THE HIJACKING OF TWA 847--FURTHER THOUGHTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01156R000100060015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: June 18, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP89TO1156R000100060015-1
S E
The Director of Central Intelligence AHC
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC 03129-85
National Intelligence Council 18 June 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: The Hijacking of TWA 847--Further Thoughts
1. The events of the last 24 hours have tilted the hijacking
incident strongly in the direction of the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979.
In effect the hostages have become integrated into an internal
struggle within Lebanese and--particularly Shia--internT-
po ics. As in Tehran in 1979, it will be mostly the internal
dynamics of the situation--and not the external forces--which
will determine the outcome of the situation.
The same social and political turmoil, the same revolutionary
actions, the same weakness of state power, the same howling
radical mobs--all exist again. The only possible good news is
that Nabih Barri is probably in a stronger position than were
the Iranian moderates. But moderation does not often fare well
in this kind of environment.
To state the complexity of the problem and the issues involved
is not meant to paralyze the policy will to take action. It is
meant to insure that the relative stakes involved are kept in
mind in the debate over policy options.
In military terms it would seem that few options exist at the
moment. Retaliation is no less effective if it is delivered
after the event and at a time when those we seek to punish have
lowered their guard. Retaliation in any case will not rescue
the hostages at this juncture.
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2. The Kissinger Thesis. I take strong exception to the Kissinger
thesis as set forth on Nightline last night in which he says that Nabih
Barri has now publicly established an "address" for this operation to
which retaliation can be directed.
Wisely or unwisely Nabih Barri has decided to buy into this
problem. The hijacking almost certainly was carried out by more
extremist Shia elements who oppose Barri and wish to challenge
his leadership. But by taking over control of the majority of
the hostages Barri has now placed himself in a potentially
dangerous situation. He wishes to seize the center stage and
deny it to his most dangerous opponents; he wishes to try to
terminate the hostage process, to gain credit both for the
release of Israeli Amal prisoners and for the release of
American hostages. If his gamble is correct it will be a
significant victory for him.
Barri might find himself unable to arrange for the release of
the Israeli prisoners or to release the American hostages,
however. In principle he controls all the hostages except those
with Jewish sounding names under control of the radicals, but
this is not entirely certain. Should he prove incapable of
delivering either group his position will be vastly weakened and
he will be hard put to release the Americans.
3. In short, Barri could end up finding himself locked four-square
into a position hostile to US interests. The stakes of the internal Shia
struggle are very high, however. As I have mentioned in previous memos,
the issue primarily is: will the Lebanese Shia turn their attentions to
Beirut and the struggle for secular power in that country, or move toward
an Islamic state devoted to perpetuating the struggle against Israel
across Lebanese borders, and against the Western and especially US
presence in Lebanon. If the Hizballah faction wins, the Shia movement in
Lebanon will be increasingly international in character, working closely
with Shia radicals in the Gulf and ran and in a position to provide in
effect the support of a state structure to their activities out of
Lebanon.
-- In short, it is very much in our interest that Nabih Barri win
this struggle. The Israelis have fully grasped this reality
after their disaster in south Lebanon last year. Israel is
desperately hoping that Barri will prevail and that the Shia
will lose interest in Israel once Israel is out of Lebanon.
Barri's victory, and lack of future Shia interest in Israel, are
far from certain. Israel is taking a gamble but has little
other alternative. If Israeli efforts to help Amal--witness the
release of Shia prisoners several weeks ago--ultimately fail, at
least Israel will have gone the extra mile to try to win Amal
neutrality and will have lost nothing in the process. It has no
other realistic option.
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4. This Shia soup will be served up again and again by those who
wish to exploit it. This problem becomes particularly urgent in view of
US aspirations for the peace process in the region. As that process
grows more serious, Syria will devote major resources to stymie the
process. Exploitation of Shia radicalism in Lebanon--however much a
two-edge sword for Syria--will be a major vehicle for Syria in attacking
and weakening the Israelis and moderate Arabs in the months ahead.
Questions of whether Syria was or was not behind this incident
are technical and somewhat irrelevant in nature. Syria
basically draws benefit from the perpetuation of anti-Western,
anti-peace movements in the area and will seek to preserve--and
try to control--the Shia extremists. Assad may have tactically
found this hijacking inconvenient in that it could invite the US
into Beirut again. But he wants to protect the radical Shia
tool for the future.
-- Iran will support Syria in the effort to block an independent
Jordanian-PLO-Israel peace. Libya will do likewise. In effect
all three are involved strategically in this struggle.
5. Thus the complexity of dealing with Nabih Barri in this situation
is clear. He is not at present a strategic ally of Syria or Iran. But
in joining the struggle and entering this hostage game he has placed
himself in a dangerous situation. If he is successful, it will be an
important political accomplishment. If he is not successful, he may be
swallowed up and consumed in the process--just as the more moderate
elements in Iran were consumed by the radicals as the hostage crisis
there spun itself out.
P:~'raham E. Fuller
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SECRET
NIC 03129-85
18 June 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: The Hijacking of TWA 847--Further Thoughts
NIC/NIO/NESA:GEFuller:jcn 18 June 1985
Distribution:
1 - DC I
1 - UDCI
1 - ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
-T DDI Registry
1 - C/NE/DDO
2 - NIO/NESA
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/28: CIA-RDP89T01156R000100060015-1