ADDRESS BY ALLEN W. DULLES DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TO THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE 4 MAY 1960 AREAS OF VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET BLOC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502620013-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: May 4, 1960
• Content Type: MISC

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-?; W
ALL,EN.
TOR OF CENTItAL
TO?,
THE: NATIONAL WAR. C
MAY 1960
lutrAs or v
L? Soviet bloc we
If today I speak of Sovtt labthties1forget
that the Soviet t a very powerfuln, secona greatest
military and tn4ustriat power rid, *triv?g over the
nee decades to reatb th, firstce nd possiibly no
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SEPPEI
Yet the Soviet Union like
2.
y othe
ountry has
ea.kne 8 see.
Some of them are inherent and cannotbe correctecL Some of
them are ebort4erm difficulties which are likely to be overcome.
Others are important only because they relate directly to the
rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States.
In this review Isbll not attempt, to distinguish among
these type
?
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3.
I shall rather deal with weaknesses which arise from
(a) geography; (b) the political and social system of the Soviet
Union; (c) the international position of the Soviet Union;
(d) the industrial, agricultural, and general economic situation
in the Soviet Union; (e) its military situation; and (1) its ideology.
Finally, I shall mention a few other weaknesses that fall in no
particular category.
(A) Geographical
When it comes to defense, or for selected offense
against neighboring European or Asiatic targets the Soviet Union
is in a position of great strength. Furthermore, its great land
mass permits wide dispersion of vulnerable assets and secrecy
and security for those assets and for its striking force.
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4.
On the other hand, dealing with targets more
distant from the USSR, such as the United States, Africa, and
Latin America. the Soviet is at a certain disadvantage, though
modern technology, missile and air transport somewhat
mitigate this.
The Soviet has no military bases outside the Bloc.
It does not even have thoroughly dependable centers of political
strength, in which it can find a secure base for extending its
influence in the neighborhood.
Our alliances and treaty relationships should give
us such bases of action nearer to the USSR.
Also, for the time being at least, the great superiority
in commercial shipping of the United States and its friends gives
us advantages in overseas trade; but air transport is cutting
down this advantage.
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Social and Political
) Their internal political system.
Past history has taught us that dictatorebipe
do not last indefinitely, ve they almost always
erate, sometimes fallingrevolt of the people
de
again
? $0111e
tbex?. Cr they mellow and reform,
f their initial aggressiveness.
It is true that modern weapons make the French
Revolution type of popul
upheaval somewhat outmod
Dictatorships have endured for a ion
by.tbe army.
tion on the wUlingnees of troops to permit.
themselves to be used against the people.
e long run I kel
LL H
rted
be a
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SLLt
(
y veil be in the evoluttonary itag?f the
Soviet .ato hip., This.
strength over the long run, but it
of dynamic aggressivene
of better e to come
to feel they mgbt have had eariier.
Even Khrushchev cannot.
popular feelings and pre
Soviet people begin
ally disregard
the evolu o br ught
vitith education and 'with more and more fore*
contacts.
SECRET
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c7prr " ?
(2) We may ask whether the form of government of
the Soviet ta an inbereit. weakne88
The us power i
Party Secretar
In roc -
957, when Ichrushchev, though his opponents
had .a majority of 7 to 4 in the Preeldium, purged Molotov,
Malenkov, Knoll v h, etc., after a succeefu1 Appea to
the Central Committee.
At the moment both the Pr aidium and the Central
Committee are e ked with Khrush?v supporters
SECRET
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8.
But packed organisations sometimes change.
If lihrushchev should have a serious defeat in his foreign
policy in industry, or in agriculture, there might be
trouble.
However, there is no clearly defined or
Institutionalised way of dealing with basic disagreement
between the dictator and any disagreeing associates.
As long as the dictator can get away with it,
the dissenters conform or disappear.
This may not be a weakness as long as it
works but come the day the dictator does not get
away with it, there is trouble and no clear way of
settling it peacefully.
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The problem ol d aling with th. succeQsion ?
while techuLaUy in t1I hands of the preuidux
Central -Committee ? to
inherent weakteee.
Will lQirushchev'e successorer e as
after Stalin, by a period of so-called collectzve leader
and the emergence of the dictator? WiU the Armycome
play a _role?
Ce
re two ciuestion marks. raditioi
p.
toe
Short for eatablishe4 procedure.
However, Communilt Party and its organa have
strict discipline its relativeestr d numbers ?e.
eight miLlion out of over 140 miUion potential voters
a basis ciimparab e to U.S.A. make it welI4cntt. The Party
leaders r alise importance of cohesive action to protect
their control,
SECREI
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SECHI
One cannot reasonably predict that t
? fail to pieces ottani,. tonally or
co-exetenCe line dangerous for their OWfl pos io . The
sa
e of Mao and companyChina. They have no
use for the c s ce ?
? The decision to return would face K rusbcbev with
ous dile
has
evidence at
moment that he
on of doing it. It would probably not, however,
result in a blowupin the USSR if done gradually. It would
weaken Ith hchev's . ternattonal position.
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SECHI
One cannot reasonably predict that t
? fail to pieces ottani,. tonally or
co-exetenCe line dangerous for their OWfl pos io . The
sa
e of Mao and companyChina. They have no
use for the c s ce ?
? The decision to return would face K rusbcbev with
ous dile
has
evidence at
moment that he
on of doing it. It would probably not, however,
result in a blowupin the USSR if done gradually. It would
weaken Ith hchev's . ternattonal position.
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Y Ye,
re ago during he war whenWendel-
ilkie vtaltCd Ru he euggeete4 that Stalin by educating
-Iiis people, ritight be edlic t himself o4t rdf a job. Stalin
mighed. u hev may be ponder
6 he lou of the old revolutionary i leo cO.net
0 _Alm!! or the questt?arises whethe
the vim and vigor may be lost to the Conununi.at movement.
Ideological revolutions such as COnunti 1.6nt purports to be#
tend to Lose their vigorousdrive alter they reach their
objectives, and adherents become' more interested in vested
i 1 o nterests and kee acquire o politica
or material rather than engaging adventure 6:.
--RRET
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13.
While Khrushchev makes a vast numb?r. of speeches,
and his regime clai
creativeness,he is not perso
credit fo
high degree f doctrinal
dialectian. 'He is eminently a practicalman4. His moat
rkable innovations
industry d agric
he organisation of
take care :o
historyal
will
United S ates._ As capitalism took
(
feudalism so communism will
e of
eofcaptaUem, and
our grandchildren will all live in a communistocie
To accomplish this he seems to rely not so much
on the power of ideology n military and industrial power,
n demonstrations of the increasing strength of the Soviet
Union,
in particular are heM
is d weapons of subversion. These latter
d up a bit, in th ?
hemisphere and in the untried areas of Central
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a dialectic
Now to turn Iro
problems,
riv. -world-
?
The Warsaw Pact.countri
viet into
a
thus protecting the. Soviet ho . The Kremlin knows baw?
:batt
a are unreliable,
would be a serious sethacit for the.USSR. Poland today
stilia powder keg.
The
though they have made most progrcssin Bulgaria and CcechoBlovakta.?
ion,
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15.
They are not likely to really win them over to
full and wholehearted cooperation in any time in the
near future.
As I have said, many of the Satellite leaders
fear the co-existence policy. The refugee flood from
Eastern Germany to the West which reached 17, 000 or more
during the month of April, points up their weakness in
this area.
2. Communist China.
(Expand orally, touching on fact that China still
follows the hard line -- still in the days of Stalinism. Further
U3SR faced with the choice of helping China become strong,
and this they fear, or of dragging their feet as regards military,
nuclear and industrial aid, and thus incurring the displeasure
of the Chinese.).
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The USSR must inherently fear a greatly strengthened
state on the Mainland of China. Mao is irritated at his exclusion
from Summit Meetings and is muddying the Soviet copybook of
co-existence by his actions in Tibet, on the Indian frontier, and
in Indonesia and elsewhere.
And Mao by his program of creating communes has irritated
the Soviet leaders who propose to sell both domestically and abroad
a much more restrained pattern of the ideal Communist state.
Mao has set himself up as a fountainhead of real
Communist ideology. Khrushchev doesn't like it. In the last
weak or two the doctrinal controversy between Moscow and Peiping,
as evidenced by Chinese writings and Soviet speeches, reached an
unprecedented height. I believe there is some basic trouble here,
though we must be careful not to overestimate its implications
for the near future.
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SECREI
. Yugoslavia.
One of the most lrritatin areas to the' om nnist
ruler is e demonstration that * untry under CommunIst
leaders
follow an independent inc and still survive.
Yugoslavia is creating a
17.
ous heresy. It is nioridangerous
to Moscow than is a state that baa always been an outright enemy.
of.theUSSR.
. By and large,Soviet policy over the Las
on few new allIes. This is in contrast.tothepreviou?
It niay represent a slowing down, and any slow down may be
dangerous ? revolutionary state.
Las
On balance,
new terri
Conrnunism since the tak.ovex 0
Xorth Vietnam. As a
apart of the ee World.
d China, has been
Attar
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? SIT.6NE1 411
? The latter has had had effec
evidenced by the Bun
free East Austria,
.heJ satellite:a ea0 as
18,
, in part due to Its contiguity with
In general, territorially the Soviet Bloc is no stronger
than it was ten years ago.
The open threat In Greece and Aorbaijan and Korea was
thwarted the Berlin Blockade was ended. The Cornxnuntst threat in
Italy though still great
less dramatic than it was twelve years
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.takeover.
fore
licy area,
rushchev's
basically a.failure,indicating
80,ME3 race
on of?
The f.future will, tell how the Co wits
ubversive
program, speazheadecl. by the Soviets, of which wesee evide c
in Cuba and other parts o Latin ica a
particularly
ntral Africa,
Ethiopia and elaewhera, will work o
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5. MILITARY WEAKNESSES.
I have suggested at the outset that the Soviet geographic
position, strong though it be for resisting attack for aggression
against periphery states, and long-range missile attack, still has
inherent in it a measure of weakness as regards launching limited
attack against distant targets overseas. "Volunteers" were
easily useable in Korea, Northern Vietnam and even if the
necessity arose, in Greece, Iran and Turkey.
Despite the debate about our readiness for so-called
'limited wars" it is unlikely that today the Soviet could do what
we did in countries as distant as Lebanon, Korea, or Taiwan.
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411
Hence, tn many
choose between open
on the other,
?countries.
For example
a
the wo,id, the Soviet has to
Sovtetinttiaily responded with econorntc and
expected to see the Soviet Loilow-up with certx
military moves iii. suppozt of a?talceov
? The facts of the .mattei are that they have been extreMely
reserved and cautious n this area so near tothcLrfro
not contiguous,g themselves to economic and the military
aid on a somewhat reetricted and ieffective 5cale.
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22.
6. SOVIET ECONOMY AND INDUSTRY.
N.N e see no immediately critical problems in the Soviet
economy or industrial fields. In general, there is no immediate
and serious shortage of basic raw materials.
But like all of us they have certain problems. At the
moment due to the war losses and the great inefficiency of their
use of agricultural manpower, there is a shortage of manpower
for industry.
Today they have on their farms about six times as many
workers as we do. Despite its far smaller agricultural labor force,
the United States produces about one third more food than does the
Soviet Union.
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111 4j.
The manpower shortage is probably one of the reasons
for their cutback in their military forces and for the fact that
a large proportion of students reaching the age of 15 are now being
sent to the assembly lines and will continue their education on a
part...time basis in the evening.
The availability of essential raw materials will probably
not impede the successful execution of the Soviet Seven-Year Plan,
1959 - 1965. There are,- however, some raw materials problems.
To support the planned expansion of the steel and aluminum
industries for example, the USSR must exploit leaner and more
costly ores. In the case of the steel industry, it must process
very expensive coal for the necessary metallurgical coke.
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Let.
Their Coat of securing essential supplies of nickel and cobalt
from indigenous sources would be considered prohibitive in the West.
These costs, however, are offset by reduction in energy coats from
the rapid expansion of oil and gas, improved efficiency in electric
power production, and improved technology in the processing of
ores to metals.
Only in the case of natural rubber and possibly copper is
the USSR likely to be dependent on non-Bloc sources for the supply
of an essential industrial raw material.
In this connection it is well to note that today they are using
their raw materials sparingly insofar as consumer production and
consumer goods are concerned and diverting them very largely to
the national power segment of their economy. For example, they
use a very modest amount of gasoline for the small number of
passenger automobiles they produce.
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? 411 45.
The task of extracting riches (tom the frozen Tundra of
the Far North is not appealing.
It is true that the Soviets are now paying serious attention
to housing for the first time in their history. But the Soviets
much.publicized civilian construction plans will not be completed
until well after 1965. Even then the available living space, on a
per capita basis, will still be only a small fraction of that now
being enjoyed in the U. S.. and for that matter, in Western Europe.
Furthermore, the quality of construction is inadequate by our
standards and even in the newest apartment house, the chances are
that the plumbing will not work.
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7. INDUSTRY
In industry, problems remain but they are centered
around the need to increase efficiency and productivity rather
than output alone. Khrushchev is still tinkering with his economic
reorganization which went into effect in 1957 substituting a form
of territorial control for vertical ministerial control of industry
from the center in Moscow. The lack of a competitive market has
resulted in lags in the introduction of new technology, in the
continued use of high cost production facilities in many industries,
and in a price structure for producers' goods which is virtually
meaningless.
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v is aware of the need
recently declared that plant managers in the
no longer receive substant
of the physical output called for in
_ cosi 0
ec managers
Pr
s. M
v
Unio
completion
us.
show substantial Lmprovement in the
uct on if they are o be rewa
bonuse5.
We can
in organization
Kremlin is
o
a
by Incentive
cad about a good deal o Aew exprim.ents
ement over the ext few years as the
solutionso these pioblems.
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110
AGRICULTURE -
'Agriculture
.The resin
problemthe Soviet Union,
collectivization and the resultant
et concentrated on the deve1opnnt of industry in the
ected; the
ny 1950e that country ceased to be
sufficient tnfood eupply for the
into the
growing of grain on the new Iartda
ohchev met this ch
d neVr lands ar
iberia and Ka
f crop acreage
subject to great uncertainty.
quently th?re is insufficient moisture
harvest, as happened;l959 ?
'old a aatL1acto
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4110 The other majox agrtculturalprogram was thettroduction of
corn. But remember that 80
n Use north of
rn does not mature and =Ufa be cut in the green stage.
The is.nocountepart in the SovLet Union to?,o r own
highly pr uctive corn belt. The uncertainty of a ricultur
cauee&severe damage to a crop in the North Caucasus and the
$outhBrn Ukraine.
A considerable part of the winter grain acreage in theBe areas
must be re-eeeded, and output on the r
to be adversely affected. A continuattori oithiunfavorable spring
weather could seriouslydelay planting .a'4posstbly could even result
acreage
in an acreage reduction from the 1959 level
be affect
a
a
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Factors of geography and climate will always make
agricultural production in the Soviet Union much more risky and
uncertain than either in the U. S. or Western Europe.
MISCELLANEOUS WEAKNESSES.
1. No convertible currency. This restricts their trade
dealings to barter type of operations. (But speed in affecting
barter deals with underdeveloped nations, as contrasted with our
redtape type deals, has created impact, though at times some of
the goods delivered In barter have proved second rat..)
2. Limited currency of Russian as a language of general
communication as contrasted to English; the great lingua franca of
the world.
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'
Shortage of ade
f world (The te
with the b??ko "Ugly .Arne rtcai
gn. languag. s.
the exception
lack
eIy trained operatives for
Kaznacheyev
ony of as asconth
This lowl
Pauc,ty cif production
of music. Lack in 1tta
sculpture. The
robably not
any Soviet e.pet do not
ted
;Pe
L the d of the aztl with
ture and poetry,
r ballet La great but it is stUlold fashioned and
good as the ttme oth?
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411/
?
their leisure.
Existenceof boredom and inadequate meansluting
correspondent; write forTimes"
chester
Washington Po ?t April 21:
"I hope it all comes true. I hope there is
benevolent Russia, a mighty force for good in the
old complexes
rdian"..
evolving a newly
world, freed of
'tions. I hope the pundi
with all my heart I wish the Ru elans well.
have my doubts4 I felt all to
"But to be
yo?
strongly the batof uncertaintythat hangs abovethe Rust scene,
the sense of hidden movements d unsus
queerness of it a
and ignorant, bewildered,
the Log and
ignorant, stranger,
-convinced,. irrevocably alieni re in-.
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,
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11 111
that no count
over survived long as
CO
Russia is
skills; massive salen
of backwardness; ho
Ruaain Is
ut a de
atheistic country and history has shown
gious purpose has
dictions; great technical
chlevementa combined
oad shortages,. transportation
problems except air transport.
711
and Lentngrad and yet thousands of small villa
change over th
Ltles like Moscow
s which showittUe
dea e; great in industry backward in
agric re; outatandirAg in music. etixile. in the other s; Russia
is great in m
th
gs and ebrivOled, tn many 0
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In the contest for survival which is Joined between the
Free Vsiorld and the world of International Communism ? the U.S.
and the Soviet Union -- we must prepare to meet their elements
of strength with equal or superior strength on our part -- and
at the same time understand and know how to exploit peacefully
but effectively the very great vulnerabilities of the Soviet Bloc.
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