FOR DCI FROM DDCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000300060001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 2, 1988
• Content Type: CABLE

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ER 1381/1-88
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C.20505
April 4, 1988
Professor Henry Bienen
Center of International Studies
Princeton University
Corwin Hall
Princeton, New Jersey 08544
Dear Professor Bienen:
Many thanks for sending me the final report for the Policy
Conference on Intelligence. I'm impressed by the quality of
the work and the sophistication of the analysis. I found the
sections on the intelligence agencies, problems inherent in the
nature of analysis and the producer/consumer nexus all to be
insightful and well done. While there obviously are specifics
with which I might disagree or have a different point of view,
the analysis itself is as good as any I have read. Further,
the recommendations are, for the most part, sensible and worthy
of serious consideration.
I found the section on covert action, however, to be more
uneven with a number of factual errors, some outdated
information, and acceptance of newspaper allegations as fact.
A few examples are worth noting:
There is a suggestion on page 49 that the Deputy
Director of Operations, the DDCI and the DCI should
sign off on all covert actions as well as on periodic
updates. Actually, for a number of years, those three
officers have been required to sign off on all covert
action findings as well as periodic updates. Beyond
this, there are regular evaluations of these operations
which are provided to these three officials and other
senior managers.
The paper says on page 53 that, "Since 1985 it has been
known that Contras and Contra supporters are heavily
involved in the US narcotics trade in order to earn
cash to purchase weapons." At minimum, that is an
unproven allegation; such a thing is not "known" at
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this time. A number of investigations are under way to
ascertain the validity of such allegations. We are
cooperating fully in these investigations. In any
event, such a sweeping assertion is unjustified, even
on the basis of the allegations that have been made.
(In this connection, the next sentence notes that, "In
1985 the AP carried a story on the largest cocaine
seizure in West Coast history; the convicted smuggler
said that the profits were meant to buy Contras arms."
I would think that some skepticism might be expressed
when quoting a convicted drug smuggler trying to
justify or excuse his actions.)
On page 55 the proposal is made to have covert actions
submitted to the DDI and the State Department for
review. Again, with the single exception of the Iran
Findings, the DDI and State have reviewed all proposed
covert action findings for at least the last seven
years. And, as you may have read, DCI Webster has
established new approval procedures for all Covert
Actions that ensure the participation not only of the
DDI but of other non-DO Agency officials such as the
General Counsel, Director of Congressional Affairs,
Comptroller, etc.
On page 59 a recommendation warns the policymaker to be
"extremely wary of employing covert action, for the
future ramifications of large scale military secret
operations can and often are extremely serious. Covert
action is not practical ...." Experience would suggest
that there are, indeed, often considerable risks
attendant to paramilitary covert actions. However,
there are a number of other types of covert action
which traditionally have had broad bipartisan support
on the Hill, have not leaked, and have been effective.
Differentiating between the risks attendant to
paramilitary covert actions and others would be a more
accurate reflection of past experience.
The paper asserts on page 64 that Casey prevented the
IOB from fulfilling its mission by moving the CIA's
General Counsel to a new office four blocks away from
CIA Headquarters at Langley, thereby isolating it from
many of his sources of information. In fact, the
decision to move the General Counsel's office out of
CIA Headquarters was made purely on the grounds that
growth in the analytical and operations directorates
whose officers need access to one another and senior
agency managers -- required making available more space
at Headquarters. It was CIA's senior professional
management that recommended to Casey that the Office of
General Counsel be temporarily relocated until our new
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Headquarters addition is complete. The decision had
absolutely nothing to do with the IOB or attempting to
isolate the General Counsel from his sources of
information. Indeed, Casey was reluctant to make the
decision and did so only under considerable pressure
from senior managers. (DCI Webster has determined that
the General Counsel's office should be returned to CIA
Headquarters as quickly as possible, and they are now
scheduled to move into the new building complex next
January. In the interim, the current General Counsel
maintains his primary office at our Headquarters, as do
additional lawyers who work closely with specific
components of the four directorates.)
With respect to the recommendations for the Inspector
General on page 65, the recommendations were
implemented some weeks ago by DCI Webster -- including
rank equal to that of the Agency's deputy directors.
The overall role and activities of the office are being
strengthened along with new powers for investigation.
Moreover, the IG can and does take matters to the I0B,
just as the General Counsel brings matters to the
attention of both the IOB and the Justice Department.
Concerning the alleged crippling of CIA's interaction
with academic resources and American business (on page
69), this is a vast overstatement. American business
has never flagged in its willingness to talk to our
people, volunteer information, and contribute to our
analytical efforts. Moreover, I think it is fair to
say this Agency now has more contacts than ever with
universities on substantive issues, for recruitment and
for consulting. It is indeed quite rare for
academicians to turn down the opportunity to talk with
us, particularly on analytical issues. Moreover, we
have strong support for these contacts from university
administrations across the entire country. Along these
lines, I would cite your own invitations to CIA
officers to participate in your conference, as well as
the recent contract signed with the Kennedy School at
Harvard University to provide training and education
opportunities for our officers.
Finally, from a purely personal standpoint, the
description on page 50 of the Agency and the
Iran/Contra affair is wrong in important particulars.
Setting aside Mr. Casey's role, which is difficult to
clarify because of his illness and death, neither I nor
my predecessor were aware of any improper activities
with respect to the Contras during the period when CIA
support was severely restricted. Any discussion of the
"Iran-Contra" affair must break it down into its
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component constituent elements: proscribed support for
the Contras in which this Agency was not involved (with
the possible exception of one or two officers operating
in violation of our rules), and the Iran affair, in
which no allegation has been made of illegal or
improper activity by the Agency -- however unwise the
policy may have been. Furthermore, the lunch with
North from my perspective was specifically to inquire
whether he was aware of any CIA involvement in the
private benefactor activity and in the crash of the
plane that led to the capture of Eugene Hasenfus. In
short, the discussion on page 50 is quite muddled and
inaccurate.
As I said at the outset, I found the report in general to
be of very high quality and most impressive. I mention the
specific points above -- the most important problems, though
not an exhaustive recitation -- only in the event that one or
another of the participants might consider publishing the
report in part or in its entirety and knowing that, as good
scholars, they would want to ensure that it is as accurate as
possible.
Again, I very much welcomed the opportunity personally to
be involved in the Conference. I found the students
extraordinarily well informed and would venture that there is
nothing comparable to the work of the Conference on this
subject that is as sophisticated as what I observed and now
have read.
Congratulations on running a first-class program.
STAT DDCl/RMGates/de/
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Eileen Roach Smith
Deputy Director, Public Affairs
[phone]
14 April 1988
NOTE FOR THE RECORD
Per instructions from D/PAO, we called
Professor Bienen at Princeton University with a
go ahead on the publication of the DOCI's letter
to Dr. Bienen commenting on the conference
report of the Policy Conference on Intelligence
held last fall at Princeton. D/PAO discussed
this with the MCI.
Eileen Roach Smith
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. CI C.20505
APR 1988
Lieutenant General Colin L. Powell
Assistant to the President for
Natio 1 Security Affairs
Washin D.C. 20506 .
Dear Ge owell:
- /3/7-
I have reviewed the Department of Justice draft Executive Order on personnel
security, which would establish government-wide policy concerning access to
classified information. Further, I have reviewed the transmittal materials which
would accompany the draft Executive Order. Based upon my review, I have concluded
that certain provisions of the draft Order would erode the statutory
responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and are, therefore,
unacceptable. Moreover, I believe that the proposed transmittal materials do not
adequately discuss certain issues that have generated substantial disagreement.
Previously, on 18 March 1987, I informed the Attorney General of my concerns
and suggested that our representatives meet to attempt resolution of our
outstanding differences with respect to the draft Order. A meeting did take place
between our representatives at that time, but the final draft Order forwarded to
you does not accommodate my concerns.
The draft Order which delegates extensive "oversight" authority for personnel
security matters to the Information Security Oversight Office (IS00) to direct
aspects of our security program, and to second-guess security policy and other
determinations made by the DCI, would undercut the statutory responsibility of the
DCI to protect intelligence sources and methods. The Order must expressly provide
for oversight autonomy for the Central Intelligence Agency and, as appropriate,
other intelligence agencies. ?
The Order also imposes, as mandatory, a set of administrative appeal procedures
for the revocation of security clearances and approvals which must be followed
unless the DCI personally certifies otherwise in each case. There is nothing in
current law that requires this, and I consider such a requirement an unwarranted
intrusion on the statutory discretion of the DCI, which carries with it a serious
potential for protracted litigation with respect to the appropriateness of the
DCI's certification in each case. Moreover, the Order ties the denial and
revocation of clearances and approvals to the legal standard of "reasonable doubt,"
another invitation for the entire program to be drawn into unnecessary and
debilitating litigation.
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Lieutenant General Colin L. Powell
Considerable effort has gone into this endeavor, and the draft Order addresses
important issues in an area in which revision and clarification are long overdue.
It is imperative, therefore, that every effort be undertaken to reach a solution.
In this vein, we will provide you, under separate cover, language to amend the
draft Order. As I believe the National Security Council Staff may be in the best
position to facilitate an agreement, I urge you to convene a staff-level meeting
of the affected agencies upon receipt of this language. I am hopeful that a
resolution can be reached under NSC auspices which accommodates our concerns.
Robert M. Gates
(14,: :7214 &ttreZ4
tft6; .6t)'
Enjoyed seeing you at the Gridiron. Kind of a strange institution
but a charming one, I think. Thcught Cuomo's remarks about Reagan
were especially gracious and touching. Assume you and Senator
Cohen had a pleasant chat. Figured things had been smoothed over
since the unpleasantness of early '87, but you never know so I split.
Enclosed are a couple of pieces I mentioned to you Saturday night.
The Fallows article, written in 1975, strikes me as perceptive and
illuminating. Forgot until after we separated that you were at
the NSC when he was writing speeches for Carter. Admiral Stockdale's
speech is both trenchant and passionate, especially at the top of
the last page.
In my book, I hope to explore that generational faultline created
by Vietnam (Fallows argues, pretty persuasively, I think, that
social class played a major role). But I also plan to look into
its corrosive effect on our national resolve, perhaps the state of
our integrity as a nation. The key to doing so successfully, though,
is not to rub the reader's nose in the theme, but to bring it alive
through the personalities and experiences and actions of the central
figures. For the moment, I find myself both excited and intimidated
by the project. But I know if I just hold it together for awhile,
sheer panic will set in, I'll feel right at home and get the damned
thing done.
Thanks for giving me a copy of the speech you gave in Dallas. I
was particularly taken by the section on glasnost and the potential
problems even a minimally successful Gorbachev could create for the
United States. I passed on copies to Steve Broening, our diplomatic
correspondent, and Frank Starr, our bureau chief. Both are old
Moscow hands. Didn't think you'd have any objection.
Thanks again for lunch. Hope to see you soon. If you're at the
White House Correspondents dinner, please stop by our reception.
No Fawn Hall this year, but our guests include Holly Hunter and
Donna Rice.
Best regards,
1627 K STREET NW. SUITE 1100. WASHINGTON. DC 20006 / 202-452-8250
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James Bond Stockdale
speaks on
Our Personal
and National Resolve
to the
American Society of Newspaper Editors
San Francisco, California
April 8, 1987
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Rnni. VOL VNLI
STAT
PAO 88-0148
28 April 1988
RE: Speaking Invitation
commencement Address
Defense Intelligence College
Bolling Air Force Base
Friday, 17 June 1988
On behalf of the Defense Intelligence College (DIC) Lieutenant General
Leonard H. Perroots, USAF has invited you to be the commencement speaker and
to receive the Honorary Doctorate of Strategic Intelligence degree at the
Graduation Ceremony on Friday, 17 June. The ceremony will be held in the
Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) auditorium on Bolling Air Force
Base from 10:00 - 10:45 a.m. The proposed format is 10 - 15 minutes of
remarks on the "Role of Strategic Intelligence" or any topic of your choice.
After nine months of postgraduate studies, 75 mid-career intelligence
professionals from the military services and the intelligence community will
receive diplomas. In addition, Master degrees will be awarded to 35 of these
students who have successfully completed the Master of Science of Strategic
Intelligence program. Although the Agency has several part-time students at
the college, none will be graduating with this class. Senior military foreign
nationals who are also graduating may be included in the ceremonies.
You could expect an audience of 400 which will include graduates, family
members, faculty, and distinguished guests. The media is not invited to cover
the event.
Representative Louis Stokes was the commencement speaker in September and
General Robert Herres last June. Dr. Edward Teller was the honorary degree
recipient in 1987.
I recommend that you accept this invitation and have attached a letter of
acceptance for your signature.
Bill Baker
ADMINISTMTVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
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EN tf
Washington. D. C. 20505
29 April 1988
Lieutenant General Leonard H. Perroots, USAF
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20301
Dear Lenny:
I am honored by and accept with pleasure your invitation
to give the commencement address at the Defense Intelligence
College on Friday, June 17th at Bolling Air Force Base. I look
forward to participating in the graduation ceremony of these
outstanding intelligence officers. A member of our Public
Affairs Staff will be in touch concerning the arrangements.
Sincerel
a s
Deputy Direc or of CentrY Intelligence
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U-1214/DIC
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. /G
ER 1520X-88
7 APR 1988
On be alf of the Defense Intelligence College, I am pleased to extend an
invitation to you to address our Graduation Ceremony on Friday, 17 June
1988. The commencement will be the culmination of 9 months of postgraduate
studies for a group of mid-career intelligence professionals from the
Services and other elements of the Intelligence Community. Additionally,
we will award Master's degrees to students who have successfully completed
the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence program.
We will begin with a coffee for VIP's at 9:30 a.m. which will be followed
by the commencement at 10:00 a.m. in the auditorium of the Defense
Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) on Bolling AFB. Following the
ceremonies, at about 11:30 a.m., the College will hold a brief reception
for the graduates and their families.
Your views on intelligence and national security, as they present
challenges to intelligence professionals, will be of great interest to the
graduates, faculty, and guests. I sincerely hope that you will honor us
with your presence on 17 June.
Dr. Hugo Keesing is the College point of contact. He may be reached at
373-3346.
Sincerely,
LEONARD H. PERROOTS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director
Cif Or--te
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