeed there emerged possi-
bility of diplomatic relations and special ties be-
tween US and SVN state as result of talks ending
conflict.
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"13. This shows 'NVN. leaders do not see aim of
solution as reunification....
"5. .At this point, I asked whether President's
San Antonio speech on Vietnam had been available to
-him during course his discussion in Hanoi. Maurer
replied in affirmative, saying it had come over radio
-during course their discussions last day. I then had
interpreter read President's two sentences in regard
cessation bombardment NVN as quoted in Secretary Rusk's
opening statement his news conference October 12 and
'asked whether North Vietnamese had reacted to this
to PrimeMin. Maurer replied negatively, saying Presi-
dent's statement came by radio on eve his departure
and North Vietnamese had no definitive text.
"16. Maurer then said that he wished to make
clear his view on a central problem which in his
opinion is looked upon in an erroneous way in USA.
He said he did not, of course, discuss with North
Vietnamese leadership NVN infiltration into SYN.
However, he would like convey his own impressions.
NVN, of course, denied sending men into SVN. Accord-
ing to Maurer's impressions, this is not quite true
though we might be wrong. He knows they're sending
to SVN supplies, weapons, munitions, medicine, food
and possibly specialists and technicians for training.
His impression is that NVN troops even if they are
to be found are few. So when President Johnson speaks
about obligation not to take advantage
of cessation of bombardment, he is referring to things
which are not based on reality and cannot be followed
by NVN. For example, NVN could not cease to support
struggle in SVN because struggle is going on. At
any rate, US doing same thing for SVN armed forces.
Maurer repeated, according his view, NVN troops as
such are few if any and that during cessation of
bombing, NVN would continue to supply SVN struggle
with food and munitions and indeed some of the aid
socialist countries give to NVN. He concluded
President Johnson's formulation does not seem satis-
factory as it proposes a unilateral condition.
"17. I explained our point of view and the
necessity of some indication from Hanoi of reciprocity
if we should cease bombardment. I cited our experi-
ence when on past occasions we had ceased bombardment
NVN. Maurer showed himself well aware of our position,
but said he thought more than that could be done. US
a great and powerful nation and could do mere with
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their possibilities without risking failure. 'Possible
military disadvantage would be compensated by political
advantage.' In Maurer's opinion, there had never
before existed so many favorable conditions for reach-
ing political settlement.
"18. ..Soviets had expressed agreement with
Romanian position saying they looked at things in
same way, but emphasized decision must remain with
Hanoi. Maurer added that moreover he had stressed to
Soviet leaders that increase in economic and military
aid by socialist countries to NVN is apt to assure
greater liberty to Hanoi. According to Romanian
judgment, this would make Hanoi less dependent on
Chinese.
"19. Maurer summed up by saying his thoughts
were very clear: negotiations' would start; US would
put forward list of proposals unacceptable to NVN
and Hanoi would do likewise. Then the other nations
desirous of seeing an end to conflict, would try to
push two sides together.
desire.'. Friends of both
to give a little here and
be compelled to listen to
tion could be found."
DAVIS
November 1) 1967
'This
sides
there
them.
is our hope and our
would compel each
and both sides would
Thus, in end a solu-
State responded with interest and a good many precise and exploratory
questions tothe Maurer interview. State also indicated that Governor
Harriman, on his way back from Pakistan, could pursue the matter should
Bucharest desire. The questions State was interested in focused on:
(1) whether the bombing stop had to be permanent as well as unconditional;
(2) the distinction among contacts, talks and negotiations; and (3) the
authorization for the Maurer statements.
State also instructed Ambassador Davis to pursue the President's
San Antonio speech and clarify its meaning. Davis was told to say that
the speech was "not assuming North Vietnam would cut off its support to
its forces in the South while the armed struggle was continuing. At the
same time USG would feel if NVN sought to take advantage of the bombing
cessation or limitation to increase its support of its forces in the South,
to attack our forces from north of DMZ or to maintain large-scale visible
resupply efforts now impossible..."
STATE 63057 to AmEmbassy Bucharest (SECRET-NODIS),
1 November 1967, Ref: Bucharest 604:
...For example, as reported reftel, Maurer
explained Romanian position as requesting North Vietnam
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to declare cate'gorically that in case bombardment ceased
unconditionally and forever North Vietnam would be
willing to start negotiations for a solution within
the framework of the 1954 Geneva Accords. According
to Maurer the NVN replied in a sense which essentially
agreed with Romania, i.e., if bombardment ceased they
would be prepared to enter negotiations. The precise
wording of the reply is obviously of great significance
to the USG. Did Hanoi ask for cessation of bombard-
ment? Did Hanoi use the words permanently or uncondi-
tionally? Did Hanoi differentiate (as it has in the
past) among contacts, talks and negotiatibns and which
word did they use to describe the discussions that would
take place after the stopping of the bombing? Was it
clear that the stopping ofbombing would be followed
by talks within -a short time? What indications were
there of the matters that would be taken up at the
talks?- What was Hanoi's reaction to Maurer's request
that it 'categorically' declare its readiness to be-
gin talks after the stopping of the bombing? FYI
Usual DRV formulation is that talkicould' follow
bombing halt. End FYI.
"5. Other specific points on which we hope Maurer
will be willing to furnish -further information include:
"a) .Whether the expectation that fighting
will continue in South Vietnam concurrently with nego-
tiations is Romanian or North Vietnamese and, if NVN,
the reasoning behind their expectation.
"b) Whether NVN agreed with Romania that
basic provisions of '54 Geneva Accords provided real
basis for discussions. If so, can Maurer provide
any specific indication of how North Vietnamese view
basic provisions?
"C) - What did Hanoi indicate as its conception
of conditions under which South Vietnamese people could
decide their own destiny?
"d) What 'special ties' between South Viet--
nam and the US did North Vietnam see as possibly emerg-
ing as result of talks ending conflict?
e) What is the basis for Maurer's distinc-
tion between the NVN leaders who use their own brains
and those who make judgments under Chinese influence?
What underlies his judgment that Chinese influence
on North Vietnam 'from war viewpoint' is diminishing?
What 'elasticity-I-in position of USG does Maurer suggest
would strengthen independent elements in North Vietnam?
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Nikel
"f) What further information can Maurer
provide as to North Vietnam's views on reunification
of Vietnam?
"g) To what extent did North Vietnam leaders
authorize Maurer to give report to USG?
"6. You should enquire whether, since Maurer's
conversations in Hanoi, Romanians have received any
indication of Hanoi's reaction to the President's
September 29 San Antonio formulation. In connection
with this enquiry you should state that the President
has instructed you to inform Maurer of two important
points:
a) There can be no doubt as to the magnitude
of NVN infiltration into South Vietnam. Through the
capture Of hundreds of prisoners, thousands of docu-
ments, the interrogation of numerous defectors from
the NVN army and other means of intelligence collec-
tion the USG can state categorically that there are
now in South Vietnam at. least 50,000 regular soldiers
of the North Vietnamese Army formed into at least 80
battalion. Furthermore, the USG estimates on the
basis of reliable evidence that NVN infiltration has
averaged approximately 5,000 men per month over the
last two years. Finally you should note that continued
artillery and other attacks upon US positions in South
Vietnam just below the DMZ are being made solely by
regular units of the NVN army 'which are not included
in the figures given above.
"b) The President, in making his assump-
tion that the North Vietnamese would not take advan-
tage of. the bombing cessatien or limitation while
discussions proceed, was not assuming North Vietnam
would cut off entirely its support to its forces in
the South while the armed struggle was continuing.
At the same time USG would feel if NVN sought to take
advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation to
increase its support of its forces in the South, to
attack our forces from north of DMZ or to mount large-
scale visible resupply efforts now impossible it would
not be acting in good faith."
RUSK (Drafted by S/AH: Davidson/Isham
November 2 - 14, 1967
On 2 November in Bucharest 6)-i8, Davis said that since Maurer was .
in Moscow, he had sought an appointment with Macovescu and conveyed contents
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f
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,14111,
F
r7 ?
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of paragraph 3, State 63057. Macovescu said that he would handle the
matter with dispatch. On 4 November in State 64852, State indicated that
.Governor Harriman could be in Bucharest anytime from November 27 to Novem-
ber 30. On 3 November, in Bucharest 651, 'Davis requests permission to
give Macovescu questions and information contained in State reftel in order
to facilitate Maurer's discussions in Moscow. State concurred (State
65068) with this course of action on 4 November. On 6 November, as stated
in Bucharest 668, Davis handed the pa-per to Macovescu. Cabling on 6 Novem-
ber in Bucharest 669, Davis reported that the Romanian government agreed
the Harriman visit at the end of November. On 14 November in Bucharest
112, Davis reported that Maurer had granted him an appointment for the
following day.
eNovember 152 1967
? Maurer accompanied by Macovescu had a long and very careful session
with Ambassador Davis in'which Maurer responded in detail to the questions
contained in State 63057. While the cable is more revealing of Romanian
thinking on Vietnam than on Hanoi's positions, Maurer's presentation seemed
to clarify a number of points. It should be noted, however, that many
of these "clarifications" were out of-whack with other signals and read-
ings the USG was. taking at the same time. Maurer's key responses were:
(1) that the bombing cessation had to be permanent and unconditional be-
fore talks can start; (2) that the Romanian objective was to get negotia-
tions started "without interrupting armed actions in SVN"; (3) that a
real basis for reaching a solution existed "because essential. points of
, NVN position are based on 1954 Geneva Accords just as essential points
' President Johnson's position based on Geneva"; ()-i-) that Hanoi made "no
differentiation?between contacts, talks and negotiations," and that "only
reference was to discussion's which would lead to solution of conflict...";
(5) that Hanoi believasthere should be a "certain lapse of time" between
cessation.of bombardment and start of negotiations; (6) that Hanoi "under-
stood necessity bf assertion of clear stand in regard to negotiations."
Maurer made clear that Hanoi in no way authorized this report.
BUCHAREST 718 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), 15 November
1967, Refs: State 63057 and Bucharest 668:
."1. PrimeMin Maurer received me for two hours
this morning Nbv 15 accompanied by Acting FonMin
Macovescu and same interpreter as at first meeting.
Today Maurer had before him paper which contained
Romanian translation of questions embodied in paper
which I had handed Macovescu on Sunday Nov 5 (Romanian
translation was in script which indicates strict secur-
ity control these conversations by Romanians about
which PrimeMin Maurer again made special point several
41110, ? times during ensuing discussion).
(-,
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r '
"2. Beginning with para 4 State 63057, Maurer
proceeded to read and answer questions seriatim.
"3. To question did Hanoi ask for cessation of
bombardment, Maurer answered 'yes and no.' In explana-
tion, he went on to say that both in his talks with
Hanoi and on other occasions, Hanoi has said that per-
manent and unconditional cessation of bombardment is
necessary before talks can start. This is also the
Romanian viewpoint. He left Vietnam convinced that
this was Hanoi's view. Hanoi more or less presented
this view in the statement by their FonMin in January
1966 .although it was 'more hazily' expressed in this
statement and more linked with other things. Maurer
continued that objective his discussions was ,hat
cessation of bombardment must lead to negotiations with-
out interrupting armed actions in SVN. Obvious there
.existed possibility of reaching solution because essen-
tial points of NVN position are based on 1954 Geneva
Accords just as essential points President Johnson's
position based on Geneva. Thus there is a basis for
discussions. Certainly there may be certain nuances
-how one side or the other understand provisions of
Geneva Accords, but this is why talks should be held
to bring to common denominator all aspects..
"4. Maurer said this justified his first asser-
tion that reply was 'yes.' 'But why,' Maurer asked,
'did I also say no.' Because during these discussions
there was not one single moment when the people to whom
we talked referred to this as their desire -- only a
necessity resulting from respect for international
norms, for sovereignty of NVN and it was presented
as 'practical possibility to bring matters to discus-
sion.' Maurer concluded this is why his reply was
made in such 'circumstantial manner because I want
my reply to be clear and definite.'
75. Did Hanoi use words 'permanently'_ or 'un-
conditionally'? Maurer replied, 'yes,' saying French
word idefinitivement' had been used for 'permanent.'
"6. Did Hanoi differentiate among contacts,
talks and negotiations and which word did they use
to describe- discussions after stopping-of bombing?
Maurer replied this was not touched upon in Hanoi.
He only touched upon subject of discussions which would
lead, if possible, to cessation of war and settlement
of conflict in Vietnam. No differentiation was made
between these words.. Only reference was to discus-
sions which would lead to solution of conflict and
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r- TO AUD1Z
1.
'I did not notice any nuances' in position NVN. Goal
floe'
is political settlement based on essential point of
Vietnamese and 'as I understand it President Johnson's
viewpoint' that right of South Vietnamese people to
determine freely and of their own accord their destiny
must be recognized.
r
L.
:
r?se
I ,
1 -
"7. Was it clear stopping of bombing would be
followed ty talks in short time? Maurer replied that
there wasa rather longer discussion on this point
because NVN viewpoint was that 'certain lapse of time'
should pass between cessation of bombardment and start
of discussions. Maurer said, 'we tried to show them
that it was not quite necessary for this lapse of
time. I should like to say in this regard that my ?
impression is that at end our talks NVN adhered to
their original viewpoint, i.e., a certain lapse of
time should ensue. We talked quite a lot abut this.
Perhaps they have certain reasons better understood
by them than by us.'
78. Here Maurer said he would like to interject
his .own opinion. Should NVN adhere to this position,
nevertheless cessation of bombing would constitute
a start of-friendly actions upon NVN in order to make
this interval as short as possible. 'I think there
would be many States, not only Romania and not only
socialist countries, who would be ready to exert pres-
sure by friendly advice on NVN to follow cessation of
boMbing by something to shorten interval between this
and start of discussion.' Maurer concluded that though
this was personal reflection he wished to emphasize
that there were many socialist and other countries
who could have a certain influence on NVN.
"9. What indications were there of matters that
would be taken up at talks? Maurer answered cryptically,
'none. I avoided discussing such subjects and I con-
tinue to do so. I am not mandatory of either NVN or
USA. In doing What I did, I did not defend either
USA (which doesn't need it) or NVN (though I wish to
defend it). What made us go to Hanoi? Our friendly
relations with Hanoi are quite Obvious and our friend-
ship grows greater so long as those events go on and
on. So we decided to go to Hanoi to discuss these
events as I described to you last time. We agreed
we should meet from time to time to consult each other.
Moreover, I had advantage of talks with President
Johnson and Secretary Rusk. I thought I noted some-
thing very positive in these discussions which led
me to folowing absurd conclusion.'
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'12. To question what was Hanoi's reaction to
Prime Minister's request that it 'categorically' declare
its readiness begin talks after stopping of bombing,
Maurer replied their discussions on this topic were
rather long and they ended with North Vietnamese state-
ment that it seemed to them 'Romanian point of view
as presented logical one and they would think about
it and how it could be practically implemented.'
Maurer said they had not been so punctilious about
certain words, but his idea as presented to Hanoi
was that it should state clearly that if bombing ceases
then talks would start. 'Since it and NVN said QUOTE
your stand logical one, UNQUOTE I can only understand
that such a statement must be made from NVN own words.
I did not think of formulation for such a declaration
because of nature of our discussions. Moreover, there
was no evidence that NVN had thought of formulation.
We discussed certain ideas and result is that NVN
understood necessity of assertion of clear stand in
regard to negotiations.'
"13 Re questions.A through G in paragraph 5
State 63057, Maurer answered as follows:
"A. Both Romanian and NVN point of view
is that fighting will continue in SVN concurrently
with negotiations. Maurer asserted he did not discuss
reasoning for common acceptance this expectation but
remarked NVN standpoint might have some different
nuances as compared with his own. His own viewpoint
is that while easy for US to mobilize or disband great
military force in Vietnam on side NVN is completely
different. They need more than 48 hours to mobilize
or disband their forces. This was no secret. This was
not first time 'strategy' of popular war is being dis-
cussed. Maurer asserted it was quite logical that
military actions would be ended only when discussions
created for both sides certainly of mutually accepta-
ble conditions. 'This is reason why I believe military
actions and politica/ discussions will continue in
parallel.'
"B. Maurer stated that EVN has always
asserted that 1954 Geneva Accords provide real basis
for negotiations. This is something which constantly
appears in statements issued by leaders of NVN and
NLF. 'Deliberately we did not discuss any subject
which might be the subject of negotiations between
the two sides. This is for the Vietnamese and Ameri-
cans.'
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? "C. To question what did Hanoi indicate
as its conception of conditions which SVN people could
decide their own destiny, Maurer said he did not ask
as he did not ask President Johnson about US concep-
tions. (Comment: Here for first and last time he
mentioned the name of NVN Prime Minister Phan Van Dong
as a participant in talks.)
"D. As to 'special ties' between SVN and
US emerging as result of talks, Maurer said if SVN
decided to remain separate state this would mean it
could establish not only diplomatic but economic,
cultural, etc., ties with many states of its own choos-
ing, including USA.
"E. To question what is basis for Maurer's
distinction between NVN leaders who use their own
brains .and those who make judgments under Chinese in-
fluence, Maurer replied simply, 'I am basing myself
on 65 -years experience of life.' He continued there
was complete unity of NVN leadership concerning secur-
ing for SVN people right todecide their own destiny
but he thought it logical there would be nuances in
their way of thinking which would be determined by
fact that 'some of them have wider liberty in their
thinking while others have a more influenced pattern
of thinking.' Here Maurer paused and said he would like
to say something.very important though he was aware
of the risk in imparting to US his view: 'My firm
impression is that at present in NVN there are men in
the leadership holding the most responsible positions
who enjoy great liberty in their thinking.' At this
juncture, Maurer with a somewhat wry smile remarked,
'what would Chou En Lai say if he knew whatI told
you? What would the North Vietnamese leadership Say?
What would happen to relations between Romania, China,
and North Vietnam if they knew? As regards what under-
lies-Maurer's judgment that Chinese influence on NVN
'from war viewpoint' is diminishing, Maurer said he
would prefer not to answer; there was great risk for
Romanian government policy here and exclaim 'think
what would happen if China or NVN knew I admitted this
affirmation. But I said this and I stick to it.
Why did I tell you this? Because I think this is
a QUOTE commanding UNQUOTE thing on part of he who
wishes to obtain certain results. For this reason I
said it was logical US should heed this fact; that
policy should be flexible enough in order to allow ,
free thinking people to develop willingness to adhere
to such ways of thinking.' To question of what.'elas-
ticity' in position of USG does Maurer suggest would ,
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strengthen indepenOent elements NVN, Maurer replied
cessation of bombing is cried out everywhere. It
would constitute an act of great political wisdom.
Maurer said he was not taking liberty of trying give
lesson to leaders USA but he thought it was good to
say what he had told US frankly and openly. He be-
lieved leaders USG have wisdom and insight to see what
in his thinking might contribute ?to peace and inter-
ests of US itself.
"F. To question re further information as
to NVN views on reunification Vietnam, Maurer simply
replied he had nothing to add to what he had already
said on this subject.
"G. To what extent did NVN leader- authorize
Maurer to give report to USG?. Maurer replied, 'absolutely
none. It was my own exclusive responsibility.' Maurer
then explained at some length why he had done this.
Essentially because he believed there exist conditions
which can lead to political solution. Existence of
conflict, troubles, many important thingsin which
Romania is interested. Especially after New York
and Washington discussions, Maurer was confident USG
was / garb12 solution. He went to Hanoi to explain
that a common basis existed for discussions to end
hostilities. He was far:from-thinking in Hanoi that
he would inform USG of his discussion there, but in
the end and upon further reflection he thought it?
important. to movethis unhappy situation toward more
reasonable solution.. He was not pushed by NVN but
acted solely on own initiative. It might be that
NVN would reproach him greatly for this but objectively
-he believes a reasonable solution is near.
"14. Maurer stated that subsequent to his visit
in Hanoi Romanian government has not repeat not re-
ceived any indication of Hanoi's reaction to Presi-
dent's September 29 San Antonio formulation. In
answer to my question, he stated flatly that Romani-
ans had not participated in discussions on-Vietnam
during their recent visit to Moscow."
DAVIS
November 17, 1967
In Bucharest 729, Ambassador Davis cabled his impressions from the
Maurer conversation. He believed that Maurer was frank and forthcoming,
but that the only new element which Maurer introduced was "his intimation
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that there-are divided councils in Hanoi and that Chinese hard stand
influence is diminishing." Davi 's accepted Maurer's statement of basic
Romanian policy -- "existence of conflict troubles many important things
in which Romania is interested."
November 29, 1967
In Bucharest 802, Davis reported 9n a discussion with Ceausescu.
reausescu took a very hard line in this conversation and argued, in effect,
hat the "DRV and NLF represented South Vietnamese people." He further
stated that US was repeating the mistake of great powers in the past by
ignoring the opinion of others and carrying out an imperialist policy.
's to why Hanoi refused to accept the San Antonio formula, Ceausescu main-
ained that the formula imposed conditions, and that a formal declaration'
by the US was in order.
BUCHAREST 802 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), 29 November
1967:
"5. Ceausescu referred to my morning conversation
with PrimeMin and in particular to request that PrimeMin
try and help bring US and Vietnam together. Ceausescu's
opinion any such attempt now would not lead to very
'spectacular' results until cessation of bombing.
While Ceausescu agreed that reunification of divided
countries should not be achieved through force, yet
blandly argued that NIP had put forth program for r6-
unification only as long-time and peaceful development
with which DRV agreed. He asserted that DRV could
not wage war in South which did not have support of
people there and suggested US policy based on incomplete
information and incorrect assumptions. To my repeated
questions why Hanoi had slammed door in face President's
generous San Antonio offer and why Hanoi refused tb
say either publicly or privately what would happen
after permanent cessation of bombing. Ceausescu took
line we were imposing conditions; that a bombing pause
would be only another form of ultimatum; that absence
of formal declaration of war raised problems in inter-
national law (i.e., bombing) not in favor of US and
that if US would only cease bombing permanently. and
unconditionally other countries would exercise pres-
sure on both sides to bring them to negotiating table.
Ceausescu also argued that cessation bombing would
be act of political wisdom."
DAVIS
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10 - JAVILLO
November 29, 1967 -- Harriman-Maurer Conversations
Maurer carried on a monologue in which he reviewed the points he had
previously 'made in Bucharest 6o4 of 25 October. Maurer again focused on
only one objective .-- getting negotiations started "and nothing more."
In this respect, he repeated that world opinion would push the two powers
toward a settlement once negotiations began
Maurer was told a very interesting story about Hanoi's view on getting
.
discussions started. In his first meeting with Pham Van Dong, it was his
mpression that Hanoi did not wish to enter discussions-. During the next
day's talk with Bong, Hanoi's position softened. Dong took the position
:that North Vietnam "should enter discussions while continuing the struggle
ln the South as long as there is uncertainty as to the right of the SVN
.2eople to decide their destiny." Dong, expressing what Maurer considered-
to be the leadership position in Hanoi, desired a "rather more circumstan-
tial " statement on Hanoi's part. "NVN was to declare that it was ready to
start discussions with the US if the US declared and ceased unconditionally
:and permanently for all time bombardment over NVN DMZ, if. US. declared that
. :it would 'never resume." Even in this event, Hanoi "would allow certain
time to pass to enable it to test sincerity of such declaration and action."
Maurer, as before, continued to stress that a very serious part of
the problem was China. Although he believed that the Chinese faction in
Hanoi was losing some influence, it was still quite strong.
Harriman, in response, said that what was missing from this dialogue
(* was "any indication that Hanoi wants serious negotiations, that Hanoi says
' that US should stop bombing, but does not even say that they will talk."
Harriman gave the impression that all we were waiting for-was a message
from Hanoi that they would enter "meaningful talks." Harriman also noted
Hanoi's- demand for a "permanent cessation."
! F
1,_.; ?
BUCHAREST 803 to SecState (SECRET-NODIS), 29 November,
r- 1967:
r
L,
r-
t
"1. After briefly touching on Middle East and
Manescu's election and performance at UN,. I brought
up Vietnam and conveyed the President's gratitude
for the complete account Maurer had given Ambassador
Davis. I asked Maurer if he had given full attention
to the President's San Antonio speech. I told him this
was as sweeping a statement as had ever been made
during war and showed the President's desire for nego-
tiated peace I informed him that the interpretation
of the 'no advantage' formulation which we had pre-
viously given him had been conveyed to Hanoi through
channels then open. I told him of our disappointment.
at Hanoi's having turned down the offer so coldly and
asked for his, judgment as to why Hanoi had done so.
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"2. Maur6r then launched into what was virtually
a two-hour monologue out of a three hour discussion.
He said he did not know directly why San Antonio offer
had been turned down since speech was given on last
day of his talk with Pham Van Dong and neither of them
had text available.
"3.. His talks with the President and the Secretary
had convinced him that primary and overriding American
goal was to guarantee right of South Vietnamese people
to determine their own destiny and only secondarily to
fulfill commitment to GVW. Based on this belief, he
advised Pham Van Dong that without ceasing military
action in South, NVN should enter into discussions
with US. He told Dong that the struggle in the South
should conclude Only when US and NVN both agree on
how SVN people can define freely their own destiny.
Then as President Johnson told him categorically Ameri-
can troops will go home.
"4. Maurer deliberately focused on only one thing:
'The starting of negotiations and nothing more.' Maurer
believes that once discussions begun the nations of the
?world will throw their influence behind reachinga suc-
cessful conclusion and would put pressure both on Hanoi
and the US that would push them towards solution accepta-
ble to both sides. US and NVN both agree that SVN people
should decide their own destiny and discussions could
work out different understandings each side may have of
this principle.
'5. At the end of the first day of conversations
with Pham Van Bong (interrupted once or twice by having
to go down to air raid shelter), Maurer concluded from
the hazy and contradictory answers he received that
Hanoi did not wish to enter discussions. Maurer decided
not to pursue the matter further. The next day Maurer
suggested that they discuss bilateral relations but
after a short morning devoted to bilateral matters
Dong brought the talks back to negotiations.. Dong then
asked Maurer to allow him to present Hanoi's stand-
point on the statement Maurer had asked Hanoi to make
to the effect that if bombardment would cease, they
would enter into discussions with the US.
"6. I questioned his use of 'would,' saying that
Hanoi usually uses 'could.' Maurer replied that it
is difficult for him to recall precise word but that,
it didn't matter since they were talking in French,
and Dones French is so poor that no such nuances
could be retained:
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"7. Maurer continued that this time Doug's position
was very clear and logical. Dong asserted that you
(Maurer) are right. The DRV must make such a state-
ment. It should enter discussions while continuing the
struggle in the South as long as there is uncertainty
as to the right of the SYN people to decide their des-
tiny.
"8. Maurer and Deng then discussed details on
how such discussions could begin. Dong thought that
Hanoi's statement must be 'rather more circumstantial,
that is to mean NVN was to declare that it was ready
to start discussions with the US if US declared and
ceased unconditionally and permanently for all time
bombardment over NVN DMZ if US declared that it would
never resume,' Hanoi would allow certain time to
pass to enable it to test sincerity of such delcara-
tion and action. Maurer asked why these conditions,
when one condition could be enough -- that the US
declare that it ceases unconditionally and for all time
and that it would not resume the bombing. Why, Maurer
asked, should there be an interval between end of
bombing and start of negotiations?
9. Maurer apparently did not receive an answer
to his question. He indicated his personal belief
that there exists within the North Vietnamese leader-
ship some with points of view more reserved towards
negotiations than one with which Dong finally agreed.
He thought such reserve might be the result of the
Chinese viewpoint. Maurer told me that the US should
exercise flexible judgment meant to strengthen the
Vietnamese (as opposed to Chinese) way of thinking.
"10. Maurer emphasized that the important thing
was that on the second day Pham Van Dong was express-
ing the opinion of the North Vietnamese leadership.
While Maurer did not see Ho, Maurer believes that
at every intermission Ho was told of the discussion.
Maurer believes that on the night of the first day,
Ho was consulted and that there might even have been
a meeting of the North Vietnamese leadership.
"11. Maurer then turned his monologue to what he
described as the 'serious angle to problem': China.
Re said that if the Chinese leadership know of today's
discussion, Romanian and Chinese relations 'would be
buried.'....
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"12. Maurer said that the Chinese reply was 'dis-
concertingly short.' They said that they agreed partially
with Maurer's judgment, that they thought that the US
had only two choices, either leaving VN, or expanding
the war. If the US extended the war, then it was
inevitable that it would expand over China. The Chi-
nese said that 'we are ready for this and are waiting
for it.' ... I asked whether he thought the Chinese
did want war. Maurer said that he wouldn't say they
wanted it, but he wouldn't say they don't want war...
Maurer said he knew the evolution of the position of
the socialist states on VN. At the beginning they
furnished less support to NVN than they do now. Con-
tinuation of the situation would bring them closer
together.
".14. I told him that what is missing is any indi-
cation that Hanoi wants serious negotiations, that
Hanoi says that the US should stop bombing, but does
not even say that they will talk. They ask not only
for unconditional but permanent cessation of bombing.
I pointed out that Hanoi isnow attacking US forces
just below the DMZ, and that since the President will
not permit the invasion of NVN, the only way we can
slow down their attack is to hit their positions in
NVN. I mentioned the Canadian suggestion of the re-
establishment of a demilitarized DMZ and Hanoi's re-
jection. I said there seems to bj a strange idea that
the bombing of the North is not part of the military
action of the war, but is somehow disconnected. Hanoi
is asking the US to commit itself not to resume bombing
while leaving itself free to do anything it wants. I
said it was our impression that Hanoi has no serious
intention of entering meaningful talks, for if they had,
they would send US a message either through Maurer
or other channels. If they sent US a message privately
or talked with US privately on conditions necessary
prior to beginning of negotiations, or if they told
US what they intended to do, this would be another
matter. I pointed out that we have no intention of
destroying the regime in NVN, but just want to stop
it from taking over the South by force. I told him
that I would have thought the socialist states would
be putting pressure for negotiation on Hanoi, rather
than encouraging it by escalating aid, and that I thought
the socialist countries should recognize that we are
not threatening the regime in NVN, but that we are
under treaty obligation to defend GVN against aggres-,
sion from NVN. I said it was my impression that the
Soviet Union and the Eastern European states, but
not Peking, want the fighting stopped, and that if
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concern exists about major confrontation, we should
get together to agree. upon ending of conflict.
"15. I said we thought that the San Antonio state-
ment, supplemented by the explanation given Maurer,
made clear a possible way to end conflict.
"16. I said I was sure that Maurer agreed that
above all the President wanted negotiations for a
peaceful settlement, and asked him if he had any doubt
about this. He replied that he had none, that if he
had any he wouldn't have talked to NVN as he did.
I asked him if he thought ITN had a right to enter
SVN, and whether he thought West Germany had a right
to enter East Germany. I recalled that we fought
in Korea because the North entered the South. I said
divided countries were unhappy situations, but the
US has agreed, and we consider that the socialist
countries have agreed, that there will be no unifi-
cation by force. I told him that perhaps he hoped
reunification of Germany would never come, but that
while we hope that it will, we do not want it to come
through force. I referred to our SEATO commitment
undertaken in 1954 during the Eisenhower Administra-
tion, and said that the socialist states should real-
ize the seriousness with which we consider our obliga-
tion and should try to induce Hanoi to terminate its
aggression.
17. I asked Maurer how he thought the President
could contribute to a change in Hanoi's attitude.
I said a pause might be considered, though unless
Hanoi acted differently than last time, it would be
of a short duration and create a more difficult situ-
ation. I explained how Hanoi had taken advantage of
the Tet pause. I said I hoped the Soviet Union, Romania,
and other Eastern European countries would use their
influence to get talks started under conditions which
would give some hope of a successful conclusion. I
said that asking for a permanent cessation without
any indication of what might result -- perhaps nothing
is like asking us to tie our right hand behind our
back while fighting continues. It would be different
if they said stop bombing for two weeks or a month
while we talk, but they ask for a permanent stop.
I asked how this could be taken seriously.
"18. Maurer said he 'absolutely agreed' that
bombing is a part of general military action, and said
he would go further, by saying that from the military
point of view not only could bombing be recommended,
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but that the occupation of NVN as a way of destroying
the 'backyard' of SVN could be recommended. After
NVN was temporarily occupied and the war in the North
became a guerrilla one, the same military recommenda-
tion could be made concerning China, which would become
the new backyard. But, said Maurer, it would not be
justified from the political viewpoint. War is nothing
but politics conducted by other means. It is waged
to bring one side in a political conflict a decisive
advantage. This is why political considerations should
be dominant and it is why President Johnson does not
permit his troops to cross the DMZ. From the military
point of view he said the President was wrong in not
ordering the crossing of the DMZ, but from the politi-
cal point of view he is correct, and that is why he
/garbijnot justified on military grounds.
"19. Maurer admitted that the cessation of bombard-
ment involved risks that talks may not start for some
time, that negotiations may start but be unduly pro-
longed, or that they may not result in a solution.
But he thought that with all countries (except possi-
bly Chita) exerting their influence, there would be
a settlement.
"20. I commented that the President is using limited
means because of the limited character of our objectives.
He did not want to invade NVN because he had no inten-
tion of interfering with a solialist regime which he
knows socialist states will defend. He ordered attacks
on supply routes and military targets but against the
advice of the military he has not ordered mining of
Haiphong harbor and interference with its shipping.
We have not attacked the dikes or engaged in area
bombing of population centers as was done in World
War II. The President's military advisors say the
situation in the south would become substantially
more difficult if NVN were permitted to freely move
men and supplies South. I appealed to Maurer as a
man in a strategic position who has the ear of Presi-
dent Johnson, of the Soviet Union, of China and Hanoi,
to advise us as to how we can bring about negotiations.
I repeated that it was impossible for the President
to stop bombing permanently, without some indication
from Hanoi as to what would happen. I said the Presi-
dent had made his proposal in San Antonio, and that
he would be willing to receive any other reasonable
proposal from Maurer. Maurer replied that the Presi-
dent might put more hope in Romanian action that was
justified. Maurer said that he believed there was
now a consensus between the US and NVN that people
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of ,SVN should have right to decide their own destiny.
Knowing that, said Maurer, we will see what we can
do. 'There is no doubt that we will try to do some,-
thing about it.'
"21. Maurer did not think it was necessary to
involve Soviet Union yet. When that time came, he
thought US was in a better position to do so than
Romania.
"22. The discussion continued after lunch. I
then asked Maurer whether he had any steps in mind
now. He replied affirmatively, but said he could
not name them yet, that the subject must be thought
over and studied. I asked him to keep Ambassador
Davis informed."
DAVIS
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PACKERS (RUMANIAN-NVN TRACK): NOVEMBER 1967 - FEBRUARY l968
It was only after the Harriman-Maurer discussions in Bucharest
on November 28,_1967 that the Rumanian track began to receive high level
'attention and priority in Washington. . Maurer had recently returned from
North Vietnam in an attempt to .convince the DRV, so he said, to make a
statement about entering discussions with the U.S. while continuing the
in the south. Maurer said that he stressed to Pham Van Dong that
self-determination was the essence of the U.S. position.
Harriman explained the San Antonio formula to Maurer. ?"The North.
could," Harriman indicated, "continue supplying its force to the extent
it does now but that it must not increase." Harriman expressed the hope
that GOR would take appropriate stepswith Hanoi to explain this. Maurer
said that he would take such steps under consideration. Harriman concluded
that what was. lacking was any vindication" or "impression" or "message"
that Hanoi wanted serious negotiations.
On December 12 3,267 First Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu and
First Secretary of the GOR Embassy Iliescu (hereafter M & I) left Bucharest.
They arrived in Hanoi on December land stayed until the 18th. They arrived
a few hours after a U.S. strike on the Doumer Bridge, which was resbruck
on December 17.
Their schedule of meetings was as follows: (a) dinner on Friday,
the 15th, with Foreign Minister Trinh, (b) a meeting with Trinh in the
morning of December 16, (c) Sunday afternoon meeting with Pham Van Dong,
(d) on the morning of the 18th there was a DRV Politburo meeting, (e) another
meeting with TrinfifTe-FTh-d?Politburo session in which Trinh spoke to
M & I from a written text. Rumanians left Hanoi on the evening of the 18th.
The Rumanian discussions with the DRV leadership were not revealed
to the U.S. until M & I visited Washington on January 5, 1968. (Substance
will be treated at that point in the chronology.) In other words, the
Trinh statement of the DRV position made on December 29 was already public
knowledge.
From December 14 through 18, while M & I were in Hanoi, Ceaucescu and
Maurer visited Moscow, informed the Soviets of the Harriman talks and the
M & I mission. They reported that the Soviets wish success to the GOR mission
in Hanoi.
On December 19, M & I visited Peking and saw Deputy Foreign Minister
Gua. Gua said Wit is the Vietnamese people who will have to decide."
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On December 24, M & I returned to Bucharest.
On December 26, Ambassador Bogdan advised that Ceaucescu and Maurer
had a message and wanted to send an emissary to the U.S. Harriman advised
Bogdan that he would be glad to receive the envoy.
On December_39, Trinh spoke at a Mongolian reception. The substance
of his talk was broadcast by Hanoi VNA in English on January 1. He stated,
in part:
"The stand of the Vietnamese people is quite clear. That
is the four-point stand of the DRV Government and the political
program of the NELSV. That is the basis for the settlement of
the Vietnam question.
"The U.S. Government has unceasingly claimed that it wants
to talk with Hanoi but has received no response. If the U.S.
Government truly wants to talk, it must, as was made clear in
our statement on 28 January 1967, first of all stop unconditionally
the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV. After
the United States has ended unconditionally the bombing and all
other, acts of war against the DRV, the DRV will hold talks with
the United States on questions concerned."
On Decem)2erg2, Ambassador Bogdan informed Harriman thatM would be
the special envoy.
On January 3, 1968, the U.S. prohibited bombing within five miles of the
center of Hanoi ci--C-S-677-02 DTG 032158Z) until further notice (JCS 6700 DTG
0621)8Z).
On January 5, Ambassador Harriman met with Madovescu, Bogdan, Iliescu,
and Celack (-Third Secretary of the Embassy).
M & I said that they had presented USG views as expressed by Harriman.
These views were that the U.S. is ready to cease bombing (1) if, within a
reasonable period of time, the DRV would come to serious and productive
discussions/negotiations, and (2) if the DRV would not. take advantage of
the bombing halt to increase its infiltration. The GOR representatives
said that they stressed to the DRV that they should make a "gesture" or
"sign" publicly or privately that Hanoi wanted negotiations. M & I said
that they repeatedly stressed that the U.S. goal for South Vietnam was
self-determination.
Throughout their stay, the North Vietnamese stressed to M & I that the
military situation was good for them. Hanoi leadership also repeated that
they did not trust U.S. peace feelers, that the Harriman exposition was
nothing new, that it was essentially as conditional as the San Antonio
speech.
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M & I said that they were quite pessimistic about the success
of their mission until after the Politburo meeting on the morning of
December 18th. It was only after that meeting that Trinh came to them
with what they believed would be a responsive message. Trinh spoke
from a prepared Vietnamese text and M & I, when speaking to Harriman,
translated the document into French. M explained that Trinh began in
even harsher terms than Pham Van Dong had the previous day. M said that
he was "not going to give a presentation of all fTrinh'g exposition, but
as I promised Trinh, I shall at least give you spirit of his document."
"It is clear that it is equally as difficult for the U.S.
to put an end to the war as to broaden it. The U.S. is bound
to strive to prevent the situation from getting worse and to
avoid serious defeats until after the November election.
"The U.S. 's aggressive designs against Viet-Nam remain
unchanged.
"The U.S. declares that it will continue its aggressive war
in Vietnam. In the San Antonio speech and in other statements by
the President and Rusk it is emphasized that the U.S. will stay
in Vietnam in the interest of its own security and that it will
abide by its commitment and that it will continue the fight. The
U.S. perseveres in its double faced policy of stepping up the
war while the U.S. administration feels compelled to take peace-
ful action to deceive and to appease public opinion.
"It is now clear that conditions are not yet ripe for peaceful
settlement because the U.S. is unwilling to do so. The U.S. can-
not intimidate by force the Vietnamese people nor deceive them by
false maneuvers of peace. As long as the U.S. continues this
aggression the Vietnamese people will fight to final victory.
The position of the DRV is clear:
'The basis for settlement of the Vietnamese issue
is provided by the four points of April 8, 1965; the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsequently issued its
January 28, 1967 statement. This is our position of
principles on which no concession is possible.'
"Macovescu read the material in quotes twice from the paper
in front of him.
"Harriman: No concession on the four points or on the January
statement?
"Macovescu: No concession possible. I Would ask you to note
this for comment for he also gave me oral comments.
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"He said the Harriman proposal contains nothing new. Essentially
the U.S: continues to claim reciprocity and will not stop until
specific conditions are fulfilled. The Vietnamese people will not
hold discussfons under pressures or the menace of bombs. So far I
thought this was repetition of their position. But from here on
there is something which interested me and precisely because it was
near the end I paid greater attention to it.
"Foreign Minister Trinh continued reading:
'We are not against discussions but any discussions
should take place according to principle. As soon as dis-
cussion engaged in, our attitude will be serious and
responsible but it depends on attitude of the U.S. whether
such discussions are fruitful.'
"Material in quotation marks was read slowly and carefully by
Macovescu.
"Here is the answer to the question that you asked Mr. Harriman.
From this point on there is a passage which in the text is in quota-
tion marks.
'We affirm the following. If the USG really wants
discussions with the Government of the DRV it should first
unconditionally cease bombing and any other act of war
against the DRV. After the unconditional cessation of all
bombing and of any other U.S. act of war against the DRV and
at the end of an appropriate period of time the government
of the DRV will enter into serious discussions with the USG.'
"While he was reading this paragraph I stopped him and told him
comrade Minister when I mentioned cessation I said final and uncon-
ditional. Trinh looked at me and reread the sentence. I said I
mentioned 'final and unconditional cessation.' He reread the
sentence again. I interrupted for the third time. May I under-
stand you are no longer speaking of final cessation. His answer
was that publicly we may continue to mention it but with a view
to negotiations. What I have said is our position.
"I asked him whether the Government of Romania is authorized
to pass this communication to the USG. He said yes. He repeated
it but he said to retain spirit of the message."
Harriman said that the Trinh public statement was much the same as
the M & I message, but that the M & I statement placed more emphasis on
the acceptance of the four points as a basis of negotiations. M said that
he did not establish any connection between his visit to Washington,
unknown to Hanoi, and the Trinh public statement. Harriman argued that
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"there must be some Connection." .M responded that he did not believe
there was a contradiction between the two messages:
"In the public statement it says the basis for negotiations
is the four points, but in private conversation they say we will
come with this basis but the U.S. side, we expect, will come
with its own point of view. They especially said this."
Harriman then questioned whether it was the DRV view that discussions
- 11 be fruitful only if we accept their four points. M responded:
"That is not the impression I gained from my discussions.
They will came with their claims but would have to negotiate on
what the U.S. puts forth. They said this specifically."
With respect to the timing of discussions, M said that Trinh stated
there could be no contacts "as long as U.S. acts of war continue,...
but as soon as bombing and other acts of aggression against North Viet-
namese cease, we are prepared to receive anybody...." Trinh added: "We
shall consider these contacts as normal diplomatic activities. The
American representative will be received by our diplomats at their suggestion."
Harriman questioned further on the timing, specifically as to the
meaning of "after a suitable length of time." Here, M retreated to the
DRV text--"the appropriate and necessary period of time." M explained
this as a period in which
"they will try to test (I don't know by what means) the
sincerity of your intentions?your wish to have discussions.
I could not deduce the period, but I do not think it will be
too long. If an understanding is reached that you stop, at a
certain established period, discussions, not negotiations,
will take place."
Harriman asked if the NLF had been mentioned. M responded: "Once,
by Dong...in connection with the program of the NLF and on their points
which they would like to discuss at negotiations." M reported that there
was no mention of involving the NLF in discussions but that this may have
been a slip.
Harriman specifically queried on the DRV reaction to the San Antonio
speech. M said that they would not give any assurances on 'no advantage'
because "they believe it is a condition and consequently cannot be dis-
cussed." M and Harriman then argued about whether 'no advantage' was
conditional. Harriman said: "The important thing is that they are on
notice, that taking advantage could have serious consequences." Harriman
repeated that there was a danger of talks breaking down "for physical
reasons--because of difficulty in negotiations." Harriman said that "this
is not a condition but a notice to Hanoi."
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Harriman asked if the North Vietnamese thoroughly understood the
implications of San Antonio. M said that he could not draw conclusions,
but
"They have a political attitude towards it--no preconditions--
but if you met them and discussed it at your first contact you may
well find a solution which will not break dawn the military sit-
uation. We must not forget that through the other door the U.S.
is pouring in men and supplies. Furthermore, you only stop in
the North and fighting and bombing in the South will go on."
In response to a question by Daniel Davidson, Special AsSistant to
Harriman, M said that the period after the bombing and before talks is
the same as the period after the bombing and before contacts.
M, again responding to Davidson, said that it was only his impression
that military matters could be discussed at the first contacts, that Hanoi
had said nothing to him on this matter.
M concluded that: "We Rumanians believe they have done it--given you
the sign you wanted."
On January 6, there was another meeting by the Rumanians and Governor
Harriman, with Secretary Rusk participating as well. This discussion was
very general and added only a few points to the substance of the preceding
day.
Secretary Rusk said that "some of 5anoi's leadershi think of talks
as a means of stopping the bombing while the rest of the war goes on without
limitation. This is not acceptable." He added that: "The problem on our
side is that the principle of reciprocity is rather important to us."
In a response to a Rusk question, M said that Hanoi would favor "private
discussions." M said that he had not discussed the secrecy issue in Hanoi.
Mudded, however, that:
"There is no doubt that at the present stage, the Vietnamese
side wants 5ontact7 kept confidential. But after the cessation
of bombing a way in which future procedures are directed towards
starting 'conversations proper' will depend on your discussions
through a third party."
M then read from a document:
"As long as the US acts of war go on we cannot have
any contacts with them. As soon as they cease the bombings
and discontinue the acts of aggression we shall be prepared
to receive any person, even a representative of the United
States, who may wish to make known to us the American point
of view or to get informed on our viewpoint. We shall regard
these future contacts as normal diplomatic activity. The
American representatives will be received by our representa-
tives at the former's suggestion."
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"Secretary Rusk and Governor. Harriman met with Messrs
Macovesu, Iliescu and Bodgan from 12:45 p.m. - 1:15 p.m., and
the Secretary gave Macovesu two papers containing the 7 written
parts and 4 oral points set forth below. At 5:15-7:15 p.m.
Governor Harriman and Mr. Bundy met with the Romanians to
explain further our drafts and to give them our French trans-
lation of our written points. Harriman told Macovesu we left .
it up to the latter's judgment as to what part and how to
convey our points in Hanoi.
"U.S. Written Points
"1. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has communicated to
the United States Government this statement of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam position:
'If the United States Government really wants dis-
cussions with the Government of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam it should first unconditionally cease bombing
and any other acts of war against the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam. After the unconditional cessation of all
bombing and of any other United States act of war against
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and at the end of an
appropriate period of time the Government of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam will enter into serious discussions with
the United States Government.'
The United States Government- welcomes this statement.
"2. We understand that Foreign Minister Trinh has stated that
as soon as' all bombing ceases, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
'shall be prepared to receive' a United States representative. The
United States Government will be prepared to have its representative
have contacts with a representative of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam as soon as all bombing ceases. (The United States Govern-
ment believes that the first contacts should take place almost
immediately, perhaps one or two days, after the cessation of bombing.)
The purpose of these contacts, which might be in Vientiane, Rangoon,
Bucharest, or some other suitable third-country location, would be
to fix the time and place of the serious discussions referred to by
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Arrangement of the necessary
modalities for the serious discussions should take no more than a
few days.
"3. The United States Government takes note of the fact that
a cessation of aerial and naval bombardment is easily verifiable.
In fact, the act of cessation would be observed immediately inter-
nationally and become a matter of public knowledge and speculation.
In these circumstances, the United States Government believes that
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the 'serious discussions' referred to by the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam should commence immediately on the conclusion of the
arrangements through the contacts.
"4. Obviously it will be important at an appropriate time,
in connection with the serious discussions, to accommodate the
interests of all parties directly concerned with the peace of
Southeast Asia. One such means is that the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam and the United States Government might suggest to the
two co-chairmen, and possibly to the three International Control
Commission members, that they be available at the site chosen for
the serious discussions in order to talk to all parties interested
in the peace of Southeast Asia. This procedure could avoid the
problems of a formal conference.
"5. The United States Government understands through repre-
sentatives of the Romanian Government that the serious discussions
contemplated by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would be without
limitation as to the matters to be raised by either side. The
attitude of ?the United States Government toward peace in Southeast
Asia continues to be reflected in the 14 points and in the Manila
Communique.
"6. The United States Government draws attention to the
statement of President Johnson in San Antonio on September 29 in
which he said:
'The United States is willing to stop all aerial and
naval bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this will lead
promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume
that while discussions proceed, North Viet-Nam would not
take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation.'
The aide memoire handed to the Romanian Government in November, 1967,
which we understand was communicated to the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam in mid-December, explained this statement in the following
language:
'The President, in making his assumption that the North
Vietnamese would not take advantage of the bombing cessation
or limitation while discussions proceed, was not assuming
North Viet-Nam would cut off entirely its support of its
forces in the South while the armed struggle was continuing;
at the same time the United States Government would feel if
North Vietnam sought to take advantage of the bombing cessation
or limitation to increase its support of its forces in the
South, to attack our forces from north of the Demilitarized
Zone or to mount large-scale visible resupply efforts, now
impossible, it would not be acting in good faith.'
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The United States Government wishes to confirm to the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam that this statement remains the position of
the United States Government.
"7. The United States Government would inform the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam in advance of the exact date of the cessation
of aerial and naval bombardment in order to enable the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam to have its representative prepared to meet
the representative of the United States Government.
"U.S. ORAL POINTS
"(a) The Romanian representative should be thanked for his
efforts and told that we are confident that he has and
faithfully reported the positions of both sides in these matters.
We are grateful for this action and have confidence that he will
continue to do so.
"(b) He should understand that the first sentence of para-
graph 4 in the written message is intended to refer to the importance
of the South Vietnamese Government and other interested parties being
present at the site of the discussions in order to play an appro-
priate role.
"(c) The United States Government wishes to avoid any misunder-
standing also with respect to any allegations which may be made
concerning specific military actions by the United States Government
against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam prior to cessation.
In deference to the serious intent and sincere objectives of the
mission of the Romanian Government, the United States Government
will refrain for a limited period of time from bombing within five
miles of the center of Hanoi or of Haiphong. This information is
for the Romanian Government only. The United States Government
states this as a fact and not as a commitment as to the future,
but the United States Government would not wish the Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam to be informed of this fact for fear that, as
in the past it could be misinterpreted by them.
"(d) The United States Government awaits with interest the
report of the Romanians, after consulting Hanoi, on the foregoing
written and oral points.
"During the course of the January 11, 12:15 and 5:15 discussions,
clarification of the USG position was given as indicated under the
several headings below:
"(I) US Cessation
) Harriman stated that we 'pointed out' or 'took note'
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that cessation would be public knowledge, but said
we hadn't thought about a public announcement and
opined that we would simply stop.
"(b) Bundy stated personally that we would probably
confirm an answer to questions that cessation was
a high-level decision without amplification and
Harriman agreed, adding that we would not mention
a time limit or condition it.
"(2) First Contacts
'(a) Timing - Harriman said 'should take place' is merely
our interpretation of 'as soon as' and not an ulti-
matum ('Des que' was actual French preposition used
by DRV). WAH underscored verb 'believes' as opposed
to 'insists' in same sentence 'one or two days after
cessation'.
'The maximum GOR can get us is that they will meet
us in 2 or 5 days 'after cessation' - the more you
can get of this the better but we are not asking for
those precise answers.'
"(b) Duration - Harriman noted US opinion that modalities
to be agreed on in contacts should not drag on more
than a few days, but invited DRV's different opinion
on duratioft.
"(3) 'Serious Discussions'
"(a) Rusk noted it will be difficult to conduct them
secretly, and if they are public many governments
and parties will feel entitled to participate.
'We could lose months'. Accordingly we suggest
'one such means' in the Para 4 that the Co-Chairman
and 3 ICC members send representatives to the loca-
tion and 'any one else' could be there to discuss
with the 2 or the 5 or with each other. Peking
could be present. This procedure could avoid the
problem of a formal conference. We don't anticipate
a big meeting with 8, 12 or 15 present but the 2 or 5
could put their heads together on the possibility of ,
agreement.
"(b) Harriman assumed that 'all parties directly concerned;
with peace in SEA' would include any socialist state
aiding DRV and SVN and the TCC's on our side. He
noted, since the DRV third point covered internal SVN
affairs, that the 'US won't talk about anything
specifically in SVN without a GVN rep being present.1
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"(4)
GVN should have an opportunity to come into
talks 'at an early point'. 'We don't want to
exclude anyone who has a legitimate right to be
present 2Lt.....9_2,ppnp.riate time.' Our para
four proposal is 'complicated' and 'quite
open to their suggestions.'
"(c) NLF - Harriman noted validity of our 13th point
that the VC 'would have no difficulty being repre-
sented and having their views presented.'
"(d) Open Agenda - Bundy said 'we would take very seri-
ously' DRV confirmation of the wide open agenda of
serious discussions.' Bundy and Harriman confirmed
our view that both sides could discuss their bases
for peace; ours would be reflected in the 14 pts
and Paras 25-29 of the Manila communique. We feel
both sides should be prepared to negotiate.
Bilateral US/DRV Discussions
"(a) Rusk noted that at the location of the Co-Chairman
and/or ICC members meeting 'any one else could...
discuss.. .with each other.'
"(b) Rusk said if talks became public, as he thought
they would 'both sides will have a serious time'
holding discussions (beyond contacts) without
other. parties 'associated'. But 'this does not
mean there cannot still be bilaterals, but we
cannot have a situation where everyone else is
excluded.' If Hanoi makes that suggestion 'we will
at it but it will be difficult.'.
"(c) Harriman: 'There are many things that we can
talk to NVN about that relate to us and NVN.'
11/ \
(5) 'No advantage'
"(a) Macovescu said the spirit of our November 'promemorial
had been given to Hanoi and he would repeat it there.'
"(b) Harriman said the President used the 'no advantage'
assumption to inform Hanoi what he would be assuming
if he stopped bombing. The US does not ask advance
DRV agreement.
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11(c)
Harriman said we could negotiate under better
conditions if the level of hostilities were
reduced. The DMZ would be the easiest place to
deescalate. The GOR may have other suggestions.
Amb. Bogdan said the Romanians understood 'no
advantage' is 'not a condition but a warning,'
and Harriman said the US was not requiring Hanoi
to agree to any conditions in advance.
"(6) Miscellaneous
"(a)? The GOR intends first to inform Hanoi, and then
if they approve, to convey the gis of the dis-
cussions with us to Moscow and Peking. We would
be happy to have the Soviets informed.
? "(b) Macovesu said he left Washington, as he had left
Hanoi, with the feeling that 'this is a new step
towards a peaceful settlement.'"
On January 12, Ambassador Bunker was given a summary of PACKERS (State
98130).
On January 15, President Johnson sent a letter of appreciation for the
Rumanian efforts to President Ceaucescu (State 98)1.90).
On January 18, Macovescu, Iliesco and Celack left Bucharest for Hanoi
via Moscow and Peking. Ambassador Bogdan informed Harriman of this trip _
on the 18th.
Also on January 18, Ambassador Harriman informed Bogdan that the
President's January 17 State of the Union remarks "confirmed the San
Antonio formula." Harriman said: "The U.S. has not changed its position."
On January 20, Bunker gave Thieu a general summation of U.S. probes
of the December 29 Trinh statement--without revealing the PACKERS channel
(Saigon 16501). Bunker did so in accord with his request (Saigon 16081)
and cable of instruction (State 996)-1.3). Bunker was permitted to tell Thieu
the explanation of 'no advantage' as given by Governor Harriman to the
Rumanians. In his talk with Thieu he made "a distinction between the
contact's to explore Hanoi's position and possibly to set up any 'serious
discussions' and the discussions themselves." He assured Thieu that "any
further decision will be a matter of full consultation with you and with
our Manila allies." Thieu expressed no reservations, about the U.S. approach.
Thieu expressed the view that the Trinh statement was good propaganda by
Hanoi. Bunker had urged permission to speak to Thieu on the basis of Bui
Diem's "implication that U.S.-Hanoi contacts to bring about a negotiation
would be tolerable the GYU, provided 5hie.t.7 was kept informed of them
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and given an opportunity to express his views before a rapidly moving
situation becomes a fait accompli."
On January 22, Macovescu et al arrived in Hanoi. The U.S. was not
informed of the results of his visit until February 12.
On February 12, Ambassador Harriman was informed of the results of
the GOR visit to Hanoi by Ambassador Bogdan. Bogdan reported that Macovescu
had been in Hanoi from January 22nd to the 28th, and Macovescu talked
mainly with Dong and Trinh.
The GDRV asserted to Macovescu that "it did not consider the proposals
of the USG an answer to the Trinh declaration of 29 December, and that .
San Antonio conditions remain."
At this point, Bogdan dictated the following passage:
"The position of the Vietnamese people and of the Govern-
ment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is very clear.
There are the four points of the Government of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam and the political program of the National
Liberation Front of South Vietnam. This is the basis for the
solution (reglementation) of the Vietnamese problem. We
stated clearly: if in actuality the United States Government
desires conversations, as it says it does, it must in the first
place stop unconditionally the bombardment and all other acts
of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. After a
convenient period of time, following the unconditional cessation
of bombardment and all other American acts of war against the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam will start conversations with the United States of America
on the questions of interest to the two parties he Ambassador
understands this to mean the interest of either side, not a common
interest7. The convenient period of time is the time necessary
to prove that the United States has really and without conditions
stopped bombardment and all other acts of war against the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam. After the unconditional cessation of
the bombardment and all other acts of war against the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam a meeting will take place between the two sides
to reach an agreement on the place, the level, and the contents of
the conversation. The right position and the correct attitude of
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have been
warmly welcomed and supported by the peoples of the world. The
attitude of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is serious. If the
conversations are leading or not to results, this depends on the
United States."
Bogdan added that the GOR was ready to transmit communications to
either side and that when Ambassador Davis returns to Bucharest he could
' obtain further details from M. Bogdan said that M was in Peking on
January 31 and informed the Chinese Government of the various positions.
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The, Chinese repeated that "it was up to North Vietnam." He said that Moscow
would soon be fully informed as well.
, Governor Harriman took note of the continued threat to U.S. forces in
the DMZ area and said that "his unofficial reaction is that Hanoi does not
wish talks...."
On February 24, Ambassador Davis spbke to M (State 117922). M told
D. is that after his discussions in Washington, Hanoi quickly responded to
r
his travel request to Hanoi. M noted that when he reached Hanoi there was
no U.S. bombing, but in accord with U.S. wishes he said nothing about this
U.q. decision to the North Vietnamese.
! M conveyed to Trinh the GOR belief that "minimum of conditions now
created to take stride forward on road to negotiations."
tow'
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KILLY
ITALION - NORTH VIETNAMESE TRACK: FEBRUARY-MA.11GL, 1968
The following account of Italian-North Vietnamese contacts was
given on February 24, 1968 (ROME 4429).
January or February 1967
Fanfani stated that he had been asked through a channel which he did
not reveal whether he was prepared to receive an unidentified North Viet-
namese. Secretary Rusk was informed and suggested that Fanfani first
find out who the contact was and what authority he would have. Fanfani
asked these questions, they were never answered, and he heard nothing
further from this contact.
3.1LV or August 1967
Fanfani was asked by a different contact (also unspecified) whether
he would be interested in sending d'Orlandi to get in touch with the North
Vietnamese AnbassadOr in Prague. The unspecified contact was aware of the
January contact. Fanfani said that there was no doubt that the initiative
for the Prague meeting came from Hanoi.
Septemberj 1967 - First Meetina
On instructions from Fanfani, D'Orlandi flew to Prague and met with
North Vietnamese Ambassador Su. D'Orlandi asked Su why he had sought this
meeting, but did not receive an answer. Su did say that he was aware of
d'Orlandi's role in MARIGOLD. D'Orlandi advised Su that Hanoi should move
rapidly to seize the opportunity of a trip Fanfani would make to Washington
in mid-September and authorize Fanfani to transmit something new. D'Orlandi
specifically requested that Hanoi set a period after the stopping of the
bombing for the first contact with the U.S. D'Orlandi told Su that Fanfani
would carry weight in Washington if he could present a time and place for
the meeting between the DRV and the U.S. Su replied that he would be unable
to obtain instructions from Hanoi prior to the Fanfani trip to Washington.
Early NoVenill 1967 - Second Meeting
After a delay of more than 50 days, d'Orlandi returned to Prague and
said to Su that he was entitled to a reply to his suggestions of September.
Su said that the matter was being considered in Hanoi, but that he had not
received a reply. D'Orlandi again stressed the importance of the need for
Hanoi to set a time and place for negotiations after the cessation of U.S.
bombing. Su said everytime Hanoi produced something in favor of negotiations
the Americans backed out and showed bad faith. D'Orlandi stressed to Su a
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favorite theme of some substantive agreements prior to the first face-
to-face contacts between Hanoi and Washington. He said the Italians would
be glad to transmit such issues between the two parties. Su said that
he odght soon be going back to Hanoi.
Su stated that if d'Orlandi's trips to Prague became known the North
Vietnamese would deny everything. Su also asked d'Orlandi not to get in
torch with the DRV Prague Embassy unless it was most urgent because he would
bc leaving for Hanoi within a week. Su would contact d'Orlandi the moment he
returned to Prague.
Jaivary, 1968 - Third Meeting
D'Orlandi flew to Prague. Su said there was general approval in Hanoi
of the idea of starting negotiations. Su said that he had been authorized
to talk to Fanfani. It was arranged that Su would come to Rome on February U.
February 17, 1968
State sent out to Rome some follow-up comments of Fanfani's which had
been transmitted to Secretary Rusk by Ortona on February 16. There were
two main points: (a) That the Italians do not have the "impression" that
San Antonio has been substantially rejected. They do believe, however, that
although reciprocity is unacceptable to Hanoi, Hanoi might consider some
"concession"; and (b) That a direct U.S.-NVN meeting was unlikely but that
Hanoi may be interested in preliminary soundings and direct channel, possibly
the Italians.
The cable also noted the Washington Post story, date of February 16,
dateline Rome, which went into considerable detail on Italian-North Vietnamese
conversations.
State also indicated reserve with respect to this track.
The Killy slug began with this cable.
(State 117384)
Daniel Davidson, Special Assistant to Governor Harriman, was dispatched
to Rome to arrive on February 20. (State 117385)
February 18, 1968
D'Orlandi was told that Su could receive him in Prague on the 21st.
D'Orlandi told Fanfani that he was expected in Hanoi on the 21st and Fanfani
expected him to defer his trip. Su had been expecting d'Orlandi for several
days, and d'Orlandi had not given him any reason for the delay.
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February 23, 1968
Davidson and Meloy met with d'Orlandi and Fanfani. Fanfani, in
translating his notes from Italian to English, repeatedly made a more
positive translation than was warranted by the Italian. ?
"Major points in his notes were:
' "(A) Su (NVN Ambassador to Prague) described NLF as the
representative of a great number of Southerners.
"(B) Su flatly rejected reciprocity but suggested that
when contacts had been established after cessation of bombing,
North Vietnamese could certainly take favorable measures and
might also suggest some act Of good will to the NLF. Fanfani
asked if among those measures Hanoi was thinking of humanitarian
measures such as liberation of Fs and received an affirmative
reply. Fanfani suggested, as example, that it would be useful
in order to improve atmosphere for Hanoi either before or on
first day of the meetings to free PWs against previously agreed
upon concessions on part of United States. Su replied that he
agreed but was not authorized to answer. He did say that much
will depend on attitude of US representatives at first encounter.
"(C) It is very apparent from notes that each time MARIGOLD
ten points were mentioned, they were dragged in from deep left
field by Fanfani. For example, initial reference to them came
when Fanfani remarked that freedom of South Viet-Nam and non-
intervention which North Vietnamese said should be part of settle-
ment appeared already in the ten points 'of Tripartite Agreement
of Saigon.' Fanfani asked whether Su meant to refer to those
understandings and Su replied that the ten points had been bypassed
by events but perhaps they can be referred to in broad outline.
The only other reference to MARIGOLD occurred when Fanfani recalled
that the 'three negotiators' to get around problem of reciprocity
accepted Phase A-Phase B formula. Su replied that he was not
authorized to discuss Tripartite contacts or current validity of the
ten points but that he would submit the question to Hanoi.
"(D) Fanfani pressed Su extremely hard for the specific number
of days (e.g. two days) between cessation of bombing and initiation
of a dialogue between Hanoi and US. He said that it would certainly
ease his task of assuring Washington that Hanoi really wanted to
establish contact with it if he was given an answer. Su said he
understood perfectly, would submit the question to Hanoi and might
be in position to give an answer to d'Orlandi at his next meeting. .
Fanfani insisted on at least being assured that a specific period
already existed in Hanoi's mind. Su spoke very slowly in reply
and d'Orlandi certain that following is verbatim record. 'We
agree for Foreign Minister Fanfani to let it be known in communica-
tions he will make to the Government of the United States that in
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case of unconditional cessation of the bombing, the delay of
"X" days already exists for a first meeting of representatives
of the two parties, Hanoi and Washington, with a view to
establish contacts for serious conversation on questions con-
cerning the two parties.'
"(E) Fanfani told North Vietnamese that they had not been
forthcoming enough to put Washington under an obligation to
reply. Fanfani asked to be put in a position to tell Washington
something about the date, place, and subject of the meeting. Su
was unresponsive.
? "(F) Fanfani asked whether Hanoi was attempting contacts
through other channels or had already established a direct
channel to Washington. Su excluded this possibility. Fanfani
commented that he was astonished at flat statement that Hanoi
had no contacts with Washington. Su again gave categorical denial.
He said there were no direct contacts and although Hanoi often
received visitors they were not qualified nor in the least author-
ized to talk on behalf of' the US Government.
"(G) North Vietnamese had suggested communique but did not
push idea very hard. Their apparent motive was to demonstrate
that they were in fact duly authorized representatives of Hanoi
and therefore in a position to release communique. When Fanfani
pointed out obvious detriMental effects of publicity, particu-
larly predictable reaction of USG, Su quickly backed off.
"(H) Points H to J come from notes d'Orlandi made after
informal discussion during which no notes were to be kept. The
North Vietnamese took copious notes anyway. (This portion of the
notes was not read to North Vietnamese.) Both parties felt that
problem of guaranteeing an agreement was increasing to decisive
importance. Su seemed to categorically exclude the UN as a
guaranteeing agency and Fanfani and Su agreed that the ICC was
not in position to guarantee anything.
"(I) Fanfani asked' if there would be any objection if he
informed Tran Van Do or even Thieu of fact that conversations
with an authorized representative of Hanoi had taken place. Su
stated he had no objections.
"(J) Su stated that declared and also real aim of Hanoi was
to have absolutely free general elections. To insure liberty of
vote, it was necessary to constitute a government with very broadly
based participation excluding only 'war criminals' (undefined).
There was discussion of various South Vietnamese personalities as
possible members of a Government. Su would raise a name and
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d'Orlandi would comment. Su generally did not reveal his opinion
but Ky was obviously unacceptable to him.
"(K) Although not reflected in notes, conversation closed
with discussion of modalities of next meeting. Su suggested
that d'Orlandi come to Prague on February 21 but exact date was
left undetermined.ff
Fanfani confirmed that there was no discussion of the San Antonio
formula and that they were unaware of the Clifford explanation. Davidson
gave Fanfani the U.S. position as contained in State 117383. (ROME 4418,
Sections 1 & 2 of 2)
Also, on February 23, Davidson cabled some additiona.A. points which
he had made to Fanfani and d'Orlandi. Davidson said:
"The important thing was that there must be no doubt in
Hanoi's mind that it had committed itself not to take advantage
of a bombing cessation by such actions as increasing its infil-
tration of munitions and supplies or attacking U.S. positions in
the area of the DMZ."
....I suggested that it might repeat might be sufficient
if Hanoi stated that it recognized that during a period when
the US was not bombing and while talks were continuing that
such acts as attacks on US positions in the area of the DMZ,
massive terror against the cities such as the Tet campaign or
increased infiltration, would show bad faith on its part and that
it, of course, would never do anything that smacked of bad faith.
Hanoi could then discuss with us at the first meeting more precise
definition of actions which would constitute bad faith."
Fanfani and d'Orlandi understood that this was "merely a verbal
gimmick to permit Hanoi to accept all requirements of the 'not take
advantage' formulation without having to actually promise 'not to take
advantage'." Fanfani said that if the U.S. approves, he will dispatch
d'Orlandi again to Prague. (ROME 4419)
February 242 1968
Fanfani gave an exposition on the Italian motivation for Vietnam
negotiations. He said that he was prepared to drop the matter entirely
if the U.S. desired or if Hanoi did not give evidence of seriousness. He
warned of escalation, and the consequences of escalation on the policy of
detente with the Soviet Union. He said that an intensification of the war
in Vietnam would help the communist vote in Italy. (ROME )422)
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February 26, 1968
Davidson cabled additional information on the February 22 meeting
with Fanfani and d'Orlandi. After he touched on "the terrible consequences"
of the U.S. stopping bombing and being forced to resume because Hanoi
took advantage, Fanfani remarked that "I had used almost exactly the
same expressions in discussing that contingency as Su had used." According
to Fanfani, "Su told him that if the bombing stopped and then were resumed
it would be 'the end of the world'."
Fanfani also discussed a. coalition government-general elections issue.
"In thinking out loud of an ultimate solution, Fanfani
discussed the 'hypothesis' of a government which would be
composed of elements of the existing government and other forces
and would have the task of preparing for free general elections.
He said that the creation of such a government would avoid
the problem of which elements are a majority or minority since
the task of the government would be technical. He recalled
that it was a non-elected Italian .Government which successfully
prepared the Italian elections of 1946. Fanfani said he men-
tioned this idea to the North Vietnamese and they didn't object
to it. Su said that they thought they would win an election and
that is why they want one. Fanfani mentioned that Su had asked
d'Orlandi for his opinion of personalities who were clearly not
rpt not part of the FLN. ' I asked d'Orlandi who they were and he
said several professional men, members of past government,
religious personalities, all in all, some 20 or 25 names. Su
did not rpt not comment after d'Orlandi gave his frank evaluation
of each name except to say that Foreign Minister Do was a gentle-
man and a man of international stature who had little internal
influence. D'Orlandi said it was clear that the FLN was thinking
of a government that would include people who had not rpt not
fought with it but who were nonetheless patriots. I remarked
that it sounded to me as if these other elements would be largely
the Bogus Committees that were being set up in connection with the
Tet offensive. D'Orlandi said he thought I was mistaken."
Su told Fanfani that he "didn't consider any of the Eastern European
channels as serious," and "Fanfani had specifically asked Su about P. M.
Maurer, and the two North Vietnamese laughed as if to say that he could not
rpt not conceivably be a serious channel." They also flatly ruled out the
UN and the ICC in bringing about negotiations or in guaranteeing a settle-
ment. (ROME 4440, Sections 1 & 2 of 2)
February 26 1968
Davidson cabled urging continuation of this track. He argued that
Italy was the first Western European nation to receive authorized repre-
sentatives of Hanoi, and that Su had authorized Fanfani to convey his
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C-
Davidson said that the press leak on the North Vietnamese visit to
Rome was by a communist newspaper and "it appears that the leak did not
come from the Italian Government. rr Davidson was sympathetic to Fanfani's
k explanation that he had, for political reasons, to unilaterally release
a statement to the press on the visit of the two North Vietnamese repre-
sentatives to discuss a basis for starting negotiations.
Davidson concluded that the U.S. had every reason to continue with
the track. He noted that there was a "danger of letting d'Orlandi go to
Prague" in that "he might succeed and we might face prospect of negoti-
ations at time when the political-military situation makes negotiations
undesirable." He added: "However, if Hanoi now wishes to try to force
negotiations on USG, it can create other situations at least as awkward
as one that might result from telling d'Orlandi that it accepts essence
of San Antonio." (ROME )441)
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comments to the USG, and that Su had again invited d'Orlandi to Prague
(d'Orlandi had been expected there by Su since February 21.).
February 27, 1968
State agreed that "we should give a constructive response to the pro-
posal that d'Orlandi make another visit to Prague as suggested by Ambassador
"gose Su." State added: "However, under existing circumstances, it would be
unwise to suggest new formulations (as you propose para )i Rome LI419) which
might give Hanoi the idea that we were weakening on the San Antonio position."
Now
State went on to issue guidance for the d'Orlandi-Su talk:
"However, it appears to us that Hanoi is undertaking a
combined diplomatic and propaganda offensive rather than
showing a serious intention to negotiate in good faith at the
moment. It would be useful for the Italians to try to dis-
cover whether the North Vietnamese look upon contacts with the
Italians as expressing a serious negotiating position or as part
of a rather widespread exercise to impress a variety of govern-
ments.
"(c) As you suggest in 10-A Reftel 4441, it appears useful
for d'Orlandi to visit Prague in order to tell Su:
"(1) his statements have been communicated to the US
and after careful analysis did not seem to US Government to be
any more forthcoming than public statements of Hanoi. If Hanoi
has any intention of conveying anything new, Su should be
requested to point it out.
"(2) D'brlandi might on his own responsibility explore
with Su anything that Su could suggest which would be more
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definite on timing and particularly any statements Hanoi would
be willing to make as to their intentions relating to the mili-
tary problem of 'no advantage.' D'Orlandi may draw on explanations
you have provided him as to meaning of San Antonio formula. FYI
We have been informed by French and through U Thant on information
he received from French that negotiations would start immediately
if we announced publicly unconditional cessation of bombing and
other acts of war against NVN. Therefore there is no value in
?
making an issue of this point through Su. END FYI.
"(3) In addition, d'Orlandi might wish to point out to
Su that since Hanoi had rejected San Antonio formula, Americans had
asked number of questions. For example, does this mean that Hanoi
feels free to move men and supplies to the South as they did during
the Tet truce last year? Would Hanoi feel free to move troops
to the DMZ area in positions to attack US forces south of the DMZ?
Would Hanoi consider it has the right to intensify artillery and
other fire across the DMZ into US positions in South Viet-Nam?
"5. If the Italians express disappointment at the lack of
detail in this message, please tell them that we are understandably
cautious because of the major military operations now in progress
or being planned by North Viet-Nam in the DMZ and the Laos Pan-
handle. We cannot ignore Hanoi's actions on the ground in inter-
preting what Hanoi's intentions may be."
(State 120937)
March 4, 1967
Report on d'Orlandi-Su meeting.
D'Orlandi met with Meloy and Davidson to report on his March 1
meeting in Prague with Ambassador Su. D'Orlandi asked Su if he were ready
to answer the question concerning the period of delay between the stopping
of the bombing and the first U.S.-Hanoi meetings? Su responded rather
lamely that he thought this contact had come to an end and, therefore, he
was not able to supply a precise answer. "He could state that the matter
of a date would be no problem. The real problem was San Antonio."
D'Orlandi said that he had dictated to Su the first portion of the
Davidson MemCon of the February 28 meeting to the North Vietnamese, but
the North Vietnamese did not comment on this.
The most important point that Su made in these talks was with respect
to "no advantage." Although he said he was speaking personally, it is
highly doubtful that he would have said the following without specific
instructions:
11
....D'Orlandi then told Su that if bombing stopped and
talks began, assaulting The Sanh, invading or trying to detach
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0
NW'
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the two northern provinces of South Viet-Nam, launching a second
wave of attacks against one or more cities or creating a sensa-
tion with something else like an assault on Camp Carrol, would
sink the whole thing. Su replied that, speaking personally and
not on instructions, such thing would be out, that from the
moment the two sides meet it was obvious no such thing could
happen. (I questioned d'Orlandi about this remark of Su's and
d'Orlandi replied that while he took no notes he i-s certain this
is the sense of what Su said.) D'Orlandi told Su that whatever
he or Su thought of the effect of bombing, it is a fact that .
the US Government and US public opinion considers bombing of the
North a most important weapon and that no President could give
away such a weapon while something terrible was happening either
in the DMZ or the South. Su did not respond to this comment.
D'Orlandi also remarked that it might be necessary for him to go
to Hanoi to receive assurances directly from the top and again Su
did not reply."
Su said that he will contact d'Orlandi when he receives a reply and
arrange another meeting in Rome or in Prague.
(ROME )590)
March 2J
Davidson cabled another exchange with Fanfani and d'Orlandi. Referring
to a Hanoi broadcast about the North Vietnamese visit to Rome "to discuss
negotiations," Fanfani argued that this was Hanoi's way of verifying that
the Italian channel is the one it wishes to use.
Fanfani reviewed Su's statements about "no advantage," and told exactly
the same story as he had on the previous day.
(RoivizE )634)
March 14, 1968
State cabled "a slight preference for Prague as site of next meeting."
(State 129885)
March 16, 1968
Lodge arrived in Rome to speak with the Italians. Nothing new was
added to previous communications.
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