THE CIA AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000300050001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 136
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
1 March 1988 ?
TO: Dr. Roy Godson
Consortium for the Study of
In
Per your request attached are
copies of the last several speeches
the DDCI has presented. Looking
forward to seeing you on the 29th
of March for lunch.
Regards,
G.: _.,
__?,s
THE CIA AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Robert M. Gates
WINTER 1987/88
No. 66201
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
1 March 1988 ?
TO: Dr. Roy Godson
Consortium for the Study of
In
Per your request attached are
copies of the last several speeches
the DDCI has presented. Looking
forward to seeing you on the 29th
of March for lunch.
Regards,
G.: _.,
__?,s
THE CIA AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Robert M. Gates
WINTER 1987/88
No. 66201
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?
YOUNG PRESIDENTS' ORGANIZATION ? DALLAS CHAPTER
16 FEBRUARY 1988
LOOKING AT STRUCTURAL CHANGE
. BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT CERTAIN POINTS IN HISTORY, ABRUPT CHANGES IN THE
DIRECTION OF A NATION, A GROUP OF NATIONS, OR THE WORLD HAVE
BEEN SO PROFOUND AS TO NAME AN ERA. ARCHEOLOGISTS SPEAK OF THE
"BRONZE AGE" OR THE "IRON AGE." HISTORIANS SPEAK OF THE "AGE
OF DISCOVERY" OR THE "INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION." IN EACH OF THESE
CASES, A NEW TECHNOLOGY OR COMPLEX OF TECHNOLOGIES -- MINING,
SMELTING, NAVIGATION, THE STEAM ENGINE -- WENT FAR BEYOND
SCIENTIFIC OR ECONOMIC EFFECTS TO FORCE CHANGE IN SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND THE RELATIVE POWER OF CLASSES AND
NATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, ACCORDING TO SOME HISTORIANS, THE
INVENTION OF THE STIRRUP MADE KNIGHTHOOD -- AND EUROPEAN?STYLE
FEUDALISM -- POSSIBLE, THE INVENTION OF FIREARMS MADE IT AN
ANACHRONISM.
IN RECENT CENTURIES, THESE "STRUCTURAL CHANGES" HAVE
ACCELERATED. TECHNOLOGIES RISE, FLOURISH, DECLINE, AND ARE
SUPERSEDED WITHIN A FEW DECADES, AND THE CHANGES FORCED UPON
SOCIETIES AND NATIONS ARE EQUALLY RAPID. POLICY DECISIONS MADE
1
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AMERICAN ELECTRONICS ASSOCIATION TEXAS COUNCIL
16 FEBRUARY 1988
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TODAY ABOUT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,
SPECIFICALLY, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER
WARSAW PACT STATES. WHILE THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES
HAVE SOUGHT TO PREVENT THE EXPORT OF MILITARILY USEFUL
EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TO THE WARSAW PACT FOR SOME 40 YEARS,
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONTINUES TO BE THE SUBJECT OF DEBATE AND
DISHARMONY HERE AT HOME AND ABROAD. THE SUCCESS THE SOVIETS
HAVE ENJOYED IN USING OUR KNOW?HOW TO DEVELOP AND ENHANCE THEIR
OWN SYSTEMS POSES A GENUINE THREAT TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.
NOW, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IS NOTHING NEW TO RUSSIA. PERHAPS
THE EARLIEST EXAMPLE OF MASSIVE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO
STRENGTHEN RUSSIA MILITARILY WAS DURING THE REIGN OF PETER THE
GREAT AT THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. PETER HIMSELF
TRAVELED TO THE WEST -- TO SWEDEN, GERMANY, HOLLAND AND ENGLAND
-- WHERE HE DREW THE PLANS OF WESTERN FORTIFICATIONS; WORKED IN
A SHIPYARD; BOUGHT TWENTY FACTORIES, HIRED SOME 800 TECHNICAL
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C.20505
March 1, 1988
Mr. James Hackett
Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
Dear Jim:
Thanks for your consideration in being willing to
change the date of our lunch. I really look forward
to seeing you.
Enclosed is a speech that I gave in Dallas last
month on "What is Going on in the Soviet Union".
It seems to me that the recent problems with the
nationalities underscore the message I was trying
to leave. I would be most interested in your reactions
when we get together.
See you on the 18th
Enclosure:
As Stated
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DALLAS COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS
19 JANUARY 1988
WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND
RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY
WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR
COMMUNIST PARTY.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
NOTE TO:
2 March 1988
Enclosed for your information
is a copy of the letter of recommen-
dation Mr. Gates sent to Cleveland
State University.
Hope everything goes well
for you.
0/MCI
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
March 2, 1988
The Honorable Richard Helms
SAFEER Company
1627 K Street, N.W.
Suite 402
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Dick:
Thanks for your kind comments on the speech.
As we discussed, here are a few additional copies.
Robert M. Gates
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DALLAS COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS
19 JANUARY 1988
WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND
RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY -
WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR
- COMMUNIST PARTY.
1
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11IP"
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STAT
STAT
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
March 2, 1988
?Ms. Elizabeth G. Weymouth
Dear Lally:
SS-og-6/
Thanks for sending me a copy of your Outlook piece
on Afghanistan. I read it when it first came out and
thought it a fine report. I note in this morning's
Post that Bill Buckley cites it favorably and quotes
extensively from it.
It was insightful of you to visit China. I personally
believe the Chinese element plays a much larger part in
Soviet calculations with respect to Afghanistan than has
been noted in our press.
Again, thanks for sending it along.
Re? ards
j4271A- 1314
DISTRIBUTION:
0 - Addressee
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1 - ER (w/inc., att.)
Robert M Gates
se ?
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I / 4
DALLAS COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS
19 JANUARY 1988
WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND
RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-19805 CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY
WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR
COMMUNIST PARTY.
1
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CIA-RDP89G00720R000300050001-2 .
c
ELIZABETH (LALLY) G. WEYMOUTH
STATBUTING EDITOR
vv /tsrIINGTON POST
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N.NDAI PEBULAN1 41, 1700 CI 1
Petafillingtonpost
OUTLOOK
Commentary and Opinion
--Does Moscow
Really Plan
On Leaving
Afghanistan?
By Lally. Weymouth: ?
..
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan?"I have never seen a test
case like, this," says French diplomat Jean-Francois
Deniau of the proposed Soviet pullout from Afghan-
istan. "It's the only way we can see if Gorbachev can do
what he says. It's so important for freedom and for
hope. It's like D-Day . . . . We can't accept that a ques-
tion like this will receive a false solution."
- A real solution, says the French special envoy on Af-
ghanistan, would be the complete withdrawal of Soviet
troops and the creation of a truly independent coun-
try?as friendly with Pakistan as with the Soviet Union.
The French diplomat is asking the right questions: Is
- Mikhail "Gorbachev's announcement that the Soviets
will withdraw from Afghanistan?trumpeted around the
world' this month?for real? ?
Does Moscow plan a "real so-
lotion," or just a cosmetic one
that maintains a Soviet proxy
government in 'abul? And will
the Reagan administration,
anxious for a.foreign-policy suc-
cess, accept a false solution?
Answers to these question L;
could begin to surface tomor- 1 ;
row, ;as Secretary of State
George P. Shultz holds talks in
Moscow on'Afghanistan. Con-
servatives worry that he may
accept a deal that would halt U.S. aid to the mujahed-
din at the start of a 10-month period of promised Soviet
troop withdrawal. Such a deal, made without the Oar-
? ticipation of the Afghan resistance fighters who waged
the war, -could well collapse?with the resistance fight-
ing on and Afghanistan, becoming a second Lebanon.
A cleat picture of what's at stake in the current dip--
lomatic. debate over Afghanistan emerges from conver,
. satiOns with some of the key players?in the -Soviet
Union; Afghanistan, Pakistan and China. What- comes
through above all is a sense of uncertainty about what
really lies ahead in Afghanistan. Many of those most
closely involved are skeptical about Soviet intentions
and doubtful that it will be possible to create the neu--
' tral, nonaligned Afghanistan that nearly everyone pro-
claims as' the goal. These comments provide a healthy
antidote to the optimistic expectations prevalent now in
Washington that a lasting settlement 'of the Afghan con-
' flict is in sight.
Here's a summary-of what some of the key officials
told me in intcniews during the last two montliS:
- or The Soviet* Union. Soviet First Deputy Foreign Min-
ister, Yuli Vorontsov, claims that as a result of the so-
called "new thinking," the Soviets have decided to with-
draw their troops from Afghanistan and to arrive at a
political settlement. But Vorontsov insists that with-
' drawal from Afghanistan does not mean defeat. Indeed,
See AFGHANISTAN, B2, Col I ' .
Lally Weymouth writes regularly about foreign affairs
for The Washington Post.
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'The Afghan
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insists tat western analysts are wrong in will actueve what
uestion predicting a bloodbath if Soviet troops with- ment?one in which the mujaheddin are ex-
Deniau calls a taise settle-
draw, as the mujaheddin take their revenge eluded and continue to fight, one that gives
on the puppet Afghan regime: "Even if the Najibullah the legitimacy he has been denied
Soviets troops pulled back, the Kabul re- for so long and one which leaves Pakistan
gime will be aided by advisors, weapons and stuck with the Afghan refugees, who won't
money. It is possible that it is strong enough return home as lonq as Najibullah reigns.
to resist and the mujaheddin are divided The present Soviet strategy, explains one
and will not succeed." senior Pakistani official, is to improve rela-
? Pakistan. There is pressure on Pakistan tions with both Iran and Pakistan so that
to agree to a settlement at the upcoming "sandwiched between the two, Soviet secu-
Geneva meeting with the Afghan govern- rity in Afghanistan can be insured." In five to
ment, scheduled for Mardi 2. Gorbachev said 10 years, according to one knowledgable
a week ago that if an agreement is signed by Pakistani, the Soviets expect to have pro-So-
mid-March, then the Soviets will start to pull viet governments in both Tehran and Isla-
out their troops in mid-May. With a summit mabad: "That could be not an unreasonable
coming up in June, American officials would expectation," he says. "Then Soviet irlfluence
like to have the Afghan war settled so that it could extend into India, Pakistan, Iran and
won't obstruct disarmament talks. Syria, and you would have a whole belt."
The Geneva negotiations have been under- As for Afghanistan's future, a Pakistani
way since 1982. So far, Pakistan and Afghan- defense analyst explains: "I think the Soviets
istan have managed to agree on three points: will withdraw but leave Afghanistan in a state
reciprocal assurances of non-interference and of civil war like Lebanon so they retain the
non-intervention by Afghanistan and Pakis- option of returning."
tan; guarantees of this non-interference by Summing up Afghanistan's future with an
the Soviet Union and the United States; the analogy, one Pakistani official asks: "Is it pos-
right of Afghan refugees to return to their sible for Mexico to have any other influence
homeland. A fourth item that would provide a than the United .States? A superpower ex-
time-frame for withdrawal of Soviet troops pects its shadow to fall on Afghanistan."
hasn't yet been resolved. ai China. Although President Zia is often
Gorbachev's recent proposal of a 10- portrayed as a hardliner,?Chinese offcials and
month withdrawal period seemed to close the analysts take an even tougher position?
gap, and some analysts thought a settlement skeptical of Soviet intentions to withdraw
was near. Then Pakistan's President Zia ul- from Afghanistan and convinced that in-
Hag introduced a new element when he told creased aid to the resistance is the key to
me in an interview last month that he would removing the,Soviets from Afghanistan. (An
not sign the Geneva Accords with the Soviet- end to the conflict in Afghanistan has been
backed president of Afghanistan, Najibullah. one of China's three conditions for improving
Zia said he would sign the accords with a co- relations with the Soviet Union.)
alition government formed of and by Afghans Chinese ,defense analytts at the Beijing
and controlled by the mujaheddin and Al- Institute of Strategic Studies express doubt
ghan exiles. thit the Soviets are Sincere In their stated
The reason for President Zia's demand for intention to withdraw from Afghanistan.
an interim government is that he wants to be "The Soviet 'condition is that the United
sure that an agreement, is a real agree- States and other countries stop interfer-
ment?that it will insure both the withdrawal ence," says one expert, "For the *United
of Soviet troops and the ability of the 3.5 mil- States and China to cut off the resistance is a
lion Afghan refugees housed in Pakistan to condition that must not be accepted!'
return to their homes. The Chinese analysts agree that the so-
A former senior Pakistani official explains called "southern strategy" of the Soviet
that Islamabad is worried that if Pakistan Union?the drive to control warm-water
signs the Geneva accords with Najibullah, it ports?hasn't changed. "It started back in
AFGIIANISTAN, From HI
he notes that "we haven't used all the mil-
itary power we could have applied."
Anatoliy Dobrynin, head of the Soviet
International Department, says he favors
? withdrawal but warns that if the withdraw-
ing Soviet troops come under attack, "it will
make the process of withdrawal more dif-
ficult. We are not prepared to withdraw at
any cost."
The future Afghanistan that Dobrynin
says he envisions is a "neutral or nonaligned
country with no foreign bases." (The Sovi-
ets use the words neutral and nonaligned
interchangably, ignoring the differences
' between Austria, a neutral, pro-West coun-
try, and Angola, a Marxist regime that de-
scribes itself as nonaligned.) Asked where
; the neutrals will come from?in a country
; where one side has been killing the other
for the last eight years?Dobrynin admits it
. is difficult to say.
The Soviets expect that the Geneva ac-
cords between Pakistan and Afghanistan
; will stop western aid to the mujaheddin
; from coming across the Pakistani border.
: But Iran, home to another 1.5 million Af-
ghan refugees, is another gateway for aid,
and Iran is not part of the Geneva talks.
Vorontsov says the Soviets are hoping to
get the Iranians to seal their border, too.
Even if the Soviets withdraw their
troops, says ambassador-at-large Nicholai
; Kozyrev, they will continue "to provide as-
sistance to Afghanistan." Economic rela-
tions, he said, have good prospects. After
:all, the Soviet Union has signed about 300
:economic treaties with the Soviet-backed
:Afghan government and it is hoping that the
;next government will assume the obliga-
:tions in these treaties. One treaty is
;thought by Pakistani intelligence to cede
.the Wakhun corridor to the Soviet Union.
Both Kdzyrev and Vorontsov say that
r-.
Soviet advisors will remain in Afghanistan
even if troops are withdrawn. At present
there are said to be 9,000 Soviet advisors in
Afghanistan?directing every aspect of Af-
ghan life.
? Afghanistan. In Kabul, signs of Soviet
control are evident everywhere from the
moment you land at the airport. My Aero-
flot plane was encircled as it landed by oth-
er Soviet planes that dropped flares to dis-
tract the Stinger missiles the mujaheddin
possess.
It's easy to spot Soviet convoys rolling
down the road. And you can't overlook the
large KGB headquarters, which is centrally
located. The KGB, and its Afghan counter-
part, known as KHAD, are said to rule the
city. Remarks one western diplomat: "Here,
there is not one centimeter of change."
"It's a complete and methodic coloniza-
tion," explains one diplomat in regard to the
Sovietization of Afghanistan. Since 1980
when they invaded, the Soviets have taken
about 60,000 young Afghans to the Soviet
Union to be "educated." "All the main offi-
- cers in the Afghan administration were
formed in the USSR," says a knowledgable
western source in Kabul.
In Kabul, I found the diplomatic commu-
nity surprisingly united in their conviction
that the Soviets aren't likely to withdraw
from Afghanistan?and that even if they do
withdraw some troops, Soviet influence will
not disappear.
One senior western diplomat in Kabul
made the case most effectively. "The Soviet
Union doesn't want to abandon Afghani-
stan," he says. "The Soviets want you, by
diplomatic means, to help them stay in
Afghanistan . . . . They want to deceive
your country . . . . Afghanistan isn't Viet-
nam. Afghanistan is at the border of the
Soviet Union. They want to stay and they
want the guarantee of the United States
that they can stay."
The West is overestimating the mujahed-
din, says this veteran diplomat in Kabul. He
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the Czarist period," says one. "It's their
dream. They won't give up what they have
achieved: They have got Afghanistan and it's
a springboard for the Soviet Union!'
President Zia of Pakistan had disclosed in
our interview that Chinese aid to the resis-
tance was as important as U.S. aid. A senior
Chinese official, speaking anonymously, con-
firmed Beijing's role: "We have been helping
the Afghan resistance forces for many years
now with arms and money and are still con-
tinuing to do that." The defense analysts ad-
vocate increased aid to the resistance from
both the United States and China as the most
effective way to persuade the Soviets to
withdraw from Afghanistan. Argues one:
"The right approach isn't to reduce our bar-
gaining position but to reduce theirs. We
should increase our aid to the Afghan resis-
tance and not stop until after the Soviet
Union withdraws its troops".
One senior foreign ministry official warnS
that "some U.S. friends are too optimistic
about the Soviet withdrawal." Huan Xiang, a
senior official, puts it this way: "I guess the
Soviets do want to withdraw but how to with-
draw is the question. They want to leave a
pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan and
are finding it difficult."
? The Mujaheddin. The last word belongs to
Younis Khalis, one of the leaders of the Af-
ghan resistance, and it doesn't bode well for a
negotiated settlement. "We said the Russians
should leave Afghanistan. This is our sugges-
tion," says Khalis. But he isn't interested in
Zia's idea of forming an interim government
that would give even a minor role to Najibul-
lah's party, the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan, or PDPA: "We will never accept
any communist element in a future govern-
ment of Afghanistan." ?
Khalis says the resistance groups "reject
the Geneva negotiations because the real
parties [to the conflict], the mujaheddin and
the Russians, were not participating. Any
outcome of such a negotiation would not be
acceptable to the mujaheddin. The Russians,
if they really want to leave Afghanistan,
should suggest negotiations with the muja-
heddin. Then we will be ready to sit down
and negotiate about a peace settlement.
There is nothing in between."
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ELIZABETH VEYINUM
I 4-
A
? itfiad
it.
FES 23
? Mr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
WashirV(m1A(120505
March 2, 1988
Dr. Constantine C. Menges
American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Dear Constantine:
Many thanks for your note and the attachments. You
can be sure that your concern about the end game in
Afghanistan is widely shared. I will share your thoughts,
but I hope you have written to others as well.
If you have not read Lally Weymouth's Post Outlook
piece (February 21, 1988) I urge you to do so. It
strikes me as sound reporting and thinking.
Good to hear from you.
Robert M. Gates
DISTRIBUTION:
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American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research [phone]
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 Telex: 671-1239
26 February 1988
Dr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Bob:
At AEI I have been writing a book on the implications of
the success or defeat of the pro-western resistance movements
for the U.S.-Soviet balance in the world. As a result, I
have studied the situation in Afghanistan in some depth.
For seven years President Reagan's policy has been that
until all Soviet troops are withdrawn and a genuinely
independent government controls Afghanistan, the free world
should continue aid for the armed resistance there. This
policy, if sustained, can succeed in accomplishing these
objectives.
But lam deeply concerned
accedes to the Gorbachev offer
defective political settlement
communists retaining power and
cut back within the next year.
that if the State Department
of February 8 there will be a
which will result in the
the resistance being severely
In my judgment this would be a tragedy for the people of
Afghanistan and open the way to substantially increased
dangers of the dismemberment of Pakistan, a pro-Soviet Iran,
and pro-Soviet groups taking power in some of the Persian
Gulf oil states.
This issue and potential dangers, it seems to me, need
to be explored by the Presidet in the context of a full
meeting of the National Security Council. I hope you will
look at the attached items and consider exercising the
leadership needed to bring this issue before the President in
a full NSC meeting. Naturally, I would be pleased to provide
further information if that would be helpful.
With all good wishes.
Sincerely,
Constantine C. Menges, PhD
Resident Scholar
CCM/tg
Enclosures
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?
February 26, 1988
Suggested Actions for the President
Afghanistan
1. President Reagan should continue with his correct policy: no
cutoff of aid to the Resistance until all Soviet troops are out
and a genuinely independent government exists.
2. Reagan should convene a weekly full meeting of the NSC to
assure that State follows his policy in the coming weeks of
intense negotiations leading to the Soviet proposed signing date
of March 15th.
3. Otherwise State is likely to fall into the Soviet trap
represented by the February 8th Gorbachev proposal: sign on
March 15 and on May 15th Soviet troops start to withdraw (with
the promise of all being out in ten months); no arrangements are
made for a genuinely independent Afghanistan; all U.S. aid to the
Resistance is terminated at the start not the end of the Soviet
withdrawal.
4. The likely result -- some Soviet troops withdraw, the Soviets
stir up combat among Resistance groups, the "international
verification group" overlooks Soviet violations but prevents
Pakistan from helping the Resistance and when the U.S.
presidential season is over the Resistance has been gravely
weakened and a communist government controls Afghanistan. In
turn this defective settlement would sharply increase the threat
of Soviet supported destabilization in Pakistan and the Persian
Gulf oil states.
Central America
1. Soon, the President should subpit a request through the
regular appropriations process for the full aid needed by the
Contras for this fiscal year (Kemp and Helms had proposed about
$270 million in August 1987 and the Administration had seemed to
agree in September 1987).
2. The President should seek an up or down vote before the July
4, 1988 recess and make this a major prospective political issue
for the November 1988 election saying: the Democrats seem to be
trying to lose Nicaragua to communism twice (in 1979-81 the
Carter Administration failed to assure implementation of
democracy as promised to the OAS; now they are abandoning the
Contras).
3. As both the late Senator Henry Jackson and Reagan have said
-- the national security risk is both a communist Central America
and a communist Mexico.
4. With a full scale political and communications effort this
vote can be won.
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The New York Times
February 26, 1988
ON MY MIND I A. M. Rosenthal
A Little Time Left
There is still time for President
Reagan to make sure that a
great victory in the making
does not become a tragedy. But not
much time. .
The Soviet Union has agreed in
theory to pull its troops out of Af-
ghanistan. This can be a smashing
political, military and moral triumph
for the Afghan resistance fighters, for
Pakistan, which gave them refuge for
a decade, and for a strong bipartisan
American policy of military and eco-
nomic support to the resistance.
. But there is a critical debate taking
place in Washington to which neither
the President nor the country has
paid enough attention. It did not rate
a Presidential statement or even a
question at his news conference.
The debate in Congress, the State
and Defense Departments, the White
House and among intelligence special-
ists is not among political caricatures
:--- war-minded kooks and mushy-
headed peaceniks. On both sides are
rational people who range from mildly
radical to devotedly conservative.
The heart of the debate is this:
' Will the ? pullout mean that Afghans
will be able to choose their own govern-
ment or is the Soviet ?Union planning
and the U.S. falling for a withdrawal
plan that will keep Moscow's puppet
Government in power in Kabul? ?
1 Two specific questions are involved:
? Will the U.S. cut off aid to the resist-
ance while Moscow openly or covertly
supplies the Kabul Communist regime
with arms and economic assistance?
: Should the U.S. accept the Soviet
determination to leave the Kabul re-
gime intact and in power after the
pullout or should we insist on an in-
terim government in which the Af-
&an resistance, vtiaich fought not
only against the Russians but their
Kabul satellites; has a dominant role
as the fruit of its victory?
In Congress and the Administration,
there is a strong inclination to make
the pullout deal quickly, to insure
Soviet troop withdrawal. As for aid cut-
offs, they say, we will make the best
deal possible. It doesn't matter that
much, anyway; once the Red Army is
out, the Kabul regime will soon be torn
apart by the Afghan resistance.
But there are also Congressmen
and specialists convinced that the Ad-
ministration's eagerness for agree-
ments with the Russians can turn an
anti-Communist victory into a Com-
munist triumph.
They believe it is naive, self-deluding
Ending secret
diplomacy on
Afghanistan.
and pantingly optimistic to assume
Moscow will not keep up the struggle
for Afghanistan. So do I. The Russians
will leave behind a well-armed Kabul
government that will fight from forti-
fied cities. Moscow will keep supplying
the Afghan Communists after we cut
off aid to the resistance.
The resistance forces will indeed
triumph over Kabul one day. But we
owe it to them and ourselves not to
leave them with a clap on the back
and very best wishes as they face
more years of war against a Soviet-
backed Kabul government.
There in fonfusion and double-talk
about what the United States has
promised or hinted at. In a day or two,
the President will get a letter from at
least 29 senators of almost every
political shading urging him to step in
and clear things up. They want him to
make sure himself that aid to the
resistance is not cut off until all
Soviet troops leave Afghanistan and
Moscow ceases aid to Kabul. .
The letter is signed by conservative
Republicans like Gordon J. Humphrey
of New Hampshire, one of the strong-
est backers of the resistance, and
Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. It
also has signatures of the Democrats
Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York
and Christopher Dodd of Connecticut.
Alfonse D'Amato of New York and
Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming, Republi-
cans, have signed and so have the
Democrats Joseph Biden of Delaware
and Dennis DeConcini of Arizona.
So it is now up to the President to
call a meeting of. the National Se-
curity Council, find out what has been
committed and decide what he is will-
ing to stand by.
But that's not enough. The next
round of talks starts in Geneva on
March 1. The agreements should be
made public before the United States
commits its power and honor to them.
The U.S. need not agree with the
resistance on every point nor satisfy
every demand. But at least the Presi-
dent should pay attention to the last
sentence in the letter he will be getting
from the senators of both parties:
"We have no right to endanger the
gains the Afghans have made at a ter-
rible price to their nation."
Then let's hear from the President
fully, openly and soon. Secret diplo-
macy is now unjustified. Whatever
Washington tells Russians is exactly
what it ihould tell Afghans, Paki-
stanis and Americans. 0
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The New York Times
FRIDAY. FEBRUARY 12. 1988
ON MY MIND I A. M. Rosenthal
A25
. The Great Game Goes On .
Mikhail Gorbachev faces a chal-
lenge entirely worthy of his
abilities as a master politician.
The task before him is to make sure
that a withdrawal Of Soviet forces
from Afghanistan, if it takes place,
does not diminish full Soviet control
' of the country.
His predecessors spilled Soviet
blood to invade Afghanistan. Mr. Gor-
bachev_ will build on what they
achieved ? Soviet domination of Af-
ghanistan for the first time in history.
. He will struggle to keep Soviet control
without more cost in Soviet lives. If he
succeeds he will be a hero at home
and in the world and still maintain
Soviet power in South Asia. .
You do not have to be a cynic or even
particularly skeptical about Mr. Gor-
bachev to realize that this is his im-
mediate goal. He already has estab-
lished much of the political and mili-
tary structure in Afghanistan neces-
sary to achieve it. This will be left be-
bind when Soviet troops march out.
He would fail in his duty as guardian
of Soviet power if he did not at least
try. He would be turning his back on
what Moscow historically has believed
are deep Russian interests in Afghani-
Ilan. He would be betraying the Soviet
Army's sacrifices. He could not last
long in power if he just gave up and
walked away from Afghanistan.
For almost 200 years, Russian
rulers, Czarist or Bolshevik, have
. tried to conquer Afghanistan. Kipling
, called it "the Great Game."
. Now, control of Afghanistan puts the
Soviet empire at the doors of the Indian
i subcontinent. Moscow need not invade
i Pakistan and India. All it has to do is
knock firmly; it will be heard.
. Afghanistan also puts Soviet power
. within tank distance of the warm
waters of the Indian Ocean. From Af-
ghanistan, the Soviet Union can move
deep into Iran. A true prize, Afghani-
stan, for a great imperial power.
But the Afghan resistance made
Moscow pay a price: 10,000 Soviet
lives, a wound that never was
stanched, bitterness in the mouths of
Soviet parents. Mr. Gorbachev is flex-
ible enough to see that perhaps con-
trol can now be maintained without
the Red Army and that in the future
only Afghan blood need be shed.
Soviet troop withdrawal will leave
behind a puppet Government whose
ministries are laced with Soviet "ad-
visers." This regime has international
recognition. It also has a well-trained
army, years of military supplies, and a
What Soviet
pullout will
leave behind.
Soviet-created air force. It has a
powerful secret police with close ties to
the K.G.B. It has the prospect of unend-
ing Soviet-bloc economic assistance.
The Afghan resistance will find itself
alone, without the U.S. military assist-
ance that has kept it fighting. It will be
under pressure to join a Communist-
dominated government. If it does not
the world will shake its finger, call
them naughty and turn away.
One million Afghans have died.
Five million, a third of the nation, are
in exile. The Afghans deserve an
honorable peace. It is up to the United
States, which profited from the stun-
ning bravery of the Afghan resist-
4
ance, to struggle for it.
1. Moscow must agree to meet with
the Afghan resistance. Three countries
? the U.S., Pakistan, the Soviet Union
? are determining the fate of a fourth.
Something like this happened once be-
fore, in 1938, in Munich.
2. The U.S. should try to wiggle out
of its incredible commitment to end
aid to the resistance when the Rus-
sians begin to pull out, replacing it
with a phased cutoff.
.???
3. The withdrawal agreements
should remove not just Soviet troops
but the small army of "experts."
4. The powerful Soviet air and com-
munication bases must be disman-
tled, not turned over to Kabul and the
"experts." ?
5. Territory along the Soviet-Af-
ghan frontier that has been annexed
de facto by Moscow should be re-
turned. So should the 10,000 Afghan
children in the Soviet Union.
6. The secret police should be 'dis-
banded.
7. Afghanistan should be ruled nor by
the Kabul regime but by an interim
government selected by a traditional
council of elders in which Kabul weuld
be a participant ? along with ,resist-
ance politicians and military leaders
and representatives of Afghan clans
and refugees. The permanent govern-
ment should be chosen by an election in
which the Communists can runrafter
the millions of refugees return. ?
This would mean a concession by the
resistance, which loathes the Commu-
nists and wants them out or dead; pref-
erably both. It would also mean the end
of total Soviet domination.
It would be a new, more difficUlt
challenge for Mr. Gorbachev AL' to
show whether in the end he will choose
peace for Afghanistan or is just_play-
ing another card in the game. , 0
? p
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February 26, 1988
Afghan Diplomacy -- Opportunity or Trap?*
Is the Soviet Union's proposal to withdraw from Afghanistan
an effort to win by diplomatic cunning what the Red Army has
failed to achieve by military force? On February 8 Kremlin
chief Mikhail Gorbachev heightened expectations of an early
settlement to the war. If the United States cut off aid to the
Afghan resistance, he suggested, a Soviet troop withdrawal could
begin on May 15 and be completed within ten months, provided
diplomats in Geneva reach a settlement by mid March. He
indicated that this pullout would proceed whether or not an
agreement was reached on a new or interim Afghan government to
succeed the current communist regime.
On the day after Gorbachev's announcement, the Washington
Post said that the possibility of "a good settlement" was
nearing. Two days later a New York Times editorial hailed the
pledge as "an extraordinary statement" that "eliminates the
biggest outstanding obstacle in the talks" and indicates that
"from all appearances, Moscow has made the painful decision to
lose a war."
Afghanistan's tragic recent history should be kept in mind
as we consider these developments. In 1978, after twenty-five
years of active Soviet subversion of Afghanistan, the Communist
*Dr. Constantine C. Menges is Resident Scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute in Washington D.C. He served in the Reagan
Administration for five years, including from 1983 to 1986 as
Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.
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party seized power there in a bloody military coup. In twelve
months the new regime executed tens of thousands, imprisoned
many more, and tried to destroy religion and all other
independent institutions. Since the Communist takeover, more
than 1 million of Afghanistan's 15 million people have died in
warfare or prison, and nearly 5 million have fled to Pakistan
and Iran as refugees.
Within weeks of the 1978 coup, an armed Afghan resistance
began to oppose the Communist regime. Now, nearly a decade
after Soviet troops invaded in December 1979, the resistance has
fought them and the Kabul Communists to a standstill. The
Soviet Union has therefore given new emphasis to the UN-
sponsored "proximity talks" in Geneva.
Where does the United States stand on these fast-paced
diplomatic developments? President Reagan's longstanding
policy, restated during and after the December 1987 summit and
in his 1988 State of the Union message, requires U.S. aid to the
resistance to continue until all Soviet troops have withdrawn
and a genuinely independent government is in place in
Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, a faction within the State Department appears
to have followed a different policy. These career officials are
working for a settlement based on a 1985 draft treaty,
negotiated under UN auspices in Geneva. It requires a Western
aid cut-off once a Soviet troop withdrawal begins.
This State Department action became public in May 1986 when
2
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a key supporter of the Afghan resistance, Senator Gordon Humphrey
(R,N.H.), questioned a senior State Department official during
Congressional hearings. He admitted that State had agreed to
guarantee this Geneva draft treaty and that Shultz knew about it,
but he would not answer whether President Reagan had approved or
even been informed of the action. On February 11, 1988, the New
York Times published a report headlined "Reagan didn't know of
Afghan deal." According to the White House and State Department
officials it quoted, "an American commitment in 1985 to end
military aid to the Afghan guerrillas at the beginning of a
Soviet troop withdrawal was made without the knowledge or
approval of President Reagan."
Will the State Department follow the President's policy or
its own inclinations on Afghanistan? If it follows its own
inclinations the United States risks being misled into approving
a defective political settlement. History has shown that the
Soviet Union and its allies know how to use false political
settlements as a strategy for Communist victory. The 1945 Yalta
agreement served that purpose for Eastern Europe, as have four
subsequent war termination agreements -- Korea in 1953, Vietnam
in 1954, Laos in 1962, Vietnam in 1973. The communist side
violated all of them.
As a 1986 Defense Department report stated, in these four
war termination agreements the communist side undertook
"significant violations, including military ones...immediately
after the agreements went into effect, suggesting that the
3
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communists were planning the infringements even as they were
negotiating." The 1962 settlement on Laos for example, required
North Vietnam, "in the shortest time possible," to remove its
estimated ten thousand troops through designated checkpoints,
but "only forty left the country through International Control
Commission checkpoints."
The 1973 Paris Accords required North Vietnam to withdraw
all of its forces from Cambodia and Laos and to refrain from
introducing additional forces into South Vietnam. In fact,
"North Vietnam never observed the cease fire and troop
withdrawal requirements. Within three months...Hanoi had
already illegally infiltrated some thirty thousand additional
troops." The 1986 report goes on to say about all four
agreements that "despite the elaborate supervisory and control
mechanisms...the communist signatories were able to circumvent
key provisions...with relative ease."
To this disturbing history can be added the conclusions
reached by President Reagan in his four annual reports on Soviet
noncompliance with arms control agreements. The 1984 report
concluded that "over a twenty-five year span the Soviets had
violated a substantial number of arms control commitments." And
in 1985 the president noted "a pattern of Soviet noncompliance"
with arms control accords.
Since the West has made no effective response to these
repeated violations, Gorbachev might well intend to offer a
Soviet troop withdrawal - with no clear-cut way to monitor the
4
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number of troops remaining or secretly reintroduced - as a lever
to terminate U.S. aid. Will the Soviets then permit a genuinely
free Afghanistan?
Seventy years of history suggest that Moscow will seek ways
to keep Afghanistan Communist. It might try to divide and
demoralize the resistance groups as they begin to discuss with
Afghan exiles and Kabul regime representatives the composition of
the new government and the methods of Soviet withdrawal. United
principally by hatred of Soviet occupation, the resistance
alliance would be vulnerable to Communist destabilization in such
a new political context.
Three groups within the alliance seek a secular government,
including a constitutional monarchy or Western-style parliament,
but the four "fundamentalist" groups unconditionally reject the
pre-Communist institutions--including the monarchy--and seek an
Islamic state. The Soviets have likely proposed a role for
former Afghan King Zahir Shah (deposed by a leftist coup in
1973) in order to aggravate these differences and perhaps to
spark warfare within the alliance.
While they create public expectations of an imminent
withdrawal, Moscow and Kabul will probably secretly attempt to
maintain Communist control over the premiership, the army, the
secret police, and the ministries of education and
communication. As in 1980, when the Soviets tried to mask their
domination of Afghanistan with a cosmetic "broad front," they
may try to control the "new" government through ostensibly non-
5
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communist Afghans who are clandestine communist partners.
If aid to the Afghan resistance is cut off before all Soviet
troops are withdrawn and a genuinely independent government is
in place, a Soviet strategy of provoking fights among resistance
groups inside Afghanistan and in refugee zones along the
Pakistan border might well succeed.
Although the resistance wants a new government without
Communists, the differences among the groups could allow the
Soviets and their proxies to support some groups against others
and bring them into cooperation with the pseudo-independent
government they will try to establish. Pakistani President Zia
ul-Haq sensibly refuses to have anything to do with the current
Kabul regime of Najibullah, but he has reportedly begun to
pressure resistance groups to join a new government that might
include Communists.
If some resistance leaders reject the emerging settlement as
a Soviet trap while others embrace it as a vehicle to power,
divisions and even warfare among the groups might increase. The
spectacle of freedom fighters at war among themselves could
undermine Western support. And Pakistan might sharply reduce
its help for whatever effective resistance remained.
These possibilities will be furthered by the UN-created
verification system, which would probably overlook or fail to
detect Soviet violations while vigilantly monitoring and
limiting movement from Pakistan into Afghanistan. In the past,
international verification groups have often stood by while the
6
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A+ a,
Communist side violated its agreements.
The Soviets may well calculate that the U.S. aid cut-off,
the infighting within the resistance alliance, and the problems
between the resistance and Pakistan, along with unobstructed
Soviet violation of the settlement, could cumulatively and
dramatically weaken the resistance. Then in late 1988, with the
United States preoccupied with presidential politics, Soviet
troops and secret police could be secretly reinfiltrated to cut
down the resistance until it no longer jeopardized Communist
control.
This destructive scenario is a real possibility. It can
still be avoided if President Reagan makes sure that his
administration carries out his publicly stated policy. He
should clearly reaffirm that policy in public statements and use
regular meetings of the National Security Council to ensure his
control. The United States should be willing to increase
military aid to the resistance unless the Soviets agree to a
genuine settlement, withdraw their forces, and permit a truly
independent Afghan government.
The resistance leaders might also increase their pressure
for such a genuine settlement. They could notify Moscow and
Kabul that unless a truly independent Afghanistan is attained by
autumn 1988, they will not provide cease-fire zones for Soviet
troop withdrawals or give amnesty to members of the Communist
Afghan government. And the resistance could demand full
reparation -- valued at tens of billions of dollars -- for the
immense human suffering and economic destruction the Communists
have caused.
7
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D C.20505
7 March 1988
The Honorable Frank R. wolf
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Wolf:
Az) ie-t;
I appreciate your letter of 19 February 1988 in which you
describe the recent mark up of H.R. 3757, the Federal Employees
Leave Transfer Act. I share your enthusiasm for what this
measure can accomplish.
The amendment to the bill which permits the Agency to
establish its own program was made necessary by the need to
protect sensitive personnel information. Having gained this
authority, I now take very seriously my responsibility to
establish a leave transfer program which will not only meet the
unique needs of our employees, but which will be exemplary for
other agencies.
I am pleased to hear that the prospects for passage in the
House are excellent and that the Senate is also likely to act
favorably. This bill is indeed one in which everyone wins.
Sincerely yours,
obert M. 'ates
Acting Director of Cen 'al Intelligence
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Washingion. C 20505
OCA 88-0594
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Wolf:
WE 0
07 MAR 1988
I appreciate your letter of 19 February 1988 in which you
describe the recent mark up of H.R. 3757, the Federal Employees
Leave Transfer Act. I share your enthusiasm for what this
measure can accomplish.
The amendment to the bill which permits the Agency to
establish its own program was made necessary by the need to
protect sensitive personnel information. Having gained this
authority, I now take very seriously my responsibility to
establish a leave transfer program which will not only meet the
unique needs of our employees, but which will be exemplary for
other agencies.
I am pleased to hear that the prospects for passage in the
House are excellent and that the Senate is also likely to act
favorably. This bill is indeed one in which everyone wins.
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 -
1 - ExDir
1 - ER
1 - DDA
1 - D/PERS
1 - D/ICS
1 - OCA Record
1 - JB Chrono
STAT CCA:
Sincerely yours,
Wigiara H. Viekszx
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
1- OCARead
b (29 Feb 88)
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STAT
STAT
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Coe cc.,
S7 MAR 198s
OCA88-0616
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Transmission of FY '89 Intelligence Authorization
Bill to Congress
1. The Office of Management and Budget (ONE) has just cleared
our draft Fiscal Year 1989 Intelligence Authorization Bill.
2. The next step in the process is the bill to be formally
transmitted to the House and Senate under letters signed by you.
3. Attached at Tab No. 1 is a memo to me from
explaining the issues in more detail. At Tab C of that memo are
the two transmittal letters for. your si2nature.
V John Beigerson
Attachments
Tab 1 - DEL/OCA memo to D/OCA
Tab A - Draft Fiscal Year 1989 Intelligence Authorization
Bill (bill, section-by-section analysis, cost
analysis and changes in existing law)
Tab B - OCA 87-6026 (8 December 1987)
Tab C - A/DCI Letter to Speaker and A/DCI Letter to
President of the Senate
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SUBJECT:
OCA/Leg
FY '89 Intelligence Authorization Bill:
Transmission to Congress
Distribution:
(9 February 1988)
Original
- Addressee (w/att)
1
- D/OCA (w/att)
1
- ER (w/att)
- Ex Dir (w/att)
DDCI (w/attY/
1
- OCA/Registry (w/att)
1
- OCA/Leg/Subject File:
FY
'89
Intel.
Auth.
Bill
(w/att)
1
- JR Signer (w/o att)
1
- PS Signer (w/o att)
1
- OCA Read (w/o att)
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4 March 1988
OCA88-0615
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Congressional Affairs
STAT FROM: Deputy Director for Legislation
Office of Congressional Affairs
STAT
SUBJECT: FY '89 Intelligence Authorization Bill:
A/DCI Transmission to Congress
1. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has just given
Administration clearance to the draft Fiscal Year 1989
Intelligence Authorization bill. The bill as cleared with
supporting materials is attached at Tab A.
2. With the Acting Director's concurrence, the bill had been
sent to OMB for clearance on 24 December 1987 after a preliminary
circulation for comment within the Intelligence Community.
Attached at Tab B is a memo explaining the issues at the time the
bill was sent to OMB.
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3. The next step is for the bill to be formally transmitted
to the Senate and the House under cover of letters from the Acting
Director at Tab C. The Acting Director's signature on those two
STAT letters is requested.
Attachments
Tab A - Draft Fiscal Year 1989 Intelligence
Authorization Bill (bill, section-by-section
analysis, cost analysis and changes in
existing law)
Tab P - OCA 87-6026 (8 December 1987)
Tab C - A/DCI Letter to Speaker and A/DCI Letter to
President of the Senate
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
STAT FROM:
SUBJECT:
STAT
OCA 87-6026
8 December 1987
Director of Congressional Affairs
Draft Fiscal Year 1989 Intelligence Authorization Bill:
Submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
for Clearance
1. A.ttached at Tab A is a letter to OMB for your signature. The letter
seeks Administration clearance for the draft Fiscal Year 1989 Intelligence
Authorization Fill and draft transmittal letters (Tab B). We hope to have
clearance on the bill in time for the Director to transmit it to the Second
Session of the 100th Congress in January 1988.
2. The first draft of this legislation was circulated throughout the
Agency and the Intelligence Comunity. This draft, which we are sending
forward to OMB, is the result of comments received on the first draft and
the Congress' action on the Fiscal Year 1988 Intelligence Authorization Act,
signed by the President on 1 December 1987 (Public Law No. 100-178). The
following is a summary of the provisions and issues involved.
3. Title I through III are standard "boilerplate".
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Central Intelligence Agency
VVashIngton.D C.20505
OCA 88-0678
9 March 1988
The Honorable George Bush
President of the Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Mr. President:
This letter transmits for the consideration of the Congress
a proposed "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1989".
A detailed section-by-section explanation accompanies the
proposed Act. Timely consideration of the bill would be
greatly appreciated.
The Office of Management and Budget has advised that
enactment of this proposed legislation would be in accordance
with the President's program.
Enclosure
erely yours,
1Robert Gates
Acting Director of ntral Intelligence
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Central Intelligence Agency
VVashIngton.D.C.20505
OCA 88-0677
9 March 1988
The Honorable James C. Wright, Jr.
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
This letter transmits for the consideration of the Congress
a proposed "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1989".
A detailed section-by-section explanation accompanies the
proposed Act. Timely consideration of the bill would be
greatly appreciated.
The Office of Management and Budget has advised that
enactment of this proposed legislation would be in accordance
with the President's program.
Enclosure
erely yours,
Robert M Gates
Acting Director of Ctjtral Intelligence
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. --
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
STAT
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
P...a.CD?X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
X
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
100C
X
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
X
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
'
17
C/NE/DO
X
18
L
19
.
20
21
22
1,STAT
SUSPENSE
Remarks To 10, 13 & 18. FOR compliance with
Paragraph 5, please.
xecutive secretary
9 Mar 88
Date
21127 mm311
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE
TO: Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
\TFROM:
OWSR/STD/SB
ROOM NO.
\T5F43
I
BUILDING HQS
1 ... ..
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 36-8
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Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
09 MAR 1988
NOTE TO: Deputy Director for Intelligence
The enclosed responds to a request from
the Defense Science Board for CIA support in
reviewing developments in high-temperature
superconductor research. People from this
office and OGI a
STATlefings.
Enclosure
Director
Scientific and Weapons Research
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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
/0D1 Registry
IV 97 y-
1 0 MAR 1988 -7 -
NOTE TO: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
The attached letter responds to a request
for CIA briefings, to help a Defense Science
Board task force to examine the potential
military applications of high-temperature
superconductors. OSWR and OGI are preparing
the requested briefings on the state of
research in theASSR, China, Japan and NATO
STAT
countries,
Richard J. Kerr
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment
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STAT
STAT
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
0 MAR 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. George P. Millburn
Executive Director
Defense Science Board
Office of the Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Defense Science Board Task Force on Military
Applications of Superconductors
Memo for Director of Central Intelligence, dated February 26, 1988
1. We would be pleased to provide briefings to the Defense Science Board Task Force.
Our briefing team will be prepared to address Soviet, Chinese, Japanese and West European
research on high-temperature superconductors, and possible military applications.
2. We have contacted Dr. Rhyne's office as you suggested, and are arranging for a
specific time for the briefing. Our team will consist of representatives from our Office of
Scientific and Weapons Research and our Office of Global Issues.
3. Our point of contact will be
Office of Scientific and Weapons Researc
/s/ Robert IL GateA
Chief of the Science Branch,
Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
nEe
_
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STAT
SUBJECT: DSB Task Force on Military Applications of Superconductors
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - Executive Registry
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 - OSWR Chrono
1 - D/OGI
1 - C/OGI/TICD
I - OGI
1 - STD/Chrono
1 - STD/SB Chrono
OSWR/STD/SB/
(08 March 1988)
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STAT
I LI
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DDCI Chrono
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C.20505
10 March 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Nancy J. Risque
Assistant to the President and
Cabinet Secretary
SUBJECT: Presidential Medal of Freedom
Executive ReOry
88-0927X/1
Your memorandum came to me inasmuch as Bill Webster is out
of the country for the next week or so. I regard that as a
fortunate coincidence because it gives me the opportunity to
suggest Bill Webster himself for the Medal of Freedom. I
cannot think of anyone more deserving of this honor than Bill.
As jurist, Director of the FBI for nine years and now Director
of Central Intelligence, Bill Webster has put aside his private
life and the opportunity for personal gain to serve this
country. I think he very much was looking forward to returning
to private life and a law practice a year ago when the
President asked him to step into the breach and succeed Bill
Casey as Director of Central Intelligence. Only a man with
Bill Webster's patriotism and dedication to public service
would have remained in government having already given such
noteworthy service.
No one can quarrel with Bill's "especially meritorous
contribution" to "the security or national interest of the
United States". It may be said of Bill Webster that he took
the reins of the FBI and of CIA at a time when each was
confronted with enormous criticism and challenges to its
professionalism and integrity. By dint of his own reputation
and efforts, Judge Webster restored effectiveness and public
esteem to these organizations so vital to America's national
security and well-being. Taking over each agency during dark
days of controversy and difficulty, he successfully led them
through trying times -- thus more than justifying the
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STAT
STAT
confidence reposed in him by successive Presidents of the
United States.
I can think of no one whose sacrifice and achievements more
warrant recognition with the Presidential Medal of Freedom than
William H. Webster.
DDCl/RMGates/deil
DISTRIBUTION:
0 - Addressee
1 - D/PAO, w/Inc.
1 - DDCI Chrono, w/Inc.
1 - ER, w/Inc.
obert M Gates
2
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Executi.e Re;istry
? 88-0927X
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 8, 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR BILL WEBSTER
FROM:
SUBJECT:
171
NANCY RIST:T/ U
Presideiltial Medal of Freedom
The Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honor
given in the United States, is awarded to persons who have made
especially meritorious contributions to "(1) the security or
national interests of the United States, or (2) world peace, or
(3) cultural or other significant public or private endeavors."
The award was established in 1963, replacing the Medal of Freedom
initiated by President Truman. in 1945 to reward meritorious, war-
connected acts or services.
Do you have any suggestions for this award -- if possible, by
March 14?
Thank you.
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STAT
A
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ER 0046/7 88
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
March 11, 1988
Mr. Richard F. Staar
Coordinator International
Studies Program
Hoover Institution
Stanford, California 94305-6010
Dear Mr. Staar:
It is a pleasure to provide you with a copy
of the speech I delivered to the Dallas Council
on World Affairs last January. I hope you will
find it of interest.
Sincerely,
Robert W Gates
Enclosure:
As Stated
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DALLAS COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS
19 JANUARY 1988
WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE WORLD, DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND
RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-19805 CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY
WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR
COMMUNIST PARTY.
1
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HOOVER INSTITUTION
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE
Stanford, California 94.305-6010
8 March 1988
The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Gates:
Would you kindly send me a copy of your speech, given earlier this
year and quoted by Craig Whitney in the New York Times of 2 March?
'Thank you for this couretesy.
RFS:jcc
End l (1)
Sincerely,
S:111k1040/
Richard F. Staar
Coordinator
International Studies Program
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The Soviet Tumult: Some U.S. Views
r.1
By CRAIG R. WHITNEY spiritually ? trouble that they recog-
Special to The New York Times
nized would soon begin to have real ef-
WASHINGTON, r171 ? Despite
fect on military power and their posi-
I aGI-1
the challenge to Mikhail S. Gorba-
tion in the world."
chev's authority posed by the current Mr. Gates went on: "Nearly every
unrest among Soviet ethnic minorities, step Gorbachev seeks to take toward
the consensus among United States structural eocnomic or political change
Government experts is that he and his
is a struggle, and support in the Polit-
policies of change have not yet been
buro for his initiatives shifts constant-
seriously endangered. ly. He must rely on a long-term, largely
But some of the Americans say that
nonviolent purge of party and bureau-
the ethnic ferment is a direct conse-
cracy and placement of his supporters
if he is to remain in power and to suc-
for more openness in discussing the quence of Mr. Gorbachev's own calls ceed at all. The central question is
country's problems. If the rioting in whether he will get enough time."
Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan grows Reagan on Gorbachev
worse, they say, his opponents in the President Reagan, according to one
Communist Party leadership could use aide, said after he started the talks last
it to slow the pace of change and December that Mr. Gorbachev looked
weaken Mr. Gorbachev's position. like a man who was "scared to death."
"Recent events in Armenia and The President thought, the aide said,
Azerbaijan have raised questions in that Mr. Gorbachev needed a success
the community here about whether this
might have repercussions for the
at the summit to strengthen his hand
over more cautious colleagues like
stability of his leadership," a State De- Yegor N. Ligachev and Viktor Chebri-
partment expert said. "But until now
the debate has been not over whether
he's in real trouble but rather how fast
he can continue to move the country
where he wants it to go." Gorbachev's
Americans at the
.genne Acenc-yi-the State Department, goals: still
the National Security Council staff, the
Pentagon and various other branches reachable,
of the Government have been trying to
figure out just how Mr. Gorbachev is
faring and what he is trying to do ever experts say.
since he was named leader of the
Soviet Communist Party in the spring
of 1985.
Americans Reach a Consensus koi, the head of the K.G.B., who have
often spoken out against the dangers of
At first, many in the Administration carrying perestroika and glasnost too
dismissed his efforts at domestic re- far.
form as illusory moves. Now most of Mr. Gates said that "many who op-
them do not question whether he really pose Gorbachev's policies believe
wants reform ? they wonder whether those policies to be inherently mis-
file collective leadership of which he is taken and bad for the country" because
a part will continue to support it, and they could destabilize domestic condi-
for how long. tions so badly that the party's control
The consensus within the United over the country could be seriously
States Government that Mr. Gorba- threatened.
chev intended far-reaching reforms, to
save the Soviet system from fatal de-
cline, began to emerge about the time
of the summit meeting in Washington
last December. Even then, the Amer-
icans agreed that Mr. Gorbachev's
plans were contentious, and speculated
about how firm his authority was.
"With the selection of Mikhall-G-orba-
chev," said Robert M. ?fife-s, Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, in a
speech earlier thiz_yeaLlhat was
aeared by the White House and appar-
ently reflects the Government consen-
sus, "the Politburo signaled its recog-
nition that the Soviet Union was in deep
i rouble especially economically and
"He'll get thrown out if his reforms
so threaten the system that his col-
leagues would prefer to go after him
than suffer the consequences," another
senior Administration official said.
"But he is very familiar with what hap-
pened to Khrushchev and will be cau-
tious about pushing ahead too rapidly."
Nikita S. Khrushchev's colleagues
threw him out of power in 1964 for
being "reckless."
Mr. Gates said this week that it was
too soon to tell whether Mr. Gorba-
chev's opponents would try to use the
demonstrations in Armenia against
him. But one intelligence official said
they would almost certainly criticize
him for letting the situation get out of
hand.
"Any changes he makes will cause a
lot of dysfunction, that's clear," a State
Department official said.
The last serious challenge to Mr.
Gorbachev's authority was in Novem-
ber, when one of his closest supporters,
Boris N. Yeltsin, lost his position as the
leader of the Moscow party organiza-
tion. A few days ago, he was also dis-
missed as a nonvoting member of the
Politburo, but Mr. Gorbachev filled the
vacancy with two more allies.
Within the Politburo, Mr. Gates said,
there seems to be general agreement
that "for now, economic modernization
requires a more predictable, if not be-
nign, international environment."
The Soviet Union appears poised to
begin the withdrawal of Soviet forces
from Afghanistan, if the final details on
how to do it can be ironed out in negoti-
ations that begin Wednesday in Gene-
va.
Experts here say they believe the
Soviet Army and the political leader-
ship decided on withdrawal because
the cost of staying had simply become
too high, with no prospect of easy vic-
tory over the American-supplied guer-
rillas.
The American experts fear Mr. Gor-
bachev could try to use the diplomatic
leverage he would gain from withdraw-
ing from Afghanistan to try to drive a
wedge between the United States and
its European allies.
If the Soviet Union does actually be-
gin pulling out of Afghanistan this
spring, there will be debate within the
Administration about how easy to
make it for the Russians to leave, in
light of the American commitment to
halt aid to the Afghan rebels as soon as
the withdrawal starts. "It might have
been a mistake," a senior official said,
"but the President has said it would be
unacceptable for the resistance to be
cut off if faced with an armed regime
supplied by the Soviets."
There is still the question whether it
is in Washington's interest for Mr. Gor-
bachev to succeed or fail as leader of
the Soviet Union. Mr. Gates of the
C.I.A. answered that question this way:
"Gorbachev intends improved Soviet
economic performance, greater politi-
cal vitality at home, and more dynamic
diplomacy to make the U.S.S.R. a more
competitive and stronger adversary in
the years ahead."
Dealing with that situation, he said,
"will be an extraordinary challenge for
the United States and the Western
democracies in the years ahead."
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ROBERT M. GATES
Mr. Herbert Meyer
President
Storm King Press
P. 0. Box 3566
Washington, D.C. 20007
Dear Herb:
15 March 1988
I finished Real-World Intelligence last night.
I think it is the best, most succinct account I
have read on what intelligence is all about. While
best sellers on intelligence (up to now) are either
fiction, historical accounts, or provide information
on covert actions and/or collection techniques,
virtually none talk about the purpose of intelli-
gence or the intelligence process (either intellectual
or institutional). As you say, "secrets can be so
titillating and so distracting that spilling them
often stops the serious discussion of intelligence
dead in its tracks".
Your discussion of intelligence, collection,
analysis and, above all, marketing, addresses these
issues with an insight and freshness -- and a sense
of reality -- that is, I think, unique. You clearly
have "ground truth". Moreover, your discussion of
the dynamic of the relationship between the policy-
maker (or executive) and the intelligence officer
is very well done.
In short, Herb, I think you have written a
great little book. You have captured and expanded
upon many of the points I was trying to make in my
Foreign Affairs article and have done so with
style. The book is a good read. It's lively and
entertaining. In my article, I ?referred to the
fact that often even writers who have served inside
an intelligence organization never understood what
it's all about. Your book plainly proves that in
the few years you were here, you picked up a
genuine understanding of what the business is all
about -- the reality and the smell of it.
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STAT.
ROBERT M. GATES
Page 2
You mentioned the possibility of my doing a
review. I have given it a lot of thought, and have
concluded that I should not. Any review I would do
would be embarrassingly and one-sidedly positive,
thereby suggesting our friendship or former
professional association had clouded my critical
faculties. Also, I think questions would be raised
about the appropriateness of my reviewing a book on
intelligence while in my present position.
Nevertheless, I want you to know that I think
so highly of the book that I am recommending that
it be used in our training courses. I am impressed
and intend to share my view with others. I don't
know of any other single publication that tackles
the nature, purpose, and dynamics of this business
better than this little volume of yours. Congratulations!
Robert M. Gates
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r)
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DCl/DDCI Executive Staff
STAT
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
15 March 1988
NOTE FOR: DDCI
SUBJECT: DCI's Friday Schedule
The Director responded to my cable of
last evening and concurs with your
attendance at the SSCl/INF hearing. The DCI
wondered, however, if it was necessary for
him to go to the Carlucci breakfast with you
and suggested that perhaps he could meet
with Admiral Hayes for breakfast Friday
morning and then go to the SSCI hearing with
you. Apparently, however, he has no strong
feelings one way or the other, and I would
recommend we go with our original plan and
that you attend the SSCI hearing alone.
Unless you indicate otherwise, I will leave
the schedule as we originally set it up.
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STAT
STAT
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
16 March 1988
TO: Director of Personnel
the letter and resume from
that I called you about.
I ave already mentioned it to Dick Kerr.
I would think an internship either in the
NIC or SOVA would be most appropriate.
Keep me informed as things progress.
Robert M. Gates
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STAT
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Central Intelligence Agency
VVashington. D. C. 20505
Mr. Arnold Beichman
Research Fellow
Hoover Institution
Stanford, California 94305
Dear Arnold:
20 March 1988
I am sorry I had to cancel our breakfast. I had very much
wanted to see you. Unfortunately, the Director was out of town
and, when that happens, I am all too subject to last-minute
changes of schedule to fill in for him.
I am pleased that you received the 1969 Agency informal
compilation of materials on "The Trust." The paper is
available for release to any requestor, and therefore we have
no objection to any plans the Hoover Institution might have for
publishing it.
I am also enclosing a copy of a thesis on the subject
completed in 1985 at the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey. On pp. 27-28 the author quotes from a Rand
Corporation study, The Trust, yet at least one of these
quotations appears to be an almost verbatim quotation from the
1969 Agency study. You may wish to sort this out with Rand.
Finally, I am enclosing a speech I gave in Dallas several
weeks ago. I hope you will find it of interest -- I would be
interested in your reaction.
Enclosures
Sincerely,
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
21 March 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DCI Administrative Staff
SUBJECT: Payment for Charges Incurred by the
DDCI for Representational Purposes
Payment from U.S. Government funds for representational expenses
incurred by the DDCI for the purpose of conducting official business of
the United States Government ic Authorized under the nolirv set forth in
or the
toiiowing tunctions:
Date Name
Organizational Affiliation
88.02.11
Robert M. Gates
liorhg.rt Mouor
(host)
DDCI
88.02.26
(host)
Robert M. Gates
DDCI
R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.
American Spectator
0/DDCI
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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TO:
V IL, LJS4#ASJ ALJ.
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
3
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9A/Chm/NIC
X
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
NIO/EA
X
18
VC/NIC
X
19
SRP
X
20
21
22
SUSPENSE
Data
Remarks
STAT
62/Executive Secretary
21 Mar 88
Data
_
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? LI ? E., ispart
1
TO:
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
yDDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
.
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
18
19
20
21
22
SUSPENSE
Date
STAT
Remarks
Original mailed, 21 Mar 88.
xecutive ecretary
21 Mar 88
Dote
#11.?17 (10411
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ucto
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. o. C. 20505
March 21, 1988
Dr. Roy Godson
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W., Suite 601
Washington, D.C. 20036
Dear Roy:
You did a nice job of editing. I have only one
minor correction -- on page 7.
I look forward to seeing you for lunch on
the 29th.
Enclosure:
Discussant Remarks
Robert M. Gates
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ER 1220X/1-88
DISCUSSANT REMARKS
Hon. Robert Gates
To a substantial degree, the essays here, although addressed
to intelligence requirements for analysis in the 19908, could
also have applied to intelligence analysis in the 60s, 70s, and
80s.
My comments are divided into three categories. First, the
relationship between the analyst and the policymaker. Second,
the analysts' background, recruitment, and training. Third,
intelligence requirements.
First, the analyst and the policymaker. Paul Seabury writes
that "intelligence should not crave, for itself, a puristic,
aloof, independence akin to academic freedom." I couldn't agree
more. I recall during James Schlesinger's brief tenure as
Director of Central Intelligence his complaint that the people at
the CIA had forgotten they worked for the United States
Government. It seems to me that support for the policymaker also
means, on a fairly regular basis, telling them things they don't
like to hear. In fact, unless intelligence officers are down in
the trenches with the policymakers and understand the issues,
know what US objectives are, how the process works, and who the
people are, they cannot possibly provide either relevant or
timely intelligence that will contribute to better informed
decisions.
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2
I have spoken recently of a significant degree of
institutional autonomy for the CIA, and Seabury's paper addresses
this topic. Autonomy is positive in that intelligence analysis
is not subject to the parochial views of one or another policy
agent. By the same token, autonomy is negative if it somehow
involves being aloof or apart from the policy process and from
those who seek intelligence support. I am also very sympathetic
to Eliot Cohen's concern over the concept of no-fault
intelligence, that all our problems somehow derive from the
failure of policymakers or failures inherent in the intelligence
problems we deal with.
I agree with Cohen that in the past inaccurate intelligence
analysis either has contributed to faulty decisions, or has
allowed policymakers to go on their way without having to deal
with at least an alternative perspective.
shortcomings in the past have been due to
we approached the analysis itself as
advice of the analysts involved. In
Some of these
inadequacies in the way
well as the substantive
recognition of this,
significant changes were made in the Directorate of Intelligence
in the CIA, both in its organization
the early 80s.
and approach to analysis in
With respect to background, recruitment, and training, to
which both authors devote considerable attention, let me first
acknowledge Cohen's point about the large number of relatively
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new analysts both in the CIA and in other intelligence agencies.
The fact is that some, probably half the analysts in the CIA,
have on the order of only five to ten years' experience. The
exodus of officers from CIA's clandestine service in the second
half of the 1970s has been widely commented upon. It is less
well-known that at least as high a percentage of people left from
the analytical side of the house as well. They did so for three
reasons. First, a generation that had come into the Agency in
the late 40s or early 50s came to the end of their careers.
Second, during the late 1970s the government made it financially
very attractive for people to retire. But, third, and equally
important, many people in both directorates, operations and
intelligence, simply found after the travails of the 70s that the
business was no longer very much fun, and many who could have
stayed longer in fact left. So new analysts had to be hired
simply to replace those who departed. Additionally there was a
significant growth in the size of the analytical directorate.
The result of all these factors was a substantial number of
relatively new analysts, with the attendant loss of experience
and institutional memory.
But, I perhaps reflect a certain generational difference in
saying that there was a good side to this as well. Newer people
came in who did not carry a lot of baggage from the past,
including old fights with other intelligence agencies, who did
not carry a lot of scars from old wars with policymakers, and
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4
especially whose backgrounds were in many respects superior to
those of the people they replaced in terms of area and language
expertise.
Now, on recruitment, Seabury speaks of the overreliance on
"highly homogeneous young, inexperienced white Caucasians with
top records of academic performance, coming from nice, good
middle-class families." I share this concern that our
recruitment brings us a heavy percentage of these people. In a
1973 article critical of our work on the Soviet Union, I noted
"There is a wide cultural gap between a college-educated analyst
in the West, and the Soviet leadership. The same thing might be
said of Iranians, Chinese, and a variety of others."
This cultural gap can be overcome in two ways: first, by
looking for people with intensive foreign studies backgrounds and
languages who have lived abroad, and secondly, by immersion in
the culture of a country for a long period. To the extent we are
unable to hire immigrants from other countries for our own
employees, we should look at them for insight in our analysis of
other cultures. It seems to me we have been deficient in this
respect in taking advantage of both emigres and defectors.
I agree with both authors that we need language skills,
analysts with a great deal of history, and significantly greater
cultural diversity. I further agree that the cadre not only of
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5
US intelligence analysts but US officials generally is today
considerably more parochial culturally than was the case in the
1950s. In fact, some of those who helped found the clandestine
service probably couldn't get in the CIA today.
Now, let me address training. The Cohen essay draws on an
article entitled, "Managing/Teaching New Analysts." He cites the
article as saying that "the manager's first task is akin to
deprogramming--undoing habits formed in four to ten years of
college-level work." Cohen suggests, "The remark about
deprogramming reveals a disdain for universities." Seabury in
his essay observes: "The analytical intelligence community has
no other raison d'etre other than that of furnishing information,
reasoned judgments and estimates on which rational action is
possible. In this the intelligence community differs greatly
from the ethos of the academy."
It seems to me there are three areas where academic training
should contribute to the formation of an intelligence analyst.
The first is in making the analyst understand that brevity is
critical. Second is the amassing of detail according to a clear
line of analysis, and drawing clear conclusions. Third, insuring
relevance and timeliness so as to enable action. But this is
hardly what most graduate programs teach.
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I agree that training and education in the interrelation of
foreign cultures is critical. Cohen cites Abram Shulsky, "that
the problem of penetrating another government's workings does not
resemble the challenge of unraveling 'a hidden, but ultimately
knowable, process of nature.' Rather, it a 'struggle between two
human intelligences, each of which is trying to outpsych the
other." I concede that in the past too many intelligence
managers have placed little value on the idea that peoples of
other cultures have different habits of thought, different
values, and different motivations. They apparently rejected the
idea that somebody who presumably has an intimate knowledge of
cultural difference has any particular usefulness. But that
view--and that view did exist to a considerable extent--is
largely a thing of the past, or least I hope it is.
Citing again the article I wrote in '73 I said, "The fact
remains that our perception of situations is widely divergent
from the Kremlin's perception. The Soviet Union has a strange
and idiosyncratic policy not to be dealt with without conscious
effort." I added: "An analyst trying to understand the Soviet
leaders or their approach to problems is seriously handicapped
without a background in Russian history and culture, and the
importance of this can hardly be overemphasized. I recommend
that intelligence agencies should take steps to insure that
?
future analysts have training in Russian and Soviet history and
culture, that analysts without such training should be sent to
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7
school to acquire it." In 1973, I was a fairly lonely voice
arguing for this. At that time I was the only person in my unit
in the DDI with an academic background in Soviet studies. My
first branch chief was an expert on the Middle East and the other
in Southeast Asia. Because of hiring,policies in the last
decade, this situation has changed dramatically.
Both essays speak of mirror-imaging. I believe it is this
lack of regional expertise that contributes significantly to
mirror-imaging. This problem has diminished in recent years, in
part because of this change in hiring practices and in the number
of people who have area expertise and experience. I accept
totally Dr. Cohen's emphasis on the importance of intelligence
highlighting the "otherness of the enemy."
With respect to training and education of analysts in the
tLi& 1A
1990s, I'd like toe(
? ..???laws w at we don ? into two categories:
secrets and mysteries. Secrets are those things, to use Cohen's
reference, such as the physics underlying a Soviet barrage
attack, that are potentially knowable. Mysteries, again to use
Cohen's point of reference, have to do with the interpretation of
foreign cultures, with that struggle between two human
intelligences, each trying to outpsych the other.
In the latter there are often no clear-cut answers, often
because the other leaders themselves do not know what they are
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8
going to do or have not worked out their problems. And here our
best contribution can be to help the policymaker understand the
thought processes involved, the other guy's approach to the
problem and how it is consistent with his culture, the
alternatives that are open to them, and our estimate about which
they are most likely to choose.
We have taken a number of steps to deal with the need for
varied backgrounds and languages described in both essays. In an
ideal world, every analyst we hired would have specialized
background knowledge and one or more foreign languages as a
usable tool. In the real world of American education and people
who can meet our security qualifications, those two don't
necessarily coincide entirely. We can not do that well.
Between 40 percent and half of all those we hire as political
analysts do meet these substantive qualifications, and we try to
give the others additional education so they can do as well.
For example, over the years we have sent a number of people
to Chinese and Russian studies programs, both for language and
history. We also try to educate our analysts to deal with
problems not addressed in universities. For example, we have a
deception analysis course on the techniques and practices of
deception, and methodology for identifying them. For two years
we have been teaching a seminar on intelligence successes and
failures, that uses case studies to illustrate causes of
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intelligence failures and how to encourage more effective
analysis. I might add it is one of our most popular courses.
And we have added others as well in an effort to help improve our
understanding of foreign cultures and add "ground truth" to our
analyst's view.
Let me close my discussion of training with several
observations, beginning with Dr. Seabury's reference to Angelo
Codevilla's paper several years ago discussing empiricism in our
culture. It seems to me that intelligence analysis must combine
an examination of empirical factors with a range of other
considerations, including not only motivation, commitment and
determination, but also history, logic, and motive. In those
areas where our empirical evidence or intelligence is ambiguous
or even absent, there is always the danger in an analysis of
saying that because nobody heard or saw the tree fall, it must
not have fallen. If a question arises about whether or not a
foreign nation is doing something, and if the information is
scanty, we must take into account the nation's past behavior,
whether they had a motive for such activity, and whether that
action would be a logical extension of that. I think our
experience with terrorism is an example. So I think there is no
question that we have to take into account "nonempirical"
considerations.
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The analyst has to build a case regardless of the nature of
the project. He has to bring together both empirical data and
subjective considerations in describing events that have taken
place or policies as they have been developed. Only if the
analyst thus establishes a presumptive and persuasive base of
argumentation--a case, if you will--can he then bring the reader
along when he begins to speculate about the future. It seems to
me the analyst has to persuade the policymaker that he, the
analyst, knows what he's talking about, has mastered the material
and understands the culture he is dealing with before he has any
credibility to forecast the future.
In dealing with the so-called mysteries we have to discuss
the alternative ways events may develop. At the same time, the
intelligence community owes the policymaker a clear-cut best
estimate. We are not paid to simply provide an array of
alternatives or options. The policymaker wants to have some
sense of what we think will happen. We simply need to be honest
with the policymaker as to the quality of our evidence and the
degree of confidence we have in our judgments.
Today, high priority is being attached to hiring analysts
who have lived abroad, who have area expertise and foreign
languages. We also are attaching high priority to developing
extensive contacts with experts in the academic community and
think tanks in order to have people challenge the analysts' views
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and bring other information and perspectives to bear on our
problems. As for problems of deception and denial, thanks in
substantial measure to the efforts of Senator Wallop and Angelo
Codevilla, they have become a growing part of our analyst
training curriculum. These and all other changes I have been
speaking about proceed at different paces, but substantial
progress has been made. We have to keep the pressure on to keep
these going.
Finally, because both authors focus primarily on training,
the need for analysts familiar with foreign, and shall we say
alien, cultures, there is very little focus in either paper on
substantive requirements. Let me address what they do say and
make a few observations on my own.
Paul Seabury focuses on the need for analysts who can see
connections between widely-separated trends and events. One of
the disadvantages of a regional organization for analysis is that
it tends to make the interconnection of such events more
difficult. It was in recognition of this that we created several
organizations to try to bridge these regional patterns. We
created an insurgency center, an organization to deal with
subversion worldwide so we could track patterns, particularly of
Soviet, Cuban, and Libyan involvement in insurgencies around the
world. So we have tried to establish some connective tissues, if
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you will, that will enable us to address these transregional
phenomena.
One of the most important assets we have in connection with
this is with academics and think tanks. It is often the people
in these pursuits who can give us the macro analysis that at
least points us in the right direction or gives us the right
questions to try to answer.
I think Dr. Cohen, however, has put his finger on a larger
issue with respect to requirements for the 19908. He writes:
"Henceforth the United States will no longer have the luxury of
concentrating its intelligence assets overwhelmingly on its chief
target, the Soviet Union." He then points to a number of other
problems that are certain to become significant intelligence
challenges. I not only agree, I would have to say this trend
began several years ago. We now have something on the order of
50 percent of the assets of the intelligence community focused on
the Soviet problem.
My principal worry for the 1990s is that the absence of
intelligence guidance and priorities from the senior levels of
the policy community will result in a continued diffusion of our
efforts as we are pushed in the direction of satisfying an
increasingly wide range of problems. In anticipation of the
1990s, the intelligence community itself is going to be forced to
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13
reexamine its priorities and at some point inform the policy
community and the Congress it can no longer carry out an open-
ended program of collection and analysis on every conceivable
subject of interest to the American government.
Beginning with the Soviet Union, we are going to have to
identify the hard-core issues where we will devote all the
necessary resources to working the problem satisfactorily,
knowing in advance that this choosing will withdraw an
intelligence effort from areas that are peripheral to national
security concerns but which have influential bureaucratic and
congressional constituencies. Identifying those areas other that
the Soviet Union will be a difficult and painful task.
Let me close with several observations.
While I am a strong supporter of the idea of specialized
area training and having analysts who not only have lived in a
foreign country but have studied its language and culture and are
steeped in its history, I must say that often regional experts
are less competent in forecasting discontinuities. It is often
forgotten that the CIA's analyst on Iran in the 1970s had worked
on Iran for 20 years. That, in my view, was part of the problem.
While a deep understanding of a country's politics and history
will help in understanding their actions and reactions the fact
is that in most countries actions are part of long, continuous
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chains of events. Thus those most familiar with these long, slow
processes are those who will find reasons to say that the warning
signs of instability have occurred before, fit into a historical
pattern, and therefore can be dismissed. Maybe they are right
and maybe they are not. In short, there needs to be a
combination of people with area expertise and those who fly
broadly, who ask hard and sometimes even simple questions. We
also need to seek out those who have unorthodox views or
challenge the conventional wisdom.
Dr. Cohen speaks of short-term analysis rather that long-
term research. This was a significant problem until a few years
ago. With the drawdown in the 1970s, the CIA was forced to
abandon its long-range research on Soviet defense industries and
also the Third World. The mail of the day always had to be
answered. One of the principal benefits of the significant new
resources provided over the last eight or nine years by both the
Administration and the Congress has been to allow us to establish
a significant foundation for a long-term research program where
the resources are protected for carrying out these projects. The
analytical directorate of the CIA has been able to produce 500 to
700 new billets for this purpose. Thus, this long-standing
problem has been largely brought under control. Most analysts
now understand that an inability to produce longer-range research
could have a deleterious effect on their careers.
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15
Finally, I would like to say that Robert Butterworth's paper
on collection notes that collection and analysis are inseparable
and that intelligence errs in making the division
bureaucratically and in other ways between them so great. In the
abstract, I endorse this but I would also say that in reality,
from the management standpoint, it is difficult to avoid this
division. Rather, it is important to have many bridges
connecting these two intimately related subjects.
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'1
Consortium
for the Study of
Intelligence
ER 1220X-88
SUITE 601, 1730 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
[phone]
MEMBERS
(Partial Listing)
Dr. Richard Betts
Brookings Institution
Dr. Richard E. Bissell
Executive Editor
Washington Quarterly
Dr. Adda B. Bozeman
Professor Emeritus
Sarah Lawrence College
Dr. Ray S. Cline
Senior Advisor
Center for Strategic and
International Studies,
Georgetown University
Dr. Stephen P. Gibed
Professor of Government,
and Director, National
Security Studies Program,
Georgetown University
Dr. Samuel P. Huntington
Professor of Government
Harvard University
Professor Myres McDougal
Yale University Law School
Professor John Norton Moore
University of Virginia
Law School
Dr. Robert Nisbet
American Enterprise Institute
Dr. Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
Professor of
International Politics,
Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy
Dr. Richard E. Pipes
Professor of History
Harvard University
Dr. Paul Seabury
Professor of
Political Science,
University of California,
Berkeley
Dr. Richard F. Staar
Senior Fellow
Hoover Institution on
War, Revolution and Peace
Dr. Allen Weinstein
Professor of History
Boston University
Dr. James CI. Wilson
Professor of Government
Harvard University
Dr. Roy Godson
Associate Professor
of Government,
Georgetown University
(Coordinator)
March 15, 1988
Honorable Robert Gates
Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Bob,
Please find enclosed a slightly edited version
of your discussant remarks at our last Consortium
meeting. I should be grateful if you could review
the text and make any necessary changes in the next
couple of weeks.
The volume in now scheduled to be published by
Lexington Books (D.C. Heath) in November. ----
Many thanks for you attention and cooperation.
S irqere1y,
Enclosure
son
A ponirri- MATICIMAI CTIJATcr.V mirclohAATICNKI CVMTFP
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STAT
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C.20505
March 21, 1988
Admiral B. R. Inman, USN (Ret.)
Westmark Systems, Inc.
301 Congress Avenue, Suite 2000
Austin, Texas 78701
Dear Bob:
Thanks again, for breakfast last Saturday; I am
glad that we have been able to get together a little
more frequently in. recent months. It's always good
to see you and talk. .
I received the invitation to Austin today and
have accepted. I enclose my speech on "What Is
Going On In The Soviet Union". I would be interested
in any reaction. If you think it appropriate, I would
probably give an updated version of this in Austin --
or would you prefer that I talk about something else?
Best to Nancy.
Robert M. Gates
Enclosure:
As Stated
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.z_
Central intelligaice.Ageng -
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A
Mr. Lawrence F. Guillemette, Jr.
Conference Director ,
Congressional Youth Leadership Council
1511 K Street, N.W., Suite 842
Washington, D.C. 20005
Dear Mr. Guillemette:
?
I accept with pleasure your invitation to address the National Young .'
Leaders Conference on Friday, 25 March at the National. Press Club. I look
forward to the opportunity of meeting with you and speaking with these-
outstanding high school students.
Best wishes.
TAT I/PAO/WM
1 Distribution:
, Orig. - Addressee
STAT 1 - ER
ISTAT 1 - D/Fx Ctaf,
,0 I /-k I 1 ??
:--- 1 - D/PAO
i
,
1 - PAO Registry
1 - PAO Ames
1 - PAO Chrono
1 - MED(Subject)
Sincerely,
Robert M. Catei
Robert M. Gates -
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
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ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
PAO 38-0090
3 March 1988
RE: Speaking Invitation
National Young Leaders Conference
Congressional Youth Leadership Council
National Press Club
Washington, D.C.
25 March or 29 March 1988
Director of the National Young Leaders Conference, Larry Guillemette, has
invited you to speak at the Conference sponsored by the Congressional Youth
Leadership Council on Friday, 25 March or Tuesday, 29 March at the National
Press Club. The suggested format is 10 minutes of remarks followed by 40
minutes of questions and answers. You are asked to speak on how the Agency
fits within the Executive Branch or any other topic of your choice. The
audience would include 350 outstanding high school students from throughout
the US. The meeting is not open to the media. The Council is expecting
Secretary of Energy John Herrington, Secretary of Interior Donald Hodel, and
Secretary of HUD Samuel Pierce to speak at the Conference session covering the
Executive Branch. (See opposite for background material.)
Since this is a high school audience, and we normally reserve our student
briefings for the college level, I recommend that you decline this
invitation. If you agree, a letter of regret is attached for your signature.
STAT
STAT OCl/PAO/WMB
Distribution:
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1 - ER
STAT 1 - E
STAT I -
1 - /PAO
1 - PAO Registry
1 - PAO Ames
1 - PAO Chrono
1 - MED(Subject)
Bill Baker
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
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EA\ 00
CONGRESSIONAL
- LEADERSHIP
p
I YOUTH -
COUNCIL
- January 20, 1988
The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director C.I.A.
The White House
Washington,D.C. 20500
Dear Mr.Gates:
? This spring the Congressional Youth Leadership Council
will once again sponsor the National Young Leaders
Conference. _ During a five week period, over 1,600
outstanding high school students will come to our nation's
capital for an intensive educational program. This group
represents the best and brightest of today's youth -
tomorrow's leaders. The enclosed information will serve to
illustrate the scope and content of our program.
The National Young Leaders Conference provides a unique
opportunity for the students to gain an insider's view of
government by interacting with those individuals who shape
public policy. I know you share our concern for educating
youth for responsible citizenship and join us in promoting
active involvement in the democratic process. We are a non-
profit, non-partisan organization which encourages our
students to consider all viewpoints as they endeavor to come
to an understanding of current issues facing our nation. We
certainly hope you can assist us by contributing to the
balance of our program and will honor us by accepting our
invitation to address the_young leaders of tomorrow .during
_
one of the Conference weeks this spring.
It is our philosophy that we can be of no greater
service to our country than by instilling an appreciation of
our American heritage and democratic institutions in the
"successor generation." It is Our hope that your calendar
can accommodate this request and we trust that you will
respond favorably.
For your convenience I have enclosed an RSVP
memorandum. If you have any questions or 'need any
additional information, please contact Rick McDonald at
[phone]. Thank you for your time and consideration.
Sincerely,
(loutuf ithwalm
Lawrence F. Guillemette, Jr.
Conference Director
Enclosures
1511 K Street, N.W., Suite 842
Washington, D.C. 20005
[phone]
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.,, ? --'
TO:
CONGRESSIONAL YOUTH LEADERSHIP COUNCIL
NATIONAL YOUNG LEADERS CONFERENCE
'REpLY-MEMORANDUM_
Lawrence F. Guillemette, Jr.
Conference Director
The Congressional Youth Leadership Council
1511 K Street, N.W., Suite 842
Washington, D.C. 20005
FROM: The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director C.I.A.
The White House
Washington,D.C. 20500
YES, I accept your invitation to be a speaker at the
National Young Leaders Conference. (Approximately 375
scholars attend each session.)
I would prefer to participate on the following date(s):
[ I
Friday, February
26,
1988
[ ]
Friday, March 4,
1988
[ ]
Wednesday, March
16,
1988
[ ]
Friday,
March
25,
1988
)
Tuesday,
March
29,
1988
STAFF CONTACT: PHONE:
If you have any questions or need any additional
information, please call Rick McDonald at [phone].
[ ] No, I cannot participate.
COMMENTS:
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. C 20505
DCl/NIC
Dear Gwen:
21 March 1988
Thank you for your participation in the
Secretarial/Clerical Management Advisory Group over the
past year and a half and particularly for your willingness
to take on the extreme demands of serving as chairman.
Your initiative and dedication lifted the MAG out of the
doldrums and gave the group the cohesion and sense of
purpose it needed. The time you gave to the MAG after
hours and weekends resulted in the successful running of
the Third Annual Secretary of the Year Awards and the
extensive MAG input to the implementation of the IS pay
system and training program.
The Director and I hope you will remember your time on
the MAG as having been an opportunity to learn about the
Agency as well as to contribute. The group's comments on
secretarial and clerical issues are helpful to senior
Agency officials and clearly played a role in our
recognition that the secretarial profession should be
enhanced with new opportunities and a new pay scale. The
awards program in particular proves that MAGs can make a
difference in providing fresh ideas to Agency management.
I encourage you to support the new MAG members and to
continue your interest in making the Agency a better place
for all employees.
CC:
Robert . Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
C/DCI Admin
0/Personnel
On-
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STAT
STAT
STAT
NOTE TO:
Stan,
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
WAling(nDUCNB
ER 1257 88
23 March 1988
Director, Office of Training and Education
On 22 March, I had the opportunity to visit
and meet with mid-level officers
from the offices of Personnel, General Counsel, and
Medical Services. At OGC, several officers noted their
lack of knowledge of the CIA as an institution -- its ,
various offices, structure, associated jargon, and
traditions. One officer noted that recent CT graduates,
with about the same amount of time on board, seem to
have a better understanding of the Agency than OGC
lawyers have. The officer attributed this to the
absence of an appropriate orientation course for their
office.
I would like you to investigate the possibility
of offering a training course which would provide an
introduction to the CIA for career specialists such as
OGC and OMS staffers, and possibly DDS&T engineers.
I think an appropriate orientation for this group of
officers could be accomplished in a two or three week
course given once or twice a year.
Robert M. Gates
Orig D/OTE
E1_-- DDCT:
1 -- ER
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23 March 1988
NOTE TO: DDCI
FROM: Alan
Bob:
I talked to Stan this morning to run by him informally your
thoughts on a training orientation course for specialists. He
noted that there is a requirement that every new officer in the
CIA take the course, "Introduction to the CIA". Currently, the
course runs for 4 to 5 days and is offered once a month. Stan
noted that the course would be given before an officer went to
work at his assigned office, and in most cases, was given
within the first or second week on board. Stan and most of his
staff believed that running the course in the first or second
week was too soon. Consequently, three months ago they started
a system whereby new hires are assigned dates for the course
sometime within their first year on board. Since it is a new
system, there is little feedback from the participants to
measure the effectiveness of the new system.
I told Stan that it was my sense that what you had in mind
was more like an abbreviated mid-career course in substance for
a selected group of officers -- specialists who were a bit
older, hired at a a higher grade, but who still lacked exposure
to the Agency. Stan indicated that he would look into it after
he received your note.
CONFIDENTIAL
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NOTE TO:
FROM:
Chief, DCI Security Staff
0/DDCI
24 March 1988
The Security Protection Officers assigned to the DCl/DDCI
suite have a most difficult job. They must be a "jack of all
trades" and be able to accomplish their tasks quietly and
quickly. It is a job where each day truly ls a nPw clay full of
25X1 ever changing requirements and challenges.
did an extraordinary job of accomplishing what needed to be
done day after day and met the challenge of rapidly changing
requirements -- sometimes literally moment to moment -- without
hesitation. He is a person who can think on his feet. We are
sorry to see Mike move on but wish him the best and want to
thank him for a job well done.
25X1
25X1
CONFIDENTIAL
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STAT
STAT
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
March 25, 1988
Mr. Angelo M. Codevilla
Hoover Institution
Stanford, California 94305-6010
Dear Angelo:
ICS 7041 88
I am w ollowup to my letter to you of 10
February. has reported back to me on his
discussions wit senior Intelligence Community managers about
feasibility, accesses, and alternatives.
Without beating around the bush, there was agreement in the
Community that the topic of your proposed study fits into a
category "too sensitive to be done fully with complete access
by anyone outside of government." More specifically, the
proposed study would involve access and clearances
substantially beyond those you had when you worked for the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
At the same time, there is a major effort about to begin
within the Department of Defense on a subject very closely
related to your proposal.
The idea of a classified outside examination or design of a
different 1990s from that which would otherwise be the case for
US intelligence seemed interesting to me, and I regret we
cannot go forward. Even so, I appreciate the spirit and
initiative behind your proposal and hope that you will continue
to send along ideas, articles and, when you think appropriate,
proposals.
Give me a call the next time you plan to be in Washington.
Maybe we could catch up over a sandwich.
Robert M. Gates
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The Deputy Ditrctor of Central Intclligence
Washington. D C.20505
STAT
February 10, 1988
Mr. Angelo M. Codevilla
Hoover Institution
Stanford, California 94305-6010
Dear Angelo:
Many thanks for your letter of January 22 following u on
my meetings with both you and Bill Harris. I have asked STAT
(who you may know is now Deputy Director of the STAT
Intelligence Community Staff for Requirements) to discuss the
proposal with selected senior Community managers in terms of
feasibility, access and alternatives. I have asked l Ito get STAT
back to me by the end of February. Either I or will be STAT
back in touch with you as soon as possible after at.
Robert M. Gates
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HOOVER INSTITUTION
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE
Stantini, California 94_3o5-ooio
Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia 23665
Dear Bob:
January 22, 1988
As you know, the technical systems for intelligence collection
that the United States possesses today, and that it will possess ten
years hence (unless budgets change substantially) were conceived in
the mid-1970s on the basis of certain assumptions about the world.
Among these were peace between the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
compliance with certain kids of arms control agreements, and a host
of details about Soviet weapons systems. But in recent years many
have realized that the nature of the Soviet target is not what was
assumed in the 1970s. Moreover, it should be no surprise that
peacetime intelligence collectors would not be particularly useful
in time of war.
We propose to study how the intelligence community might modify
current intelligence systems (including ground based components),
and/or modify how they are used, in order to maximize their
usefulness against the Soviet target that will exist five to ten
years from now, and above all to maximize their usefulness in time
of war. We also propose to study haw the intelligence community's
(including some D.O.D. elements) plans for procurement and R&D would
have to change in the next two to three years in order to provide
for better mix of peacetime and wartime capabilities about the mid
1990s. We would provide a framework for deciding on a mix of
collection assets. MoLeover, we wish to consider alternative
strategies for procurement that may increase the availability and
utility of intelligence in wartime, even under budgetary
constraints.
We propose to do this as consultants to you. Bill would take
leave-of-absence from RAND. We propose also to obtain the help of
the following people: Peter Stan, RAND Corporation; Roland Herbst,
R&D Associates; retired from Lockheed and consultant
to C.I.A.; and possibly others as mutually agreeable. We expect
this initial task to take about eight months from completion of
clearences, and approximately 250 man-days.
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We would require access to collection programs across the
community, at a level at least equal to that which Bill and I have
had in the past. Needless to say, the study would be for the
Director and yourself.
Sincerely,
,
Ange o M. Codevilla
William R. Harris
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TO:
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
DCI
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
X
4
D/ICS
.
X
5
DDI
x
6
DDA
X
7
DDO
X
8
DDS&T
X
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
D/FMSEO
X
18
19
20
21
22
--.
SUSPENSE
Date
Remarks
STAT
Executige Secretary
28 Mar 88
Date
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Draft
18 March 88
REFERENCE: I March 88 letter to DCI from SSCI
Hearing on 29 March
Attachment:
item (4)
Establishment of a security standards and auditing capability
under the DCI
The President, accepted the recommendation that Secretary Shultz and I
made to establish an independent unit responsible for setting standards to
protect embassies from penetration by foreign intelligence activity and for
monitoring conformance. This unit will be responsible to the DCI, enabling
him to prepare an annual report to the President and the Congress on the
status of security at US foreign missions. This organization, tentatively
designated the Foreign Mission Security Office, will be an independent
office of the DCI. I have appointed as the
Director and have asked the Department to nominate a senior Foreign Service
Officer as his deputy. The office will build toward a strength of
people, capable of establishing a program of aggressive, objective audits of
our overseas missions.
We will establish two advisory groups in connection with this new
4
office. One will be a working-level group, chaired by the Director, Foreign
Mission Security Office, to facilitate communication and resolution of
issues with the Director of Diplomatic Security and other elements of the
Intelligence Community. The second group will be a high-level board,
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including the Secretary of State, chaired by the DCI and meeting as
reauired. I envision this high-level group as the forum where the Secretary
of State and the DCI will discuss recommendations of the Foreign Mission .
Security Office. If there is disagreement, either of us can appeal to the
President.
2
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Q.
What will the auditing unit, the Foreign Mission Security Office, do?
A. This independent office will:
IMP ??110
analyze the vulnerabilities of our foreign missions and the hostile
intelligence threat to them
1MA. set security standards to protect our missions against foreign
intelligence activity
- monitor conformance with those standards, and
- report problems and recommendations to the DCI.
Q. How independent is this Foreign Mission Security Office?
A. Very independent. It . . .
Ol?
.10
reports to me;
is set up as an independent office, similar to my National
Intelligence Council;
is not a part of State or its Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
Q. How closely will it be associated with the working levels of State?
And, the working levels of the Intelligence Community?
A. The Foreign Mission Security Office will have close ties to the
Department, and the Intelligence Community. The Director of the Foreign
Mission Security Office will establish and chair a working group to
facilitate commnications with the Director of Diplomatic Security and
comparable levels in the Intelligence Community who have common security
concerns and can help with solutions. We expect most problems to be
solved and improvements to be made at this level.
Q. What if problems of security in an embassy are not solved at that level?
A. The DCI will chair a high-level group consisting of the Secretary of
State and other appropriate people to resolve such difficulties.
Q. What if the DCI and the Secretary of State continue to disagree on a
problem, or a solution?
A. The DCI is obligated to take the issue to the President.
1
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Q. How will Congress, the oversight committees at least, be informed?
A. The DCI has been directed to prepare an annual report to the President
and the Congress on the status of security at US missions.
Q. Will the Foreign Mission Security Office have any State people in it?
A. Yes, the Deputy Director will be a State officer and we hope that some
of the working level people will be selected from State.
Q. Will any other Intelligence Community people be in the Foreign Mission
Security Office?
A. Yes, we would expect people to be selected for assignment based on the
FMSO needs arid skills available. We probably will find NSA, CIA, DoD,
and the FBI in the Foreign Mission Security Office as well.
2
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Questions Posed by John Elliff of SSCI Staff
Q. Will the FMSO combine positive collection experts and defensive experts
in its organization?
A. Yes. We will include people with those skills and experience in the
staffing complement.
Q. Will FMSO provide guidance to security R&D projects?
A. Yes. The FMSO will set standards in all aspects of personnel, physical
and technical security concerns; therefore it will be important to
ensure that R&D projects are appropriately designed.
Q. Will the FMSO produce all-source threat and vulnerability assessments
worldwide?
A. Yes, the FMSO will have an intelligence analysis function for
determining threats and vulnerabilities. The FMSO will draw upon the
full resources of the Intelligence Community to perform this function.
Q.
Will FMSO establish liaison with foreign governments to obtain
information on threat and vulnerability of US facilities?
A. The Director of FMSO will obtain foreign government information through
the established liaison channels such as are maintained by the FBI, NSA,
and CIA.
Q.
Will FMSO conduct tiger-team operations that are entirely black to test
security at foreign missions? Will FMSO have specialized personnel
assigned to conduct such tiger team operations?
A. The FMSO has a clear responsibility to monitor State Department
conformance to security standards. It will monitor conformance through
appropriate inspection techniques and report audits. Some activities
may not be fully visible to members of a particular embassy, if that is
what you mean by "black," but we do noteticipate any need to surprise
the Director of Diplomatic Security. .
Q. How will FMSO be funded? -- separately from other Intelligence Community
organizations or, for example, funded like the DCI Special Program?
A. We will fund it in whatever way seems to be appropriate, in consultation
with OMB and the Committees. Initially, we probably will fund from the
NFIP but we can advise you of changes if we make them. We will have
FMSO in the FY90 submission.
SECRET
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How will people be initially assigned to FMSO and from where will they
be drawn?
A. We will draw people from throughout the Intelligence Communify where we
find the appropriate skills and experience. I expect these to be
reimbursable detail assignments.
g. State Department has established security standards. ,, Under those
standards certain small missions must be closed. In those small
missions where intelligence collection is important, ?What is the DCI's
position on the closing of these small missions?
A. The Director, FMSO will evaluate the threats and vulnerabilities of
these missions and make recommendations on improving security or changes
in operating procedures. We will consider cost vs. gain in these
circumstances carefully; I can't be more specific at this time.
4
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ICS 0785-88
25 February 1988
MEMORANOtiM FOR: Members of FMS0 Working Group
FROM:
Acting Director, Community Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Office, Intelligence Community Staff
SIEJECT: Foreign Missions Security Office Charter
1. In an interagency meeting held on 9 February 1988 unaer auspices of
the National 'Security Planning Group (NSPG), the Foreign Missions Security
Office (FM50) organization WdS discussed. Without recounting elements of
discussion here, it is significant to this memorandum to note that the
Chairman, MPG, directed that a charier for FMS0 be drafted for consideration
by the MPG. The Chairman set a 30-day deadline for completion of the charter
25X1 draft.
25X1
25X1
25X1
7. A first draft has been prepared and is attached. It is requested ihat
addressees review the draft and provide comments to this office not later than
4 March 198g. Brief comments may he offered via telephone to myself or my
Art inn tifficer for this matter. My numbers are
secure. Please be prepared for a meeting dUring the Week OT / marcn to rclifew
the proposed final revision of the draft charter.
Downgrade to CONFIDFNTIA1 When
25X1 Peztoved Frog. Classified Attachment
25X1
SECRET
Thomas F. Burns, Jr.
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?
SECRET
DRAFT
FOREIGN MISSIONS SECURITY OFFICE (FMSO)
--CHARTER--
I. MISSION: The Foreign Missions Seturity Office (FMSO) will provide
Irltelligence Community (IC) guidance and support to the Diplomatic Security
Program of the Department of State. Its mission will be to insure that U.S.
diplomatic missions abroad meet minimum acceptable standards for the handling
and storage of classified information and for the conduct of classified
activities.
7. AUTHORITIES: The development and implementation of security programs
at our diplomatic missions abroad remains the responsibility of the Secretary
of state. The DCI is given new responsibilities to insure that acceptable
minimuw standards fur security of those missions are establisheu; and for
certifying compliance with the established standards. The UCI's executive
agent for carrying out these responsibilities will be FMSO.
3. The Director of FMSD will be named by the DCI from within the
Intelligence Community. FMSO will be subordinate to the DCI and will be
independent of the organization of the Department of State. The Secretary of
Stale will roominate a candidate from within the Department of State tn serve
as Deputy Director of FMSO.
4. The Director of FMSO will establish an advisory group, with membership
Consisting of the Director of Diplomatic Security and equivalent-level
persomel from the other agencies involved. This group will seek to insure
that a constructive balance is maintained between the activities of FMSO and
the ueetls and prugralbs of the Deportment of State and the other tenants of
diplomatic missions abroad. It will provide advice and guidance to the
Director of FMSO and seek to resolve problems and issues as they arise.
S. A high-level board, with membership including the DCI and the
Secretary of State, will also be estanlished. This board will meet once each
ooarter or on call. The board will have the authority to recommend to the
Secretary of State that he rescind the authority of a particular facility to
receive, retain, or perform classified functions in the event Of serious
security problems. In the event of disagreement, an appeal can be made to the
President. The board will also provide direction on other issues, as
appropriate.
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6. FUNCTIONS: FMSO will carry out the following functions:
a. Setting of Minimum Security Standaras: FMSO will establish
minimum physical, technical, and personnel security standards for the
haadlina and storage of classified information and for the conduct of
classified activities at U.S., diplomatic missions abroad. These standards
will include those applicable to the construction or renovation of
diplomatic missions aboard.
FMSO will develop criteria for security stanaaras, relying heavily on
threat and vulnerability information. It will review existing standards
in liqht of the criteria established and develop new standards, as
appropriate. Standards may vary at different locations according to
threat levels or other factors affecting security.
Standards will be coordinated with State Diplomatic Security and the
tenant agencies, and issued under the authority of the DCI. An appeals
process will be provided through senior advisory panels.
b. Inspection of Diplomatic Missions Abroau: Primary responsibility
for reporting the security conditions At missinns abroad remains with the
Department of State. Reporting from tenant agencies will continue to
supplement this.reporting.
FMSO will maintain inspection units to provide an independent
check-and-balance on security reporting by State and other residents of
U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. FMSO may apply skills resident within
the Intelligence Community to conduct these or other special inspections.
FMSO will conduct scheduled inspections of selected missions and will
also conduct inspections in response to a special security situation or a
particular threat or vulnerability. Inspection may also be requested by
State dr other tenant agencies. It will shape its inspection teams
according to the particular need and may draw upon intelligence sources
and methods in conducting its inspection. Team members with special
skills may be drawn for temporary duty from within the Intelligence
Community.
c. Audit and Certification: FMSO will audit all missions abroad for
compliance with security policies and minimum standards, on a regular
basis. Auditors will review, compile, and assess reporting by State,
tenant agencies, and FMSO inspection teams; and assess compliance with
specific policies and standards. Although primarily a desk function,
auditors may travel to the field in some situations.
FM50 will develop schedules for audits. Frequency of auoits will be
based on threat and vulnerability information or other factors affecting
security. Schedules for audits will be published will in advance to
insure that the necessary information is available. Special audits may
also be undertaken in response to a particular need.
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Certification is based upon the results'of an audit. Three results
can be expected; Certification of compliance, conditional-certification,
or non-certification. Conditional:certification allows continuance of
classified activities, at a level determined by FMSO, while deficiencies
are being corrected; a timetable for correction is specified.
Non-certification requires cessation of classified activities until
specific deficiencies are corrected.
FASO will produce an annual report for the DCI reflecting the status
of security at U.S. diplomatic facilities. This report will be forwarded
to the President and to Congress along with any recommendations necessary
to achieve enhanced security at such facilities.
d. Intelligence Support: FMSO will provide intelligence support to
Diplomatic S'ecurity and in support of its own activities. The FMSO
intelligence support unlit will conduct liaison with the Intelligence
Community regarding the hostile intelligence threat to diplomatic missions
abroad. This unit will reouest and coordinate specific studies of
vulnerability.
Its objectives will be to assist in the formulation of policies and
!.tanddrds; to determine the appropriate level at security response at each
mission; to provide support in audit and certification; ano, to provide
other support, as required, such as in the direction of RDT&E programs.
It will have a special responsibility in providing close intelligence
support to FMSO inspection teams. It will also issue collection
requirements to fill gaps in specific knowledge concerning the threat.
While the FMSO unit will have a small analytical staff, it will draw
primarily on work conducted elsewhere in the Intelligence Community.
e. Other Services of Common Concern: FMSO.will provide other
services of common concern, as appropriate. Coordination of RDT&E efforts
to support the various security activities, and liaison with other
elements of the Intelligence Community arc likely.
7. ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT:
a. Program and Budget: Resources to support FMSO will be programmed
as a line item in the National Foreign Intelligence Program. All
positions and funding necessary to carry out the rmso mission will be
included.
h. Manning: FMSO.staff personnel will be drawn from across the
Intelligence Community. Full-time staff personnel will serve rotational
tours, usually a minimum of two years in duration. Positions will be
provided by FMSO and assignees will be detailed on a reimbursable basis.
c. Support: FMSO will hdve on integral staff to provide and
coordinate support for its operations. It will draw upon the established:
SECRET 1
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support capabilities of State, CIA, and others, as appropriate. It will
likely be necessary to augment the resources in these programs to support.
FMSO reauirements.
d. Security: All personnel assigned on a full-time basis to FMSO
will meet minimum personnel security standards, as established.by the
DCI. Part-time assignees who will have access to sensitive information
must also meet these clearance,requirements.
S. ACTION PLAN: It is estimated that three years will be required to
bring MO to full operational capability. The primary pacing factor will be
the:availability of skilled personnel. FMSO development should not
unnecessarily jeopardize the capabilities of departmental security programs.
Ilevelopoent. of FMSO should occur in three general phases:
a. Phase I: Phase I. is the initial building phase. It will require
a major p(-57-TWef the first year following FMSO's establishment.
Detailed organizational planning ana development will begin after the
appointvent of a. Director of FMSO and a. core.staff. Early recruiting willi
focus on personnel to review and prepare minimum, security standards in the
oast critical areas. A nucleus of personnel will be estaulished in each
of the other.functional components of FMSO.:
b. Phase II: Phase II is the initial operating phase, beginning
during FM767T?S-Jand year. Limited inspections will be. conducted, the
intelligence unit will begin initial operations, and a few high priority.
audits and certifications will be undertaken'.
c. Phase III; Full- operational capabilities will be attained during
FMSO's third year.
SECPET.
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WtOto"*'" L
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
28 March 1988
TO: Ted Price
Director of Personnel
Let me explain the attached employment
application. First -- the DDCI has no
special interest in this case. The connection
is with is Admiral Inman's
personal assistant.
alled me a few weeks ago telling
me a ou this applicant. He wanted to be
sure somebody really took a look at her and
her resume wasn't just left in the stack of
thousands that come in. I suggested that she
send it to my attention and my only promise
was that I would send it along to the appropriate
people.
Thanks,
0/DDCI
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ROUTING SLIP
TO:
?
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
X
6
DDA
7
DDO
x
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
?
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
18
19
20
21
22
SUSPENSE
Date
Remarks
STAT
3637 (1041)
Execbtive Secretary
7R Mar RR
Date
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ER 1309 88 -
30 March 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Training and Education
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Attached Book
1. Herb Meyer has written the attached book on
intelligence -- what it's all about and how it's done. He
states up front that he has no intension of spilling any
secrets or providing any particular detail on how US
intelligence or CIA does their work. What he does describe in
the book is what intelligence is (the organization of
information), the mechanisms by which this information is
assembled and provided to users (whether in government or
business), and on the relationship between producers and users
25X1 of intelligence.
2. I think it's as fine and succinct an overview of this
business and how it's done as I have ever seen. I think that
for people coming into this Agency, in all parts of our work,
this would be as good an introduction as I can imagine to help
them understand why we are here in the first place. It's
freshly written and only takes about an hour and a half to
read. I think that it should be used widely in our
introductory and CT courses. (I understand that it is being
used or is going to be used at the Defense Intelli ence
25X1 College.) Read it and let me have your reaction.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Roberi Gates
Attachment:
Real World Intelligence by Herbert E. Meyer
cc: DDI, w/att
(DD/R&E/ICS), w/att
tro.ci wro-atTE7
ER w/o att
CONFIDENTIAL
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?
?
,:i14041Ark ,7 ? . ? e; t
4
HEAL?111111111.
INTELLIGENCE
HERBERT E. MEYER
Organized Information
for Executives
Intelligence isn't spying.
It's the hot new management tool
for competing?and winning?
in today's business world.
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STAT
,
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z
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
March 31, 1988
Dear Dr. McFrazier:
I had the pleasure this week of spending some time with two
of your students, Jason Newell and Mark Roeder, who are
involved in the oral history program at Topeka West. I want to
tell you how deeply impressed I and others in Washington were
with these two fine young men. We do not get too many
uplifting experiences in this city, especially in my line of
work. However, spending some time with these two smart, well
informed, responsible and mature high school seniors was both
inspiring and a real treat. All who met Jason and Mark agreed
that, based on what we saw of them, the future of the country
is in good hands.
I want to commend Topeka West and Mike Printz for an
immensely ambitious and creative history program. It is
testimony to the confidence of the community in these high
school seniors, as well as the maturity of the students
themselves, that you are willing to send them to distant cities
to carry out these projects and to do so with obvious trust in
how they will conduct themselves. Your trust and confidence in
them is admirable and clearly well founded.
As a native Kansan, I can only applaud you, Topeka West and
the Topeka community for sending such extraordinary ambassadors
around our country. Jason and Mark made an enormously
favorable impression on everyone they encountered. Their
parents must be quite proud of them. And I am reassured.
STATTICl/RMGates/de
DISTRIBUTION: w incoming
1 - Addressee
1 - D/PAO
1 - ER
1 -(DDCI-Chrobo--1
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C.20505
March 31, 1988
Dear Mark:
I want to thank you for coming to Washington and including
me in your program. I certainly enjoyed the time I spent
talking with you and Jason, both on camera and at dinner. All
those with whom you came in contact here in Washington were
deeply impressed with your character and intelligence.
The program in which you are participating is a remarkable
one and I know an honor and pleasure for you. By the same
token, you will never know what a positive and reassuring
experience it was for us here to get to meet you. It is hard
to imagine better ambassadors than you and Jason for Kansas and
for your generation. Your parents should be very proud.
Best wishes for a very successful future.
STAT
STAT DDCl/RMGates/de
DISTRIBUTION:
1 ? Addressee
1 ? D/PAO
1 ? ER
1 ? DDCI Chrono
incoming)
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STAT
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VVash ington. D C.20505
March 31,
1988
Dear Jason:
I want to tell you how much I
enjoyed
the
opportunity
meet and spend some time with you.
I am flattered that I
to
was
chosen to participate in your program. You certainly made a
very positive impression on me and everyone you encountered
here in Washington. Your evident intelligence and character
had a profound impact and, frankly, were immensely reassuring
and inspiring to all of us.
It is hard to imagine better ambassadors than you and Mark
for Kansas or for your generation. Your parents should be very
proud.
Best of luck in what I expect will be a very successful
future.
Sincerely,
Sl-fokT DDCl/RMGates/de,
DISTRIBUTION: (w/ incoming)
1 - Addressee
1 - D/PAO
1 - ER
1 - DDCI Chrono
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Washington, D.C. 20505
A /1
22 February 1988 (1230)
Bob --
The attached arrived almost at the same moment
that I received a call from OCA. The message
was from Senator Dole's Topeka Kansas office
requesting an interview with you.
STAT
'STAT
It seems a group of students is ready to jump
on a plane and come see you at a moment's notice.
I suggested OCA not return the call as yet since
you will be in tomorrow. In the meantime I will
get a reading from Public Affairs.
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STAT TO:
STAT
March 31, 1988
Chief, DCI Admin Staff
The DDCI was asked to participate (be interviewed and provide
names of friends and family to be interviewed) in the Topeka
(Kansas) West High School oral history program. This program
honors native Kansans who have gone on to distinguish
themselves in their respective fields. The history will become
property of the Kansas State Historical Society. In order to
facilitate this project the DDCI hosted dinner for the students
conducting the interviews (Jason Newell and Mark Roeder) on 29
March at The Tivoli Restaurant (receipt attached).
The DDCI was given an advance of $150. The DDCI invited his
daughter (Eleanor Gates) to attend dinner bringing the total
dinner bill to $130. The Deputy Director wishes to cover the
cost of his daughter's dinner therefore the cost of dinner (for
expense purposes) is $105 and the remaining $45 is returned.
1700 N. MOORE ST. ROSSLYN, VA 22209 [phone]
0/DDCI
CHECK 40
02 278
DATE
AM^,
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?
3TAT
STAT
STAT
Date .
? ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP 23 Feb 1988
syrnb? room number. InItials 1 Date
D/PAO
0 . .
2. DDCI
,
-
S..
?
.
. .
,
Action 0File
Note and Return
Approval
For Clearance
Per Conversation
As Requested
For Correction' ? ?
Prepare Relty
Circulate
For Your Information.
See Me.
Comment
? Investigate
sit/nature ? ?
Coordination
? Justi
DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences. disposals, '
clearances, and similar actions ?
' FROM: (Name, org. symbol. Agency/Post)
?PAO
Room No.?Bldg.
7D00 Kos
5061-102.
1983 0 381-529 (232)
Phone No. ? ,
27676
OPTIONAL FOrun 4,1 (Rev. 7-76)
O PrestAwicriu701- 11.206 -
Milt (41
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.rx.r-t
-
February 19, 1988
The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Mr. Gates:
During the Bicentennial, Topeka (Kansas) West High School Library Media
Specialist Michael Printz`?diped an orat-hiaory program to honor native
Kansans who have gone on to distinguish st1ye-m?ge.176-?1:n their respective fields.
A few of the one hundred twenty-six (126) past Oral Histories include projects
on Dwight D. Eisenhower, Alf Landon, Senators Nancy Landon Kassembaum and
Bob Dole, astronaut Steve Hawley, actors Gordon Jump and Ed Asner, Pulitzer
Prizewinning poet Gwendolyn Brooks, and Amelia Earhart.
Completed Oral Histories become the property of the Kansas State Historical
Society, where they are made a permanent part of the Society's research and
educational materials. Scholars and.writers from across the country travel
to Kansas to use the over two thousand seven hundred-seventy (2,770) hours of
audio and video recorded interviews that the two hundred one (201) students
who have worked with the Oral History Program have accumulated in the past
twelve years. For example, since the project on Amelia Earhart was completed
in 1978 over two thousand two hundred-twenty (2,220) writers have come to
the Kansas State Historical Society to use the materials prepared by the
students that produced her oral history.
The students that work on each project also present their finished product
to various civic, service, and political organizations throughout the state.
Obviously, a first rate oral history requires extensive travel, time, and
money to interview and research the subject of the documentary and those
that have influenced his life. All expenses are covered by funds raised by
the students through community contributions from the people of Kansas.
We are extremely excited this year to have been selected to complete a
documentary on the life and accomplishments of Robert M. Gates. Our project
will involve extensive research into your life in Wichita and the years since
TOPEKA WEST HIGH SCHOOL, 2001 FAIRLAWN RD. 66604, 913/272-1643
TOPEKAPUBLICSCHOOLS CU t ? Li&SI-A ?13.1-LV3
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300050001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300050001-2
S TAT
STAT
you left Kansas. We will be interviewing your family, friends, teachers
and other colleagues that have influenced your life. Our research will
culminate with a trip to Washington, D. C. to trace your life in our
nation's capitol.
We are hoping to meet with you at your convenience to conduct a personal
interview for use in our documentary. In addition, we would also like to
interview several of the people associated with your work in Washington,
and we would appreciate any suggestions you might have regarding others
that would contribute to our project.
We are interested in discussing dates that we would be able to meet with
you in Washington. Please feel free to call one of us collect at home
this weekend, or if this is not possible we will contact you Monday,
February 22.
The people of Kansas are always excited to hear about the success of other
Kansans, and we are very enthusiastic about the project. Your cooperation
will enable us to complete a quality documentary, and look forward to
speaking with you soon.
Sincerely,
Jason Newell
Mark Roeder
Topeka West Library
[phone], Ext. 80
TOPEKA WEST HIGH SCHOOL, 2001 FAIRLAWN RD. 66604, 913/272-1643
TOPEKA PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300050001-2