AUSTRIAN SECURITY CAPABILITIES FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF OCCUPATION FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000500020001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 11, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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C 0311
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
AUSTRIAN SECURITY CAPABILITIES FOLLOWING
WITHDRAWAL OF OCCUPATION FORCES
NIE-21/1
Published 11 December 1952
Tv: TS
ANTI is 13Et 7CL2
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
concurred in this estimate on 1 December 1952.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
COPY NO.
ASSISTANT DIRECT0R, O ;E
-,.~MER: _'_72^44
i"~L V,i_.
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T
AUSTRIAN SECURITY CAPABILITIES FOLLOWING
WITHDRAWAL OF OCCUPATION FORCES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Austria's capability for maintaining its independence and security
against internal and external pressures for at least one year following the simultane-
ous withdrawal of all occupation forces under either the "long" treaty, the "short"
treaty, or any other arrangement that provides (a) for termination of the -occupa-
tion and abrogation of the control agreement and (b) that Soviet-owned enterprises
are subject to Austrian law.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Communist Party in Austria re-
mains weak and without significant
para-military capabilities. The Austrian
population is strongly anti-Communist.
2. Present and projected Austrian secu-
rity forces will probably be capable of
coping with any internal Communist
threat to the security of Austria after
the withdrawal of occupation forces, pro-
vided that the US continues to give eco-
nomic and political support to Austria
and that Western military equipment is
made available to the Austrian security
forces.
3. If four-power troop withdrawal did
not take place until 90 days after ratifi-
cation of an Austrian treaty, the Aus-
trian army which it is planned to build
up during this period would almost cer-
tainly suffice to meet any internal at-
tempt to overthrow the government.
Even if such withdrawal took place un-
der arrangements which did not allow
the full 90-day period, the existing Aus-
trian security forces, with the active sup-
port of organized Socialist workers, could
probably cope with such an attempt.
4. Any agreement on troop withdrawal
which left in Soviet ownership part or all
of the properties which the USSR now
controls would present a serious security
problem,. but probably would not be a
critical threat to Austria's internal secu-
rity during the period of this estimate,
so long as these enterprises are effec-
tively subjected to Austrian law.
5. Austria would not be able to defend
itself against an invasion by Satellite
forces, but we believe the USSR would
be unlikely to risk an open Satellite in-
vasion of Austria unless the Kremlin is
prepared to accept general
1r1~rK`Aral ga.
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DISCUSSION
6. Austria's Political and Economic Stability.
There has been relatively little change in Aus-
tria's over-all stability and pro-Western orien-
tation since the publication of NIE-21 (22
January 1951). The government and the vast
majority of the people, particularly in the
Soviet Zone, continue to be strongly anti-
Communist. The Communist vote in the
1949 national elections did not exceed about 5
percent in any zone.
7. Despite probable continued economic diffi-
culties and increased political strains, we be-
lieve Austria's political and economic stability
following troop withdrawal is unlikely to de-
teriorate to such an extent as to create condi-
tions favorable to a Communist coup within
the period of this, estimate. However, Aus-
trian internal stability under such circum-
stances would depend upon Austria's continu-
ing to receive US political support and US
economic aid. While troop withdrawal would
eliminate a burden on the Austrian economy,
Austria still would not be self-supporting and
cessation of US aid would cause serious eco-
nomic deterioration. A withdrawal of US
economic and political support would also
make the Austrians feellexposed and helpless,
would probably lead them to increase greatly
their trade with the Soviet Bloc, and might
result in a substantial increase in Soviet in-
fluence in Austria.
8. Austrian Government Security Forces.
The strength and reliability of the Austrian
security forces have improved. These forces
now number about 34,000.1 They include:,
a. 16,551 Federal Police, constituting the
police force of fifteen principal Austrian cities
and towns. About 11,000 of the Federal Po-
lice are in Vienna.
b. 11,362 Regular Federal Gendarmerie,
constituting the rural police force.
c. 3,027 Special Gendarmerie.
d. 3,065 Customs Guards.
These forces are in general armed with Ger-
man World War II model pistols and rifles.
' See Appendix A for disposition of these forces
within Austria.
The Vienna police also have tear-gas guns.
In addition, the Regular Federal Gendarmerie
have German light machine guns, and the
Special Gendarmerie , have some US scout
cars, light machine guns, and carbines. The
Federal Police have no special training,, ex-
cept in Vienna, where they are trained in riot
tactics. The. Regular Federal Gendarmerie
has received some squad, platoon, and com-
pany training. However, its capabilities are
limited by lack of logistic support, including
inadequate transport and supply facilities.
As a result, only about 6,000 could be concen-
trated at any one spot in an emergency. The
Customs Guards, scattered along the Austrian
border, are armed only with pistols and rifles.
9. The Special Gendarmerie, now being
trained and equipped in the three western
zones, is designed to serve as the nucleus of a
projected Austrian army of 28,000 men.
Progress in recruiting the Special Gendarm-
erie has been slow, partly because the Aus-
trian Government is still fearful of provoking
the USSR, and partly because only temporary
status and low pay can be offered recruits at
present. However, this force has received
more extensive military training than either,
the Federal Police or the Regular Federal Gen-
darmerie, and plans call for the increase of
this force from its present strength of 3,000
to 5,000 by the spring of 1953. Assuming
agreement on an Austrian treaty, plans call
for the Special Gendarmerie to be expanded
from 5,000 to 28,000 men in the 90-day period
specified between ratification of the treaty
and withdrawal of the occupation forces.
Under these plans, equipment would be made
available from Allied sources. Trained man-
power would be drawn primarily from World
War II veterans.
10. Austrian Communist Strength. Despite
some seven years of Soviet occupation of a
large part of Austria, the Austrian Communist
Party remains weak. Although the Party
polled 216,000 votes in the last (1951) elec-
tions, the Communists' own count of the num-
ber of their activists is only 30,000. The
Communists have not made significant in-
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T O P S E C R E T
roads into organized labor, which remains
Socialist-dominated.
11. Since the early days of the joint occupa-
tion, the numbers and influence of Commu-
nists in the Austrian security forces have been
sharply curtailed by action of the Austrian
Government. The Ministry of Interior, un-
der which all the security forces are organized,
contains no known Communists. There are
believed to be few, if any, Communists or Com-
munist sympathizers in the Special Gen-
darmerie, and the 1951 union elections showed
only a 1.3 percent Communist vote in the Reg-
ular Federal Gendarmerie.
12. Though considerable progress has been
made, Soviet pressure has prevented the com-
plete purging of Communists from the Fed-
eral Police; for example, 10 of the 27 police
districts in Vienna are known to be headed
by Communists. In the 1951 union elec-
tions, 14.4 percent of the Federal Police Voted
for Communist candidates (19 percent in
Vienna). However, we believe that, immedi-
ately upon the withdrawal of Soviet troops,
the Austrian Government would take meas-
ures to weed out Communists from the
security forces.
13. The only approximation to a Communist
para-military force in Austria is the Werk-
schutz organization of factory guards in the
Soviet-controlled enterprises in the Soviet
Zone. Its estimated strength is not more
than 3,000 men, all below . 30 years of age;
it is armed with rifles, pistols, and sub
machine guns. Although many Werkschutz
members are Wehrmacht veterans, there is no
evidence that the Werkschutz is being trained
in platoons or companies. Of the estimated
60,000 workers in the Soviet-controlled enter-
prises, about 12,000 are believed to be poten-
tial recruits for expanding the Werkschutz.
However, the bulk of the 60,000 .workers are
anti-Communist and members of Socialist-
dominated unions.
14. Probable Austrian Security Capabilities.
In view of the limited strength of the Aus-
trian Communists, particularly in para-
military terms, we estimate that, with the
projected Austrian security forces, the gov-
ernment would be able to cope with any
internal Communist threat during the year
following the withdrawal of occupation
troops. While the Communists would prob-
ably be capable of fomenting strikes, riots,
and other disturbances, especially in Vienna
and the former Soviet Zone; they would meet
with strong opposition from anti-Communist
labor unions. In addition, the bulk of the
Austrian people, including those in Eastern
Austria, probably would actively oppose Com-
munist attempts to create widespread dis-
turbances or to overthrow the government.
Deprived of the immediate support of the
Soviet army, the Austrian Communists would
probably decline in strength and the Aus-
trian Government would almost certainly
take measures to restrict their activities.
15. If four-power troop withdrawal did not
take place until 90 days after ratification of
an Austrian treaty, the Austrian army which
it is planned to build up during this period
would almost certainly suffice to meet any
internal attempt to overthrow the govern-
ment. Even if such withdrawal took place
under arrangements which did not allow the
full 90-day period, the existing Austrian
security forces, with the active support of
organized. Socialist workers, could probably,
cope with such an attempt.
16. There is no prospect that an Austrian
army will develop the capability of repelling
a Satellite invasion.
17. Any agreement on troop withdrawal
which left in Soviet ownership all or part
of the numerous Soviet-controlled enterprises
in Eastern Austria would provide the USSR
with continued opportunities for clandestine
activity. However, as and when Soviet
troops withdraw, the Austrian Government is
likely to take measures to minimize the use-
fulness of these enterprises as bases for clan-
destine activities. Hence, while continued
Soviet ownership of Austrian enterprises
would present a serious security problem, it
probably would not be a critical threat to
Austria's internal security during the period
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of this estimate, so long as these enterprises
are effectively subjected to Austrian law.
18. Probable Soviet Intentions. In any case,
we believe that the USSR would estimate that
the chances were poor for carrying off a suc-
cessful coup with indigenous Austrian. Com-
munist forces after withdrawal of occupation
troops. A Soviet attempt to support such
a coup covertly from the adjacent Satellites
on a scale sufficient to insure success would
be difficult to conceal. We believe that the
Kremlin would estimate that such an at-
tempt would provoke a strong Western reac-
tion. For the same ,reason, we believe that
the Kremlin would be unlikely to risk an
open Satellite invasion of Austria, unless the
Kremlin is prepared to accept general war.
TOP S E C R E T
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DISPOSITION OF AUSTRIAN SECURITY FORCES
(31 October. 1952)
FEDERAL
POLICE
GE
REGULAR
FEDERAL
NDARMERIE
GE
SPECIAL
NDARMERIE
CUSTOMS
GUARDS
(1 JULY)
Provinces
Soviet Zone
Lower Austria 413
2,315
Burgenland 76
668
Muehlviertel 186
472
Total Soviet Zone 675
3,455
...
Western Zones 4,700
7,757
2,837
Vienna 11,176
1502
190
TOTAL 16,551
11,362
3,027
3,065
2 Assigned to administrative duties in Vienna.
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T
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