CIA AND THE UNIVERSITY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP89G00720R000700870003-6
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
21
Document Creation Date:
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 3, 2013
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 10, 1987
Content Type:
MISC
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Body:
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CIA AND THE UNIVERSITY
ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
NATIONAL CONVENTION
TYSONS CORNER SHERATON HOTEL
10 OCTOBER 1987
I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO SUCH AN UNABASHEDLY
FRIENDLY AUDIENCE. THIS IS A PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT TIME TO
BE MEETING WITH FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS -- AND FRIENDS OF
INTELLIGENCE -- AS WE CELEBRATE THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
FOUNDING OF THE CIA. I'VE BEEN ASKED TO SPEAK TODAY ABOUT THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE- AGENCY,
ESPECIALLY ITS ANALYTICAL/RESEARCH ARMS, AND THE ACADEMIC
COMMUNITY.
THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION ABOUT OUR RELATIONS WITH
THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY. SOME REPORTERS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE
SITUATION IS TERRIBLE AND GETTING WORSE. IN FACT, I SUSPECT
RELATIONS BETWEEN CIA AND THE ACADEMIC WORLD HAVE NEVER BEEN
BETTER DESPITE SOME LINGERING MISUNDERSTANDINGS. ESPECIALLY
GRATIFYING TO ALL OF US IS THE INTEREST IN THE STUDY OF
INTELLIGENCE ITSELF. SUCH SCHOLARS AS ROY GODSON AT
GEORGETOWN, BRAD WESTERFIELD AT YALE AND OUR OWN ALUM, SCOTT
BRECKINRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, ALONG WITH A HOST
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OF OTHERS, HAVE WRITTEN BOOKS, INSTITUTED COURSES, AND
GENERALLY PROMOTED A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE
INTELLIGENCE PLAYS IN THE MAKING AND IMPLEMENT OF FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY.
MY REMARKS TODAY CENTER ON TWO SIMPLE PROPOSITIONS:
-- FIRST, PRESERVING THE LIBERTY OF THIS NATION IS
FUNDAMENTAL TO AND PREREQUISITE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM; THE UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY CANNOT
PROSPER AND PROTECT FREEDOM OF INQUIRY OBLIVIOUS TO THE
FORTUNES OF THE NATION.
-- SECOND, IN DEFENDING THE NATION AND OUR LIBERTIES, THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO HAVE RECOURSE TO THE BEST
MINDS IN THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE ACADEMIC
COMMUNITY. TENSIONS INEVITABLY ACCOMPANY THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENSE, INTELLIGENCE AND ACADEME,
BUT MUTUAL NEED AND BENEFIT REQUIRE RECONCILIATION OR
ELIMINATION OF SUCH TENSIONS.
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THE HISTORY OF CIA-UNIVERSITY RELATIONS
IN DISCUSSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ACADEMIC
COMMUNITY AND AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE, AND SPECIFICALLY THE
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS SIDE OF INTELLIGENCE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO
GO BACK TO ANTECEDENTS. IN THE SUMMER OF 1941, WILLIAM J.
DONOVAN PERSUADED PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT OF THE NEED TO ORGANIZE A
COORDINATED FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TO INFORM THE
GOVERNMENT ABOUT FAST MOVING WORLD EVENTS. HE PROPOSED THAT
THE SERVICE "DRAW ON THE UNIVERSITIES FOR EXPERTS WTH LONG
FOREIGN EXPERIENCE AND SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE OF THE HISTORY,
LANGUAGES AND GENERAL CONDITIONS OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES."
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AGREED AND CREATED THE OFFICE OF THE
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION, LATER RENAMED THE OFFICE OF
STRATEGIC SERVICES, UNDER DONOVAN'S LEADERSHIP.
WHEN CIA~WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF
1947, THIS PATTERN WAS REPEATED. WILLIAM LANGER OF HARVARD
ESTABLISHED THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND ROBERT AMORY OF
THE SAME UNIVERSITY WAS NAMED CIA'S DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR
INTELLIGENCE IN 1952, AND SERVED IN THAT CAPACITY FOR NEARLY
TEN YEARS. OTHER ACADEMICIANS WHO JOINED INCLUDED: HISTORIANS
SUCH AS LUDWELL MONTAGUE, SHERMAN KENT, JOSEPH STRAYER AND
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DEFORREST VAN SLYCK; ECONOMIST MAX MILLIKAN, WHO ORGANIZED THE
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE EFFORT; ECONOMIST RICHARD BISSELL, WHO
LATER HEADED THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE; AND EVEN WILLIAM SLOANE
COFFIN WHO LEFT THE UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY TO JOIN CIA FOR
THE DURATION OF THE KOREAN WAR BEFORE BECOMING CHAPLAIN AT
YALE. HE IS QUOTED AS RECALLING THAT HE JOINED THE AGENCY
BECAUSE "STALIN MADE HITLER LOOK ,LIKE A BOY SCOUT." IT WAS A
COMMON REASON FOR ACADEMICIANS TO JOIN THE AGENCY IN THE EARLY
YEARS.
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SCHOLARLY COMMUNITY AND CIA WERE
CORDIAL THROUGHOUT THE 195OS. THE COLD WAR WAS AT ITS HEIGHT
AND FACULTY OR STUDENTS RARELY QUESTIONED THE NATION'S NEED FOR
THE AGENCY AND ITS ACTIVITIES. SOME OF THE MOST NOTED
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS OF THE TIME SERVED ON A REGULAR BASIS AS
UNPAID CONSULTANTS, HELPING CIA TO FORM ITS ESTIMATES OF
PROBABLE TRENDS IN WORLD POLITICS.
THESE HALCYON DAYS WERE SOON TO CHANGE. THERE WAS SOME
CRITICISM ON CAMPUSES OVER CIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE BAY OF PIGS
EXPEDITION IN 1961. BUT THE REAL DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS
BETWEEN CIA AND THE ACADEME PARALLELED THE WRENCHING DIVISIONS
IN THE COUNTRY OVER THE VIETNAM WAR, DESPITE CONTINUING
ACADEMIC COOPERATION WITH THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE. THE
DECLINE IN CIA-ACADEMIA TIES ACCELERATED WITH THE FEBRUARY 1967
DISCLOSURE IN RAMPARTS MAGAZINE THAT CIA HAD BEEN FUNDING THE
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FOREIGN ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL STUDENT ASSOCIATION FOR A
NUMBER OF YEARS.:
SENSATIONAL ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING BY CIA BECAME MORE
FREQUENT IN THE MEDIA IN THE EARLY 1970S, CULMINATING IN THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION AND SUBSEQUENTLY
BOTH THE CHURCH COMMITTEE IN THE SENATE AND THE PIKE COMMITTEE
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. EVEN THE CHURCH COMMITTEE,
HOWEVER, SO CRITICAL OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
"RECOGNIZED THAT CIA "MUST HAVE UNFETTERED ACCESS TO THE BEST
ADVICE AND JUDGMENT OUR UNIVERSITIES CAN PRODUCE."
SINCE THOSE DIFFICULT DAYS, THE AGENCY'S .RELATIONS WITH THE
ACADEMIC WORLD HAVE IMPROVED FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS,
INCLUDING DEVELOPMENTS ABROAD AND RECOGNITION IN THE ACADEMIC
COMMUNITY THAT CIA, TOGETHER WITH THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND
DEFENSE, HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT AND USEFUL SUPPORTER OF AREA AND
REGIONAL STUDIES AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE STUDIES IN THE UNITED
STATES. THE AGENCIES OF THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS
WELL AS THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAVE LONG BEEN A PRIMARY SOURCE
OF EMPLOYMENT FOR SPECIALISTS IN THESE AREAS. .THE ACADEMIC
COMMUNITY ALSO CONSULTED CLOSELY WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THEIR SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN TO WIN
SUPPORT FOR A CONGRESSIONAL-APPROVED ENDOWMENT OF SOVIET
STUDIES. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES INFORMALLY STRONGLY SUPPORTED
THIS ENDEAVOR.
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IN SOME AREAS OF RESEARCH, SUCH AS ON THE SOVIET UNION, OUR
COOPERATION FOR NEARLY 40 YEARS HAS REMAINED BOTH CLOSE AND
CONSTANT. THIS ALSO HAS BEEN THE CASE OFTEN IN THE FIELDS OF
ECONOMICS AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE HAVE
BEEN MUCH MORE PRONOUNCED UPS AND DOWNS IN OUR RELATIONSHIPS
WITH POLITICAL SCIENTISTS AND ALLIED SOCIAL SCIENCES,
PARTICULARLY AMONG THOSE WITH EXPERTISE IN THE THIRD WORLD.
WHY CIA NEEDS ACADEME
THERE IS ONE CONSTANT IN-THE HISTORY OF THIS RELATIONSHIP
AND IN ITS FUTURE AS WELL: OUR NEED TO REACH OUTSIDE OUR
BUREAUCRACY FOR FRESH IDEAS AND INSIGHTS AND THE OPPORTUNITY
THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY HAS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTER INFORMED
POLICYMAKING PROCESS BY COOPERATING WITH US. LET ME DESCRIBE
HOW AND WHY.
iN JUST THE LAST DOZEN YEARS, WE HAVE BEEN CONFRONTED WITH
A LARGE NUMBER OF NEW ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS AND ALSO HAVE HAD
TO PAY ATTENTION TO PROBLEMS T00 LONG NEGLECTED. THE OIL
EMBARGO OF 1973, THE SUBSEQUENT SKYROCKETING OF OIL PRICES AND
NOW THEIR PLUNGE; THE RELATED DRAMATIC'CHANGES IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM, THE GROWTH OF DEBT IN THIRD
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WORLD COUNTRIES AND NOW REPAYMENT PROBLEMS; REVOLUTIONS IN
IRAN,- ETHIOPIA, AND:NICARAGUA~; THE FINAL PASSAGE OF EUROPEAN
COLONIALISM FROM AFRICA, NEW SOVIET BEACHHEADS AND SURROGATES
IN THE THIRD WORLD; CHANGING PATTERNS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE;
AND THE GROWTH OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
NETWORKS AND TERRORISM ALL HAVE DEMONSTRATED VIVIDLY THAT OUR
NATIONAL SECURITY IS GREATLY AFFECTED BY DEVELOPMENTS AND
EVENTS IN ADDITION TO THE NUMBER AND CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET
STRATEGIC WEAPONS.
ACCORDINGLY, THE SUBJECTS WE DEAL WITH TODAY ARE STAGGERING
IN THEIR DIVERSITY. THEY INCLUDE PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENORMOUS INDEBTEDNESS OF KEY THIRD WORLD
COUNTRIES; PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
INSTABILITY AND HOW TO FORECAST THEM; HUMAN RIGHTS; NARCOTICS;
THE ILLICIT ARMS MARKET; THE IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRATION FLOWS
IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD; POPULATION TRENDS AND THEIR
POLITICAL AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS; THE GLOBAL FOOD SUPPLY;
WATER RESOURCES; ENERGY; TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER; TERRORISM;
PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS;
CHANGING COMMODITY MARKETS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THIRD
WORLD COUNTRIES; AND OTHERS TO0 NUMEROUS TO RECOUNT.
BUT NEARLY ALL OF THESE PROBLEMS HAVE SOMETHING IN COMMON:
WHILE CIA HAS EXPERTS IN VIRTUALLY ALL SUBJECTS OF CONCERN,
THERE IS A VAST RESERVOIR OF EXPERTISE, EXPERIENCE, AND INSIGHT
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IN THE COMMUNITY OF UNIVERSITY SCHOLARS THAT CAN HELP US, AND
THROUGH US'THE AMERICAf~~GOVERNMENT; BETTER-.UNDERSTAND THESE
PROBLEMS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR US AND FOR INTERNATIONAL
STABILITY.
WITH THIS DIVERSITY OF ISSUES AND PROBLEMS IN MIND, THE
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE SEVERAL YEARS AGO INITIATED AN
INTENSIFIED EFFORT TO REACH OUT TO THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY,
THINK TANKS OF EVERY STRIPE, AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY FOR
INFORMATION, ANALYSIS AND ADVICE. '
-- SENIOR MANAGERS IN CHARGE OF EACH OF OUR SUBSTANTIVE
AREAS WERE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE AN EXPANDED PROGRAM OF
SPONSORSHIP OF CONFERENCES ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF
CONCERN TO US AND TO ENCOURAGE PARTICIPATION OF OUR
ANALYSTS IN SUCH CONFERENCES SPONSORED BY THE PRIVATE
SECTOR. SINCE 1982, CIA HAS SPONSORED MORE THAN 370
CONFERENCES, NEARLY ALL OF THEM INVOLVING CONSIDERABLE
PARTICIPATION BY THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY AND TOUCHING ON
MANY OF THE ISSUES I NOTED. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE
RECORDED MORE THAN 2700 INSTANCES OF OUR ANALYSTS
ATTENDING CONFERENCES SPONSORED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR
-- AND DOING SO AS OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED CIA EMPLOYEES.
-- WE HAVE INCREASINGLY TURNED TO THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY
TO TEST OUR ASSESSMENTS IN WAYS CONSISTENT WITH
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PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS. WE HAVE
HELPED SCHOLARS GET SECURITY CLEARANCES-SO-THAT THEY
COULD EXAMINE THE ACTUAL DRAFTS OF OUR STUDIES. A
GROWING PERCENTAGE OF OUR WORK IS REVIEWED BY
SPECIALISTS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT -- IN THE ACADEMIC
COMMUNITY AND VARIOUS THINK TANKS, AND BY RETIRED
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, INDEPENDENT SPECIALISTS, AND
OTHERS.
-- WE HAVE ESTABLISHED PANELS OF SECURITY CLEARED
SPECIALISTS FROM BUSINESS AND THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY TO
MEET WITH US REGULARLY NOT ONLY TO HELP IMPROVE
SPECIFIC RESEARCH PAPERS BUT TO HELP DEVELOP NEW
RESEARCH METHODS, REVIEW PERFORMANCE, AND HELP US TEST
NEW APPROACHES AND HYPOTHESES.
-- OUR ANALYSTS ARE REQUIRED TO REFRESH THEIR OWN
SUBSTANTIVE CREDENTIALS AND EXPAND THEIR HORIZONS BY
OBTAINING OUTSIDE TRAINING AT LEAST EVERY TWO YEARS.
THIS REQUIREMENT CAN BE MET THROUGH TAKING UNIVERSITY
COURSES, PARTICIPATING IN BUSINESS OR OTHER OUTSIDE
? SPONSORED SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES, ATTENDING MILITARY
TRAINING COURSES, AND SO FORTH.
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OUR INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ACADEMIC~COMMUN.ITY TAKES .SEVERAL
FORMS:
-- CONSULTING: THIS IS THE MOST PREVALENT. IT CAN BE
FORMAL, UNDER A CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT IN WHICH THE
INDIVIDUAL IS PAID A SET GOVERNMENT RATE, OR IT CAN BE
INFORMAL AND UNPAID -- AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN
INTERESTED SPECIALISTS. WE ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED
'IN IDEAS THAT CHALLENGE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM OR
ORTHODOXY. WE KNOW WHAT WE THINK, BUT WE NEED TO KNOW
WHAT OTHERS THINK ALSO.
-- SPONSORSHIP OF CONFERENCES: WE GENERALLY ORGANIZE OUR
OWN, BUT OCCASIONALLY WE CONTRACT WITH OTHERS TO
ORGANIZE A CONFERENCE FOR US. AND, OF COURSE, OUR
ANALYSTS ATTEND CONFERENCES SPONSORED BY BUSINESS,
ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, THINK TANKS,
AND UNIVERSITIES.
-- RESEARCH: IN SOME AREAS, SCHOLARS IN UNIVERSITIES HAVE
THE EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE TO CARRY OUT BASIC
RESEARCH FOR US, FOR EXAMPLE, ON DEMOGRAPHIC AND
ECONOMIC SUBJECTS. THE RECENT CONTROVERSY AT HARVARD
AND .THE MEDIA HAVE FOCUSED ON THIS AREA OF
COOPERATION. IN FACT, IT PRESENTLY IS A VERY MINOR
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ELEMENT IN OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ACADEMIC
COMMON-ITY: I-T IS HARDLY A PROGRAM ,. .AS RECENTLY
ALLEGED, OF "COVERT FEES AND FELLOWSHIPS" WITH WHICH WE
CAN "BUY SCHOLASTIC PRIORITIES."
-- SCHOLARS IN RESIDENCE: WE HAVE HAD A
SCHOLARS-IN-RESIDENCE PROGRAM FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS
UNDER WHICH INDIVIDUALS FROM THE ACADEMIC WORLD CAN
SPEND A YEAR OR TWO WORKING WITH US, WITH FULL SECURITY
CLEARANCES, ON TOPICS OF INTEREST TO THEM AND US.
-- INFORMATION: FINALLY, WE ARE INTERESTED IN TALKING
WITH SCHOLARS WHO ARE WILLING TO SHARE WITH US THEIR
IMPRESSIONS AFTER TRAVELING TO PLACES OF INTEREST OR
PARTICIPATING IN EVENTS OF INTEREST ABROAD.
A PRINCIPAL FACTOR IN OUR PURSUIT OF CONTACT WITH SCHOLARS
IS OUR PERCEPTION THAT QUALITY ANALYSIS ON THE INCREDIBLE RANGE
OF ISSUES WITH WHICH WE MUST COPE REQUIRES NOT ONLY DOGGED
RESEARCH BUT ALSO IMAGINATION, CREATIVITY, AND INSIGHT. LARGE
ORGANIZATIONS, AND PARTICULARLY GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES, ARE
NOT FAMOUS FOR THEIR ENCOURAGEMENT OF THESE CHARACTERISTICS --
ALTHOUGH THERE IS SURPRISINGLY MORE THAN YOU MIGHT THINK.
SIMILARLY, TO RELY SOLELY ON INFORMATION FUNNELED THROUGH
GOVERNMENT CHANNELS INEVITABLY WOULD CONSTRICT THE RANGE OF
VIEWS AND INFORMATION NEEDED. WE ARE LOOKING FOR PEOPLE TO
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CHALLENGE OUR VIEWS, TO ARGUE WITH US, TO CRITICIZE OUR
ASSESSMENTS-CONSTRUCTIVELY, TO MAKE US THINK AND DEFEND AND TO
GO BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD WHEN WE HAVE MISSED SOMETHING
IMPORTANT. IN SHORT, WE DON'T WANT SCHOLARS TO TELL US WHAT
THEY THINK WE WANT TO HEAR. THAT WOULD MAKE OUR ENTIRE EFFORT
POINTLESS.
FINALLY, THIS RELATIONSHIP IS NOT NECESSARILY A ONE-WAY
STREET. I BELIEVE THAT MOST OBJECTIVE ACADEMICS WOULD AGREE
THAT THERE IS MUCH TO LEARN FROM US. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT
SCHOLARS, DEANS, AND INSTITUTIONS DON'T HAVE MAJOR CONCERNS
ABOUT DEALING WITH US. THEY D0. SOME OF THESE CONCERNS REACH
WELL BEYOND JUST CIA AND INVOLVE THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF
RELATIONS BETWEEN OUTSIDE SOURCES OF FUNDS AND THE UNIVERSITY
COMMUNITY. BELIEVE ME, QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PROPER "RULES
OF ENGAGEMENT" SO TO SPEAK BETWEEN SCHOLARS AND UNIVERSITIES ON
THE ONE HAND AND US ON THE OTHER CAN GET VERY COMPLICATED. BUT
AFTER MUCH EXAMINATION AND STUDY WE HAVE PUT INTO PLACE SOME
COMMON SENSE GROUND RULES WHICH I BELIEVE SERVE US AND THE
ACADEMIC COMMUNITY WELL.
CIA WILL PERMIT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OUR FUNDING OF RESEARCH
THAT IS LATER INDEPENDENTLY PUBLISHED BY A SCHOLAR UNLESS (1)
THE SCHOLAR REQUESTS PRIVACY OR (2) WE DETERMINE THAT FORMAL,
PUBLIC ASSOCIATION OF CIA WITH A SPECIFIC TOPIC OR SUBJECT
WOULD PROVE DAMAGING TO THE UNITED STATES. ANY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
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OF CIA FUNDING.WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECT::THAT:THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND DO
NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF CIA OR OF THE US
GOVERNMENT. I ASSUME, OF COURSE, THAT UNIVERSITIES ALSO WILL
PRESS HARD FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF OTHER SOURCES OF FUNDING
FOR RESEARCH.
WE EXPECT ANY SCHOLAR OR INDIVIDUAL WHO CONSULTS OR WORKS
WITH US TO ABIDE FULLY BY THE RULES OF HIS OR HER HOME
INSTITUTION IN TERMS OF REPORTING THE RELATIONSHIP WITH US.
BUT, IN OUR VIEW, IT IS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INSTITUTION TO SET SUCH, RULES AND TO
ENFORCE THEM, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SCHOLAR TO COMPLY.
ACADEMIC CONCERNS ABOUT THE MODALITIES OF THE RELATIONSHIP
IS ONE THING. BUT WE ALSO HAVE TO CONTEND WITH A VIEWPOINT
THAT THERE SHOULD BE ~ RELATIONSHIP -- THAT OUR TWO
ENTERPRISES SIMPLY ARE INCOMPATIBLE. SUCH ARGUMENTS AMOUNT TO
A DIRECT CHALLENGE TO THE INTEGRITY OF OUR PROFESSION AND THE
VALIDITY OF OUR MISSION AND WE MUST REBUT THEM.
ONE HEARS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SINCE, IN ADDITION TO
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS, THE CIA IS ENGAGED IN COVERT ACTION
AND A VARIETY OF OTHER "IMMORAL ACTS," ASSOCIATION OF A SCHOLAR
WITH ANY PART OF CIA WOULD CORRUPT AND IMPLICATE BOTH THE
SCHOLAR AND HIS~OR HER UNIVERSITY. THE ANSWER- TO THIS IS
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FAIRLY OBVIOUS. ACTIVITIES AT CIA ARE CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE
LAW, WITH.TH.E APPROVAL OF APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES, AND WITH THE
OVERSIGHT OF THE CONGRESS. THEY ARE ACTIVITIES ,MANDATED BY THE
DECISIONS OF ELECTED OFFICIALS IN BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES. CONGRESS CAN AND DOES DENY FUNDS FOR
LEGAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WITH WHICH THEY DISAGREE, THEREBY
TERMINATING SUCH ACTIVITIES.
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS A FOREIGN POLICY
INSTRUMENT OF THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE, JUST LIKE THE MILITARY, USIA OR THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE. IF A SCHOLAR FINDS SOME ELEMENT
OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY OR ACTIVITY
INCONSISTENT WITH YOUR PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT, I WOULD
ENCOURAGE HIM FIRST TO DO ALL HE CAN TO TEST THE
VALIDITY OF YOUR POSITION.
OF COURSE A SCHOLAR CAN DECLINE TO HAVE ANY
ASSOCIATION WITH US AT ALL. BUT IN THIS CASE, THE
DECISION WHETHER TO ASSOCIATE WITH US SHOULD BE LEFT TO
THE INDIVIDUAL. ONE INDIVIDUAL'S FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION SHOULD NOT BE DENIED BECAUSE OF ANOTHER'S
PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW. A UNIVERSITY STEPS ON
PRECARIOUS GROUND AND ITSELF ENDANGERS ACADEMIC FREEDOM
IF IT STARTS MAKING ARBITRARY RULES ABOUT WHICH
ORGANIZATIONS A SCHOLAR MAY PARTICIPATE IN OR TALK WITH
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-- AND, I WOULD ADD, ESPECIALLY IF ONE OF THOSE
ORGANIZATIONS~IS A.BRANCH OF OUR SOCIETY'S OWN
DEMOCRATICALLY CHOSEN GOVERNMENT.
THOSE WHO EMBRACE THE "INCOMPATIBILITY" THEORY ALSO OFTEN
ASSERT THAT RESEARCH OR ANALYSIS UNDER CIA AUSPICES INEVITABLY
COMPROMISES ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE HONESTY OF ACADEMIC
RESEARCH. FOR EXAMPLE, ON DECEMBER 3RD OF LAST YEAR THE BOSTON
GLOBE STATED "THE SCHOLAR WHO WORKS FOR A GOVERNMENT
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CEASES TO BE AN INDEPENDENT SPIRIT, A TRUE
SCHOLAR." THESE ARE STRONG WORDS. IN MY VIEW THEY ARE
ABSOLUTELY WRONG. BUT UNFORTUNATELY THIS VIEW CONTINUES TO
CIRCULATE AND INDEED THE OBJECTIVITY OF CIA'S ANALYSIS HAS BEEN
THE FOCUS OF SOME SHARP QUESTIONING IN RECENT MONTHS. LATE
LAST MONTH, IN AN ADDRESS AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, I TRIED TO
SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT REGARDING THE ROLE OF CIA ANALYSIS IN
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND, MORE SPECIFICALLY,
THE GREAT PAINS WE TAKE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF OUR
ANALYTICAL PROCESS.
LET ME TAKE A FEW MINUTES TO SUMMARIZE THE CASE I MADE AT
PRINCETON. THERE IS NO CHARGE TO WHICH WE IN CIA ARE MORE
SENSITIVE THAN THAT OF "COOKING" INTELLIGENCE -- OF SLANTING
OUR REPORTING TO SUPPORT POLICY. EVERY DIRECTOR SINCE I JOINED
CIA HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF THIS AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER. I BELIEVE
IN VIRTUALLY ALL INSTANCES UNFAIRLY. FIRST, ONE MUST
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UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
VIEWS - NATION-AL ESTIMATES-ARE REVIEWED .AND COORDINATED BY A
DOZEN AGENCIES; CIA ASSESSMENTS ARE WIDELY REVIEWED INSIDE THE
AGENCY BUT ALMOST NEVER EVEN SEEN BY THE DIRECTOR BEFORE BEING
PUBLISHED AND CIRCULATED. AS NOTED EARLIER, ALL GO TO SEVERAL
COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS, WHERE THEY ARE SCRUTINIZED.
THESE FORMAL ASSESSMENTS MUST BE DISTINGUISHED FROM
PERSONAL VIEWS EXPRESSED BY INDIVIDUALS AT ALL LEVELS OF THE
AGENCY, FROM ANALYST TO SENIOR OPERATIONS OFFICER TO DIRECTOR.
MORE THAN ONCE, DCI CASEY (AND PROBABLY HIS PREDECESSORS)
APPROVED AN ESTIMATE WITH WHICH HE DISAGREED PERSONALLY, AND
SEPARATELY CONVEYED HIS PERSONAL VIEW TO POLICYMAKERS. LEST
THIS RAISE EYEBROWS, I REMIND YOU THAT IN 1962 DCI MCCONE
DISAGREED WITH THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON WHETHER THE
SOVIETS MIGHT INSTALL MISSILES IN CUBA. HE TOLD PRESIDENT
KENNEDY THEY WOULD, AND HE ALONE IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WAS
RIGHT. AS LONG AS ALL POINTS OF VIEW ARE FAIRLY REPRESENTED
AND REPORTED, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE -- THE
PRESIDENT'S CHIEF INTELLIGENCE ADVISER -- IS ENTITLED (EVEN
OBLIGATED) TO HAVE AND TO PUT FORWARD HIS OWN VIEW. AS
PROFESSOR HENRY ROWEN OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY RECENTLY WROTE IN
THE I~LE.~i YORK TIMES, "...A CIA DIRECTOR IS NOT SUPPOSE TO BE AN
INTELLECTUAL EUNUCH." .
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IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE OVER THE YEARS THAT THE
POLICYMAKERS' RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE THEY DISAGREE WITH OR
FIND UNPALATABLE MOST OFTEN IS TO IGNORE IT; SOMETIMES, THEY
WILL CHARACTERIZE IT AS INCOMPLETE, T00 NARROWLY FOCUSED OR AS
INCOMPETENT (AND THEY ARE SOMETIMES RIGHT); AND OCCASIONALLY
THEY WILL CHARGE THAT IT'IS "COOKED" OR THAT IT REFLECTS A CIA
BIAS. IN 21 YEARS IN INTELLIGENCE, I HAVE NEVER HEARD A
POLICYMAKER (OR ANYONE ELSE FOR THAT MATTER) CHARACTERIZE AS
BIASED OR COOKED A CIA ASSESSMENT WITH WHICH HE AGREED. ON
VIETNAM, VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY AND BEHAVIOR, ANGOLA,
LEBANON, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMBARGOES OR SANCTIONS, AND OTHER
ISSUES OVER THE YEARS, OUR ANALYSTS HAVE DRAWN CONCLUSIONS THAT
DASH COLD WATER ON THE HOPES AND EFFORTS OF THE POLICYMAKERS.
SOMETIMES WE HAVE BEEN WRONG, BUT ON PROBLEMS LARGE AND SMALL
WE HAVE NOT FLINCHED FROM PRESENTING OUR HONEST VIEW.
THE PRESSURES CAN BE ENORMOUS. THIS IS WHERE THE INTEGRITY
OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, BOLSTERED BY A NATURAL TENDENCY TO
RESIST PRESSURE AND AN OFTEN ADVERSARIAL BUREAUCRATIC
RELATIONSHIP, COMES INTO PLAY TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF
THE ASSESSMENT. BUT OVERALL, YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE GIVE
AND TAKE -- THE DIALOGUE -- BETWEEN POLICYMAKER AND
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ON ISSUES IS NORMAL, HEALTHY, AND USUALLY
IMPROVES OUR ASSESSMENTS AND MAKES THEM MORE USEFUL TO THE
POLICYMAKER -- EVEN WHILE OBJECTIVITY IS PRESERVED. WE KNOW
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THEY ARE OFTEN TRYING TO INFLUENCE AS ASSESSMENT, BUT THAT DOES
NOT RENDER-THEIR INFORMAT'ION.AND INSIGHTS IRRELEVANT OR
OFF-LIMITS.
A FINAL THOUGHT. TO ATTEMPT TO SLANT INTELLIGENCE NOT ONLY
TRANGRESSES THE DEEPEST ETHICAL AND CULTURAL PRINCIPLE OF CIA,
WE ALL KNOW IT WOULD BE FOOLISH -- IT WOULD PRESUPPOSE A SINGLE
POINT OF VIEW IN AN ADMINISTRATION AND WOULD IGNORE THE REALITY
OF CONGRESSIONAL READERSHIP. INDEED, IN MY OPINION, THE
SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH CONGRESS IS ONE OF THE SUREST
GUARANTEES OF CIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY. AS DIRECTOR
WEBSTER HAS SAID, "WE INTEND TO 'TELL IT AS IT IS,' AVOIDING
BIAS AS MUCH AS WE CAN, OR THE POLITICIZATION OF OUR PRODUCT.
POLICYMAKERS MAY NOT LIKE THE MESSAGE THEY HEAR FROM US,
ESPECIALLY IF THEY HAVE A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW. MY POSITION
IS THAT IN THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS,
PARTICULARLY IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WE WILL
PROVIDE THEM FOR THE USE OF POLICYMAKERS. THEY CAN BE USED IN
WHOLE OR IN PART. THEY CAN BE IGNORED, OR TORN UP, OR THROWN
AWAY, BUT THEY MAY NOT BE CHANGED."
IN SHORT, WE ARE PROUD OF OUR ABILITY TO CONDUCT OBJECTIVE
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ACADEMIC FREEDOM
DEPENDS ON NOT BEING BEHOLDEN TO Ai~LY OUTSIDE INFLUENCE OR RIGID
IDEOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS BUT ONLY TO THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH. A
SCHOLAR OR AN INTELLIGENCE ANALYST SHOULD BE FREE TO SEARCH
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WHERE HE OR SHE WISHES AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRAINED BY ANY
IMPROPER INFL-UENCES, -INCLUDING_T.HE PREFERENCES OF COLLEAGUES OR
PREVAILING CULTURAL WINDS.
CAN IMPROPER INFLUENCES COME TO BEAR ON INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSTS? OF COURSE. I'VE ALLUDED TO SOME EXAMPLES ALREADY.
BUT IMPROPER INFLUENCE ALSO CAN BE EXERTED ON A SCHOLAR IN A
NUMBER OF WAYS: FUNDING FROM CONTRACTS AND CONSULTANTSHIPS
WITH BUSINESS, FOUNDATIONS AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS -- OR EVEN
THE THREAT OF WITHHOLDING TENURE. AMERICAN ACADEMICS HAVE LONG
CONSULTED WITH OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OF ALL
STRIPES. IN LIGHT OF THIS, SINGLING OUT A US GOVERNMENT AGENCY
AS A PARTICULAR THREAT TO HONEST INQUIRY REPRESENTS A DOUBLE
STANDARD IF NOT OUTRIGHT HYPOCRISY.
CONCLUSIONS
I THINK I'VE SAID ENOUGH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I BELIEVE
CIA HAS NOTHING TO BE ASHAMED OF IN COMPARING THE INTEGRITY AND
OBJECTIVITY OF OUR RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS PROCESS WITH THAT OF
ACADEMIA. LET ME CONCLUDE BY REITERATING THE NEED FOR
COOPERATION.
THE WORLD IS INCREASINGLY COMPLEX. THE CHALLENGES TO THE
SECURITY AND WELL BEING OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE INCREASINGLY
DIVERSE AND SUBTLE. DIRECTOR WEBSTER AND I, AND OTHERS IN THE
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EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND OUR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES
BELIEVE THAT CONTACTS WITH UNIVERSITIES AND OTHERS IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR ARE IMPERATIVE IF WE ARE PROPERLY AND
EFFECTIVELY TO CARRY OUT OUR MISSION OF INFORMING, IMPROVING
UNDERSTANDING, AND WARNING THE GOVERNMENT ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS
AROUND THE WORLD -- THE SAME MISSION IDENTIFIED BY GENERAL
DONOVAN AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT. OUR ABILITY TO CARRY OUT OUR
MISSION, AS IN THE DAYS OF LANGER AND DONOVAN, DEPENDS ON
VOLUNTARY COOPERATION BETWEEN THOSE OF US WHO CARRY THIS
RESPONSIBILITY IN INTELLIGENCE, AND THOSE IN THE UNIVERSITY,
BUSINESS, RETIRED MILITARY, AND OTHERS WHO CAN HELP US
UNDERSTAND THESE CHALLENGES BETTER AND FORECAST THEM MORE
ACCURATELY. OUR COUNTRY IS THE ULTIMATE BENEFICIARY.
CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION WITH CIA ON THE PROBLEMS THIS
NATION FACES ABROAD DO NOT THREATEN ACADEMIC FREEDOM. HOWEVER,
I BELIEVE THAT FREEDOM OF INQUIRY IS LIMITED, A DESIRE TO
RENDER PUBLIC SERVICE SOMETIMES TRAGICALLY THWARTED, AND OUR
NATION DISADVANTAGED, BY THOSE WHO WOULD DENY A SCHOLAR'S
WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN
ASSESSING THE WORLD AROUND US.
THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT COERCE ANY SCHOLAR TO COOPERATE OR
WORK WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OR
CIA. BY THE SAME TOKEN, NO SCHOLAR SHOULD BE PREVENTED BY
ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS OR COLLEAGUES FROM DOING S0. AND NONE
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SHOULD HAVE TO WORRY THAT HIS OR HER REPUTATION WILL SUFFER
BECAUSE OF :A PUBLIC=SPIRITED,?PATRIOTIC WILLINGNESS TO HELP US
BETTER UNDERSTAND AND FORECAST DEVELOPMENTS ABROAD AFFECTING
OUR NATIONAL WELL-BEING AND THE FORCES THAT THREATEN OUR
FREEDOM.
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