ESTIMATE OF POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, IN THE EVENT OF WAR BEFORE JULY 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 20, 1950
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
}'CEUTRAL =;,LMrtTCE AGEUCY
2
3
G()%~.FIDENTIA 20 January 1950
20 January 1950
INTELLIGENCE I TMORANDU14 M. 263 .
SUBJECT: EstLrato of Political Factors in the Strategic Situatioax,
in the Event of War Before July 1951
1. The problem presented assumes the outbreak of a general war
at some time before July 1951. It is further assumed that this event
would result from deliberate Soviet military aggression.
40 In the assumed circumstances 'the immediate political objective
of the USSR would be the occupation of Western Europe and the Near East
and their incorporation in the Coimmrnist "cusp."
3, The USSR regards political and psychological warfare as
integral rather than incidental to the waging of war. Not only would
its considerable capabilities in this respect be exploited to the.
utmost to facilitate its military operations, but the mi.. tary opera-
tions themselves would be designed to support and facilitate the
political revolution for the accomplishment of which the war, was being
waged, .
In important respects tho,USSR is itsalf vutnerable.to
political and psychological warfare, but these vulnerabilities nre
latent and could not be effectively exploited until the meo`.mnssm of
Soviet police control had been disrupted by Alllicd attack and Allied
military support was immediately at hand.
5. The allies of the USSR would be the European Satellite States
(Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Ait.nac.),
Outer M ngo13a, North Korea, and China. In addition, Co unistwled
insurgents now hold extensive areas in Indochina and Bunia, and those
countries might be brought under Soviet control, before July, 1951,
1.60 The nations allied or aligned with the. United States would be:"
The North Atlantic Treaty States: Canada, Iceland,
Norway. Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxeioovrg, HLance. Ite1y, and. Portugal, with
their overseas possessions. -
Note: This memorandrnn has not been coordinated with the iato2lr4. \'.ee
organizations-of the Departments of State,
DOCUMENTNO. Afzi Fnrnn P
Document
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^ CHANGE,) F1 nFr1 accicirn N4 ~,\r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
 rh R%
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
-ewffffr"Y 1AML
Other recipients. of US military aid;
Faun, Korea, and the Philppineno
Other members of the British Coznonvasltdxs South Africa,
Pakistan, India, Ceylon; lui itralia, and New Zealand.
Indonesia, and also Indochina, to the extent that it
remained free of Conamt3ist, control.
The British Arab alliess Fgrpt:i. Jordan, and Iraq,
49. The other American repablies.
g? The occupied areast Western Ge3ta'auy and im ti ta,
Trieste, the former Italian colonies, and Japan.
7. ` All other nations would probahl+y be. neutral initially, None
wmvld be 'sympathetic with the 'USSR or likely to join it in aggression.
Most would be disposed to, resist.Soviot attack, and would look to the
United States for aid In that cased A fotr might eventually be perm
suaded to'become belligerent allies of the United States, even if not
attacked.
S. ?~More extended discussion of these natters is in the. Enclosure.
ii
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
COMFiDENTIAL"
1, Bt )fir
The rulers of the USSR have as their ultirate objective a Goxznist
world order under their on domination, The Problem aaswmss a Soviet
resort toydirect military aggression in pursuit of that objective, Such
an event,~within the period under consideration, would presumably result
froth a cotaviction on the part of the Kremlin that the progressive economic'
recovery,.politinal coalescence, and military rehabilitation of Western
Europa, in alliance with the United States, posed an intolerable threat
to the security of the USSR, that the trend could be reversed only by
military force, and that it, twi become imperative to act before the ro-
lativo strength of the West had been further enhanced,
The immediate Soviet objective in resorting to war, therefore, would
be to smash the supposedly hostile alliance of the West and to ensure
the security of the USSR by military occupation of Western Europe and
the Rear East, Corollary objectives would be to seize and convert to
Soviet use the resources of the conquered area, greatly enhancing the
potential strength of the' USSR in relation to that of the surviving
capitalist states, and to reconstruct the states of Western Europe at
.Satell:ites. on the Eastern European model,
Soviet Cansbil..i:iee for Po_iticss L,,_,and P? cho~o a3~ !,tt
In the Soviet concept, a state of political and psychological t_ar-,
fare is the normal relationship between the Ccmm-anist and capitalist
ncemipo.n Aimed conflict is merely the employment of additional means
in the conduct of this continuing struggle. Thus, even in the event
of s resort to military aggg ression, political and psychological warfare
would be regarded as integral and basic rather than incidental to the
business of waging war.
In conducting political and p ychological warfare the Kremlin has
,at its disposal not only the apparatus of the Soviet state, but also
that of the international Communist movement, A p?thnary and uudeviat..
ing allegiance to the USSR is required of every disciplined Communist,
the world over, .
Today, and every day the agencies of Soviet propaganda and dip<
lomcy, end of Communist agitation, are constaaxtly at work eeaking to
spread disillusionment and disaffection in the ron--Soviet world, to
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
 L.~aont'HM
discredit.non-Soviet governments and to create antagonisms among
them, and in every tray to undermine the will and capacity to resist
in the event of war. The way will have been prepared for presenting
.the USSR as the invincible champion of the peaceloving and oppressed
masses, compelled by the machinations of capitalist arnrmongers to
act in self-defense for the secure establishment of pence and-demo-
craey. By such propaganda the USSR would seek to paralyse resistance
by inciting pacifism,, labor disturbances, desertion, mutiny, and
rebellion. Its particular targets would be industriallabor, the.
ideal' tic intelligentsia, self-consoioua minorities, colonial
populations, and the armed forces.
The USSR would also seek to cripple resistance through sabotage
of military installations, transportation and communications facilities,
other public utilities, tar industries, and stocks of essential com?-
modities. Communist penetration of industrial labor has been conducted
with this end in view and, despite all precautions, would present a
serious threat.
In areas under direct Soviet attack the hard core of militant
Communists moist also be expected to provide actin fifth column
support for Soviet military operations. The strongest capabilities
in this respect exist in Italy and Franco.
finally, in the wake of the Soviet advance, the surviving Com--
munists would emerge as collaborators in the establishment of police
control and civil administration, Despite the absolute power of the
USSR as military conqueror, every effort would be made, as.previously
in Eastern Europe, to present conquest as liberation and the resultant
Communist regime as the product of a genuine popular revolution. The
purpose would be to convert the conquered communities into allies as
quickly as possible through the foniliar device of the Satellite state.
. The Russian'people have on occasion rallied magnificently to expel
foreign invaders.from their soil, but have never yet succeeded in armed
aggression against a major power. Their recent experience of war-has
given them reason to dread it, despite the ultimate triumph of the USSR.
They have been taught to expect atteek.by the capitalist world and are
probably prepared to resist it -- although their rulers have recently
been under apparent necessity to reassure them that such an attack may not
be imminent. They have not been prepared to support military aggression in contrast to the Germane, who for generations have been convinced of
the necessity to defend the Reich beyond its own frontiers, or to the
French of 1914, who were thoroughly indoctrinated in the spirit of the
attack.' The Soviet Russians are conditioned to think in terms of
M. ENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28 CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
revolutionary aggression; but military defense. Even in the- armed
forces, strategic doctrine is defensive: to receive the initial shock of
invasion, give ground, and achieve ultimate victory by counterattack
upon an overextended enemlr. Virus the Soviet people and armed forces are
psychologically unprepared for military aggression, and the Soviet govern-
msnt, for reasons of domestic as well as foreign propaganda, would find'
it necessary to be able to attribute the war to capitalist aggression.
The war would, of course, be represented as essential to national
survival, and few Soviet citizens would be in a position to know better.
-Under thecoercion of the circumstances, and particularly of the
absolute power of their totalitarian state, the Soviet people would
support the war effort, albeit without enthusiasts,
4. Politscai V lneratsility of the !.
In addition to the reluctiance of~the Soviet people to undergo
the rigors of a na^.r war, three principal bases of. potential disaffec-
tion exist in the TSSSH:
g. General disillug o nt, and resentment of. the exactions,
repressions, and personal inaeourity characteristic of the Soviet
state. Although the Russians have never known liberty and are inured
to despotism, no people in modern.timea have been so closely controlled
and systematically exploited for so_loag as they.
b. The peasantsV particularly intense resentment of collectivization..
The German Any found that. the rural population (still a large majority)
would support even a foreign invader so long as it pia, believed that he
would abolish the collective farms and distribute the lar43 on a basis
of private ownership.
The hostility of minority nationalities toward Great Russian
dominations The Ukranians are most notable in this respect: Sporadic
guerrilla resistance still exists"in the newly annexed western Ukraine.
Other areas of potential disaffection are the Baltic States, the Caucasus,
and Soviet Central Asia.
This potential disaffection is aormalljr kept under effective
control through isolation of the Soviet people ,.internal propaganda,
economic, coercion, Communist monopoly. of political power; and, above all,
police terrorism. However, the unrepresentative character of the govern-
ment, its high degree of centralization, and its ultimate dependence on
police coercion are specific weaknccoes of the Soviet system. Should
the mechanism of close police control be broken, disintegration would
cot in.
CO DENTIAL
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
So long as Soviet militar operations met with success and
the internal security mechanism remained intact, no serious hindrance.
to the Soviet urea effort Could resit from the latent. disaffection
within the USSR, If Soviet internal propaganda were disproved by
events- If Allied capaoilities,proved greater than expiated, and
Soviet capabilities less -? Soviet 1horale would he adversely affected,
but not decisively son The disaftection existing within the USSR
could bring about a disintegration of rbsiatarieo only if Allied
attack succeeded in disruptipg the Soviet control mechanism and Allied
support were imwdiately at hand.
CONFIDENTIAL
 a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
tOIN FIDENTML
5. teliability of the Juror an SatellUc Status,
At the outset, and so long an Soviet operations were proceeding
successfully, the European Satellite governments would of necessity
support the USSR. The satellite armed forces, however, could not
be regarded as reliable. Although no wholesale defections mig1it occur
in the circumstances, their utility would be strictly limited.
The vas, majority of the people of the Satellite States are
thoroughly disaffected toward the USSR and the Communist regimes imposed
on them. They would welcome war in the hope of eventual liberation.
The outbreak of host lities night occasion sporadic acts of open
resistance, which would be `ruthlessly suppressed. In the circumstances,
popular resistance -would be predominantly passive: slowdowns, concealment
of produce. draft-dodging, and other forms of non-cooperation.. Active
resistance would be mainly 'clandestine: counter-propaganda, espionage,
sabotage, and acts of terrorism. Substantial guerrilla resistance eorld.
be espocted only in Poland, and there would not exceed the ability of
security forces to keep it within bounds..
This situation would be radically altered if the USSR were to appear
to be losing the war and if advancing Allied forces were in a position
to. render effective support to popular resistance in the Satellite States.
The Satellite armed forces, and even the rank;-and-file of Satellite
Communists, would become increasingly unreliable. Defections and popular
insurrection would occur wherever there was prospect .of immediate Allied
support and early liberation. In the most favorable circumstances,
crypts-'nationalist elements in Satellite governvuonts might attempt to
assume at least a Titoist character. but the probability is that. in the
face of the rising tide of patriotic reaction, most Satellite officials
would perceive no future for themselves apart from the fortunes of the
USSR and would accordingly seek to maintain a desperate resistance.,
6. The Far Eastern SasellitHe,,
No considerable problem of reliability arises-in relation to Outer
Mongolia and North Korea, short of impending Soviet defeat. In that
situation, Korean nationalism might assert itself, but only under the
protection of Allied forces.
The Chinese Communist regime is in a position to pursue an
independent policyv but is firmly aligned with the USSR and would prove
& ,willing ally in the event of war during 195051.
d'5
CONFIDENT WA
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
OINFIDE TI. L
The present capability of the regime to pursue an independent policy
is at least eoual to that of.Tito before his break with the Kremlin,
Like Tito, it has come to power by its own efforts in a genuine
"revolutionary situation" (not as a result of Soviet military occupation
and police control, except in Manchuria). It is supported by the,
psychological force of Chinese nationalism, and, in China proper it controls,
the armed forces, the police, the media of internal propaganda, and the
machinery of administration? Such outlying areas as Manchuria and
Sinkiang, however, are already in effect usdor Soviet control, and there
is an evident possibility that the influx of Soviet technical advisers
may produce the same result with respect to the whole of China,
In any case, the Chinese Communists are genuine Communists who
regard with respect the world revolutionary leadership of the Kremlin and
the powerful support of the USSR., They are.publiely pledged to support
the USSR in any war with the West, and an explicit treaty of alliance is
now presumably under negotiation, As in the case of Tito, only the USSR
itself could force the Chinese Communists to abandon this policy and
adopt an attitude of defiance, and it is too much to expect that the
Kremlin would so conduct its relations with China as to produce that result.
In all probability, thereffore,.China will remain through 1951, not a
Satellite, but a willing ally of the USSR.
On this basis, the resources and facilities of China would be freely
available to the USSR in the event of war, and China would become the
belligerent ally of the USSR if Soviet policy were to require it,
Strictly strategic considerations would not necessarily lead to such a
requirement, particularly if Soviet strategy in the Far East were
defensive, Gives the nature of Soviet control in Manchuria and North
Korea, no more would be recuired for an adecuate position confronting
Japan. A friendly, but non-belligerent, China would serve to cover an
extensive front, while a co-belligerent China might prove a strategic
liability. An important fact in popular acceptance of the Communist
regime is. the promise of peace to an utterly war-weary people. The actual
value of Chinese belligerency would have to bo neighed against the vulnerability
of the regime to external attack and internal subversion if it ererc to
involve the country in war on behalf of a foreign interest, Despite these
considerdtions, however, the probability is that the USSR would recuire
China to enter the war as a categorical act of political adherence.
Apart from Soviet requirements, war in Europe would probably so
attenuate the anti-Communist military position in the Far East as to
tempt the"Chinese themselves to engage in imperialistic adventures,
particularly as regards Hong Kong and Southeast Asia,
CONHIDE 7AtL
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
CONFIDENTIAL
. Apart from mopping up in China (including Formosa. Hainan, and
Tibet),, Southeast Asia is the only area in which there is any. likelihood
of a further expansion of Communism by means short of war before
July 1951. The.situatibn is precarious'in Indochina, where Communist-
led nationalists have long controlled most of Vietnam, and in Burma,"
where Communist insurgents control extensive areas amid a general
disintegration approaching anarchy. It is rendered critical by the
arrival of the Chinese Communists on the frontiers of those countries.
The most powerful political force in Southeast Asia, however, is
not Communism, but a resurgent nationalism dsreeted initially against
Lvrcpean'imperialism, Communism has flourished only in identification
with this force,. B,! the same token, were Communism to become iden-
tified with Chinese imperialism, the force of nationalism could be
turned against it.
ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS
9 The North A'-lantig R ae Yv S atDs
The nations adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty would honor
their commitments in the event of war. The effectiveness of their
resistance, however, would depend upon considerations of morale as
well as organization, and armament, The morale factor is likely to
be critical with respect to the continental-states directly exposed to
SovieE mess attacks For the short term under consideration the means
of resistance available to them will be strictly limited, and they will
be acutely conscious of their vulnerability. Their determination can
not'be sustained by promises:of eventual liberation and ultimate,
victory, but will depend on confidenca in prompt and decisive support.
Militant Communist elements in these states must be ezpected'to
serve as a fifth column in support of any Soviet attack, Their poten
tial active strength is estimated as some 250,000 men and women in
Italy, 100.000 in France, 13.000 in Belgium, and 9,000 in the
Netherlands, The numbers who could be expected to engage in open
violence, however, wuu3.d be much less, and, unless they received prompt
Soviet military support, they could probably be controlled. In the case
of Iceland, the internal danger is lease a matter of Communist strength
thou of a.lack of effective means of control. With respect to Norway,
Denmark, the United Kingdom, ax Portugal, local Communist capabilities
are limited to espionage and sporadic sabotage,
CONFIDENTIAL
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
CONFIDENTIAL
Except for Indochina (see 8 above and 12 below) the colonial
territories of the North Atlantic Treaty powers are generally secure,
although Commirist guerrilla activity continues in Malaya and there
is some, unrest in French North Africa, British Vest Africa, Cyprus,
Eritrea, Madagascar, and Hong Yong. Unrest may develop in Itali?.n
Somaliland when the Italians return to that area,
10, ger Hecini~s of US Military Aid,
As recipients of,US military aid, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Korea,
and the Philippines look to tha United States for support and protection
against Soviet aggression. In common discretion, however, none would be
willing to take any action on behalf of the United States deemed likele
to precipitate an otherwise avoidable Soviet attack upon itself. Time,
if the USSlt chose to direct its offensive effort elsewhere, each would
remain non-belligerent. In all probability, however, each (except the
Philippines) would bo?attacked immediately on the outbreak of war, in
which case each would defend itself as best it could wn.ile calling for
US aid,
Although the other Commonwealth governments are not committed by
the adherence of the United Kingdom and Canada to the North Atlantic
Treaty, it is probable that Australia, New Znalaud, South Africa, and
Ceylon would render prompt. belligerent support in the event of Soviet
military aggression. India and Pakistan would probably remain non-
belligerent for the time being, although otherwise cooperative. They
would expect Commonwealth support if they should be themselves directly
threatened, and would resist Soviet or Chinese attack.
12e I.A4 nesla and Indochinaa
Although the solution was long delayed and its viability has yet to
be tested, it appears that Indonesia like India, will prove a prime
example of constructive solution of the colonial problem. Had Indonesian
nationalism been frustrated, as is the case in Indochina, the area would
have been rendered as vulnerable to Communism. Indonesian aspirations
being satisfied, the continued alignment of the area with the West is
probable. if'not assured. Indonesian policy will probably parallel that of
India, for similar reasons rather than because of Indian influence,
A similar solution has long; been the only real hope for Indochina and
it appears that the French are at last beginning to appreciate that fact, but
their concessions may prove to be too little and too late. If'the
CONFIDENTI\L
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
CONFIDENTIAL
Vietnamese can be convinced that the Bao Dal regime can achieve a real
rather than a counterfeit independence, and that the Communist
alternative involves subservience to the USSR or to China, the situation
may yet be saved, in which case Indochina would be aligned with the
West in the same sense as India and Indonesia. The probability, however,
1s that by 1951 all or most of Indochina will have passed under Communist
control,
13, The British Arsb Ailies,
The British treaties of alliance with Egypt. Jordan, and Irac
would. be operative in the assumed circumstances. Zcipt and Iraq have
shown, in the past, a disposition to repudiate this alliance, but in
any case, the British would utilize their bases and forces actually in
the throe countries as the occasion required. There might be popular
disturbances in Egypt and Iraq, but it is probable that tnose governments
could control the internal situation and that they would render. at least
passive support to Great Britain. There is no question about Jordan,
which is dependent on the British for its existence,
14, The_
Anertpa ,Rouublics,
Tb,s other American republics would be aligned with the United States
in various degrees of effective cooperation. The Rio Treaty reouires:
(1) immediate assistance to an American state attacked in the Western
Hemisphere as defined, the form of assistance to be whatever each other
state deems appropriate; (2) consultation regarding appropriate action
in the event of an attack on an American state outside of the Hemisphere.
Thus co-belligerence is not required, and wide variation may exist in the
action taken by various states, If the USSR were to attack the United
States trithia the Hemisphere, most of the American republics would become
passive co-'belligerents, Some (e.g., Brazil) would be disposed to accept
active military roles. If the attack were to occur elsewhere in the world,
the result would probably be essentially, the sane, but in some cases action
would be slower. None of the American republics would favor the USSR.
15. Tho Cccunied Aroas.
The continued Western military occupation of Western Germany and
Austria, Trieste, the former Italian colonies, and Japan would assure at
least initicl Western control of those areas.
The Gorman people generally are strongly anti-Communist, although a
potential Communist fifth colurn of some 70,000 men and women exists in
Western Germany, The internal danger to Western interests lies not In,
the appeal of Communism, but in that of an ?nmret=utanc German nationalism
disposed to take opportunistic advantage of Fast-West competition, All
Germans are acutely sensitive to the partition of their country, the
subordination of its interests, and the extreme valaerabillty of its
.position in the event of war. Continued denial of free and equal West
CONFIDENTIAL
 J0 , M. ~1711
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
W L,L)JvrIUtrv 1) L%j
German membership in the Western community will tend to strengthen the
influence of those who contend that Germany can attain national unity
and dignity only in alliance with the USSR. Thus, in the event of wars
German opinion is likely to be paralyzed by'confusion in the calculation
of national as well as personal interests.
Communism is an even less effective force in Austria than in Germany,
Any considerable sentiment against open alliance with the West would
derive from a sense of the hopelessness of resisting the USSR.
The Japanese people and government, acutely conscious of the vul-
nerability of their position* would look to the United States for
protection, If assured of effective support, they would willingly
take an active part in.their own defense, in the hope of rehabilitation
as the premier power in East Asia. If denied such a role, their
attitude could become at least passive, and possibly hostile;
16,. I'1ul gad,
The Finnish people are stubbornly anti-Soviet, but Finland is in no position to
defy the USSR. The Finnish Government, therefore, without repudiating the Soviet-
Finnish mutual assistance treaty, would seek to remain neutral, or at least to avoid
Soviet occupation of Finnish.territory. The Finns would not willingly assist the
USSR o and, if Soviet forces entered their territory without express permission,. they
would fight. In any case, any Soviet forces' entering Finland would be in hostile
territory.
17. Sweden S 4tge]c1HIId.
Both countries are ideologically anti-Soviet, but both cling to a
traditional neutrality in the hope of avoiding Soviet attack. If
attacked. both would resist to their utmost ability,
The Irish republic is strcn ly anti-Soviet in sentiment, but dis-
posed to make the cession of Northern Ireland a precondition to any
formal alignment with the West. Eventually, it would probably become a
belligerent ally of the Atlantic Porers.
The Franco regime is conspicuously anti-Soviet, but.is ideologically
unacceptable to Western Europe, In the event of war, Spain, having no
hope of accommodation with the USSR, might seize the occasion to escape from
isolation into defensive alliance with the Atlantic Powers, but would
probabl; remain non-belligerent-unless attacked,
20, FuQUSlavia~
The Tito regime is anathema to the USSR, which is actively seeking to
overthrow it by any means short of open military aggression. At the same
time, ideological considerations prevent its open alliance with the West.
These circumstances would indicate a policy of neutrality in the event of
war, If attacked, however, the Yugoslavs would offer a stubborn resistance,
10 e CONFIDENTIAL
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5
CONFIDENTIAL
Israel-'s position is one of deliberate neutrality between the
East and West. Western ties are actually predominant, however, and,
.if compelled to take aides, Israel would align itself with the West.
22, Syria and LebMone
These states are too weak to pursue an independent policy. Their
passive alignment with the West is probable.
23, Soli Arab?la,
Ibn.Saud would expect the United States to defend Dhahran, and
would do what he could'to cooperate.
24?, istsa,
In dangerous proximity to the USSR and-remote from succor,-
Afghanistan would remain neutral unless attacked,
25. Hine.
In its present anarchical condition, Burma would be incapable of
taking effective part on either side. If the government should regain
control, with Commonwealth aid,. it would presumably honor passively
its military commitments to Great Britain, If the Communists should
gain the ascendancy, they would be too remote from Soviet or Chinese
support to be able to provoke Western intervention with impunity,
26. Siam,
Siam has a chameleon-like facility in adopting protective
coloration. Its.passive alignment would be determined by circumstances.
It could be coerced by internal and'external Chinese Communist
pressures, or bribed by the fulfillment of territorial aspirations with
respect to the Shan States, Laos, Cambodia, or Malaya, but would take no
action involving risk and'would be unlikely to become an active
belligerent, in any case. .
T 11 M
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28 : CIA-RDP78-01617A000800240002-5