COVERT ACTION IN THE 80S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000100050067-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 67
• Publication Date: September 16, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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16 September 1981
MEMORAPJDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Robert M. Gates
SUBJECT Covert Action in the 80s
1. I have read the Frank Lindsay memorandum you forwarded to me and believe,
13 years after it was written, that its judgments continue to be timely and
accurate. As we think about the future of covert action, I would pick out the
following major points he has made as valid foundations for our own work:
-- "Covert operations should be called upon only when something
should be done in a secret manner and onl when secrec is
possible." page 1 As this country looks increasingly to
covert action as an instrument of foreign policy in an era
of "no war, no peace," we are likely to be asked to do more
and more things covertly because of the political difficulties
here of going forward with them in a more public manner.
This will significantly increase the risk of public disclosures.
"Covert operations can rarely achieve an important objective
alone." i~1ore often than not, our covert operations are seen
as a way to accomplish a policy objective (if there is one}
on the cheap, to cope with a problem where no one has any
idea how to obtain public support fora solution to the
problem, or to use covert action as a short-term tactic to
fend off a problem or disaster--a tactic to be repeated or
expanded upon in the absence of the ingenuity, will, or
money to come up with a viable long-term overt option.
Tn the ideal world, a covert action proposal would be
accompanied by a paper from the Department of State or the
NSC Staff which would identify the larger policy context of
a covert action and identify an overt program which would be
approved simultaneously with the covert action as the real,
lon er-term solution to a roblem.
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Such 25X1
an ideal world oes not exist. Therefore, I believe it is incum-
bent upon CIA as it forwards a covert action proposal, when
appropriate, to accompany it with an analytical judgment as to
the kinds of overt programs by the United States that our analysts
judge might 6e effective over the longer term in resolving a
problem or issue in a targeted country. This has the benefit
of putting covert action in context as a short-term tactic and,
internally, requiring our covert operators and our analysts to
interact more closely in identifying both the, real nature of a.
problem in a country and how it might be ameliorated. But, what
is important here is a better understanding on the part of policy-
makers that covert action is rarely a long-term solution to any
problem and that they must face up to their responsibilities to
develop viable longer-range policies in situations where covert
action has bought them some time.
"The more democratic the co~.~ntr or the more o en its olitics,
the greater the ossibilit of dama e if a U.S, covert action
is discovered ."
2
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2. My overall impression upon reading this paper, and as I think about covert
action in the future, is that tyre perhaps need to focus more on the criteria set
forth by Lindsay.
Covert action operations can rarely achieve an important
objective alone.
Covert operations are best suited to tactical situations
where success will bring an immediate short-term gain.
Large operations cannot be kept secret.
-- CIA should concentrate on doing the special clandestine things
that it is expected to 6e especially competent in accomplishing.
3. I do not have the kind of creativity that is especially suited to conceiving
of covert actions; but I do knova something about international politics and bureau-
cracies, and what I know tells me that Lindsay's guidelines generally make a great
deal of sense. I think you do not have, in the senior management of the DDO,
people.who can think conceptually about covert action in the 80s in the context
of these criteria and of the political conditions that are likely to prevail during
that period. Thus, I am drawn to the benefits of bringing together a group of
four to six outs.i.ders--perhaps Including some CIA retirees who were especially
good in this area-~-who have good instincts on these matters and ask them to brain-
storm the. question for a fe~v days and provide you with their ideas. The point
would not be. for them to devise. spec ific covert actions but for them to consider
the world of the 80s and 90s and to develop some ideas on generic types of covert
actions (including paramilitary operations) that you, the DDCI, the DDO, and perhaps
even the Executive Committee might examine as we plan for the years ahead.
Robert M. Gates
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