ADDRESS BY ALLEN W. DULLES DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TO THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE 4 MAY 1960 AREAS OF VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET BLOC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502620012-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 4, 1960
• Content Type: MISC

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'
ADDRESS
BY
ALLEN W. DULLES
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TO
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
4 MAY 1960
AREAS OF VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET BLOC
Any report dealing solely with thecSoviet)bloc weaknesses
is one-sided and therefore must be taken with reserve.
True picture of the country's strength is a net balance
between assets and liabilities.
If today I speak of Soviet liabilities, we must not forget
that the Soviet is a very powerful nation, second greatest
military and industrial power in the world, striving over the
next decades to reach the first place, and'possibly now first
in certain areas of military power.
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SUNL
11\
?
Yet the Soviet Uhion like any other country has weaknesses.
Some of them are inherent and cannot be corrected. Some of
them are short-term difficulties which are likely to be overcome.
Others are important only because they relate directly to the
S
riro-a-l-ry between the Soviet Union and the United States.
In this review I shall ;not.attempt to distinguish among
these types.
L L L
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? 77 '7
3.
I shall rather deal with weaknesses which arise from
(a) geography; (b) the political and social system of the Soviet
Union; (c) the international position of the Soviet Union;
(d) the industrial, agricultural, and general economic situation
in the Soviet Union; (e) its military situation; and (f) its ideology.
Finally, I shall mention a few other weaknesses that fall in no
particular category.
(A) Geographical
When it comes to defense, or for selected offense
against neighboring European or Asiatic targets the Soviet Union
is in a position of great strength. Furthermore, its great land
mass permits wide dispersion of vulnerable assets and secrecy
and security for those assets and for its striking force.
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? 111
On the other hand, dealing with targets more
distant from the USSR, such as the United States, Africa, and
Latin America, the Soviet is at a certain disadvantage, though
modern technology, missile and air transport somewhat
mitigate this.
The Soviet has no military bases outside the Bloc.
et.e 1-0-44-C?Li
It does not even have thoroughly dependable centers of political
strength, in which it can find a secure base for extending its
tMltrtiV4 ?k4IL ?
4.
Our alliances and treaty relationships ,should give
us such bases of action nearer to the USSR.
Also, for the time being at least, thegreat)superiority
in commercial shipping of the United States and its friends gives
Clitat,t1444,7t, 11,4inAt4
us advantages in overseas trade; but air transport,is cutting
down this advantage.'
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SECRET ?
(B) Social and Political
(1) Their internal political system.
Past history has taught us that dictatorships
do not last indefinitely. Eventually they almost always
degenerate, sometimes falling to a revolt of the people
against them. Or they mellow and reform, and lose
some of their initial aggressiveness-.
It is true that modern weapons make the French
Revolution type of popular upheaval somewhat outmoded.
e--
Tlwr
15ictatorships have endured for ataa.g time if supported
by the army. But there is in the long run likely to be a
limitation on the willingness of troops to permit
themselves to be used against the people.
5.
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6.
We may well be in the evolutionary stage of the
Soviet dictatorship. This may give it a new kind of
strength over the long run, but it might lead to a loss
of dynamic aggressiveness.
Today the Soviet system is becoming more
vulnerable to popular pressures and the expectation
of'better things to come', which the Soviet people begin
to feel they might have had earlier.
Even Khrushchev cannot totally disregard
popular feelings and pressure of the evolution brought
with education and4with more and more foreign
contacts
HUE
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7.
(2) W_e_xclay_asJs....trabet-irer the/form of government 01?.
ttcomSaub?ktot?ii.? an inherent weakness.
The locus of power is of course in the Presidium,
and iri)the Party Secretariat.
In recent conversations some Soviet spokesmen
have suggested that ultimate power really lay in the
Central Committee rather than in the Presidium. They
point to July 1957, when Khrushchev, though his opponents
had a majority of 7 to 4 in the Presidium, purged Molotov,
Malenkov, Kagonovich, etc., after a successful appeal to
the Central Committee.
Le-CuL1/4?.
At the moment both the Presidium and the Central
Committee are well packed with Khrushchev supporters.
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SECRE ?
But packed organizations sometimes change.
If Khrushchev should have a serious defeat in his foreign
policy, in industry, or in agriculture, there might be
trouble.
However, there is no clearly defined or-
institutionalized way of dealing with basic disagreements
between the dictator and any disagreeing associates.
As long as the dictator can get away with it,
the dissenters conform or disappear.
This may not be a weakness as long as it
works -- but come the day the dictator does not get
away with it, there is trouble and no clear way of
settling it peacefully.
3E4 FLY
t
8.
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SEAEI
9.
(3) The problem of dealing with the succession --
while technically in the hands of the presidium and
Central Committee -- is, a major inherent weakness.
,t?
Will Khrushchev's successor be determined, as
after Stalin, by a period of so-called collective leadership)
and the emergence of the dictator? Will the Army come to
play a role?
These are two question marks. Tradition is too
short for established procedure.
However, Communist Party and its organs have
strict discipline. Its relative restricted numbers -- some
eight million out of over 140 million potential voters on
a basis comparable to U.S.A. make it well-knit. The Party
leaders realize importance of cohesive action to protect
their control.
,
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? SEUtit
10.
One cannot reasonably predict that the Party will
fall to pieces, organizationally or otherwise, if Khrushchev
disappears.
(4) But what would happen if Khrushchev decided that
the soft line was counterproductive; tried to reverse the
present trend and returned to Stalinist type dictatorship?
Hard-boiled leaders in the Satellites --Ulbricht,
and Novotny, for example, would like this as they find the
co-existence line dangerous for their own positions. The
same is true of Mao and company in China. They have no
use for the co-existence line.
The decision to return would face Khrushchev with
serious dilemma and no evidence at the moment that he
has any intention of doing it. It would probably not, however,
result in a blowup in the USSR if done gradually. It would
110C1=ILI
weaken Khrushchev's international position.
of\s.
U
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? 111 11.
(5) The dilemma of education. To compete with the
U.S.A. and the Free World,?the'y have stressed the development
of their technology, industry and the sciences. This has led
to a broad educational program throughout the Soviet Union.
While the emphasis has been in science and technology
rather than on the liberal arts, and hence less dangerous from
the ideological viewpoint, nevertheless education makes men
and women think and makes them seek for more, even in
broader fields than their particular areas of specialization.
It makes them more interested in developments in the outside
world. Over the years the Soviet has taught their people so
much nonsense about the outside world that the coming of the
truth to them may be a shock, and Khrushchev probably realizes
this.
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IP 12.
Many years ago during the war when Wendell
Wilkie visited Russia, he suggested that Stalin by educating
his people, might be educating himself out of a job. Stalin
laughed. Khrushchev may be pondering.
(6) With the loss of the old revolutionary dialecticians
of Communist theory, the question arises whether some of
the vim and vigor may be lost to the Communist movement.
Ideological revolutions, such as Communism purports to be,
tend to lose their vigorous drive after they reach their initial
objectives, and adherents become more interested in vested
interests and in keeping (ari) acquired position -- political, social,
military, ?or material, rather than engaging in adventures.
'
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SECRET 13.
While Khrushchev makes 'a vast number of speeches,
and his regime claims credit for a high degree of doctrinal
creativeness, he is not personally distinguished as a
dialectitian. He is eminently a practical man. His most
remarkable innovations have been in the organization of
industry and agriculture. He proclaims that history will
take care of the United States. As capitalism took care of
feudalism so communism will take care of capitalism, and
our grandchildren will all live in a communist society.
To accomplish this he seems to rely not so much
on the power of ideology as on military and industrial power,
on demonstrations of the increasing strength of the Soviet
Union, and on the old weapons of subversion. These latter
in particular are being sharpened up a bit, in this
hemisphere and in the untried areas of Central Africa.
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*-6 enough,to keep alive
a dialectic Communist drive on a world-wide basis.
r -L,
it-4?41-4".
Now to turn from the domestic to the Soviet international
problems.
1. The Warsaw Pact countries.
14.
Communist control in these countries is an asset in that
it moves the real frontiers of the Soviet Union into the heart of Europe,
thus protecting the Soviet homeland. The Kremlin knows, however,
that these allies are unreliable.
They have had the setback of Hungary and another situation
of this kind would be a serious samtinrck for the USSR. Poland today is
still a powder keg.
They haven't yet won over the people in the Satellites
though they have made most progress in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.
T,?
c:').)[1. (1, 1,', r?
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15.
They are not likely to really-win them over to
full and wholehearted cooperation in any time in the
near future.
As I have said, many of the Satellite leaders
fear the co-existence policy. The refugee flood from
Eastern Germany to the West which reached 17,000 or more
during the month of April, points up their weakness in
this area.
2. Communist China.
(Expaaa.cLw..aLLy.,?t-fauen?fae.t..tlaat China still
follows the hard line -- still in the days of Stalinism. Further
USSR faced with the choice of helping China become strong,
and this they fear, or of dragging their feet as regards military,
nuclear and industrial aid, and thus incurring the displeasure
of the Chinese.
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? 4 t7,, 0-11 ? 16.
The USSR must inherently fearsa greatly strengthened
state on the Mainland of China. Mao is irritated at his exclusion
from Summit Meetings and is muddying the Soviet copybook of
co-existence by his actions in Tibet, on the Indian frontier, (and)
in Indonesia and elsewhere.
And Mao by his program of creating communes has irritated
the Soviet leaders, who propose to sell both domestically and abroad
a much more restrained pattern of the ideal Communist state.
Mao has set himself up as a fountainhead of real
Communist ideology. 1,Chrushchev doesn't like it. In the last
week or two the doctrinal controversy between Moscow and Peiping,
as evidenced by Chinese writings and Soviet speeches, reached an
unprecedented height. I believe there is some basic trouble here,
though we must be careful not to overestimate its implications
for the near future.
L
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SECRET 411/
3. Yugoslavia.
17.
One of the most irritating areas to the Communist
rulers is' the demonstration that a countryikunder Communist
leadership can follow an independent line and still survive.
Yugoslavia is creating a dangerous heresy. It is more dangerous
to Moscow than is a state that has always been an outright enemy
of the USSR.
4. By and large, Soviet policy over the last ten years has
won few new allies. This is in contrast to the previous decade.
, It may represent a slowing down, and any slow down may be
dangerous to a revolutionary state.
On balance, the only new territory gained by
Communism since the takeover of Mainland China, has been
North Vietnam. As against that, eastern Austria has become
a part of the Free World.
r.f.
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18.
The latter has had bad effects .0n the satellite areas as
evidenced by the Hungarian revolt; in part due to its contiguity with
free East Austria.
In general, territorially the Soviet Bloc is no stronger
Cii-Cteace Cl 444AAr1e
than it was te/r-rea.r-s agot
-
The open threat in Greece and Azerbaijan and Korea was
thwarted; the Berlin Blockade was ended: The Communist threat in
Italy though Still great, is far less dramatic than it was twelve years
ago.
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19.
Obviously still many weak points but no immediate threat
of territorial takeover, In the foreign policy area, Khrushchev's
Visit to India and Southeast Asia was basically a failure, indicating
some recession of Soviet/ influence in these areas.
The Uuture will tell how the Communist subversive
program, spearheaded by the Soviets, of which we see evidences
in Cuba and other parts of Latin An rica, and in Central Africa,
particularly in Guinea, Ethiopia and elsewhere; will work out.
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110 S r ,
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20.
5. MILITARY WEAKNESSES.
I have suggested at the outset that the Soviet geographic
position, strong though it be for resisting attack for aggression
against periphery states, and long-range missile attack, still has
inherent in it a measure of weakness as regards launching limited
attack against distant targets overseas.
"Volunteers" were
easily useable in Korea, 'Northern Vietnam)and even if the
necessity arose, in Greece, Iran and Turkey.
Despite the debate about our readiness for so-called
eltatecAr
vit ?AAA,.
"limited wars" it is unlikely that today the Sovietic-oTila,To?hat
we did in countries as &Stark as Lebanon, Korea, or Taiwan.
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21.
Hence, in many parts of the world, the Soviet has to
choose between open war on the one handy or political subversion
on the other, as an instrumentsfor changing controls in foreign
countries.
For example, When the revolt took place in Iraq and the
Soviet initially responded with economic and military aid, many
expected to see the Soviet follow-up with certain aggressive
military moves in support of a takeover.
trL, LtCf.AAj I
The facts of the matter are that they have been extremely
reserved and cautious in this area so near to their frontiers, but
not contiguous, limiting themselves to economic and the military
aid on a somewhat restricted and ineffective scale.
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22.
6. SOVIET ECONOMY AND INDUSTRY.
We see no immediately critical problemi4 in the Soviet
economy or industrial field. 141-gesTex-al-rttrt-re-is--no iwnaecliat-e-
-antil-s;exio_us
But like all of U.S they have certain problems. At the
moment due to the war losses and the great inefficiency of their
use of agricultural manpower, there is a shortage of manpower
for industry.
Today they have on their farms about six times as many
workers as we dd. Despite its far smaller agricultural labor force,
the United States produces about one third more food than does the
Soviet Union.
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23.
The manpower shortage is probably one of the reasons
for their cutback in their military forces and for the fact that
a large proportion of students reaching the age of 15 are now being
sent to the assembly lines and will continue their education on a
part-time basis in the evening.
The availability of essential raw materials will probably
not impede the successful execution of the Soviet Seven-Year Plan,
1959 - 1965. There are, however, some raw-materials problems.
To support the planned expansion of the steel and aluminum
industries for example, the USSR must exploit leaner and more
costly ores. In the case of the steel industry, it must process
very expensive coal for the necessary metallurgical coke.
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24.
Their cost of securing essential supplies of nickel and cobalt
from indigenous sources would be considered prohibitive in the West.
These costs, however, are offset by reduction in energy costs from
theqapid expansion of oil and gas, improved efficiency in electric
power production, and improved technology in the processing of
ores to metals.
Only in the case of natural rubber and possibly copper is
the USSR likely to be dependent on non-Bloc sources for the supply
of an essential industrial raw material.
In this connection it is well to note that today they are using
their raw materials sparingly insofar as consumer production and
consumer goods are concerned and diverting them very largely to
the national power segment of their economy. For example, they
use a very modest amount of gasoline for the small number of
passenger automobiles they produce.
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P
The task of extracting riches from the frozen Tundra?af.
the Far North is not appealing. 4,AA,4*--
25.
It-is-trae-bhiat the Soviets are now paying serious attention
to housing for the first time in their history. But the Soviets
much-publicized civilian construction plans will not be completed
until well after 1965. Even then the available living space, on a
per capita basis, will still be only a small fraction of that now
being enjoyed in the U. S., and for that matter, in Western Europe.
Furthermore, the quality of construction is inadequate by our
standards and even in the newest apartment houses, the chances are
that the plumbing will not work.
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26.
7.
7. INDUSTRY
In industry, problems remain but they are centered
around the need to increase efficiency and productivity rather
than output alone. Khrushchev is still tinkering with his economic
reorganization which went into effect in 1957, substituting a form
of territorial control for vertical ministerial control of industry
from the center in Moscow. The lack of a competitive market has
resulted in lags in the introduction of new technology, in the
continued use of high cost production facilities in many industries,
and in a price structure for producerst goods which is virtually
meaningless.
I;
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27.
Khrushchev is aware of the need for reform. He has
recently declared that plant managers in the Soviet Union will
no longer receive substantial bonuses merely for the completion
of the physical output called for in the various annual plans.
Now these managers must show substantial improvement in the
cost of production if they are to be rewarded by incentive
bonuses.
We can expect to read about a good deal of new experiments
in organization and management over the next few years as the
Kremlin leaders grope for solutions to these problems.
rfr I
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28.
8. AGRICULTURE
Agriculture In. s been a perennial problem in the Soviet Union.
The resistance of the peasants to collectivization and the resultant
liquidation of millions of peoples by Stalin is well known. While
the Soviet concentrated on the development of industry in the
years following WW II, agriculture was neglected; the inevitable
result was that in the early 1950s that country ceased to be self-
sufficient in food supply for the first time in history.
Khrushchev met this challenge by expansion of crop acreage
into the so-called new lands area of Siberia and Kazakhstan. The
growing of grain on the new lands is subject to great 'uncertainty.
Frequently there is insufficient moisture, to yield a satisfactory
harvest, as happened in 1959.
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29.
The other major agricultural program was the introduction of
corn. But remember that 80% of the Soviet Union lies north of the
50th parallel or Winnipeg, Manitoba. This means that much of the
corn does not mature and must be cut in the green stage.
There is no counterpart in the Soviet Union to our own
highly productive corn belt. The uncertainty of agricultural
production eyen in the traditional growing areas of European USSR
is showing up again this year. Winterkill and dust storms have
caused severe damage to a crop in the North Caucasus and the
Southern Ukraine.
A considerable part of the winter grain acreage in these areas
must be re-seeded, and output ai the remaining acreage is likely
to be adversely affected. A continuation of this unfavorable spring
weather could seriously delay planting and possibly could even result
in an acreage reduction from the 1959 level in the affected areas.
F..111p",r
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30.
Factors of geography and climate will always make
agricultural production in the Soviet Union much more risky and
uncertain than either in the U. S. or Western Europe.
MISCELLANEOUS WEAKNESSES.
1. No convertible currency. This restricts their trade
dealings to barter type of operations. (But speed in affecting
barter deals with underdeveloped nations, as contrasted with our
redtape type deals, has created impact, though at times some of
the goods delivered in barter have proved second rate.)
2. Limited currency of Russian as a language of general
communication as contrasted to English; the great lingua franca of
the world.
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31.
3. Shortage of adequately trained operatives for
Kaznacheyev
many parts of world - (The testimony of l'ailiOaCas contrasted
with the book, "Ugly American".) Many Soviet experts do not
know foreign languages.
4. Soviet rulers lack of trust in their people.
This slowly changing but still exists.
5. Paucity of production in the field:of the a.rtolwith
the exception of music. Lack in literature and poetry, painting,
sculpture. Their ballet is great but/ it is still old fashioned and
probably not as good as in the time of the old regime.
;rf
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32.
6. Existence of boredom and inadequate means of using
their leisure.
See article by James Morris, distinguished British
correspondent; writer for "Times" and "Manchester Guardian".
Washington Post - April 27:
",1.-luape-it.ealle-S-A3tre. I hope there is evolving a newly
benevolent Russia, a mighty force for good in the world, freed of
its old complexes and inhibitions. I hope the pundits are right, and
with all my heart I wish the Russians well.
"But to be honest with you, I have my doubts. I felt all too
strongly the haze of uncertainty that hangs above the Russian scene,
the sense of hidden movements and unsuspected motives, the fog and
queerness of it all. I went to Russia an ignorant, ill-read stranger,
and ignorant, bewildered, half-convinced, irrevocably alien I remain."
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33.
7. Russia is an atheistic country and history has shown
that no country without a deep moral and religious purpose has
ever survived long as great.
CONCLUSION
Russia is a count,ty of great contradictions; great technical
skills; massive scientific achievements combined with great areas
of backwardness; housing shortages and road shortages, transportation
problems except for air transport, With great cities like Moscow
and Leningrad and yet thousands of small villages which show little
change over the past decade; great in industry, backward in
agriculture; outstanding in music, sterile in the other arts; Russia
is great in many things and shriveled in(many")others.
'
4Ei
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502620012-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502620012-1
IFV*0, '04 SEP.ET ?
34.
In the contest for survival which is joined between the
Free World and the world of International Communism -- the U. S.
and the Soviet Union -- we must prepare to meet their elements
of strength with equal or superior strength on-our part -- and
at the same time understand and know how to exploit peacefully
but effectively the very great vulnerabilities of the Soviet Bloc.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/21 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502620012-1