OUTLINE OF REMARKS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE QUANTICO JUNE 20, 1958

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502520009-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 20, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 CIA-RDP80M01009A001502520009-6
OUTLINE OF REMARKS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
QUANTICO
June 20, 1958
I. Introduction
1. For purposes of this conference, most useful thing I can
a. What kind of a world military situation the USSR
is trying to create.
b. In what ways they intend to exploit this military
s ituat ion.
c. What dangers and problems will be created for us.
II. The World Military Situation They Are Trying to Create
2. What they are trying to do is to create a deterrent which
will be as effective as the one we have possessed*
a. They have had for some time capability to damage the
US with nuclear weapons.
b. But US superiority was so great and their own
capability to inflict critical damage on the US so dubious
that they were effectively restrained.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502520009-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502520009-6
co Their aim now is to develop enough capacity in long-range
aircraft or ICBM's to inhibit the US from using or threatening
to use its own capability.
3. The Soviet leaders probably now believe that their goal
is in sight.
a. They possess adequate nuclear weapons capability.
b. Between now and mid-1960 they will have an initial
ICBM capability, 100 to 200 heavy bombers, and a large number.
of medium bombers.
co Between 1960-63 they will be shifting over to greater'
reliance on missiles.
d. By mid-1963 they will probably be placing major reliance
upon ICBM's for delivering nuclear weapons, but will probably
also possess about 200 to 300 heavy bombers.
L. Meanwhile, they will probably develop submarine based
missiles and short and mediums-range missiles, and they will retain a
substantial ground and air capability of more conventional types.
III. Under the Cover of a Condition of Mutual Deterrence, the
wage a prolonged and intensive
5. They will probably avoid courses of action which would clearly
lead to serious risk of general war. But -- since they think we will
ET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502520009-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 CIA-RDP80M01009A001502520009-6
? O[Wit 0
be inhibited from using our own power -- they probably believe they
can pursue somewhat bolder policies than in the past without a
corresponding increase in risk.
6. One major facet of this cold war will be effort to gain
influence in underdeveloped areas.
a. Economic aid program, in support of neutralists and
even in some countries allied with us, i.e., Turkey.
b. Soviets avoiding openly trying to recruit neutralists
into their camp.
7. Underdeveloped areas -- Southeast and South Asia, Middle East,
Africa, Latin America -- are politically unstable and economically weak.
Good area for Soviet meddling. All undergoing social and economic
revolutions.
8. Neutralism in Asia and Africa is a course which has great
appeal. People here not concerned with Commmunism, but think largely
in terms of a US-Soviet power struggle. Neutralism regarded as safe
and profitable.
9. Soviets taking advantage of this and are penetrating
neutralist states. Coming struggle in many will be between neutralism
and pro-Communism. Cases of Syria and Indonesia. Pro-Western forces
in Asia and Africa under attack from neutralists and communists. Cases
of Lebanon, Tunisia, Laos.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502520009-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01: CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502520009-6
?
10. Soviets also carrying on campaign to weaken US alliances --
through alternate use of carrot and stick.
a. They are sometimes bellicose and talk of the dangers
of nuclear destruction to some of our allies. This has some
success, especially with those who are small and weak. There
is some real fear in some of these allied countries that the US
would not come to their aid, because the US fears its own
destruction, and that -- even if the US did come to their aid
it would not be worth it. Thus, a form of neutralism --
pacifism is developing as a way out.
b. Soviets are also offering the carrot. Their propaganda
for a summit conference, for nuclear-free zones, bans on nuclear
weapons and foreign bases, etc., are designed to show.our friends
and allies that there is a way out through negotiation. They
hope our allies will weaken..their ties with the US and reduce
their awn military establishments.-.This line of effort by
Soviets also has its appeal, though at the moment this appeal has
been somewhat weakened by the Soviet performance regarding Nagy
and-the Moscow ambassadorial talks.
c. These efforts against our allies are having an effect.
They have and they will slow down our efforts to establish overseas
missile bases, and create increasing difficulties for us in
retaining overseas bases on terms assuring their availability and
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502520009-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502520009-6
S EC 11)'c -
f e v
effectiveness in case of need. Especially in Asia and the
Middle East trends toward neutralism among our friends and allies
will be troublesome.
IV. Probil.ems and Dangers Created
U. As a result of Soviet cold war activities, there will be
constant movement and jockeying for position as countries or areas
move in or out of neutralism or in or out of Soviet or US influence.
This will create very difficult problems in calculating the risks
involved in actions -- or inactions. It is not easy for us to decide
whether we would be better off or worse off by intervening in Lebanon.
It is not easy for us to decide whether we should extend large-scale
economic aid to Indonesia. But it is not easy for the Soviets or the
Chinese Communists to decide to what to do about Taiwan, massive
economic aid to India, or the sealing off of Berlin.
12. There will be from time to time numerous points at which
we will resist by one means or another Soviet and Chinese Communist
efforts to gain influence or control, and points at which they will
resist our efforts. Periods of tension will arise.
13. These periods of tension will contain the danger of local.
war, and even of general war. Local wars are not necessarily kept
limited because it is sensible not to allow them to expand. You
gentlemen are aware of the rapidity with which events occur, the
pressures upon chiefs of government and commanders to look to the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502520009-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502520009-6
V nnufc1 f
security of their countries and of their military forces. You are aware
of the importance of time and of surprise attacks. Actions taken under
pressure or as a protection against contengencies could confuse and
distort the intentions of the governments involved.
V. Conclusion
14. The years ahead are not going to be pleasant and easy. There
will be nervousness on both sides. We may suffer some losses, and the
.Communists may make some gains. The Sino-Soviet bloc will be an
increasingly formidable opponent, but its leaders also must cope with
problems.
15. There has been a significant change in the USSR and in
relations between the USSR and the other bloc countries toward somewhat
more liberalism. These changes can not be easily undone. With
fits and starts, more changes will probably occur. The USSR and the
Soviet bloc now seem politically strong, but major changes in the
Soviet leadership and in the satellites could again disrupt what may
be a strong but nevertheless remains a somewhat fragile political
system.
16. We cannot count upon an evolution in the Soviet system to
ease our problem. We must use our own political, economic, and
military resources to the best advantage in the prolonged and
intensive cold war which lies ahead.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01502520009-6