ADDRESS BY ALLEN W. DULLES DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE DEFENSE STRATEGY SEMINAR JULY 20, 1960 EXPLOITING THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 20, 1960
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
.Oil
ADDRESS
BY
ALLEN W. DULLES
,DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE DEFENSE STRATEGY SEMINAR
JULY 20, 1960
EXPLOITING THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD
Any report dealing solely with the Soviet bloc weaknesses
is one-sided and therefore must be taken with reserve.
True picture of any country's strength is a net balance
between assets and liabilities; its relative world position is its power
in contrast to that of its chief rivals or potential antagonists.
Today I speak of Soviet vulnerabilities and methods of exploiting
them. But, at no point in any such presentation, should we forget that
the Soviet is a very powerful nation, second greatest military and
industrial power in the world, striving over the ne decades to reach
A.
the first place, and possibly now first in certain areas of military
capability.
R i1'
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
41a
?
The Soviet Union and its communist allies, like any
alliance has weaknesses which can be exploited. Some of them
are inherent and cannot be corrected. Some of them may be short-
term difficulties which are likely to be overcome. Others are
important chiefly because. they relate directly to the contest between
the Communist world and alliances of Free States.
I shall deal chiefly with weaknesses of the Soviet Union but
in the context of its position,-as the Bloc leader.
UP UT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
!-L,aaI- s ?
3.
In this review I shall cover these features of national power:
(a) geography; (b) the political and social system of the Soviet Union;
(c) the international concerns of the Soviet Union; (d) the industrial,
agricultural, and general economic situation in the Soviet Union;
(e) its military , Finally, I shall mention a.few exploitable
weaknesses that fall in no particular category.
(a) Geography.
When it comes to defense, or for offense against so~
neighboring European or Asiatic targets, the Soviet Union is in a
-, r
position of great strength.. (Napoleon-Kaiser-Hitler learned. this)._-
its great land mass permits wide dispersion of vulnerable
assets and a large measure of secrecy and security for those assets and
for its striking force -- aircraft and missiles. (Evidence of ability to
penetrate this security by U-2 -- hit Soviet at most sensitive point).
lerPOCT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
is t
0
On the other hand, in dealing with targets more distant
from the USSR, such as the United States, Africa, and Latin
America, the Soviet is.at a 6,ei win disadvantage, though modern
tecHnology, missiles and air transport somewhat mitigate this.
The Soviet has no dependable military bases outside the
Bloc. It does not even have thoroughly dependable centers of political
strength, in which.it can find a secure base for extending its. influence
in the neighborhood. (Trying to get them in Cuba -- Guinea Indonesia).
Our alliances and treaty relationships give us such .bases of
action nearer to the USSR. (Reason Soviet wants to get us out of our
bases).
Also, for .the time being at least, the great superiority in
commercial shipping and numbers of commercial aircraft of the United
States and its frt rf4s gives us advantages in overseas trade; but Soviet
.air tr.'ansport development is cutting down this davantage somewhat.
RHR 'T
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
I
(b), Social and Political
(1) Their internal political system.
Past history has. taught us that dictatorships do
not last indefinitely. Eventually they almost always
degenerate, sometimes. falling to a revolt of the people
against them. Or they mellow and reform, and lose
some of their initial aggressiveness.
It is true that modern. weapons make the French
.Revolution type of popular upheaval outmoded.. Dictatorships
endurfor a long time if supported by the army. or
an effective police system, although even these will not
1suffice nowadays if discontent is severe and disaffection
widespread.
UPTU
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
The Soviet dictatorship
A
evolutionary stage. -may-girve-i - ; b?tl~id of
Today the Soviet system is b '=g somewhat
more responsive to popular pressuresN The Soviet people
todamy have high expectation of better things to come.
Even.Khrushchev cannot totally disregard popular
Gtt,~~
feelings or the pressure for evolution brought by education
and increasing foreign contacts. The new generation of
R may well differ greatly from the Old Bolsheviks.
We have every interest in exploiting these
evolutionary trends.
6.
SHUT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
?
(2) The form of government of the Soviet is an. inherent
The locus of power is of course in the Presidium 4
With the personnel changes formally approved by
the Supreme Soviet in early May, the presidium became the
meeting ground of the three key power-wielding bodies, the
Party Secretariat, the Cabinet of the Russian Soviet Republic,
and the Soviet government itself. It is noteworthy that Khrushchev
alone is the. only presidium member to sit on all three bodies,
and that the .Central Committee is packed with Khrushchev
supporters.
But packed organizations sometimes change in
attitude. If Khrushchev should have a serious defeat in
his,foreign policy, in industry, or in agriculture, there
might be trouble.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01: CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 eclassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01: CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
?
In the Soviet, as in China, there is no clearly
defined or institutionalized way of dealing with basic
disagreement between the dictator and any disagreeing
associates. (Refer to 1957 when K. in minority and
appealed to Presidium).
This is .a rr weakness.
IN_
Will Khrushchev's successor be determined, as
were the successors to both Lenin and Stalin, by a period
of so-called collective leadership and the emergence of
the dictator? Will the Army come to play a role ?
These are two question marks. Tradition is too
short for a procedure to have been settled.
'Purr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
9.
However, the Communist Party and its organs have
strict discipline. Its relative restricted numbers -- some
eight million out of over 140 million potential voters on a
basis comparable to U.S. , help to make it well-knit.
The Party leaders realize importance of cohesive action
to protect their control.
One cannot reasonably predict that the Party will
fall to pieces, organizationally or 'otherwise, if Khrushchev
disappears. On the contrary, the discipline of the eight
million party members will constitute the main guarantee
A
of regime stability in the event of a new succession crisis.
SECUT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
? . M t` 10.
These institutional weaknesses are not readily
open to direct exploitation. However as contact with the
outside world increases, internal pressures in Soviet Union
will also increase. K's summit decision, refusal to receive
President Eisenhower, actions toward, Cuba and the Congo,
K
tka-
are all evidence K. desired to slow up the trend of co-
k
existence. It had become too dangerous.
(3) Soviet educational programs also present K. with
a dilemma. To compete with the U.S.A. and the Free. World,
r
they have stressed the development of their technology,
industry and the sciences. This has led to a lweerd
educational program throughout the Soviet Union.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
11.
While the emphasis has been on science and
technology rather than on the liberal arts, and hence less
dangerous from the ideological viewpoint, nevertheless
education makes men and women think; it makes them seek
for more, even in broader fields than their particular areas
of specialization. It makes them more interested in develop-
ments in the outside world.
Over the years the Soviet has taught their people so
much nonsense about the outside world in general, and the
gradual
U.S.A. in particular, that the /coming of the truth to them
is something of a shock, and Khrushchev realizes. this.
Fr PcT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
?
The sly perception with which the Russian people
note all this is illustrated by the following joke that is being
passed from mouth to mouth in Russia today:
"School teacher: Sascha, tell us about America.
"Sascha: America is a-land of poverty, .corruption
and degeneracy.
"School teacher: Good; now, tell us about Russia.
"Sascha: Russia is trying to catch up with America."
Many years ago during the war when,Wendell Wilkie
visited Russia, he suggested. that Stalin by educating ,his
people, might be educating himself out of a job. Stalin
laughed. Khrushchev is pondering.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01: CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
is
(4) With the disappearance of the old revolutionary
dialecticians of Communist theory, some of the vim and
vigor rye lost to the\Communist movement,
e
Q
drive after they reach their initial objectives, & ad adherents
volutions such as.. Communism tend to lose their vigorous
become more interested in their vested interests and in
keeping an acquired position political, social, military,
or material, rather than engaging in adventures.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
EET S
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
` Act ?
14,.
While Khrushchev makes a vast number of speeches,
and his regime claims credit for a, high degree of doctrinal
creativeness, he is not personally distinguished as a
dialectician. He is eminently a practical man. His most
remarkable innovations have been in the organization of
~,
industry and agriculture. ~
~ (,j,,(! .~ ;
,i 1":
{1
'~ ~~,Qut t.e a CCU, L (.`a-Cii i.:_W +t-~ee lluvt i c~V Z~rL,
Khrushchev's philosophy is simple: history will
take care of the United States. As. capitalism took care of
feudalism so communism will take care of capitalism, and
our grandchildren will all live in a communist society. He
proposes to help along this process -- peacefully he proclaims.
'PP. 'T
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
15.
(c) Now to turn from the domestic to tie Soviet international
problems.
(1) The Warsaw Pact countries.
Communist control in these countries is an asset
hin that it moves the.frontiers. of the Soviet Union into the
heart of Europe, thus protecting the Soviet homeland. The
Kremlin knows, however, that these satellite allies are for
the most part unreliable.
They have had the setback of Hungary and .another
situation of this kind would be serious for the USSR. Poland
today is still a powder keg.
They haven't yet won over the people in the Satellites
though they have made most progress in Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia.
M.RFT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
9 ? OI~UI1>!?? 4P . 16.
They are not likely to really win them over to full
and wholehearted cooperation at any time in the near future.
As I have said, many of the Satellite leaders are
tough Stalinists; they fear the co-existence policy. They
believe contact with the West will make peoplef even more
restless. . This is clearly shown by the refugee flood from
Eastern Germany to the West which reached.20, 000 in May
and 18, 000 in June. It points.up their weakness in this area.
We can help to keep alive the hope and goal of
freedom in this Eastern European .area -- and we are doing
so (RFE). We can continue to help Berlin and. West Germany
to be "show cases," of freedom and free enterprise.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
? 17.
(2) Communist China.
China still follows the hard Communist line --
still in the days of Stalinism.
USSR faced with the choice of helping .a Stalinist
China become strong, and this they fear, or of dragging
their feet as regards military, nuclear and industrial aid,
and thus incurring the displeasure of the Chinese Communists.
4
Mao is irritated at tkias, ''-his exclusion from
Summit Meetings and had been muddying the Soviet copybook
of co-existence by his a x4;aasa.ea in Tibet and on the Indian
crP0CT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01: CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
18.
And Mao by his program of creating communes
has irritated. the Soviet leaders who propose to sell both
domestically and abroad a much .more restrained pattern
of the ideal. Communist state.
Mao has set himself up as a,fountainhead of real
Q
Communist ideology. Khrushchev doesn't like this. In the
last month or two the doctrinal controversy between Moscow
.and Peiping, as evidenced by Chinese writings and Soviet
speeches, reached an unprecedented height. 'here i s*wme
basic trouble lae~, but it would be premature to predict a
break. Chicom aggressive and antagonistic attitude toward the
U. S. makes it difficult today to exploit this weakness but it
can be advertised, and we must work for opportunities to
widen the breach.
SFCRFT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 n.r< n rb r? r_
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
(3) Yugoslavia.
One of the most irritating,experiences for the Soviet
rulers is the demonstration that a country under Communist
leadership can follow an independent of Moscow line and still
survive. Yugoslavia.is creating a dangerous heresy. It is
more dangerous to Moscow than is a state that has always been
an outright enemy of the USSR. Our policy toward Yugoslavia,
has helped to free Y.S. from dependence on the
Kremlin Q`
(4) General balance of Soviet progress.
Soviet policy over. the last ten years has won-few new
allies or Satellites (only change. North. Vietnam - vs. East Austria).
This is in.contrast to the previous decade. . It represents a S
slowing downA and any slow down is dangerous for a
revolutionary state.
SF PT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
0 20.
Territorially the Soviet Bloc is no stronger than
it was ten years ago.
The open threat in Greece and Azerbaijan and Korea
was thwarted; the Berlin. Blockade was ended. The Communist
twat in Italy and France, though still serious, is far less.
dramatic than it was twelve years ago.
LM & ~F, .... _ ry
Obviously still many weak points but no immediate
threat of territorial takeover.
In the foreign policy .area, Khrushchev's visits to
India and. Southeast Asia and Austria were. not r.,e T
successful.
UPRFT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01: CIA-RDP80M01009AO01502660003-7
91
?
15
Today a new aggressiveness -evidenced in
Africa (Congo and Guinea), in the Caribbean (Cuba), and
in SEA -- particularly Indonesia and a threat to Laos. In
many of these areas a clear evidence of Soviet-Chicom
coordination.
Some of these new held initiatives are far from
0 1-
theme home base. This fact is a weakness we should be
able to exploit with our greater ability to meet the problem
of logistics. (In Congo they threaten -- we act). Both-Congo
and Cuba show signs of backfiring.
UL~
' Cam-x.11 .
SF1RET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
? . ` ?' %0 t o &. f ? 2 Z.,
(d) The Military Sector.
I have suggested at the outset that the Soviet geographic
position, strong though it be for -resisting attack for aggression
against peripheral states, and as a base for long-range missile attack,
still has inherent in it a measure of weakness as regards launching
limited attack against distant targets overseas. "Volunteers" were
easily useable in Korea, Northern Vietnam and even if they chose, in
awA &41m,.
Greece, Iran and Turkey. In the Congo, Cuba s-Indonesia they must
aid
rely largely on economics and subversive action.
14-
Despite the debate about our readiness for so-called
r...
"limited wars" it is unlikely that today the Soviet could do what we
1 in countries as distant as Lebanon, Korea, or Taiwan.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 ornnrT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
Hence, in many parts of the world, the Sovie Chas
1W
4 rVUj ~ &q V
to choose between-4ar on the one hand, which I believe
they do not desire, or political subversion and economic
penetration on the other, as instruments for changing controls
in foreign countries in their favor.
I believe that for the time being they will choose the
latter and that it is in this arena that we must seek out their
vulnerabilities and meet their challenges.
Meanwhile, however, we must not overlook the fact
fib-
that we are now cilte g the nuclear-missile age. Here
distance is no longer an obstacle. The Soviet will soon have
the potential to attack any part of the world from their interior
BERET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
But this means all out nuclear war. Today and
tomorrow it is a weapon which can be used as a threat,
as we have recently seen .in the Cuban situation -- and
four years ago during Suez. To carry out the threat
changes the face of the world. It is not likely to be
invoked to achieve limited objectives in any of the areas
where the Communist world is today threatening us, and
the more the missile threat is brandished, the less
effective it becomes.
SF RFT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
25.
(e) Soviet Economy
We see no immediately critical problems for the Soviet
in the economic or industrial fields.
But like all of us they have certain problems. . At the
moment due to the war losses and the great inefficiency of their
use of agricultural manpower, there is a shortage of manpower for
industry.
Today they have on their farms about six times as
many workers as we do. Despite this far smaller agricultural labor
force, the United States produces about one-third more food than
does the Soviet Union.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
26.
The manpower shortage is probably one of the reasons
for their cutback in their military forces and for the fact that
,many students reaching the age of 15 are now being sent to the
assembly lines and-will continue their education on a part-time
basis in. the evening.
The availability of essential raw materials will probably
not impede the successful execution of the Soviet Seven-Year Plan,
1959 - 1965. There are, however,. some raw materials problems..
To support the planned expansion of the steel and aluminum
industries for example, the. USSR must exploit leaner and more
costly ores. In the case of the steel industry, it must process
vy expensive coal for the necessary metallurgical coke.
SEC ?A
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
27.
Only in the case of natural rubber and possibly copper
is the USSR likely to be dependent on non-Bloc sources for the supply
of an essential industrial raw material.
In this connection it is well to note that today they are
using their raw materials sparingly insofar as consumer production
and consumer goods are concerned and diverting them very largely
to the national power segment of their economy.
a
For example, they need/relatively modest amount of
gasoline for the small number of automobiles they produce, and
are even able to make substantial quantities available for export
n
where political considerations dictate;. viz. , Cuba.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
28,
The task of extracting riches from the frozen Tundra of
the Far North is, not appealing.
While the Soviets are now paying serious attention to housing
their much--publicized civilian construction plans will not be
completed until well after 1965. Even then the available living
space, on a per capita basis, will still be only a small fraction of
that now being enjoyed in the U. S. ,. and .for that matter, in
Western. Europe, Furthermore, the quality 'of construction is
inadequate by our standards and even in..the newest apartment house,
the chances are that the plumbing will not .work.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01: CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
.(F) INDUSTRY
In industry, problems remain but they are centered around
the need to. increase efficiency and productivity rather-than output
alone. Khrushchev is still tinkering with his economic reorganization
which went into effect in 1957 substituting a form of local control
for vertical ministerial control of industry from the center in
Moscow. The lack of competition has resulted in lags. in the
A
introduction of new technology, in the continued use of high cost
production facilities in many industries.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
Khrushchev is aware of.the need for reform. He has
recently declared that plant managers in the Soviet Union will
no longer receive substantial bonuses merely for the completion
of the physical output called for in the various. annual plans.
Now-these managers must show substantial improvement. in the
cost of production if they are to be rewarded by incentive bonuses.
We can expect to read a good deal about new experiments
in organization and management over the next few.years as the
Kremlin leaders grope.for solutions to these problems.
E T
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
The So viet Central Committee Plenum which adjourned
last Friday, has been considering problems of industry and
transportation. According to Soviet press repo.rts,, it.found
that serious difficulties still existed., including failure to make
use of new gains in science and technology, to cut production
costs and to improve the quality of the goods produced. The 'Tass:
summary of the final resolution failed to indicate what .measures
had been determined to overcome these deficiencies..
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
AGRICULTURE
Agriculture, as I have indicated, has been a perennial
problem in the Soviet Union. The resistance of the peasants ' to
collectivization and their resultant cruel measures of deportation
and liquidation by Stalin are well known. While the Sovviet concentrated
on the development of industry in the years following W W II, agriculture
was neglected; the inevitable result was that in the early 19.50s
that, country ceased to be self-sufficient in food supply for the first
time in history.
Khrushchev tried to meet this challenge by expansion of crop
acreage into the so-called new lands area of Siberia and Kazakhstan.
The growing of grain onthe new lands is subject to great uncertainty.
Frequently there is insufficient moisture to yield-a satisfactory
harvest, as happened.in 1959.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
SECRF'
The other major agricultural program was the introduction
of corn. But remember that'80% of'the Soviet Union.lies north of
the.50th parallel or Winnipeg, Manitoba. This means that. much
of the. corn does not mature and must be cut in the green stage.
There is no counterpart in the Soviet. Union to our own
highly productive corn belt. The uncertainty of agricultural
production even in the traditional growing areas of European USSR
showed up again this year. Winterkill and dust storms caused severe
damage to crops in the North Caucasus and the Southern Ukraine.
The present harvest outlook is at best uncertain.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01: CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
? ' T Y-! ~i ?
34.
Factors of geography and climate will always make
agricultural production in, the. Soviet Union. much more risky and
uncertain than.either in..the. U. S.. or Western Europe.
MISCELLANEOUS WEAKNESSES.
1. No. convertible: currency. .This restricts their -trade
dealings to barter type of operations. .,(But speed. in effecting
barter deals with underdeveloped nations, as contrasted with our
red-tape type deals, has created impact, though at times some of
the goods. delivered in barter have proved second rate. )
2. Limited use of Russian as a.langua.ge.-of general
communication as contrasted to English; the great lingua franca of
the world. Here is an asset of our -to, exploit.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
3. Shortage of adequately trained operatives for
many parts of world -.(The tes-timony of Kaznacheyev as contrasted
with the book, "Ugly American".) . Many Soviet experts do not
know -foreign languages .
4. Soviet rulers lack of trust in their people.
This slowly changing but still exists.
5. Paucity of production in the field of the arts with
the exception of music. Lack in. literature and poetry, painting,
sculpture. Their ballet is great but it is still old-fashioned and
probably not as good as in the time of the old regime.
6. Existence of boredom and inadequate means of
using their leisure.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
7. Russia is an atheistic country and history has shown
that no country whose people lack a deep moral and religious purpose
has ever survived long as great.
CONCLUSION
Russia is a country of great contradictions; great technical
skills; massive scientific and military achievements combined with
great areas of backwardness;-housing shortages and road shortages,
transportation problems except for air transport. With great cities
like Moscow and Leningrad. and yet thousands of small villages
which show little change over the past decade; great in..industry,
backward in agriculture; outstanding in-music, . sterile in. the other
arts; Russia is great in many things and shriveled in many others.
It remains a state isolated from freedom.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01: CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
37.
In approaching the problem of exploiting the vulnerabilities
of the aggressive Communist movement which boasts that it will
take us over in time, there are certain general considerations which
I feel are quite fundamental.
First: there is.no trick solution, We cannot solve the matter
by creating some sort of Cold War Executive to master-mind a program.
We cannot solve it by massive propaganda,
Second: The Communist Bloc has largely closed and sealed
itself off from the normal methods for the exchange of thoughts and
ideas . There. is both an Iron. Curtain and a jamming ,barrier, There
are, of course, leakages into the Communist orbit which. can. be
exploited by radio, by exchanges and by the very fact of a considerable
flow of people back and forth.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
0" 0 38.
Third: There is no subtle propaganda thesis which even
if it could be got over to the Soviet people would have much effect
upon them. They think they are doing reasonably well; better than
in the past. They have a pride in their country's accomplishments..
While there are the elements of unrest and uneasiness, of desire
for more contact with the outside world, these are slowly moving
forces. Evolution and not revolution should be our objective in
exploiting vulnerabilities. Educational advances may be a solvent
in this process as we come to deal with a new generation of Russians.
UPUT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 nronr
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
!.~ ?
39.
Fourth: Communist vulnerabilities are most open. to direct
and effective countermeasures where we meet them outside of the
Communist Bloc, in the uncommitted and rapidly changing areas
of the world -- in-Asia, Africa and Latin America. Also we must
meet the threat, even in countries of the NATO Alliance. In Italy,
for example, a strong, Communist Party, tied to Moscow, is still
endeavoring to undermine Italy's freedom.
Fifth: I do not believe that the Soviet now intend to try to
achieve their objectives by direct military actions. As long as we
maintain.our own military strength, they will rattle their atomic
to time
missiles from time/for blackmailing purposes but probably will not
use them. Hence our attack should be against their economic and
subversive thrust into the free and uncommitted world.
SF1RFT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502660003-7
 0% V- ew at V* Ir
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
40.
This .should include publicizing the activities of Communist
parties in the Free World, and their controlled, subversive front
organizations. . We should meet their economic thrust both directly
or collaterally by quicker action on our own part; sending better
a
goods and giving better services; by/better understanding of the
needs and,aspirations of the new nations of the world. And don't
let us try to make them little replicas of the United States,
.governmentally or economically, as we cannot do it.
t id of rnn
ccr r T
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7
41.
Where we are "cheek by jowl" with the Communist world,
let us help to build show cases of freedom, as in Berlin, in.West
Germany, in Austria.
Finally, in the contest for survival which is joined between
the Free World and the world of aggressive Communism, we must
be prepared to meet their elements of military strength with equal
or superior strength; we must maintain our economic and industrial.
superiority and continue to exploit peacefully but effectively the
vulnerabilities of the.Communist ,
QCPDCT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502660003-7