ORDER OF BATTLE HANDBOOK CZECHOSLOVAK ARMY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 202
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2014
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 1, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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ORBAT.CZECH
ORDER OF BATTLE
HANDBOOK
? anostolfAK ARMY (C)
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
OFFICE OF A /C OF S, G2
1 AUGUST 1958
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.43FZe
FOREWORD
This Order of Battle Handbook is intended to serve as a
complete reference for all those engaged in the collection and
analysis of information concerning the Czechoslovak Armed Forces.
With the exception of the Border Guard and the Air Force, all ele-
ments of the Armed Forces are covered herein. The Czechoslovak
Border Guard is covered in a separate publication issued by this
Headquarters and the Czech Air Force in appropriate USAFE publi-
cations; installations data is provided in the five volume set of
handbooks entitled "Military Installations, Czechoslovak Ground
Forces."
It is believed that the utilization of all these books in combina-
tion will provide as complete a picture as is now possible to present
on the Czechoslovak Ground Forces.
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Figure No. 1
COLONEL GENERAL BOHUMIR LOMSKY
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
Chapter I
ORGANIZATION & EQUIPMENT
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Top Control of the Czech Armed Forces
Unit Organization
Non-Divisional Units
Weapons and Equipment
Uniforms and Insignia
ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS
13
19
52
62
75
Chapter VII Major Organizations
Chapter VIII Minor Organizations
Chapter IX Supply Installations and POL Facilities
REFERENCE DATA
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
104
144
153
X Index of Locations
XI Personalities
XII Personnel Actions
XIII Training
XIV Supply and Maintenance
XV The Scho91 System
XVI Mani)ower
XVII Mobilization
XVIII List of Known Field Manuals
XIX Czechoslovak Permanent Fortifications
XX The Interior Guard VS
XXI Political and Athletic Organizations
XXII Quasi and Para-Military Organizations
XXIII The Soviet Military Mission
XXIV Military Maps
XXV List of Historical Names
XXVI Czechoslovakia in Brief
161
177
189
200
248
253
262
272
281
290
299
303
307
310
312
319
321
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Chapter XXVII Czechoslovak Calendar of Events ?
'Chapter XXVIII Key Industrial Cities
Chapter XXIX Transportation and Communications
Chapter XXX List of Czechoslovak Abbreviations
356
368
373
382
INTRODUCTION
The Czechoslovak Armed Forces of today are not generally
considered to be an effective fighting element of the Soviet Bloc
military machine. Despite a reasonably high degree of military
proficiency at all levels, the Czechoslovak Army rema5.ns largely
untested, logistically dependent on the Soviet Union, and of question-
able political reliability from the Soviet Bloc point of view. It must
be looked on as an instrument of Soviet Military Power, which would
undoubtedly be totally subordinate to the Soviet Army in case of a
major East - West conflict. Beyond temporary diversionary
maneuvers, independent action by the Czechoslovak Army is-judged
to be highly improbable.
The ability of the Czechs to soldier has been proven in both
world wars, and twice during the short history of the Czechoslovak.
Republic the Armed Forces have reached a very high degree of
military proficiency only to disintegrate in the wake of political
events. Fully mobilized and judged?one of Europe's finest forces,
the Czechoslovak Army of .1938 was rendered impotent by the Munich.
agreement.
agreement. After World War II a reborn Army had reached 'a marked
degree of military proficiency by 1948. It was one of the few European
Armies capable of?conducting corps level maneuvers. But the
Communist coup d'etat in February of that year again reduced the
Army to a state of military ineffectiveness.
In spite of these things', however, the Czech is basiCally-not
a martial individual. The Czechoslovak Army, as such, has never
been tested and consequently lacks a real military tradition. - With 7
the exception of Ziska, the men-who have made Czech history have/
not been men of letters. "The Czechs are frugal, industrious, ?
extraordinarily Competent, home loving, possesbed of inordinate -
personal integrity, above all reasonable in their dealings with' one
another and with the outer world; they care little for the
soldier, butenormously for the prophet and the :man of letter.
- ?
The Czech soldiers today only, as an. obligation, and not,' -
because of a desire to 'further' the -aims of the?-regime.- ? He.differs':
from the conscripts of Western Armies in that although they serve-"'
only because they are obligated to, they believe in the reasons for ?
1 We shall live again, Hindus
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obligatory service. He differs from the average conscript of the Soviet
Army in that he has the mental capacity to question it. He knows,
however, that his 'service record follows him into civilian life, and
that malfeasance on his part can permanently deprive him of the normal
privileges of a citizen.
Often today Czechoslovakia is misconstrued as a "reliable"
Satellite.. -Her failure to revolt in 1956, at the same time as her
Polish and Hungarian neighbors, has certainly countenanced this
illusion. However, some of the very reasons why the Czechoslovaks
did not revolt also tend to explain why this country is not considered
to be a "reliable" Soviet Satellite. In an effort to provide an under-
standing of the Czech soldier, as well as an appreciation of the current
political and psychological climate as it exists within this nation, a
brief examination of its history would be pertinent.
Basically the Czech is considered to be a realist and now,
perhaps, a more opportunistic type individual not inclined to rash
action -- who for years has suffered as the face of Europe changed.
The Magyars, ,the Hapsburgs, the Nazis and now the Communists have
all contributed to this philosophy. The value of such rash an action
as open revolt would have to be proven and obvious before the Czechs
would consider it.. An analogy reflecting this situation and attitude is
illustrated by a prevalent, if not entirely accurate comparison, that
the "Czechs are like a clever old trout swimming in a stream fished
by murderers."
While the Ciechs must have before them the oftrepeated
Komensky apostrophe: .... "after the tempest of God's wrath shall
have passed, the rule of this country will again return unto thee,
01 Czech People;" -- the inclination to follow a cautious, almost
apathetic approach is stronger than the prospect of revolution and
freedom -from Soviet domination.
Catholicism is not synonymous with nationalism as is-the case
in Poland and Hungary: It would more accurately be synonymous with
Hapsburg oppression. .The Czech Roman Catholic might well explain
that he is a Catholic but also-a Hussite. By this he would'imiily that
he believes in the-Hus.site traditions of democracy, freedom; and
equality. Hus.is not considered an enemy-of the church, but rather
a great liberator of-his people.
Because of an already -established industry, Communist forced
industrialization was not necessary in Czechoslovakia. (It is
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interesting to note a few percentages of pre-1918 Austro - Hungarian
industries that remained in Czechoslovakia: Sugar 92%, glass 92%,
cotton 75%, jute 90%, shoes 75%, china 100%, chemicals 75%, malt
products 87%, brewing 57%, wool 80%, and leather 70%.) Skoda is
today synonymous with armaments; but in addition it produces highly
specialized iron and steel goods for shipping needs, agricultural
implements, motor cars, rolling stock and all,sorts of manufacturing
technical equipment. Between Skoda, Tatra, and Praga, Czecho-
slovakia has supplied its own soft-skinned vehicle needs and Czech
developed and produced armaments today are ample evidence of Czech
self sufficiency in these fields. Much Czech military equipment is '
exported both to the Soviet Union and other Satellites. The Soviet
Union at present appears to value Czech armament research, devel-
opment and production above armament standardization. There is
evidence to believe that the relatively new T-54 Soviet Tank had its
inception in Czech tank plants in early 1949 (see Equipment). In his
book, "We Shall Live Again," Hundus wrote in 1939: "In a practical
sense the Czech overshadows all his Slav brethern and can hold his
own with any of his neighbors. What an asset such a people would be
to a Russia which is struggling frenziedly with the modern machine!
If ever there is a union between these two Slair peoples -- which is
not the most fantastic dream in the world -- the Czechs will astonish
Russia and the world with the contribution they will make to the
country's economic development."
The irritant of Soviet occupation is not present, and the Czech
enjoys a higher standard of living than any of his Satellite neighbors.
In summary, the appearance of the Czech as a reliable Satellite
is more mirage than actuality. He has tasted democracy, is a discern-
ing individual, and again awaits the day KOMENSKY promised. The
difference in Czech and Slovak temperament is also worthy of mention.
The independence loving Slovak favors the Magyar or Pole more than
the Czech. He is not to be trusted by the regime in either Prague or
the Kremlin,. During the Hungarian rebellion there were reports of
attempted Slovak sabotage of the Vah Valley rail lines. Following the
rebellion in Hungary a new Interior Guard Brigade was organized
with headquarters in Spisska Nova Yes. Its only apparent mission
is the security of this rail line. In addition, Prague reportedly signed
an "agreement" with Moscow to allow Soviet troops to use these lines
whenever necessary - thus, of course, furnishing a legal basis on
which Soviet troops could be moved into Slovakia.
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The most important reasons for "keeping an eye" on Czecho-
slovakia today appear to be its location and the probability of its provid-
ing information concerning Soviet intentions. Geographically, Czecho-
slovakia provides the Kremlin with a salient in Western Europe. Its.
western borders, heavily wooded and mountainous, are natural defensive
positions. Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor, once stated that he who
controls the borders of Bohemia also controls central Europe. To the
east of these borders lies the Bohemian Plateau with its egress the .
traditional invasion route of the Moravian Gate. To the west lies the
almost indefensible Danubian Valley. Through the Vali Valley of
Slovakia runs the only land line of communication with Eastern Germany
if the "unreliable" Pole were to again revolt and cut the most used rail
lines between USSR and East Germany.
Evidence of Czechoslovakia furnishing information concerning
Soviet intentions is best exemplified by recent changes in Soviet TOE in
East Germany. Many of the changes effected had been already estab-
lished in the Czech Army for several years. Truck mounted rocket
launchers in rifle divisions, 152mm Howitzers in line division artillery,
etc., were reported in Czech units as far back as 1954. This is
believed to be because the Czech Army is used by the Soviets as a
TOE laboratory with the Soviet Military Mission playing the part of
the researcher.
If attacked, the Czech soldier of today can be expected to fight
well in his own defense. In an offensive operation against the West,
his performance would be half-hearted, and once the tide turned so
might he. The military leaders in Czechoslovakia, like those in other
Satellite countries, have limited direct influence on the developments
of Bloc strategic plans. The Unified Military Command, established
by the Warsaw Pact in May 1955, is organized on a representative
basis, but the real headquarters is in Moscow. Details of the role 0 -
assigned to the Czechoslovak Armed Forces in a future war might be
worked out on Czechoslovak initiative, but it is believed that general .44
supervision and control over all Czechoslovak military actions,
including mobilization, rests ultimately with the Soviet Union.
ts.
In conclusion, it is interesting to compare the motto from the -
seal of Duke Vladislav (1147), "Duke Vladislav is ;the Custodian of the
Peace of this Land assured us by Saint Vaclav, " with that of the Czech
Army today, "We Must Conquer for Peace."
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41, CHAPTER I - HISTORY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK ARMY
The Beginning
In reading the histories of individual Czech units one will note the
frequent appearance of the names of Jan Hus and Jan Ziska. They also
appear frequently as names of military installations, and it might be
said that Czech military tradition has its roots in the lives of these twb
men. The blind Ziska, an ardent follower of the religious reformer
Hus, is one of history's most brilliant generals. As the leadei-of.the
Taborites (after the city of Tabor, stronghold of the radical Hus sites),
Ziska time and again routed the far superior forces of Emperor
Sigismund. He never lost a single military engagement, and today
his name and the city of Tabor are symbols of the bravest war of
liberation in Czech history.
With the defeat of the Hus sites at the battle of the White Mountain
near Prague in 1620, Czechoslovakia became a part of the Hapsburg
Monarchy, and the Czech Army as such ceased to exist.
World War I
Perhaps the most important phase of Czech military history was
the participation of Czech units in the fight against the Central Powers
in World War I. This is so because it was the action of these units
which was primarily responsible for the recognition of Czechoslovak
independence by the West.
As part of the Austro - Hungarian Empire at the outbreak of
hostilities, Czechs were called upon to fight and die for German
Imperialism which they associated with oppression in its most exact ?
sense. When mobilization was ordered on 26 July 1914 some Czechs
refused to obey - others departed from Prague stations with anti-German
cries and singing Slav songs. "Maria Theresa lost Silesia, Francis
Joseph is going to lose everything" was often heard. On the other hand,
Sudeten Germans formed some of the Austrian Army's crack regiments.
In the early days of the war the average Czech expected the
Russian Army to be with them any day, but when initial German successes
became known Czech soldiers began to desert to the Russians by the -
thousands and even by units. The most notorious of these was the 28th
Prague Regiment which went to the Russians on 23 April 1915. Within
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30 minutes after entering combat the 35th Pilzen Regiment also deserted
in a body. A total of 300, 000 Czech and Slovak soldiers deserted, and
of these Masaryk estimated 182, 000 ultimately fought beside the Russian
and Western Armies. Approximately 25, 000 deserted on the southwest
front to the Serbians. Of these about 11, 000 survived a death march to
Albania and 4, 000 of them were taken to France as a nucleus of a Czech
Army in that country.
The Czech unit formed in Russia in August of 1914 was comprised
mostly of Czech residents of Russia. It took the name of Czech Legion
(Ceska Druzina) and was officered mostly by Russians. It was initially
commanded by Lt Col Lotocky and later by Lt Col Sozentovich with
headquarters in Kiev. The unit was actually a regiment in size and its
colors consisted of the Russian Tricolor on which the crown of St
Vaclav was superimposed. Members took an oath of allegiance to the -
Russian Czar on 28 September 1914 and the Legion was then attached to
the Russian Third Army. Members of the Legion were dispatched indi-
vidually to Austro-Hungarian lines to induce Czechs to desert, and by
the Spring of 1915, the strength of the Legion totaled 3, 000. When the
Central Powers forced the retreat of the demoralized Russian forces
from Galicia the Legion distinguished itself in several rearguard
actions. Following this campaign it was transferred to the Army of
Gen Brusilov on the Volhynian frontier.
In March of 1915, the "Federation of Czechoslovak Associations
in Russia" was formed with the principle aim of the formation of a large
Czechoslovak Army from the thousands of Czech and Slovak prisoners.
The Russian government, however, refused to allow formation of a
Czech Army which had any semblance of independence from Russian
control.
Masaryk, in the belief that one must prove ones value to those
from om one asked help, went to Russia in May 191/ and was succes.s-
ful ir ganizing the-Legion into a.Czech Army which received its baptism
of fire at the battle of ZBOROV in Galicia on July 1 - 2, 1917. Its size
at this time was actually a brigade of four regiments formed on June 13,
1917. During the battle Czec}. personnel conducted themselves with
cool courage and had eminent success in capturing 4, 200 prisoners and
much materiel.,
The battle of ZBOROV was the last real flare of Russian military
activity and foreseeing little future Russian participation, Masaryk won
permission,to move the Czech Army to France. By the end of 1917 it -
had a strength of 32, 000 organized into two divisions. However, under
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the chaotic conditions in Bolshevik Russia in 1918, only about 2, 500
members of the Legion reached France. The remainder of the Legion
ultimately fought its way through Siberia - courageously and with 'perfect
discipline - to return to Czechoslovakia via the United States.
In 1914 many Czechs and Slovaks living in France joined the
French Foreign Legion. They were later joined by Czechs' from Britain
and formed a unit known as the Nazdar Company. They received their
baptism of fire near Rheims on October 23, 1914. , Their standard bore
the historic emblem of Bohemian freedom - the Lion of the House of
Luxemburg. To this unit was added the 4, 000 from Albania and about
2, 500 more from the United States.
In 1917 Benes went to Rome and was initially rejected in his
request to form Czech military units. However, a treaty was finally
concluded on 21 April 1918 which allowed the formation of an independent
Czech Army in Italy to be commanded by General Andrea Graziani. It
was officered by Italians, Czechs and Slovaks. Under the control of the
Czechoslovak National Council in ?Pa-ris, it had a strength of approxi,
mately 22, 000. The Czech Army in Italy was cited for conspicuous
gallantry by General Diaz on September 22, 1918. Its last engagement
of importance was in the battle of the Piave in late October.
The importance of the Czech Army's participation in World War
I can best be illustrated by the following statements:
August 9, 1918 from the British Foreign Office:
"Since the beginning of the war the Czecho-Slovak nation has
resisted the common enemy by every means in its power. The Czecho-
Slovaks have constituted a considerable Army, fighting on three different
battlefields and attempting, in Russia and Siberia, to arrest the German
invasion.
"In consideration of their efforts to achieve independence, Great
Britain regards. the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied Nation and recognizes
the unity of the three:Czecho-Slovak,Armies as an allied and belligerent
Army waging a regular warfare against Austria-Hungary and.Ger many. "
"Great Britain also recognized the right of the C.zecho-Slovak
National Council as the supreme organ of the Czecho-slovak national,,
interests, and as the present trustee of the future Cecho-Slovak-
Government to exercise supreme authority over this'allied and ?
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belligerent army. " ?
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September 2, from the U.S. State Department:
"The Czecho-Slovak Peoples having taken up. arms against the Ger-
man and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and having placed in the field organ-
ized armies which were waging war against those empires under officers
of their own nationality and in accordance with the rules and practices of
civilized nations, and the Czecho-Slovaks having in the prosecution of
their independence in the present war confided the supreme political
authority to the Czecho-Slovak National Council, the Government of the
United States recognizes that a state of belligerency exists between the
Czecho-Slovaks thus organized and the German and Austro-Hungarian
Empires."
"It also recognizes the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a de
facto belligerent government, clothed with proper authority to direct the
military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks."
"The Government of the United States further declares that it is
prepared to enter formally into relations with the de facto government thus
recognized for the purpose of prosecuting the war against the common
enemy, the empires of Germany and Austria-Hungary. "
1918 - 1938
Compulsory service was introduced in 1920 which was universal
for all male citizens. Service liability began at age 17, although inductions
were usually effected at age 20 for a two-year period of active service.
All male citizens remained members of the reserve until age 60. In 1919,
a French Military Mission was established to remain 10 years. This
mission was primarily, responsible for the high state of efficiency ultimate-
ly achieved by the Czech Army.
Under the provisions of the new constitution the President was
the supreme head of the Army. The country was divided into four military
- districts and comprised 12 divisions and a number of separate brigades.
The Army of .1920 - 1938 was considered to be a very efficient force, well
disciplined, and true to the principles of the Republic. No min could
enter an officers" school until he had finished his service in the ranks, -
and no class was-favored for officers.- Drills were strenuous, ,and
obedience imperative. Sudetan Germans- also served and were in no way
-discriminated against. Later Hitler's Sudeten followers were surprised
? by the flood-of Sudeten Germans to the Czech colors in the critical days
. .
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before Munich. '
With the election of Benes in 1935 rearmament was pushed- and,
for the first time in Czech history, the Czech Army became popular.
By 1937 the strength of the Czech Army totaled 10, 059 officers and
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153, 356 enlisted men. It was by this time regarded as one of the finest
in Europe, both in equipment and training. The Air Force had a total
of six regiments with 566 combat planes. A reserve of 2, 000, 000
existed in 1938 and mobilization was ordered on 21 May 1938. The
mobilization was effected so quietly and efficiently that it took Hitler
by surprise. In late September all men up to age 40 were called to the
colors.
At this time the Army placed its faith in General Sirovy whom
they likened to Ziska with a patch over one eye. On September 22
Sirovy told the people of Prague:
"I guarantee that the Army is standing and will continue to do so
on our frontiers, and will defend our liberties to the very end
Do not allow any internal enemies to sway you into the belief that the
Army could possibly change its attitude." But the attitude did
change, Benes accepted the Munich Decision, and the Czech fortifica-
tions were handed over to the Germans. Not only the German Army
stood poised for attack, but so did the Polish and Hungarian Armies on
the North and South. The Czech Army's spirit had been contingent on
Western support, but now their strength was sapped and General Sirovy
announced:
"I have lived through the most difficult moment of my life because
I have had to fulfill the most painful duty that could ever have befallen,
me, a duty which is worse than death. And because I have fought in war
and know the conditions under which a war may be won, I must tell you
frankly, even as the conscience of a responsible Army demands, that
the force which in this hour would rise up against us compels us to
recognize superiority and to act accordingly We are a fortress
that is surrounded by forces stronger than ours We, shall fulfill
the conditions which have been imposed on us by force it
World War II
As was the case in World War I, Czech and Slovak soldiers began
defecting to Poland, Russia, Yugoslavia and other-Eastern European
countries and eventually to France. On October 2, 1939, an agreement
was signed between the French Government and the Czech Minister in
France to reconstitute the Czech Army in that country. A French
Military Mission was assigned to it and General Ingr became CINC.
Thousands of these Czechs later escaped to England during and rafter
Dunkirk. Czech flyers participated in the Battle of Britain, and the
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Czechs continued' to serve with British Forces as a welcome addition to'-.
. the Allied military effort.
Meanwhile in' Slovakia a different picture-Was evolving. Slovalcia
had declared its independence of the Czech lands and became a Nazi'
puppet state. The Hlinka Guards and their affiliated Hlinka 'Youth were
formed. They?were created according to the pattern of Italian Black
Shirts and the German SS and SA Corps, including black uniforms and
the Fascist salute. They were armed with light weapons and were
organized along m3litary lines. The Hlinka Guard was the organization
primarily responsible for the remcival of Czechs from Slovakia, and -
the deportation- of thousands of Jews. In addition, a Slovak Army con-
tinued to exist and on September 1, 1939, the Slovak Army participated
in the German attack on Poland; Its operations were confined to Polish
territory along the Slovak border and it occupiedcommunities that had
been ceded-to Poland in early 1939.
-
In June of 1941, a Slovak Army of 50, 000 participated in the
attack on Russia. The size of this force soon dwindled to 16; 000 because
of the defection of Slovaks to the Russian forces. In 1943, this Slovak'
"Security Division" under the ,command of Jan Vesely was moved from
the Soviet front to Italy. There it built bridges and fortifications as
part of the Axis war machine.
Those who' deserted tot-the Russians joined the Czech Corps
which fought with the' Russian 'Army against'the Germans. In the summer
of 1943, the Slovak Government offered to Send 10,-?500 Slovak troops to
Germany to form' labor units. Soldiers in Trnava,and Senica revolted
and refused to move. On August 29, 1944, over the Banska Bystrica
radio the insurgent Slovak National Council called Slovakia to rise ?
against the German forces called into Slovakia by Tiso.. Lt Col Jan
Golian.ordered the Slovak Army to start combat operations. From the
outset they were at a definite disadvantage. The Germans entered
Slovakia simultaneously .from several, directions, with superior forces
supported by the Hlinka Guards and German Ordne.7.-s. The Slovaks
lacked heavy arms, air support and adequate small arms, ammunition.
The Western Allies attempted to, assist the Slovak insurgents with scime
arms ammunition and American and British Military. Advisory Groups.
The. Russian contribution was' half hearted at best. Although in the.best
position to render assistance, they time and time again' failed to fulfill'
promises of Material help such as to fly in a Czech Brigade from Russia,
and to launch an attack under Marshal Koniev in the Carpathians.'
Instead of troops they flew in Soviet partisan officers, .,political
11"
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commissars, and Czech and Slovak Communist agitators and politicians.
The Czech Brigade under Col Vladimir Prikryl was flown in but much
later than promised. The Soviets also launched a half hearted attack
toward the Carpathian ranges in the region of Dukla Pass, but when
stiff German opposition was encountered, they abandoned the project.
Thus the situation deteriorated rapidly. On October 28, 1944, General
R. Viest, who had succeeded Golian as Commander of the 1st Czecho-
slovak Army in Slovakia, issued an order to continue the fight "until the
victorious end." As a result, the partisan type fighting went on until
the liberation of Slovakia in April 1945. An interesting note was
President Roosevelt's reference to the Slovak insurgents on October
28, 1944: "The People and Armed Forces inside Czechoslovakia have
joined actively and gloriously with their countrymen abroad in the ranks
of the nations against tyranny We Americans salute our Czecho-
slovak Comrades-in-Arms who are today so bravely contributing to the
liberation of their homeland and the rest of Europe."
Post-World War II
Following World War II the Czechoslovak Army was again re-
organized and by 1948 had reached a marked degree of military pro-
ficiency. It was one of the few European Armies capable of conducting
corps level maneuvers. With the Communist coup of 1948 and the sub-
sequent extensive purges of "unreliable elements" the army was once
again reduced to a state of military ineffectiveness. Officers who had
fought with western armies were weeded out because of pro-Western
tendencies: Many of those who had fought with the Russian Army were
also purged. The theme was now "like the glorious Red Army", and
many of those _who had fought with Russian units were eye witnesses to
the contrary, rendering their retention undesirable.
In 1950, the reorganization of the Czech Army along Soviet lines
commenced. The Soviet Military Mission members were assigned to
all units down to regiment and to all schools. Some Soviet equipment
was furnished, and initially much old German and Czech equipment was
in use. Higher level exercises did not achieve any degree of proficiency.
until 1956.
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CONFIDENTIAL
ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT
CHAPTER. II - TOP CONTROL OF THE CZECH ARMED FORCES
Administrative Organization
The Army high command coincides with that of the Armed Forces;
the "Air Force" is, in effect, part of the Army and there is no Navy.
The President of the Republic is designated. Supreme Commander by
The Constitution of .190. The President can, upon recommendation
by the National Assembly, declare war on other state of emergency
and institute mobilization. He is advised on military matters by a
small Military Office of the President. The determination of ordinary
military policies .and the making of routine decisions affecting the
military are delegated to the Council of Ministers. and, specifically,
to the Minister of National Defense. The Minister exercises direct
control over all major tactical units, staff agencies, and other head-
quarters. He is assisted by a number of Deputy Ministers, each of
whom heads a major element,of the Armed Forces high command.
The high command includes several agencies that serve all
components of the?Armed Forces and are represented at lower levels
of command: The .General Staff, the Main Political Directorate, the
Main Directorate of Personnel,. the Main Directorate of the Rear,
and a Military Counterintelligence (Vojenska Kontrarozvedka) agency.
There is also a Military Schools Directorate that supervises all
military schooling. There is a separate Air-Defense Command that
coordinates all matters pertaining to the detection and interdiction
of air attacks against the national territory of Czechoslov4-rin..
there are separate commands for the air force and all the ground arms
and services: artillery, armor, transportation, chemical, engineers,
and signal. The -commanders of these agencies exercise administrative
and technical control. over the troops of :their respective branches.
The militarized security.forces of the. Interior Ministry are
administered by a 'siugle Main Directorate of Frontier and Interior
Guards. These troops, are train'ed and equipped. in much the same way
as infantry troops. In wartime, militarized security force units would
serve with the Army ground forces.
The functions of the various components of the
as follows:
? , (1) General Staff -- The Chief of General Staff
possibly a First Deputy, Minister of National Defense.
13
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high command are
is a Deputy, and
He does not
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exercise operational control over military headquarters or units
except as expressly delegated by the National Defense Minister. The
various staff sections of the General Staff include Operations, Intel-
ligence, Mobilization and Organization, Communications, Cryptography,
and Registry and Archives.
The General Staff, is charged with the preparation of plans and
studies concerning the operational employment, administration, and
general functioning of the Army. These include strategic operational
plans, intelligence on foreign armies, the classification and assignment
of conscripts in peacetime and the mobilization of reserves in wartime,
and the conduct and security of military communications.
(2) Main Political Directorate -- This agency heads an
apparatus that extends to every part of the Army. It is charged
with the political "education" or indoctrination of all members of
the Army. Political officers serve at every command level down to
company. They regularly lecture the troops on Communist policy
and idealogy. In addition, they perform some of the functions of the
Chaplain and Special Services Officer in a United States Army unit.
The Political?officer is also responsible for insuring that all commands
and proceedures followed by the unit are in accord with Party doctrine.
The political officer system provides its own channel of communication,
exclusive of the normal command chain, directly to the Main Political
Directorate. The latter agency maintains close liaison with the Party
Central Committee for advice concerning the latest twist of the "Party"
line and for informing Party leaders on the political health of the
Army. It is very probably that this Directorate has recently been
given increased importance in keeping with the U. S. S. R. and several
other Bloc armies.
,
(3) Main Directorate of Personnel -- This agency is responsible
for administering?the,transfer, promotion, and retirement of military
personnel (Possibly officer personnel only).
(4) Main Directorate of the Rear --This agency is responsible
for the procurement, storage, and distribution of all commonitems .of
supply and equipment used in the Army. Counterpart agencies in -the
respective branch ,commands .are responsible for-handling items -that
are unique to the particular branch. Rear-Services officer's are assigned
at every leyel.of command down to battalion. They, like ,the folitical. .
officers, employ a channel of communication .for supply matters that is
outside of themormal,command.line., Rear-Services officers at higher:
levels can refuse the requests of comrnandexs, based on their judgment'
of available supply stocks and the requirements of the overall situation.
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In combat, rear-services officers are responsible generally
for all matters pertaining to the rear area. These include movement
of troops and supplies 'and the maintenance of storage depots, hospitals,
and repair shops.. The medical, ? veterinarian, supply, and administrative
services are all supervised by the rear-services agency.
(5), .Military Counterintelligence:? Formerly under the General
Staff, the military counterintelligence office is now directly responsible
to the Ministry of Defense.., It is believ.e4 to be responsible for the
detection of actual or potential subversion or sabotage of the Armed
Forces. It works closely. with'the Party Central Committee and with
Party-member cells that exist throughout the Armed Forces.
The counterintelligence apparatus has small working groups at
all higher echelon levels and one or a few officers and men at the lower
tactical-unit level. These men operate almost completely independ-
ently of the local commander who, of course, might himself be a target
of their operations. Their findings and reports are transmitted upward
to other counterintelligence offices. ,
The military counterintelligence organization maintains close
liaison with security agencies within the Ministry of Interior, and in
fact may actually be, supervised and controlled by that Ministry. Such
a direct tie cannotsbe confirmed in Czechoslovakia,' but it would
correspond with the known system in other Soviet-Bloc countires. It
is, in facto a deliberate practice- of Communist or other totalitarian
states to not permit an agency to be responsible for its' own security.
(6) Directorate for Military Schools -- This agency is believed
responsible for coordinating and providing overall guidance for the
military school system. It probably reviews curricula for adequacy
and conformance to Army-wide standards, , _and participates in estab-
lishing, standards for. the acceptance of students and instructors.
(7) Air Defense COMmasid --This agency corresponds directly
with the Soviet PVO (literally, _"anti-air'defense")_organitation. ? It is
responsible .for the 'centralized control of all matters pertaining to the
detection and interdiction of ,every air attack against the Czechoslovak
homeland. The C techOslovak.Air-Defense Command.isi moreover, tied' ?
in with-the Soviet PVO and with comparable organizations in the other
European Satellites-,in what amounts. to, a Bloc-wide air-defense system.
The ,Air Defense Command has operational antiaircraft.artillery
and fighter-interceptor units -directly- as signed, to_ it. .'L These maybe called
,
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CONFIDENTIAL
home-defense units as distinguished from the tactical units that will be
used in connection with ground combat operations. Tactical' AAA and
fighter units would be subordinated to the air-defense command in time
of emergency, however, to supplement the permanently assigned home-
defense units. ?
The air-defense command is the only element of the high command
that has a distinct operational command function. This is exercised
through a system of air-defense regions and sub-regions. The AAA and
air units subordinate to the command are subject to the administrative
and technical control of their respective branch directorates.
(8) Air Force Command -- The Czechoslovak Air Force is not
an independent service and the Air Force Command is not an operational
headquarters. Instead, it is comparable to the branch commands
(actually directorates) discussed in the next paragraph.
(9) Branch Commands -- The commands of the various branches
of service are similar to the "Special staff" agencies of many of the
service branches (Ordnance, Quartermaster, Engineers, etc. ) of the
United States Army. They are responsible for the design, procurement,
and distribution of specialized branch materiel. They prepare training
doctrine and deal with organizational problems peculiar to each branch.
They do not exercise operational control over tactical units, but do
exert administrative and technical control over all troops of their branch,
wherever they are assigned.
Territorial Organization
For purposes of military administration and control, Czechoslovakia
is divided into two military districts. The first Military District has
its headquarters in Prague and is responsible for military developments
in Bohemia. The Second, at Trenchin, administers Moravia and Slovakia.
The district commanders, both lieutenant generals, are in the
line of command between general headquarters (GHQ) and the tactical ,
units. They have a general responsibility for the combat readiness of
the troops in their respective areas and participate in the direction of
the troop-training program.
In addition to these operational functions, the district headquarters
have a primary responsibility for various administrative and logistic
matters. These include supervision of conscription and the call-up and
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training of reserves, military construction, the physical maintenance
of military installations, and the. movement and storage of certain
military supplies. _
? In wartime, the military district headquarters would take a'
direct part in the mobilization, assignment, and movement of reserves.
In addition,, it would continue to function as a territorial-administrative
headquarters. Meanwhile, the district staffs would provide cadres for
the establishment of field-army headquarters should these be necessary
in the event of mobilization.
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When considering the Czech armament manufacturing capability,
the number of years which have elapsed since the communist court,
Soviet aid, and the available accurate equipment counts in camparison
to GSFG data, there is every reason to believe that most active Czech
units possess their full complement of equipment. It is a well corn-
firmed fact that units operating at a reduced personnel strength maintain
the majority of their equipment in storage in the unit itself. Because
it is in storage casual observers are in a position to count it only on
infrequent occasions, and therfore accurate equipment counts are lack-
ing. Moreover, it is usually the best equipment which is kept in stor-
age for purposes of mobilization and is only used as familiarization
training dictates. Occasional observations of a full complement of
equipment can usually only be accomplished when a unit is preparing
to move out of an installation to a training area. An example 'of this
is the observation of 24 x 57 mm AA guns in the STRIBRO barracks in
1957. A comparison with GSFG TO&E indicates that the 11th Rifle
Division in STRIBRO has its full complement of this relatively new
weapon. In 1957 the Army Artillery Brigades of GSFG upgunned their
flat trajectory weapons to 122 mm. In early 1958 these same weapons
were observed in LESANY. LESANY is believed to house elements of the
I Military District Attillery Brigade (See Artillery). The exceptions
to this seem to be in T-54 tanks and heavy AA. T-54 tanks have been
confirmed in Czech units, and it is probable that except for famili-
arization training they are most often kept in storage and are therefore
only infrequently observed. Antiaircraft guns of 100 mm have been
confirmed in Czechoslovakia, but home defense units (PLOS) apparently
do not possess a full complement, and 122 mm AA guns have never been
reported in Czecl- units.
For the foregoing reasons details of Czech TO8tEts are badly
lacking, and in order to preeent a probable picture it was deemed best
to list Soviet TO&E's in comparison to known Czech. It will-be noted
that the tables contain two colums for each item of equipment one
prefixed by an "S" and the second by a "C". The "S" represents.the
Soviets as they are currently believed to be in GSFG, and the "C"
represents the highest and/or best count of the same item of Czech
epuipment for that unit. In utilizing these tables it is emphasized that
cognizance must be taken of probable TO&E. differences and the fact
that Czech units more than likely possess their full complement of
equipment.
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The Czechoslovak Army is known to possess two tank divisions
which have proven to be two of the most nebulous elements of the Czech
Armed Forces, This is primarily because one of the two is housed entirely
in a single, very secure installation, and the other has half of it's major
elements concentrated in one town, and the other half intermingled with
other 'units around a field training area. Moreover, it is reported that
assignment to a tank division is predicated on "political reliability"
wich is probably a major. reason why tank division defectors are mon-
existent. Thus, significant information concerning Czech tank divisions
is very rare.
In keeping with the basic premise that Czech TO&E's generally
correspond to those of GSFG, it is presumed that this is true also in
tank divisions. This is evidenced by the apparent disappearance of one
of the 4th Tank Divisions artillery regiments and the concurrent trans-
fer of its rocket launcher battalion. (See the Order of Battle Listing).
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Figure No. 6
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p.
CONFIDENTIAL"):
MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS
It is believed that all Czech rifle and mechanized divisions are
now motorized rifle as are GSFG units. Some old mechanized divisions
may still be referred to as ,such, but this is probably a matter of habit,
or on the other hand, the name may have been retained as a matter of
an honorific. There may be one exception to this in the case of the 5th
Mechanized Division where 122nun guns have been observed in divisional
artillery barracks, and a separate assault gun. battalion is reported to
exist in. Zatec which is directly subordinate to the division headquarters.
If true, the-se may well 'be indications ,that,this division has been converted
to a tank division as opposed to the continued existence of mechanized divi-
sions?with a TOILE different than either-the iank or motorized rifle divisions.
Czech mechanized and rifle divisions are now believed to be motor-
ized for the following reasons:
a. 1522nm.howitzers have been reported in rifle and mechanized t;
divisional artillery since 1954. This was one of the major 'recent changes'
in the!GSFG reorganization. ??? !, ; ? ?
4-_-b; A rocket4auncher battalion-has-been organic, to-rifle divisions ,
sinhe11.954:.;: This a.).4:14;_iii` recent In`a.j?OFGSFG change,? !
? -
c. Tanks were reportedly introduced into Czech rifle regiments
in 1955, and since have been observed in several installations known to
house. rifle,regiments.,-This..was:.still_another.,recent-GSFG-change.-
7
jd. A recent knowledgeable officer defector stated that the organic
;
transportation of his rifle regiment was capable of moving the entire
-
unit-simult?aneously:-It'sliould be coiiiii:dered here, however; that his '?
unit rag prObably helow_wartime;TO&E and his statement Was based on
exfsting conditiond......On_the, other hand,:._the:Czechs are apparently self-
sufficient as regards to soft-skinned vehicle production. Until very
recenty, a Soviet soft-skinned vehicle has never been reported in
z ? G?AZ viraiiii-67111"hlir?Te- e'd, -
and the Czechs mar well have manufactUred these.
,5
Theinajdidiffereiia-e'TietWeen tlie"Old 'Czech anct?Sairiet
-
niiedr divisions -4p:eared to be the non-existence of a medium-tank regi7
- .
rriene-irk the Czlec11,-:ilifehhan lifecently,; howe;rer,zrnedium
tank regiments .have been 'reported in two of these divisions, and in-one,
' the dissolution of the old tank assault gun regiment is also apparent.
; -
f.?Last and most important, sOme"rifle regiments and divisions
have been reported as motorized rifle units.
)15110Rizn RIPI Diit3I011
c.r._
5 _
** This unit is'not-belieVid to be organic to GSFG-MOtOrized Rifle
-
'Divisions, but has heen?rePOrted'in'the-Ciehh 5th ?MOtOriZeii_
'- Rifle DiiriiiOn-;? ? SeelTank-Dirision'for 1tTOE.fr' 4 ?
." -
? ? ?1., Figure NO..- 7'
-4, ?I.:, ?. .s
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r--
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CONFIDENTIAL
'ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES
General
The antiaircraft defense. of, C.zecho,slovalcia.has improved during
the last few years but still tends to lag behind the other Soviet Satellite
countries. The reason for this may, be that-the country does not lie astride
the Soviet lines of communication in the, same way as Poland. Another
? reason may be because the Czechs relild a,larger extent than other Satel-
lites on their own industries to produ-c-e,the 'necessary AA equipment.
General Organization and Strength
z .
I"-
'A8 in all other' Soviet Satellites AA defense units can-be divided
into two' main categories. '
a. Home Defense AA Units.
b. Field Army AA Units.
Home defense units from part of an integrated Fighter aircraft/
AA gun! parlYWiining -10r known ai PR prrry. Z DUSNE OBRANY
ST ATU-P, . V. O. S. (AA iDegens e of the, State). The AA Artillery and Early
Warning Units of PeiV'.0.-S-.--are manned br, the--Army,---while the Fighter -
and Grlianizt eontrol units are mannecrby-the Air FO-C-..?
6
The estimated strength of the Army element of P.V. 0. S. is 15, 000.
Field Army AA units fo'm an intergral part of the army formations
to which they are organic.
?
Oxganitation of Honierkefense AA
Vz
The Readquartets of,P.V. 0.S. is located in Prague and is
directly. subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense.
, So far five P.V. 0.S. AA artillery divisions have been identified.
-Each AA division consisting, of three, AA Regiments. It was thought that
these units wre,iitndd eventually,,to have: a, similar oTganization-to that
of Russian P. V. 0.S. Regiments (i. e., 48 guns organized .into six eight
gun batteries). Recent- observations tend to show that the guns around
, Prague may be organized into 6 gun batteries. This could mean that the ?
Czechs have not followed Soviet practice blindly, but have organized
their regiments into eight troops of Ciiiris each, or alternatively that
25 CONFIDENTIAL
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opy Approvedor Release
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?
CONFIDENTIAL
they have so far only sufficient guns to deploy six of the proposed total
of eight guns on each site.
In either case it is considered that the total number' of guns is
48 in each regiment. ? ? ,? ?
In addition tb the P.V. 0.S. AA Divisions there area number of
airfield defense AA-units manned by army personnel and ?consist-of both
85 mm and 37 or 57 min tAA guns, which- are thought to subordinate to ,
P.V.O.S. ? s ? ?
y
? ?
Field Army AA Artillery - .
? - ,
It is not believed that there are any AA divisions in the Field
Army. There-may, however, be one or3more'HAA regiments consisting
of 36 x 85 mm AA guns which are either GIs .1 or district troops. In
addition each line division is thought to have an organic AA regiment.
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This unit was originally picked up because of a few low-level
report that an artillery division t existed in the Czech Army, -plus its
relative geographical isolation and the proximity of type units which in
combination formed a "Breakthru".division type pattern. In addition,
all other:non-divisional and divisional type artillery-could be accounted
for elsewhere,,thus_leaving in close proximity,only_these type units
which ordinarily'compriser,a division, of this type. _Since then information
confirming the existence of this unit has been received. It is believed
to be directly'subordinate to GHQ and in the event of was its employment
would depend on. the level of employment of other Czech units, i.e., if
an entire Czech.,Army: were employed as such it would be iniplOYed'in
a divisional?role-or if Czech units were not employed above division
level its; elements would be employed, separately,, and the division head-
quarters disolved.:, ' - 2.
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CONFIDENTIAL
MD= AID um wirt.ssinacus, axriusar DITISIOI
?
-
Figure No. 10
MUSIC
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Primary
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29
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23
220
243
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.
26
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32
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,
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127
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48
12
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12
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Figure No.,
CONFIDENTIAL
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ROCKET LAUNCHER BRIGADE ARTILLERY DIVISION
Figure No. 12
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4'.
s
,
i
UNIT
,
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127
1010
1137
12
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s
232
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a,
?'F'igure' No. 13
_CONFIDENTIAL
'30
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
31
CONFIDENTIAL
MORTAR BRIGADE ARTILLERY DIVISION
HQ
11
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MOTORIZED RIFLE REGT tINE DIVISION
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Figure No. 21 '
CONFIDENTIAL')
37
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co .y Ap roved for Release ?50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
CONFIDENTIAL
111011111 TAU REM', LINZ DIVISION
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Figure No. 22
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CONFIDENTIAL
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*NUNN TAU IATTAIICe. 10DINK TANK MAIM
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1=1
Figure No. 24
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I
I- I
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UNIT
Officers
W
TOTAL
S Med Tk
C Med Tk
S Trucks
Trucks
k
g
X
Ea
rn
IC Tk Retr
Bn H?
9
16
,
25 1
1
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41
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4 I
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.
2
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.
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,
TOTAL
27
133
,
160 31
,
31
3
3
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Figure No. 25
CONFIDENTIAL
,
38
 )
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
_CONFIDENTIAL
HEAVY TANK REGIMENT, TANK DIVISION
HQ
0 ? ?
Figure No. 26
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282
TOTALS '-----'
127-
774841',
' 94-
-'6--
9 .
- 97 -..
-
39
r
Figure. No. 27
CONFIDENTIAL
Elks)
?
?
CONFIDENTIAL
IHQ I
1
IHQ 1
? ? ?
1-1 ,3 Its each.
.
7
I
I.
1
UNIT,
I
VI
$4
'V
U
-
'TOTAL 1
?S Hv-Tks
C Hv Tks
S Trks
Trks
..-
,.
Hia & Hq Plat
_ .
9
, .
16
25
1
.-
11
?
-
,
,
.1-Ivy Tli Co (3) --
'5
'38.
43
10
10
,
3
,
Plat--
1 34
34
? .
,Svc
: - ?
124'
'
-
-
-
,
'
_
.
TOTAL
26
11'6,
212
31
31
4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
Figure No. 29
CONFIDENTIAL
-1
40
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
CONFIDENTIAL
ARTILLERY RIOT - TAU DIVISION
Ill
?
HQ
?
Ill
?
HQ
122 ma Now
152 ma How
?ARTY
CNTL
SURV
Figure No. 30
svc
.---
t
_
....
I
I
/
.
UNIT
,1
Officers
?
kl
TOTAL
O
N
-.
co
,
O
N
0u
'
_C 122 How
S 100 Gun
C 100 Gun
S 76 ATG
C 76 ATG
S D7 ATG
C 57 ATG
_S APC
U
U
S Trk
..
U
0
to
1
A
Arty Regt1 Hcl
19
44
636
_
r
,
100 rnm Cinn fin..?,Z3
32
255
18
._

.
28
3
IN Btry
(8)
(16)
(24)
-.
.
(4),
_ ,
pun Btry (3
(5)
(72)
232
(77)_
255
,
(6)
1
(5)i
28
(1)1
HowBn(Z)23
,12,2nun
154mm How Bn
2:3
232
255 18
?18
28
aurvey Platoon
1
231
24
?-. ...
3I
,
i Sional Coi-Floa.ny
'5
57"
62
-
4
peirvice -C Elm
-3
61..'
64
32
,
-
Arty Cntl Btrv
4
51
r
155
Ptedical Oat
2
5
74
?
?
'
126
1691295
18
36
,
18
141 ..
,TOTAL
,
:..-Figure
41 CONFIDENTIAL
?
CONFIDENTIAL
MOTORIZED DIT ARTY
X X
1
Ilim???=???1??????
HQ
ARTY
CNTL
H
RCN
WIRE
08TR
MRTR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
Figure No. 32
CONFIDENTIAL
42
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
CONFIDENTIAL
MOTORIZED DIVISION ARTILLERY
, .
UNIT
_
el
N.
C
' 41
-
1-1
S pc
Art PC
C
u)
0
u
4
, E-1
ul
C Trks
S Radar
C Radar
i
Div Arty Ha
8
..
19
27
4
6.rty-1/ rgt 121
9 Et
Ji Q1
897
54
9
4
139
HqicHq Platoon
(20)
(45)
(65)
...
(9)
.4.4?
?? :
Platoon
R
(21)
(22)
(5)4
.
purvey
...
5unrav Platoon
, 4
,
(9)
,
" - -
. ? .
.(1414(14),
7
Vehicle Repair
-
-
- (2)
-
(18)
20
,
17
Arty Repaii
Shop -
m
(111,112)
(15)(16)(8)
4_
4
, (7)4

?
?vc Platoon
in
. ... .
A Bn 3
,
23
224
247)
41
(18)
(18)
(3)
.
rs..
....
(28)
;Arty Cntl-Btry
.
62
67
_
9
-..
Btrv Hqs
(1)
1
(4)
9)
(5)
(10)
,
A
(1)?
(1)
.
,
Telephone Sec
!
?
I
I: ? ?
6
17
Computation
g 0 r i? 4 AN n
131
'
Counter Morta-
_?Section
..
(1)_,111)112).
,,,(3)
?
, ,
?
S
.
(1
TOTAL
205
16831888
108
_
..
18
?1
291
1
.I
.......
...?
r
?
Figure No; 33
CONFIDENTIAL
?
CONFIDENTIAL
mumanr BATTERY LINE DIVISION ADVILIZIT
? ? ?
? ? ?
GUN
Figure No. 34
GUN
;
C Trks
11-U
lr
&
I
N
1
.
.?!?_,
... - ....,
UNIT
..
,
Officers
41
TOTAL.
::14 ...T.
d ; '
E'0
k
cA I
?,
-14 ?
-
5 a
k
U
I.S Trks
1
r
.
Battery Hq
'
?
'
2 ,
,
2 , 4'
.
.
Hq plitoon.
l..
._ .18
,
- --. 19_
- '
2. -,
? - 1
,..
'
1
. ,. . .... _?,, ..
GUN Platoon
- - ....
2
,
II ..
1?
28 2?
e.
.:,.....0
--,-..?
,- -- ..---_---?-,
Platoon Hq
-- -.
.,
.,
=
(1) t
,_.?...?__....
(1) :(2)i
......--,:.....;...
-
.. .,..,..
.......,..*P..' ..7.:-....2,:-LI-,
3 ,_-..., ?-,
GUN Sec (3)
: ..,
--..,--77.: t.
?
?,
.7..,
:-._:-::::.-.,
(9)'
17,..--::,::
(1)-
',;',:.:::.':.,7,7,..
" '-'''''
(1) _
TOTAL
,
5
?
72 77
6
.._
-.?,-...-- - !:
8
1
1k
1
11.
A
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
Figure No.35
ceit4OIDENtAL
44
ii
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
CONFIDENTIAL
ASSAULT GUN BN, TANK DIVISION
It
HQ
41,
HQ
Figure No. 36
SVC
3 JSU ea
k
w
i
..,
--
? , ,
UNIT
.
4
k
C.)
,4-1
oz
,
t???1
44
0
N
N
.'4
6
in
u.1
C JSU 122
0
cn
E
U.
S Trki
,C Trks
,
'-Ha lk Ho -Platoon ?
9
16.
25
.
,
1
.
,
.
(3) Asiault Gun cl
'
5
48
53
,
10-
10
'
1
I
SVC Platoon : '
i
` 1
'31
-32-
-..'
_
...
6

4, , TOTAL - ?
25.-
191
ii
216
?30'
30;
'
?
i
8
'.
A
'
k
'
45
, This unithas.been reported in' the Czech 5th Moidrized Rifle Division and JSU,
152ts have been reported-as organic to it. This may indicate a conversion-to
a tank divisionas well as a.differeuce in Czech TOE.
.. . ? , .
. -
Figure No. 37
CONFIDENTIAL
J
CONFIDENTIAL
ANTIAIRCRAFT REGIMENT - LINE DIVISION
HIQ 1
1
? ? ?
HQI
57 MK
? ? ?
MT
? ? ?
1SUPPLY
Figure No. 38
ORD I
AIN'T
SHOP
? ?
UNIT
Officers I
fll
0
E4
CIi
.tc
c
c
ce
co
0
crA
0
In
0
K
N
a
E._4
IC Tric' a
Rezimental Hg
23
9
32
HQ Plato();
35
36
,
100mm AA
Btrir (Z
,1,
5
2
77
57mm AA
Btrv (4
5
6
65
,
6
6
1
2
1 '
,
Mt Platoon
'1
20
21
-
16
..
Supply Platoon
1

17
18
Ord Maint' Shot)
115
16
_
Medical Sec
1
6
24
6
12
P Z
55
..
TOTAL
58
t86
544
,
12
12
24
,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
Figure No. 39
CONFIDENTIAL
46
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
CONFIDENTIAL
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY - LINE .DIVISION AA REGIMENT
HQ
RAW
HQ
Figure No. 40
? ?
_
- UNIT ?
, Officers
-
tx.1
-El
El
0
N
. ci)
.0
AN.
U
a,
co
cli
U
co
C PUAZO
,g
co
,C Son ?
-
a.)
0
S Trk
. - k
U
-
.
..
Battery Hq
.
2
,3
5
,
1
.
?
r
1
,
_ . .....
Radar Platoor
1
11
12
,
?
-
, 1
1-
1
-
3
..
.
.-
,
-
.......
_,. ; - .-__.
Platoon Hg -
--
(1)
(2)'
(3)-.
...
.
(2)
IM.iifSe (3)'
--
(7)
(7)
??..---.--
(1)
'-'
?
.
..
TOTAL
'.5.
60
65
-6
,
1
,.,_
_
1
.,
1
-
1,
,14
:."
?
Figure No. 41,
.=CONFIDENTIAL
?????
?
?
?
HQ
CONFIDENTIAL
ROOKER IAA/DOER BR, TX DIV
? ?
.1.
? ?
Figure No. 42
? ?
SVC
t.

I.
UNIT
a
v
U
...
. ...
OW
I
I-
11
11 TOTAL
S 240 RI,
a
c-
o
;.._
RS Trks
II G TrIcs
II S LMG
0
a
, 0
-1
,
BN HQ
11
ft-
8.
19
i
1
Rid Btrv (3)
3
36
3 9
4*
6 I
2
Btry HQ
..
(L)
(4)
.-
(5)
-.
.
Sig Sec
(4)'
(4)
-
R Spr
--.
8
1
en
Sig Platoon
18
?_1}
18.-
..._
2

,
.
.
MT Platoon
1
,
40
41
14
Maint Platoon
1
13
14
3
.
Svc Section
9
9
?
1
a
Aid Section
1
5
6
_I
2
TOTAL
_ 23
A209
232
12
_
41
_
6
_ _
* May be 3 batteries of 6 RLis each. Cannot au s an .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
Figure No. 43
-CONFIDENTIAL
.48
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
49
HQ
CONFIDENTIAL
ROCKET WENCHER DN, MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION
HQ
? ? 0
Imer
La-;-
IL
LL-
? ?
? ? ?
'MAINT
Figure No. 44
? ? ?
? ?
SVC
UNIT
1 Officers 1
...
W
TOTAL
1 S 140 RL I
4
c4
C'.
U
I S Trks
C Trks
0
.1
in
1 C LMG I
Battalion Hq
11
8
19
,RICT Btrv (31
3
52
55
6
6
6
2
, Btry Fin _
(1)
(4
(5)
RKT Plat (2)
(1)
(22)
(23)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(1)
Signal Sec
(4)
(4)
,
Rcn Sec,
8
8
1
Signal Plat
18
18
,
2
..
Mt Platoon
1
40
41
-
14
Maint Platoon
1
13
14
3
1
Svc Sec
..
O
.4
1
,
Aid Sta
1
5
6
...
2
,
?
,
.
. ?
TOTAL
23
257
280 _
18 _
18
' 41
2
Figure Na. 45
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SAPPER BATTALION, LINE DIVISION
1=1
1 75 EM
1
1TECH 1
(c) 60 EK
(C) 4 Off (0) 75 111
48 IMP Sec (0) 60 - 70
1 Crane
1 Power Boat (C) 6
1 Amphibious Track
6 Tracked Anphib
2 Bull Dozers
9 BTR 1621s
1 Dry Gap Bridge
(0) 65 Trks
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
Figure No. 46
CONFIDENTIAL
TRANS
50
HQ I
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800140007-5
CONFIDENTIAL
RECON BATTALION -- LI1EC DIVISIONS
I
MTCL I -
Figure No. 47
Sr ?
SVC
1
4
-
7
UNIT
.,
,
.
?
(.4
ITOTAL
FS Med Tks
C Med Tks
Amphb Tks
C Amphb Tks
a.