THE 1958 ANNUAL ESTIMATES POLITICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

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• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 3, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE 1958 ANNUAL ESTIMATES
POLITICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION
OF
THE SONO-SOVIET BLOC
REVISED
'3 SEPT 1957
50X1 -HUM
1
1 50X1 -HUM
Prepared by Air Research Division
Library of Congress
Washington 25, D. C.
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4.195DAYLULUINDLI
4 4.
DA1 :.1
I vi k.1%;faS
Demographic
Composition ,^mA 11^Ma0suAphir
Composition
of
THE 5110-SOVIET BLOC
(Revised)
3 September 1957
Prepared Under
the Direction
? Chief of Staff, USAF
Directorate of Intelligence
Deputy Director for Targets
Washington, D. C.
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FOREWORD
Estimates,The 1958 Annual here presented, is
a revision of the fourth edition of a series of analyses
of the political and demographic composition of Com-
munist-ruled countries. A summary of estimates which
is part of ARD research during the year 1956-57 and
historical changes noted during that time, it also
includes certain revisions and adjustments necessitated
by new data received or evaluated since the publication
of the original edition on 1 May 1957. An attempt has
been made to initiate a system of rating the relative
accuracy of estimates or groups of estimates, and this
system, presently employed only in estimates of urban
population, will be refined and extended in subsequent
editions.
The volume of new data relating both to the
current period and the past has increased tremendously
during the past year, although the quality of the mater-
ial is highly variable--both from country to country
and topic to topic. The present edition, for the first
time, encompasses the entire Sino-Soviet Bloc, having
been expanded to include the Korean People's Demo-
cratic Republic (North Korea), the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and the Mongolian People's
Republic (Outer Mongolia). Available data relating
to these newly included areas are incomplete, however,
and in many cases the material presented is limited
to the crudest estimates, This volume, as revised,
also includes an analysis of the initial effects of
the program of economic decentralization, as well as
certain adjustments occasioned by new or revised data
appearing in the recently received statistical hahd-
books Narodnoye khozyaystvo RSFSR, Narodne gospodar-
stvo Ukrainskoi RSR, and the 1956 supplement to
Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR. Additional material
dealing with the structure and distribution of the
population of the USSR and of ethnic groups within
the Soviet Union is anticipated, and further adjust-
ments will be prepared for inclusion in subsequent
editions.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Part One. The Sino-Soviet Bloc
The Sino-Soviet Bloc
Political
A.
Part Two. The USSR
The Communist Party
1. Growth
2. Distribution
3. Composition
4. Organization
B. The Komsomol
1. Growth
C. Government
1. The USSR Control Force
2. Trends in Administration
3. Government Control Centers
H. Population and Manpower
A. Total Population
1. Variations in Soviet Policies on
Statistics
2. Total Population: 1958
3. Changes in Total Population: 1913-61
4. Geographic Distribution of USSR
Population
B. Urban-Rural Population
1. Total Urban Population
2. Urban Population Ranges
3. Republic Distribution and Rate of Growth
1+. Population of Cities
5. Rural Population
6. Population Density
C. Age-Sex Structure
1. 1958 Age-Sex Structure
2. Problem of Enumeration
D. Trends in Vital Rates
E. Ethnic Composition
1. Ethnic Groups
2. Dynamics of Soviet Nationality
Distribution
F. Labor Force
1. The "Gainfully Occupied" Population
2. Categories of Gainful Employment
3. Reported Data on "Employed Persons"
1+, The Concepts of Gainfully Occupied
and Employed Persons
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1
5.
5
5
5.7
11
12
12
52
52
52
56
59
62
77
79
80
81
83
85
85
86
90
92
92
94
99
99
100
101
106
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Part Two II continued
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5. Distribution of Gainfully Occupied
Population by Union Republics
6. Trends in Main Working Ages
7. Workers and Employees
8. Specialists
Urban Living Space in the Soviet Union
1. Urban Housing and the Growth of
Urban Population
2. Large Cities
Part Three. The Asian Bloc
The People's Republic of China
A. The Communist Party
1. Growth
2. Geographic Distribution of the Party
3. Social Composition
4. Occupational Composition
5. Age-Sex Structure
6. Party Organization
7. Party Trends
8. The Communist Party Youth League
B. Government
1. Central Government
2. Provincial Government
3. Local Government
1+. Government Control Centers
C. Political Economy
1. Agriculture
2. Industry
3. Consumer Industry and Trade
D. Population and Manpower
1. Size
2. Migration
3. Distribution
4, Urban Population
59 Age-Sex Structure
6. Ethnic Composition
7. Labor Force
II. The Korean People's Democratic Republic
(North Korea)
Ill. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(North Vietnam)
IV. The Mongolian People's Republic
(Outer Mongolia)
ii
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109
110
112
125
129
129
132
133
133
133
135
118
13b
139
140
141
142
143
144
146
146
147
150
150
151
153
154
154
155
156
158
162
165
165
173
176
177
1
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Page
Part Four. The Soviet Satellite Bloc
General
A. Population
B. Labor Force
179
179
180
II. Albania 182
III. Bulgaria
184
IV. Czechoslovakia 186
V. East Germany 190
VI. Hungary 1914-
VII. Poland 197
VIII, Rumania 201
Appendix
Tables
Number
1-1 Population Growth of the
Sino-Soviet Bloc: 1958-62 1
1-2 Population of Sino-Soviet Bloc: 1958-62 2
1-3 Urban-Rural Distribution of Population
in the Sino-Soviet Bloc: 1958 3
1-1+ Distribution of Workers and Employees
in the Sino-Soviet Bloc: 1958
2-1 Growth of the USSR Communist Party:
1939-1958 6
2-2 Estimated Distribution of the USSR
Communist Party by Major Adminis-
trative Divisions: 1958
2-3 Estimated Level of Education of USSR
Communist Party Membership: 1958
2-4 Estimated Distribution of Communists in
Armed Forces and MVD Troops by Admin-
istrative Division: 1949, 1952, 1954,
1956 10
2-5 Growth of the USSR Komsomol: 1939-1958 13
2-6 Estimated Composition of the USSR Control
Force: 1958 15
2-7 Estimated Distribution of the USSR Control
Force, by 'Administrative Division: 1958 16
2-8 The Government Control Force: 1958 17
2-9 The Military Control Force: 1958 19
2-10 The MVD and KGB Control Force: 1958 21
2-11 The Economic Control Force, by Occupa-
tional Category: 1958 22
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Flaet,
Tables (continued)
2-12 Additional Control Functions of Selected
Government Control Centers 49
2-13 USSR Major and Alternate Government Control
Centers by Administration Division: 1940,
1958 50
2-14 Changes in USSR Population: 1913-61 59
2-15 Distribution of USSR Population by Major
Area: 1939/40, 1955, 1958 65
2-16 Average Annual Growth of USSR Population,
by Major Administrative Division:
1939/40-55 and 1955-58 65
2-17 Population of the USSR by Major Adminis-
trative Division: 1939/40, 1955, and 1958 67
2-18 Total Population Changes 1897-1926,
1926-39, and 1939-55 70
2-19 Summary of Redistribution of USSR
Population Within Unoccupied ?Area:
1939-55 73
2-20 Growth of Urban Population in the
USSR: 1926-58 76
2-21 Changes in USSR Urban Population
Ranges: 1926, 1939, 1956 78
2-22 Estimated Urban-Rural Distribution of
USSR Population,by Republic: 1958 78
2-23 Estimated Changes of USSR Urban Population,
by Republic: 1939/40-1958 80
244 Estimated Changes in USSR Rural Population,
by Republic: 1939/40-1958 82
2-25 Population Outside Major Urban Areas of
the USSR, by Major Administrative
Division: 1958 84
2-26 Age-Sex Structure of the USSR: 1958 85
2-27 Age Composition of the Soviet Population:
1 January 1956 88
2-28 Changes in Age Composition of the Soviet
Population: 1940-56 90
2-29 Birth and Death Rates and New Growth of
USSR Population: 1913-56 91
2-30 Ethnic Composition of the USSR: 1958 93
2-31 Distribution of Ethnic Groups by Union
Republic: 1958 97
2-32 The Gainfully Occupied Population of
the USSR: 1958 99
2-33 Categories of Gainful Employment:
1 January 1958 100
2-54 Distribution of Population Employed in
Productive and Nonproductive Branches
of the USSR National Economy 104
2-35 Distribution of the Population Employed
in the USSR National Economy, by
Branches 107
2-36 Estimated Distribution of the "Gainfully
Occupied" Population by Union Republic:
1 January 1958 110
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2-37 Projected USSR Population in Working Ages
(15-54): 1955-75 111
2-38 Comparison of USSR and U. S. Projected
Populations (Males) in Prime Military
Ages (20-51+): 1955-70 112
2-39 Workers and Employees in the USSR: 1541-61 113
2-40 Distribution and Growth of Workers and
Employees in the USSR: 1940, 1950, 1958 115
241 Industrial Workers and Employees in the USSR:
1940, 1950, 1958 117
2-42 Industrial Workers and Employees in the RSFSR:
1940, 1950, 1958 118
2-43 Distribution of Workers and Employees by
Sectors of Employment: 1940-58 120
2.44 Changes in Sectors of Employment: 19)40-58 121
2-45 Increases in Branches of Soviet Industry:
1940-58 123
2-46 Workers and Employees by Branches of Industry:
1940, 1955, 1958 124
2-47 Specialists in the USSR: 1941-61 126
2-48 Specialists with Higher Education:
1541, 1955, 1958 128
2-49 Specialists with Secondary Education:
191+1, 1955, 1958 130
2-50 Urban Housing: 1923-61 131
3-1 Growth of the Chinese Communist Party:
1921-58 133
3-2 Increase in Party Membership per 1,000
Total and Adult Populations: 1950-58 131+
3-3 Estimated Distribution of Chinese Com-
munist Party Membership by Adminis-
trative Division: 1958 136
3-4 Estimated Urban-Rural Distribution of
Civilian Communist Party Members by
Administrative Division: 1958 137
3-5 Estimated Social Composition of the
Chinese Communist Party: 1958 138
3-6 Estimated Occupational Composition of the
Chinese Communist Party: 1958 138
3-7 Estimated Age Composition of the Chinese
Communist Party: 1958 140
3-8 Summary of Major and Alternate Govern-
ment Control Centers of the People's
Republic of China: 1958 148
3-9 Estimated Total Population of the People's
Republic of China: 1953, 1958-62 155
3-10 Provincial and Regional Distribution of
Population of the People's Republic
of China: 1958 157
3-11 Estimated Growth of Urban Population in
the People's Republic of China: 1953,
1958-62 158
3-12 Estimated Urban-Rural Distribution of
Provincial Populations: 1958 160
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Paae.
Tables continued
3-13 Estimated Age-Sex Structure of the People's
Republic of China: 1958 164
3-14 Ethnic Composition of the People's Republic
of China: 1958 166
3-15 Potential Working Ages (15-59) of the
Chinese Population: 1958 167
3-16 Rough Distribution of Urban Wage and
Salary Earners in the People's Republic
of China 170
3-17 Age Distribution of Wage and Salary Earners
of the People's Republic of China 171
3-18 Regional Distribution of Wage and Salary
Earners of the People's Republic of China 172
3-19 Estimated Distribution of the North Korean
Population, by Provinces: 1958 174
3-20 Population of Selected Cities of North Korea 174
4-1 Soviet Satellite Bloc: Summary of Estimated
Total Population: 1958 and 1962 179
4-2 Soviet Satellite Bloc: Summary of Estimated
Urban Population: 1958 180
4-3 Soviet Satellite Bloc: Estimated Distribution
of Urban Population: 1958 181
14-1+ Soviet Satellite Bloc: Summary of Esti-
mated Labor Forces of Satellite
Countries: 1958 181
4-6 Albania: Development of Population:
1415-1962 182
4-6 Albania: Cities and Towns with Estimated
Populations of 10,000 and Above: 1958 182
4-7 Albania: Estimated Distribution of Urban
Population: 1958 183
14-8 Bulgaria: Development of Population:
1946-1962 184
4-$.9? Bulgaria: Estimated Distribution of Urban
Population: 1958 184
4-10 Bulgaria: Cities and Towns with Estimated
Populations of 10,000 and Above: 1958 185
4-11 Czechoslovakia: Development of Population:
1547-1958 186
4-12 Czechoslovakia: Estimated Distribution of
Urban Population: 1958 187
4-13 Czechoslovakia: Cities and Towns with
Estimated Populations of 10,000 and
Above: 1958 188
li-ilf? East Germany: Development of Population:
1946-1958 190
1+-15 East Germany: Estimated Distribution of
Urban Population: 1958 190
4-.16 East Germany: Cities and Towns with Esti-
mated Populations of 10,000 and Above:
1958 191
4-17 Hungary: Development of Population:
1949-1958 194
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Figures
2-5
2-6
0_4
)-1
Page
(continued)
Organization of the Council of National 1+2
Economy (Sovnarkhoz) of the Gruzinskaya SSR
Industrial Subordination in the USSR: 1957 43
Composition of the State Council of the PAnpliz2q
Republic of China: April 1957 1411-
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"fables (continued)
4-18 Hungary: Estimated Distribution of Urban
0 Population: 1958 154.
4-19 Hungary: Cities and Towns with Estimated
Populations of 10,000 and Above: 1958 195
4-20? Poland: Development of Population:
1946-1958 197
4-21 Poland: Estimated Distribution of Urban
Population: 1958 198
4-22 Poland: Cities and Towns with Estimated
Populations of 10,000 and Above: 1958 198
h_01
Rumania: Development of Population:
1948-1958 201
11-24 Rumania: Estimated Distribution of Urban
Population: 1958 201
4-25 Rumania: Cities and Towns with Estimated
Populations of 10,000 and Above: 1958 202
A-1 Major and Alternate Government Control
Centers of the USSR: 1940, 1958 204.
A-2 Estimated Distribution of the USSR Com-
munist Party by Administrative
Division: 1958 225
A-3 Data on Selected Regional Economic Councils 230
A-4- Distribution of USSR Population by Adminis-
trative Division: 1939/40, 1955, 1958 238
A-5 Redistribution of USSR Population within
Unoccupied Area: 1939-55 247
A-6 Estimated Urban-Rural Distribution of the
USSR Population by Administrative
Division: 1958 250
A-7 Population Outside Major Urban Areas of
the USSR, by Administrative bivision. 1958 255
A-8 1958TOu1ation'of USSR Cities and 1940
Population of 3eiected Cities 260
A-9 Total Floor Space in Selected Large Cities of
the USSR 24.
A-10 Major and Alternate Government Control
. Centers of the People's Republic of
China: 1958 276
A-11 Population of Selected Cities of the
People's Republic of China 281
Figures
2-1 Reorganization of the USSR Council of Ministers 31
2-2 Reorganization of the Russian SFSR Council
of Ministers 33
2-3 Reorganization of the Republican Councils of
Ministers in the USSR: 1957 /f?
2-4 Distribution of Sovnarkhozy (Regional
Economic Councils) by Administrative-
Territorial Diviseion: 1957 37
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PART ONE. THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
The Sino Soviet Bloc, comprising the Communist-ruled
countries of the world, is a vast domain stretching from Central
Europe to the Pacific Ocean and from the North Pole to the shores
of the South China Sea. It covers more than 25 per cent of the
total land area of the earth and inc ludes about 35 per cent of
the world's populatinn.
The 1958 population of this bloc of Communist states is
estimated to total more than 950 million (see Table 1-1). By
Region
Table 1-1
POPULATION GROWTH OF THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC:
1958-62
Population
(in thousands) Increase
1958,, 1962 Absolute Per Cent
USSR and East
European satellites 303,098 320,650 17,552 5.8
China and
Asiatic satellites 649,050 _aall_ 39,180 6.0
TOTAL 952,148 1,008,880 56,732 5,9
1962 the population will have increasecl about 6 per cent, or 57 mil-
lion, approximately the same rate of increase as for the world popu-
lation during the period 1950-51+. About 69 per cent of the increase
is expected to occur in the Asiatic sector. The USSR and most of the
East European satellites are areas of comparatively low birth and
death rates whereas high birth and death rates prevail in China and
the Asiatic satellites. The population increase in the Asiatic
countries is expected to result primarily from a declining death rate,
since fertility is expected to remain high despite recent Chinese
attempts to institute birth control measures. In the USSR and the
East European satellites, death rates have decreased tremendously
since World War II--by more than 50 per cent in the USSR and by almost
as much in some of the satellite countries, but as a result of a
lower birth rate, population will increase at a slower rate than in
Asia.
In terms of population, the People's Republic of China
dominates the bloc. Here are found an estimated 623 million.
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Part One
persons, or more than 65 per cent of the total population. The
population of the USSR is estimated at 206.3 million or 21.6 per
cent of the total. The seven countries comprising the East European
satellites contain about 97 million persons, or 10.2 per cent of the
total, with the Asiatic satellites containing
or 2.7 per cent of the total (see Table 1-2).
visr% r
DI.? r. No
T,klit% 1-2
IcLwaA,
POPULATION OF THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC:
195862
Country..
USSR
East European
Satellites
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Rumania
China
than 26.05 million,
1958 1962
Population Per Cent Population Per Cent
n thousands of Total (in thousands)of Total
206,a00
2,2
2116)12 21.8
96.798 10.2 101,150 10.0
1,483 0.2 1,662 0.2
7,725 0.8 8,101+ 0.8
13,410 1.1+ 13,926 1.4
17,598 1.9 17,163 1.7
9,861 1.0 10,300 1.0
28,706 3.0 30,991 3.0
18,015 1.9 19,001+ 1.9
623,000 65.4 661,200 65.5
Asiatic Satellites 26,050 2.7 27,030 2.12
Outer Mongolia 1,050 0.1 1,130 0.1
North Vietnam 13,000 1.1+ 13,300 1.3
North Korea 12,000 1.3 12,600 1.3
TOTAL
952,1 48 100.0 1,008430 100.0
This vast complex, and particularly the Asiatic sector, is
primarily agricultural: of the total population 76.11- per cent live
in rural areas (see Table 1-3). It is necessary, however, to point
out certain distinctions between the two chief components. The USSR
and the East European satellites form a comparatively modern, urban-
ized technological society in which industrial production plays a
large role. China and the Asiatic satellites are predominantly agri-
cultural countries, even though industrialization is increasing under
the Communists.
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Table 1-3
URBAN-RURAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN
THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: 1958
Area
Sino-Soviet Bloc
USSR
East European
Satellites
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland 28,706 13,000 15,706 45.3
Rumania 18,015 5,915 12,100 32.8
China 623,000 85,000 538,000 13.6
PopylatiOnn Per Cent
Total (in thousands) , Urban of
Population Urban Rural Total
952,148 21-1-,585 727,563 ,29.6
206,300 90,500 115,800 43.9
96,798 46,185 50,613 47.7
1,483 350 1,133 23.6
7,725 2,686 5,039 31-1-.8
13,410 7,510 5,900 56.0
17,598 12,791 4,807 72.7
9,861 3,933 5,928 39.9
Asiatic Satellites 26,050 2,900 21,150 11.1
Outer Mongolia 1,050 200 850 19.0
North Vietnam 13,000 900 12,100 6.9
North Korea 12,000 1,800 10,200 15.0
The most highly urbanized section of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
is the region of the East European satellites, where almost 48 per
cent of the population live in cities and towns. Even among these
countries, however, there is considerable variation, ranging from
23.6 per cent in Albania to 72.7 per cent in East Germany. By
1962, it is estimated that at least one-half of the population will
live in urban areas.
The USSR, straddling 'Europe and Asia, is now almost as
highly urbanized as the East European satellites, with almost 44.
per cent of its population living in cities and towns. The Soviet
urban population is growing steadily at the expense of the rural,
chiefly through a continuous in-migration from the countryside to
the city. Of the reported 17 million urban increase during the
Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-55), 9 million were rural in-migrants.
Although increasing industrialization will help maintain a steady
flow of in-migrants, the number coming to urban areas has already
begun to decline from the peak period of 1951-55.
3
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Part One
In the Asiatic sector, urban definitions are somewhat tenu-
ous and the rate of urbanization continues to increase slowly, par-
ticularly since China, which contains almost 97 per cent of the urban
population, is currently following a policy designed to control the
unrestricted flow of population from the countryside to the cities.
Only 13.5 per cent of the total population of the Asiatic sector
live in cities or towns, making it one of the least urbanized areas
in the world.
The labor force in the Sino-Soviet Bloc consists chiefly
of workers and employees (i.e., wage and salary earners) and farmers,
(both individual and collective) Workers and employees are the
more highly skilled component; they are essentially urban in character,
but include a small group living in rural areas who are employed
in agriculture and various services.
Table 14
DISTRIBUTION QF WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES
IN THE SIK-SOVIET BLOC: 1958
, Number Per Cent Per Cent of
atigift'a Iln.ibutmdil 0 T9tal 111:11F12.22sidlii9/1
USSR 51,250 50.1 56.6
East European
satellites 25,070 g+.5 5463
Asiatic satellites 1,000 1.0 34
China.Qa.. .lisi.
TOTAL 102,320 100.0 45.6
About 50 per cent are concentrated in the.USSR (see Table 1-4).
In the USSR and the East European satellites, workers and employees
comprise more than one-half the .urban population; In China and the
Asiwtic satellites they comprise 29.4 and 34.5 per cent, respectively.
L.
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PART TWO.
THE USSR
POLITICAL
A. The Communist Party,
1. Growth
By 1 January 1958 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) will total an estimated 7,458,000. Thirty-six of every
1,000 persons or 56 of every 1,000 adults will be Party members
(see Table 1-1).
Since 1939 the rate of growth of the CPSU has been uneven,
reflecting the adjustments of Soviet leadership to changing foreign
and domestic situations. The greatest increase in membership occur-
red during the early months of World War II; by the end of the war
the Party had increased by 1.8 million, an average annual rate of
10 per cent since 1940. From 15Lq to 1952, during the period of
postwar recovery and reconstruction and a deepening political crisis
within the aging Stalinist regime, the annual rate of growth de-
creased to about 2 per cent. In the period of consolidation of
power following Stalin's death, the rate further decreased to one
per cent and since 1956 has remained nearly constant.
The number of Communists per 1,000 total and adult popula-
tions has decreased slightly since 1952, as the rate of Party growth
has fallen behind the natural increase in the population. Since
1956 quantitative growth in the Party ranks has been deemphasized
and given a role of relatively minor importance. The Party leader-
ship has assigned priority importance to qualitative growth in Party
membership, calling on all Party organizations to admit to member-
ship only the most advanced workers, agriculturalists, and intellec-
tuals. It is estimated, therefore, that the number of Communists
per 1,000 total and adult populationswi 1 I remain constant through
1957, and may even decrease slightly if current policy is continued.
2. Distribution
Note: Following the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956,
data were published for the first time since 1939 which
permits the application of a single method (the extrapo-
lation of delegate listings) to determine the distribution
of Party members and candidates for all administrative
divisions.. ThArAforAl each entry in the tablas which
follow is more accurate and the conclusions drawn from the
entries are considered more reliable than in previous ed-
itions of The Annual Estimates.
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Part Two I. Political
Table 2-1
GROWTH OF THE USSR COMMUNIST PARTY,:
1939-1958
, Candidates Members per
Per Cent Members 1,000 Adult
Total of Total b per 1,000 Population (Age
Year Membershjpa Menil..?__P.--)i Populationc 18 and Above)
1939 2,306,973 34.37 14 23
1940 3,399,975 41.68 17 30
1947 6,300,000 na na na
1952 6,882,145 12.63 37 58
1954 7,050,000 6.92 37 57
1956 7,215,505 5.82 36 56
1958 7,458,000 na 36 56
All

?
All figures reported, except 1951+ and 1958. For discussion
of 1954 estimate, see The 1957 Annual Estimates. The 1958 figure
is based on total civilian membership reported at Party Congresses
of the 15 union republics; the 1957 estimates of Party membership
in the armed forces and MVD troops by union republics were kept
constgnt.
All figures reported, except 1954. For discussion of 1954
estimate, see Annual
cBased on ARD estimates of total and adult population.
1
The distribution of the Party among the various administra-
tive divisions is extremely irregular, and the variations in the
incidence of Party membership can be considered one of the useful
indices for assessing the significance of an area. The geographic
distribution of Party membership reflects the Kremlin's evaluation
of the importance of various groups in Soviet society and a desire
to place Communists in what it considers strategically important
occupations.
Party membership, therefore, is concentrated in areas which
are Highly urbanized and? industrialized or which contain large mili-
tary contingents. It is estimated that Party incidence is six times
as high in urban centers as inrural areas, and is significantly higher
in highly industrialized areas (Kiyevskaya Oblast, Ukrainskaya SSR)
than ih predominantly agricultural areas (Sumskaya Oblast, Ukrain-
skaya SSR). Party incidence is also much higher in areas in which
there are relatively large military contingents (Murmanskaya Oblast,
RSFSR). National minorities, with the striking exception of the
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Part Two I. Political
Transcaucasian ethnic groups, have a much lower participation than
have Great Russians. Thirty-six of every 1,000 persons in the So-
viet Union are members of the Communist Party; 56 of every 1,000
age 18 and above are Party members. Party membership within the
union republics varies from a high of 81+ per 1,000 adult population
in the Gruzinskaya SSR to a low of 26 in the Litovskaya SSR (see
Table 2-2). Party membership among the ?b lasts, krays, and ASSR's
varies from a high o185 per 1,000 total population in Murmanskaya
Oblast to a low of 9 per 1,000 in Ternopolskaya 0blast5 in the
Ukrainskaya SSR (see Table A-2, Appendix, and Map 1).
3. Composition
During the past year the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
theoretically a "union ... of people of the working class, the work-
ing peasantry, and the working intelligentsia," has continued to
develop as an elite group dominated by a large bureaucratic appa-
ratus intent upon maintaining its monopoly of political power.
, A re-analysis of data dealing with the full-time employees
of the Party who comprise the staff of the Party apparatus has
necessitated an upward revision of previous estimates. It is esti-
mated that by January 1958 the Party bureaucracy will total approxi-
mately 440,000, or almost 6 per cent of total Party membership.
Of this to*lmore than one-third will appear on the nomenclature
or "patronage list" of the USSR Party Secretariat, 10 per cent on
those of the republics, and almost 60 per cent on those of the local
Party committees.
One of the principal means by which the Party bureaucracy
attempts to assure the continuation of its dominant status in the
Soviet power structure is by staffing all important positions with
Communists through placement and highly selective recruitment of
Party members in certain occupations. Since Soviet society places
a high premium upon education, the more highly educated an indi-
vidual, the more likely that he is a Party member. Data:published
during and following the XX Party Congress reveal that Par.ty members
with a higher or incomplete higher education, constituting 15 per
cent-of Party membership-(see Table 2-3), represent more than 1+5'
per cent of all such persons in the USSR .More-than 33 percent
of Soviet scientists, engineers, and technicians are Communists.
It is felt that the proportion of Party members with specialized
and higher educations will continue to increase significantly.
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Table 2-2
L. Political
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF THE USSR COMMUNIST PARTY
BY MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS: 1958
Administrative
Division
Russian SFSR
Northwestern Region
Central Industrial
Region
Volga Region
Southeastern Region
Urals Region
West Siberian Region
East Siberian Region
Far Eastern Region
Ukrainskaya SSR
Belorusskaya SSR
Uzbekskaya SSR
Kazakhskaya SSR
Gruzinskaya SSR
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR
Litovskaya SSR
Moldavskaya SSR
Latviyskaya SSR
Kirgizskaya SSR
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Armyanskaya SSR
Turkmenskaya SSR
Estonskaya SSR
Abroad
TOTAL
? Total
Membershipa
(in thousands)
4,8E_38
586
2,041+
376
531
398
42
267
1,086
197
168
281
212
146
146
1+5"
67
53
43
78
46
61
7,458
Number per
1,000 Tot4
.Enpti 1J
Number per
1,000 Adult
Population cAgp
18 and Above)
1+2 65
62 na
45
43
33
32
32
35
58
26
21+
22
32
52
17
16
33
27
23
46
36
36
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
40
37
140
59
81+
72
26
28
144
)46
. 1+2
83
55
)41+
na
. 36 .56
-----5Ts'ed upon delegate listings extrapolated from reported and
calculated norms of representation at republic Party Congresses in
19514- gnd 1956 and the All-Union Party Congress in February 1956.
Based upon ARD estimates for the legally resident total and
adult populations.
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Part Two
Table 2-3
I. Political
ESTIMATED LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF
USSR COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP: 1958
Level of
Education
Higher
Complete
Incomplete
Secondary
Complete
Specialized
Incomplete
Lower
TOTAL
Membershipa
(in thousands). Total Membership
Per Cent of
1,112
842
270
3,911
1,675
861
2,236
_2414-12._
7,458
15
11
14-
52
22
12
30
al_
loo
Based on projections of data reported by The Mandate Commission
at the XX Party Congress, February 1956.
Further research also indicates that 812,000 Communists,
or slightly more than 11 per cent of total Party membership, we
serving in the armed forces and MVD troops (see Table 2-1) in 1956.
This figure represents a reported decline of about 145,000 from a
high believed to have been reached during the first years of the
Korean War. Since 1946, however, it is believed that Communists
in the military have continued to represent about 19 or 20 per cent
of total military personnel. Although details of the social compo-
sition of Communists serving in the military are not known, reported
data dealing with the pre-World Wei' II period indicate that virtual-
ly all officers, almost 50 per cent of the NCO's, and 10 per cent
of the lower grades are Party members. It is felt that the 1956
incidence of Party membership in the military and possibly also the
1956 total in the military will be applicable to the 1958 situation.
The estimated postwar distribution of Party members serving
in the armed forces and MVD troops (see Table 2-4) is believed to
reflect the disposition and internal movement of military personnel.
Generally speaking, the number of troops in the western border areas
such as the Litovskaya SSR declined steadily during the 1549-56
"period, while the number in interior areas increased. Perhaps the
most striking example is in Moskovskaya.Oblast where the number of
Communists in the military, and probably the military itself, in-
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Table 24
1. Political
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNISTS IN ARMED FORCES AND
MVD TROOPS BY ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION:
1949, 1952, 1954, 1956a
(Numbers in Thousands)
Administrative Division
Russ* SFSR and abroad
Moskovskaya 0.
Leningradskaya O.
Sverdlovskaya O.
Chelyabinskaya O.
Kemerovskaya O.
Ukrainskaya SSR
Kiyevskaya O.
Krymskaya O.
Voroshilovgradskaya O.
Belorusskaya SSR
Uzbekskaya SSR
Kazakhskaya SSR
Gruzinskaya SSR
Aze*ydzhanskaya SSR
Litoyskaya SSR
Moldavskaya SSR
Latviyskaya SSR
Kirgiz$kaya SSR
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Armyanskaya SSR
Turkmenskaya SSR
Estonskaya SSR
Karelo-Finskaya SSR'
TOTAL
583.8
na
na
na
na
na
57.7
na
na
na
71.7
2.3
1.3
16.9
.11.2
20.8
11.1
7.2
12.5
.P+.6
7.3
192
622.0
(30.5)
(76.5)
(17.2)
(1+.1)
irs
(5.3)
113.2
(38.1)
na
na
45.4
11.2
.2.9
k?15.5
? 114.3
10.7
7.9
28.1
0.8
5.9
6.3
14.0 ?
9.5
q4c)
560.5
(133.9)
na
na
na
na
125,2
(26.?)
(26.1)
(2.2)
37,14
10.1
3.9
21.3
15.9
9.5
3.0
25.7
2.9
6.
5.4
13.4
9.0
5.5__
1956
518.,9
057.0)
(16.0)
(9.2)
(7)4
123.2
(21.7)
(30.1)
(3.8)
36.7
10.2
11.6
17.5
19.4
7.5
3.9
22.0
3.7
7.5
4?7
12.0
8.4
1+.9
846.2 913.6 855.2 812.1
aAll estimates are residuals obtained by subtracting reported
Party membership from total Party membership estimated on the basis
of extrapolations of delegate listings.
bTransferred to Russian SFSR and downgraded to the Karelskaya
ASSR during 1956.
creased 340 per cent in the two years immediately following Stalin's
death and has decreased only slightly since that time. Consider-
ing the significant fluctuations in the distribution during the
1949-56 period, it is believed that the 1956 figures can be used
only as an indication of the possible distribution for January 1958.
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Part Two
4.
I. Political
Although the function and basic organization of the Communist
Party apparatus have remained essentially unaltered during the past
year, by the end of 1956 a trend toward a decrease in intra-Party
"democracy" had developed. The trend is most noticeable within the
lower echelons of the Party, where the responsibilities of local
Party officials are being increased in conjunction with the "decentral-
ization" of the economic apparatus (see Section C.2. Trends in Ad-
ministration).
Since Stalin's death in 1953, and particularly since the
XX Party Congress in February 1956, the Party press has featured
numerous calls for greater exercise of intra-Party democracy. Ap-
parently some members of the Party's rank-and-file accepted this
call at face value and leveled strong criticism at lower- and middle-
rank officials. Some of these contained implied criticism of the
highest Party officials and the basic tenets of Communist ideology.
Even before the Polish and Hungarian trouble, however, it became
apparent that the call for greater freedom of discussion was meant
to apply only to particular aspects of certain subjects, and many
of those who had criticized most frankly were censured for violat-
ing the principle of "democratic-centralism."1 The end result has
been that although public discussion continues, it has again been
limited to details or implementation of plans or "theses," rather
than to the rationale behind the proposals af top leadership.
'.86incident with theii.estriction on baic.discussions, Party
leaders lengthened the periods between the general membership meet-
ings, thereby altering one of the weakest tenets of democratic-
centralism--"the periodic accountability of Party bodies to their
Party organizations." Party officials, particularly in the'lower
Party units, are thus less subject to criticism from the rank-and-
file. In general, Party officials in republics, ()blasts, kray
okrugs, cities, and rayons now report to their "constituents" once
every two years rather than every 12 or 18 months; in the Ukraine,
Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, republic officials now
?
in we official definition of "democratic-centralism" the most
important clauses are: 1) "the decisions of higher (Party) bodies
are unconditionally binding upon lower ones"; and 2) "strict Party
discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority."
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Part Two I. Political
report only once every four years.1 The responsibility of these
officials to report to the higher echelons on every occasion remains,
however. And the appointments of all officials must be confirmed
and in most cases initiated by the USSR Party officials.
At the lowest level of the Party structure, the Party Prima-
ry Organization (formerly cell), changes have been introduced which
lead to the compartmentalization of membership, thereby decreasing
the possibility of any "united" action oh a significant scale by
the rank-and-file. In enterprises with more than 300 members, the
primary organization, as such, has been abolished, and separate shop,
brigade, or similar Primary Organizations have been established.
These smaller organizations no? longer elect representatives to an
enterprise Party unit but are supervised by Party professionals
at the plant who are appointed by the higher echelons of the Party
apparatus. Primary Organizations with less than 300 but more than
50 members (formerly 100) are now subdivided into shop, brigade,
or similar units; and are administered by an elected bureau which
must be confirmed by the. Party apparatus. 0
While the long-range significance of these changes is de-
batable, the immediate consequences are obvious. The initial
"loosening of the bonds" resulted in unforeseen difficulties and
was followed by a significant decrease in "intra-Party" democracy
as far as general Party membership was concerned. Local Party
officials, however, have gained greater freedom of action vis-a-
vis the general membership. The March 1957 pronouncements of First
Secretary Khrushchev on governmental reorganization, when implement-
ed, will place even greater demands upon the capacities of local
Party officials without, however, significantly increasing their
freedom of action vis-a-vis the Kremlin.
B. The Komsomol
1. Growth
By 1 January 1958 Komsomol membership will total an estimated
18 million. Eighty-seven of every 1,01000 persons within the total
population and 369 of every 1,000 between the ages of 14 and 26
(the eligible age group) will be Komsomol members (see Table 2-5).
meNn4
1Simitar changes have.been proposed recently for local govern-
agAnnlacsO
....omoscacis the city, ward, and rural rayon executive committees.
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Part Two
Year
1939
1940
1941
19+5
1949
1950
1952 (Jan.)
1952 (June)
1954
1956
1958
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Table 2-5
GROWTH OF THE USSR KOMSOMOL:
1939-1958
Total
Membershipa
?(in thousands)
5,000
8,700
10,500
8,000
9,283
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,825
18,500
18,000
Number per
1,000 Tota
Pop4ation
29
4.4
na
na
na
67
75
86
98
93
87
I. Political
Number
per 1,00%
Ages 14-26
4 n1
185
na
na
na
na
82
323
369
All figures reported in the Soviet press, except for the
1958 estimate. Figures for 1949 and 1954 reported during the All-
, Union Komsomol Congresses held in those years.
Based on ARD estimates for total population.
The rate of growth of the Komsomol has been extremely ir-
regular. In 1936 the main task of the organization was redefined
and stressed as the Communist indoctrination of youth, with the
result that membership increased sharply in the late thirties and
during World War II. By 1947, however, total membership still had
not reached the 1941 level of 10.5 million. Komsomol membership
more than doubled between 1949 and 1954, reflecting the increased
importance the regime attached to the ideological preparation of
the most promising of Soviet youth for Party membership and for the
organization and indoctrination of Soviet youp, in general for
service to the regime.
Given the widespread unrest among educated Soviet youth,
particularly noticeable since the Polish-Hungarian uprising in 1956,
the Komsomol may be expected to re-emphasize political conformity
for its membership. Since more than 80 per cent of students in
higher educational establishments and 20 per cent of students in
general are members, the Komsomol will become increasingly important
as an organ of control over the nonconformist elements of Soviet
youth.
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Part Two Political
C. Government
1, The USSR Control Force
Note: Data published since The 1957 Annual Estimates has
permitted an extension in the coverage of the primary and secondary
control force categories. A more rigorous definition of subgroups
has separated officers and ACOs into the primary and secondary
categories, respectively, and as a result some subgroups and totals
are not comparable with figures presented previously. The possible
effects of the proposed (March 1957) decentralization program on
the numbers, subordination' and distribution of control force per-
sonnel, where known, are discussed. Since the situation remains
dynamic, the estimates for primary government and economic control
forces continue subject to change.
The USSR control force totals an estimated 18,696,000 per-
sons, or approximately 9 per cent of the USSR population and 20
per cent of the USSR labor force. It consists of persons who, be-
cause of military or administrative rank, type of employment, or
character of professional activities, direct, supervise, or control
at least part of the activities of others. The primary control
force is that segment which is responsible for the formulation of
policy or for the exercise of general administrative or command
functions; the secondary control force provides certain professional
services of a public nature or has supervisory or command status
involving the direct control of a limited number of persons engaged
in the production of goods or provision of physical services.
The most important of the various components of the control
force is the Communist Party, followed in order of imprtance by
the primary government and military sectors (see Table 2-6).
Each of these possesses either the position or the means to command
the activities of large segments of the population. The least im-
portant are the secondary government and economic sectors, in which
control functions are limited to small groups and occasionally are
dependent upon an individual's prestige.
The functions and status of the control force create inter-
ests and relationships which tend 'co set its members apart from
other sectors of the population. And although officially there are
no classes in Soviet society, nevertheless these differences serve
in the free world as criteria for the determination of social classes.
Members of the Soviet control force, therefore, may be equated with the
upper- and middle-classes in other secieties. As elsewhere, they
hold a more favored economic position than the mass of the populntinn.
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Part Two I. Political
Table 2-6
ESTIMATED COMPOSITION
OF THE USSR CONTROL FORCE: 1958
(Numbers in thousands)
Catemmy. Prima x Secondary
Total
1.1.n
Communist Party 444J
Government 1,239 8,856 10,095
Military 620 1,090 1,710
MVD and KGB 130 260 390
Economic 732 5,)129641
TOTAL 31* 15,535% 18,696
The rewards for their services range from the high salary and ex-
tensive perquisites of a member of the USSR Council of Ministers
to the meager pay and limited privileges of a rural primary-school
teacher.
The growth of the USSR control force will probably continue
in the near future, since the increasing industrialization and
urbanization of the economy demands more and varied administrative
and supervisory positions.
Distribution. The estimated distribution of the USSR .
? primary and secondary control forces among the major ad-
ministrative divisions is rough,ly in proportion to the estimated
distribution of population (see Table 2-7). The distribution with-
in the major divisions, however, is believed to show a high degree
of concentration in Moskva and the capitals of the union republics.
' Communist Party Control Force: The estimated 440,000
members of the Communist Party control force constitute
the single most important component of the USSR control force, for
their power and authority cut across all other sectors. Through
this group are channeled the directives of the Party Presidium
(formerly Politburo) which affect every segment of Soviet society.
The Party control force consists of all employees of the
Party apparatus, from the secretaries of the USSR Central Party.
Committee, such as Nikita S. Khrushchev, down to the members of the
rural rayon.Party Committees. Members of the Party control force
occupy the commanding heights of the Soviet power structureg At
the apex of government, all members of the Presidium of the USSR
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Part Two I. Political
Table 2-7
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF THE USSR CONTROL FORCE,
BY ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION: 1958a
AdministratiVe Division Primary. Secondary Total
Russian SFSR and abroad 1,932 f,r 10,799
Ukrains 33kaya SSR ")Gi
en4 3,732
Belorusskaya SSR 112 7548 660
Uzbekskaya SSR 79 WI 523
Kazakhskaya SSR 127 835 962
Gruzinskaya SSR 66 290 356
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR 56 2146 302
Litovskaya SSR 10 192 233
Moldavskaya SSR 28 141 169
Latviyskaya SSR 48 171 219
Kirgizskaya SSR 33 128 161
Tadzhikskaya SSR 32 132 164
Armyanskaya SSR 28 120 11+8
Turkmenskaya SSR 32 104 136
Estonskaya SSR 26 106 132
TOTAL 3,161 151535 18,696
a.ll figures are rough approxiMhtions. The control force
components are distributed among the administrative divisions as
follows: Party professionals, in proportion to Iota' Party
membership; government, on the basis of budgetary data; armed
forces and MVD and KGB troops, through extrapolation of estimated
Party membership serving in the military; militia, fire defense,
and others, in proportion to estimated urban-rural distribution
of population; and economic, according to estimated nonagricultur-
al workers and employees and rural labor force.
Council of Ministers are also members of the Presidium of the USSR
Party Central Committee. A similar situation exists at the union
republic level, but at the local level Party officials are full-
time professionals. At all administrative-territorial or organ-
izational levels the Party control force functions primarily
through selection and placement of personnel; some Oblast Party
Committees are responsible for personnel in as many as 2,600 types
of positions.
With such wide powers over key personnel, members .of the
Party control force enjoy high status and considerable prestige.
their responsibilities are great and at the middle level--oblast,
kray, and ASSR--will probably increase considerably in the immed-
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Part Two
1. Political
iate future as the proposed decentralization program is implemented
(see Section C. 2, Trends in Administration).
Government Control Force. The government control force
totals an estimated 10,095,000, including 1,239,000 in
the primary and 8,856,000 in the secondary control force (see Table
9-8). This vast bureauracy is employed by the ministries and
specialized agencies of the USSR, union republic, and autonomous
republic governmen?s, and by the departments and directorates of
the oblast, kray, okruo: i+
and rakinn-einvarrtme1^4, .14
7 "4/ 7 ? sw, I litts.41 1..t7 I t.
tir.o.1,JUVO
the highest members-of the USSR government as well as .the chairmen
of village selsovets. Although the disposition of .persons in the
governmentcontrol force is in the process of change, their.
numbers may be expected to continue to increase as the Soviet
State ages.
Table 2-8
THE GOVERNMENT CONTROL FORCE: 1958
(Numbers in thousands)
Level of
i b :,
.;4
.Subordination Primarya Secondary hotal
USSR ' 361 ___ 361
Republic 284 2,176 2,460
Local IL_ 6 680 7,274
TOTAL 1,239 8,856 10,095
aDerived from 1) appropriations for upkeep of adminis-
trative and judicial bodies; 2) official statement concerning
propof-tion of wages to total costs in these bodies; 3) author-
itative statements as to costs of administrative agencies at
local level; 4) official statements regarding savings made pos-
sible by the discharge of stated numbers of administrative per-
sonnel.
Prnm
bDerived 11 t^tml mnnrnrikrimt;ro-to
? ?r, Pro-
each union
republic; 2) appropriations for local government agencies for
each union republic; 3) average annual wages derived in item 1+,
footnote a.
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Part Two I Political
Control The primary govern-
ment control force includes all employees of state
administration and judicial organs, from the central government
to the most remote rural soviet. Although there are wide differences
between the authority of those in the upper and lower levels of
th4- n. D 1 1 0 ?
group,car0.1 I. I will LI1U uvmuluni L raft.), t/FpdielIUS s he 'most
important-component of the USSR control force. In general, this
group does not directly control the production of goods and
services but rather exercises'overall r.nn+rril over mlm^c4 n11 types.
of economic, social, and cultural activity in the Soviet Union.
At the highest level, the central USSR authorities
have great power and prestige. They are the leaders in the
determination of policy and they tend to act without considering
the wishes or needs of peripheral areas. Although the authority
of republic and local authorities has increased considerably dur-
ing the past year and may be expected to increase further as the
decentralization movement continues, it will continue to be limited
largely to implementation of directives issued by agencies at the
USSR level.
Since 1955 there has been an estimated decrease of
122,000 in the total primary control force, reflecting the transfer
of certain controls to nongovernmental agencies and the results of
a campaign for the reduction in administrative personnel. The
number of USSR employees has decreased considerably airing the past
year, but the decrease has been almost compensated for by increases
in the number of emp1o5tees a.E.,u4on republic level. Prior cam-
paigns to reduce the number of administrative personnel have been
effective at first, but have always been followed by increases
which sometimes exceeded the reduction. It is felt, therefore,
that the long-term trend toward growth will reassert itself, and
that while some components may be reduced, the to;tal primary con-
trol force will increase as republic governments extend their
activities.
Secondary Government Control Force. The 8,856,000
members of the secondary government control force
are employees of institutions and enterprises funded through
budgetary appropriations of the USSR, union and autonomous re-
publics, oblasts, krays, okrugs, cities, and rayons. They include
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Part Two L Political
health and educational personnel and those employed in various
public service and utility activities. Although the secondary
control force has no responsibility for policy determination or
planning, it carries out the policies set by the primary control
force and also directs certain activities of a public nature.
Its influence is significant, particularly since its members in-
clude workers in the health and educational services who are
important forces in most urbanized and industrialized economies.
The economic status of this group is far less favorable than that
of members of the primary control force.
Significant changes in the subordination of the secon-
dary control force as a result of the increasing decentralization
of governmental activities have resulted in an increase in the
number of employees during the past year as the central govern-
ment has transferred the responsibility for specific functions
to lower agencies. This increase will continue as the Soviet
State becomes more consumer-oriented.
Military Control Force. The Soviet military control force
comprises the 1.71 million officers and NCOs of the USSR
army, navy, and air force (see Table 2-9). The key position of the
military is reflected in the high incidence of Party membership
in its ranks: a reported 77 per cent of the total armed forces
and 86.4 per cent of Soviet officers are members either of the
Party or of the Komsomol.
Table 2-9
THE MIL I TARY _CONTROL FORCE: 1958a
(Numbers in thousands)
Primary Secondary
Branch of Service (Officers) (NC0s) Total
Army . 325' 65 950
Navy (excluding
? Naval Air Force) 95 185 280
Air Force (including
*Naval Air Force) 200 280. Ia.
TOTAL 620 1,090 1,710
..1101=.10?Idrp,
aBased on Order of Battle information as of 'I May 1957.
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Part To
The primary control force of the military consists of the
estimated 620,000 Soviet officers. The officer corps occupies a
privileged position in Soviet society and receives special treat-
ment, such as access to normally unobtainable consumer. goods at
nominal prices. The lowest ranking Soviet officer receives abase
pay which is 13 times as great as that of a private soldier; the
pay of the highest ranking officer is more than 100 times. as. great.
The estimated 1.09 million professional NCOs comprise the.
secondary .control force. They receive substantially the same priv-
ileges, on a reduced scale, as commissioned.officers. Their base
pay ranges from 3 to 10 times greater than that of the private
soldier.
Among the branches of service,. officers and NCOs.serving
in.the air force have higher status 'than. those in the navy and army.
Within each. branch, those serving in combat units, such as air crews
and submarine service, receive preferential treatment.
211........S.GICE_Is.itrol.Fre.leMandl. The Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MVD) and Committee of State. Security (KGB) control
force totals an estimated 390,000 officers and ACO's (see Table
2-10). As members of the Soviet state security organs, they are
firmly controlled by and act as the enforcement arm of the central
apparatus of the Ctmmunist Party.. While their status and prestige
has declined' in recent years, they continue to control the only
majcir segment of Soviet society other than the armed forces with
the right to bear arms.
The primary security control force. consists of the 130,000
careerist .aficers, who. range from a member of the KGB or"secret'
police" in Moskva to a.fire departmeni chief. in a'small remote city.
Officers .of the most militarized groups command the estimated 400,000
MVD border guards-and-internal security troops, including-the convoy,
railroad, 'and 'government signal troops: Pay-differentials are even
1- IL.. 4 41ftei .nemus...A forces, .-P,C" 1 ^ 10 *
greater Limn in wv and 'officers 'as. ,sceive pri-
vileges not accorded their counterparts.in.theinilitary.. -
An estimated 260i000 NCOs constitute the secondary security
control fokce. They occupy positions comparable to the NVOs in the
armed forces but have greater prestige in the eyes of the civilian
population.
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1, Political
Table 2-10
THE MVD AND KGB CONTROL FORCE: 190
(Numbers in thousands)
Primary Secondary
Branch of Service (Officers) (NC0s) Total
Border guardsb b 20 1+0 60
Security troops 30 65 95
Militia (police)c 5'5 105? 160
Fire defense and
others _gi. 50 , ?75.
TOTAL 130 260 390
aAll figures are rough approximations.
bBased on Order of Battle information as of 1 May 1957.
Based on the assumptions that 1) the ratio of urban militia
to urban population reported in the 1926 census has remained constant;
2) there are approximately 50 militiamen in the average rural
rayon (based on information in captured German documents); and 3)
the relationship between officers, NCOs, and total militia is the
same as in the border guard and security troops.
Based on the assumption that the relationship to urban
population reported in the 1926 census has remained approximately
constant. Fire defense personnel comprise approximately 50 per
cent of total.
Among the various components of the security control force,
those serving in the KGB are the most closely screened by the Party
and are the most feared by the other sectors of the USSR control
force and the population in general. While the turnover has been
high since Beria's purge in 1953, their numbers are believed to
have remained relatively constant. Members of the militia and
fire defense services, the lowest ranking of the security organs,
recently have lost their autonomous status and have become sub-
ordinate to local organs of the civil government.
The Economic Control Force. The economic control force,
estimated to 6,061,000, equates roughly with the Soviet
"managerial' class" (see Table 2-11). Members of the economic control
force hold positions ranging from that of director of an economic
unit managing the work of a large group of factories with tens of
thousands of workers to the foreman of a labor'group on a small
collective farm. Whatever his position, however, each one controls
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Table 2-11
THE ECONOMIC CONTROL FORCE,
BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY: 1958a
(Numbers in thousands)
Political
Occupational Category Primaryb secol:.u...x.irc Total
IndustrYd d 312 2,156 2,468
constructil- )( 285 342
Agriculture 81 2,220 2130I
Transportation and
communicationse 36 97 133
Trade, procurement, and
supplyd
237 518 755
Education and public healthe 3 gi. 27
Others 6

TOTAL 732 51329 6,061
aAll estimates derived by applying pre- and post-war percent-
ages of administrative-managerial personnel of total labor force
to ARD 1958 labor force estimates.
Includes administrative staffs of economic organizations
(departments, associations, trusts, and combines) not part of
enterprises and plants. Does not include workers in institu-
tions for administration of the economy financed by the state
budget (included in the government control force category) nor
managerial personnel in enterprises or plants.
cIncludes administrative-managerial personnel in enter-
prises and plants, and collective and state farms and machine-
tractor stations.
dBased on data contained in Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSR
(Moskva, 1956) and Sovetskaya torgovlya (Moskva, 1956)7--
eBased on projections of the relationship between admin-
istrative-managerial personnel and labor force contained in
Chislennost i zarabotna a data rabochikh i sluzhashchikh v SSR
Moskva, 193 Trud v SSR Moskva 193 and E211112zy vo vtorei
stalinskoy piatletke (Moskva, 1939)1 assuming such relationships
have remained relatively constant.
.6?410.111000#
the economic activities of a number of persons. As a result, he
not only is responsible for the proper fulfillment of set plans
but also enjoys a greater reward for success than does the common
worker. As industrial and agricultural production increases in t
USSR and as new forms of economic control are developed, this
group will tend to increase in numbers and importance.
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Part Two I. Political
Primary Economic Control Force. The primary economic
control force, totaling 732,000, is responsible for
the supervision of groups of producing enter prises. Its members
are the "middlemen" between the ministries and other governmental
agencies and the actual producers. They are employed by economic
organizations (trusts, combines, associations, and departments)
which are generally organized on a geographical basis to control
activities of specific types of enterprises within a given area
(e.g., the Karaganda Coal Combine which controls a number of
trusts operating coal mines in the Karaganda fields in Kazakhstan,
or an oblast state farm trust which supervises a regionally
defined group of state farms). They receive relatively high re-
wards for their services, and by virtue of the level at which
they work are somewhat remote from the rest of the population.
Indirect evidence suggests that the centralization of policy and
planning at the USSR level tends to make this intermediate group
somewhat superfluous, and its authority is resented by those at
the plant level. However, the current plan for the decentraliza-
tion of the control of economic activity will propbably increase
the importance of the primary control force and bring about a
corresponding growth in its numbers, for, given the local
experience, it will form the nucleus of the new type of control
agency, the regional Councils of National Economy.
Secondary Economic Control Force. The estimated
5,329,000 persons who comprise the secondary economic
control force range in position from the director of the Magni-
togorsk Metallurgical Combine, with its thousands of employees, to
the foreman of a small work group on a collective farm. Theirs
is the responsibility of supervising the actual production of
goods or services and of controlling to that end the activities
of a group of workers. The closer contact between the working and
the managerial group at this level, AR contrasted With groups at
other levels, promotes frequent clashes of interest. In compari-
son with groups at lower levels, members of the secondary economic
control force receive substantial economic benefits and enjoy
A2c;ar Annacc +e% er.zrno. ^ninecamar
%OP %eV %OW; 1.011,411TV
gyvvo?
The industrialization of the Soviet economy and continued
urbanization will increase the number and significance of this group,
particularly as decentralization of some functions increases the range
of control at this level.
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Part Two L Political
2. Trends in Administration
Soviet Communist Party Secretary Nikita N. Khrushchev's
grand scheme to reduce the extreme centralization of Soviet
economic administration entered its operational phase in the early
summer of 1957. The new system, which transfers working re-
sponsibility for many spheres of industrial and construction
activity to local control, divides the USSR into 105 economic re-
gions, each supervised by a national economic council (sovnarkhoz).
It is based on proposals, made by Khrushchev in late March, modified
during a subsequent "nationwide" discussion, and enacted into law
by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 10 May and by the 15 republic Supreme
Soviets in late May and early June.
Although first presented to Soviet citizens with dramatic
suddenness in early spring, the new system of economic administra-
tion had been in the making for several months. It was foreshadowed
by a two-year Soviet campaign against the evils of overcentralization,
bureaucratic gigantism, and irrational business practices in the
Soviet economic-administrative system. in previous actions Soviet
leaders had already reduced all light industrial and some heavy in-
dustrial ministries from all-union to union-republic status, had
ordered them to divest themselves of superfluous departments and
personnel, and had attempted to transplant the offices of numerous
directorates and administrations from'Moskva to industrial and con-
struction sites throughout the country. In the course of these
two years, some 15,000 separate enterprises were transferred to
republic jurisdiction.
The policy suffered a fleeting setback in December 1956 when
a plenary session of the Party Central Committee called for measures
"to ensure a further extension of? the powere of ministries, chief
directorates of ministries, soviets, and economic enterprises" in
the name of "eliminating excessive centralization in management.,"
But the crisis passed quickly, and two months later the February
(1957) Plenum of the Central Committee demanded a reorganization
of industrial and construction administration "according to the
territorial principle on the basis of definite economic eegions."
Even then the scope of the proposed reform was not apparent; ii
did not become apparent until late March when Khrushchev outlined
his grand plan to scrap the existing functional, or ministerial,
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Part Two 1. Political
approach to economic management and to return to the territorial-
production system which had dominated Soviet economic management
during the 1920s. Although certain of Khrushchev's specific re-
commendations were abandoned in the subsequent legal enactments,
there was no effective challenge to the main princiOles he pro-i
pounded. The consequence was abolition of many functional economic
ministries, the removal of direct significant managerial functions
from All but two of the remaining industrial ministries (Medium
Machine Building and Transport Construction), and the delegation
of responsibility for industrial and construction work to sovnarkhozy
in each of 105 economic regions.
The entrance of Khrushchev's new system into operation on
1 July marked the opening of a third major phase of organizational
development in the Soviet scheme of indus'tr'ial management. During
the earliest period of Soviet rule, while Lenin's personality still
dominated and shaped the attitudes of the Communist Party's lead-
ing economic thinkers, the concept prevailed of large regional in-
dustrial conglomerates. These attitudes were Ixpressed organiza-
tionally and territorially in the formation of10-ge economic regions
whose productive activity was arranged and coordinated by regional
councils of national economy. Central direction and coordination
were achieved througha Supreme Council of National Economy (VSNKh),
which at the height of its authority during the period of War Commu-
nism (191'7120), acted as a central state institution for the general
administration of all nationalized industry in the Soviet state.
Although initially the authority of the VSNKh was ills-defined,
it had by mid-1918 assumed control of industrial activity, with
special emphasis on fulfillment of military orders for the Red Army.
On the basis of this authority, it was able by year's end to abolish
the principle of local supervision of industry and to introduce
strict centalization. The largest and most important industries
were' subordinated directly to agencies of the VSNKII; medium-size
enterprises were jointly subordinated to VSNKh and local economic
councils, and only small enterprises fell under local jurisdiction.
After the New Economic Policy was adopted in 1921, the power
of the VSNKh began? to decline. Industrial financing passed into
the hands of the State Bank (Gosbank) in 1921, and denationalized
industries fell outside the system of industrial control. In that
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Part Two I. Political
year, too, the Soviet government organized 22;478 trusts but placed
only 133 of them under VSNKh jurisdiction. The remainder were as-
signed to local economic councils and other agencies. Further re-
organizations in 1923 and 1926 affirmed the competence of the VSNKh
(1) to direct policy and to frame legislation for industry as a
whole, and (2) to administer state industry. But the XVI Party
conference, meeting in 1929, stripped the agency of the former func-
,
tion and transformed it into an "organ of the actual technical ad-
ministration of industry." The VSNKh continued in this role, con-
ducting its operations through combines and trusts which in turn
directed entire branches of industry, until 1932 when it was finally
reorganized out of existence. In its place, the central government
formed three industrial commissariats (ministries): the People's
Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the People's Commissariat of Light
Industry, and the People's Commisariat of the Timber and Woodwork-
ing Industry. The era of industrial functionalism at the ministerial
level--of creating commissariats which governed the activities of
individual and increasingly specialized branches of industry--had
opened.
, The years 1914-37 witnessed a short-lived attempt to revive
the territorial-production principle. Criticisms of industrial
management at the XVII Party Congress in 1934 led to the formation
within commissariats of a number of chief directorates which ad-
ministrated their own branches of the conomy within defined territor-
ial limits. Operative industrial agencies, however, continued to
exist within ministries, and the miOstries themselves remained
organized along functional lines. Ai industrial production became
increasingly specialized during the Second and Third Five-Year Plans
there occurred not only a further narrowing of the competences of
the economic commissariats and their division into a large number
of specialized commissariats but a proliferation of independent
chief directorates. By 1940 industrial administration had already
passed to the hands of commissariats and to scores of chief
directorates. The Soviet Union's entrance into World War II in-
terrupted but did not halt the trend; and in the early postwar years
it was resumed with full vigor. A peak was reached in 1947 when
59 individual all-union and union-republic ministries, 50 of which
directed various aspects of Soviet economic life, were simultaneously
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Part Two I. Political
in being, A wave of economy led to the abolition or consolidation
of 12 ministries in 1948 and 1949; but it passed and the process
of ministerial atomization continued.
, Stalin's passing momentarily reversed the trend. His
anxious legatees, doubtless fearing the worst, moved quickly to
consolidate their positions. On 7 March two days after Stalin died,
Soviet leaders by merger and consolidation reduced the number of
ministries from 60 to 25. However, the unwieldiness of the new
administrative structure 'soon led to a new division of ministries.
By April 1954 the number of ministries had increased to 46, and in
1956 it had reached 52. Despite this new multiplication of functional
administrative agencies. Khrushchev's rise to eminence in the Soviet
leadership group brought with it an attack of mounting intensity
against the rigidities and inefficiencies of the ministerial system
of industrial administration. The basic themes were epitomized in
a three-count indictment with which Krushchev in March 1957 pre-
faced the revelation of his plan to cupplant the existing_industrial
ministries with a system of territorially organized economic councils.
The most damaging point of-the indictment was Khrushchev's hint of
a rising trend toward ministerial autarky. lnduirial ministries,
he complained, "often seek to manufacture [for themselves] every-
thing they need," and erect departmental barriers which "disturb.
normal economic connecti-ons between enterprises of different branches
of industry" located within the same territorial unit. This system,
he declared, had encouraged the growth of irrational construction,
egocentric tendencies in ministerial planning, and ineffective
utilization of the nation's industrial and manpower. resources. -
in addition to such tendencies as these, Khrushchev argued,
the ministerial system had promoted a growing isolation of manage-
ment from production. Not only were numerous directing agencies in
Moskva located physically at great distances from the sites of
production, but the ministries and their departments had also failed
to make rational use of specialists and local nadrAs in the guidance
of industry and construction. As his third point Khrushchev again
singled out the Soviet Union's huge and growing bureaucratic machine
for criticism and repeated his frequent demand for a reduction and
simplification of the entire managerial apparatus.
For Khrushchev's purposes, these faults constituted REL.%
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Part Two I. Political
facie evidence of the inability of the existing economic-adminis-
trative system--and the functional principle upon which it was based
--to meet the requirements of future Soviet economic development.
In that it had created a "powerful technical and material base,
specialists, mature managers, and a large labor force," 'the system
had served its purpose. But, he argued, it had also created
"favorable conditions" and the need to return to the territorial
principle in economic management.
While Khrushchev's plans were presented to the public with
the imperator of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union and the USSR Council of Ministers after a discus-
sion which reportedly lasted for four Months, it was apparent that
considerable disagreement existed as to details and fundamental
principles. In his presentation Khrushchev pointedly referred to
'certain Comrades'lwho had attempted to obstruct Party approval
of the plan, and during the nationwide discussion of the plan, not
a single prominent member of the "Stalinist" 'old guard lent public
support to the reorganization proposal. In the provinces there
appeared contending groups which vigorously debated the detils--
although not the principles--of the planned reorganization. By
May, the opposition was ready to contest openly the principles of
the plan itself. At the USSR Supreme Soviet Meeting two nonpolitic-
al specialists presented arguments for the preservation of the in-
dustrial ministries and continued centralization of economic manage-
ment, complaining that the "dismemberment [of industry] on a regional
principle'( contradicted the economic experience of the most advanced
industrial countries and that the dispersal of engineering and tech-
nical experience could result in grave setbacks to the' continued
progress of Soviet industry. Faced with the opposition of at least
some of his colleagues in the Presidium of the Party and the Argu-
ments of prominent experts, Khrushchev hedged.
In his own report to the Supreme Soviet Khrushchev t'-etreated
somewhat from his earlier stand, leaving some of his supporters
1When the sequel was played out before the June (1957) Plenum
of the Central Committee of the Party, Kaganovich, Molotov, and
Malenkov were purged as leaders of an !"anti-Party" group which
had, among other misdeeds, "persistently opposed and sought to
frustrate the reorganization of industrial management.
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Part Two
from the hustings in exposed positions. While his earlier state-
ments implied abolition of most, if not all, industrial ministries,
at both union and republic levels, he now admitted the need to re-
tain eight key industrial ministries connected with national de-
fense, but insisted that all but two of them, the ministries of
Medium Machine Building and Transport Construction, be stripped of
most of their managerial functions. And he further agreed to allow
republic Supreme Soviets to determine for themselves whether to
retain certain industrial ministries at the republic level. In its
legislative enactments, the USSR Supreme Soviet promptly abolished
25 industrial and construction ministries and ordered their enter-
prises transferred to the jurisdiction of appropriate sovnarkhozy.
Two other ministries were merged out of existence, and eix of the
eight remaining economic ministries were divested of operational
control over industrial enterprises and trantformed into planning
and coordinating organizations (see Figure 2-1).
In the republics, similar scenes were enacted at Supreme
Soviet sessions in late May and early June. The RSFSR Supreme
Soviet abolished eight union-republic and two republic industrial
ministries and reduced two from union-republic to republic status
(see Figure 2-2). The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet abolished eleven
union-republic-and two republic ministries and reduced one ministry
from union-republic to republic status The Latvian Supreme Soviet
liquidated six union-republic ministrieb, merged the republic
ministries of Municipal Economy and Fuel and Local Industry into
a single republic ministry of Municipal and Local Economy, and re-
designated an enlarged republic ministry of the Timber Industry as
the republic ministry of the Foresfry and Timber Industry. The
reorganization of industrial administration followed similar lines
in the other republics (see Figure 2-3).
Khurshchev's plans for the organization of the sovnarkhozy
and the establishment of a new system of territorial economic ad-
ministration underwent a somewhat similar metamorphosis in the
period between March and July. Even when the March theses were
published, a plan for the territorial and administrative organ-
ization of the proposed new system had apparently been under dis-
cussion for several months at high Party and governmeOt levels.
And as subsequent developments seemed to indicate, it had been
30
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1
1
1
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Figure 2-1
April 1956
Chairman
First Deputy Chairmen
Deputy Chairmen
Chairmen of following agencies:
Board of the State Bank
Committee of State Security
State Committee for Construction
and Architectual Affairs
State Committee on New Technology
State Committee on Long-Range
Planning of the National Economy
State Economic Commission on Current
Planning of the National Economy
State Committee on the Question of
Labor and Wages
All-Union Ministers of:
Agricultural Procurement
Automobile Industry
Aviation Industry
Chemical Industry
Construction and Road-Machine
Building
Construction of Electric Power
Stations
Electric Power Stations
Construction of Enterprises
of Coal Industry
Construction of Enterprises
of Petroleum Industry
Defehse Industry
General Machine-Building
Foreign Trade
Heavy Machine-Building
Machine-Building
Machine Tools and
Instruments Building
July 19P
Chairman
First Deputy Chairmen
Deputy Chairmen
Chairmen of following agencies:
Board of the State Bank
Committee of State Security
State Committee on Construction
Committee for State Control
State Planning Commission
Central Statistical
Administration
State Scientific-Technical
Committee
Republic Councils of Ministers
(ex officio)
All-Union Ministers of:
AviationIndustry
Chemical Industry
Electric Power Stations
Defense industry
Foreign Trade
ItinimminimmiJ_De 31'
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Figure 2-1 (continued)
April 1916_
? Medium Machine-Building
Maritime Fleet
Production of Instruments and
Means of Automation
Radio-Technical Industry
River Fleet
Shipbuilding Industry
Tractor and Agricultural
Machine Building Industry
Transportation
Transport Construction
Transport Machine=gBuilding
Union-Republic Ministers of:
Agriculture
State Farms
Automotive Transport and Highways
Building Materials Industry
Coal Industry
Communications
Construction
Construction of Enterprises of
Metallurgical and Chemical Industry
Culture
Defense
Ferrous Metallurgy
Finance
Fishing Industry
Food Products Industry
Foreign AffairQ
Geology and Protection of
Mineral Resources
Higher Education (
Internal Affairs
Justice
Light Industry
Meat and Dairy Products Industry
Non-Ferrous Metallurgy
Paper and Wood-Processing Industry
Petroleum Industry
Public Health
State Control
Textile Industry
Timber Industry
Trade
Urban and Rural Construction
32
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1%1
Medium Machine-Building
Maritime Fleet
Radio-Technical Industry
Shipbuilding ,riclustry
Transportation'
Transport Construction
Union-Republic Ministers of:
Agriculture
Communications
Culture
Defense
'Finance
Foreign Affairs
Geology and Protection of
Mineral Resources
Higher Education
Internal Affairs
Public Health
Trade
Grain Products
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Figure 2-2
REORGANIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN SFSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
April 1956
Chairman
Deputy Chairmen of
Committee of State Security
State Committee for Construction
and Architectural Affairs
State Planning Commission
Union-Republic Ministers of:
Agriculture
Automotive Transport and
Highways
Building Materials Industry
Communications
Culture
Defense
Finance
Fishing Industry
Foreign Affairs
Internal Affairs
Justice
Light Industry
Meat and Dairy Products Industry
Public Health
State Control
State Farms
Textile Industry
Timber Industry
Trade
Urban and Rural Construction
Republic Ministers of:
Education
Local Fuel Industry
Local Industry
Municipal Economy
Social Security
33
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July 1957
Chairman
First Deputy Chairmen
Deputy Chairmen of
Committee of State Security
State Planning Commission
Union-Republic Ministers of:
Agriculture
Communications
Culture
Defense
Finance
Foreign Affairs
Internal Affairs
Public Health
State Control
Trade
Grain Products
Republic Ministers of:
Education
Municipal Economy
Social Setu6ty
Automotive Transport and Roads
Construction
Justice
Paper and Wooci-Processing
Industry
River Fleet
Timber Industry
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Figure 2-3
ORGANIZATION OF REPUBLICAN COUNCILS OF MINISTERS
IN THE USSR: 1957a
Chairman
First Deputy Chairmen
Deputy Chairmen
Chairmen of:
Committee for Construction and
Architectural Affairs
Committee of State Security
Council of Ministers of ASSRs
Scientific-Technioal Committee
Sovnarkhozy
Slate Planning Commission
Union-Republic Ministers of:
Agriculture
Communications
Culture
Defense
Finance
Foreign Affairs
Grain Products
Higher Education
Internal Affairs
Public Health
State Control
Trade
Republic Ministers of:
Automobile Transport
and Roads
Building Materials Industry
Armyanskaya SSR
Be 1 orusskaya ssk
Es tons kaya SSR
1Gruzinskaya SSR -1
lkir2izskaya SSR
1RSFSR
rUkrainskaya SSR
aauaua
II
MI
EIHEMME101111x
Mix
x
x
1:11:11x
1:11 x 11111111x
Clx
Mix
El
PIPIPINIFINIIMIPPIPIPIPIN
I
I
I IIIIII
?innuma
NI
tin
1111
111111FIFIFIMPIPIPIPUIPIPIPI
III
11
ill
Pill
tnenimeni
x ""Px
IIx

x
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kol
x MI
Egg
xP
X)IXXXIXXXIXXX
E3
111 x Clel
x
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x ell
xxxx
xx
x x
x
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tilX
x:
xx
xx
xxx
XXX
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1 1
XXXXXIIIX
1
XX
X
X
XXX
X
X
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?lllIlIlIlUUIx
ilium xx
I
xx
xx
2:
x
xx
xx

x
INN xxix
NI
x
x
ii in
mixxxxxi
RI 111111i
x
x x
111
aX indicates mandatory inclusion of offic-holder in Republic Council
of Ministers. P indicates inclusion of office-holder in Republic Council
of Ministers at the discretion of the appropriate council.
34-
1
1
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Figure 2-3 (continued)
Construction
Education
Forestry and Timber Industry
Geology and Protection
of Mineral Resources
Justice
Local Economy
Local Industry
Melioration
Municipal and Local Economy
Municipal Economy
Petroleum Industry
Paper and Wood-Processing
Industry
River Fleet
Social Security
Timber Industry
Water Economy
Chief Directorate for
Construction
35
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[Armyanskaya SSR
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR I
Be I orusskay& ssk
Estonskiwa SSR
Gruzinskaya SSR
Kazakhskaya SSR
Kir2izskaya SSR
Laiviyskaya SSR
Li toyskaya SSR
L_Moidaysk'aya SSR I
fr-T?F'SR
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Turkmenska;ia SSR
Ukrainskaya SSR
Uzbekskaya SSR
4
X X
XXXX
XX XX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
I I,
X
p I .
X X
3:4nX
X X
X
LX
X'
X i 'X X X
X
X
,
wX
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X
P.
X
X
AA
X X
X X
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t
, n
X
A
r
X
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X,
X X
X
X
I
X X X
A
X
.
1
f
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
Part Two I. Political
drawn up in considerable detail. But the theses limned only its
main outlines. Three principles, nevertheless, emerged as decisive
in the creation of the forthcoming arrangement of economic-territor-
ial units:
1. Economic regions would be based primarily upon the country's
largest industrial centers or upon foci of projected large-scale
industrial investment;
2. Despite the absence of industrial bases--and largely for lack
of a suitable alternative?remote and territorially sr
di -0-
erbed arect
would be organized as separate economic regions; and
3. The boundaries of existing political-administrative divisions
at oblast or superior levels would generally be respected.
Khrushchev's report stipulated no specific number of econom-
ic regions, but it appeared from his explanation that most of the
regions would consist either of entire republics or of oblast con-
glomerates in the largest andf-economically strongest republics.
During the subsequent public discussion, the number cited rose
from 50 to 70. And Khrushchev recommended 92--presumably 68 in the
RSFSR, 11 in the Ukraine, and one each in the remaining 13 repub-
lics--in his report to the USSR Supreme Soviet in May. At the
meetings of the republic Supreme Soviets which followed enactment
of the new system into law at the USSR level, the number was raised
to 105. The RSFSR increased the number of its economic administra-
tive regions from 68 to 701; the Kazakh Supreme Soviet organized
9 regions, and the Uzbek body created four. Of the total 105 eco-
nomic regions which thus emerged from the reform, one encompassed
a single city (Moskva), 77 embraced single oblasts or equivalent
administrative-territorial units (autonomous ()blasts or autonomous
soviet socialist republics), 16 were composed of more than one
Oblast, and 11 comprised entire union republics (see Figure 2-4).
In no case was the territorial integrity of an oblast or superior
territorial administrative unit compromised.
According to the new economic order, the sovnarkhozy, or-
ganized in each of the 105 economic regions, act as the basic
1 No economic council was organized in the Tuvinskaya
Autonomous Oblast, making Tuva the only ritgion of the USSR which
does not participate in the new organization of industry and
construction.
36
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Figure 2-14
DISTRIBUTION OF SOVNARKHOZY (REGIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCILS)
BY ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL DIVISION:
1957
Regional Seat of
Economib Council Administration,
RSFSR
Northern Economic Region (old)
Arkhangelskiy Arkhangelsk
Komi Syktyvkar
Vologodskiy Vologda
Northwest Economic Region (old)
Leningradskiy Leningrad
Kalininskiy
Murmanskiy
Karelskiy
Central Economic Region
Balashovskiy
Belgorodskiy
Bryanskiy
Chuvashskiy
Gorkovskiy
lvanovskiy
Kalininskiy
Kaluzhskiy
Kirovskiy
Kostromskiy
Kurskiy
Lipetskiy
Mar iyskiy
Moskovskiy (oblast)
Moskovskiy (city)
Mordovskiy
Orlovskiy
Penzenskiy
Ryazanskiy
Smolenskiy
Tambovskiy
Tulskiy
Viadimirskiy
Voronezhskiy
Yaroslavskiy
Kaliningrad
Murmansk
Petrozavodsk
(old)
Balashov
Belgorod
Bryansk
Cheboksary
Gorkiy
Ivanovo
Kalinin
Kaluga
Kirov
Kostroma
Kursk
Lipetsk
Yoshkar-Ola
Moskva
Moskva
Saransk
Orel
Penza
Ryazan
SMolensk
Tambov
Tula
Vladimir
Voronezh
Yaroslavl
Volga Economic Region (old)
Astrakhanskiy Astrakhan
Kuybyshevskiy Kuybyshev
Saratovskiy Saratov
Stalingradskiy Stalingrad
37
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Administrative-Territorial
Division
Arkhangelskaya 0
Komi ASSR
Vologodskaya 0
Leningradskaya, Novgorod-
skaya, Pskovskaya 0
Kalininskaya 0
MOrmanskaya 0
Karelskaya'ASSR
Balashovskaya 0
Belgorodskaya 0
Bryanskaya 0
Chuvashskaya ASSR
Gorkovskaya 0
lvanovskaya 0
Kalininskaya 0, Velikoluk
skaya 0
Kaluzhskaya 0
Kirovskaya 0
Kostromskaya 0
Kurskaya 0
Lipetskaya 0
Mar iyskaya ASSR
Moskovskaya 0
Moskva
Mordovskaya ASSR
Orlovskaya 0
Penzenskaya 0
Ryazanskaya 0
Smolenskaya 0
Tambovskaya 0
Tulskaya 0
Vladimirskaya 0
Voronezhskaya 0
Yaroslavskaya 0
Astrakhanskaya 0
Kuybyshevskaya 0
Saratovskaya 0
Stalingradskaya 0
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Table 2-4 (continued)
? Regional
Economic Co9ncil
Tatarskiy
Ulyanovskiy
North Caucasus Economic
Checheno-Ingushskiy
Dagestanskiy
Kabardinskiy
Kamenskiy
Krasnodarskiy
Rostovskiy
Severo-Osetinskiy
Stavropolskiy
SECRET
Seat of
Administration
Kazan
Ulyanovsk
Region (old)
Groznyy
Makhachkala
Nalchik
Shakhty
Krasnodar
nuts '..vv'
Ordzhonikidze
Stavropol
Urals Economic Region (old)
Bashkirskiy Ufa
Chelyabinskiy Chelyabinsk
Chkalovskiy Chkalov
Molotovskiy (Permskiy) Molotov
Sverdlovskiy Sverdlovsk
Udmurtskiy lzhevsk
West Siberian Economic
Altayskiy
Kemerovskiy
Kurganskiy
Novosibirskiy
Omskiy
Tyumenskiy
Tomskiy
East Siberian Economic
Buryat-Mongolskiy
Chit inskiy
Irkutskiy
Krasnoyarskiy
Yakutskiy
Far East Economic
Amurskiy
Kamchatskiy
Khabarovskiy
Magadanskiy
Primorskiy
Sakhalinskiy
Region (old)
Barnaul
Kemerovo
Kurgan
Novosibirsk
Omsk
Tyumen
Tomsk
Region (old)
Ulan-Ude
Chita
Irkutsk
Krasnoyarsk
Yakutsk
Administrative-Territorial
Division
Tatarskaya ASSR
Ulyanovskaya 0
Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR
Dagestanskaya ASSR
Kabardinskaya ASSR
Kamenskaya 0
Krasnodarskiy
RnstelvAkaya 0
Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR
Stavropolskiy Kray
Bashkirskaya ASSR
Chelyabinskaya 0
Chkalovskaya 0
Molotovskaya (Permskaya 0)
Sverdlovskaya 0
Udmurtskaya ASSR
Altayskiy Kray
Kemerovskaya 0
Kurganskaya 0
Novosibirskaya 0
Omskaya 0
Tyumenskaya 0
Tomskaya 0
Buryat-Mongolskaya ASSR
Chit inskaya 0
Irkutskaya 0
Krasnoyarskiy Kray
Yakutskaya ASSR
Region (old)
Blagoveshchensk Amurskaya 0
Petropavlovsk Kamchatskaya 0
Khabarovsk Khabarovskiy Kray
Magadan Magadanskaya 0
Vladivostok Primorskiy Kray
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Sakhalinskaya 0
Southern Economic Region (old)
Ukrainskaya SSR
Dnepropetrovskiy
Kharkovskiy
Dnepropetrovsk
Kharkov
Khersonskiy Kherson
Kiyevskiy Kiyev
38
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Dnepropeirovskaya 0
Kharkovskaya, Poltavskaya,
Sums kaya 0
Khersonskaya, Krymskaya,
Nikolayev'skaya 0
Kiyevskaya, Cherkasskaya,
Chernigovskaya, Kirovograd-
skaya, Zhitomirskaya 0
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Figure 2-+ (continued)
Regional
Economic Council
Lvovskiy
Odesskiy
Stalinskiy
Stanislavskiy
Vinnitskiy
Voroshilovgradskiy
Zaporozhskiy
Moldavskaya SSR
Moldavskiy
Baltic Economic Region
Belorusskiy
Estonskiy
Latviyskiy
Litovskiy
SECRET
Seat of
Administration
Lvov
Odessa
Stalino
Slanislav
Vinnitsa
Voroshilovgrad
Zaporozhe
Kishinev
(old)
Minsk
Tallin
Riga
Vilnyus
Transcaucasian Economic Region (old)
Yerevan
Baku
Tbilisi
Armyanskiy
Azerbaydzhanskiy
Gruzinskiy
Central Asiatic and
Kazakhskaya SSR
Aktyubinskiy
Alma4tinkiy
Guryevskiy
Karagandinskiy
Kokchetavskiy
Kustanayskiy
Semipalatinskiy
Vostochno-
Kazakhstanskiy Ust-Kamenogorsk
Yuzhno-Kazakhstanskiy Chimkent
Kazakh Economic
Aktyubinsk
Alma Ala
Guryev
Karaganda
Kokchetav
Administrative-Territorial
Division
Lvovskaya, Rovenskaya, Tern-
opolskaya, Volynskaya 0
Odesskaya 0
Stalinskaya 0
Stanislavskaya, Chernovit-
skaya, Drogobychskaya,
Zakarpatskaya 0
Vinnitskaya, Khmelnitskaya 0
Voroshilovgradskaya 0
Zaporozhskaya 0
Moidavskaya SSR
Belorusskaya SSR
Estonskaya SSR
Latviyskaya SSR
Litovskaya SSR
Armyanskaya SSR
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR
Gruzinskaya SSR
Region (old)
Aktyubinskaya, Zapadno-
Kazakhstanskaya 0
Alma-Atinskaya, Dzhambul-
skaya, Taldy-Kurganskaya 0
Guryevskaya 0
Karagandinskaya, Akmolin-
skaya, Pavlodarskaya 0
Kokchetavskaya, Severo-
Kazakhstanskaya 0
Kustanayskaya 0
Semipalatinskaya 0
Vostochno-Kazakhstanskaya 0
Yuzhno-Kazakhstanskaya,
Kzyl-Ordinskaya 0
Kirgizskaya SSR
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Turkmenskaya SSR
Kokand Ferganskaya, Andizhanskaya,
Namanganskaya 0
Kara-Kalpakskaya ASSR,.
Khorezmskaya 0
Samarkandskaya, Bukharskaya,
Kashka-Darinskaya, Surkhan-
Darinskaya 0
Tashkentskaya 0
Kustanay
Semipalatinsk
Kirgizskaya SSR
Kirgizskiy
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Tadzhikskiy
Turkmenskaya SSR
Turkmenskiy
Uzbekskaya SSR
Ferganskiy
Kara-Kalpakskiy
SamarkandslOy
Tashkentskiy
Frunze
Stalinabad
Ashkhabad
Fergana or
Nukus
Samarkand
Tashkent
39
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Part Two I. Political
agencies of Soviet economic administration in their areas. For all
industrial and construction enterprises of greater than local sig-
nificance within their areas (and according to Soviet reports this
accounts for 70 to 80 per cent of the total industrial production
of each area) they function as supreme administrative, coordinating
and planning agencies. For the USSR as a whole, the sovnarkhozy
control enterprises producing three-fourths of the total volume of
industrial output. They control the entire production of iron,
metallurgical equipment; steam and gas turbines, and automobiles.
Their administration covers enterprises supplying nearly all
steel, rolled ferrous metals, oil, mineral fertilizers and cement,
98 per cent of coal, 97 per cent of textiles, and more than 80 per
cent of leather goods and footwear (for production data on selected
sovnarkhozy, see Table A-3, Appendix). Moat of the remaining en-
terprises which produce the other 25 per cent of the USSRs indus-
trial output have been placed under the jurisdiction of local
executive committees. However, certain plants, whose production
is deemed vital to the national defense and which were named in
a secret list prepared by the USSR Council of Ministers, remain
under direct central administration. Within the framework of gen-
eral decisions, taken at higher levels, the sovnarkhozy have Te-
sponsibility for elaborating and thmplementing long-range and current
production plans, for promoting industrial specialization within
their regions, for arranging deliveries of raw materials and semi-
finished products within and between regions, and for determining
the financial and economic activities of subordinate agencies
(economic organizations, trusts, combines, and branch administra-
tions).
The March theses did not spell out the organizational
format through which these responsibilities would be discharged,
but later proposals, advanced by prominent members of the
Khrushchev team, laid bare the main organizational forms. These
were later standardized and confirmed by the USSR Supreme Soviet
and by appropriate republic Supreme Soviets. Although each of the
organizational schemes differs from the others in detail, an obvious
concession to regional economic peculiarities, all of them manifest
remarkable similarities. Each sovnarkhoz consists of a chairman,
deputy chairman, and members. Special technical-economic committees,
40
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Part Two I. Political
as well as research and experimental institutes and designing bu-
reaus, appear as advisory bodies attached directly to the sovnarkhozy.
Below the central apparatus of the sovnarkhozy are ranged a series
of functional and industrial branch administrations and trusts.
Where warranted, thepe agencies have also established their own
research institutes and designing bureaus and, according to Khrushchev,
will enjoy the right of operating on a self-sustaining basis (see
Figure 2-5). In their administrative capacity, they are charged
with direct control of the nation's factories and productive enter-
prises.
Direct supervision and controi of the activities of the
sovnarkhozy themselves will, according io the established Soviet
principle of dual subordination, be exercised both by the govern-
ments of the union republics and by the government of the USSR.
Territorial-administrative units below the republic level (oblasts,
krays, ASSRs, etc. ) which are located within economic regions
have the right to be informed of the activities of the sovnarkhozy,
but they exercise no jurisdiction over them. At the republic level,
supervision is exercised both through the formal system of subordina-
tion and through the appointment of chairmen (and in some cases,
members) of the sovnarkhozy as members of the republic councils of
ministers (see Figure 2-6).
This system of control appears to be an outgrowth of Khrushchev's
proposals for changes in the organization of the USSR Council of
Ministers which faces on a larger scale the same problem of co-
ordination and supervision. In his theses, Khrushchev indicated
three direct avenues of control and accountancy over the subordin-
ate economic agencies, and all three proposals'were' subsequently
enacted into law. One was a suggestion that the chairmen of the
15 inion'republic Councils of Ministers be admitted to the USSR
Council of Ministersias ex-officio members, a situation which would
make them immediately and directly accountable to the central govern-
ment for economic activities within their? republics. Khrushchev
proposed further that the head of the State Statistical Board,
which will have sole charge of statistical accounting in the USSR,
also be seated on the Council. And he argued lastly for admission
to the Council not only of the Chairman of the State Planning
Commission (Gosplan) but the vice chairmen and heads of the most
4-1
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Planning
& Economic
Metallurgical,
Chemical
Industries
Enterprises
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MINIM
ORGANIZATION OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL ECONOMY (SOUNARKHOZ)
OF THE GRUZINSKAYA SSR
FUNCTIONAL DEPARTMENTS
Industrial
& Technical
Electric
Power
Industry
Enterprises
Capital Construction
BRANCH ADMINISTRATIONS
Machine
Building
Electra-
Technical
industries
Enterprises
Coal & Mining
Industry
Enterprises
Chairman
5 Deputy Chairmen
II Members
Labor 81 Wage
Building
Materials
Industry
Enterprises
Cadres a Schools
Timber
Industry
Enterprises
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Textile
Industry
Figure 2- 5
Technical-Economic Committee
FUNCTIONAL ? DEPARTMENTS
Central
Accountancy
Finances
BRANCH ADMINISTRATIONS
Light
Industry
Enterprises
Enterprises
Meat &Dal y
Products,
Flub industry
[Enterprises
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First Department
Food
Products
Industry
Enterprises
Administrative
a Economic
Material
Technical
Supply aSales
Administration
Depots
Transportation
Administration
Motor Pools
Repair Shops.
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INDUSTRIAL SUBORDINATION IN THE USSR, 1957
Gospian
ALL- UNION INDUSTRIAL MINISTRIES
USSR Council
of Ministers
Transport
Construction
Enterprise
Medium
Machine
Building
Enterprise
Defense
Industry
Aircraft
Industry
Ship Building
Scientif i? -
Technical
Committee
???????????
Gosplan
Machine Building
Electric Power
Radio Technical
Chemical Industry
Republic Council
of Ministers
Scientific- Technical
Committee
Ministry
LARGE- SCALE INDUSTRY
Council
of National
Economy
(Sovnarkhoz)
Sovnarkhoz
Branch
Administration
Branch
Administration
Defense
Plant
Aircraft
Factory
Enterprise
Functional
Administration
Figure 2 - 6
UNION - REPUBLIC MINISTRIES
Ministry
Ministry
Scientific- Technical
Committee
LOC AL INDUSTRY
Oblast
Executive
Committee
{Oblast
Executive
Committee
ASSR
Council of
Ministers
Rayon
Executive
Committee
Rayon
Executive
Committee
Rayon
Executive
Committee
L_
nteripri se
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Enterprise
Ministry Ministry
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SE C RE T
Part Two I. PoliticAl
important divisions of that agency. Since these persons (who will
enjoy ministerial rank) are in many cases the former directors of
liquidated industrial ministries, their entrance into the Council
of Ministers has created within the Council what amounts to a sub
council of individuals who have long been associated with the prob-
lems of economic planning, control, and management,
Aside from its direct association with ministerial control
of industrial development, the enhanced status of Gosplan accords
With that body's expected rise in importance both as a planning
and coordinating agency and as an indirect agent of central control
over the activities of local economic councils. As in the past
Gosplan is destined to play its chief role in the sphere of plan-
ning. It will continue to draft integrated national economic
plans on the basis both of the national economic interest as
defined by leading Party and governmental bodies and of economic
pians drawn up at subordinate levels by economic councils and re-
public Gosplans. Its plans, Khrushchev pointed out, must envisage
a proper and rational distribution of the Soviet Union's productive
forces, regional industrial specialization, the establishment of
economic bonds between regions, and the integrated development of
economic areas in terms both of current productive possibilities
and of future national economic requirements
In the Khrushchev view, Gosplan's capacity to plan also
provides a rationale for a broadening of its powers and operative
functions. If Gosplan constructs a national plan, he argued in
his theses, it must have the'responsibility for the fulfillment of
that plan. If its plans provide for interregional deliveries of
goodsand services, it must exer6se "control over the strict
observance of state discipline" regarding such deliveries. If its
task is the promotion through planning 'of 'a unified national economy,
it must be empowered to "nip in the bud" every tendency toward the
development of regional autarkie4.
The precise form .which such powers would ultimately take
remained an open question in midsummer 1957. The reorganization
law, enacted at the May session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, charged
the USSR-Gosplan with responsibility to conduct thorough studies
of the needs of the national economy, to elaborate current and
long-range eopnomic plans, to ensure the proper distribution of
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Part Two j_,. Poiitic
production forces throughout the country, and to plan the distribu-
tion of material and technical supplies on a nation-wide scale.
But neither the March theses, the ensuing newspaper discussion of
Gosplan's role, nor the reorganization law made provision for Gos-
plan inspection of economic activities at the local level; and the
theses specifically denied the agency the right to interfere in the
administrative management of the economic administrative areas.
At the USSR level its sole coercive weapon remained its right "6
submit major questions for consideration" to the USSR Council of
Ministers and the Central Committee of the Communtsf Party.
The subsequent discussion of Gosplan's role in the RSFSR
and the Ukrainian ,SSR provides a somewhat greater degree of enlighten-
ment. At the Fourth Session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, Yasnov
declared not only that the RSFSR Gosplan must supervise continually
the fulfillment of state plans but that it must "take operative
measures" through the sovnarkhozy and ministries "to overcome any
lag revealed in individual economic administrative regions or branches.
Independently and with complete responsibility for matters entivsted
[to it]," he pointed out, "the Gosplan of the RSFSR must solve opera-
tional questions linked with guaranteeing fulfillment of the state
plan.q To solve at least one part of the problem of supervision
at the operative level, the Ukrainian government organized under
the republic Gosplan three specialized supply departments for the
purpose of achieving ta "unified system of material-technicil supply"
fbr enterprises and building sites. According to the plan) these
three departments-6-raw materials and materials, equipment, and supply
organization and the control of material resources utilizaiion--
exercise control over 18 republic supply-distribution administrations
whit+ in turn allocate moierials imported from other union-republics
and export goods to other republics according to the national economic
plan.
, Although many details of the new economic dispensation re-
mained clouded in the summer of 1957, the legislative enactments
of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the republic Supreme Soviets drew
the main outlines of the 8oviet Union's new system of economic
management. Despite Khrushchev's emphasis upon decentralization,
it was clear that the newisystem was aimed at increasing the effec-
,
tiveness -of centralized.domination of. the.USSR economy. . In this
it spelled a return to the. Leninist principle that centralism is
best realized through an organizational system which features
45
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SE C R,E T
Part Two Fr Polittcal
centralization of the decision-making process and decentralization
of the execution of decisions. The removal of agencies, involved
directly in production, from the center will certainly relieve
the top leadership of much of the welter of administrative detail
which has tended in the past to obscure and to obfuscate their
participation in the crucial processes of rational policy forma-
tion at the national level. At the same time, the retention of
eight all-union ministries, involved in defense and defense-related
production, will continue to afford the central authorities a direct
channel of supervision and control over many of the most critical
branches of industry. Moreover, the crucial features of central-
ized control--centralized planning, ttle allocation of fixed and
working capital, centralized price fixing, and control over distribu-
tion--have been strengthened and reinforced.
At the same time the authority and prestige of republic
governments--and of republic Party organizations, since these bodies
in practice will advance candidates for leading positions in the
new administrative agencies--in economic matters has? been enhanced
considerably. This is the crux of the decentralization, for the
republic governments and, to some extent, the sovnarkhozy rill
doubtless be called upon to exercise many of the routine adminis-
trative functions now performed at the USSR ministerial level.
Economic policy formation of a restricted nature will also be pos-
sible at the republic level, but it will be geared closely to de-
cisions taken previously at the center.
Whether regional economic management will actually create
a greater degree of economic efficiency, as Khrushchev has argued,
is a question that will receive no final answer for many years.
Elements of greater efficiencywere present in the removal of economic
directing agencies and theltransfer of an estimated 30,000 to 40,000
officials to the scenes of production and in the latitude given
to regional economic councils to solve local economic problems.
But tendencies toward bureaucratic empire-building and industrial
self-sufficiency are inherent in the Soviet system of production
and distribution. The new economic dispensation will not eliminate
them; it will merely postpone them and transfer them from the
ministerial to the territorial level.
During the period of transition to the new system, additional
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Part 1"..w.,(2
I. Political
complications, confusion and even a certain amount of passive re-
sistance are inevitable. The ink was hardly dry on the RSFSR re-
organization law before a' sovnarkhoz official was complaining that
neighboring government agencies were refusing to deliver needed
industrial supplies. In other cases, it was reported that trained
specialists and technicians were? being relieved of production re-
sponsibilities so that they might serve as administrators in the
sovnarkhozy and the chairman of ehe sovnarkhoz protested in July
that only 18 of 83 specialists requisitioned from Moskva had reported
for duty. These and other reports reveal also that certain of the
remaining all-union and republic industrial ministries have resisted
orders to turn over agencies to local control and that supply and
distribution organizations are in a turmoil.
While economic considerations appear to have furnished the
major motivating force for the reform, strategic military con-
siderations may well have played an auxiliary role. From a purely
military standpoint, reversion to the territorial productive princi-
ple in economic organization will probably represent a net gain for
the defensive capabilities of the USSR, even though the new economic
regions do not appear to be coordinated with the'-odd Soviet mil-
itary districts. Within the present century, Russia has learned
two costly and historic lessons concerning the military importance
of a proper distribution of its manpower and productive capacity.
Defeat in the Russo-Japanese war showed the country's leaders the
necessity for creating an independent economic Oase in the Far East;
and Soviet planners took cognizance of the lesson by investing
heavily in the economy of Trans-Baykal and the Maritime regions
during the early Five-Year Plans. World War. II demonstrated the"
necessity'
necessity for creating a stable economic base'in the middle regions
of Siberia and Central Asia; and this objective constitutes the
critical goal of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. Khrushchev's system,
therefore, represents a continuation of this trend in that if en-
visages the establishment of regional economic entities capable of
continuing production even though some of their number are lost or
communication between them is interrupted. "If-this is how bourgeois
politicians understand our reorganizationfh Khrushchev commented,
"we shall not deny it."
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,rt Two I. Poliiigg
3. ,gOvernment Control Centers
The growth of USSR major and alternate government control
centers and their distribution among the various administrative
divisions reflect accurately economic development in the U$SR.1
Analysis of the political significance and subordination of these
control centers provides an excellent guide for determining channels
of control over the peoples and economy of the Soviet Union. In
general, there has been a significant increase in the number of
major and alternate control centers since 19O, reflecting increased
' urbanization and industrialization accompanied by an increase
of administrative divisions in economically important areas,
The capitals of 14- union republics and all cities of union-
republic subordination in the RSFSR and Ukrainskaya SSR are the
Soviet Unions most important major government control centers and
may be considered alternate control centers for Moskva. In addi-
tion to their all-union political and economic significance, most
of these cities have Major military, transportation, and/or power
control functions. Headquarters for 10 of the 20 military districts,
19 of the 45 railroad systems, and 23 of 'the 1+5regional power
systems in the USSR are located within these cities (see Table
2-112). The USSR military establishment could be directed from
any of these military headquarters, if the national headquarters
in Moskva were incapacitated.
Of the total number of major and alternate control centers,
more than half are located in the RSFSR (see Table 2-1113 and Map MI
including 47 per cent of major centers and 67 per cent of alternate
centers. The largest concentrations are found in the Central
Industrial Region, particularly in and around Moskovskaya Oblast,
and the Urals. Outside the RSFSR the greatest concentration is
in the Ukrainskaya SSR, which contains 37 per cent of all centers
in the other 14 republics.
1Major control centers house executive agencies which exercise
direct control over the population and all types of economic and
civic activity within major administrative subdivisions of the USSR.
They include union republic, ASSR, kray, and oblast capitals.
Alternate control centers exercise administrative control
over lesser areas. They contain skeletal prototypes of executive
agencies in major centers and would probably assume the control
functions of major centers if the latker were incapacitated. They
include autonomousoblast and okrug capitals, and all urban centers
of union republic, ASSR, kray, oblast, autonomous oblast, and okrug
suboi-dination. (For complete list see Table A-1, Appendix).
48
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Political
Table 2-12
ADDITIONAL CONTROL FUNCTIONS
OF SELECTED GOVERNMENT CONTROL CENTERS
Hdqrs., Mili- Hdqrs., Hdqrs., Reg-
-Lary District Railroad lona' Power
CT Fleet System System
Alma.Ata X X
Ashkhabad X X
Baku X X
nhAlvakincak X X
/
Frunze X
Gorkiy X X
Kiyev X X X
Kishinev X
Krasnoyarsk X X
Kuybyshev X X X
Leningrad X X X
Minsk X X X
Molotov
Novosibirsk X X X
Omsk X X
Riga X X X
Rostov X X X
Saratov X
Sevastopol X
'SiOinabad X
Stalingrad X
Sverdlovsk X X X
Tallin X
Tashkent X X X
Tbilisi X X X
Viknyus X
Yerevan X
The most significant changes in the number and distribution
of major and alternate control centers between 1540 and 1958 occurred
in the Urals, Central Industrial, Western Siberian, and Eastern
Siberian Regions of the RSFSR, and reflect the spectacular industrial
development of these regions during and after World War I I. Seventy
per cent of the total increase in major control centers occurred in
the RSFSR, with the Central Industrial Region experiencing the great-
est increase. The RSFSR accounis' for 81 per cent of the total
increase in alternate centers, with the greatest increases occur&
t'ihrg in the Central In4ustriml znd HrAlc Regions. The slight de-
crease in the number of major centers in Turkmenskaya SSR and of
both major and alternate centers in Tadzhikskaya SSR reflects a
)49
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Table 2-13
Political
USSR MAJOR AND ALTERNATE GOVERNMENT CONTROL CENTERS
BY ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION: 1540, 1958
Administrative Division
Per Cent Change
...1940-58
Total USSR 4.18 608 45
Total Major 128 153 20
Total Alternate 290 1465
Russian SFSR
Major
Alternate 172 305 77
Northwestern Regiona 28 42 50
Major 6 7 17
Alternate 22 35
Central Industrial Region 71 116
Major 18 27
Alternate 53 89
Volga Region 13 22 69
Major 5 6 20.
Alternate 8 16 100
Southeastern Region 31 37 19
Major 8 8
Alternate 23 29 26
Urals Region 33 69 109
Major 6 6
Alternate 27 63 133
West Siberian Region 21 38 81
Major 3 7 133
Alternate 18 31 72
East Siberian Region 11+ 26 86
Major 5 5
Alternate 9 21 1..),..)
Far Eastern Region b 11+ 27 93
Major 2 6 200
Alternate 12 21 75
225 377
72 36
68
53
59
63
50
68
1111011111111?1
Ukrainskaya SSR
Major
Alternate
Beloruaskaya SSR
Major
Alternate
Uzbekskaya SSR
Major
Alternate
77 85 10
22 26 18
55 59 7
17 18 6
9 7 -22
8 11 38
25 30 20
6 10 67
19 20 5
aIncludes Kaliningradskaya Oblast, 1958; also Karelskaya SSR
in 1540 and 1958.
bOblast capitals subordinate to Khabarovskiy Ktay in 1940 and
1957 are included as alternate centers.
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Part Two
Table 2-13 (continued)
Administrative
Kazakhskaya SSR
Major
Alternate
nrnzinskaya.SSR
Major
Alternate
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR
Major
Alternate
Litovskaya SSR
Major
Alternate
Moldavskaya SSR
Major
Alternate
Latviyskaya SSR
Major
Alternate
Kirgizskaya,SSR
Major
Alternate
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Major
Alternate
Armyanskaya SSR
Major
Alternate
Tyrkmenskaya SSR
Major
Alternate
Eston'skaya SSR
Major
Alternate
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Political
Number Per Cent Change,
14iQ58
18 25 39
14 16 11+
9 125
7 10
3 3
7
)4 6
2 2
100
)24. 8 100
1 1
3 7 133
1+.7 75
1 1
3 6 100
5 6 20
1 1
14- 5" 25
9 12 33
5 6 20
1 6 50
8 9 13
4- 2 -50
4 7 75
2 3 50
1 1
1 2 100
9 7 -22
5 1 -20
1+ 3 -25
4 5 25
1 1
3 1+ 33
)-1-3
IOW
75'
OW OMB
consolidation o administrative-territorial divisions in these
republics.
In view of a recent policy statement by Khrushchev call-.
ing for increased decentralization of-economic control, the control
responsibilities of many of the alternate centers will probably
increase.
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Part "Ala
II. _EMOTION AND MANPOWER
A. Total Population
1. Variations in Soyiet Policies on Statistics
Judging by their guarded secrecy, the Soviet government of
the Stalinist era attributed far more significance to their popula-
tion statistics than did any other government in the world. The
presumable motive of withholding military and-ecOnomic information
from potential -enemies was apparently reinforced by a desire to
conceal certain facts (such as the extent of population
imam
4,WWW
the period of enforced collectivization) from the Soviet people
themselves. And as a corollary to the policy of suppression, and
in direct contrast to Russia's advances in other fields of science,
the study of population within the Soviet Union was pursued on? an
exceedin2ly primitive level.
The policy of suppressing population and manpower statistics
was rigorously pursued in the late 1930s. The regular statistical
series on wage and salary earners did not appear after 1936, and
the all-union population census of 1937 was suppressed in toto.
Only summary data comprising less than ten pages were released from
the all-union census of 1939, in striking contrast to the publica-
tion in some 50 volumes of the 1926 census results. A year later,
on the eve of the German invasion, an official handbook on education-
al statistics appeared. Understandably, only scraps of data were
published during World War II. The German advance into Soy(fet terri-
tory encompassed an area which previously had been inhabited by
some 85 million persons; and one aspect of the severe disruption
of life during this period was the impossibility of collecting and
publishirig population data.
Although a scattering of material appearing in the reconstruc-
tion period of 194547 included several significant items, it seem-
ingly was a selective presentation. Aieksandrov, the director of
the Communist Party's propaganda and agitation organization, stated
on 22 January 1946 that the Soviet Union's population totaled 193
million, a figure which indicates that war losses were 15 million
below those now implied by official Soviet'data' Various demographers
have observed that Aleksandrov's figure corresponds to the announced
prewar population of the Soviet Union. It was presented as if it
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Part Two I. Political
were the then current population, however, and included a rein-
forcing remark that 100 million had been born since the Revolution.
This latter figure could not have been derived from the previous
Soviet all-union census of 1939 so must have been derived from a
new estimate.
In March 1946 Stalin announced, as a result of the German
invasion the Soviet Union has irrevocably lost...about 7 million
people." The Soviet historian Tarle in a 1947 broadcast from Moskva
then spoke of the "7 million Soviet soldiers (italics added) who
laid down thAir livec [in the war]." Stalin wAs thmt
total losses amounted to 7 million, even specifying the individual
categories, yet lane's specified loss of 7 million soldiers is
more in conformance with western estimates of Soviet military
casualties.
It is difficult to distinguish between lack of data and
attempts at deception during this period. Aleksandrov may not have
had new data on the size of the total population, but he certainly
knew that it was not 193 million, as stated. Stalin cannot possi-
bly have had accurate war loss data, but he certainly knew that
war losses were higher than 7 million. And if one conjectures that
Stalin was deliberately being deceptive, he then is faced with
explaining why lane was permitted to criticize western interpreta-
tions of Stalin's statement.
It is evident, however, that precise population data were
not available as late as 1 7. In that year it was announced that
the Academy of Medical Science and the Ministry of Public Health
were to investigate and study Soviet vital rates and their trends,
migration, and the effects of war on the population. The results
of this planned study were never released, although 1950 marked the
end of the Fourth Five-Year Plan.
Although reconstruction was certainly essentially completed
by 1948-49 and it is known that important measures were being taken
to improve the internal flow of data concerning rural pop:dation
and labor force to branches of the Soviet government, such material
was not published. In this period, too, Soviet statisticians attempted
to conceal and distort the wartime birth deficit by reporting only
total enrollment in schools after 1949. Instead of reporting enroll-
ment in the general school (grades 1-10) separately, as had been
5.3
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Part Two I 11 Popullirons ad ManP9wer
the Soviet practice, to the number in the general school were added
students in tekhnikums and related institutions. A similar decep-
tion was practiced with regard to housing: in order to cloak the
serious housing shortage Soviet statisticians reported total re-
sidential floor space rather than living space (which excludes
certain nonliving areas). Western scholars, however, recognized
these deceptions, and in recently published Soviet literature the
true situation has been delineated.
Stalin's last days represent the nadir of social science
statistins in the qovictrt Union, when the policy of suppression
reached an all-time peak. Outright deception, however, seems to
have been the exception rather than the rule; rather, the figures
were manipulated, and even manipulated figures must? have some basis
in reality. Infinitely more important than the instances of out-
right deception was the failure to publish data. Virtually the
whole flow of information was cut off, which, in effect, amounted
to deception. The picture that emerges in Stalin's last days is
of a government unwi 1 ling to face real i ty?the enormity of war
losses, the enormity of the birth deficit, unparalleled in the
history of any modern nation, and the economic and social con-
sequences of a rutal population seriotiSly depleted of males in the
prime of life.
Not until 1955-56 was the policy of suppressing population
data relaxed. Previously unpublished statistics from the 1939
census were released and in 1956 the first of a new series of
official handbooks, Narodnoye khozyaysitSSS9,.appeared. This
handbook included general data on population and manpower as :well
as data on vital rates which had not been published regularly since
the late 1920s. It was followed in rapid succession by Sovetskaya
torgovlya, doling primarily with trade by., including rates which
make it possible to infer a 1955/ distribution of Soviet population
among the ?blasts,'and- J.L.ILtuinme.L_troitelstvo., which presented
an abundance of' material on education at the general and higher
school levels. Three other handbooks were released early in 1957:
ft.:.2whlennost ,S$SR which included a republic distribution of workers
and employe:es in industry; Narodnove khozvavstvo RSFSR,list in
urban centers in the RSFSR which have a population of at least
50,000 and/or the status of oblast, ASSR, or autonomous oblast
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,Part Two 114...E2Rgiftiion and Manpower
centers; and a new edition of IlalzingmislauxultajgElAich in-
cludes population figures for all ()blasts of the USSR and 1956
birth and death rates. A bulletin or pamphlet dealing explicitly
with Soviet population (Naseleniyeigle was to have been published
in the first quarter of 1957 and may already be available in the
Soviet Union. This publication is to include data on Soviet popom
ulation and its distribution by administrative divisions, including
the urban-rural distribution of the population of each oblast.
Still more important, the Soviet government apparently is going
ahead with plans for 'a new all-union populaon census, which is
plant* for January 1959.
It is important to ascertain how post-Stalin policies differ
from those of his last days. The most significant difference seems
to be in the increased availability of data. In reading some of
the new books, hciwever7 one still has the impression that the Soviet
world is being viewed through a screen held selectively upon differ-
ent aspects of Soviet life. In a few cases it can be demonstrated
that Soviet statisticians are aitempting to conceal the facts, as
in the case of the crude labor force percentages presented in
N rod o e Khoz a stvo U1(1956), although in this instance the
very primitiveness of the definitions is also impressive.
Fortunately, there are few such instances surprisingly enough,
some of the leading relics of the Stalinist era, such as the contrived
1939 social classification of population repurted in most earlier
Soviet writings on population, are excluded from the new materials.
In general, however, the new data are imperfect and approximate,
are often crudely expressed, and lack the methodological footnotes
and technical explanations befitting a modern demographic study.
An outstanding exception appears in Sovetskaya torgovlyal where a
footnote indicates that percentages have been computed before round-
ing the basic figures--a type of technical detail which virtually
disappeared from Soviet works during the last two decades.
The proposed 1959 census will undoubtedly be held, for the
Soviet Union desperately needs population and manpower data for
planning purposes in view of the new strains now apparent in her
economy, a situation which will soon worsen when remnants of the
wartime and immediate postwar deficit years enter the labor force.
It is doubtful, however, that the forthcoming census will be published
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Part Two H.Pc.....2.ition.And Manpower
in detail, and researchers will probably be forced to continue
working with approximations derived from summary results and
scattered local returns. Such was the case in some of the more
recent censuses in eastern European countries after they came under
Soviet domination.
2. Total POulation: 1958
Extrapolation of official Soviet population data indicate
a population of 206.3 million, as of 1 January 1958. This figure
is utilized throughout The 1958 Annual Estimates, despite evidence
that the official Soviet estimate of 200.2 million for April 1956,
used as a base, involves an underenumeration of 1 to 10 million.
The decision to use the Soviet figure is motivated by two practical
considerations, apart from the obvious gain in terms of convenience
and usefulness in maintaining direct comparability among various
types of Soviet data: 1) there are no data which. yield a firm.
estimate of the."true" population; and 2) although some data at
the national level suggest the general magnitude of underenumer-,
ation, none has been found usable in terms of differential distri-
bution of the assumed underenumeration among administrative divisions
of the USSR.
Evaluation. The "official" Soviet population figures for
1950-56 are based on a system of population registers which
are subject to many errors of omission and incorrect registration.
Populations of isolated areas and the most mobile groups (e.g.,
young adult in-migrants to cities) are often omitted; certain seg-
ments of the population are omitted in part, as in the underregi-
stration of births and deaths and the failure to register children
of migrants even when ti.e parents are registered. Incorrect regi-
stration mainly cpncerns the double registration of an individual,
in particular some migrants who are counted both as residents of
the.areas which they leave and residents of the areas into which
they migrate Intentional errors are also included, as in the
failure "?o report manpower on collective farms in order to minimize
the labor supply which might have to be released for other state
uses, and the failure to register births out of wedlock to avoid
the stigma of such births and to make it possible for these children
to use their father's name.
At local levels, efforts apparently are made io adjust the
registration data. The recording secretary of the local selsovet
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Part Two II. Population and Manpower
is instructed to reconcile his own registry of birth5and deaths,
?name by name, against the official listing prepared by the agency
in charge of registering vital statistics. This type of reconcili-
ation, however, cannot possibly influence the errors which lie out-
side the scope of both systems. With regard to the more important
errors, such as those pertaining to population groups on the move,
double listings for checking purposes are not available to the local
authorities. And the massive agglomerations of populations at
higher levels preclude any name-by-name crosschecking. Although a
tear-off coupon system is in effect for "permanent" migrants to
and from cities, Soviet authorities, including Boyarskiy (1955),
consider the data Oh migrants defective and unreliable.
At the national level, it would appear to be still more
difficult to rectify the Soviet registration data, in view of the
increased scope of the problAm;Ii
and .the lack ^A^^garn
muuw4vugv
ing adjustments made at lower levels. Samples could be employed,
but thene is only fragmentary evidence that this type of sample of
population has been made in the Soviet Union. And, since the first
edition of Narodnoy.e. khozyayetvo,SSSR s"sent for typesetting on
,6 April 1956," time considerations also militate against precise
adjustments. The registry data are collected as of 1 January and
forwarded to the regional statistical offices by 28 January. This
leaves little time for processing and analysis at the all-union
level. Furthermore, final tabulatbns on births and deaths' apparently
are not available until several months after the preliminary tabu-
lations are obtained. Thus, in April 1951+ Mikoyan reported a death
rate for 1953 of 8.9 per 1,000 inkabitants. Narodno-elvo
two years later reported a figure for 1953, presumably the result
of a more complete tabulation, of 9.0 per 1,000. Also, in January
1957 a death rate of 8.2 per 1,000 was reported for the year 1955,
as compared with the figure of 8.14 per 1,000 for the same year re-
ported in Narodnoye khozyaystvo in April 1956.
To the above points must be added the apparent unconcern
of Soviet authorities for glaring inaccuracies in their population
statistics. For example, in Narodnomel, the 1940 popu-
lation of the Soviet Union by official estimate is reported
no
191.7 million, excluding "the areas given to Poland by the treaty
of 1945 which had a population of 1.4 million persons." When in
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Part ?Two II. Population 04 Manpower
Moskva, Warren Eason, of Princeton University, queried the respon-
sible Soviet authority as to the time reference for the estimate
and was told that it was an "annual average for 1940" and specif-
ically that it included the natural increase of the population
within the 1939 Soviet boundaries. Comparison of returns from the
1939 census for republics ,not affected by the bound4ry changes
and Soviet annexations reveals that the data cited inhitmlauft
,khozyaystvo for 1940 are identical to the 1939 census returns? for
these areas. Furthermore, "1940" population data derived from
Sovetskaya torgovlya for oblasts and selected cities are identical
to data of the 1939 census in cases where no internal boundary
changes occurred. The effect of this exclusion of the natural
irderease within the 1939 boundaries is to understate the true
1 population within these boundaries by at least 3 million.
Estimated Underenumeration. It is not possible to study
available data without obtaining an impression of signi-
ficant inaccuracies, and errors of underenumeration appear to out-
weigh those of overenumration. Characteristically in population
counts underenumeration tends to outweigh overenumerat ion, even
in modern censuses. The most objective Ota pertinent to the
problem are Soviet statistics showing the birth rate in the 1950-55
period and regular statistics covering school enrollment and
eligible voters. These materials maybe 'used to build up an esti-
mate of the age composition of the Soviet population which can be
used to assess the size of the total population. The 0-6 age group
is estimated from-the reported birth rates; the 7-17 age group is
derived from school enrollment data; and the population age 18 and
above, from lists of eligible voters. Unfortunately, these compon-
ents cannot beiestimated with precision, partly as a result of the
need for modifying the materials to allow for underregistration of
births, for infant and child mortality between birth and age 6,
and for adults legally ineligible to vote. An estimaie derived in
this way, however, implies that the reported population for 1956
underrepresents the trcie population by 3 to 10 million. If this
is the degree of underenumeration, the performance of the Soviet
authorities should be commended, for the error would amount to only
2.5=5 per cent. Even full-fledged population censuses often yield
far from perfect results, as indicated by the fact that in the U.S.,
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Part Two I Ppu1ation and Manpower
where no such serious dislocations of population occurred as in
the Soviet Union during World War II, the 1950 census is thought
to have an underenumeration of 2 to 3 per cent,
3. Changes in Total Population, 1913-61
For the first time in 15 years, the Soviet government has
published official statistics showing the size of the USSR's popu-
lation for selected years 1913-56 (see Table 244). Data are shown
in AaL94144L511:24m5141,ASSRIer 1926 and 1939 from the two all-
union population censuses of these years. Data for 1913, 1540, and
1956 are "officialleptimates," the latter two? referring to the
present boundaries of the'Soviet Union. And in this same volume,
Table 241-
CHANGES IN USSR POPULATION: 1913-61
(Selected Years)
Average Annual
Population Growth or Decline
L1114.2.1nIs (in Per Cent
17 September 199 Iloundaries
1913 I39.3a
1926-7 147.0b
1939 ?
Present boundaries
1540 191,7a
1950 (1 Jan.) 180.00
1956 (April) 200.2a
1958 (1 Jan.) 206.3c
1961 216.3c
0:341-
1.338
- 0.610
1,796
1.741
1,616
aOfficial Soviet estimates. , (The 1 'official
estimate" is actually the total population from the
1939 all-union census, plus crude adjustments for
the annexed areas.)
.b Data from all-union population census. The 1939
total published in 1940 has been adjusted slightly
upward, representing the final tabulation of the
1939 census returns.
ARD extrapolation from official Soviet esti-
mate, based on reported annual rates of natural in-
crease of populatiOn for 1950,..55.
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Part Two 11.1__Eagiftim_and_limem
the annual rate of natural increase of population for 1950-55 is
also reported, which makes it possible to impute an "official es-
timate" of the size of the USSR's population in 1950 and subse-
quent years to 195'6.
World War I'and Civil War. Russia had an average annual
growth of only 0.354- per cent from 1913 to 1926, and the
population loss involved in this low rate of increase can better
be appreciated if one compares the actual population in 1926 with
the expected population on the basis of "normal" trends in the
rate of growth of population of 1.66 per cent per annum. The ex-
pected population of 1926 would have been 172 million, in compar-
ison with the population enumerated in the 1926 census of 147
million. The difference of 25 million can be attributed to the
excess deaths of the subsequent Civil War and its attendant as-
pects of famine and widespread epidemics. The major components
of the figure, exceeding 20 million, were civilian excess deaths
and birth deficits. Military casualties and emigration together
amounted totonly about -i-'million of the total loss.
Collectivization and Famine. The rate of population
growth in the period 1926-1939 was much higher than in
1913-1926, and amounted to 1.3 per cent annum. Nevertheless, the
actual population shown by the census in 1939 was 6 million below
the expected population. This 6 million represents losses from
the Soviet collectivization program of the early 1930's partic-
ularly from famine.
World War II. The Second World War not only swallowed up
the whole natural increase of Soviet population between
1940 and 1950, but also led to an outright decline of population.
If the reported Soviet population data for the prewar and postwar
years are assumed to be accurate, the decline of population would
amount to 0.6 per cent per annum. The 1 Soviet population
figure reported intNarodnoye ktmaxlialuir is known to be in-
correct, however, and a better estimate than the reported 191.7
million probably would be 196 million. In the absence of the war,
the Soviet population could have been expected to increase by at
least 1.5 per cent per annum, the decline in the death rate off-
setting or more than offsetting the decline in the birth rate.
Given this hypothesis, the population in 1950 would be expected
to number about 225 million persons, or 45 million more than the
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Part Two ii4.22PulatiorLITELAMME
figure of 180 million to be derived from Soviet data. If, on the
other hand, the figure of 180 million represents an underenumer-
ation of 3-10 million, the implied population deficit in the war
and immediate postwar period decreases to 35-42 million.
School enrollment statistics covering the first four grades
of school in 1950-56 indicate a decrease in the number of children
by 11 million as of 1950 if compared with the prewar period, as a
consequence mainly of birth deficit and to a lesser extent of excess
mortality in the years 1943-50. Migratory losses amounted to 3
million, military losses are reported to have been 7 million, and
civilian losses are thought to have constituted about 10 million.
The sum of these groups exceeds 30 million, although the extent to
which the estimate of civilian losses may exclude or include other
known losses not directly related to the war is not clear. indirect
losses include excess mortality resulting from terroristic practices
by the Soviet government in deporting various groups as well as
excess mortality of inmates of Soviet concentration camps, the ex-
cess mortality in the immediate postwar period of servicement total-
ly disabled during the war, and excess mortality from the drought
and other causes in 1946-47. Despite the enormity of the? figure,
it seems likely that Soviet losses during World War (I may have
totalled 35 million, or, excluding the birth deficit, an outright
1--- OM#
UI MIIIIVflo
1116151510, Although the degree of change in Soviet population
in the immediate postwar years is not known for the period
1946-49, changes in these years can be inferred in part. Published
data suggest that births exceeded deaths during 1949 by?more?than
3 million. In 1947 the death rate was so highl it is unlikely that
births exceeded deaths by more than 15 million. Interpolating
between 1947 and 1949, births would have exceeded deaths by some
2 million in 1948. The combined increase for 1947,a0i under these
assumptions, was 6-7 million. It is doubtful that any increase of
population occurred during the year 1946. There may even have been
1The Minister of Public Health announced in Pravda (23 April.
19)4-9) that "the mortality of the population in 01177;;-: lower by
27 per cent than that of 1947 and 12 per cent lower in comparison
with the last prewar years." Thus, mortality in 1547 was 21 per
cent higher than before the war, or 21-22 per 1,000 inhabitants.
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Part Two and Manpower
a net decrease of population as a result of the drought-created
famine
in the western regions of the USSR in that year. Also, it
seems likely that the death rate in 1946 would be inflated by excess
mortality of totally disabled soldiers who, characteristically, have
an extremely high death rate in the years immediately following
disablement.
1950116... Between 1950 and 1956 the average annual growth
of Soviet population, following official Soviet data, was
1.8 per cent. The high level of the immediate prewar period had
once again been reached. The main factor in this high rate of
growth was the strikingly low death rate, whereaa before World War
II the high rate was the product of a high birth rate and a high
death rate.
1956-62. The rate of population growth in the Soviet Union
is expected to taper off between 1956 and 1958 and decrease
even more in the 1958-62 period, under the assumption of a gradual
decline in fertility, while the low level of death rate remains
constant or even increases somewhat owing to an increased propor-
tion of older persons in the population. However, in these two
periods there is no reason to expect any drastic change in popula-
tion growth, whereas in the years that follow a sharp reduction
in the rate of population increase is anticipated. The number of
potential parents will be drastically reduced as those born during
the war and postwar birth-deficit years begin to enter the marrying
ages (the main child-bearing period is from ages 20 through 34).
The first significant wartime birth deficit year was 1943; this
reduced cohort will become age 20 in 1963 and in successive sub-
sequent years will be joined by at least two more age cohorts
drastically reduced by birth deficits in the years of their birth.
Thereafter, the number of potential parents will stabilize at a
somewhat higher level.
4, g,ftilamphic Distribution of USSR Population.
The Soviet handbook, Sovetskaya torgovlya (1955), presents
data expressing relationships between population and various aspects
of trade. Although the relationships are expressed in the form of
rates, the degree of rounding is slight, with the result that the
population statistics used in preparing the handbook can be derived
with only an insignificant degree of error. In this way, population
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Part Two 11.2.122Ruitihn_1124,MatREAL
statistics have been derived for the USSR as a whole, for its con-
stituent republics, and for autonomous areas and oblasts for 1939/40
and 055 (see Table A4, Appendix). Comparison of the total pop-
ulation figure of 197,539,000 derived from data in the trade volume
with the figure 200.2 million reported in ImplIngyftmmatta
in April 1956 suggests that the 1955 statistids refer to the middle
(1 July) of 1955.
Despite evidence of the existence of underenumerationl the
1955 geographic distributions of population derived from Soviet
estimates are considered fairly accurate representations of the
true geographic distribution of population. This statement, how-
ever, should be qualified in two important ways:, 1) Soviet popula-
tion estimates for 1955 (as shown in Table A4), as well as more
summary data by union republics for 1956, shown in Nar261401
IllauLaylly9Apildo not reflect the actual distribution of the
population; and 2) underenumeration tends characteristically to
have significant area differentials.
A de facto, or actual, population count is an enumeration
of the population present in a given area at a given time. An
alternative method of counting, often utilized in population cen-
suses, is to assess the number of legal residents, or de jurt
population. Soviet practice represents a combination of these two
methods. Thus, in the' 1939 census, forced laborers were not listed
as inhabitants of the places in which they were actually located
in 1939, but as inhabitants of their birthplaces or places of trial
or arrest. Military personnel, on the other hand, are thought to
have been included in the census in terms of their actual residence,
except in the case of naval p4sonne1, where the base of operation
was used as the place of legal residenm. Since the "1940" Soviet
data in reality are a reproduction of the results of the 1939 cen-
sus, it is obvious that these figures as reported in Table Aal-
are comparable in definition to the 1939 census. The same appears
true with the 1955 and 1956 population data. Thus, the reported
population by union republics adds exactly to the reported all-
union population (a de facto count would show about 500,000
Soviet citizens residing abroad). Also, in the case or the stu-
dent and voting populations it is known that a de facto enumeration
procedure is followed. Comparison of voters and school children
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, Part Two 112-19PulatiTIMIAN112ME,
by union republic with SoViet estimates of total population in each
republic reveal glaring discrepancies* For example, in Estonia the
voting and student populations alone constitute more than 90 per
cent of the reported population, which could not possiblii be true.
The explanation is that undoubtedly the population estimates do
not represent de facto enumOrations.
Underenumeration tends characteristically to have signi-
? ficant area differentials*? For example, on the eve of World War
II it was reported that underenumeration of population in the Soviet
Union was greatest within the more backward areas. Also, election
data underrepresent the population more in the areas of most rapid
population increase.
Projection of Data, 1955-58.. Soviet data showing the geo-
graphic distribution of population by oblast were projected to
?J January 1958 as follows:
? 1., The rate of population increase 1955-56, derived from
1955 oblast data appearing in Sovetskaya torgovlya and 1956 data
in Laadnilyt_khaatatto (1956), was used to project the 1956
population to 1 January 1958.
2. Certain adjustments were made to allow for the repatri-
ation of ethnic groups deported in 1943-14 from North Caucasus areas.
3. The figures were then forced to the previously calculated
republic totals.
Results. The geographic distribution of population
in 1939/40, 1955, and 1958, presented in detail in
Table Ali., are summarized in Tables 2-15, 2-16, and 2-17.
Table 2-15 shows the distribution of USSR population by
broad areas. While European USSR still accounts'for' the great mass
of the Soviet Union's population, its share of the national total
dropped from 82.2 per cent in 1939 to 78.5 per cent in 1955. Mean-
while, Asiatic Russials proportion increased from 17.8 to 21.5 per
cent. Between 1939 and 1955 Asiatic USSR had an average annual
growth of populati'on' of about 2 percent, as compared with only 1.6
per cent in the prewar period 1926-39* This difference resulted
from prewar collectivization losses in Kazakhstan; and considering
Asiatic USSR apart from Kazakhstan, the average annual rate of
population growth in the 1926-39 period was 2.9 per cent, or
more than double the 1939-55 rate of the same area of 1.3 per cent
per year.
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11,....112,tion and Manpower
, Table 2-15
DISTRIBUTION OF USSR POPULATION BY MAJOR AREA:
1939/4a, 1955, 1958
Area 1232Z941!
European USSR 158,219
Asiatic USSR 14-43643
TOTAL 12,582
? (MIUMLAI
7 \1VUMVV4Q
?
spft
All
11,;lainnAAn)
111.Ww,
153,091
2 14143
197,539
In Per Cent of Total
European USSR 82.2 78.5 77.8
Asiatic USSR 17.8 , 21.5 22.2
160,572
.162a.
206,293
TOTAL 100.0
100.0 100.0
aBased on 1939 census for the old territory of the USSR and
on official estimates for the annexed areas.
?Based on data presented in Sovetskaya torgoylya.
cExtrapolation of 1955 data.
Table 2-16
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH OF USSR POPULATION,
BY MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION:
1939/40-55and 1955-58
e Div is1
Russian SFSR
Northwestern Region
Central Industrial Region
Volga Region
Southeastern Region
Urals Region
West Siberian Region
East Siberian Region
,Far Eastern Region
Ukraimskaya .SSR
Be lorysskaya ,SSR
Uzbekskaya SSR
Kazakhskaya SSR
Gruzinekaya SSR
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR
Litovekaya SSR
Moldavskaya SSR
Latviyskaya SSR
Kirgizskaya SSR
Tadzhikikaya SSR
Armyangkaya SSR
Tur menskaya SSR
Estonikaya SSR
TOTAL
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0.1.9
0+7
-0.62
0.05
0.18
1.43
1.02
1.29
3095
-0.23
-0.88
0.80
2.02
0.59
0.20
-0.57
0.
0)40
1,76
1.04
1045
0,42
0.33
0.16
1.76
1.80
le0Lf
0.96
2,32
2008
3.16
di+
.88
1.48
1.16
3.88
1.36
2.80
0.80
1.64-
0.16
2048
2.76
2.48
1.88
-0.04
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Part Two 1,14.22:1.21 and Manpower ,
Two factors have been of prime importance in the eastward
shift of the Soviet Union's center of population: 1) The incidence
of war losses was much higher in European Russia; and 2) there has
been a steady flow of migants from the western to the eastern
territories. With the present emphasis on the industrialization
of Siberia and Kazakhstan and with continuing agricultural colon-
ization connected in part with ihe new lands program, it can be
expected that Asia's share in the over-all population of the \USSR
will continue to grow.
The decline in European Russia's proportion of the Soviet
Union's populatbn can best be understood through a discussion of
its various regions (see Tables 2-16 and 2-417). Four areas of
European Russia--the Central Industrial Region of the RSFSR, and
the Ukrainskaya, Belorusskaya, and Litovskaya,SSRs--have a lower
population and consequently represent a less significant segment
of the USSR total than in 1939/40. In all cases this results
primarily from the heavy concentration of war losses in these areas
during World War di., Even in recent years, however, their Share
of the national whole has declined.
Except for the Central Industrial Region, populations of the
territories of the European RSFSR have increased. In the North-
western Region the rate of increase was above the national average
in the 1939/40-55 period but during 1955-58 was below average, In
the Southeastern Region the growth was above average in both periods
while in the Volga Region it was below average.
Population within the two Baltic republics of Latvia and
Estonia increased more slowly than did the over-all population of
the Soviet Union in the earlier period. War losses were heavy in
both areas, but Russian in-migration tended to counteract their
depressive effect. Since 1955, the population of Latvia has con-
tinued to increase, while that of Estonia has remained static.
The rate of growth in the Transcaucasian republics was be-
low average between 1939 and 1955, except in the Armyanskaya,SSR
which in the years 1946-47 received a large number of immigrants.
Since 19555 however, Armenia's and Azerbaydzhan's growth has been
considerably above that of the USSR as a whole, although in Georgia
where the natural increase is relatively low for the area the rate
has been below the national average.
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Part Two
Administrative Division
Russian SFSR
Northwestern Region
Central Industrial Region
Volga Region
Southeastern Region
Urals Region
West Siberian Region
East LiberianRegion
Far Eastern Region
Ukrainskaya SSR
Belorusskaya SSR
Uzbekskaya'SSR
Kazakhskaya SSR
Gruzinskaya SSR
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR
Litovskaya SSR
Table 2-17
POPULATION OF THE USSR BY MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION:
1939/40, 1955, and 1958
Population (in thousands)
1939.Atg July 1955b 1 Jan. 11958c
108,1442 111,856
(8,1+65) (9025)
0+99374) (41+5337)
(9,823) (9,897)
(101564) (10,880)
(12,)+74) (1591+22)
(9,904) (11,569)
(59275) (69397)
(2,563) (4,229)
419831 40,240
9,249 7,909
6,333 7,172
6,051+ 8,121
3,570 3,920
312o6 3,311
2,925 2,650
116,761
(99532)
(1+5,)+70)
(10,135)
(11,507)
(16,220)
(1 2,1481 )
(6,881)
0+,535)
41,733
8,142
79V+
8,907
4,055
3,543
2,704
_II. Population and Manpower
Per Cent of Total
JEla .1.255 1253.
56$ 56.6 56.6
(4.10 0+06) (4.6)
(2507) (22.5) (22.0)
(5.1) (5.0) (4.9)
(5.5) (5.5) (5.6)
(6.5) (7.8) (7.9)
(5.1) (5.9) (6.1)
(2.7) (3.2) (3.3)
(1.3) (2.1) (2.2)
21.7 20.14 20.2
4.0 3.9
3,3 3.6 3.7
3.2 4.1 4.3
1.9 2.0 2.0
1.7 1.7 1.7
1.5 1.3 1.3
aBased on 1939 census for the old territory of the USSR and official Soviet estimates for the annexed
territories.
bgased on data presented in Sovetskaya torgovlya.
cProjection of 1956 data on basis of 1955-56 rate of increase.
millim=mmostimmimmmilm
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Part Two
Table 2-17 (continued)
Administrative Division
Moldavskaya SSR
Latviyskaya SSR
Kirgizskaya SSR
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Armyanskaya SSR
Turkmenskaya SSR
Estonskaya SSR
TOTAL
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Population (in thousands)
1939140a July 1955b 1 Jan. 1958c
2,500
1,901+
1,45S
1,282
1,252
1,052
192,582
2,030
1,880
1,740
1,590
1,340
i,1)+0
197,539
217149
2,039
1,996
1,860
1,688
1,403
1,139
206,293
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1_1. Population and Manpower
Per
1939/40
1.3
1.0
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.5
Cent of Total
1951_ 1958
1.3 1.3
1.0 1.0
1.0 1.0
0.9 0.9
0.8 0.8
0.7 0.7
0.6 0.6
DZ)
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Part Two liA,IERLItiaLATLANamm
Asiatic Russia's relatively high rate of population in-
crease is reflected in all of its regions. Without exception the
rate of growth has been above the national average. Of the various
regions of the Asiatic RSFSR, the Far East grew most rapidly in the
earlier period, while West Siberia showed the greatest growth in
the later period. In both cases in-migration was a significant
factor in the increase. Two other factors in West Siberia's
growth have been the new lands and the eastern industrialization
programs.
Of the areas of Asiatic Russia outside the RSFSR, Kazakhstan
shows the mpst rapid rate of growth. It has risen from fifth to
third place in number of inhabitants while its proportion of the
over-all population will have increased from 3.2 per cent to an
estimated 4..3 per cent by 1 January 1958. In the World War II
period this growth resulted largely through the evacuation of pop-
ulation? from the threatened western border regions of the USSR,
and in the postwar years through agricultural colonization and
immigration to the republic's rapidly growing industrial centers,
Of all the areas of Asiatic Russia, the republics of Central
Asia show the lowest rate of population increase. In the earlier
period many wartime evacuees from European Russia came into the area,
but the great majority returned to their homes after the war.
Since 1955, the concentration on the development of Siberia and
Kazakhstan has probably drawn off many of the migrants that other-
wise would have come to Central Asia. Consequently, net in-migration
has been low, exercising a restraining influence on population
growth.
Population Redistribution Produced by Calamities and Migra-
tion. The existence of data for 1939/40 and for 1955
makes it possible to study thee-geographic redistribution of Soviet
population within a'1&1/2. year period. if each subarea of the.
Soviet Union' had increased by the same proportion as did-the total
population of the Soviet Union. in the -1939-55 'period, the geo-
graphic distribution of the. population would ,have remained constant.
This hypothetical assumption. is used to measure actual differences
in the growth or decline. of area populations (see Table 2-!18)..
The areas have been grouped so as to gain maximum comparability
with an earlier study of redistribution of Soviet population by
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1142220AliSTLEISLAMEMIL
, Table 2-18
TOTAL POPULATION CHANGES
1897-1926, 1926-39, and 1939-55
(Numbers in thousands)
Redistribution of Increment (+)
2r Decrement
..........WAXICRA,...!..... 1897719261 1926-39.c 1939-55
European USSRb -3,69+ -51258 -10,365
Belorussia _ 176 - 209 - 1,578
Ukraine 407 - 2,712 - 2,617
CentralABlack Soilc _ 263 - 2,576 - 2,426
Western . 380 - 1,372 - 2,241+
Old Industrial Centere _ 208 + 2,666 + 218
? Northern (Leningrad,
Karelia-Murmansk,
Northeast) - 542 + 1,388 - 939
Vyatka and Tatar - 1,462 ,
- 279 - 679
? Central Volga - 639 - 1,903 . 222
Lower Volga and Don 89 - 629 _ 251
? Crimea - 12 299 . 51
North Caucasus
and Dagestan 316 + 69 . 52
Ba1t1elst4es', Kalinin-f
grads6ya.0., Moldavia .. + 476
Transcaucasus . 356 + 1,227 555
Urals. Bashkir, and
Asiatic USSR + IF 419 + 31257 + 6,
Urals
Urals and Bashkir - 127 + 11194 West Siberia + 2,953 + 83 ++ N161.96
Central Siberia + 853 + 514 --1-- 779
East Siberia - 17 + 567 + 208
Soviet Far East + 757 + 899 + 1,602
Kazakhstan + 186 - 897 +? 1,873
Central Asia - 565 + 1,671 + 1,333
TOTAL USSR 5',i5IF +10,577 +11,059
- 5,154 -10, -11,059
aFrank Lorimer, The Population of the Soviet Union, League of
Nations, Geneva (1946), p. 170.
elncludes districts of Gorkiy, Ivanovo, Moskva, Ryazan, Tula,
and Yaroslavl.
bExcludes Urals and Bashkir (included with Asiatic USSR).
clncludes districts of Kursk, Orel, Tambov, and Voronezh.
dlncludes districts of Kalinin and Smolensk,
fAreas annexed by USSR at end of 1939.
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Part Two II. Population and Manpower
Frank Lorimer, covering the periods 1897-1926 and 1926-39. For ter-
ritories annexed by the Soviet Union after 1540, no comparability
can be achieved, but for the remainder of the Soviet Union the areas
are approximately comparable.
Predistribution increment or decrement, as shown in Table
2-18, is the product of several factors, apart from any question
of the accuracy of the data. Of great importance is the factor
of differential exposure of various areas' to calamities, such as
World War I, the Civil War, the famine and the epidemic years of
1921-22, collectivization of the Ivarly 1930s, and World War II.
Also of basic significance is the factor of internal migration
(international migration, although significant in the western pro-
vinces following several of Russia*s calamities, has never been as
important as in the more developed European nations a America).
Internal migration often acts to fill in the irregularities of pop-
ulation distribution created by calamities. Immediately after
World War for example differential population losses were much
more evident than a few years later when there was a return move-
ment of displaced peoples to'the occupied areas and even a migra-
tory gain of population in certain newly acquired areas such as
Kaliningrad and the former Baltic States. Internal migration in
the Soviet Union as in other modern nations, however, is basically
influenced by industrialization and urbanization. Of less impor-
tance as a factor in population redistribution except in certain
subareas of the Soviet Union (such as the Transcaucasus) is the
factor of markedly different birth and death rates.
For the period 1939-55, the data in Table 2-18 indicate a
gross transfer of population among Lorimer4s study areas of
11,059,000 persons, or 5.5 per cent of the average population in
the period 1939-55, as compared with a gross transfer of population
within the pre-1540 Soviet boundaries of 10,577,000 persons in the
1926-39 period (6.6 per cent of the average population size 1926.39).
Virtually all of the population redisttibution has occurred as a
result of an increase in Asiatic USSR and the Urals and a Oecrease
in the remainder of Luropean USSR. It is interesting that these
same trends, in general, characterize the redistribution of Russia's
population in the preceding four decades. Two exceptions can be
noted in the 1926-39 period when rapid industrialization produced-
substantial in-migration into the Old Industrial Center (including
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Part .Tw9 IL Population and_Mpower
Moskva, Ivanovo, Gorkiy, Yaroslavl) and the Leningrad and Karelia-
Murmansk regions. The same areas also show redistribution incre-
ments in the 1939-55 period, although the repopulation of former
Finnish provinces of Karelia with Soviet settlers overcompensates
for a decline of population in and around Leningrad.
Although the use of the redistribution increment or decre-
ment method provides insight into the differential growth or decline
of population, it should be remembered that the results are an ex-
pression only of the net effects of various changes. Thus, to take
an extreme example, the former Baltic republics show a redistribu-
tion increment of only1400,000, whereas in reality some 1.2 million
Soviet migrants entered these areas after 1940; but 800,000 of this
gain was cancelled by wartime and postwar population losses in ex-
cess of losses suffered by the Soviet population on the average.
Migratory Trends within the Unocupied Area, 1939-55. What
part of the all-union population redistribution increment
or decrement for a given area 1939-55 is due to losses associated
with the Second World War and what part is due to migration? if
either component could be estimated, the other could be obtained as
a residual. Unfortunately, neither factor can be estimated directly
with any degree of reliability for the whole USSR. However, it is
possible to establish the direction of migratory trends within the
area of the Soviet Union which was not directly touched by the Ger-
man occupation of World War II. The unoccupied area of the Soviet
Union includes both areas of in-migration -(the'Urale and.Asiatic-
Ruseia)-end'aeas of out-iligration (such as-theTeastei.n periphery
of the Central Industrial Region and the Volga)* Between 1926 and
1939 the area equivalent to the unoccupied area had a modest migra-
tory gain of some 500,000 persons, or less than one per cent of the
areals population. By roughly estimating military casualties and
birth deficit of the area, it appears that the unoccupied area had
little or no net migration gain or loss 1940-55 at the expense of
the remainder of the Soviet Union. Using only the hypothesis that
war losses in the unoccupied area would tend to be spread evenly
over the oblasts comprising this area, an assumption which is not
inconsistent with an ()blast distribution of birth deficit computed
from school enrollment daia, it is possible to compute population
redistribution increments and decrements within the unoccupied
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A Part&Twp II Population and Ma,t_ipsf,
areas, 1939-55w The procedure is as follows: the 1939 population
of each oblast within the unoccupied area is multiplied by the ob-
served rate of growth of the unoccupied area as a whole, yielding
as expected 1955 population for each oblast. Deviatons between
the observed population of an oblast and the expected population
of the oblast are computed on a plus or minus basis.
Table A-6, Appendix, presents the population redistribution
increments or decrements among ()blasts within the unoccupied area,
1939-55; Table 2-19 summarizes these results by major' administra-
tive divisions. The results are assumed to eive a reliable picture
of the pattern of migration within the unoccupied area, although
the computed gross redistribution of the population of plus and
Table 2-19
SUMMARY OF REDISTRIBUTION OF USSR POPULATION
WITHIN UNOCCUPIED AREA: 1939-558
(Net Increment or Decrement)
Region
Russian SFSR
North and Northwest
Southeast
Volga
Central
Urals
West Siberian
East Siberin
Far East
Armyanskaya SSR
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR
Gruzinskaya SSR
Kazakhskaya SSR
Uzbekkaya SSR
Kirgizskaya SSR
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Turkmenskaya SSR
TOTAL
in Absolute
Fjgures
1,442,175
- 266,365
293,912
- 7448,096
- 3,919,165
1,40,428
479,358
490,828
1 359,749
154.,700
,642
76,355
1,297,750
80,625
9615
78,251+
62.124
+ 5,64,659
- 5,64,659
aSee also Table A-6, Appendix.
In Per Cent
of Total
- 25.53
- 4.72
- 5.21
-13.25
- 69.43
25.80
8.49
8.70
24.09
2.74
- 1.35
22.98
1.43
4.39
1.38
- ?1.10
+100.00
-100.00
minus 5.4 million persons for the unoccupied areas as a whole
might be either high or low if strictly interpreted as an ex-
pression of migration. The most significant out-migrant region
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Part Two II. Population and Manpower
in the unoccupied area was the Central Region, constituting 72 per
cent of the total population decrement of the unoccupied area, or
3.9 million. Out-migration was also substantial from the Volga
Region and ?o 'a' lesser extent in the Southeast and the North and
Northwest Regions. Almost all of the migratory gain within the
unoccupied area was registered by the Urals Region, Kazakhstan,
and the Far East. Unlike other parts of the unoccupied area, the
Armyanskaya ,SSR attracted in-migrants from outside the Soviet Union
in the return-home drive sponsored by the Soviet Government in
1946-48. Within the Soviet Union, however, little internal migra-
tion from and to the Transcaucasus Region took place in the period
1939-55, a tendency characteristic of much of the modern history
of this region.
All Union M. rator Trends 1 8 Migration to the new
lands areas is expected to continue in 1955-58, although
the rate of migration will he greatly reduced. Two migratory trends
of far greater significance are associated with 1) the Sixth Five-
Year Plan of industrialization in the east; and 2) migration to and
from acquired areas.
Industrialization in the East. Soviet reports of April 1956
indicate that 3 million migrants will be required to supply
the manpower requirements of a vast program of industrialization
in the east (apparently in the Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan, and the
Soviet Far East) during the period of the Sixth Five-Year Plan.
Over a five-year period, this would mean an average of 600,000 per
year. An authoritative Soviet source, however, has given a some-
what smaller figure: Khrushchev in May 1956 called for 500,000
migrants per year. Internal migration within the RSFSR yields an
estimated "normal" migration to the entire area of the Urals, Siberia,
Kazakhstan, the Soviet Far East, and Central Asia of 440,000 migrants
per year, of which 350,000 per year would migrate into the areas
directly affected by the new industrialization program. Thus, it
seems likely that the total volume of migration to Asia will be
intensified only modestly, whereas the new industrialization pro-
gm will to some extent effectuate a redistribution of migrants
in terms of where they settle.
It is too early to foresee the degree to which the proposed
industrial program will have advanced by 1958. However, high rates
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Part Two 11. Population and Manpower,
of "normal" in-migration were observed for many of the ?blasts
reportedly involved in the new industrialization program, and it
was only in the ?blasts which did not have high rates of "normal"
in-migration that in the present estimates were considered in
need of adjustment to allow for the new program. An arbitrary
100,000 migrants were added to the latter areas and distributed
among different oblasts in proportion to the "normal" migration
trends. Oblasts primarily involved in the new program appear to
be Novosibirskaya, Omskaya, Akmolinskaya, Karagandinskaya, Kokche-
tavskaya, Kurganskaya, Kustanayskaya, Pavlodarskaya, and Severo-
Kazakhstanskaya, and the Bashkirskaya iPSIR., Administrative div-
isions secondarily involved in the new program include Altayskiy
Kray and Kemerovskaya and Aktuybinskaya Oblasts.
Migration to and from Acquired Aneas. The repopula-
tion of the former Japanese territories included now
in the Sakhalinskaya Oblast in the Soviet Far East appears to have
been basically completed. The Japanese nationals have been repa-
triated and their places taken by Soviet in-migrants. This in
-
migration is still proceeding, although at a reduced rate, and
therefore the estimated in-migration in 1955-58 on the basis of
1940-55 data was adjusted downward. The repopulation of the former
German territory included now in Kaliningradskaya Oblast on the
western periphery of the RSFSR is still continuing at a rapid pace.
The former German population has been completely resettled, with ?
virtually all having been returned to Germany. A German source in
April 1956 reported that the Soviet government had decided to send
another 600,000 Soviet settlers to Kaliningrad, at the rate of 120,000
a year. The' German report may exaggerate' the scope" of move-
ment; however, the estimaterfor V.. .1 Oblast shown Lit
".
Table-A-5 allows for a net, in-migration of about 100,000 persons
in the period' 4955-58.
An agreement has .been'conclude&between the Soviet-and .
Polish governments supplementing the Soviet-Polish agreements of.
1544=45. Under' the terms of the 19Y1 16'agreements, about-half a
million Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians were transferred
from Poland to-the USSR, and some 1.8 million Poles and Jews left
the Soviet'Union for Poland. -These agrements envisaged .the.liqui-
dation in the postwar period of the Polish and Jewish minorities
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Part ,Two Population and.
residing in the USSR? who had been Polish citizens until the Sept-
ember 1939 annexations of former Polish territory by the Soviet
Union. However, the repatriation program was interrupted by Pol-
itical exigencies and only recently has an agreement been reached
to continue the repatriation of Poles and Jews from the USSR to
, Poland. 1? has been reported that 40,000 persons left the Soviet
Union under terms of the new agreement in 1956 and that it is ex-
pected that 120,000 will be repatriated in 1957 and an unknown
number in 1958 (the 1958 estimates of population in the present
study do not allow for this out-migration). The total volume of
out-migrafion from the USSR under terms of the new agreement may
possibly-total-half a million.
B. Urban-Rural Population
1. Total Urban Populatioa
The official Soviet estimates of the urban population, re-
ported in Narodnoye-khozyaystvo. SSSR, indicate that between 1951
and 1955 urban population increased 13.2-million (see-Table 21.20).
The implied urban growth closely 'corresponds with' Khrushchevis-state-
ment in February 1955 that the urban population increased by more
than 17 million during the 1950-54 period, including a movement of
Table 2-20
GROWTH OF URBAN POPULATION IN THE USSR:
1926-58a
Total Urban Per Cent
Population of Total
Year Op mi1liqn0 Population
b
1926 (Dec.) 2603L 17.9
1939 56.1 32.9
1940 60.6c :30.6
1951 71.4C 39.0
1955 8)+.6c 43.2
1956 86.5c 43)+
1956 (April) . 87.0! 43.5
1957 88.5.; 43.6
1958 90.5' 43.9
,a of .1. January, except as otherwise indicated.
b Census figure..
9 Official Soviet estimate.
.ARD estimate.
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Part TWO II. Population and Manpower.
9 million persons from rural to urban areas., The figures also
indicate a significant decrease in the rate of urban growth start-
ing with 1955: the average annual rate of urban growth was 4.6
per cent between 1951 and 1955 but dropped to 2.3 per cent after
1955.
There are several plausible explanations for this reduced
rate. In the past, Sovieturban growth has drawn heavily. on.the
rural population, and the present supply of rural manpower is no
longer as abundant. -As.a result of war losses ?the rural segment
of the population cannot spare the manpower-to relieve the short-
age caused .by the continuing growth of urban complexes. The new
emphasis on agricultural production, as evidenced in the develop-
ment of the virgin lands, contributes to the tight labor force
situation in the rural .regions-of -the Soviet Union
Assuming an annual natural growth of urban population of
1 7 per cent-, a yearly increase of only 2 million-Persons allows
for a'minimal flow of migrants from rural to urban areas. Since
a certain urban' increment is added as a result of reclassification
of populated points as urban, the .annual rural-to-urban migration
is estimated' atslightly less than 500,000 persons.
2. Urban Population Ranges
In the 1926-55 period the urban population of the Soviet
Union increased by more than 200 per cent, from 26.3 million to
86.6 million, while the number of urban settlements more than
doubled (see Table 2-21). Although most of this growth occurred
betWeen 1926. and 1939; during the period of rapid industrial growth,
a high rate of urban growth continued in the postwar period. In
the-1939-56 period, the gyeatest percentual increase in.the number
of cities occurred in-the over-5?0,000 class. The greatest per-
centual growth of 'population occurred.in the Under-10,000class,
chiefly-as the result of reclassification of rural settlements.
The future.will'probably see a decrease in'the rate of.growth of the
largest cities and an attempt to decentralize. some.of the industrial
complexes. Even prior to World War certain restrictions were
issued on continued growth of the.large Soviet. cities. Comparing
the prewar and the present populations of these cities, it becomes
obvious that the restrictions have not been effective 'Nevertheless,
more recent comments in the Soviet press indicate that perhaps some
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Balla
Under 10,000
10-20,000
20-50,000
50-100,000
100-500,000
Over 500,000
TOTAL
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jJ Population and Manpower
Table 2-21
CHANGES IN USSR URBAN POPULATION RANGES:
1926, 1939, 1956
Republic
Number of
Urban Settlements
1.26, 19,39 1956
1,446 1,443 2,577
253 466 706
135 288 432
60 944 139
28 71 113
.11.. 22
1,925 2,373 3,989
Population
in millionsl...
192 1939 1914515
5.2 7.1 1199
3.5 6.5 9.8
4.0o 807 1302
4.01 6.8 9.114.
5014 14.2 21.5
t2.8 20.8
26.3 5601 86.6
Table 2-22
ESTIMATED URBAN-RURAL DISTRIBUTION
OF USSR POPULATION, BY REPUBLIC:
1958
Russian SFSR
Northwestern Region
Central Industrial
Region
Volga Region
Southeastern Region
Urals Region .
West Siberian Region
East Siberian Region
? Fa..r Eastern Region
Ukrainskaya SSR
Belorusskaya SSR
.Uzbekskaya SSR
Kazakhskaya SSR
Gruzinskaya SSR
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR
Litovskaya SSR
Moldavskaya SSR
Latviyskaya SSR
Kirgizskaya SSR
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Armyanskaya SSR
Turkmenskaya SSR
Estonskaya SSR
TOTAL
Population (in thousands)
Rural
Total Urban
116,761
(9,532)
(45,470)
(10,135)
(11,507)
(16,220)
(.12.1+81)
(6;881)
(4,535)
,733
? 87142
8,907
4,1055
3,543
2,704
? 2,749
2,039
1,996
1,860
1,688
,403
3132
206,293
56,826
(6,4)o),
(20,206)
(4,840)
(+,391)
(9,103)
(5,550)
(31219)
(3,077)
16,573
2,144
2,363
3,618
1,575
1,687
902
546
1,050
618
591
756
636
.615
90,500
78
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591935
(3,092)
(25,26)+)
(5,295)
(7,116)
(71117)
(6,931)
(3,662)
(1,458)
25,160
? 5,998
5,211
5,289
2,480
1,856
1,802
2,203
989
1,378
1,269
ryl
767
115,793
Per Cent
Urban
of Total
48.7
67.6,
4404
47.8
38.2
56.0
44.5
46.8
67.9
39.1
6.3
31.2
40.6
38.8
47.6
33.4
1909
5u5
31.0
31.8
4408
45?3
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Part Two II. Population and Manpower
further measures will be taken in this direction.
3. BgIblic Distribution and Rate of Growth
The proportion and the rate of growth of the urban popula-
tion eachvariisgreatly among the republics and ?blasts of the Soviet
Union (see Tables 2-22 and A-6, Appendix). As is true of the total
population a general eastward shift of the urban population has
been in process for several decades. The growth of cities in Siberia,
the Urals, and Central Asia received an impetus during the war years,
when millions of persons were evacuated with industriaJ installwo
tions to the east. Although many of the evacuees returned to the
west after the war, -a' large number settled in the new areas. More
important, as a result of the war the Soviet Union realized the
necessity of developing the less accessible hinterlands, of the
country. Continued urban growth in these regions is insured by the
current plans to accelerate industrialization in Siberia, a process
which will involve a redistribution of millions of persons.
n Only about 20 per cent of the urban population were located
in Asiatic Russia (including the Urals) in 1926. This proportion
had increased to about 25 per cent in 1939 and to slightly more
than 30 per cent in 1958, despite the annexation of urban popula-
tion in the Baltics, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia. Al-
though the bulk of the urban population is located in the Central
A Industrial Region of the RSFSR, the areas with the highest pro-
portions of urban population are usually in regions where conditions
preclude the possibility of important agricultural development, as
in the case of the Northwestern and Far Eastenn Regions of the RSFSR.
Ukrainskaya,SSR, on the other hand, with important industrial centers
and a large urban population,is 63 per cent rural, because of the
high density of the agricultural population.
, Urban population in Asiatic Russia doubled in the 1939-58
period, while European Russia showed a rate-of growth about one-
third as high. Since the RSFSR spreads across both continents,
the estimated growth of 56.2 per cent (see Table 2-23) is deceiving,
since it includes both the regions of rapid urban growth and the
war-devastated areas in the west. For example, the urban popula-
ion of the Far East increased-more -than 170 per cent between 1939
and 1958, while in the Volga Region during the same period, it
grew by less than 20 per cent. In the Kazakhskaya SSR and the
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1.14,22Rmigi2a4millawm:
Thble 2-23
ESTIMATED CHANGE OF USSR URBAN POPULATION
BY REPUBLIC: 1939/406-1958
Republic
Russian SFSR
Ukrainskaya SSR
Belorusskaya SSR
Uzbekskaya SSR
Kazakhskaya SSR
Gruzinskaya SSR
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR
Litovskaya SSR
Moldavskaya SSR
Latviyskaya SSR
Kirgizskaya SSR
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Armyanskaya SSR
Turkmenskaya SSR
Estonskaya SSR
Urban Population
in thousands
12.322
36,377
13,175
2,159
1,445
1,706
1,067
1,161
675
450
? 708
271
252
366
416
372
TOTAL 60,600
122.
56,826
16,573
2,114
2,363
3,618
1,575
1,687
902
546
1,050
618
591
756
636
615
Per Cent
Change
+ 56.2
+ 25.8
007
+63.5
+ 112.1
+14706
+145?3
+ 33.6
?+ 21.3
+1+8.3
+ 128.0
+ 13405
+ 106.6
+ 52.9
+ 6503
90,500 + 49.0
republics of Central Asia, urban population almost doubled during
these years. Republics with the lowest rates of urban growth are
the Ukraine and Belorussia, where many of the cities were almost
destroyed during World War II and barely regained their prewar
populations by 1958. Moldavia experienced a slight population loss.
With few exceptions, the distribution of urban growth fol-
lowed the regional pattern established between 1926-39, during the
period of greatest urbanization, and there is no reason to believe
that any major changes in this growth will occur in the near future.
Siberia and Central Asia will continue to receive a disproportional
number of urban in-migrants, concurrent with the planned develop-
ment in that area, while the urban growth in the western regions
will be substantially more moderate.
4. Population of Cities
Table A-7, Appendix, presents the 1958 estimated populations
for urban areas of oblast subordination or above and the 1939/40
populations of those-cities which currently have populations of more
than 50,000. Cities with populations of 100,000 and above wee
included in the list published in Narodnoye khozyaystwo ,SSSR. The
populations of all cities in the RSFSR with more than 50,000 in-
habitants and/or those which are administrative centers were listed
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Part Two 1.4,2ARILltiara_miAmstm
in Narodnoye khozyaystvo RSFS_R, while those of Ukrainian urban
centers of republic or oblast subordination were listed in Narodne
gsmosin..?....s.tairarsvoulisl,y.oRSR. These data were projected to 1958
usitig the regional differential rate of urban growth. Population
estimates for the remainder of the cities are based on numerous
reports and indexes, scattered population data from both Russian
and German sources, data on election districts, and the 1926 and
1939 census.
It should be recognized that the validity of each estimate
is directly proportional to the size of the city. Thus, estimates
for cities of 100,000 and above (including about half the Urban
population) are the most accurate. Estimates for cities which were
Over 50,000 in 1939 and were reported in the census of that year
are also considered relatively reliable. For urban areas under
50,0001 the estimates are more tentative. They are usually more
accurate for cities outsidA thP RSFSR and the Ukraine, where an
accurate indication of the size of a town may be'obtained from
small election districts (based on populations of 5,000-20,000),
and less accurate for cities within these two republics, where
election districts are based on populations of 150,000 and 1001000,
respectively, and where other indexes and rates of projection had
to be used.
5. Rural Population
The rural population of the Soviet Union is estimated at
116 million as of 1 January 1958. This total is derived on the
basis of projections of the total and urban populations as reported
for 1956 in AtudnomishozygystvojpR. Since the system of registra-
tions in the urban areas is more complete and the urban statistics
are more reliable, the problem of inaccurate data is essentially
concentrated in the rural regions of the Soviet Union (see Section
IL A. 2 for a discussion of underenumeration). For example, prior
to the 1939 census, Soviet sources freely admitted that for all
practical purposes the rural population of the country was an un-
known quantity. Although definite improvements have been made in
the system of registration in rural areas, particularly in 1948-49,
there is still no evidence of complete enumeration, and undoubtedly
current data reflect a serious underenumeration.
The rural population has decreased as a result of the high
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Part Two -11-1---EggOationandlower
volume of rural-to-urban migration, which during the periods of
greatest urban grOwth more than wiped oUt the natural increase of
the rural population, In terms of outright War tosses, the rural
segment of the population sustained a much higher proportion of the
casualties than did. the urban population. Not only did the military
services recruit more heavily from the rural population, but a higher
proportion of the. urban population was evacuated to the east and
the return movement to the cities was higher. Postwar rural-to-
urban migration 'usually compensated for losses sustained by the
urban population.
The heaviest losses sustained by the rural population were.
in the occupied areas of-the Soviet Union. 'Thus, the old territories
of the RSFSR,.Ukraine, and Belorussia and the. old Baltic republics
show the greatest-proportional decrease (see Table 240. A de-
crease is also revealed in Turkmenistan, Georgia, and Azerbaydzhan.
Table 24'4
ESTIMATED CHANGES IN USSR RURAL POPULATLON,
BY REPUBLIC: 1939/40-1958
Republic
Russian SFSR
Ukrainskaya SSR
Belorusskaya SSR
Uzbekskaya SSR
Kazakhakaya SSR
GruzinSkaya SSR
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR
Litovskaya $SR
Moldavskaya SSR
La.Myskaya SSR
Kirgizskaya SSR
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Armyanskaya SSR
Turkmenskaya SSR
Estonskaya SSR
Number Change: .1919/40-$3
(in thousands) Absolute
1939/40 1258 (in thousands), Per Deli
72,065
28,656
7,090
41888
4-1388
2,503
2,
2,250
2,050
1.196
11087
1,232
916
836
680
TOTAL 131,982
59,935
25,160
5,998
5,211
5,289
2;480
1,856
1,802
2,203
989
1,378
1,269
932
767
115,793
- 12,130
- 3,496
- 1,092
323
901
23
189
88
? 153
207
191
37
16
- 69
- 16,189
- 16.8
- 12.2
- 15.4
6.6
20,5
-
- 9.2
- 19.9
7.5
- 17.3
16.1
3.0
1.8
- 8.3
- 22.9
- 12.3
The remaining republics, which except for Moldavia were not occupied
by the enemy, show a moderate growth 'of about 9 per cent in the
1939-58 period, or about 0.5 per cent per annum. This slow-rate.
of growth was due to rural-to-urban migration, military losses and
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Part Two
a birth deficit. These factors, however, were somewhat compensated
for by an eastward movement of the rural population. Although. rela
tively small in -volume, this movement was accentuated by the devel-
opment of virgin and fallow lands in Kazakhstan and western Siberia.
During the height of the program (1954-56), a large number of rural
migrants from European RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia, as well
as from the-other republics of the, USSR, came to settle on-the
previously uncultivated lands. On a much smaller scale, rural
settlement has also been taking place in the Far East and eastern
Siberia.
SECRET
The Soviet Union has perhaps reached the point where it
can-no longer afford. to continue a policy which builds up-the urban
population at the expense of the rural population. Although a re-
duced rate of rural-to-urban.migration will continue, it is ex-
pected that the rural population will grow for the next few years
at an annual- rate of about one percent Only a significant in-'
crease in agricultural productivity, necessary to feed a constantly
growing urban population, would release.additional rural manpower
for the growing industrial capacity of the Soviet Union.
6. Population Density
As in all-countries with large land areas, the density
pattern of the Soviet population is extremely irregular. Table
2-25.presents.the population density -outside the-major urban areas
for the 15 union republics and for the major economic regions-of
the. RSFSR. The estimated populations in this table -exclude all
urban areas of oblast -subordination and.abovel so-that the den-
sities primarily represent the distribution of the rural popula-
tion (approximately 80 per cent rural. and 20 per cent urban).
(See ,alSo Table A-79 Appendix, and-Map Up.
In general, the most densellyi populated' regions'are in
areas of intensive agricultural. developuint, such. as Ukrainskaya
BelorusskayaSSIT,.and Moldavskaya.SSR. The population den-
sity is also relatively high- in the republics of the Caucasus.
, The Central Industrial Region, in. which total 'density is among
the- highest in. the USSR., drops considerably as a result' of' the
exclusion of major urban 'centers, particularly.of.Moskva.
The lowest 'densities are found in the vast areas of
Siberia, Central Asia and the European northwest. Since a large
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II. Population and ManmeAL
Table 2-25
POPULATION OUTSIDE MAJOR URBAN AREAS OF THE USSR,
BY MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION: 1958
Administrative
Russian SFSR
? Northwestern Region
Central Industrial
Region
Volga Region
Southeastern Region
Urals Region _
? West Siberian Region
East Siberian Region
Far Eastern Region
Ukrainskaya SSR
Belorusskaya SSR
Uzbekskaya SSR
Kazakhskaya SSR
GruzinSkaya SSR
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR
Litovskaya SSR
Moldavskaya SSR
latviyikayi:SSR
Kirgizskaya SSR
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Armyanskaya SSR
Turkmenskaya SSR
Estonskaya SSR
TOTAL
Estimated
a
Population
(in thoulonds)
74,607
0+1118)
(301948)
(6,271)
(8,273)
(9,426)
(8,137)
(51016)
(2)486)
310042
6,680
5;509
6,439
2,951+
2,387
2,023
2,289
10144
1,54+
1,440
1,075
944
671
1141,866
a
ARD estimates.
Landb Population
, Area Density
(Pq. Miles) per Sq. Mile
6,336,728 12
(603,975) (7)
0+18,463) (714)
(164,551) (38)
(152,740) (54)
(293,)+313) (32)
(935,511) (9)
(2-1'74118010 (2)
(1,026,246) (2)
232,604. 133
80;131+ 83
159,101 35
1,060,465 6
29,490 100
33,080 72
25,167 80
13,047 175
241897 48
76,698 20
54,812 26
11,503 93
187,133 5
17,1408 _39
8,3)+2,267 17
b Land areas for Administrative divisions in the East Siberian
and Far Eastern Regions are taken from ARD Oblast Political and
Population Surveys. Areas affected by changes in administra7-
tive divisions in Kazakhskaya SSR and Uzbekskaya SSR, involving
oblast and republic boundaries, were measured, and the new oblast
and republic areas were calculated. The remaining figures are
from The AIM 1956 Annual Estimates. Calculated areas have not
been rounded,
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Part Two 11. Population and Manpower
proportion of the population in these areas is urban, the exclusion
of major urban settlements reduces sharply the population density.
As a result of the general redistribution of the popul&-
'lion of the USSR and the tendency to migrate to the east, the popu-
lation density east of the Urals will increase. However, the con-
sequences will be significant only for local areas and will have
little effect on the over-all figures of the large economic regions.
C. Age-Sex Structure
1. 1958 Age-Sex Structure
The estimated 1958 age composition of the USSR population
is a projection of the mid-values of the 1956 age structure esti-
mate, based on scattered Soviet data (discussed in Section 3, fol-
lowing). The sex structure is an adaptation of the ratios pre-
sented in &Estimate of the Develo ments in USSR Po ulation Struc-
ture from January 17, 1939, to January 1, 1952 (ARD Technical
Paper, 1-3).
The excess of females in the Soviet population (see Table
2-26) reflects the heavy male losses during World War. 11 and many
of the other disasters of the past half century which periodically
have produced excess mortality among the males* The estimated sex
ratio in 1958 is 113 females per 100 males; in 1950 it was 118 per
100. Although an excess of females in the Soviet Union will persist
for several decades, the tendency to approach an equality between
the sexes will continue.
Table 2-26
AGE-SEX STRUCTURE OF THE USSR:
1958
Per Cent
Population (in millions) of Total
Age Group , Male 'Female Total Population
0-14 30.5 30.2 60.7 29.4
15-59 59.7 70.1 129.8 62.9
60 plus ._6.1.2_ 9.2 15.8 7.7
TOTAL 96.7 109.6 206.3 100.0
The modification in the age-structure-of-the 1956-Soviet
population, which saw an increase-in-the-proportion of the' adult
population (discussed in detail'in.Section 11,4.0..2), is also
obvious in 1958. It is interesting to note that the higher level .
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Part Two 11.9.--alulatiPandManawer
of mortality in the Soviet Union and the effects of past calamities
are reflected in the low proportion of the population over 60 years
of age. This is particularly striking when faced with the exceed-
ingly low crude death rate of the Soviet Union and is more repre-
sentative of a country with high death rates. Nevertheless, the
60-plus cohort for the first time reflects a relative growth and
is well above the 13 million reported in 1954.
2. Problem of Enumeration
An estimate of the age compopition of Soviet population was
constructed by synthesizing scattered Soviet data pertaining to
various components of the total population in 1956. 'As 'a first
step, statistics on births, school enrollment, and eligible voters
were utilized to form a set of preliminary estimates of population
ages 0-6, 7-17, and 18 and over, respectively. It was necessary,
of course, to modify the basic data in part. Mortality occurring
between birth and age 6 was subtracted from the computed number of
births; similarly, as the relationship between school enrollment
and population of school age is not perfect, allowance was made
for nonattendance at school and for the continuation in primary
school of children above the "normal" four ages (7-110) of primary
school.
The technical aspects of these modifications may be summa-
rized as follows:
1 Infant mortality was computed on the basis of state-
ments in the Soviet press concerning the decline of infant
mortality in various postwar years as compared with the pre-
war period. The resulting level of infant mortality was
found to be consistent with infant mortality in the model
United Nations life table for a population with an average
life expectancy at birth of 64 years, the level of life ex-
pectancy recently reported as obtaining for the Soviet Union.
Of far less significance statistically, child mortality rates
were derived by averaging the child mortality rates of seven
countries having similar levels of infant mortality as that
estimated for the Soviet Union.
2. The population ages 7-17 was estimated by utiliz-
ing reported information on enrollment in grades 1-4, per-
centages of age classes attending school, and drop-out and
failure rates. Thus, enrollment in grades 1-4 in 1948-49,
1951-52, and 1955-56 was utilized to establish the number
7,. 8, 9, and 10 years olefin these three school years. By
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II. Po o r
aging theindividuals to 1955-56,, a consistent series was
obtained as follows:
Ages as of Year
Enroltpd in Grades ,1-4
8-10 (1948-ai9)
7-10 (1951-52)
7-10 (1955-56)
Ages as of
1955-16
15-17
1144
7-10
3. The percentage which eligible voters constituted of
the reported total Soviet population in 199+ and 1955 was
relatively constant (62.7 and 6209, respectively), and
therefore the 1955 percentage was applied to the 1956 re-
ported population to derive an estimate of eligible voters
In that year.
The groups 0-61 7-17, and 18 and over total 196,389,0001
or 2,978,000 less than the 1956 reported total population of
199,347,000. Under the tentative assumption that this residual
can be interpreted as an allowance by Soviet authorities for the
nonvoting adult population, the conclusion is implied that the
scattered materials pertaining to the age composition of Soviet
population basically confirm the official population reported by
Soviet authorities. It should be kept in mind, however, that the
preceding computations make no allowance for adjustments to the
0-6 and 7-17 estimates and that the allowance of about 3 million
nonvoting adults would seem to understate significantly the true
size of this group. The possible scope of such adjustments is
discussed below.
Underregistration of births. Russia's experience in birth
registration is extensive, as church registers date back
to the early eighteenth century. Following the Bolshevik Revolution
in 1917, responsibility for maintenance of vital statistics was
transferred from eccles4astical to civil authorities. By 1939 reg-
istration was considered by Soviet authorities to be satisfactory
except in the more backward areas. In Soviet sources, the effec-
tiveness of birth registration is usually measured against the
results of a census, disregarding the well-known fact that censuses
themselves nearly always involve underenumeration of infants and
children. The scope of the problem is suggested by the estimate
made by rrank-Lorimer, the demographer, that the 1939 census under-
enumerated the children under two years of age by 6.3 percent.
Effectiveness of registration has undoubtedly improved since 1939,
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Part Two .114,-ESSIALUSELAIUMIMEE
but it appears that births still may be under registered by 5 to 10
per cent. In comparison, underregistrat ion of births in the U.S.,
according to official data of the U.S.. Bureau of the Census, amounted
to 8 per cent in 1940 and to 1.5 per cent in 1954, (Ansley Coale
has"estimated that the 1950 U.S. census underenumerated the popula-
tion under age five by 3 per cent-4 per cent of all white children
and 10 per cent of nonwhite children )
, School enrollment in relation to ?o ulation o school ..e
School participation, drop-out, and failure rates for the
prewar period were utilize0. to test'the.method of deriving postwar
data on population of-school age from statistics on school enroll-
ment in primary grades. The population as-predicted from school
enrollment data was 4.5 per cent lower than the population reported
in the official 1939 census. School participation rates tend to
expand gradually to optimal levels, whereas failure and drop-out
rate tend to decrease gradually to minimal levels, in such a way
that there is a general tendency for primary school enrollment to
approach a state of perfect correlation with the actual population
of school age. Thus, it is doubtful if school enrollment data in
the postwar period underrepresents the actual population of school
age by as much as was found in the prewar comparison. Alternatiie
estimates of underrepresentation of 2-3 per cent are given in Table
2-27
Age Group
0.6
7-17
18 and over
Eligible
Voters
Others
neclassified in
Table 2-27
AGE COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET POPULATION:
1 January 1956
? Unadjusted
Estimate
cin,tho*nde
31,912
39,097
125,312
Assumed
. Percentage of
Underrepresentation
5-10
2-3
Total
Reported Total
Discrepancy between reported
and adjusted totals
88
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Adjusted Estimate
(in thpu?ands)
LOW , UPPer
-33,600 35,500
39,900 40,300
1 29 ,200 133,300
202)700 209,100
199,31+7 1V 4,3107
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Earia?"wc-' IL..autulaiimmdlaamtrE
included as It has been offi-
cially reported that in 1931+ disfranchised adults consti-
tuted 2.5 per cent of the population of voting age (age 18 and
over). In the absence of reliable population data for 1934 (the
previous all-union census was in 1926), it appears likely that the
reported percentage refers to those explicitly deprived of .voting
eligibility rather than constituting the difference between the
lists ofeligible voters and .the population age 18 and over. Thus,
the total number of adults in 193+ probably exceeded somewhat the
reported percentage who were explicitly deprived of voting eligi-
bility. Comparison of.reported voters for 1938-39 with the adult
population counted in the 1939 census indicates. that eligible voter
statistics underrepresented the recensed population age 18 and over
in 1938-39 by 6.2-6.3 per cent. It is known that the number of perr.
sons disfranchised for political reasons increased significantly
after 1934 as "a result of the purges of the late 1930s. If the
estimate of forced laborers from the 1541 plan, made by the Soviet
specialist Jasny, is accepted as an estimate for this group as of
1939, it would appear that forced laborers would account for some-
what more than half, or 3.5 million, of the computed 6.2-6.3 per
cent discrepancy and that the remaining 2.7 million would consist
of insane and senile persons, common criminals, and unregistered
eligible voters.
During the war and immediate postwar years, the number of
forced laborers increased radically as a result of various Soviet
deportations. In the post-Stalin period many forced laborers have
been released, and it must not be forgotten that the high forced
labor camp population has been continuously decimated by excess
mortality caused by severe living conditions, inadequate food and
clothing, and overwork. However, despite Soviet propaganda to the
contrary, forced labor camps still exist, and the proportion of
nonvoting adults as a whole undoubtedly falls within the range of
3-6 per cent implied for 1934-39.
Table 2-27 suggests that the 1956 reported total population
may understate the size of the USSR's population by 3-10 million.
However, the relationships among the three broad age groups would
not be significantly altered by the indicated ranges of underenumer-
ation, as shown in Table 2-28, where the age structure of Soviet
population in'14OJ,.compared with 1956.
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1,1?0?..190.104.120.0).fsmorLer.
Table 2-28
CHANGES IN AGE COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET POPULATION:
1940-56
(in per cent of total population)
121
17.3j 16.01-17,35
23.90 19.12-1904,
57 63,0?-61+.46
100.00 100.00
APPr9uP
0-6
7-17
18 plus
TOTAL
a
ARD Technical Paper.
111111?11.
, Changes. _ill age catiposAtion., 19140'and 1956g, The most funda?
mental modification in the age structure of the Soviet popu-
lati9n, 1940.s56 (see -Table 2-T28) was the changed relationship be4
tween the adult and nonadult -population, persons ages -18 and over
constituting 58 77 per cent of the- total population in -1940 and
634+ per cent in 1956. The decreased proportion of the'nonadult
population is chiefly the product of the war and immediate postwar
birth deficit and excess mortality of the 7-17 age group during
World War The 0-6 age group in 1956 still constituted a rela-
tively high proportion of the total population, despite a drop by
one-third in the birth rate, as a consequence of the reduction by
over two-thirds of infant mortality between 194.4-1956.
D. Trenciatet
? Three significant trends are apparent in Soviet vital rates
"-- table 1) the crLide death- r'ate Fes per
',Quo
cent; 2) the crude birth-rate has declined by one-third; and 3) the
natural increase' rate "hs remained relatively- stab le
The most singular. aspect of the-new Tates is the radical
dee I ine- the ' crude 'death rate. 1 t has bon conjeCtured th4t this
reductiorrmight be -artificial- to a significant degree ciwing-to in-
complete- registration of deaths, -particularly deaths of. persons in
forced labor camps. This conjecture does. not seem -explana-
tion-of the decline in comparison.with the prewar rate, however,
since prewar 'data'may be-assumed to have been equally defective.
The'enormous decline appears rather to be the- product of 1) Imo
provements in living conditions through medical advances; 2). the
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Table 249
BIRTH AND DEATH RATES AND NEW GRRINTH
OF USSR POPU(ATION: 1913-56
Blahs Deaths Net Population
ilder 1,000 per 1,000 Increase per 1,000
Year Population P9pulati9n Population_
1913 47.0 30.2 i6.8
1926 44.0 20.3 23.7
1938 38.3 17.8 20.5
1940 31.7 18.2 13.4
1950 26.5 9.6 16.9
1951 26.8 9.6 17.2
1952 26)4 9.3 17.1
1953 X.9 9.0 15.9
1954. 26.5 8,9 17.5
1955 25.6 8.2 17.2
rit-g,
i
I 7,"/ .--../ P`,
X n 707 17.3
aSource: NaroOnoye kho;yaystvo SSSR (1957).
selective effects of the war, which killed off the sick and aged
who otherwise would have died later; and 3) the changed age-sex
structure of the population which places a larger proportion of
the total population in the ages of lowest mortality rates.
TL- last e
importance of thes point, in particular,is emphasiz-
ed by new Soviet data indicating that average life expectancy reached
61+ years in 1955, a rate corresponding to a life table death rate
(i.e., actual Soviet mortality rates for each age-sex group in the
population computed in relation to a hypothetically stationary popu-
lation) of 15.6 per 1,000. Since the life table death rate is not
computed in relation to the? actual age-sex composition of the
pOpulatiOht it adequateljr expresses the actual level of mortality
rates and makes possible the following comparison. Although the
crude death rate in the Soviet Union was lower than the crude death
rate in the U.S. in 1955, the actual level of mortality rates was
10 per cent higher.in the Soviet Unibn in the same year. Never-
theless, the reduction of 'mortality rates in the Soviet Union has
been-enormous, the current life table death rate being 28 per cent
lower in 1955 than the life table death rate of 1939.
Although the change in the crude birth rate has been less
spectacular than that of the death rate, the degree of.change is
actually quite large--a reduction in the number of births on
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Part Two II. Population and Manpower
average, of about 2 million per year. This phenomenon may be viewed
as the anticipated consequence of increased industrialization and
urbanization in the USSR, and since it is contrary to the Soviet
government's pronatalist policies, an attempt was made to hide
the greatly lowered birth rate as recently as the last World Popu-
lation Conference held in 1951+. Since that time, however, Khrushchev
has castigated bachelors and argued for the achievement of a three-
child family. The birth rate in the next five years will probably
not decline significantly, as persons in the reproductive ages of
20-34 will be drawn essentially from age classes born in high birth-
rate years. After 1962, however, a precipitous decline in the birth
rate can be expected, for the number of potential parents will have
been reduced by nearly 10 million as a consequence of the war and
immediate postwar birth deficit. Under the assumption of a slowly
rising crude death rate and aprecipitous decline in the birth rate,
the natural increase rate is expected to drop sharply in the future.
E. Ethnic Composition
1. Ethnic Groups
An outstanding characteristic of the ethnic composition of
the Soviet Union is its great complexity. Aside from the Great
Russians, who constitute only a bare majority of the population
(54.58 percent), probably 168 other ethnic groups of the most
diverse linguistic and cultural background are represented. Only
twelve of the groups are large enough to constitute more than one
per cent of the population (see Table 2-30). Of the remainder
moriu'amount' to
only 'a 'few thousand, some having been classified
separately purely on the basis of dialect or tribal distinctiveness.
The diversity of the Soviet Union's ethnic composition be-
comes less formidable when it is realized that an estimated 76 per
cent of the population belong to the single linguistic-cultural
grouping of the Eastern Slays. In addition to the Great Russians,
this cactegory includes the Ukrainians and the Belorussians, the
second and third largest nationalities of the Soviet Union. Al-
though all three groups speak Eastern Slavic languages and share
a common Eastern Orthodox cultural heritage, important differences
exist among them. Great Russian culture tends to dominate the other
two groups, particularly the Belorussian, and there has been con-
siderable assimilation of the two smaller groups by the Russians.
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Part ,TwoII. Popu lat ion and Manpower
SE CRJE
, Table 2-30
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE USSR: 1958a
Ethnic Group
Per Cent
of Total Population
Great Russian 514-.58
Ukrainian 18.26
Belorussian 3.16
Uzbek 2.59
Tatar 2.25
Kazakh 1.63
Jewish 1 .24
Georgian
AzerbaydzhaniAn
Armenian
Polish
Moldavian
Lithuanian
Mordvian
Chuvash
Tadzh;k
German
Latvian
Peoples of Dagestan
Kirgiz
Bashkir
Turkmen
Estonian
Others
TOTAL
1.20
1.20
1.15
1.10
1.01
0.96
0.77
0.77
0.67
0.67
0.62
0.43
0.43
0.43
0)+3
0.43
4 ,02
100.00
aProjection of data presented in ARD
Technical Paper 1-3.
The Turkic-language groups constitute an important bloc in
the Soviet Union's population. The more important nationalities
are the Uzbeks, the Kazakhs, the Turkmen, and the Kirghiz of Turkestan;
the Azerbaydzhani of the Transcaucasus area; and the Tatars and
Bashkirs who reside in the region between the Volga River and the
Ural Mountains. These groups share a common Islamic cultural her-
itage.
The Tadzhiks of southern Turkestan are closely related to
the-Turkic nationalities of-Turkestan but differ from them in their
Iranian -speech. The "influence' of Turkic languages has been impor-
tant within this group and a large number now speak Uzbek.
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Part Two I I. Population and Manpor
The more important Finnic groups of the USSR are the Mord-
vinians in the Volga region and the Estonians in the Baltic litto-
ral. Other smaller groups speaking Finnic languages inhabit the
northern portion of European Russia and'western Siberia and the
Volga valley. Despite similarities among their languages, wide
cultural differences exist.
The nationalities constituting the Baltic linguistic group
are the Lithuanians and the Latvians, who with the Finnic Estonians
make up the population of the Baltic littoral. Primarily Protestant
or Catholic in religion and culturally oriented toward the west,
these groups have little in common with their Russian neighbors.
Prior to the Soviet occupation in 1940 they enjoyed national inde-
pendence.
The most numerous of the ethnic groups of the Transcaucasus
area, aside from the Azerbaydzhani, are the Georgians and Armenians.
These two peoples have independent civilizations which date back to
ancient times but are related in that their cultures are basically
Christian.
The MnIdAviAns, the basic' population'of the Moldmvsknyn ,SSR,
are closely connected lingustically, culturally, and religiously
with the Rumanians. Until 1940 they formed a part of the Rumanian
Kingdom.
The peoples of Dagestan are a melange of small ethnic groups
who inhabit the eastern end of the Caucasus Mountains. Linguisti-
the most ? they pertain
IL_
part, LEM), perLam LU the ISIdMIC
cultural sphere.
Although there has been a tendency toward nationality dis-
persion and intermixture in the USSR, most of the ethnic groups are
still largely concentrated in compact areas of settlement. There
are, however, exceptions to this rule, the most notable of which
are the Jews, the Poles and the Germans. The Jews and Poles are
located primarily in the Ukrainskaya, Belorusskaya, and Litovskaya
SSRs and the RSFSR. The Germans, previously centered in-the Lower
Volga Region of the RSFSR and the Ukrainskaya,SSR, are now dis-
persed through the eastern regions of the RSFSR and Central Asia.
2. 214amics of Soviet Nationality Distribution
, Two major trends are evident in the dynamics of Soviet
nationality distribution in the 1957-58 period: , 1) a continuing
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Part 1Twq II Population and Manpower
dispersion and intermingling of nationalities, characteristic of
the Soviet period as a whole; and 2) a regathering of previously
scattered groups into their original areas of settlement.
The intermingling of Russia's ethnic groups has resulted
primarily from the continuing migration sof .Russians, Ukrainians,
and Belorussians into the underdeveloped areas of the Union, the
most publicized aspect of which has been the "new lands" movement.
The effect of this migration as far as the non-Russian areas of
the USSR are concerned has been one of gradual Slavification,
and the trend has been more apparent in Kazakhstan than in any
other area. Reduced to a minority prior to World War the
Kazakhs now constitute only about one-third of the population of
their? native republic. The new-lands program, bringing an influx
of settlers into the republic, is to be continued until the end
of the current five-year plan, and it is also planned to direct
a great flow of in-migrants into the republic during the extensive
industrialization program envisaged for the next few years. The
realization of these plans will make the Kazakhs a small minority
in their own land and may in time lead to the absorption of Kazakh-
stan by the RSFSR.
The probable fate of Kazakhstan has been foreshadowed
during the past year by the incorporafin of the Karelo-Finskaya
SSR into the RSFSR. One of the determinants in this change in
administrative status was the heavy Russian movement into the
republic which reduced the Karelian and Finnish population,
depleted by prewar and World War II migrations into Finland, to
small minorities.
The effects of Russian migration on the indigenous na-
tionalities of Kazakhstan and Karelo-Finland cannot be considered
typical of non-Russian areas of the USSR. Actually,-the intensive
campaigns to develop the new-lands areas and to industrialize
Kazakhstan and Siberia have probably absorbed and will continue
to absorb a large part of any excess agrarian population from
the traditional areas of out-migration--the northwest and north-
central Ukraine, Belorussia, and central RSFSR--which normally
would be directed to other areas in which the Russians are in
the minority. The only other republic imminently threatened with
Slavification is the Kirgizskaya,SSR, where in a few years the
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Part Two
majority of the population will probably be Russian and Ukrainian.
Of the other central As republics, none has *a Slavic minority
numbering more than a quarter of the population. The same is true
of the Transcaucasian republics, while in the Baltic area only
Latvia is more than one-quarter Slavic. In the Ukraine and Belo-
russia, probably 15 per cent and 10 per cent of the population,
respectively, are Russian, although a considerable additional
segment has undergone partial Russification.
The second significant trend in the dynamics of Soviet
nationality distribution during the past year has been the re-
gathering of ethnic groups dispersed wholly or in part during the
Stalinist period. This trend is intimately connected with the
de-Stalinization program of the present regime and was clearly
presaged in the section of Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth
Party Conference which attacked the Stalinist policy of deporting
entire nationalities from their homelands, as weJl as by a 1955
decree restoring civil rights to the Caucasian expellees. Probably
the most significant aspect of this repatriation--that involving
the return of the North Caucasian groups and the Kalmyks exiled in
1943-4- for alleged collaboration with the Germans?was provided
for in a 1956 decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This
enactment provided for the restoration of the Balkars, Chechens,
Ingush, Kalmyks, and Karachai to their homelands and the recreation
of their prewar administrative-territorial unitse The transfer of
the Kalmyks, Karachai, and Balkar is to be nnmpleted by 1958,
while the terminal date for the return of the Chechens and lngush
has been set for 1960.
It should be emphasized that this measure does not com-
pletely reverse the mass deportation policy of the World Wan II
period. No provision has been made, for example, for the return
of the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars to their homelands,
and it is presumed that these groups will be forced to remain in
the areas to which they were deported.
The trend toward a regrouping of the ethnic groups wholly
or partially dispersed during the Stalinist period has not been
limited to the nationalities deported during World War il. It has
also involved a repatriation of some Estonians, Latvians, an0 Lithu-
anians from exile or forced labor. Large numbers of these groups
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Part Two Ii44299111ativa_and manpower
were exiled after the Soviet seizure of the Baltic republics in
1540-41, in the immediate postwar period, and during collectiviza-
tion. It is possible, moreover, that the amnesty decrees of 1953
and 1955 have led to the return of other groups from forced labor
camps and areas of deportation, but data are insufficient to
reach any definite conclusions.
A final current in the repatriation trend involves the
return to their homeland of persons who had Polish citizenship
on 17 September 1939, This is a return to the policy of 1946-47
when approximately 1.5 million Poles were sent to Poland in ex-
change for a lesser number of Ukrainians, Belorussians, and
Lithuanians resident in Poland. The current emigration received
its first impetus under the repatriation agreement of November
1956 and is expected to be intensified under a new accord of March
1957. Forty thousand were repatriated in 1956 and about 120,000
are expected to emigrate in 19570 The total number of potential
repatriates has been estimated at 500,000.
Table 2-31 presents the distribution of ethnic groups by
union republic.
Table 2-31
DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC GROUPS
BY UNION REPUBLIC: 1958a
Ethnic Group
Russian SF8R
Rusian
Others
TOTAL
Ukrai6skaya SSR
Ukrainian
kusian
Others
TOTAL
PAr nAnt
of Total
Population
80
20
100
75
15
10
lco
?Per Cent
of Total
Ethnic Groua
?Belorusskaya SSR
Belorussian 80
Russian 10
Others 10
TOTAL 100
...?11.Kazakplay4,04
Kazakh 35
Russian and
Ukrainian 50
Others 15
TOTAL 100
? aProjection of data presented in 212_125LLamoilitimItAi
with adjustments for the Ukraine, Belorussia, the RSFSR, and
Kazakhstan.
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Part Two
Table 2-31 (continued)
Per Cent
of Total
Ethnic Group Population
Uzbekskaya,SSR
Uzbek
Russian
Others
? TOTAL
Gruz.illskaya S,?!i
tIorgi*n
Armenian
Russian
Others
TOTAL
60
20
20
100
60
10
10
20
100
Azerbaydzhansk.aya SS,B
Azerbaydzhanian 60
Russian 20
Armenian
Others
TOTAL
Litovskaya SSR
Lithuanian
Russian
Others
TOTAL
Moldavskaya SR
Moldavian
Russian
Ukrainian
Others
TOTAL
Latviyskaya
Latvian
Russian
Others
TOTAL
10
10
100
80
15
100
85
5
5
5
100
60
35
5.
100
H Populatipn and ManpQwey..
Ethnic Group
Kirgiz
Russian
Uzbek
Ukrainian
Others
Per Gent
of Total
Population
45
30
10
10
5.
TOTAL 100
T,adz,hikskaya SS
Tadihik 60
Uzbek 20
Others 15
Russian
TOTAL 100
Armyanskaya SSR
Armenian
Russian
Others
TOTAL
Turkmen%W.120.
Turkmenian
Russian
Others
TOTAL
Estonskaya SSR
Estonian
Russian
TOTAL
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80
10
10
100
60
20
20
100
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Part Two II. Population.
F. Labor Force
1. The "Gainfully Occupied" Population
The 1958 "gainfully occupied" population of the USSR totals
an estimated 113.8 million persons (see Table 2-32), or 55 per cent
of the total population as derived from Soviet sources. The large
proportion which are estimated to be gainfully occupied may in
large part be associated with the problem of underenumeration (see
Section II. C.) of the total population. However, it is also the
result of using in the present study the "gainfully occupied" con-
cept which has been traditionally utilized in Soviet censuses. A
more restrictive Soviet concept of employment will be discussed
later in this section, where certain new Soviet data will be pre-
sented.
Table 2-32
THE GAINFULLY OCCUPIED POPULATION OF THE LR: 1958
(Numbers in millions)
Males Females Total
Total 61.6 52.2 113.8
Urban 27.1 17.0 114. I
Rural 34.5 35.2 69.7
The estimated gainfully occupied population in Soviet urban
areas closely approximates the western concept of labor force, in
that men and women engaged for the most part in full-time economic
activities are included, while youths under age 16 are included
only if they engage in full-time employment. The number of females
gainfully occupied in Soviet urban areas appears low in comparison'l
with the number of males, but aaually the proportion of urbanife-
males who are working is quite high. In 1958, 35 percent'of all
urban females (and 50 per cent of women ages 16-49) were gainfully
occupied as compared with only 31 per cent in 1939.
In rural areas, approximately the same number of males and
females are gainfully occupied, although the number of women
greatly exceeds the number of men in the total rural population.
The estimate of persons gainfully occupied in rural areas is arti-
ficially high, as is true for any predominantly agricultural
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Part Two 111.20.092.421AAJAMVU:
population where the gainfully occupied concept is utilized. Youths
who work part-time after school hours, on weekends, and during the
summer school vacation are considered gainfully occupied. Similarly,
womem who work only during the harvesting season are also included.
Even the level of employment of men is exaggerated, since off-
season and other unemployment is not taken into account.
In general, it is considered that the above estimates for
the? urban population are a fairly accurate representation of the
actual urban labor force, whereas the estimates for the rural pop-
ulation more closely approach an estimate of the potential rural
labor force.
2. Categories of Gainful Employment
The largest single category of the gainfully occupied in
1958 consisted of workers and employees (see Table 2-33). This
category is now significantly larger than the collective and indi-
vidual farmer group; together, these two categories comprise 85
Table 2-33 icwie G?.15
CATEGORIES OF GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT:
1 January 1958
Category
Workers and employees
Collective and indi-
vidual farmers
Military
Forced laborers
Cooperative and non-
cooperative handi-
craftsmen
Othersa
TOTAL
Number
Males
28.2
21.4b
3.2
1.3
2.0
in millions ,Per Cent
Females Total of Total
23.1 51.3 45.1
23.6b 46.0b 140.4
14-.5 3.9
.3 3.5 3.1
mommis.
.6
61.6 52.2
1.9
6.6
1113L8
107
5.8
100.0
alncludes persons who by definition are excluded from re-
ported categories '(defense workers, full-time Party and Kom-
somol officials, and self-employed persons) or who, in relation
to Soviet data having a more restricted definition of employ-
ment, are not usually employed throughout the year in a
leading branch of the national economy.
bResidual.
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Part Two -1-11-42"ancnower
per cent of the gainfully occupied population. In the 1939-55
period, however, workers and employees increased from about one-
third of the total gainfully occupied to 45 per cent, while col-
lective and individual farmers, despite annexations of predomi-
nantly agricultural populations after 1939, decreased from more
than 50 per cent of the 1939 gainfully occupied population to
about 40 per cent of the 1958 gainfully employed. These trends
are expected to continue.
Reported Soviet data in 1955 confirm ARD's estimate that
females constituted 4-5 per cent of the total number of workers
and employees in that year. In the immediate future, the pro-
portion of such persons who are women is expected to remain
relatively constant and may even decline slightly. The dis-
torted sex ratio among collective and individual farmers as a
consequence of heavy male military casualties in World War II
is becoming more normal each year, as the number of persons enter-
ing the working ages are about equally split between males and
fAmAlAc, The cistimated sex ratio in 1958 is 110 females for each
100 males gainfully occupied.
30 Etported Data on ____.........nledPersone
Unlike much of the new data concerning Soviet population
and workers and employees, material concerning "employett persons"
is of questionable usefulneqs and, in fact, taken as a whole, is
perhaps one of the grossest statistical monstrosities to appear in
Soviet literature. This may be illustrated as follows: Three
thisles in Narodnoye khozyaystvo (1956) have a direct bearing? on
the total USSR labor force. The first (on page 19) deals with
social classes of the working population and their dependents, but
the definition of such groups as lworkers an' employees" and-"col-
lective farmers" apparently differs significantly from data shown
in two general labor force tables. The first of the general labor
force tables (on page 187) deals with the "distribution of the
population employed in the USSR national economy by branches."
Only percentages are shown, however, and these are rounded so
severOy as to make them almost worthless. In the second (on page
188) the "distribution of the population employed in the USSR nat-
ional economy in productive and nonproductive branches" is reported,
but again only as percentages of an unknown total, although they
are rounded by one less digit. Comparison of ffiese two tables is
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Part Two II. Population and Manpower
further impaired by the use of different classifications of "branches
of national economy" in each, and one is also confronted with the
problem of components which are not compatible. It has been offical-
ly stated that student-members of families of collective farmers
(probably those 16 years of age and above) who work part-time
(e.g., during their vacation periods) on collectives are listed in
the balance of labor resources as collective farmers, converted to
year-round employment. Members of families of workers and employees
Who are employed in auxiliary private economy, however, are cal-
culated by determining the quantity of labor (man-days) expended.
Thus, the problem arises of interpreting A rARult whinh is
com-
pounded of amounts of accredited time worked and the number of
persons working.
Study of available materials leaves the following impres-
sions: 1) Soviet authorities appear more interested in obscuring
than in clarifying the size and distribution of the Soviet labor
force; 2) the materials on which these tables are based are un-
certain, both in terms of quality and scope; and 3) the components
are often not compatible and the labor force concept which emerges,
in some respects, is similar in meaning to that which might obtain
from counting watermelons and grapes.
Two methods may be utilized in attempting to derive abso-
lute data on employment from the table appearing on pagec188
1) Members of industrial artels, according to the table, constitute
1.8 per cent of the "total employed (excluding military personnel)."
If an absolute figure were available for members-of artels, the
total labor force could be derived, and as a consequence of obiain-
ing this total, the numbers in all other branches of national
economy. On the following page, members of artels in 1955 are re-
ported to have totalled "1.8 million persons." However, on page
44 of the same source members of artels are reported in the same
year to have totalled 1 6 million persons. To this should be added
the note that various Soviet sources in the postwar years have
consistently reported the- number of artel members as on the order
of 1.8 million. For example, Pravda has reported that members of
artels totaled 1,865,000 in 1953 and 1,961,000 in 1956. The effects
of using either 1.6 million, 1.8 million, or 1,961,000 on the size
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Part Two 14. Population and ,Manpower
of the "total employed (excluding military and nonworking students
is as follows:
Assumed Number of
Members of Artels
1,6001000
1,800,000
1,961,000
Resulting Total Employed
(e)ccluding Military)
88,888,889
100,000,000
108,9)4,4+
Thus, there is a difference of 20 million in total employed depend-
ing upon which figure is used for members of artels. Various hypo-
theses can be offered as a possible explanation of the divergences
in the reported number of artel members. It is possible that i6
million represents an annual average, while the other figures are
end-of-year figures. A more plausible conjecture by specialists
outside the USSR is that the smaller figure is a ?less inclusive
one, excluding members of artels who are not engaged in "material
branches of production."
(2) Another method may be used to check the above results
By combining subcategories of the table on page 188 (appearing as
Subcategories a and 'b of Category land all of Category 2 in Table
2-3+)'a percentage can be obtained of the tptal employed which is
roughly equivalent to the data on workers and employees as reported
in Nrodnoelmastvo on page 189. Dividing the latter by the
former, a? 1955 total employment figure (excluding military) of
85,43$1162 is obtained. This result is not basically incompatible
with the result of 88,888,889 obtained by Method 1 above, since
the subcategories as combined from the table on page 188 have been
admitted by the Central Statistical Administration to be "slightly
more complete (included are hired personnel of collectives, social
organizations and other small groups)" than the data on workers and
employees alone.
To summarize available statistics on total Soviet employ-
ment are exceedingly crude and of unknown reliability. However,
it appears that in preparing Narodnoye khozyaystvo Soviet statis-
ticians used a figure on total employment) excluding military and
nonworking students, of about 89 million. This figure, as well as
the implied distribution among branches of national economy, is
shown in Table 2-11-. In Column 4-of the table, the results ob-
tained for 1955 by Method "l are shown (assumOtion: members of
artels constitute 1.6 million persons) and this column is believed
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Part Two
11422211,2:iimmAnilLanpower
Table 2-54
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION EMPLOYED IN PRODUCTIVE
AND NONPRODUCTIVE BRANCHES
OF THE USSR NATIONAL ECONOMYa
(Numbers in thousands)
Total employed in
state and cooper-
ative enterprises
and institutions
and on kolkhozes
and private subsid-
iary farms (exclud-
ing military per-
sonnel)
1. I branches of
material produc-
tion (including
freight transport
and trade)
a. Workers
b. Engineering
and technical
personnel, em-
ployees, subor-
dinate mainte-
nance personnel,
trade workers
c. Members of in-
dustrial artels (1,600)
d. Kolkhoz workers
employed on col-
lectivized farms
and private sub-
sidiary farms (337333) (3+,726)(3)+1714) (32,039) 11-1700)
d. Individual peas-
ants and unin-
corporated
handicraftsmen (355) (7,298) (1,578) (342) (400)
Method 1
1955
88t882 76,827
MestiOd 2
1950
Estimates
for 1 Jan.,
1958 (in
1955, thousands)
85 ,4-3 8 9 2 800
75,733 67,531 6,007 72,793 79,100
(28,089) (114,905) (20,197) (26,998) (29,400)
In nen\
Y) 'V) (
(G nnAl
ko,771)
(r 8 i0 ) (8,715) (moo)
(1,690) (11183) (17538) (1,600)
a The 1957 edition of Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR, received while these
Annual Estimates were in preparation, contains data_showing the proportion
each category of the employed population represents of the total. The
most significant changes revealed by these data involve an increase in the
proportion of workers and a reduction in that of industrial artel members.
These changes are primarily the result of the transfer of certain indus-
trial cooperative enterprises to state industry and the consequent reclas-
ification of their 60d1000 members as workers.
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Part Two ij,21,3agiat man mer
Table 24+ (continued
Method 1
1
Estimates
foril Jan.
Method 2 1958 (in
1950 thoupilds)
f. Members of fam-
ilies of workers
and employees
employed in priv-
ate subsidiary
farms (3,289) (1,921) (2,5'25') (3,161). (3,500)
2, In nonproductive
branches (education,
public health, com-
munal housing, pas-
senger transport and
communications,
state administrative
apparatus, public
and cooperative
organizations)
13,156
9,296 10,888 12 645 13,700
to be more valid than the results for 1955 shown under Column 3 which
were obtained by Method 2 (assumption: Subcategories a and b of Cat-
egory 1 and all of Category 2 are approximately equal to exactly re-
ported data on the number of workers and-employees). However, in
the absence of a comparable figure on artel members for 1940 and 1955,
the results of utilizing Method 2 are considered more valid in study-
ing the changes through time among the branches of national economy)
since the method can be held constant.
The most striking change? suggested in Table 2-34 is the de-
cline in the number of EA.rsons employed in the two subcategories
"kolkhoz workers employed on collectivized farms of kolkhozes and
an private subsidiary farms" and "individual peasants and unincor-
porated handicraftsmen." In 1940, 42 million persons, or 54.7 per
cent of the total employed (excluding military), were doing such
work, as compared with only 36 million in 1950 and about 33 mil-
lion in 1955. In 1955 the two categories amount to only 37.9 per
cent of the total employed (excluding military).
A second trend of interest in Table 2-31+ is the indication
that wage earners (rabochiye or, roughly, blue collar workers)
almost doubled between 1940, from about 15 million to about 28;
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Part Two II. Population and Manpower
million. The subcategory "engineers, salary earners, subordinate
maintenance personnel, and trade workers" also expanded significant-
ly, by about 2 million persons between 1940 and 1955.
In Table 2-35 the distribution of employed persons among
somewhat different branches of the national economy is quoted di-
rectly from Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR. Rough estimates for each
of the categories specified can be obtained by multiplying the approx-
imate reported percentages for 1955 by the assumed total employed
(excluding military) of 89 million. A similar absolute figure for
total employed (excluding military) in 1913, 1928, and 1937 is not
given in the Soviet source. However, the reported percentages
illustrate very well the long-term effects of industrialization--
the enormous decline in agriculture and forestry going hand in hand
with an expansion of employment in industry, education, and public
health.
It is possible to estimate roughly the proportion of collec-
tive farmers engaged primarily in nonagricultural activities. By
comparing Tables 241- and 2-35 a residual of 4 per cent, or 3.6
million persons, can be obtained for farmers engaged primarily in
construction and subsidiary enterprises on collective farms. From
a breakdown of labor days earned in terms of various types of activi
ties, it is estimated that about 1.1 million collective farmers
worked primarily in administrative-service activities on collective
farms in 1955, and that the number of collective farmers employed
primarily in nonagricultural activities totaled 4.7 million, or 11+
per cent of persons reportedly employed on collective farms.
1+. The Concepts of Gainfully Occupied and Employed Persons
Explicitly excluded from "employd persons" as reported in
112rodnuLthayilyiLILNELE were military personnel, and inspection
of Tables 2-34 and 2-35 does not reveal any subcategory where
the work of concentration camp inmates and similar laboring groups
might be conveniently hidden. Reductions of military personnel in
the last few years have been reported, but the Order of Battle esti-
mate as of May 1957 indicates that the USSR still has under arms
4.5 million men, including some 400,000 MVD and KGB personnel.
Most of the nonvoting adults, including forced laborers, are of
prime working age (see Section C.I. 1958 Age-Sex Structure) and
may therefore be presumed actually employed.
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II. Population and Manpower
Table 2-35
DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION EMPLOYED
IN THE USSR NATIONAL ECONOMY, BY BRANCHES
Estimates for
In Per Cent of To71a1 1 Jan. 1958
113 1928 1937 190 (in thousands
Total employed (exclud-
ing students and mili-
tary service personnel) 100 100 1C0 100 92,800
In industry (including
small- and large-scale)
and in construction 9 8 24 31 28,800
In agriculture and for-
estry (including sub-
sidiary private farms) 75 80 56 43 39,900
In transportation and
communication 2 2 5 6 5,600
In trade, public dining,
and material and tech-
nical supply 9 3 4-5 ,600
in education and public
health 1 2 5 9 8,300
In communal housing, in
other branches, and in
organs of state admini-
strations and the ad-
ministrative apparatus
of cooperative and
public organizations LE 5 6 6 5,600
In organs of state admin-
istration and the ad-
ministrative apparatus
of cooperative and
public organizations
(3) (2) (1 900)
Even apart from the exclusion of these groups from the
reported "employed persons," however, it must be mentioned that
the new data in Narodnoye SSSR represent a restrictive
definition of labor force. This may be contrasted with the more
inclusive approach utilized in Soviet censuses as well as in the
censuses of various other nations of the "gainfully occupied "
Soviet authorities have stated that the data shown in Narodnoye
khozyaystvo "roughly corresponds" with the definition "persons
having an occupation' used in-the census
of 19264 'Actually, this
does not appear to be true, unless "roughly corresponds" is inter-
preted to mean "exceedingly rough!' correspondence. Various
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Part Two II. Population and Manpower
researchers have attempted to derive an estimate of the "gainfully
occupied" population in 1939 by using as a starting point the age-
sex composition of the 1939 population, and by modifying where,posi-
ble 1926 labor force participation ratios for different age and sex
groups to reflect as much as possible the actual conditions of 1939.
These studies have consistently estimated that the 1939 "gainfully
occupied" population (including military) amounted to approximately
50 per cent of the total population, a finding which is compatible
with the results of the 1926 Soviet census after subtracting the
number of very young children counted in that census a; part of
the "gainfully occupied" and is also compatible with studies of
various other countries similar to the Soviet Union. However, the
computations as indicated in Table 2-34 imply that Soviet statis-..
ticians used ,a total employment figure of about 77 million for 1940.
In July 1939 military personnel constituted less than 3 million
persons (including MVD), and forced laborers have been estimated
at 3.5 million. Combining these three figures--771 3, and 3.5--
yields an employment figure of 8-81+ million, or only 43-44 per
cent of the total 1940 population.
Such an all-inclusive approach to the problem of assessing
labor force as the "gainfully occupied" concept, however, is known
to err in the direction of overstating actual employment due to the
inclusion of large numbers of women and youths in rural areas who
are engaged in farm work only on a part-time or seasonal basis.
The concept of "employed persons" used in Narodnoye khozvavstvo,
on the other hand, probably understates actual employment. This
may occur in two ways: 1) the actual labor force is minimized by
use of averages or man-year equivalents instead of "counting heads"
employed at a given time; and 2) the actual labor force is minimized
by disregarding persons not officially employed, marginal labor,
and, in particular, miscellimeous and nondescript occupations. The
most important difference between ARD estimates of "gainfully occu-
poWand Soviet data on "employed persons" refers to the category
of collective and individual farmers. ARD's estimate, obtained as
a residual by subracting other groups from the computed total gain-
fully occupied, amounts to 46 million, whereas as shown in Table
2-34, following data in Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR a rough estimate
of 34 million is obtained. Apart from questions of the accuracy
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Part Two II. Population and Manpower
of the method used to derive the figure of 34 million, as described
above, it appears that the lower figure partially or fully excludes
youths "gainfully occupied" under age 16 which, according to the
ARD estimate, amounts to about 7 million. The remaining difference
of 5 million could presumably be due to the use of different con-
cepts and/or inaccuracies in the methods of derivation.
5. Distribution of Gainfully Occupied Population by Union
Republics
Reported Soviet data imply an employed population (exclud-
in military, forced laborers, self-employed persons, and persons
officially not employed) in 1958 of 92.8 million (see Section F. 4).
ARD's estimate of the gainfully occupied popullation, more compreii
hensive in coverage than the Soviet data, indicates a gainfully
occupied population in 1958 of nearly 111+ million. A distribution
of the gainfully occupied population by union republic (see Table
2-36) was obtained by computine the prewar coefficients between
gainfully occupied in each union republic to eligible voters)
multiplying these coefficients by the postwar number of eligible
voters in each republic, and adjusting the resulting preliminary
estimate to the required total. By utilizing the voting statistics
which are tabulated on a de facto population basis, the effect is
to produce a de facto distribution of the gainfully occupied popu-
lation, in contrast to the de jure distribution of total population
among union republics as derived from recent Soviet data. For this
reason, gainful employment cannot be legitimately expressed as per
cent of the population of each union republic, but rather as the 1-
ratio of the gainfully occupied population to the total population
of each republic (shown in Column 2 of Table 2-36).
Inspection of Table 2-36 reveals that the ratio of gain-
fully occupied population to total population is highest in Estonia
and Latvia. This is not surprising since it is known that the
de jure population of these republics is significantly lower than
the de facto population and, in addition, that these areas have a
higher percentage of population in the working ages as a consequence
of relatively low birth rates and relatively high proportions of
persons in the older ages. In the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania
the ratio of gainful employment to population is also high) in part
due to the extensive participation of the rural population in farm
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II. Population and Manpower
Table 2-36
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF THE "GAINFULLY OCCUPIED"
POPULATION BY UNION REPUBLIC: 1 January 1958
Russian SFSR
Euroman Russia
(excluding RSFSR)
Ukrainskaya,SSR
Belorusskaya SSR
Litovskaya SSR
Moldavskaya SSR
Latviyskaya SSR
Estonskaya SSR
Transcaucasus
Gruzinskaya SSR
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR
Armyanskaya SSR
Kazakhskaya SSR and
Central Asia
Kazakhskaa qSR
Uzbekskaya SSR
Kiegizskaya SSR
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Turkmenskaya SSR
TOTAL USSR
Number
(in thousands)
65 8+a
33,885.
187
4,700
1,5+7
1 ,422
1,263
766
4.450
1,909
1,756
885
? 1
31,-71
3,14.81
839
845
656
113,800
a
Includes Karelo4inskaya,SSR.
Ratio of
Gainfully Occupied
to Total Population
56)4-
5212
58.0
57.7
57.2
51.7
61.9
67.3
42-
47.1
49.6
52.4
1.2
46.0
42.0
145.4
46.8
55.2
work, In the Transcaucasus and the Kazakhskaya SSR and Central
Asia, Moslem tradition prevents many women in urban areas from
undertaking gainful employment.
6. Trends in Main Working, Ages
The number of persons expected to be within the main work-
ing ages (15-51) during the period 1955-75 is based upon projec-
tions of the 1955 estimated Soviet population to 1960, 1965, 1970,
_(see Table 2-37). It has been assumed that no major war
or calamity or significant volume of immigration or emigration will
occur during this period.
The number of persons in the main working ages will increase
modestly until 1965 as a consequence of the entrance into the work-
ing ages of persons in the severely reduced birth cohorts born dur-
ing and immediately following World War I. For example annual
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II. Population and Manpower.
Table 2-37
PROJECTED USSR POPULATION!
IN WORKING AGES,(15-54):
1955-75a
(Numbers in millions)
Year Males Females Total
1955 54.2 63.3 117.5
1960 57,6 65.1 122.7
1965 60.2 65'09 126.1
1970 66,4 69.0 135%4
1975 74.4 7)4:04 148.8
aEstimates prepared by U. S. Bureau of the
Census,
entrants are expected to decline from 1-i- million in 1957 to about
2 million in 1960, but thereafter the annual number of entrants will
again increase. The total number of persons in the main working
ages, however, is not expected to decline between 1955 and 1960,
since the aging of the population will, place a larger number of
persons in the older proportion of the 15-54 age span. Thus, the
average age of the Soviet working population in this period will
increase significantly. This could be of importance to the Soviet
aim of increasing worker productivity. After 1965 the working age
population will grow at a rate approximately double that of the
ten preceding years.
The greatest increases in the period 1955-75 are expected
in the male population of working age, principally as 'a result of
the replacement of war-reduced age groups by age groups having a
relatively equal number of men and women., Under the hypotheses
of no wars and no international migr'ation, by 1975 the number of
men will approximate the number of women of working age in the
Soviet Union.
The male population ages 15-54 is usually a rather accurate
index of labor force, the small number of nonworking males (prin-
cipally students and technically unemployed) being compensated or
overcompensated by persons in the labor fore above age 55 or be-
low age 15. The female population ages 15-5+ is much less accurate
as an index of labor force and more closely approximates what
might be termed the maximum potential female labor force under
conditions approaching optimum stress.
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Part Two II. Population and Manpower
' The male population eligible for military mobilization
during the next several years is also expected to increase at a
rapid rate. Soviet males in the prime military ages (20-34) will
number about 29 million in 1960, as compared with about 25 million
in 1955 (see Table 2-38), an increase of 16 per cent. In the same
period, the number of males ages 20-34 in the U.S. is expected to
remain constant. After 1960, however, it is anticipated that the
number of USSR males in this age group will decline sharply and
will show an increase only in 1975.
Table 2-38
COMPARISON OF USSR AND U.S. PROJECTED POPULATIONS
(MALES) IN PRIME MILITARY AGES (20-34): 1955-70
(Numbers in millions)
Year
1955
1960
1965
1970
USSRa
U.
25.1 17.4
c.7.117.2
ry- 1 4
27.5 18.5'
27.3 21.9
a
U.S. Bureau of the Census estimates.
Adapted from P.K. Whelpton$ Forecasts
of the Population of the United States,
194571975$ (1947), p. 81 ff.
7. Workers and Employees1
The current trend in Soviet planning is to achieve greater
industrial output through increased labor productivity rather than
through an increase in Manpower. Soviet authorities have attested
t6 the key role of increased industrial productivity for the future
of the Soviet economy in such recent statements as "...The growth
of labor productivity is the decisive factor in raising the entire
national economy. Our task is now to surpass the United States in
the level of labor productivity... In the Sixth Five-Year Plan
1
Workers and employees as used here (approximating wage and sal-
ary earners in this country) comprise all persons employed by the
state and paid wages or salaries, with the exception of the military
and the MVD and KGB, defense workers, and full-time Communist Party
and Komsomol workers. Includes three major groups: production
workers, white-collar and administrative employees, and engineering-
technical personnel (ITR).
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Part Two II. Population and Mgatier
increased labor productivity must secure 85 per cent of all increase
in industrial output."
Although sizable increments of workers and employees will
undoubtedly continue, the total number recruited in the future
will probably decline, particularly during the next decade when the
large wartime birth deficit will seriously inhibit the manpower
reserve available for the labor force. Recent Soviet data provide
for the first time since 1935 a consistent set of figures for
workers and employees in terms of the total and by sectors of em-
ployment. Utilizing these data it is now possible to assess with
greater accuracy postwar trends in the worker and employee segment
of the economy.
Table 2-39 reveals a gradually smaller increment of workers
and employees during successive Five-Year Plan periods. Between
1945-50 the total increment was 11.5 million, almost as large as
the 12 million recruited during the First FivA-Yanr Plan, 1Q2P-12.
At that time a large pool of workers was required immediately to
operate the expanding industrial economy; during the remainder of
the prewar period the increment declined considerably. During the
initial period of postwar reconstruction it was necessary to re-
cruit vast numbers of workers and employees to replace war losses
and rehabilitate the economy. The subsequent increment was almost
3 million less at that time. The 8.1 million recruited during
1951-55 included 1.4 million tractor drivers transferred in October
Table 2-39
WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE USSR:
1541-61
Increase or Decrease
Number Absolute Annual Average
Year' (in thousands (in thousands)
1541 31,500
1914. 28,300
1951 39,800
1956 47,900
(1958) (51,250)
1961 55,000
-3,200 - 640
+11,500 +2,300
+ 8,100 + 1,620
+ 7,100 + 1,420
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Part Two ii.2.22atigim.anilassen
1953 from collective farm to MTS payrolls so that the actual in,
-
crease of unskilled labor and trained reserves was only 6.4 million,
or an annual average of 13- million.
The current Five-Year Plan (1956-60) provides for an in-
crease of 7.1 million, or an average 'annual increaSe of i1+2 million.
Reports on the 1956 Plan fulfillment, however, indicate an increment
of 2.1 million, including 600,000 members of artels of a number of
enterprises of producers cooperatives who officially became workers
and employees when these enterprises became a part of state industry.
This levy of manpower augmenting the planned increase of workers
and employees may have been necessary to meet production goals..
If the plan for 55 million workers and employees by 1961 is main-
tamed, the annual average increase during the next 1+ years will
be only 1.25 million, the lowest of any of the previous Plans.
Of course, a gradual increase in productivity per worker may require
a further revision of manpower needs during the remainder of the
current Plan period.
In January 1957 the goal of 50 mi1lidn1 workers and em-
ployees in the USSR was finally reached, and this group exceeded
in number those working on collective farms. Since workers and
employees are essentially urban in characteri the disparity be-
tween this group and agricultural labor should continue to increase,
particularly as the urban population continues to expand.
Distribution
? Total Workers and Employees. For the first time since
1936, complete data are available on the distrihution
of workers and employees among the union republics? of the Soviet
Union. An examination of these data indicates that the basic
pattern. of distribution evident ;r1 na++Arn determined in
6?
large part by the industrialization of the thirties--continues
with few significant changes. More than 80 per cent of the Soviet
Union's workers and employees in 1958 are found in the RSFSR and
the Ukrainskaya SSR, and although several of the smaller republics
have gained at the expense of the Ukraine, the decrease in this
republic in the 18-year period has amounted to only 2 per cent.
Perhaps the best index in measuring the significance of
the distribution of workers and employees is by means of differ-
ential rate of growth of the individual republics in the periods
11+
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Part Two I I. PopuJp.? ion and Manpower
1940-50 and 1950-58. Wartime devastation and reconstruction in the
western areas, the transfer of industry eastward to the Urals and
Siberia, and the postwar establishment of new industrial concentra-
tions in the east have led to the shift of workers and employees
to the new areas. The large increases within the Kazakhskaya SSR
during these two periods (see Table 2-40), reflect the transfer of
evacuated industries during the war, the exploitation of local
mineral resources, and the construction of a multitude of state
farms and MTSs during the virgin lands program in 1954-55. The
outstanding increases within the Moldvaskaya, Litovskaya, and Latviy-
skaya SSRs--all prewar annexations of the USSR--are the result of
great postwar expansion and the absorption of many formerly self-
employed persons into the workers and employee segment of the labor
force. The increments in the Ukrainskaya and Belorusskaya SSNs,
among the lowest for the period 1940-583 were limited in ..he years
1940=50 by immense war losses in these areas. Since 1950, however,
Table 2-40
DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH OF
WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE USSR:
1940, 1950, 1958
Number 4p thousands) Per Cent Charles.
publib 1940a 1950h 190, 1940-50 1950658
Russian SFSR
Ukrainskaya SSR
Belorusskaya SSR
Uzbekskaya SSR
Kazakhskaya SSR
Gruzinskaya SSR
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR
Litovskaya SSR
Moldavskaya SSR
Latviyskaya SSR
Kirgizskaya SSR
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Armyanskaya SSR
Turkmenskaya SSR
Estonskaya SSR
TOTAL
20;778 25,660 33,364, 23.5 30.0
6,202 6,729 8,900 8.5 32.3
1,062 971 1,324 -9,11+ 36.3
693 81-1- 1,090 18.9 32.3
917 1,423 2,279 55.2 60.1
454 605 7t6 33.3 23.3
456 552 626 21.1 13.4
187 328 500 75.4 52.1+
.1.,,rodr;" 01 r-vr-0 &C) t Lit
62,5
.e)) ?-r ?
264 429 564 .62.5 315,
165 328 46.7 35.5
139 169 239 21.6
11+2 227 303 59.9 33.5
173 200 15.6 04.5
, 179, ?81 63 57.0 22.2
31:906 38,895 51,250 21.9 31.8
aAs of September.
bAnnual average.
cAs of 1 January.
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Part Two Ili Poquitii2n_anst.Matuttc
workers and employees in these two republics have increased at a
rate which is slightly above average.
Industrial Workers and Employees. Industrial workers
and employees in the USSR in 1958 constitute slightly
more than one-third of total workers and employees, and their
geographic distribution, in general, follows the pattern of distri-
bution of the larger group. For example, 65.1 per cent of all
workers and employees and 68.5 per cent of industrial workers and
employees are found within the RSFSR; within many of the smaller
republics the correspondence is even closer.
A comparison of the rates of growth of total and industrial
workers and employees in the period 1950-58 reveals that in about
half the republics the magnitude of change has been fairly close
to the national average of 32.4 per ceni. Within the RSFSR, total
workers and employees increased 30 per cent; the industrial sector
increased 28.5 per cent (see Tables 2-40 and 2-41). Kazakhstan is
the outstanding exception: the increase in the over-all group was
almost twice that of the industrial sector. An influx durinethe
virgin lands program of approximately 200,000 agricultural workers
plus workers and employees in the various supporting services, how-
ever, in large part contributed to this disparity.
Within the individual republics, the increase of industrial
workers and employees ranges from a low of 28.5 per cent in the
RSFSR to a high of 117.6 per cent in the Litovskaya SSR (see Table
2-41). Although in absolute terms the increase in the RSFSR was
greatest, the low percentual increase reflects the location in this
area of many old, relatively well-established industrial centers
Which, in many cases, have probably reached the peak of their
development. All other republics increased at the expense of the
the RSFSR, although for the majority the increase was not substantial.
The greatest increases occurred within the Litovskaya, Moldavskaya,
Kirgizskaya, and Armyanskaya SSRst indicating that postwar industrial-
ization in the Soviet Union has not been confined to any particular
geographic region. The outstanding growth in the Litovskaya SSR
reflects the development of the republic's industrial potential
to an extent comparable with that of the other two Baltic republics.
Increases within the Ukrainskaya and Belorusskaya SSRs sugest
continuing industrialization within these areas even though the locus
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H. Population and Manpower
Table 2-41
INDUSTRIAL WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE USSR:
1940, 1950, 1958
Number Per Cent Workers Per Cent
(in thousands) and Employees, Increase
1950 :1.98 1950 thil 195M8
Russian SFSR 9,971.12,809 38.9 38.4 28.5
Ukrainskaya SSR 2, 3,278 34.9 36.8 39.6
Belorusskaya SSR 325 505 33,5 3.1 55.4
Uzbekskaya SSR 226 300 27.14 27.5 32.7
Kazakhskaya SSR 368 488 25.9 21.14 32.6
Geuzinskaya SSR 156 206 25.8 27..6 32.0
?Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR 144 188 25.5 30.0 33.3
Litovskaya.SSR 85 185 25.9 37.0 117.6
Moldavskaya SSR 57 99 22.4 26.4 73.7
Latviyskaya SSR 156 206 36.4:7 36.5 32.0
Kirgizskaya SSR 57 99 23,6 30.2 73.7
Tadzhikskaya' SSR 42 56 Li-.19 23.14 33.3
Armyanskaya SSR 711 117 31.3 38.6
Turkmenskaya SSR 42 56 21.0 22.532.3
Estonskaya SSR 99 131, 3.2. .3.6.41 32.1
11+ 11-11+ 18,723 36.4 36.5 32.1+
TOTAL
of industrial concentrations has continued to move eastivOrd. In
those republics which in the period 1950-58 show the greatest inr
creases, the relationship of industHal to total workers will con-
tinue to fluctuate for some years, as industrialization usually
precedes the development of services. In the long run, increases
in the over-all groups will compensate for the changes in the in-
dustrial sectors, and the relationship of the two groups will prob'r
41)1y-tend to achieve the balance shown in the RSFSR, which closely
approximates that of the USSR as a hole.'
Industrial Workers and Employees in the RSFSR, The
newly released data on the distribution of industrial
workers and employees among the major geographic regions of the
RSFSR in the period 1940-58 make it possible to assess the shift
of industrial development from western parts of the republic.
The industrial push toward the eastern areas of the RSFSR
occurred during the war and reconstruction years, 1540i-50, taper-
ing off between 1950 and 1958. In 1940, more than 60 per cent of
all industrial workers and employees in the republic were found
in the Central Industrial and Northwest Regions; the Urals and
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Part Two
Siberia together had less than 25 per cent (see Table 2-142). The
tremendous industrial expansion in eastern areas during the war,
when many industrial complexes were developed to offset the de-
struction of industry in the west, is reflected in the increases
in the number of industrial workers and employees: 102 per cent
in West Siberia, 84.6 per cent in East Siberia, and 81.5 per cent
in the Urals (see Table 2-42).
Table 2-42
INDUSTRIAL WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE RSFSR:
1940, 1950, 1958
(in Per Cent)
Per Cent of Total Per Cent Change
, Region 1940 1950 1958 1540-50 190856..5
North 2.9 3.0 3.2 33.5 37.5
Northwest 13.5 9.3 9.6 -13.1 32.3
Central Industrial 47.7 40.4 4.0.14. 9.0 28,7
Volga 6.2 7.5 7.5 55.2 31.3
N. Caucasus 6.1 5.4 i ?7
a' n 14..7 40.9
Urals 12.1 17.0 16.5 81.5 ri. 4.-r.)
c"
W. Siberia 5.2 8.2 8.4 102.0 31.3
E. Siberia 3,3 4,7 4.6 814..6 25,1
Far East ...I:2 ...1-b5' 3.7 aLL
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 28.7 28.5
In the Northwest Region, almost entirely overrun by the
Germans, destruction was widespread and the loss of industrial
capacity was enormous. As late as 1950 this had not been over-
come, and there were 13.1 per cent fewer industrial 'workers than
before the war. Destruction in the Central Industrial Region, only
partially occupied, must have been almost as great, for the increase
there in the.period 1940-50 was only 9 per cent. Although indus-
trial reconstruction in these areas had been completed by 1950,
in that year the Central Industrial Region had only 40.14 per cent
of the republic's industrial workers and the Northwest, only 9.3
per cent. Seventeen per cent of this group were concentrated in
the Urals, and in West Siberia the group almost equalled that in
the Northwest. The Urals and Siberia represented more than one-
third of the total, and the Northwest and Central Industrial Re-
gions had decreased to less than one-half.
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Part Two II. Population and Manpower
In the period 1950-58, regional increases tended to stabil-
ize. The greatest increase was in the North Caucasus Region (00.9
per cent). The Far East, which in the earlier period had increased
more than 90 per cent, showed a minimal growth of 6.5 per cent.
The increases in the Urals and Siberia, about average, are rather
surprising in the light of recent Soviet announcements of industrial
expansion in these areas.
Sectors of Employment. The new body of postwar data in-
'cludes information on the various branches of the Soviet
national economy, or sectors of employment. Between 191+0 and 1958
the total number of workers and employees increased by 20,058,000,
or 64.3 per cent (see Table 2-43). This includes the 1.4 million
tractor drivers and the 600,000 members of producers' cooperatives
transferred to government payrolls. Excluding this group the in-
crease would be 18,058,000, or 57.9 per cent.
The 1958 estimateslbased on these reported data, reveal t
that UUSpILU au auoviuu, increase in every sector except govern-
ment administration, 7 of the 12 sectors have not kept pace with
the total increase (see Table 240. Industry remains the largest
sector in the national economy, comprising more than one-third of
1
all workers and employees, although it has not increased as much
as has rural economy, public health, or construction. Sizable in-
crements are expected in the future, but the Soviet leaders are
continuing to stress increased labor productivity, so-that the rate
of increase in the futur.. P."kv decline.
Rural economy underwent a greater percentual increase than
any other sector; part of this increase, however, is due to the
transfer of the 1.'4 million tractor drivers. Even without this
groupi the increase would be 96.1 per cent, reflecting the in-
creasing role of agricultural mechanization in the national economy.
The large increase in the construction sector betokens the
continuing importance of construction projects of all types in Soviet
planning. The postwar expansion of health and medical facilities,
particularly in rural areas, and the extension of compulsory educa-
tion to 7-year and secondary schools, plus the rapid training of
specialists for every sector of the economy, have contributed to
the large percentual increases of the public health and education
sectors.
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Table 2-43
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES
BY SECTORS OF EMPLOYMENT: 12451-58
Number (in thousands)
.1955 J.
Sector
Industry
Construction
Rural economy
Sovkhozes
MTS
Transportation
Railroad
Water
Motor vehicle
and other
Communications
Trade, procurement,
and supply
Public dining
Education
Public health
Credit and insurance
institutions
Government administra-
tion
Others
TOTAL
10,967 9,508 11+,1)+4 17,362 18,723
1,563 1,515 2,569 3,172 3,423
2,290 2,532 3,103 5,890 6,168
(1,760) (2,147) (2,1425) (2,832) (3,053)
(530) (385) (678) (3,058) (3,115)
3,425 3,111 4,082 5,047 ,5,442
(1,752) (1,841) (2,068) (2,301) (2,438)
(203) (190) (222) (285) (312)
(1,470) (1,080) (1,792) (2,+61)(2,692)
478 426 542 611 659
2,539 1,Y1-1-7 2,705 2,929 3,023
784 715 659 856 884
2,930 2,551 3.752 1+,582 1+,821
1,507 1,109 2,051 2,627 2,827
262 197
264 265 268
1,825 1,61+5 1,831 1,361 1,239
2,622 1,897 3,193 _4656 .303
31,192 27,263 38,895 48,358 51,250
Industry
Construction
Rural economy
Transportation
Communications
Trade, procurement,
and supply
Public dining
Education
Public health
Credit and insurance
institutions
Government administra-
tion
Others
TOTAL
Per Cent of
35.2
5.0
7.3
11.0
1.5
8.? 694
2.5 2.6
9.1+ 9.1+
0
Tota
34.9
5.6
9.3
11.1+
1.5
36.11+ 35.9
6.6 6.6
8.0 12.2
10.5 10.1+
1.4 1.3
6.9
1.7
9.6
e
2 .3
36.5
6.7
12.1
10.6
1.3
6.1 5.9
1.8 1.7
9.5
a' 1
leT
0.8 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5
2.8 2.11+
705 -IL+
5.9 6.0 14.7
8.4 7.0 8.2
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
aFigures for 1940-55, yearly averages; 1958, estimated as of
1 Janvary.
?Includes employment in geological prospecting organizations,
drilling, capital repairs, forestry, municipal housing, and other
types of enterprises which were previously reported separately.
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C'RET
11422pulation and Man ower
Table 24+,
CHANGES IN SECTORS OF EMPLOYMENT: 19+0-58
Sector
Increase
or Decrease Per'Ceest
in thousands) Chang
Industry + 7,756 + 70,7
Rural economy + 3,878 + 169.3
Education + 1,891 + 61+.5
Transportation ?4' 2,017 4' 58.9
Construction + 1,860 +1119.0
Public Health + 1,320 + 87.6
Others + 1,151 + 43.9
Trade, procurement,
and supply + 1+84 + 19.1
Communications + 181 4' 37.9
Public dining + 100 + 12.8
Credit and insurance
institutions ? 6 + 2.3
Government administration_ ' 0 1
administration-. 586 ----04:-..."--
TOTAL +20,Q58 + 64.3
In the transportation sector, the most significant post-
war development has been the rapid increase in motor vehiale and
other nonrail and nonwater transport, so that the number of workers
and employees in this branch is now larger than that in railroad
transportation.
Only one sector, government administration, has undergone
a decrease in workers and employees, Principally the result of the
attempt during the past few years to limit the size of the Soviet
bureaucracy by the transfer of technically trained personnel from
desk jobs to positions in factory and field.
Despite comparatively laro percentual increases, none of
the sectors, compared with 1940, comprises a much higher or lower
proportion of the total number of workers and employees, except
rural economy and government administration, Where the changes -
are partly the result of arbitrary measures. Rural economy, con-h
struction, industry, and public health show increases in per cent
of total workers and employees, ranging from 4,8 for rural economy
to 0.7 for public health. No change is evident in education.
The remaining sectors have declined in per cent of total, particularly
government administration which in 1958 is 3.14- per cent lower than
in 1940.
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Part Two II. Population and Manuffejl
Considering the development of comparatively stable relation-
ships among the sectors, particularly during the postwar period,
similar relationships are indicated for the future, barring further
arbitrary changes such as the transfer in 1957 of 600,000 members
of producers' cooperatives to industry. Industry, construction,
rural economy, and government administration, discussed below,
have experienced the most significant changes.
Industry. Since the advent of the Five-Year Plan in
1928, industry has commanded the largest share of
workers and employees within the nonagricultural section of the
economy. No other branch of the national economy has grown so
rapidly (with the exception of machine-tractor stations in the post-
war period--a special case). This rapid increase occurred initially
and at the expense of the other sectors. After reaching a peak in?
1937, when the sector represented 37.8 per cant of, total workers and
employees, it declined to 35.2 per cent in 1940. Since that time,
the increase has closely approximated the total increase of workers
and employees and in 1955 was only slightly higher than in 19140.
As a result of attempts during the past few years to increase pro-
duction through technological advance, stimulated in part by an
impending shortage of manpower, it appears likely that no great
increment will occur in the near future, certainly none that will
increase the percentage. The slight percentual increase indicated
by the 1958 estimate reflects the addition through reclassification
of 6010,000 members of producer cooperative artels. If this number
were excluded, the industrial sector would represent only 35.2 per
cent of the total, exactly the same as in 1940.
For the first time since World War Il Soviet data have been
reported for the ten basic industrial categories, according to per
cent of total industrial workers. Applied to the total for workers
and employees, these percentages yield absolute figures for each
category. Table 2-45 lists the increase of each industrial -category
between 1940 and 1958. To some extent the variations are ihdica-
tive of the growth and relative importance of each category. Never-
theless, more advanced technology and greater labor productivity
may vary considerably from industry to industry, obviating the need
for greater numbers of workers. Until more detailed information is
available, however, an increase in the number of workers and employees
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11.1_299.09.1kla_and Manpower
Table 2-
INCREASES IN BRANCHES OF SOVIET INDUSTRY:
1940-58
Absolute
in thous?sl Per Cent
Machine building and
metalworking 2,801 90.0
Light industry 926 41.4
Lumbering, woodworking,
and paper 871 lip
Food 352 27,7
Fuel 687 97.9
Ferrous and nonferrous
metallurgy 547 110.7
Construction materials 761 90L0
Chemical and rubber 213 62.6
Printing 31+ 30.9
Power 176 160.0
Others 333 89.3
TOTAL 7,701 70.2
may he considered an index of increased production and expanded
operation. Among the most significant postwar developments has
been the rapid increase in the number of workers and employees in
the construction materials and power industries (204 and 160 per
cent, respectively), reflecting the emphasis on industrial con-
struction and the need for additional industrial power. The in-
' IL- -1 11urgical (11(' " cent) also re=
kAcc=u 1H um muLal IUU0 y IVe
flects this emphasis. The development of producers' goods indus-
tries at the expense of consumers' goods industries apparently
continues. Since 1940, the number in the food industry has in-
creased only 27.7 per cent, less than all other categories; the
increase in the printing industry was only 30.9 percent, and in
light industry 41.4 per cent. As a result, light industry has
dropped to 16.9 per cent of the total and food industry to 8.7
per cent (see Table 2-46). Machine-building and metalworking re-
mains the largest category, representing almost one-third of all
industrial worker.
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II. Population and Manpower
Table 2-46
WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES BY BRANCH OF INDUSTRY:
1940, 1955, 1958
Industr
MaChine4uilding and
metalworking
Light industry
Lumbering, woodwork-
ing and paper
Food
Fuel
Ferrous and nonfer-
rous metallurgy
Construction materials
Chemicals and rubber
Printing
0v,?.^..e
Others
TOTAL
Number
in thousands Per Cent of Total
1958 19140 1955' 198
3,147
2,236
1,810
1,272
702
5140 5,966 28.7 31.5 3109
2,899 3,172 20.14 16.7 16.9
2,605' 2,689 1615 15,0 11403
1,563 1,629 1.6 9r00 8.7
1,302 1,393 614 7.5 7,14
454 990
373 1,007
340 503
110 139
110 26o
ro5
nml
omisame..?1:11:14:4
11014
1,137
554
144
287
208
4..5 5.7 5.6
3.4 5.8 6.1
3.1 2.9 3.0
1.0 0.8 0.8
1;0 1.5 1.5
3,6 _La
10,967 17,362 18,723 100.0 100.0 100.0
Construction. The construction sector has continued
? to advance slowly but steadily since the end of World
War II, evidencing the greatest percentual increase of any sector
other than those which have acquired personnel through the trans-
fer from other sections of the economy. The number of construction
workers has more than doubled since 1940 and may continue to increase
under.present Soviet plans. The 1957 plan to expand housing con-
struction, from about 30 million sq. meters in 1956 to more than
35 million in 1957, may require additional woi-kers despite a re-
ported 10 per cent increase of labor produCtivity in 1956 by workers
in construction. On the other hand, the reported suspension of
some of the larger construction projects in the Soviet Far East as
a result .of the decrease in some production goals for 1957 may
offset any great increase in this sector.
Rural Economy. The number of personnel in the agri-
cultural sector has fluctuated during the postwar
period depending upon' changes in emphasis on agricultural produc-
tion and techniques of exploitation. The number of machine-tractor
stations and state farms has increased steadily since the end of
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Part Two ILLIS00211.911Miliall4.92E
World War II, particularly during 19514-55 when 581 new state farms
were organized. This has resulted in a great increase in person-
nel, mostly during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1950-55). The appar-
ently large percentual increase within this sector is somewhat
artificial, however, since it includes the 1.:14- million tractor
drivers transferred from collective farms to MTSs. Excluding this
group, the per cent of total in 1955 would be only 9.2, almost the
same as it was in 1945, although certainly an absolute increase
over the prewar figure. The training of technical and professional
personnel in agriculture continues to play an important role in the
economy: in 1956, of 650,000 persons trained in factory, railroad,
construction, mining, and agricultural mechanization
0^11,1f11
v.,
%.7%.011WW4,
250,000, or 38.5 per cent, were sent to work in agriculture.
Government Administration. In the 1950-55 period,
470,000 persons employed in central government admin-
istrative posts were transferred to positions in other sectors of
employment, notably to industry and agriculture. During 1956 the
transfer of personnel continued and the recently revised Soviet
economic plan for 1957 provides for an even further decrease as
greater jurisdiction in the economic field is placed in the hands
of republic and regional councils of the national economy. Most
of those discharged from the state apparatus will continue to serve
in administrative capacities on the staffs of economic institutions.
? 8. Specialists
Soviet leaders are exceeding proud and boastful of their
"army nj of specialists," as they term the rapidly growing elite of
doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists, economists, teachers,
agricultural experts, and managers and technicians in every branch
of industry. This is the group which will contribute the most to-
ward the development of ihe Soviet economy into a more advanced
technological state. That the Soviet leaders are aware of the nec-
essity to outstrip the "capitalist countries" in technology and
science is readily apparent from their continual comparisons of
the rate of development of their own specialists with those of
the western countries, particularly with those of the U.S. Bul-
ganin, in a speech delivered last year to the XX Communist Party
Congress regarding the Sixth Five-Year Plan, stated that "special-
ists are our gold reserve; we are proud of them and treasure them.
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Part Two II. E2pulation and Manpower
Table 2-47
SPECIALISTS IN THE USSR: 1541-61
(Numbers in thousands)
Professionals .Se2,imahlui21111
Per Cent , Per Cent
Year Total Number. of Total Number of Total
1941 2,400 908 37.8 1,492 62.2
1946 1,225 568 46.4 657 53.6
1951 3,155 1,220 38.7 1,935 61.3
1956 5,553 2,340 42.1 3,213 5709
1958 7,113 3,027 42.6 4,086 57.4
1961 9,553 1+,227 44.2 5,326 55.8
It is not surprising that some public figures in the capitalist
countries hnv., notPd with AlArm tht their countries
lag
us in the training of specialists."
The Soviet hierarchy is exerting every effort, not only
to increase compulsory education for the masses but also to accel-
erate the production of their specialists--the "professionals"
(those with college and advanced degrees) and the semiprofessionals
(graduates of technical and special secondary schools). If the
plan to train million additional specialists during the current
Five-Year Plan (1956-60) is fulfilled, it would mean that almost
as many will be trained during this period as were trained during
the two previous Five-Year Plan periods, 1946-55 (see Table 2-47).
That this plan is not exaggerated is indicated in the re-
port that 2 million students were attending higher educational
institutions (including correspondence courses) during 1956 and
that about 2 million were studying in technical colleges and
other specialized secondary educational' institutions (including
correspondence courses). In addition, the 760,000 new specialists
reported in 1956 approaches the planned annual average of 800,000
for the five-year period.
During the current five-year period the emphasis on the
training of engineers and, during the last few years, of agri-
cultural specialists, is pointed up by the plan to train more than
650,000 of these specialists for industry, transport, construction,
and agriculture. This would represent approximately 34 per cent of
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Part Two jj. Population and Manpower
the total professionals to be trained, and about twice the number
of these specialists trained during the last Five-Year Plan (1951-
5'5). Serious attention is also being given to the training of
specialists for new branches of science and technology, such as
automation, telemechanics,radiotechnology, and atomic energy.
In addition to regular students, a vast number of persons
(3)+ million in 1956) employed in the various branches of the econ-
omy were attending evening schools or taking correspondence courses
in higher and specialized secondary educational institutions. The
other source of skilled labor and technicians is the labor reserve
program--the factory, railroad, trade, and agricultural schools
training young people between the ages 16-19 for positions in indus-
try, transportation, construction, and agriculture. In 1956'; of 'more
than 650,000 finishing courses in these schools, approximately 38
per cent were assigned to work in agriculture and the remainder were
assigned to industry, transportation, and construction.
In the recently published Narodnoye khozyaystvo ?SSSR, the
specialists were listed under six basic categories: engineering
agriculture, economics, law, health, and education. A residual num-
ber not reported has been designated "others." Among both the pro-
fessionals and semiprofessionals the greatest number are employed
in the fields of engineering, scientific research, and teaching and
related cultural activities. Professional engineers, although com-
prising a smaller per cent of total professionals than in 1941, are
gradually regaining their position after heavy losses.sustained
during the war. If the trend' continues, engineers may eventually
comprise one-third of all professionals (see Table 2-48)
The number of graduate research workers, mostly engaged in
scientific research, has increased considerably during the postwar
period. As of 1 January 1957 there were 239,000 scientists and
scientific research workers, including over 95,000 with doctors'
or candidate of sciences' degrees. The number of physicians has
increased from approximately less than one per thousand in 1541
to 1.7 per thousand in January 1958.
Among the semiprofessionals, the number of graduates of
engineering technical schools has increased tremendously since
1541, outstripping the number of semiprofessionals in all other
categories. This trend promises to continue during the current
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Part Two il_elstion and Manpower
Table 2-48
SPECIALISTS WITH HIGHER EDUCATION:
1941, 1955, 1958
.C.B.L.te(g2E.Y. 1 Jan. 12111 1 July 1955 1 Jan. 1958
Number ( in thousands)
Engineers 289.9 585.9 84.0
Agronomists, zoo-
technicians,
veterinarians,
foresters 69.6 158.7 226.0
Economists, statis-
ticians, commodity
experts 59.3 113.8 156.0
Lawyers 20.9 47.1 64.0
Doctors 140.8 299.0 350.0
Teachers and uni- a
versity graduates,
library and cul-
tural education
workers
Others
TOTAL
300.14-
27.1
906.1+
73.1
11297.0
100.0
908.0 2,184.0 3,027.0
In Per Cent of Total
Engineers 31.9 26.8 27.6
Agronomists, zoo-
technicians,
veterinarians,
foresters 7.7 7.3 7.5
Economists, statis-
ticians, commodity
experts 6.5 5.2 5.1
Lawyers 2.3 2.2 2.1
Doctors 15.5 13.7 11.6
TAanhArs and uni- a
versity graduates,
library and cul-
tural education
workers 33.1 1+1 .5 42.8
Others 3.0 3,3 3.3
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
aOther than lawyers, doctors, and economists.
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Part Two if. Population and Manpower
Five-Year Plan and perhaps beyond. Engineering technicians, med-
ical workers (nurses, attendants, etc.), and teachers comprise
almost 80 per cent of all semiprofessionals (see Table 2-49).
Since 1541 the increase in the specialist class has far
surpassed the rise of workers and employees. During the period
1940-57 workers and employees increased by 64,3 per cent, and
specialists increased by 196.4 per cent. In 1940 specialists
represented only 7.7 per cent of the total number of workers and
employees; in 1958 they are estimated to represent 18.6 per cent.
G. Urban Living Space in the Soviet Union
1. Urban Housing and the Growth of Urban Population
A primary factor in any discussion of the Soviet housing
problem is the relationship of housing construction to the growth
of urban population. Urban population in the Soviet Union has
been increasing since IL? beginning
of +km%.? SovietAr
nind.?hui: it
%.11_
was not until 1929, at the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan,
that a serious disparity between available urban housing and the
size of the urban population manifested itself. At that time,
materials which could have been used for new housing for the great
influx of in-migrants were diverted into the construction of
factories. Urban population increased 125 per cent between 1926
and 1941, from 26.3 million to 60.6 million, and to keep pace
with this increase, total living space should, at the least, have
doubled. At the end of 1541, however, living space totaled only
1-1-2.1 million sq. meters (approximately 2.5 billlion sq. ft.), as
compared with 153.8 million sq0 meters in 1926. This is reflected
in a per-capita decrease from 5.85 sq. meters in 1926 to sq. meters
in 1910 (see Table 2-50).
Official Soviet estimates place urban housing losses (total-
ly and partially destroyed) at 70 million sq. meters. And although
the urban population also decreased during the war, the growth in
the postwar period (1946-50) was even greater than in the immediate
prewar period. It is evident that with the dual problem of restor-
ing destroyed housing and providing housing for the increasing
urban population, the Soviet government was faced with a tremendous
task. Reconstruction began almost on the heels of the retreating
Germans and the Fourth Five-Year Plan (19)-6-50) was devoted large-
ly to the problems of restoration. In the postwar years the down-
ward trend in per-capita living space was finally reversed. By
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lit.PosulgjoLI.And Manpwer
Table 2-49
SPECIALISTS WITH SECONDARY EDUCATION:
1541, 1955, 1958
Category 1 Jan. 1941 1 July 1955
Technicians 320.1
Agronomists, zoo-
technicians
veterinary assts.,
foresters 92.8 254+ 360.0
Statisticians, plan-
ners, commodity
specialists 36.2 186.1 253.0
Lawyers 6.2 23.2 29.0
Medical workers 39302 731.1 960.0
Number (in thousands)
804.9 1,1+.0
Teachers, library
and cultural educa-
tional workers
Others
TOTAL
536.4
107.1
818.6 11160.0
130.8 180.0
1,492.0 2,549.1 1+,086.0
In Per Cent of Tqtg
Technicians, 21.5 27.3 28.0
Agronomists, zoo-
technicians,
veterinary assts.,
foresters 6.2 8.6 8.8
Statisticians, plan-
ners, commodity
specialists 2.4 6.3 6.2
Lawyers 0.4 0.8 0.7
Medical workers 26,1+ 14..8 23.5
Teachers, library
and cultural educa-
tional workers 36.0 27.8 28.14
Others 7.1 4.4 4.4
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Part Two II. Population and Manpower
Table 2-50
URBAN HOUSING: 1923-61
Urban Housing Sq. Meters
Urban Pop- Olion sq. m.) per person
ulation (in Floor Living Floor Living
Year millions) Space ,Space *Space Space
1923 21.6 139.1 6.)0:
1926 26.3 153.8 5.85
1933 38.7 191.5 4.95
1937 53.0 220.8 4,17
1941 60.6 42.1 4,00
1951 71.4 513 318.1 7.18 4,46
1956 86.5 640 396.8 7.40 4..59
1957 88.5 681 422.2 7.69 4,77
1958 90.5 722 447.6 7.98 4,95
1959 92.6 763 473.0 8.24 5.11
1960 54.7 804 498.4 8.49 5.26
1961 96.9 845 523.8 8.72 5.10
1951 per-capita living space had increased to 4,46 sq. meters.
It is important to note that during the period of the
Fourth Five-Year Plan Soviet statisticians began to report urban
"total floor space" as if it were "living space." Prior to that
time it had been Soviet practice to divide living quarters into
living and nonliving space--nonliving space including kitchens,
bathrooms, hallways, vestibules, and storerooms; living space
including rooms used solely for living purposes. Since 1948 the
unit "total floor space," defined as the sum total of all floor
space within living quarters, has been used. The official
VIN
planation for this change is that it was made to bring Soviet
-
statistical practices in line with other countries, and it has
also been stated that living space represents, on average, 62
per cent of total floor space. Thus, the failure to allow for
the changed unit of measure creates the illusion that the ratio
of housing to population is more favorable than it actually is.
A.total of 115.14 million sq. meters was constructed under the
Fifth-Five-Year Plan (the planned goal was 105.14 million sq. meters
of floor space, to be financed from state funds). In addition,
there was constructed 38.8 million sq. meters of floor space by
individuals, at their own expense and with state credit. By 1956
urban housing stock had increased to 640 million sq. meters of
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Part Two II. Population and Manpower
floor space, or 396.8 million sq. meters of living space, and per-
capita living space totaled 4.59 sq. meters (see Table 2-50).
The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-60) has a planned goal of
205 million sq. meters of floor space to be constructed by the
state and its various agencies. No goal for the construction of
housing by individuals has been reported. The construction of 205
million sq. meters of floor space is nearly double the amount of
construction completed during the previous five years, but for the
first time construction in rural communities has been included in
the plan figures. The living space figures in Table 2-50 for the
years 1957-61 have been projected on the assumption that the
Soviet Union will meet its planned objective in housing construc-
tion. As can be seen in the table, even if the planned objective
is f,ulfilled, the per-capita living space at the beginning of 1961
will still be less than the per-capita living space in 1926. This
means that even by 1961 the average Soviet urbanite will occupy an
area less than that occupied by a 9 x 12-ft. rug.
2. Large Cities
In analyzing Table A-91 Appendix, it should be noted that
most of the large cities have a lower per-capita floor space in
1956 than in 1939-40 or 1926. There is also a large regional vari-
ation in per-capita floor space. In general, the further east
the city is located the lower the per-capita floor space. To
some extent these regional differences may be due to the methods
used in population counts, that is, the Soviet procedure of in-
cluding certain groups (such as forced laborers and deportees) in
the population counts in terms of de jure rather than de facto
residence.
I.
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PART THREE. THE ASIN B.LQC
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (4-11AA
The Communist PALt4
1. Growth
In little more than 35 years the Communist Party of the
People s Republic of China has increased from the 50 members re-
ported in 1921 to more than 12 million (see Table 3-1) and has
become the world's largest national Communist Party, By .1 Jan-
uary 1958 it is estimated that Party membership will total
12,433,000, and that 20 of every 1,000 persons or 35 of every
1,000 adults (age 18 and above) will be Party members (see Table
3-2).
Year
1921
1922
1923
1925
1926
1927
1928
1930
1933
1937
1940
1910
1542
1944
. Table 3-1
GROWTH OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY:
1921-58
Total a
M19212milia_
50
100
300
1,000
57,900
10,000
40,000
122,318
300,000
40,000
800,000
763,447
6,151
73
853,420
Year
191+5
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957(Mar
$58
Total
Membertipt!
1,211,128
1,348,320
2,759,456
3,065,533
1+1488,080
5,821,604
5,762,293
6,001,698
6,612,254
7,859,473
91393,391+
10,734,384
.) 12,000,000
12,433,000
a192157 figures, reported; the 1958 figure is
a projection of data reported to March 1957.
The rise and fall in membership in the ppriod prior to
the Communist. ascendancy in 1949 reflected the inner Party adjust-
ment to the-changing political situation in China. Party member-
ship increased after 1922, when the Communists joined the Kuomintang
in the fight against the warlord domination of China, and by 1926
totaled almost 601m. At that time the majority of members were
urban workers, students, and intellectuals. The dissolution of the
alliance the following year led to mass desertions from the Party's
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I. jhe EggslgILRepublic of _China
Table 3-2
INCREASE IN PARTY MEMBERSHIP
PER 1,000 TOTAL AND ADULT
POPULATIONS: 19506-58
? Members per Members per 1,002
1,000 Tota Adult Population
Year Population' Akove
1950 10 18
1951 10 18
1952 10 18
1953 11 19
1951+ 13 22
1955 15 27
1956 18 30
1957 19 31+
1958 20 35
aBased on ARD population estimates.
00...111111?0110.10?11REMPOWSONS
ranks, and by the end of 1927 only 10,000 members remained.
With the virtual collapse of the urban Communist movement,
the Party turned its efforts toward expansion into the rural areas
and established its base in south-central China. The? land reform
movement, instituted by the Party in the areas under its control,
increased Party membership to 3000 by-1933, but repeated attacks
by Kuomintang troops against Communist-controlled areas during the
1934-37 period and a severe inta-Party struggle for dominance re-
duced membership to 40,000.
Late in 1937 the Communists returned to the "United front"
tactics of the pre-1927 period and joined the Kuomintang in resist-
ing the Japanese invasion of China. ,Membership again began to climb,
reaching 800,000 by 1940. Members were recruited largely from the
peasarrb-y, and the low educational level and lack of political
training of most of the recruits create 'serious disciplinary
problems. An "indoctrination" campaign within the Party was launched
in 1941.42, and by 1943 Party membership was reduced to 736,151
Thereafter, the Party expanded rapidly and by October 1949, the date
of the founding of the People's Republic of China, membership totaled
4,4881o80.
Prior to the conquest of the mainland, the Party was pre-
dominantly rural in origin and military and peasant in occupation.
After the establishment of the republic, however, the Communtes
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Part Three 14_111.9.Eggple,s Regiblic of China
began an intensive recruitment campaign among urban workers and
employees and virtually halted recruitment of peasants Between
1950 and 1954 more than two million joined the Party, and most of
the recruits were office workers or from the industrial labor force.
Since the inauguration of the enforced cooperative farming movement
in 1954, the recruitment policy has again changed, and almost all
of the six million new members have come from rural areas.
2. Geographic Distribution of the Party
The geographic distribution of Communist Party membership
varies greatly both in terms of absolute size and in proportion to
the populations of the administrative divisions. In general, vari-
ations in the incidence of Party membership may be considered one
of the useful indices for assessing the sigWicance of an area to
the Communist regime.
Areas in which the incidence of Party membership is above
average are highly urbanized and industrialized or have large.mili-
tary contingents. Those with high incidence reflect combinations
of these factors. The heaviest concentrations of Party membership
are found in the administrative and industrial centers of the
northern and northeastern provinces; the lightest concentrations
are in the southwestern and northwestern regions (see Table 3-3
and Map IV). In only three provinces--Hopeh, Shantung, and Kiangsu--
is total membership in excess of one million. And only in Tsinghai
Province are more than 5 per cent of the total populatioim Party
members. Proportionally, there are almost twice as many civilian
Party 'members in;urban areas as in rural areas (see Table 3-10 and
in only five administrative divisions--Fukien, Inner Mongolian
Autonomous Region, Kweichow, Kirin, and Tsinghai--are more than 5
per cent of the urban population in-the Party. Provinces-in which
the incidence of Party membership is above.gtverage in-rurii areas
reflect, in partl.the presence of Communists, assoeiated.with the.
enforced cooperative farming movement, and, in effect,.ihe extent
of that movement.
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Part Three I. The Peoples Republic of China
Table 3-3
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP BY ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISLON:
1958
..:
Total 7Members per Members per 1,000
Administrative Membership 1,000 Totall) Adult Population b
Division (in thousands) Population (Age 18 and Above)
Anhwei 1I-27 13 22
Chekiang 359 15 26
Fukien 329 24 1+1
Heilungkiang 465 36 66
Honan 589 12 21
Hopeh 1,772 140 70
Hunan 14-27 12 20
Hupeh 442 15 26
Inner Mongolian
Autonomous Region 275 311- 5'5'
Kansu1414-
Kiangsi if?* g 37
Kiangsu 1,021 20 35'
Kirin 267 22 38
Kwangsi 324 17 29
Kwangtung 491 13 21
Kweichow 2140+ 15 27
Liaoning 542 25 1+2
Shansi 437 29 49
Shantung 1,228 24 4-1
Shensi 327 19 33
Sinkiang-Uighur 139 28 146
Autonomous Region
Szechuan 818 12 20
Tsinghai 106 53 106
Yunnan 476 25 43
Tibet Autonomous
Region (Preparatory) na na na
Central Government 60 na na
Abroad and unlocated 11+1
........ ..........
TOTAL 12,433 20 35'
aAll estimates are rough approximations.
bBased on ARD population estimates
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Part Three I. The People'sRepublic of China
Table 3-4
Administrative
Division
Anhwei
Chekiang
Fukien 250 109 141
Heilungkiang 435 *5 290
Honan 562 56 506 12 Fr? 11
Hopeh 11649 1+11 1,238 36 33
Hunan 390 39 351 11 17 11
Hupeh 400 60 340 13 18 13
Inner Mongolian
Autonomous Region
Kansu
Kiangsi
Kiangsu
Kirin
Kwangsi
Kwangt ung
Kweichow
Liaoning
Shansi
Shantung
Shensi
Sinkiang-Uighur
Szechuan
Tsinghai
Yunnan
Tibet
Autonomous Region
(Preparatory)
ESTIMATED URBAN-RURAL DISTRIBUTION
OF CIVILIAN COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS
BY ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION: 1958
Civilian Membershipa
(in Thousands)
Total Urban Rural
Members per 1,002
Total Population
Total Urban Rural
400 40 360 12 25 12
300 11+0 160 12 37 8
18 64- 11
35 38 33
265 17 g-1.8 35 57 34
325 20 305 23 29 23
350 35 315 19 22 19
920 413 507 18 22 16
1.1.6 138 108 21 53 11
300 301 270 16 18 15
400 loo 300 lo 16 9
214 45 169 13 56 11
44o M 154 20 30 14
400 32 368 26 40 25
1,170 205 965 22 28 25
300 75 225 18 42 15
100 25 75 19 42 16
790 115 675 11 19 10
82 5 77 46 50 45
425 42 383 23 47 22
na na na
na na na
TOTAL 11,113 2,543 8,570 21 30 16
aAll figures are rough approximations; exclude Party
Professionals, and Party members in the armed forces and
security troops in the central government organizations.
bBased on ARD population estimates.
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Part Three
3. Social Composition
On the basis of current social status, it is estimated that
almost 8.6 million Party members, or 69.1 per cent of total member-
ship, are peasants (see Table 3-5). Despite their numerical pre-
ponderance, however, the peasantry remains less "communized" than
other sectors of the social complex, and the incidence of Party
membership in this group is much lower. Approximately 3 per cent
SECRET
I. The People's Republic of China
Table 3-5
ESTIMATED SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY:
Category
Peasants
Workers
Intellectuals
Others
TOTAL
195'8a
Members Per Cent of
(in thousands) Total Membership
8,590
1,740
1,453
650
12,433 100.0
aBased on projection of data on sociail
in 1956.
status reported
of peasants are Party members, as compared with 7 per cent of the
total number of workers. And within the two smaller categories--
"intellectuals" (white-collar workers) and "others" (in general,
members of the armed forces)--the proportion of Party members is
more than four times greater than among the peasants.
The numerical preponderance of the peasantry will continue
in the foreseeable future and may even increase as the regime ad-
vances its collectivization program. The numerical growth of
Party membership in the other categories will probably parallel
the growth of the categories themselves, resulting in slight pro-
portional increases.
4. Occupational Composition
The occupational composition of Partymembership reflects
the same phenomena as does the social composition: numerically,
agriculture is the largest category but is weakest in terms of
proportional relationship. More than 7 million Communists, or
57.9 per cent of total Party membership, are engaged in agriculture
(see Table 3-6), but this number represents only slightly more than
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12--:1-P-294.111.LEitagblia_stf China
Table 3-6
ESTIMATED OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY: 1958a
Occupational
Category
Agriculture
Industry
People's organizations
Party professionals
Armed forces
Planning,
finance and trade
Culture and education
Transportation and
communications
Members
in thousands
7,196
1,299
1,204
715
650
617
481
TOTAL
. Per Cent of
Membership
5.7,9 57.9
10.5
9.7
5?7
5.2
5.0
3.9
271 2.2
100.0
12,433
aBased on projection of data on occupational
composition reported 1956.
2 per cent of the Chinese agricultural labor force. Although no
breakdown of the nonagricultural labor force is ayailable, it is
estimated that Communists in the industrial labor force are pro-
portionally more than five times as numerous as in the agricultural
labor force. In the other categories (excluding Party professionals)
it is believed that the proportion of Communists is at least as high
as in the industrial labor force and probably is highest in the
people's organization category, which includes state administrative
employees. The estimated 715,000 Party professionals, the full-
time employees of the Party apparatus constitute the most important
segment
of the Chinese control force
5. Age-Sex Structure
By 1 January 1958 it is estimated that more than 8 million
Party members, or 67.6 per cent of the total membership, will be
between the ages of 25 and 46 (see Table 3-7). The top leadership
of the Party falls mostly within the more-than-46 age cohort, and
most of the older members are, of course, also senior in terms of
Party tenure. The emphasis in current recruitment campaigns, how-
ever, is on the younger elements of Chinese society, for it is felt
that they are not only more enthusiastic and patriotic but are also
more pliable. Proportionally, this group may be expected to in-
crease more rapidly in the near future while the older elements will
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Part Three
Age
Less than 26
26-46
Over 46
TOTAL
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I. The People's Republic of China
Table 3-7
ESTIMATED AGE COMPOSITION
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY: 1958a
Members
La.. thousands",
3,087
8,397
12,433
Per Cent
of Total
Membership.
24.8
676
100.0
Members
Per 1,000
in Age Group
39
35
aBased on projection of data on age composition reported in 1955.
remain rather static.
Male membership in the Chinese Communist Party, as of 1
January 1958, is estimated to total 11.2 million, or almost 90
per cent of total membership. Females constitute a small Party
minority nationally; however, in a few provinces in the northern
and eastern regions, female membership reportedly is as high as 30
per cent of total provincial membership. Nationally, there are 9
female Party members per 1,000 adult women and approximately 142
male Communists per 1,000 adult males.
6. Epliy Organization
Under the revision of the Communist Party Constitution by
the VIII National Congress in 1956, the Central Party organization
was expanded but ihe structure of the Party as a whole remained
unchanged. Membership of the Eighth Central Committee was increased
from 144 to 97 full members and from 23 to 73 alternate members.
Membership of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee was also
increased from 13 to 17 full members and a Standing Committee of the
Political Bureau was created. According to the new Party statute,
representatives to the National Party Congress are now elected for
five-year terms and the Congress convenes annually. (As of April
1957, however, no call had been made for the 1957 Congress.)
Despite the expansion of central organizations, however,
leadership at the top remains unchanged. Thirty-eight of the 41
Seventh Central Committee full members were reelected and all but
two of the former alternates were elected full members. Mao Tse-tung
continued as chairman of the Committee, with four vice-chairmen and a
secretary general.
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UbliC of
cial Party reAsp..als now thtoo yearsh
. . . .
nnui1y De'egates to Party
.r4.00.40$ H4hsien (county)
yearlyand the congreases also convene each year0
ro o
it?r!orr
- n
-
IL
ers rea an members In.,, rural areas
Communist membershiphasincreased sharply in the
ear re 195'7 that Party member-
onincrease of 1 3 million, or 12 per
sjx-month perIadGe majority of these recruits are
also members of agricultural producers/ cooperatives.,
areost era an few have had more an a onef introduction
?
o
Communist eolo
olitical consciousness
i.on among these recruits brought to the at-
eadere the need for a reexamination-of. Party
March 7 on the fifteenth anniversary of
or adjustmen of-work stYle- movement, the chief
nnnnlinelarl
_
nifric4.^n44. -
r?, 4.? -
etermined ?okeep Party members unified
also anxious to retain as many Party members
new movement is designed as an intensive
OCt.r.i...natiO6 :and 'educat iOn -campaign, rather than 'as
Partypurge during which-ihdeviation.ists"?are treated as enemies ?-
of the .Party. and are expelled.According to official -statements
e*P4S.fons from the Party during'the'Cheng-feng-moVement.will be
minimal and occur only in "obstinate" cases where. members'
. ,
refuse refOrm" and follow .Party instructions despite reeducation
or refuse - :Correct" their thinking.
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Part Three I The People Vs Republic of China
The Cheng feng movement will probably continue through most
of 1957 in preparation for the Second Five-Year Plan which opens
in 1958. Consequently, Party recruitment will probably operate at
a low level during the campaign period.
8. The Communi0. Party Youth, Leaue
Growth and Distribution. Founded only eight years ago, the
Youth League of the Chinese Communist Party will have a
membership in excess of 22 million by 1958. In 1952, three years
after its organization, the League had 8.3 million members, organ-
ized in 360,000 League brancheso later, the Communist press
reported 12 million members or 500,000 branches. League member.-
totaled 16 million in 1955, and toward the end of 1956, re-
portedly totaled 20 million, or 17 per cent of all Chinese youth.
Judging from recruitment plans and reports of League activities
appearing in official publications, membership will exceed 22 mu-
ship
A year
lion by 19
estimated that by 1958 League members in
rural areas will total 13 million, or 21.8 per cent of all rural
Youth; about 75 per cant of these are members ni agricultural
Producers cooperatives and about 270,000 hold key positions in
cooperative administration.
The heaviest concentration of Youth League members, about
6 million, is found in the eastern provinces. Four million are in
the northeastern and northern provinces, including the Inner Mong-
olian Autonomous Region; and 5 million are in the central and south-
ern provinces. Only 2 million members are from the northwestern
and southwestern provinces; another 2 million are estimated to be
in the armed forces. The remaining 2 million have not been located.
, Organization. Until its third National CongrPqA, held in
May 1957 in Peking, the Communist Party Youth League was
called the New Democratic Youth League. Sponsored by the Chinese
Communist Party, the League is the equivalent of the Komsomol in
the Soviet Union. Its members are youths from 15 to 26 years of
age (approximately the same age range as the Komsomol). And al-
though officially a league member must resign upon reaching 26
years of age, there are indications that a few members are between
the ages of 26 and 28. The League is used as a tool to organize
China's younger generation and to build a strong base for future
support of its aims and policies. It also serves as ,a Party school
for teaching Marxist-Leninist principles and for preparing future
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Part Three I The Peo le's Re ublic of China
Communist Party members. It is estimated that 2)4- million former
Youth Leaguers will be members of the Communist Party by 1958.
Although organizationally independent, the League functions
under the political direction of the Communist Party. All League
committee secretaries are Party members and serve dually as provincial
or hsien Party committee members League members also occupy im-
portant positions as assistants in the promotion of the Party's
programs and objectives. They are used most frequently in local
administration as members of administrative committees, people's
supervisory committees, and cultural or educational committees.
The organization of tha Youth LK"gue follows ^1^sely the
organization
*.7
organization of the Communist Party itself. The League has a
Central Committee, a provincial committee in each province, a city
committee in each city, and local working committees-throughout the
country, with branches or primary organs in all factories, mining
districts, and other industrial organizations, as well as in schools,
military units, and rural areas.
B. Government
The functions, role, philosophy, and fundamental organiza-
tion of the government of the Chinese People's Republic, as outlined
in the 1957 Annual Estimates, have remained intact, and little
change is foreseen in the immediate future. The highest positions
in the governmental apparatus will continue to be held by the ranking
officials of the Communist Party and most, if not all, officials
down to and including hsiang (township) committeemen will be Party
members and therfore responsible to the Party apparatus for their
acts as government officials. The trAnd toward decentralization of
decision-making so noticeable in the Soviet Union and its European
satellites will probably not be manifest in China by January 1958.
On the contrary, the trend toward greater centralization and
specialization of agencies observed during the past few years will
probably continue well into 1958. It is feat that only substantial
successes by those Communist states participating in the decentral-
ization movement, would encourage China to follow suit. The availa-
bility of reliable cadres, requisite skills and techniques, and the
dictates of tf)e geographic complex indicate that the "loosening
of the bonds" in China will only occur in the more distant future.
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Part Three
1. Central Government
The most significant changes which have occurred during the
past year at the central government level have been in the details
of organization of the State Council, the operational focus of state
power. The trend toward proliferation of specialized economic min-
istries and agencies has continued, and the current (April 1957)
Council now comprises the premier, 42 ministries, 7 commissioners,
16 bureaus, and 3 aencies attached to the Council (see Figure 3-1).
SECRET
I. of ?1,,,?,lina,
Figure 3-1
COMPOSITION OF THE STATE COUNCIL
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
APRIL 1957
Premier
12 Vice-premiers (2 added, November 1956)
Secretary General
7 Deputies Secretary General
Assistant Secretary General
Miaiatoul.911.
Defense
Foreign Affairs
Supervision
Interior
Public Security
8 Staff Officers
Staff of the Premier
The Secretariat
Consultaiion Staff
Documents Office
Justice
Culture
Education
Higher Education
Public Health
Ministers of Financial-Economic Committee:
Finance
Foreign Trade
Commerce
Textile Industry
Railways
Communications
Post and Telecommunications
Fores:try
Water Conservancy
Labor
Light Industry
Grain Production
Agriculture
Food Production Industry (formed May 1956)
Agricultural Land Reclamation (formed May 1956)
Coal Industry
Electric Power Industry
Power Equipment (formed May 1956)
Petroleum
Procurement of Agricultural Supplies
144
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Part Three
Figure 3.11 (continued)
Ministers of:
First Machine Building
Second Machine Building
Third Machine Building (abolished May 1956; reconstituted
November 1956)
Construction
Geology
Metallurgical (formed May 1956)
Chemical Industry (formed May 1956)
Building Materials Industry (formed May 1956)
Marine Product (formed May 1956)
Timber Industry (formed May 1956)
City Construction (upgraded from Bureau, May 1956)
City Service (formed May 1956)
Commissioners of
Technological Commission (formed May 1956)
National Economic Commission (formed May 1956)
Overseas Chinese Affairs
State Planning Commission
Nationalities Affairs
Physical Culture and Sport Commission
National Construction Commission
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Bureaus of
Commodity. Supplies (formed May 1956)
Experts (formed May 1956)
Foreign Experts (formed from Bureau of Expert Work, 1956)
State Statistical Bureau
Standard
Handicraft Industry Control
Civil Aeronautics
Weather Bureau
Commerce and Industrial Administrative Control
Broadcasting Control
Foreign Cultural Relations
Religious Affairs
Laws and Regulations
State Council Personnel
Conficlential Communications
Departmental Affairs Control
Agencies:
New China Nes Service
People's Bank of China
Reform of the Written Chinese Language
The evils of departmentalism inherent in a strict categorical
approach to administration are already apparent, as agencies strive
for more complete linear control over activities which support their
own functions.? The? continued growth of the number of agencies sub-
ordinate to the State Council must perforce result in an increase
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Part Three I. ThtltgsaiBeoj121jc.9L_L_Ch'na
in the role of the apparatus of the premier in order that adequate
coordination if not control is exercised.
Available data suggest that there has been no public dis-
cussion of possible alternate solutions which include a simplifica-
tion of the central apparatus through merger of complementary agen-
cies or, more significantly, a transfer of authority over economic
activities to the lower levels of government. Of the possible al-
ternatives, it is felt that the merger approach will probably be
tried before any attempt at decentralization.
2. Provincial Government
There have been no significant changes in the functions,
role, or organization of China's 23 provinces and 2 autonomous re-
gions.1
The process of consolidation of the provinces, begun shortly
after the establishment of The People's Republic 144 loqn
.??,
r
uUCCLI 0
--r_
to have been completed and no significant changes in administrative
boundaries have occurred since April 1956. It is felt that the
status and geographic areas of the major administrative divisions
of Communist China will remain fairly constant in the immediate future.
3. Local Government
Developments at the local governmental level during the past
year have been intimately connected with the progress of the co-
operative farming movement. The authority of hsiang (township)
governments has grown considerably as the farmlands within their
territorial confines have been organized and reorganized into co-
operative and collective farms. Earlier, their authority in agri-
culture was limited largely to serving as channels for the trans-
mission of orders from the provincial government to the thousands
of individual peasant households which worked the land. At present
they are at least indirectly responsible for the administration and
plan fullfillment of the dozens of "unified" farms under their
jurisdiction.
1A Preparatory Committee for Tibetan Autonomy was created in
April 1955, but no formal grant of autonomy has been made as of this
date. The theoretically special status of autonomous divisions in
China (regions, chou, hsien, and hsiang) is largely limited to
"titles" and they have functions and roles identical with their
nonautonomous equivalents.
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Part Three I. The People's Republic of China
Coincident with the growth in the authority of the township
government there has been a great increase in their territorial
jurisdiction. Their number has been reduced from more than 200,000
in 1955 to approximately 100,000 in 1957. This augmentation of the
power and jurisdiction of local government has had two basic aims:
1) to destroy the remnants of the Pao-Chia or "village elder"
system and 2) to make government units coincide territorially with
the planned areas of the new collective farms. The Pao-Chia system
is based on households, with 10 households equaling a chia; 20 chia,
a pao; and 15 pao, a township. At each level the heads of house-f
hol-ds, usually 'he senior male members of the family, are in author-
ity. The system has been conservative in outlook and highly re-
sistant to pressures from the outside, whether from war lords, the
Nationalists, or the Communists. Initially the Communists attempted
to govern the villages through the system by placing their own
personnel at the township and pao levels. Failing this attemPil
they are now trying to destroy the system in its entirety by re-
placing the pao and chia with "people's congresses" and by alter-
ing the apex through the amalgamation of townships* While the
formal structure may change completely in the year ahead, the in-
formal relationships established over centuries will probably con-
tinue and will seriously inhibit the implementation of Communist
control over Chinese agriculture.
1+. Government C9ntrol Centers
The growth and distribution of major and alternate govern-
ment control centers in The People's Republic of China accurately
reflects the development and location of channels of Communist con-
trol over the peoples of China "in general, the number-of major
centers has decreased while the number of alternates has grown.
These changes reflect the centralization of control over regions
and the development of new industrial bases.
The reduction in the number of major government control
centers from 35 in 1947 under the Nationalist regime to 26 in 1957
(see Table 3-8 and Map V) is a direct result of the consolidation
of provinces undertaken by the Communists shortly after their assump-
tion of power. These major centers consist of the republic capital,
Peking, and the capitals of the 23 provinces and 2 autonomous re-
gions. Each of the provincial or regional capitals administers
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Part Three I. The People's Republic of China
Table 3-8
SUMMARY OF MAJOR AND ALTERNATE GOVERNMENT
CONTROL CENTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
1958a
Administrative
Division
Number of Cities, Per Cent Change
_IL-4. 1958 1947-58
Total 64 136 113
Major 35 26
Alternate 29 110 279
National Municipalities 11 3 =27
Anhwei 1 6 500
Major 1 1
Alternate ...... 5
Chekiang 1 7
Major 1 1
Alternate ...... 6
Fukien 2
Major 1 1
Alternate 1 3 200
Heilungkiang 4- 5 25
Major 4 1 -25
Alternate __ L. ........
Honan 1 12
Major 1 1
Alternate ...... 11
Hopeh 3 14 367
Major 2 2
Alternate 1 12
Hunan 2 9
Major 1 1
Alternate 1 8 700
Hupeh 1 5 14C?
Major 1 1
Alternate ..... 4
Inner Mongolian
Autonomous Region 3 2 -67
IMO
600
11111??0111111
600
100
1100
??????110
VEM
sm.. oar
1100
350
CIMINO
CYO ova
Major 2
Alternate 1
Kansu 2
Major 2
Alternate
1 50
1
7 250
1 -50
6
???11,2?0
aMajor government control centers: cities containing agencies
exercising direct control over large areas [e.g., provinces and
autonomous regions]. Alternate government control centers: cities
which contain agencies exercisingeontrol over lesser areas which
could operate over a larger area if their counterparts in major
centers were inoperative. For complete listing, see Table A-10,
Appendix.
148
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Table 3-8 (continued)
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I. The P,t2p1e's %public of China
Administrative Number of Cities Per Cent Change
Division 1947 - ....120 121-12:21_____
Kiangsi 1 6 500
Major 1 1
Alternate OM OM 5 . MO
Kiangsu 2 7 260
Major 1 I
Alternate 1 6 500
Kirin 5 5
Major 3 1 -33
Alternate 2 4 100
Kwangsi 4 14-
Major 1 1
Alternate 3 3
Kwangtung 2 1
Major 1 1
A14.?.4... 1 --1-
nLi..iliaLv
Kweichow 1 1
Major 1 1
Alternate __ --
Liaoning 5 11 600
Major 1 1 --
Alternate 4 10 150
ShaRsi 1 5 400
Major 1 1 --
Alternate 1=1???3 4 MO OM
Shantung 3 4 33
Major 1 1 --
Alternate 2 3 50
Shensi 1 4 300
Major 1 1
Alternate MIYMMI 3 ......
Sinkiang-Uighur
Autonomous Region 1 2 100
Major 1 1
Alternate OM MN 1
Szwechwan 3 11 267
Major 2 1 -50
Alternate 1 10 900
Tibet Autonomous Region
(Preparatory) 1 1
Major. 1 1
Alternate
Tsinghai 1 1
Major 1 1
Alternate ?=1. PP .1 MI MN
Yunnan 1 2 100
Major 1 1
Alternate OM. ???? 1
???
NM% MEI
API IMO
IMO VIM
-33
=WOW
W1101.4110
=MOM
.0101.M.
.111???
NOM. ?11110
wit am
111101.1115
????
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Part Three I. The People's Republic: pf China
areas ranging in size from 39,000 to 750,000 square miles with
populations ranging from 1.4 million to 70.3 million.
The 25 major centers and the 2 municipalities of national
subordination, Shanghai and Tlien-Ching (Tientsin), could func-
tion as alternates to Peking, the republic capitals Five of these
cities, Cheng-tu, Kuang-chou (Canton), Lan-phou, Nan-ching, Shen-
yang, and Wu-han, are regional army or air force headquarters which
could direct some of the operations of the Chinese Communist mil-
itary establishment if the national headquarters in Peking were
inoperative. Seven cities, Kuang-chou, Shen-yang, Cheng-chou,
Chi-nan, Ha-erh-pin, Shanghai, T'ien-ching,are regional headquarters
of the Chinese railroad system, which is the only reliable all-
weather means of transportation outside of the major rivers.
Kuang-chou and Shen-yang are also military control centers.
? The number of alternate government control centers, cities
of provincial and autonomous region subordination exclusive of the
capitals, has increased from 29 to 110 since 1947. Most of this
increase results directly from the development of new industrial
and mining centers in the interior regions. The majority of secon-
dary industrial centers, however, remain concentrated in such
established industrial provinces as Hopeh, Liaoning, and Szechwan.
Each of these cities contains agencies which could assume province-
wide authority if their counterparts at the province capital were
incapable of functioning.
C. Political Economy
, On 1 January 1958 the People's Republic of China will begin
its Second Five-Year Plan which envisages a doubling of the gross
national product. Thus will open the second stage of the long-
term Chinese effort to solve China's desperate triangle of food,
population, and forced industrial growth. China's burgeoning
population will continue to press inexorably upon available food
supplies, perpetuating the internal pressures which curb and
circumscribe Peking's ambitious program of industrial expansion.
1. Agriculture
Since 1949 China's population has grown from 540 million
to an estimated 623 million (1958); and with each year it increases
by an additional 10 million. Meanwhile, food production?although
it too has grown--has failed to surpass the minimal requirements
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Part Three Republic of
for sustaining these millions and for investment in industrial
construction. Already Communist leaders have revealed the critical
nature of the problem by adopting drastic measures to increase
supplies of food available to the state, to control rigidly the
distribution of foodstuffs, and even to retard future population
growth.
Although competing demands for industrial investment have
compelled the regime to maintain at low levels its investment in
improving the conditions and techniques of agriculture, unceasing
Communist pressures have led to the expansion of agriculture into
marginal and submarginal farming areas. Corresponding pressures
upon the peasant population to join cooperative and collective
farms in which the state enforces a policy of "grain distribution
first to the state and second to the cooperative members" have
brought control of agricultural products firmly into the hands of
the regime. And these practices have been accompanied since 1955
by a direct Communist effort to curb population growth by popular-
izing and encouraging birth-control measures despite the fact that
such measures run counter both to Marxist principles and to Chinese
social mores.
The foregoing policies have led to some increases in food
production and to state seizure of "hidden" agricultural reserves,
but the food shortage remains acute. Moreover, the regime's birth
control measures have had no visible impact upon the pattern of
population growth, nor are they likely to in the foreseeable future.
While the government has carefully maintained the illusion of public
well-being through the publication of apparently inflated statistics
on crop production, the real consequence of Communist policy has
been a steady decline in living standards in town and country and
the delivery of a destructive blow to peasant initiative.
2. Industry
An atmosphere of official optimism pervades the Communist
approach to the problem of economic construction in the coming
five-year plan, but serious obstacles still stand in the way of
China's industrial growth. Despite the regime's plan to expend
60 per cent of the total national revenue on industry, and two-thirds
of that on capital mnstruction, the country's industrial growth
will continue to lag behind official expectations. Limited means
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Part Three I. The People's Republic of China
for capital investment, barriers to increases in industrial produc-
tion, and the absence of trained manpower reserves will circOmscribe
severely the Communist Party's ability to establish and sustain
high levels of economic growth.
Sources for capital investment have been limited largely
to surpluses which could be drawn from agricultural production
and to Soviet economic aid. Since these not only have remained at
comparatively low levels throughout the period of the First Five-
Year Plan but exhibit no ability to increase significantly in the
near future, it cannot be expected that the pace of investment will
quicken. The seriousness with which the regime regards this restric-
tion is evidenced by the strenuous efforts of Communist leaders to
encourage economy at every level of production and consumption in
the country. There has been, in fact, a hint that the government
might consider future foreign investment in China's economy in
Chou En-lai's recent suggestion that China would be willing to
develop "economic, technical, and cultural contacts" with non-
Soviet countries.
The problem of investment has been and will continue to be
magnified by inefficient use of available resources. Largely,
this is the consequence of Communist inexperience in planning, the
absence of sufficient knowledge of internal economic conditions,
and the effort to maximize the pace of industrialization at any
cost. During the First Five-Year Plan, these factors led, among
other things, to overinvestment in capital constructbn at the ex-
pense of current production, to faulty allocation of scarce materials
among industries, to breakdowns and bottlehecks in the distribution
system, to irrational uses of available materials and to a general
decline in the quality of goods produced.
That these same problems will recur during the Second Fivp-
Year Plan is a certainty. Indeed, many of them still afflict in-
dustrial production in the USSR which boasts 30 years of experience
in total economic planning. In China the problems are infinitely
more serious. For one thing, the absence of a modern transporta-
tion system has hindered and will continue to hinder the orderly
exchange of goods and services on a nationwide scale. The rigid-
ities of the bureaucratic system of economic administration, more-
over, prevent easy adaptations by parts of the industrial machinery
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Part Three I. The Peoples Republic of China
to unexpected changes in local economic conditions. Of far greater
significance, the Communist regime has eliminated the market as a
controlling factor in economic production without replacing it
with a reliable system of economic indices and barometers. And
this factor has tended to obscure the perception by planners and
managers of the realities of their economic situation and has often
prevented them from acting rationally.
Beyond this, the Communist shock calTipaign to create a modern
economy in China continues to lag for lack of trained troops to
?
man the industrial battlements,
still remains a country with vast reserves of unskilled labor and
acute shortages of experienced managerial personnel and skilled
industrial workers. Many of the most striking instances of indus-
trialwaste and inefficiency during the past several years can be
traced directly to this source. To overcome this problem, the re-
gime has introduced broad-scale programs to train cadres of man-
agers, technicians, and skilled workers 'at every level of the ed-
ucational system. But the training periods are by their nature
lengthy; and several years will pass before their graduates enter
the industrial area in etfective numbers. In the interim, the
mistakes of managerial and technical inexperience will continue
to hamper achievement of the regime's economic goals.
3. Consumer Industry and Trade
It is characteristic of the Soviet type of economic adminis-
tration to show little real interest in the development of light
and consumer goods industries and in the organization of an efficient
system of retail trade outlets during the initial period of planned
industrial expansion. As have their counterparts in the Soviet
Union during an earlier period, Communist China's economic planners
have neglected and are continuing to neglect this area of economic
activity. Inattention to the development of the light and con-
sumer goods industries led to a sharp decline in the availability
of consumer goods during the First Five-Year Plan. And-the state
compounded the difficulty by interfering in the existing system
of retail distribution. In the winter of 1955-56, the regime herded
90 per cent of the country's urban small producers into cooperatives
and joint state-private enterprises. Originally Communist leaders
bkad planned to complete the socialization of small traders and pro-
ducers by 1957, but the deepening consumer goods crisis which followed
L.G I VI IG
five-year plan China
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Part Three J. The People's Republic of ghina
the original assault compelled them to postpone action until the
end of the Second Five-Year Plan.
The same kind of problems have plagued Communist policy in
the rural areas. The collectivization of agriculture and the re-
sulting state seizure of agricultural surpluses have forced rural
incomes to new lows and have provided the impetus for a new migra-
tion of destitute peasants to urban centers. To overcome the crisis
and to reestablish the flow of consumer goods in rural China, the
government began in 1956 to encourage "subsidiary" production
(cottage industry) among the collectivized peasantry. The year
1957 thus witnessed a rapid rise in the number of smal producers
and traders on the countryside, a trend which is destined to con-
tinue well into the period of the Second Five-Year Plan.
D. Population and Manpower
1. Size
The crucial population problem is one of many that face the
Chinese Communists. For centuries the balance between food supply
and population in China has been a fine one, and seldom has a year
passed without famine in some area. Nevertheless, each year the
population increases by ten million, and now totals an estimated
623 million (1958). The Communists have been slow to admit the
problem and until recently the official line, in effect, stated
that China is a country of vast new lands and unexploited natural
resources where the rate of production is increasing more rapidly
than the population. Now, although the problem is admitted it
remains veiled in Communist gobbledygook. A birth-control program
has been initiated, attempts are being made to cultivate previously
unused lands, and people are being resettled in areas where a better
balance exists between food production and population. It is ques-
tionable, however, whether the regime can adequately provide for
the rapid population growth through these reforms. It is also
doubtful whether the Chinese economy can develop rapidly enough
to provide employment for so many new hands when unemployment and
underemployment admittedly prevail in both the urban and rural seg-
ments of the population.
It is estimated that by 1 January 1958 the population of
the Chinese People's Republic will total 623 million (see Table
3-9). A projection of the 1953 Census figure of 582.6 million,
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Part Three I. The People's Republic of China
the 1958 estimate contradicts the 2 per cent rate of natural in-
crease reported in the Census but is supported by a figure pub-
lished in 1956 which indicates that the annual rate of population
increase in China has averaged 1.5 per cent since the Census.
Based on the latter rate, it is estimated that by 1962 China's
population will have increased 38 million over the 1958 figure
and will total 661.2 million. This estimate is probably conserva-
tive, since an anticipated drop in the current mortality rate will
probably be coupled with a continuing high birth rate.
Table 3-9
ESTIMATED TOTAL POPULATION
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
1953, 1958-62
Year
1953a
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
Population
millionsl
582.6
623.0
632.3
641.8
651.4
661.2
aOfficial census figure.
2. Migration
For several years the Chinese Communists have been engaged
in a program of resettlement to increase food production through
reclamation of waste lands and to relieve the pressure of surplus
population in the densely populated regions of central and coastal
China. Migrants have been drawn chiefly from the provinces of
Shantung, Honan, Hopeh, and Kiangsu and from several of the larger
cities such as Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking and Canton. The majn
regions of the new settlement are within Heilungkiang, Tsinghai,
Kansu, and Inner Mongolia.
Although the mainland press has devoted considerable space
to this program and the general volume of the movement is apparent,
it is not possible to determine the distribution of the migrants
between the provinces of departure and settlement. The time ele-
ment is often vague, and data are generally presented for groups
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Part Three I. The People's Republic of China
of provinces in such a way that there is no possibility of extract-
ing figures for a particular province.
A Chinese report states that in 1956, the first year of
organized migration, more than 725,000 persons migrated to new
areas and that this number exceeds the total number of migrants
between 1949 and 1955. On the basis of this statement, 1.4 million
migrants since 1949 would be a reasonable estimate. Assuming, for
illustrative purposes, that the transfer of population took place
between the eight provinces mentioned as principal participants,
the 1:4 million constituted 1+.3 per cent of the population of the
four provinces of in-migration but only 0.8 per cent of the popula-
tion of the four provinces of departure. The significance is ob-
vious: although migration could substantially alter the relative
size of the population and modify the economic life of the sparsely
settled areas of in-migration, a minimal rate of natural increase
would more than compensate for the migratory losses.
The migrants may be roughly divided into three groups.
The first and the largest are the peasants, who usually migrate
by households. In the spring of 1956, for example, 143,698 rural
families moved into Heilunekiang to cultivate new lands. Another
large group consists of young volunteers who come from both urban
and rural areas. For example, 90 per cent of the 40,000 persons
who recently arrived in Sinkiang were between the ages of 18 and
25. The third group consists of urban unemployed, vagrants, and
small groups of specialists, who provide labor for projects in the
isolated regions.
The future rate of migration will probably be greater than
in 1956, for the Chinese government estimates that China has 250
million acres of wasteland and that one-third of this can be re-
claimed during the course of several five-year plans. Assuming
that this reclaimed land will be settled as densely as China as a
whole, it would provide a living for some 22 million persons. This
would involve a tremendous migratory movement but would result in
the resettlement of a number equivalent only to the nations natural
increase over a two-year period.
3. Distribution
The 1958 estimated provincial distribution of the Chinese
population (see Table 3-10) is a projection of data reported in the
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Part Three I. The People's RepuJDlic of China
Table 3-10
I
PROVINCIAL AND REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 1958a
Population
Province and Region (in millions)
Northeast
I
Heilungkiang 12.7
North
Northwest
Shansi
Hopeh
Total .44a_
46.2
61.5
Kirin 12.1
Liaoning 22._5
Total
47.3
Kansu 1.8.
Shensi 17.0
Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous
Region 5.2
Tsinghai
Total
East
Anhwei
Chekiang
Fukien
Kiangsu
Shantung
1.8
37.8
32.4
24.5
14.1
50.7
2
Total 1 0
Central South
Honan 1+7,3
Hunan 35.5
Hupeh 29.7
Kiangsi 17.9
Kwangsi 19.0
Kwangtung
Total 188.5
Southwest
Kweichow 16.1
Szechwan 70.2
Yunnan 18.7
Total 105.0
Other Areas
IMAR 7.5
Tibet (incl. Chang-tu area) 1.1+
Total 3.9
GRAND TOTAL 621,12
aProvinces grouped according to former ad-
ministrative areas, abolished by the Chinese Com-
munists in 1953 but still used in describing eco-
nomic regions.
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Part Three I. The People's Republic of China
1953 Census. Although the latest boundary adjustments have been
made, it has not been possible to allow for population changes as
a result of migratory shifts. Even if it were possible, however,
to estimate the variations by province, the changes would hardly
be significant. In the province of Heilungkiang, for example,
which received the largest share of the in-migrants, the total
population has reportedly increased only two per cent as a result
of the arrival of the settlers; and in the provinces of out-migration,
such adjustments would account for only a fraction of one per cent.
4. Urban Population
Development. China is an agrarian country, with a 1958
estimated urban population of only 85 million, or 13.6
per cent of the total population (see Table 3-11). This estimate
Table 3-11
ESTIMATED GROWTH OF URBAN POPULATION
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
19rd
53, 1958-62
Urban Per Cent
Population of Total
Year
1953a (in millions). Poyulation
1-71-7 p 13.3
((.3
1958
1959 85.0 13.6
86.7 13.7
1960 88.5 13.8
1961 90.8 13.9
1962 93.2 14.1
aCensus figure. Communist sources do not
define clearly the urban area; this may explain
the lower census total for the urban population
over previously estimated totals.
is based on a projection of the urban population reported in the
1953 Census, made under two basic assumptions: 1) that the annual
rate of natural increase is 1.5 per cent for both total and urban
populations; and 2) that rural-to-urban migration will average one
million between 1960 and 1965. Thus, by 1962, it is estimated that
the urban population will total 93.2 million and will constitute
14.1 per cent of China's total population.
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Part Three I. The People's Republic of China
Since in the West, industrialization and urbanization gen-
erally go hand in hand, it may seem surprising to find such a slow
rate of urban growth in China. However, several compensatory fac-
tors tend to produce a minimal growth. Factors tending to increase
the size of the urban population in China are 1) industrialization,
with an accompanying influx of rural in-migrants to the cities;
2) the building of new industrial towns in the interior of the
country; and 3) natural increase of the urban population. Factors
contributing to a decrease of the urban population or hindering its
growth are 1) government restrictions on urban in migration; 2)
government efforts to return peasants to the land and the movement
of urban population into new areas of agricultural development;
3) shortages of skilled labor, capital investment, and equipment;
and LO the existing urban unemployment which has to be absorbed
by the economy. After a decade or so, with the absorption of the
urban unemployed and an increasing number of skilled personnel and
continued industrial growth, the rate of growth of the urban popula-
tion will accelerate.
Provincial Distribution. The size of the urban population
of China and its provincial distribution have remained
relatively stable since the turn of the century. The greatest
change occurred as a result of the industrialization of Manchuria,
where a number of cities experienced sizable increases in popula-
tion during the 1920s and 1930s. This growth in the northeastern
provinces has continued under the Communists, and therefore the
three Manchurian provinces of Liaoning, Heilungkiang, and Kirin
constitute the most highly urbanized region of China (see Table
3-12).
The new policy to develop the national economy will probably
result in a modest redistribution of urban population. The Second
Five-Year Plan calls for the construction of new industrial bases
in the inland areas "according to the principle of location of
natural resources and sensible distribution of productivity," whigh
indicates that provinces in the western part of China will receive
disproportionate amounts of capital for economic expansion and
urban growth. it is too early to quantify the results of these plans,
however, to the extent of making adjustments in provincial distribu-
tions of the urban populations.
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Part Three
Table 3-12
0
CC ? ?
Province
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? 6 6
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I. The People's Republic of China
160
? 6 0
0 \ CO
0 \ CO coo'
ai
* ? ? ?
Cr) tr
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6 ?
11--N 0 T?
r- r-
co
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0
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CO \O
? I 0 ?
0 00
,t 0N00 al
0 ? ? 0
IrN cr) \D
ocOcODcO
0 cr),-t
?O? 00
al al 1.r\.4.
r.r.)
cO
0 0000
r\ C0 re)
r- r-
\O c)C) C\I
60000
1-- Cr) r'". OD
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?-4MC(.00
On-4-1
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6
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(T)
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(D
Table A-14- (continued)
Administrative Divisiona
Ukrainskaya SSR (continued)
Sumskaya 0
Ternopolskaya 0
Vinnitskaya 0
Volynskaya 0
Voroshilovgradskaya 0
Zakarpatskaya 0
Zaporozhskaya 0
Zhitomirskaya 0
Belorusskaya SSR
Brestskaya 0
Gomelskaya? 0
Grodnenskaya 0
Minskaya 0
Mogi levskaya 0
Molodechnenskaya 0
Vitebskaya 0
Uzbekskaya SSR
Andizhanskaya 0
Bukharskaya 0
Ferganskaya 0
Kara-Ka lpakskaya ASSR
Kashka-Darynskaya 0
111111111M1111111111111111?1
--1232/4ob
Population
(in thousands)
(1,706)
(11504)
(21288)
(11-c98)
(1 837)
?eloo)
(11389)
(1,692)
912+9
(1,3)+5)
(1,542)
(11125)
(1,579)
(11339)
(11038)
(17281)
61333_
(653)
0+81)
(778)
? (454)
(460)
(11527)
(1,085)
(2,137)
(874)
(2,171)
(920)
(1,373)
,5714-)
7,909
(1,310)
(9)+8)
(1,600)
(1,123)
(847)
(899)
7,172
(700)
(517)
(9+7)
(1+32)
July 1955c 1 Jan 1958d
(17538)
(1,110)
(2,173)
(935)
(2,355)
(957)
(11452)
(11630)
8-14-2
(1,212)
(1734-2)
(96)+)
(1,698)
(1,14c)
(865)
(921)
7 571+
Z731)
(552)
(891)
(404)
(456)
? Average
Annual Rate
of Growth
(in per cent)
71-940-55 195-
-0.0+ 0.28
-1.69 0.92
-0.40 0.68
-1.24- 2.80
1.10 3.140
0.91 1.60
-0,07 2.32
-0.42 1.44
-0.88 1.16
-0.73 1.00
-0.91 0.96
-0.96 0.68
0.08. 2.41+
-0.98 0.60
-1.12 0.9+
1.81 0.96
0.80 2.24
0.44 1.76
0.45 2.72
0.53 2.08
-0.30 2.96
3.00.
?
APPENDIX
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Table A-14 (continued)
Administrative Divisiona
Uzbekskaya SSR (continued)
Khorezmskaya 0
Namanganskaya 0
Samarkandskaya 0
Surkhan-Darynskaya 0
Tashkentskaya 0
Kazakhskayia_221
Akmolinskaya 0
Aktyubinskaya 0
Alma-Atinskaya 0
Dzhambulskaya 0
Guryevskaya 0
Karagandinskqya 0
Kokchetavskaya 0
-Kustanayskaya 0
Kzyl-Ordinskaya 0
Pavlodarskaya 0
Semipalatinskaya 0
Severo-Kazakhstanskaya 0
Taldy-Kurganskaya 0
Vostochno-Kazakhstanskaya 0
Yuzhno-Kazakhstanskaya 0
Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya 0
(3)44)
(521)
(1,022)
(315)
(1,305)
6e417
(338)
(481)
(355)
(287)
(403)
(331)
(372)
(328)
(249)
(381)
(363)
(317)
(537)
(6)+9)
(380)
0
Population
in thousands
July 1955c 1 Jan 1958d
(376)
(401)
(532) (555) 7
(1,028) (1,070)
(310 (3214)
(11976) (2,080)
8,121 8.907
(535) (651)
(371) (391)
(V54) (819)
(508) (547)
(271+) * (279)
(847) (924)
(409) (WA)
(541) (667)
(306) (309)
(401) (504)
(436) (472)
(422) (Y16)
(440) (472)
(689) (722)
(846) (867)
(342) (363)
Average
? Annual Rate
of Growth
Ma:a 135.25.1
0.58 2.61+
0.13 1.72
0.04 1.64
0.47 -4.00
3.12 2.12
2.02 3.88
3.99 8.68
0.59 2.16
3.144 3)44
2.62 3.08
-0.28 0.72
0.62 3.614-
1.43 6.36
2.75 9.32
-0.1440
3.69 10.28
0.88 3.32
0.98 2.28
2.36 2.92
1.72 1.92
1.83 1.00
? -0.61 2.44
APPENDIX
?
0
0.)
n.)
n.)
?
Table A-4 (continued)
Administrative Division
a
Gruzinskaya SSR
Gruzinskaya Proper
Abkhazskaya ASSR
Adzharskaya ASSR
Az2.02ydzhanskaya ,SSR
Azerbaydzhanskaya Proper
Nakhichevanskaya ASSR
Litovskaya SSR
Moldavskaya SSR
Latviyskaya SSR
Kirgizskaya SSR
Dzhalal-Abadskaya 0
Frunzenskaya 0
Issyk-Kulskaya 0
Oshskaya 0
Tyan-Shanskaya 0
Tadzhikskaya SSR
1939/401')
Ti4,56Z73-59
(312)
(200)
3,206
2,925
2,500
_LOCI+
1,1+58
(258
04.85)
(174)
(417)
(121+)
1.1+
Population
(in thousands)
July 1
_1601-
(3,311)
(369)
(240)
_3_121.1
(3,18LTT
(127)
2,650
2,940
1,880
(276)
(787)
(219)
(482)
(116)
1,740
1 Jan 195.8cl,
o
(449)
(238)
3q,f3
(3,411)
(132)
2,704
2,749
2,039
_1_122L_
t28144-
(849)
(24)
(509)
(120)
1,860
Average
Annual Rate
of Growth
(in per cent)
1940-55 1
0.59
0.52
1.18
1.29
0.20
-0.57
0.34
0:40
1.76
0:43
3.78
1.56
0.95
0.41
1-01+
1.36
0.68
8.68
-0.32
2.80
2.84
1.56
0.80
1.64
0.16
2.48
1.16
3.16
2.72
2.24
1.36
2.76
APPENDIX
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P1
P1
Table A-4 (continued)
Administrative Divisiona
Population
(in thousands)
1939/401? July 1
in per
1 Jan 1958d ? 1040-55
Tadzhikskaya SSR (continued)
Gorno-Badakhshanskaya A..0. (69) (60) (67)
Leninabadskaya 0 (523) (588) (622)
Cities and Rayons of
Republic Subordination (892) (1,092) (1,171)
Armyanskaya SSR 1 282 ....1i5.2.0_ 1 688
Turkmenskaya SSR 1 _1331_1J.0
Ashkhabadskaya 0 @% 0+77 (511)
Chardzhouskaya 0 (266) (295) (307)
Maryyskaya 0 (290) (308) (319)
Tashauzskaya 0 (249) (261) (266)
Estonskaya _SSR 11052 11*0 11139
-0.18
0.76
1.35
1.45
0.42
0:39
0.66
0.38
0.28
0.33
cent)
j.915-58
4-.68
2.32
2.88
2.48
1.88
2.96
1.64
1)44
0.76
-0.04
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Table A-5
REDISTRIBUTION OF USSR POPULATION
WITHIN UNOCCUPIED AREA: 1939-55
(Net Increment or Decrement)
Region and Administrative Division
North_an?yeste ion
RSFSR
Arkhangelskaya 0.
Komi ASSR
Vologodskaya 0.
g21192.28RIAREIDI
RSFSR
Dagestanskaya ASSR
12110412812n
RSFSR
Kuybyshevskaya O.
Kuybyshev City
Remainder Oblast
Saratovskaya 0
Saratov City
Remainder Oblast
Tatarskaya ASSR
Ulyanovskaya 00
Central Region
RSFSR
Arzamaskaya O.
Balashovskaya 6.
Chuvashskaya ASSR
Gorkavskaya 00
Gorki,y City
Remainder Oblast
Ivanavskaya O.
Kirovskaya O.
Kostromskaya 0.
Mariyskaya ASSR
Mordovskaya ASSR
Penzenskaya O.
Tambovskaya Oe
Vladimirskaya O.
Yaroslavskaya 0.
Urals Region
RSFSR
Bashkirskaya ASSR
Cheliyabinskaya 00
Chelyabinsk City
Remainder Oblast
Chkalovskaya 00
247
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APPENDIX
In Absolute ln Per-Cent
Figures of Total
- 4.72
- 459380 - 0080
2789417 4093
-4999402 - 8085
22.12 7 5021
?2939912 -, 5021
?7489096 ?13.25
3199045 5.65
(3089612) (5047)
( 109433) (0.18)
?3649193 _ 6045
( 969065) (1070)
(-4609258) (- 8015)
-5019250 - 8.88
?2019698 ? 3057
-3-la.a.1-L -69043
14409831 - 7081
-3119447 - 5052
-1219003 - 2014
- 817 - 0001
( 1499782) (2065)
(-1509599) (- 2066)
2269282 ? 4001
?7129127 ?12.62
?2859611 ? 5.06
? 139672 ? 0.24
?3369174 ? 5.96
-3469777 - 6014
-5489190 - 9071
-1529765 . 2071
-439469 - 7050
w24-45110. 2122.2_
-3629466 - 6042
7819697 13086
( 3009601) (5033)
( 4819096) (8052)
-1099100 - 1093
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4
Table A:2'Lcao.L....it,inued.)
SECRET
'legion and AdministratiyIejAvision
gra3....datgio (continued)
Molotovskaya 0.
Molotov City
Remainder Oblast
Sverdlovskaya 00
Sverdlovsk City
Remainder Oblast
Udmurtskaya ASSR
htLailtEllaitga
RSFSR
Altayskiy Kray
Kemerovskaya 0.
Kurganskaya 00
Novosibirskaya O.
Novosibirsk City
Remainder Oblast
Omskaya O.
Omsk City
Remainder Oblast
Tomskaya Oe
TyumenSkaya 00
Eat.glatElanItga
RSFSR
Buryat-Mongolskaya ASSR
Chitinskaya 00
Irkutskaya 00
Krasnoyarskiy Kray
Krasnoyarsk City
Remainder gray
Tuvinskaya A00.
Yakutskaya ASSR
Ear.kaIltglan
RSFSR
Amurskaya 0.
Kamchatskaya O.
Khabaravski7 Kray
Magadanskaya 00
Primorskiy Kray
Sakhalinskaya 00
Transcaucasus Region
'Armyanskaya SSR
Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR
Gruzinskaya SSR
Kazakhstan and Central Asia
Kazakhskaya SSR
21+8
SECRET
In Absolute
-11E0P.
500,545
( 2489008)
( 252,537)
738,541
( 2309762)
( 5079779)
- 939789
A79.058
-1769034
717,468
-128,521
729616
( 2799203)
(-206,587)
149801
( 1809909)
(-1669108)
169622
- 37,594
4.222B1
24,746
-
85,452
249,382
222,006
( 1099107)
( 112,899)
65,651
149495
2-125-2.9a2
19,353
759978
377,655
38,259
282,253
566,251
154,700
-278,642
- 76,355
12.6.216.2
1,297,750
APPENDIX
In Per Cent
of Total
8087
(4039)
(4047)
13008
(4009)
(9000)
- 1066
112
. 3012
12072
- 2028
1029
(4095)
("i 3066)
0026
(3020)
(- 2094)
0029
. 0067
822
044
- 1051
4042
3093
(1093)
(2000)
1016
0026
24009
034
1035
6069
068
5000
10003
2074
- 4094
- 1035
2808
22.98
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Table A-5 (continued)
Kazakhstanskaya SSR (continued
Alma-Atinskaya O.
Akmolinskaya O.
Aktyubinskaya 0.
Vostochno-Kazakhstanskaya 00
Guryevskaya O.
Dzhambulskaya 0.
Zapadno-Kazakhstanskaya 0? 0
Karagandinskaya 0.
? lzyl-Ordinskaya 00
Kokchetavskaya O.
Kustanayskaya O.
Pavlodarskaya O.
Severo-Kazakhstanskaya O.
Semipalatinskaya 0.
Taldy-Kurganakaya 00
Yuzhno-Kazakhstanskaya O.
Central Asia
Uzbekskaya SSR
Andizhanskaya O.
Bukharskaya 0.
Kashka-Darinskaya O.
Namanganskaya O.
Samarkandskaya O.
Surkhan-Darinskaya O.
Tashkentskaya O.
Ferganskaya 00
Khoremskaya 00
Kara-Kalpakskaya ASSR
Kirgizsksya SSR
Dzhalal-Abadskaya O.
Issyk-Kulskaya 0.
Oshskaya O.
Tyan-Shanskaya O.
Frunzenskaya 00
Tadzhikskaya SSR
Leninabadskaya O.
Rayons of Republic
Subordination
Gorno-Badakhshanskaya A.O.
Turkmenskaya SSR
Ashkhabadskaya 0.
Maryyskaya O.
Tashau5skaya O.
Chardzhouskaya O.
Total
249
SECRET
In Absolute
.11E112.
( 215,269)
( 1730874)
(- 7,640)
( 870560)
(- 47,565)
( 1100760)
(- 00618)
(396,284)
(- 600999)
( 380656)
( 124,259)
( 121,884)
( 150350)
( 10,062)
( 85,257)
( 118,357)
24191?..9.
80,625
?(- 30,889)
(- 21,689)
(- 90,921)
(- 51,193)
(-116,381)
(- 13,042)
( 515,043)
(- 25,038)
(. 80573)
(- 760692)
247,965
(- 12,472)
(? R30910)
( 150691)
(- 230197)
( 244,033)
78,254
( 20955)
( 920573)
(- 17,274)
- 62,124
(- 24,217)
(- 16,747)
(- 180377)
(- 2,783)
_
+5,644,659
-50644,659
APPENDIX
In Per Cent
of Total
( 38l)
( 1908)
(- 0014)
( 1055)
(- 0084)
( 1096)
(- 1048)
( 7002)
(-I 1008)
( 0068)
?( 2020)
( 2016)
( 0027)
( 0018)
( 1051)
( 2010)
f2.2.12,
1043
(- 0055)
(- 00,8)
(- 1061)
(- 00?1)
(- 0043)
( 901?)
(- 0044).
(- 0015)
(- LINO
4039
(r 0022)
( 0042)
( 008)
(- 0041)
( 4032)
1.38
0005)
( 1064)
(- 0031)
- 1010
(- 0042)
(- 0030
(- 0033)
0.05)
+100.00
-100.00
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Table A-6
ESTIMATED URBAN-RURAL DISTRIBUTION OF USSR POPULATION
BY ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION: 1958
(Numbers in thousands)
Administrative Divisiona
USSR
RSFSR
Northern Region
Arkhangelskaya O.
Kaliningradskaya 00
Karelskaya ASSR
Ko* ASSR
Leningradskaya O.
Murmanskaya 00
Vologodskaya 00
Central Industrial Region
Arzamasskaya 00
Balashovskaya 00
Belgorodskaya 00
Bryanskaya 00
Chuvashskaya ASSR
Gorkovskaya 00
Ivanovskaya O.
Kalininskaya O.
Kaluzhskaya 00
Kiravskaya O.
Kostromskaya 0.
Kurskaya 00
Lipetskaya 00
Mariyskaya ASSR
MordovskAva ASSR
Moskovskaya 00
Novgorodskaya 00
Orlovskaya O.
Penzenskaya 00
Pskovskaya O.
Ryazanskaya O.
Smolenskaya 0.
Tambovskaya 00
Tulskaya 00
Velikolukskaya 00
Vladimirskaya 0.
Voronezhskaya 0.
APPENDIX
Per Cent
Urban
Total Urban Rural of Total
?..2ftLE3 224222 112122
116.761 64,826, 120,2
2,02 .61442
1,232 574 658
638 403 235
627 341 286
753 369 384
4,456 3009 597
523 474 49
1,303 420 883
ALE
0067
67.56
46059
63.17
54.039
49.00
86.60
90.63
32.23
45.470 20 206 25.264 4111.44
1,086 199 887 18.32
978 227 751 23.21
19208 141 19067 11.67
19586 498 1,088 31.40
1,122 234 888 20.86
2,436 1,541 895 63.26
1,607 667 494 63.46
940 41.51
1,352 858
916 n1 605 33.95
1,956 620 1,336 31.70
902 17 585 35014
1,501 264 1,237 17059
1,156 274 882 23.70
660 158 502 23.94
885 13049
1,023 138
11,195 8,611 2,584 76.92
726 260 466 35.81
934 1/9 755 19.16
1,545 48 1,107 28.35
570 123 447 21.58
1,430 317 1,113 22.17
1,184 338 846 28.55
1,03 368 1,165 24.01
1,518 868 650 57.18
667 173 494 25.94
1,370 719 651 52.48
1,934 603 1,331 31.18
&The following abbreviations are used: SSR, Soviet Socialist
Republic; 00, Oblast; AO, Autonomous Oblast; ASSR? Autonomous Soviet
Socialist lievublic; K., Kray.
250
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Table A-6 continued)
Administrative Divisiona
Yaroslavskaya 00
Vo1g Ron
Astrakhanskaya 00
Kuybyshevskaya 00
Saratovskaya Oo
Stalingradskaya Oo
Tatarskaya ASSR
Ulyanovskaya Oo
algksElasniadaa
Dagestanskaya ASSR
Checheno-Ingushskaya
ASSR
Kabardino-Balkarskaya
ASSR
Kamenskaya 00
Krasnodarskiy K.
North Osetinskaya ASSR
Rostovskaya 00
Stavropolskiy X0
SECRET
Total
19375
j1.22
675
29275
19762
1,460
2,831
19132
..11192.
986
659
Urban Rural
762 613
441.4.2
354 321
1,318 957
954 808
827 633
19045 19786
342 790
A,221 7,116
291 695
331 328
APPRUIRC
Per Cent
Urbaft
;of Total
Urals Region
Bashkirskaya ASSR
Chelyabinskaya 00
Chkalovskaya 00
Molotovskaya 00
Sverdlovskaya 00
Udmurtskaya ASSR
390
1,387
3,642
430
1,979
2,034
16 220
3,340
2,897
1,799
2,990
3,879
1,315
155 235
665 722
1,098 29544
238 192
1,047 932
566 19468
2.011 2a111
1,169 2,171
2,151 746
734 19065
1,648 1,342
29883 996
518 797
WestSilanReion
Altayskiy Ko
Kemerovskaya 00
Kurganskaya Oa
Novosibirskaya Co
Omskaya 00
Tomskaya 00
Tyumenskaya O.
1244
29774
2,758
19025
2,326
19689
784
1,125
_L552 ,61211
766 2,008
29007 751
292 733
1,166 1,160
664 1,025
334 450
321 804
East Siberian Rvion
Buryat-Mongolskaya ASSR
Chitinskaya 00
Irkutskaya 00
Krasnoyarskiy K.
Tuvinskaya AO
Yakutskaya ASSR
683
1,046
19869
2,606
180
497
92119 2Aga
265 418
549 497
1,044 825
1,101 1,505
49 131
211 286
atir.lutatalitgLon.
Araurskaya 00
105.
753
2,2221. /.4122
423 330
55042 ?
47076
52.44
57093
54014
56.64
36091
30.21
X3016
29.51
50023
39074
47095
30015
55035
52091
27083
56012
35.00
74.25
40080
55012
74.32
39039
,44.2.AZ
27061
72077
28.49
50013
39031
42.60
28053
46078
38080
52049
55086
42025
27022
42.45
55.18
251
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AppiNnTY
MONIIIME.1011111111111?1110MMINIMI
Table.A-6 continued)
Administrative Divisiona
Total Urban Rural
Per Oeht
Urban
of Total
Kamchatskaya O.
Khabarovs4iy K.
Magadanskaya O.
Primorskiy K.
Sakhalinskaya 00
YhEalaA:5ATAIR
Cherkasskaya 00
Chernigovskaya 00
Chernovitskaya O.
? Dnepropetrovskaya O.
Drogobychskaya O.
Kharkovskaya 00
Khersonskaya O.
Khmelnitskaya O.
Kirovogradskaya 00
Ki,yevikaya O.
Krymskaya 0.
Lvovskaya O.
Nikolayevskaya 00
Odesskaya O.
Poltlivskaya 00
Rovenskaya 00
Stalinskaya 00
Stanislavskaya O.
Sumskaya O.
Ternopolskaya O.
Vinnitskaya 00
Volynskaya 00
Voroshilovgradskaya O.
Zakarpatskaya O.
Zaporozhskaya 00
Zhitomirskaya O.
236 138
1,201 862
nrn 1?8
417
1,371
715 543
gal li152/
19510 264
19592 297
789 192
2,549 19569
865 209
29481 19429
844 251
1,663 216
19231 307
2,752 19297
19161 690
1,274 539
19016 323
2,001 846
1,646 390
954 127
4,128 39402
19127 250
1,538 364
1,110 127
2,173 274
935 185
29355 1,739
957 225
1,452 715
1,630 346
98
339
61
458
172
R21.162
19246
1,295
597
980
656
1,052
593
1,447
924
19455
471
735
693
1,155
1,256
827
726
877
1,174
983
1,899
750
616
732
737
19284
58.47
71077
76.45
66.59
75.94
22.011
17.48
18.66
24.33
61.55
24,1e
57.60
29.74
12.99
24.94
4701:3
59043
42031
31.79
42.28
23069
33031
82.41
22018
23.67
11.44
12.61
19079
73084
23.51
49024
21.23
?
Belorusskaya SSR
Bretskaya O.
Gamelskaya 00
Grodnen6kaya Oct
Minskaya O.
Mogilevskaya 00
Molodechnenskaya O.
Vitebskaya O.
241q.
19212 248
1,342 346
964 185
1,698 640
1,140 338
865 84
921 303
5.298
964
996
779
1,058
802
781
618
EgEllgAKIIR
Andizhanskaya 00
Bukharskaya 00
Ferganskaya O.
Kara-Kalpakskaya ASSR
Kashka-Darynskaya O.
Khorezmskaya O.
7121 2a2.62
731 ?160
552 112
891 259
464 120
456 63
401 54
522;
571
440
632
344
393
347
?La
20046
25.78
19.19
37069
29065
9071
32090
1020
21.89
20.29
29007
25.86
13.82
13047
252
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Table A-6 continued
Administrative Division&
Namanganskaya 0.
Samarkandskaya Oa
Surkhan-Darynskaya 00
Tashkentskaya Oa
Total Urban
.4mmakhgan.?11.
Akmolinskaya Oa
Aktyubinskaya Oa
Alma-Atinskaya 00
Dzhambulskaya 00
East Kazakhstanskaya Oa
Guryevskaya 00
Karagandinskaya Oa
Kokchetavskaya 00
Kustanayskaya Oa
Kzyl-Ordinskaya Oa
North Kazakhstanskaya 00
Pavlodarskaya Oa
Semipalatinskaya Oa
South Kazakhstanskaya 00
Taldy-Kurganskaya 00
West Kazakhstanskaya Oa
Gruzinskaya_SSR
Gruzinskaya Proper
Abkhazskaya ASSR
Adzharskaya ASSR
AREtlEgAgENMIE
Azerbaydzhanskaya Proper
Nakhichevanskaya ASSR
Litovskaya SSR
Moldavskaya SSR
IgIaAqa SSR
Kirgizskaya SSR
Dzhal-Abadskaya Oa
Frunzenskaya Oa
Issyk-Kulskaya Oa
Oshskaya Oa
Tyan-Shanskaya Oa
Tadzhikska a SSR
Gorno-Badakhshanskaya 00
Leninabadskaya Oa
Cities and Rayons of
Republic Subordination
555 133
1,070 284
374 56
2,080 1,122
8,907
651 247
391 164
819 379
547 183
722 381
279 156
c24 711
474 118
667 128
309 134
446 145
504 119
472 210
867 300
472 149
363 101
49055 1.575
3,368 19314
449 162
238 99
.12.618
3,411 1,653
132 34
Zak 22
2.749
2.039 1202.
4?6 618
284 80
849 318
234 55
509 150
120 15
L860 i9.1
67 9
622 225
1,171 357
253
Rural
422
786
318
958
5028.3
404
227
440
364
341
123
213
356
539
175
301
385
262
567
323
A..
APPENDIX
Per Cent
Urban
of Total
23.96
26.54
14097
53094
40062
37094
41094
46.28
33.46
52.77
55.91
76.95
24.89
19.19
43037
32.51
23.61
44049
34.60
31.57
27.82
a.480
2,054
287
139
38.84
39.01
36.08
41.60
laglk
1,758
98
1802
2203.
12378
204
531
179
359
105
ALLP2
48046
25.76
22211
19.86
51050
28.17
37.46
23.50
29.47
12.50
1,269
58
397
814
(21
13043
36.17
3049
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1
?
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Table A-6 continued)
Administrative Divisiona
ArmyaflS1ca SSR
Turkmenskaya SSR
Ashkabadskaya 0.
Chardzhouskaya 00
Maryyskaya 0.
Tashituskaya'00
ggIssgimffa
SECRET
Total
1 688
511
307
319
266
1.1,39
APPENDIX
Per Cent
Urban
Urban Rural of Total
22g
Lk.
347
114
112
63
44079
67 4,033
1 4 67.91
37.13
35011
23.68
193
207
203
254
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Table A-7
POPULATION OUTSIDE MAJOR URBAN AREAS
OF THE VSSR, BY ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION;
1958
Administrative Divisiona
Total USSR
Russian SFSR
Northwestern Rtgion
Arkhangelskaya O.
Kalinineadskaya O.
KarelskaYa ASSR
Komi ASSR
Leningradskaya O.
Murmanskaya O.
Vologodskaya 0.
Total
Poplationb
Land Area
in Thousands) (Sq. Miles)
Arzamaskaya O.
Balashovskaya 0.
Belgorodskaya O.
Bryanskaya O.
Chuvashskaya ASSR
Gorkovskaya 0.
Ivanovskaya Q.
Kalininskaya 0.
Kaluzhskaya 00
Kirovskaya O.
Kostromskaya O.
Kurskaya O.
Lipetskaya O.
Marilyskaya ASSR
Mordovskaya ASSR
Moskovskaya O.
Navgorodskaya O.
Orlotskaya O.
Penzenskaya O.
Pskovskaya O.
Ryazanskaya O.
Smolenskaya O.
Tambovskaya O.
Tulskaya O.
42161
2.6621,
856
257
488
637
685
173
1,
981
810
1,133
1,286
963
1,251
778
1,123
788
1,700
662
1,312
965
925
4,225
599
80
1,251
500
1,265
937
1,191
1,133
APPENDIX
Pernorm
MaRtlialt
_____ 2
229,361 4-7
6,099 42
044901 7
JA;1716 4
52,849 21
53,693 3
56,896 18
416.02 a
10,499 93
14,707 55
10,654 106
13,394 96
7,064 136
17,756 70
9,496 82
25,476 44
11,502 69
46,938 36
22,388 30
11,773 111
9,187 105
8,917 66
10,07 92
18,682 226
20,728 29
9,380 $6
140714 ?75
12,236 41.
15,247 83
18,t4 50
12,584 95
9,303 122
ETEII;;44 abbreviations are used: SSR4 Soviet Sociaist
Republic; O. nblastv.A.O., Autonomous Oblast; ASSR, Autonomous
Soviet SociaLt Republic; N.O. National Okrug; Ki, Kray.
'ARD Estimates of the legally resident population.
25'5
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
Table A- ontinued
APPENDIX
Total
PopulationP, Land Area Per
Administrative Divisiona (in Thousang0 (494.112,0 4ELNA412
RSFSR
Central Industrial
Region Cont.)
Velikolukskaya 00 607 17,331 35
Vladimirskaya 00 930 11,155 83
Voronezhskaya 00 1,523 12,120 126
Yaroslavskaya O. 722 14,243 51
Vol:48. Region bal 1.-1.6.4A5 2.8
Astrakhanskaya 0. 391 29,683 13
MAYboYshevskaya O.
Saratovskaya O. 1:: 200805
31
51
Stalingradskaya O.
Tatarskaya ASSR 833
3326i109i 21
2,028 78
Ulyanovskaya O. 912 14,359 64
Southeast:Enka-12a g272 3.42,J14g a
Dagestanskaya ASSR 764 14,745 52
Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR 397 12,738 31
Krasnodarski,y K. 2,g4.14 32,810 87
210963
4,555
43
70
KaOnskaya O.
Kabardino-Balkarskaya ASSR 317
Rostovskaya O. 1:7114. 234,01g 45
76
North Osetinskaya ASSR
Stavropolskiy K. 1,669 38,253 44
Urals Re' ion 1421
Bashkirskaya ASSR 2,564 55,391 /it
2Liak R2.
Che1yabinskaya O. 1,219 33,891 36
Chkalovskaya 00 102224 26
Molotovskaya O. 1,696 26
Sverdlovskaya 00 1,822 675%9
74,537 24
Udmurtskaya ASSR 903 16,289 55
Westsil............D.2.1:i.....E.,-an Re ion 8j37 934511 2
Altayskiy K. 2,140 100,978 21
Kemerovskaya O. 1,205 36,863 33
Kurganskaya O. 852 27,445 31
Novosibirskaya 0.1,402 69,017 20
Omskaya O. 1,129 53,770 21
Tomskaya O. 539 121?320 4
Tyumenskaya 00 870 526,118 2
East Siberian Region 5.1216. lagA22k
Buryat-Mongc? ikayla ASSR 510 138,106
Chitinskaya 00 774 162,330
Irkutskaya O. 1,288 283,171
Kr/moyarskiy K. 1,881 893,216
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5
5
2
1
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Table A- continued
APPENDIX
Total
PopulationP Land Area Persons
Administrative Division& (in Thousands) (kb. Miles) pps Sq. Mile
RSFSR
East Siberian Region
(CongT
Tavinskaya A.O.
Yakutskaya ASSR
147 65,031 2
416 10200,950 0.3
...1:FaAgEERiltglIg. 2.486 1 026 246 2
Amurskaya 0. 531 135 4 4
Kamchatskaya O. 176 119,682 1
KhabarovsKy K. 536 223,452 2
Magadanskaya O. 198 459,479 0.4
Primorskiy K. 747 62,000 32
Sakhalinskaya 00 298 26,562 11
crain?y SSR
1.042 ?201, 133
Cherkasskaya 00 1,361 8,067 169
Chernigovskaya O. 1,424 12,198 117
Chernovitskaya 00 637 3,242 196
Dnepropetrovskaya O. 1,259 12,584 100
Drogobychskaya O. 734 3,860 190
Kharkovskaya O. 1,528 12,005 127
Khersonskaya O. 685 10,615 65
Khmelinitskaya O. 1,555 8,029 194
Kirovogradskaya 0. 1,058 9,727 109
Kiyevskaya O. 1,698 11,194 152
Krymskaya 0. 627 10,036 62
Igovskaya 0. 866 4,401 197
Nikolayevskaya O. 761 9,303 82
Odesskaya O. 1,309 12,777 102
Poltavskaya O. 1,435 11,117 129
Ravenskaya O. 913 7,952 115
Stalinskaya Oa 1,998 10,229 195
Stanislavskaya Oa 1,027 5,365 191
Sumskaya O. 1,369 9,418 145
Ternopolskaya O. 1,048 5,288 198
Vinnitskaya 0. 2,044 10,268 199
Volynskaya 0. 825 7,681 107
Voroshilovgradskaya O. 1,691 10,306 164
Zakarpatskaya O. 868 4,979 174
Zaporozhskaya 00 902 10,383 87
Zhitomirskaya 0. 1,420 11,580 123
r
.1.321?I.-wL8P-11.4a."1 6.680 80.134 83
Brestakaya Oa 998 12,815 78
Gomelskaya O. 1,134 15,826 72
Grodnenskaya O. 868 7,141 122
257
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Table A- continued
APPENDIX
TotaA
popuiationb Land Area Persons
Administrative Divisiona in Thousands) (?24.11192) per Sq. Mile
atiallEgAMIR ( ?MT" )
Minskaya O.
Mogilevskaya 0.
Molodechnenskaya 0.
Vitebskaya O.
Uzbekskaya
1,200 13,394 90
-940 10,538 89
830 9,264 90
710 11,156 64
5.,0E 1590.01
Andizhanskaya O. 589 1,468 401
Bukharskaya O. 442 48,983 9
Ferganskaya O. 677 2,856 237
Kara-Kalpakskaya ASSR 382 61,451 6
Kashka-Darynskaya O. 399 10,847 37
Khorezmskaya O. 349 1,814 192
Namanganskaya O. 424 2,239 189
Samarkandskaya O. 834 13,780 61
Surkhan-Darynskaya O. 332 7,295 46
Tashkentskaya O. 1,081 8,368 129
Kazakhskaya SSR 69 4060,465 6
Akmolinskaya O. 537 58,942 9
Aktynbinskaya O. 329 115,067 3
4ami-Atinska7a O. 470 41,688 11
Dzhambulskaya O. 444 56,437 8
East Kazakhstanskaya O. 446 37,326 12
Guryevskaya O. 212 104,577 2
Karagandinskaya O. 351 155,326 2
Kokchetavskaya O. 372 29,722 13
Kustanayskaya O. 604 76,042 8
Kzyl-Ordinskaya O. 248 89,475 3
North Kazakhstanskaya O. 323 16,096 20
Pavlodarskaya O. 434 52,689 8
Semipalatinskaya O. 331 67,511 5
South Kazakhatanskaya O. 655 56,090 12
Taldy-Kurganskaya O. 412 47,748 9
West Kazakhstanskaya O. 271 55,729 5
katafta SSR gada 29.490 100
Gruzinskayi Proper 2,437 25,013 97
Abkhazskaya ASSR 361 3,350 108
Adzharskaya ASSR 156 1,119 139
ARSAMiglEALMILTi talk 220.80 2.
Azerbaydzhanskaya Proper 2,276 31,073 73
Nakhichevanskaya ASSR 111 2,007 55
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
S EPC RET
Table A- continu
Total
a
Populationb Land Area Persons
Administrative Division (in Thousands) (191.11.12!) eza...141
Litovskaya SSR
Holdavskaya SSR
Latvigskaya SSR
o Kirgizskaya SSR
2.023 254167 80
?Aga ataz RI
o
14194
24.892 g
1.414ii 2?A?21 20
Dzhalal4badskaya O. 235 11,618 20
Frunzenskaya O. 605 10,075 60
Issyk-Kulakaya O. 183 16,289 11
Oshskaya 0. 416 17,216 24
Tyan-Shanskaya O. 105 21,500 5
Tadzhikskaya SSR 1,440 ikagla 26
o
Gorno-Badakhshanekaya A.O. 58 23,585 2
Leninabadskaya O. 461 9,418 49
Cities and Rayons of Republic
Subordination 921 21,809 42
Armyanskiva SSR 11275 a,..5223., 22.
Turim,.../1814.........caSSR 2.14 11.32a22
Ashkhabadskaya O. 236 87,545 6
Chardzhouskaya O. 224 35,898 6
Miry$!skaya O. 248 34,701 7
Tashauzskaya O. 236 28,989 8
Estonskaya SSR 612.- 17.4Q.22
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
S EGRET
Table A-8
1958 POPULATION OF USSR CITIES
AND
1940 POPULATION OF SELECTED CITIES
? (Numbers in Thousands)
cit
Abakan
Achinsk
Aginskoye
Akmolinsk
Aktyubinsk
Alapayevsk
Alatyr
Aldan
Aleksandriya
Aleksandrov
Aleksandrov-Sakhal-
inskiy
Aleksandrovsk
Alma Ata
Almalyk
Almetyevsk
Anadyr
Andizhan
Angarsk
Angren
Anzhero-Sudzhensk
Arkhangelsk
Armavir
Arsenyev
Artem
Artemovsk
Arzamas
Asbest
Ashkhabad
Astrakhan
Babushkin
Babushkin
Baku
Balakhna
Balashikha
Balashov
Baley
Balkhash
Baltiysk
Barabinsk
APPENDIX
Population Map
Administrative Division 1940 2.258 Key!:
? Krasnoya. K.9 RSFSR
Krasnoya. K09 RSFSR
Chitin. 00v RSFSR
Akmolin. Oop Kaz. SSR
Aktyubinsko 009 Kaz. Sal
Sverdlovo 0.9 RSFSR
Chuvash. ASSR
Yakutsk? ASSR9 RSFSR
Kiravograd. 00. Ukr. SSR
Vladimir? 0.9 ?iSFSR
Sakhalin. 00, RSFSR
Molotov? 009 RSFSR
Alma Atin. 009 Kaz. SSR
Tashkent. 009 Uz. SSR
Tatar. ASSR9 RSFSR
Magadan? 009 RSFSR
Andizhano 009 Uz. SSR
Irkutsk? 0.9 RSFSR
Tashkent? 009 Uz. SSR
Kemerovo 009 RSFSR
Arkh. 009 RSFSR
Krasnodarskiy K09 RSFSR
Primoro I09 RSFSR
Primoro K09 RSFSR
Stalinsko 009 Ukr. SSR
Arzamaso O., RSFSR
Sverdlov. 009 RSFSR
Ashkhabad? 009 Turk? SSR
Astrakhan. 009 RSFSR
aRefer to Map III?
49 F10
... 34 G10
.._ 4 F12
39 114 F8
41 62 F6
27 58 E6
31 58 F5
NOM 17 G13
011194aVilla 32 E4
sums 26 G4
01.0411ft4110, 46 F15
0.1.0OMD 32 G6
231 349 D8
OMMOMM 7 D7
MIMMICEM 6 F6
... 5 H18
84 121 D8
MOSNOMP 46 m
.... 31 D8
71 126 G9
281 246 H5
84 107 D5
39 51 D14
22 55 D14
55 58 E4
... 40 G5
... 55 E6
127 151 C6
.254 284 E5
Buryat-Mongol. A5SR9 RSFSR ---
Moskov. 00, RSFSR 35
Azerbaydzhan. Prop09Az0389 809
Gorkov. 009 RSFSR '
Moskov0 009 RSFSR
Balashov. 009 RSFSR
Chitin. 008 RSFSR
Karagandino Co9 Kaz.359
Kaliningrad. 0.9 RSFSR
Novosibirsk? 009 RSFSR
260
SECRET
4 Fll
106 G4
932 D5
36 G5
54 G4
43 57 F5
ONOVAZI 35 F12
35 75 E8
35 F2
OM6C1131= 47 G8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap?roved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R0024nownnna_n
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
Table A-8 (continued
Baranavichi
Barnaul
_Bataysk
Batumi
Bayram All
Belovat
Belaya Tserkov
Belgorod
Belgorod Dnestrovskiy
Beloretsk
Belovo
Beltsy
Bendery
Berdichev
Berdsk
Berezniki
Berezovskiy
Bezhetsk
Bezhitsa
Birobidzhan
Kysk
BlagovesOchensk
Bobruysk
Bogorodsk
Bogotol
Bologoye
Bor
Borislav
Borisoglebsk
Borisov
Borovichi
Borovsk
Bratsk
Brest
Bryansk
Bugulma
Buguruslan
Bukhara
Buy
Buynaksk
Buzuluk
Chapayevsk
Chardzhou
Cheboksary
Cheleken
Chelyabinsk
Cheremkhovo
SECRET
APPENDIX
Population Map
Administrative Division 1940 1.25.8
Brest? 0.9 Belo. SSR
Altay. K. RSFSR
Rokov. 009 RSFSR
Adzharo ASSR9 Gruz. SSR
Maryy. 009 Turk? SSR
Tashkent. 009 Uz. SSR
Kiyev. 009 Ukro SSR
Belgorod. 009 RSFSR
Odessa. 009 Ukro SSR
Bashkir. AMR, RSFSR
Kemerovo 009 RSFSR
floidav. SSR
Moldav. SSR
Zhitomirsk. 0.9 Ukro SSR
Nomasibirsk. 0 RSFSR
Holotovo 0.9 RSFSR
Sverdlov. 009 RSFSR
Kalinin. 009 RSFSR
Bryansk. 0, RSFSR
Khabarov. KO9 RSFSR
Altay0 KO9 RSFSR
Amursko 009 RSFSR
Mogilev. Oa, Belo? SSR
Gorkov. 009 RSFSR
Krasnoyao K09 RSFSR
Kalinin? 009 RSFSR
Gorkov. O, RSFSR
Drogobych. 009 Ukr. SSR
Balashov. 009 RSFSR
Minsk. 009 Belo. SSR
Novgorod. 00, RSFSR
Molotov? 00, RSFSR
Irkutsk. 009 RSFSR
Brest? 009 Belo. SSR
Bryansk 0 RSFSR
Tatar. ASSR9 RSFSR
Chkalov. 009 RSFSR
Bukhara 009 Uza SSR
Kostromo 009 RSFSR
Dagestan. ASSR, RSFSR
Ghkalova 00.9 RSFSR
Kuybyshev. 009 RSFSR
Chardzhouo 0., Turk. SSR
Chuvash. ASSR
Ashkhabad. 0.9 Turk. SSR
Che1y. 009 RSFSR
Irkutsk? O., RSFSR
----7g17527;3717.gyansk.
261
SECRET
26 68
148 272
41 55
71 82
21
Oxit.6 GOO 3 6
4,4
48 45
COO =.01310 22
35 52
43 68
18 88
44
66 48
31
64 95
01[161100... 31
=0004M 30
53
8 38
80 120
59 87
84 90
21
28
25
20
30
52 56
46
46
26
CM =NMI 9
58 104
87 225
54
21 57
50 72
30
23
33 53
F3
F9
E4
D5
C7
D7
E4
F4
E4
F6
F9
E3
E3
E3
F9
G6
E6
G4
F4
E14
F9
F13
F3
G5
G9
G4/
G5
E3
F5
F3
G4
G6
Gil
F3
F4
F6
D5
C7
G5
D5
D5
58 80 F5
55 66 C7
64 G5
5 C6
273 659 E6
66 130 Fll
larmilwAm
0
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
Table A-8 continuell
alb
Cherepovets
Cherkassy
Cherkessk
Chernigov
nu_
v or.
Chernogorsk
Chernovta
Chernyakhovsk
Chesnokovka
Chiatura
Chimbay
Chimkent
Chirchik
Chistopol
Chistyakovo
Chita
Chkalov
Chusovoy
Chust
Daugavpils
Debaltsevo
Denau
Derbent
Dmitrov
Dneprodzerzhinsk
Dnepropetrovsk
Dolinsk
Donetsk
Drogobych
Druskininkay
Druzhkovka
Dudinka
Dzerzhinsk
Dzhalal-Abad
Dzhambul
Dzhezkazgan
Dzhizak
Elektrostal
Engels
Feodosiya
Fergana
Frunze
Furmanov
SECRET
Administrative Division
Vologodo 009 RSFSR
Cherkass. 0.9 Ukr. SSR
Stavropol? K., RSFSR
Chernigovo 009 Ukr. SSR
Bashkir? ASSR
Krasnoyao K09 RSFSR
Chernovito 00, Ukro SSR
Kaliningrad? 009 RSFSR
AltayQ L, RSFSR
Gruzin. Proper, Gruz. SSR
Kara-Kalpo ASSR, Uz. SSR
Yuzhno-Kaz. 009 Kaz. SSR
Tashkent? 009 Uz. SSR
Tatar. ASSR9 RSFSR
Stalinsk. 00, Ukr. SSR
Chitin. RSFSR
Chkalovo 00, RSFSR
Molotov? 00, RSFSR
Namangan. 009 Uzo SSR
APPENDIX
122gation
1940 1.2g
Lato SSR
Stalinsk. 009 Ukr. SSR
Surkhan-Daryn. 0., Uzo SSR
Dagestan. ASSR, RSFSR
Moskovo 00? RSFSR
Dnepropetrovsk. 00, Ukr.
SSR
Dnepropetrovsk? 0.9 Ukr.
SSR
Sakhalin? 0.9 RSFSR
Kamensko 0., RSFSR
Drogovecho 009 Ukro SSR
Lit. SSR
Stalinsk. 00, Ukr. SSR
Krasnoya. Ko, RSFSR
Gorkovo 00, RSFSR
Dzhalal-Abad. 0.9 KiroSSR
Dzhambulo 0.9 Kazo SSR
Karagandino 009 Kaz. SSR
Samarkand. 0., Uzo SSR
Moskov. 00D RSFSR
Saratovo 0.9 RSFSR
Krymsko 009 Ukro SSR
Fergan. 00, Uzo SSR
Frunz. 00, Kir. SSR
Ivanovo 009 RSFSR
----"-EgiimeTWITEIT7aTTIT1956.
262
SECRET
NapKeya
27 74 G4
52 63 '14
38 D5
67 76 F4
b F6
28 F10
79 152 E3
49 50 F3
36 F9
20 D5
16 D6
74 140 D7
45 67 D7
39 G6
58 80 E4
103 175 F12
173 240 D5
45 57 G6
22 D8
1211.1210..0.
...111111401.1.
0024110C130
ensmsogio
aissaco...
Cusow.a^P
40.0.231.110*
45 62 G3
21 34 E4
15 C7
40 D5
20 G4
148 170 E4
06190.21.63
terlIKE1001.
.610,1130.
501 596 E4
46 E15
3 E5
39 38 E3
6 F3
40 E4
17 19
103 153 CO
21 D8
63 103 D8
18 E7
23 D7
0211.?NIC01,
1300.01.0Iti
111110 AVM CO
22 90 G4
73 81 F5
C?a?
44 E4
36 71 D8
93 206 D8
41 G5
mamma
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Declassified
in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/08/27 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
, ?
Table A4 Scontinued
Gatchina
Gizhduvan
Glazav
Gomel
Gori
Gorki,y
Gorlovka
Gorno Altaysk
Gorodets
torodok
Gremyachinsk
Grodno
Groznyy
Gubakha
Gukovo
Guryev
Guryevsk
Gusev
Gus Khrustalnyy
Igarka
Illich
Irbit
Irkutsk
Isfara
Ishim
Ishimbay
Iskitim
Ivanovo
Ivanteyevka
Ivdel
Izberbash
Izhevsk
Izmail
Izyum
Kadiyevka
Kagan
Kagul
Kakhovka
Kalinin
Kaliningrad
Kaluga
Kamenets Podolskiy
Kamen-na-Obi
Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy
Kamensk Uralskiy
Kamyshin
Kamyshlov
Kanash
SECRET
APPENDIX
paylation Map
Administrative Division 1249. 1221 ge
Leningrad? 0.9 RSFSR
Bukhar. O., Uz0 SSR
Udmurt? ASSR9 RSFSR
Gomel. 00? Belo? SSR
Gruz. Prop" Gruz. SSR
Gorkov. 00, RSFSR
Stalinsk? ?09 Ukr. SSR
Altay. K09 RSFSR
Gorkov. 009 RSFSR
Buryat Mongol? ASSR, RSFSR
Molotov. 009 RSFSR
Grodnen. 0.9 Belo? SSR
Checheno-ingushskaya ASSR
Molotov? 009 RSFSR
Kamensk. 00, RSFSR
Guryev. 0.9 Kaz. SSR
Kemerovo 00, RSFSR
Kaliningrad? 00, RSFSR
Vladimir? OoD RSSR
Krasnoya. K09 RSFSR
Yuzhno-Kaz. 009 Kazo SSR
Sverdlovo 00, RSFSR
Irkutsk? 0.9 RSFSR
Leninabado 009 Tad. SSR
Tyumen. 009 RSFSR
Bashkir? ASSR9 ASFSR
Novosibirsk ? 009 RSFSR
Ivanov. 009 RSFSR
Moskav. 009 RSFSR
Sverdlov. 0.9 RSFSR
Dagestan? ASSR9 RSFSR
Udmurt? ASSR9 RSFSR
Odess. 009 Ukro SSR
Kharkov? 009 Ukro SSR
Voroshilo 0.9 Ukro SSR
Bukhar0 00, Uz0 SSR
Moldav. SSR
Kherson. 009 Ukr. SSR
Kalinin ? 009 RSFSR
Kaliningrad. O., RSFSR
Kaluzh. 009 RSFSR
Khmelnit. 009 Ukro SSR
Altay0 K09 RSFSR
Kamensk0 0,9 RSFSR
Sverdlov? 00, RSFSR
Stalingrad. 009 RSFSR
Sverdlov. 0.9 RSFSR
Chuvash. ASSR9 RSFSR
263
SECRET
38 55
15
31
148
31
644 910
109 252
26
16
5
21
57 71
172 236
19 51
1
42 67
32
29
47
41.0?1110141111.
eno01100110
6100101.111,
MANIMUO,
1311=paplame
0.6.0*010
0,00d1.5.2
23
18
37
243 328
11
36
25 68
21
285 330
20
26
5
176 265
27 44
35
.11061,10.9.
0102...0?0
0.1.01MOSS
11?13.1.21111
two.c1121:a
40.01?0411.1
180
23
22
19
216 246
372 192
89 128
36 34
25
28 60
51 128
35
31
37
G4
D7
E5
F4
D5
G5
E4
F9
G5
FU
G6
F3
D5
G6
E5
E6
F9
F3
G5
19
D7
E6
FU
D8
G7
F6
79
G5
G4
F6
D5
E5
E3
E4
E4
C7
E3
E4
G4
F3
74
E3
F9
E5
E6
F5
E6
G5
;/27 : CIA-RDP81-n1n4mPnn9Annrionnrin /1
';',;t? ? ,;egg
,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
Table A-8 continued
Way
Kandalaksha
Kanibadam
Kansk
Karabash
Kara Bogaz Gol
Karaganda
Karpinsk
Karshi
Kasimov
Kaspiysk
Katta Kurgan
Kaunas
Kazan
Kemerovo
Kentau
Kerch
Kerki
Khabarovsk
Khanty Mans iysk
Kharkov
Khasavyurt
Kherson
Khimki
Khiva
Khmelnitskiy
Khodzheyli
Kholmsk
Khorog
Kimry
Kineshma
Kingisepp
Kirov
Kirovabad
Kirovakan
Kirovgrad
Kirovograd
Kirovsk
Kiselevsk
Kishinev
Kislovodsk
Ki,yev
Kizel
Kiziyar
Kizyl Arvat
Klaypeda
Klin
Klintsy
Klukhori
Kokand
SECRET
APPENDIX
1222041111211
Administrative Division 1242 1.22.1
Murmansk? 0.9 RSFSR
Leninabad. 0?9 Tad. SSR
Krasnoya. K09 RSFSR
Chelya. 009 RSFSR
Ashkabad. 009 Tnrk. SSR
Karagandin. 0.9 Kaz. SSR
Sverdlovo 009 RSFSR
Kashka-Daryn. 00, Uzo SSR
Ryazan. 0.9 RSFSR
Dagestan. ASSR9 RSFSR
Samarkand. 0., Uz. SSR
Lit. SSR
Tatar. ASSR9 RSFSR
Kemerov. 009 RSFSR
Yuzhno-Kaz. 0?9 Kazo SSR
Krymsk? 009 Ukr. SSR
Chardzhouo 0.9 Turk. SSR
Khabarov K.9 RSFSR
Tyumen. 00, RSFSR
Kharkov. 00, Ukro SSR
Dagestan? ASSR9 RSFSR
Khersono 00p Ukr. SSR
Moskovo 009 RSFSR
Khoremskaya 0.0 Uzo SSR
Khmelnito 0., Ukr. SSR
Kara-Kalpo ASSR9 Uso SSR
Sakhalin,' 0.9 RSFSR
Gorno-Badakhshano A000,
Tado SSR
Kalinin? 0.9 RSFSR
Ivanovo 0., RSFSR 75
Leningrad? 0.9 RSFSR
Kirov? 009 RSFSR 143
Azerbaydzhan. Prop., Az.SSR 99
Armyano SSR
Sverdlovo 0.9 RSFSR
Kirovograd 0., Ukr. SSR 100
Murmansk? 009 RSFSR 28
Kemerovo 0.9 RSFSR 44
Moldav. SSR 53
Stavropol, K.9 RSFSR 51
Kiyev. 0.9 Ukr. SSR 846
Molotov.. 0.9 RSFSR 44
Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR
Ashkhabad? 0., Turko SSR
Lito SSR 41
Moskov. 00, RSFSR
Bryansko 009 RS1-91
Stavropol? K.9 RSFSR
Fergan. 009 Uz. SSR 85
ametam..
36
39
62
37
11
166 384
IMMICOMI
MIMISMIM
GIMMOCIIM
42
33
22
20
35
154 200
402 590
133 260
36
104 97
17
199 306
19
833 894
24
97 140
25
26
IMORICIM
0001001.11
VILMOMII
MIMAMICI
38 53
16
18 53
mooMCIM
nfl
MOOM01111
acratioano
MIMMOM
SIMILIMCM
264
SECRET
13
30
86
216
115
61
47
121
57
125
212
59
1,010
90
26
21
56
25
46
10
92
Map
E.92
14
D8
G10
E6
D6
E8
E5
C7
F5
D5
07
G3
G5
G9
D7
E4
07
E14
117
F4
D5
E4
G4
D7
E3
D6
E15
G8
G4
G5
G4
G5
05
D5
E6
E4
14
F9
D5
F4
G6
D5
C6
G3
G4
F4
05
08
cr
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
Table A-8 continued
Kok chetav
Kokhtla Yarve
Kok Yangak
Kolchugino
Kolpasheve
Kolomna
Kolomyya
Kolpino
Komsomolsk
Konotop
Konstantinovka
Kopeyek
Kovel
Korkino
Koresten
Korsakov
Kospash
Kostroma
Kotlas
Kotovsk
Kovrov
Kramatorsk
Krasnodar
Krasnokamsk
Krasnoturinsk
Krasnoufimsk
Krasnouralsk
Krasnovodsk
Krasnoyarsk
Krasnyy Luch
Krasnyy Sulin
Krasnyy Tekstilshchik
Kremenchug
Kremenets
Krivoy Rog
Kronshtadt
Kropotkin
Kudymkar
Kulebaki
Kulyab
Kumertau
Kungur
Kuntsevo
Kupyansk
Kurgan
Kurgan Tyube
Kursk
Kushva
Kustanay
SECRET
Administrative Division
Kokchetavo 000 Kazo SSR
Est. SSR
Dzha1alAbad? 0.0 Kir. SSR
Vladimir. 0o9 RSFSR
Tomsk. 000 RSFSR
Moskov. 00? RSFSR
Stanislav? 0., Ukro SSR
Leningrad? 0e9 RSFSR
Khabarovo K09 RSFSR
Sumo 0.0 Ukr. SSR
Stalinsko 00, Ukr. SSR
Chelya. 0.0 RSFSR
Vayn. 000 Ukr. SSR
Chayao 009 RSFSR
Zhitomiro 00, Ukr. SSR
Sakhalin? 00, RSFSR
Molotov. 000 RSFSR
Kostrom. 009 RSFSR
Arkh. 0.? RSFSR
Tambov? 00? RSFSR
Vladimir. 00, RSFSR
Stalinsk. 00, Ukro SSR
Krasnodar. Ko? RSFSR
Molotov? 009 RSFSR
Sverdlovo O., RSFSR
Sverdlovo 00, RSFSR
Sverdlov. 00, RSFSR
Ashkhabad. 00, Turk? SSR
Krasnoyao K., RSFSR
Voroshilo 0.? Ukr. SSR
Kamensk. O., RSFSR
Saratov O., RSFSR
Poltavo 0.? Ukro SSR
Ternopol. 00, Ukro SSR
Dnepropetrovsk. 0o9
Ukr. SSR
Leningrad. 009 RSFSR
Krasnodar? Ko, RSFSR
Molotov? 000 RSFSR
Arzamaso 0.0 RSFSR
Tad. SSR
ASSR9 RSFSR
Eblotor. 0.9 RSFSR
Moskov0 O., RSFSR
Kharkov.'0.? Ukro SSR
Kurgan. 000 RSFSR
Tad. SSR
Kursk. 0., RSFSR
Sverdlov. 000 RSFSR
Kustanay. O., Kaz. SSR
265
SECRET
APPENDIX
Population
1940 1958.
Map
16 70 F7
42 G3
16 Det
41 G4
INNIAMO 5 G9
75 96 G4
35 E3
4.0?10?11. 44 G4
71 185 F14
43 49 F4
95 92 E4
47 162 E6
eletIMONO 23 F3
79 D6
35 F3
22 53 El5
32 G6
121 160 G5
13 50 H4
CIIM.010.12 14 F5
67 92 G5
93 a:23 E4
204 282 E4
29 51 G6
8 63 E6
37 E5
.N.P4O.MM. 42 E6
45 D6
190 347 G10
51 70 E.:4
31 67 E5
6 F5
90 79 E4
29 F3
198 336 E4
48 55 H3
52 E5
20 G6
31 G5
16 C7
13 F6
33 61 G6
61 114 G4
24 E4
53 126 G7
22 C7
120 189 F4
47 E5
34 63 F7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
xe.44,:ggger6'"'
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
Take A-8 (continutll
4
A
Cit
Kutaisi
Kuybyshev
Kuybyshev
Kuyyshevka-Vostochn4a
Kuznetsk
Kyshtym
Kyzyl
Kyzyl Kiya
Kzyl Orda
Lenger
Leninabad
Leninakan
Leningrad
Leninogorsk
Leninogorsk
Leninsk
Leninsk Kuznetskiy
Lida
Lipetsk
Lisichansk
Liyepaya
Lomonosov
Luga
Lutsk
Lvov
Lysva
Lyubertsy
Lyublino
Magadan
Magnitogorsk
Mak eyevka
Makhachkala
Malgobek
Marganets
Margelan
Mariinsk
Mary
Maykop
Mayli Say
Mednogorsk
Melekess
Melitopol
Mezhdurechensk
Miass
Michurinsk
Millerovo
SECRET
Administrative Division
Gruz. Prop., Gruz. SSR
Kuybyshev. 009 RSFSR
MpvQsairsk. 0.9 RSFSR
frliarski 0.),2 RSFSR
Peplen, 0, RSFSR
Chelya. 0.9 RSFSR
Tuvinsko A.0.9 RSFSR
Oshso 009 Kir. SSR
Kzyl Ordin. 0., Kazo SSR
Yuzhno-Kazo 00, Kaz. SSR
Leninabado 0.9 Tad. SSR
Armyano SSR
Leningrad 0.0 RSFSR
Tatar. ASSR9 RSFSR
Vostochno-Kazo 00, Kaz.
Andizhano 0.9 Uzo SSR
Kemerovo 0., RSFSR
Grodneno 00, Belo. SSR
Lipet. 0., RSFSR
Voroshilo 0.9 Ukro SSR
Lat. SSR
Leningrad. 00, RSFSR
Leningrad. 0.9 RSFSR
Vayn. 0.9 Ukr. SSR
Lvov. 0., Ukr. SSR
Molotov. 009 RSFSR
Moskovo 0.9 RSFSR
Moskovo 0.9 RSFSR
APPENDIX
lazilation
1940 1958
81
390
IMP. AM
IMOD 0???
33
34
MO NM GM
ONIIIIIMIN OMB
47
a-
46
68
3,191
50
SSR 030
01111114,11040116
82
011?1111= .00
67
25
57
401401111...0
.110.11100IF
411111.110
358
51
35
64
Magadan. O., RSFSR 35
Chelya. 00, RSFSR 146
Stalinsko O., Ukr. SSR 240
Dagestan. ASSR, RSFSR 87
Severo-Osetinsk. ASSR?
RSFSR
Dnepropetrovsk. O., Ukr.
SSR
Fergan. 00, Uz. SSR 40
Kemerovo 0.? RSFSR
Maryy. 0.? Turk. SSR 34
Krasnodar. K., RSFSR 67
Dzhalal-Abad. 00, Kir, SSR
Chkalov. 0., RSFSR
Ulyanov. 0.? RSFSR
Zaporozh. 0.? tJkr0 SSR 76
Kemerovo 0.0 RSFSR
Chelya. 0, RSFSR 24
Tambov. 009 RE)FSR 70
Kamensk. 0.9 RSFSR
OM MO INMOI
011111MOD ONO
IDIVO 0114 MID
Ms or.=
MO MN ISO
.1?0?111M12
al11.1110
266
SECRET
--a
Map
a
Key
120 D5
813 F6
18 G8
51 F13
51 F5
80 E6
33 F10
26 D8
61 D7
18 D8
77 D7
117 D5
3,250 G4
56 F6
99 F9
21 D8
129 F9
25 F3
130 F4
36 E4
103 G3
25 G3
45 G3
54 F3
397 E3
67 G6
83 G4
86 G4
56 G16
308 D5
326 E4
110 D5
D
nn 5
33
51
37
50
79
2
29
25
92
2
58
77
36
E4
D8
G9
C7
D5
DS
D5
F5
E4
F9
D6
F5
E5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
Table A-8
continued
City
Mingechaur
Minsk
Minusinsk
Mirzachul
Mogilev
Mogilev Podolskiy
Molodechno
Molotov
Molotovsk
Monchegorsk
Morshansk
MoskvA
Mozyr
Hukachevo
Murmansk
Murom
Myski
Mytishchi
Nakhichevan
Nakhodka
Nalchik
Namangan
Narva
Naryan Mar
Naryn
Nebit Dag
Nelidovo
Neman
Nerekhta
Nezhin
Nikolayev
Nikolayevsk
Nikopol
Nizhniy Tagil
Nizhnyaya Tura
Noginsk
Norilsk
Novgorod
Novocherkassk
Novograd Vaynskiy
Novokiiybyshevsk
Novomoskovsk
Novorossiysk
Novoshakhtinsk
Novosibirsk
Novo-Troitsk
Novo Vilnya
SECRET
APPENDIX
FoNlation Map
Administrative Division 1940 1258 Keva
Azerbaydzhan Prop.9 Az.
SSR
Minsk. 0.9 Belo. Safi*
Krasnoya. Ko9 RSFSR
Tashkent. 00, Uz. SSR
Mogilev. 009 Belo. SSR
Vinnits. 0.9 Ukr. SSR
Molodechnen. 009 Belo.
Molotov. 0.9 RSFSR
Arkh. 0.9 RSFSR
Murmansk. 0.9 RSFSR
Tambov. 0.9 RSFSR
Moskov. 0.9 RSFSR
Gomel. 0.9 Belo. SSR
Zakarpat. 0.9 Ukr. SSR
Murmansk. 009 RSFSR
Vladimir. 0.9 RSFSR
Kemerovo 0., RSFSR
Moskov. 0., RSFSR
.9.1111119139?1111
30 D5
239 431 F3
/115. 1,07
99 110 F4
19 E3
15 F3
575 G6
69 H4
31 14
45 51 F5
4,137 4,950 G4
20 F3
117 144 14
34 65 G5
4 F9
60 93 G4
6.9
0?1919110i ONO
1111111????? MIS
SSR
255
20
10111.????
Nakhichevan. ASSR9 Azo SSR
Primoro K09 RSFSR
Kabardino ASSR9 RSFSR
Namangan. 0., Uz. SSR
Est. SSR
Arkh. O., RSFSR
Tyan-Shano 00, Kir. SSR
Ashkhabad. 0.9 Turk. SSR
Velikoluk. O., RSFSR
Kaliningrad, 0.9 RSFSR
Kostram. 0.9 RSFSR
Chernigovo 0.9 Ukr. SSR 38
Nikolayev. 0.9 Ukr. SSR 167
Khabarov. Ko9 RSFSR 18
Dnepropetrovsk. 0.9 Ukro SSR 58
Sverdlov. O. RSFSR 160
Sverdlov. 0.9 RSFSR
Moskov. 0.9 RSFSR
Krasnoya. K., RSFSR
Novgorod. 0.9 RSFSR 36
Rostov. 0.9 RSFSR
Zhitomir. O., Ukr, SSR
Kuybyshev. 0.9 RSFSR
Dnepropetrovsk. 0.9 Ukro
SSR
Krasnodar. K., RSFSR 95
Kamensk. 0" RSFSR 49
Novosibirsk. 0.9 RSFSR 406
Chkalov. 0.9 RSFSR
Lit. SSR
dIMLIKENOM
0111011M411015
11110??????11.
MEM MOO=
21 C5
1 55 D14
48 73 D5
77 109 D8
42 G3
11 16
19 Da
42 C6
6 G4
12 G3
25 05
45 F4
214 E4
75 F15
86 E4
311 E5
31 E6
81 101 G4
94 19
50 G4
81 92 E5
30 F3
11 F5
C11111?111111.1111101
119911011109 IRO
0111. 1.1100
Wham era
??? MAP MEP
111?113?Iirs 111011
MOM 1???????
=1111..a.
1.1?0,000 al/ma
ONO ?1?1.41MM,
//1111.M1111910
9119011939.?
267
SECRET
eic* mama
33 E4
81 D4
97 E4
771 F9
31 D5
12 F3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
9
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
Table A-8 continued'
City
Novo zybkov
Nukus
Odessa
Okha
Oktyabrskiy
Omsk
Ordzhonikidze
Orekhovo-Zuyevo
Orel
Orgeyev
04pha
Orsk
Osh
Osinniki
Osipenko
Palana
Panevezhis
Pavlodar
Pavlograd
Pavlov()
Pavlovsk
Pavlovskiy Posad
Penza
Pereslavl Zaleskiy
Perovo
Pervomaysk
Pervouralsk
Petrodvorets
Petrokrepost
Petropavlovsk
Petropavlovsk Kamchat-
skiy
Petrovsk Zabaykalskiy
Petrozavodsk
Pinsk
Plast
Podolsk
Polevskoy
Polotsk
Poltava
Polyarnyy
Poronaysk
Poti
Priluki
Priozersk
Prokopyevsk
Palanga
SECRET
APPENDLX
Population Map
Administrative Division 1940 1251 Eeya
Bryansk. 0.2 RSFSR
Kara-Kalp. ASSR2 Uz. SSR
Odesskaya 0.2 Ukr. SSR
Sakhalin. 0.0 RSFSR
Bashkir. ASSR2 RSFSR
Omsk. 009 RSFSR
Severo-Osetinsk. ASS;
RSFSR
Moskov. 009 RSFSR
Orlov. 0.2 RSFSR
Moldav. SSR
Viteb. 0.2 Belo. SSR
Chkalov. O., RSFSR
Osh. 009 Kir. SSR
Kemerovo 0.2 RSFSR
Zaporozh. O., Ukr. SSR
Kamchat. 0. RSFSR
Lit. SSR
Pavlodar. 0.2 Kaz. SSR
Dnepropetrovsk. 009 Ukr.
SSR
Gorkov. 0.2 RSFSR
Leningrad. 0., RSFSR
Moskov. 0.0 RSFSR
Penzen. 0.2 RSFSR
Yaroslavl. 0.0 RSFSR
Moskov. O., RSFSR
Nikolayevsk. O., Ukr. SSR
Sverdlav. 009 RSFSR
Leningrad. 000 RSFSR
Leningrad. O., RSFSR
Severo-Kaz. 0.0 Kaz. SSR
Kamchat. 009 RSFSR
Chitin. 0.0 RSFSR
Karel. ASSR2 RSFSR
Brest. 0.2 Belo. SSR
Che1ya. 0.2 RSFSR
Moskov. 002 RSFSR
Sverdlov. O., RSFSR
Viteb. 0.2 Belo. SSR
Poltav. 002 Ukr. SSR
Murmansk. 0.2 RSFSR
Sakhalin. 0.0 RSFSR
Gruz. Prop., Gruz. SSR
Chernigov. 009 Ukr. SSR
Leningrad. 009 RSFSR
Kemerovo 0.2 RSFSR
Lit. SSR
268
SECRET
811?00011atale
0?11.011?41.0
29 F4
32 D6
604 617
46
43 64
281 540
lallso?????111
127
99
na.
,21...1.113110
35
66
33
25
52
MMOzipt
129
112
132
11
50
167
52
75
60
1
27 60
28 70
--a
36
29
25
53
157 243
26
78 135
43 41
80
10
10
92 123
Inn se !IND
VW...edam
amem101/100
.10CMCNI
7 59
13 58
70 126
42
17
72 116
31
30
130 132
31
46
42
47
20
107 281
8
elll? MOM ????,
.1.111.1:11101.
???41.11115 mot
421.MV.AW
momm.0.10
a-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R00240no7onng_n
E4
F15
F6
G8
D5
G4
F4
E3
F4
D5
D8
F9
E4
F16
G3
F8
E4
G5
G4
G4
F5
G4
G4
E4
E6
G3
04
F7
F16
FU
H4
F3
D6
G4
E6
G3
E4
14
El5
D5
F4
H4
F9
G3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002400020009-0
Table A-8 continued
Przhevalsk
Pskov
Pugachev
Pushkin
Pushkin?
Pyarnu
Pyatigorsk
Ramenskoye
Ras skazovo
Raychikhinsk
Rechitsa
Revda
Rezekne
Riga
Roslavl
Rostov
Rostov
Rovno
Rtishchevo
Rubezhnoye
Rubtsovsk
Rustavi
Ruzayevka
Ryazan
Rzhev
Safonovo
Salavat
Salekhard
Samarkand
Sambor
Saran
Saransk
Sarapul
Saratov
Semipalatinsk
Serpukhov
Serov
Sestroretsk
Sevastopol
Severomorsk
Severouralsk
Shadrinsk
Shakhrisyabz
Shakhty
Sharya
Shatura
Shcherbakov
Shchekino
SECRET
Administrative Division
Issyk-Kuls. 0.9 Kir? SSR
Pskov. 009 RSFSR
Saratov. 0.9 RSFSR
Leningrad. 0., RSFSR
Moskovo 009 RSFSR
Est. SSR
Stavropol. K09 RSFSR
Moskov. 0.9 RSFSR
Tambov? 0., RSFSR
Amursk. 009 RSFSR
Gomel. 009 Belo. SSR
Sverdlovo 0.9 RSFSR
Lat. SSR
Lat. SSR
Smolensk. 0.9 RSFSR
Rostov. 009 RSFSR
Yaroslavl? 00 RSFSR
Rovensko 009 Lro SSR
Balashovo 009 RSFSR
Voroshilo 0.9 Ukro SSR
Altay. Ko, RSFSR
Gruz. Prop09 Gruzo SSR
Mordov. ASSR9 RSFSR
Ryazan. 009 RSFSR
Kalinin. 0., RSFSR
APPENDIX
Population Map.
1940 1958 Ke?
Smolensk. 0.9 RSFSR
Bashkir? ASSR9 RSFSR
Tyumen. 0.9 RSFSR
Samarkand. 0.9 Uz. SSR
Drogobycho 009 Ukro SSR
Karagandino 009 Kaz. SSR
Mordov. ASSR9 RSFSR
Udmurt. ASSR9 RSFSR
Saratovo 009 RSFSR
Semipalatinsk? 0.9 Kazo SSR
Moskov. 009 RSFSR
Sverdlov. o.; RSFSR
Leningrad. 0.9 RSFSR
Krymsko 0.9 Ukr. SSR
Murmansk. 0.9 RSFSR
Sverdlov. 0.9 RSFSR
Kurgan. 0.9 RSFSR
Kashka-Daryn. 00? Uz. SSR
Kamensk. 009 RSFSR
Kostrom. 0., RSFSR
Moskov. 009 RSFSR
Yaroslavl. 0.9 RSFSR
Tul. 009 RSFSR
269
SECRET
20 51
60 70
26
40 55
20
31
70
411.1.0110-47?11,
MINOMMONNI
OKOMUICIO.
63
25
45
28
40
52
21
385 592
40
510 564
36
48 41
30
41 32
26 97
41
31
95 143
54 55
IMISONI?411115.1
Moreno Naas
ICM?11100/0
D8
G3
F5
G4
G4
G3
D5
G4
F5
EU
F4
E5
G3
G3
F4
E4
G4
F3
F5
F9
D5
F5
F4
G4
8 G4
13 F6
16 17
134 178 C7
24 E3
21 F8
41 67 P5
37 61 E5
376 539 F5
110 141 F9
91 105 F4
65 95 E6
32 H4
112 137 D4
16 14
26 F5
47 G7
24 C7
155 189 E5
25 G5
45 G4
139 170 G4
15 F4
/11.1.10???10
????I?Iseno