INTRODUCTION 1. I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE WORLD SITUATION WITH YOU THIS MORNING.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502470006-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 20, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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Introduction
1. I would like to discuss the world situation with you this morning.
One of my mayor responsibilities to the President and the National Security
Council is to keep them informed of current developments affecting US policies
and the US world position. It is equally important that the leaders and policy-
makers appreciate the meaning of these current developments and that they be
made aware of the less dramatic developments which nevertheless add up to be
significant trends.
2.
For example, while we may be -- and I must say we often are --
devoting much time and attention to pressing problems in the Middle East or
in the Gaza strip, other things not so easily apparent are happening elsewhere.
. Unannounced to the world, the Russians are developing new weapons and possibly
whole new weapons systems; the African peoples are rapidly emerging from
backwardness and demanding a greater role in governing themselves and planning
their own dest~:r~y. Such developments as these could have as great an impact
upon our lives as the question of administration of the Gaza strip.
3. It is the practice of the intelligence organizations to produce
periodically an~~~ Estimate of the World Situation. It is the responsibility of ,
CIA to prepare this estimate in consultation with the other intelligence agencies.
It is my responsibility to submit this estimate to the National Security Council.
But my work does not stop there. I brief the Council regularly on ourrent
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developments and, whenever necessary and appropriat?, I inform the council of
the way in which these developments affect the world situation generally.
4?
I should like to make one point very clearly. gn intelligence
estimate of the world situation is quite a different thing from a commanders
estimate of the situation. We do not "war-game" world politics. We do not
recommend courses of action to deal with situations in the world, nor do we
try to assess how our policy or our strength measure up to that of the USSR.
5. On the other hand, we cannot ignore our policy or our strength.
For example, we must estimate how likely it is that the USSR might go to war
in a given situation. Naturally how the Kremlin estimates our strength is a
factor in their decision and therefore in our estimate. But we do not try to
estimate how such a test of military strength would come out.
6. Let us eay~ then, that an estimate of the world situation is an
analysis of the mayor trends developing in the world. It is an analysis of
how these trends affect each other. We try to project these trends into the
future as far as our information and our 3udgment will permit. We hope, that
by so doing, we will give to the policy-maker an understanding of the things
with which he is confronted and will be confronted in the months and years
ahead.
The Big_Picture
7. With these thoughts in mind, let us turn to the world situation as
we see it. The first general observation I should like to make is that there
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are great changes going on in the world. This last year has witnessed more
significant changes than I can recall for some years past. There was great
instability and ~eertainty in the world at the close of the Second World
War and that instability persisted for several years. But about 1948 a kind
of unhappy stabilization developed in the world; the world clearly dt~vided into
two eamps~ and a cold war, punctuated by a series of hot wars in various plsaes~
took over. This was not a stable situation in any real sense, but at least
the main parties to the cold war were clearly identifiable. There were the
USSR, Communist China, and the Satellites on one side, and the US and its
NATO allies on the other. Most of the rest of the world was either friendly
to the US and its NATO allies, or under occupational or colonial control.
8. There were many changes brewing and festering during the years since
191.8. Some of these changes we saw; some of the ferment we lo~ew about and
recognized; some we did not fully apprecis.te. But in recent years and partic-
ularly in 1956 it has become apparent that some major changes had in fact
occurred or were occurring. What are these chanties? They could be described
or enumerated in any number of ways. I should like to describe them as follows:
First: The deterrents to general war have increased, but the
opportunities for war through miscalculation have also increased.
Seconds There has been a major upheaval in the Communist world.
Third: The Western alliance has been weakened.
Fourth: The underdeveloped and uncommitted countries have gained
a new leverage, a new bargaining power.
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~~~~~ ~
,~
Fifths Nationalism, particularly among hitherto submerged peoples,
is operating in unusual strength.
Dancer of War and Deterrents to War
9. I should like to discuss these points in order, and first will take
up the question of deterrents to general war and the danger of general war.
We do not have any precise knowledge of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile,
but we do know something of the quantity of nuclear materials mailable. It
is formidable. We also lrnow that the USSR is improving its capability for
delivering nuclear weapons. We judge from things they are doing and saying
that they take our capabilities very seriously indeed. his, we believe that
even if they should increase their own capabilities, the Soviet leaders would
regard a war with the United States as a very ris~- venture at best. There-
for, we believe that they will r~a.~=~~.for some years to aome -- deliberately
initiate a war a~inst the US, nor do we believe trey will ~sc'ovs~ and
deliberately undertake the kind of risky course of action which they thought
might lead us to call a halt, by force if necessary.
10. This does not mean we believe a general war is out of the question.
W? believe that the Soviet leaders would go to war if they thhught the sur-
vival of their system was threatened by an outside power. They have always
been suspicious of our intentions and they probably always will be. This
could lead to trouble. If, for example, there were an uprising in Poland or
East Germany involving Polish or East German forces, such an uprising might
not be very easy for the Russians to suppress. Even if the Western powers
d.id not make any moves to intervene, the Western powers would probably take
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some steps to protect or alert their forces, purely as a precaution. The
Kremlin might misinterpret these as anina~~~n to intervene. It might
become ext~mely sensitive and take some action from which it could not
retreat. tjn balance, we thigk this is unlikely because all the ma3or powers
will almost certainly make great efforts to prevent a general war from
developing.
11. Likewise in the Middle East, the Kremlin is committed to support
of the Egyptians and it probably would engage in considerable risk to try
to keep Nasser from going down. We do not believe, however, that the USSR
would really risk a big war over its commitments or interests in the Middle
East.
12. It is obvious from these examples that there is a continuing
danger of a general war arising out of local conflicts, nationalist uprisings,
or civil wars in which the great powers are involved. The instability
existing in the world has increased the number of opportunities for this
to occur. But as I noted earlier, the deterrents are likewise increasing,
and this has the eff~et of forcing the great powers to proceed with great
deliberation.
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13. The Communist IIpheaval. This situation of deterrents and dangers
puts all the leaders of the major world powers under great strain. This
includes the Soviet leaders. They are--their moat be--worried over US eapa_
~ilities, and achievements. They seem obsessed with the idea of catching up
with, and overtaking, the US in industrial production and military strength.
They r~}i~ear determined to increase their military capabilities, to build up
the USSR as a base, and to seize every opportunity to expand their influence.
14. But the Soviet leaders also have some troubles. The death of
Stalin was probably a relief to some of the Soviet leaders; it relieved them
of some of their fears fdrtheir own personal safety. But they also recognized
that Stalin~s kind of tyranny had killed--besides people--a lot of popular
initiative and hope. There was widespread apathy in the IISSR and there was
antagonism in the Satellites. So they tried to relax tensions at home and in
the world. At home they did this by relaxing police controls and permitting
some limited freedom of expression in intellectual circles. Finally, they
andertook to exppe~e~, the tyranny and abuses of Stalin himself. They evidently
sought, by so doing, to stimulate faith in themselves, to win friends--or at
least reduce antagonism--abroad and in the Satellites, and to inspire some
hope in the Russian people that a better day was at hand. They probably
thought they could control this new freedom and keep it from getting out of hand.
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15. However, they unleashed forces with which they will have to
deal for some time to come. To some extent they undermined their own authority.
They have felt called upon to answer criticisms. They have encountered dis-
content in student and intellectual circles.
16. The most obvious effects occurred outside the IISSR. Soviet control
over the Communist parties in the Satellites was weakened by Stalin~s death.
Dissension within those parties which had existed for years and had not been
eliminated by Stalin~s purges, came to the surface. The repudi~?tion of Stalin
gave added boldness to the dissenters. When the Soviet leaders tried to make
a concessions to national sentiment by announcing a doctrine of "different
roads to socialism", open opposition in Poland and Hungary followed.
17. Outside the Soviet Bloc, the Communist parties were also weakened.
This has become especially obvious in Great Britain and Italy. The Communists
have lost some ground in France and elsewhere. Most of the Communist party
leaders outside the Soviet Bloc continue to reaffirm their loyalty to Moscow,
but down in the ranks there is much confusion, lack of enthusiasm, and
outright defection.
18. As a result of these difficulties, the Soviet leaders have retreated
from their more liberal posture of a year ago. They are clamping down in
the Satellites and trying to put the squeeze on Gomulka. They are in affect
carrying out a military occupation of Hungary. In the process they have lost
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Tito again. A year ago Soviet-Yugoslav relations became noticeably friendly,
but they deteriorated again when the trouble developed in Hungary and Poland.
The Yugoslavs and the Russians now seem to have settled back to the kind of
name-calling that went on a few years ago.
19. We do not think the Soviet leaders will try to go back to Stalinism.
They probably recognize that the popular reaction would be too great to make
it profitable. There is probably some division of opinion at the top about
how to deal with the situation. Some of these leaders probably would oppose
a return to Stalinism simply because it would require a new Stalin. After
watching the last Stalin "shorten by a head" most of his fellow conspirators,
they should probably hesitate to put
20. In the aggregat?, the Communist world has been weakened. Certainly
the Soviet military, political, and economic position in the Settellites has
deteriorated. The ideological and psychological leadership of the IISSR has
been impaired, and the Communist movement outside the II5SR has been visibly
diminished.
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Weaker Western Alliance
21. The Western alliance system, and particularly 2JtiT0, has also been
weakened in the last year or two. In 1948 the Western European powers were
anxious to join in an alliance with us because they were frightened. They
were pressed by the growing Communist movements in their own countries, and
they saw the brutal way in which complete Communist control was established
in Czechoslovakia through the combined effect of the Soviet military threat
and domestic Communist subversion. They were further frightened by the Korean
venture. By 1955 56, these fears had eased considerably. Communism at home
was no longer gaining; in some countries it was declining in strexrgth. The
Soviet leaders were trying to relax tensions; they were being personable anti
!',?iendly; they were making much of the "spirit of Geneva."
22. In these circumstances, the Peoples of Western Europe began to
think they could ease off. They could reduce their militar;~ budgets. They
could denote more resources to investment and to social programs. They could
pursue their national interests instead of subordinating them to the interests
of the Western community as a whole.
23. It was in this atmosphere that the Suez crisis came upon us.
British and French national interests were involved in the dispute with Nasser.
Moreover, Western Europe as a whole felt itself under some challenge. Western
E~,u?op? was the principal world area using the canal. In addition, Western
Europe depended heavily upon Middle East oil; many thought they could not accept
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this kind of thing lying down -- for fear it might ba the beginning of a long
series of seizures and encroachments which would eventually strangle them
economically and politically.
24. When the British and French went ahead and intervened militarily
in Egypt, some of those in Europe who sympathized with them did not approve
of their action any more than we did. The entire affair has caused strain
all aroand. Some of the people in Britain and France who were our best
frien-as are unhappy about us, just as many of us and other Europeans are
unhappy about what the British and French did. One consequence of the Suez
crisis was a British decision to reduce their troop strength in Germany, in
order to cope with some of the economic consequences of Suez affairs. This
has created considerable displeasure in Germany and elsewhere on the continent.
NATO is not in a state of ex'isis over this or any other issue before it, but
there has been a decline in vitality and some loss of mutual confidence.
25. Recent events in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe have pro-
foundly affected Western European thinking about NATO on the one hand and the
USSR on the other. A sense of relief at the Soviet attempt to relax tension
gave way to new anxiety with the Soviet application of bouts force in
Hungary. The West Europeans were worried over Bulganin~s talk about rockets
during the British and French intervention in Egypt; they are still worried
about the Soviet drive for influence in the Middle East.
26. It wj_11 be some time before a clear pattern of thought and policy
appears in Western Europe. The Europeans are beset by contradictory fears
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and wishes. They want US protection and support, but are afraid of involvement
in any US-Soviet quarrels. They would like to have their own atomic bomb, in
order to give them a greater influence in world affairs, but they are afraid
that bit having the bomb they will open themselves to atomic attack. They would
,, a ,
like to cooperaterwith each other, but they are un~-fig to make national
sacrifices. They would like to strengthen Western Europe in order to counter-
balance US and Soviet power, but they are afraid of "going it alone." They
are still afraid of the USSR, but they look at Soviet difficulties in Eastern
Europe with some hope; they have developed a new interest in the possibility
that somehow the Soviet leaders might become persuaded to negotiate a gradual
withdrawal. Thus, Soviet leaders would first have to give some persuasive
indication that they were prepared to withdraw. These indications do not
now exist, and we have no reason to believe that they will be given at any
early date. Over the short term at least, we expect that the European m?~
bers of NATO will continue to support it. They will press for greater
coordination of policy among the NATO powers. They will press for a reexamina-
tion of NATO military concepts and for a study of the problems presented by
the growing Soviet nuclear capability, It appears unlikely, however, that
the European NATO members will extend the degree of support they have in the
past. We think there will be a continuing tendency to slacken the effort and
to look toward their own national and economic problems.
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Underdeveloped Areas
28. One of the reasons for Western Europe's concern and uncdrtainty is
that it has suffered a relative decline in world power position. Europe has
been prosperous during the past several years, but its continued prosperity is
dependent upon resources and markets over which it no longer has control. The
underdeveloped peoples have begun to play a bigger role in world affairs and
those which are independent states have begun more aggressively to exercise
their sovereign rights to dispose of their own resources.
2g. There are several reasons for this. One is that the big powers--
the US and the USSR alike -- are solicitous of them, although for quite
different reasons. The USSR has entered the arena; it is trying to gain
influence in the underdeveloped and uncommitted countries by extending them
diplomatic tnd economic aid. You may recall that Lenin said he would attack
capitalism in Asia and Africa and deprive the "imperialists" of the markets
and resources upon which their capitolism depended.
30. Many of these underdeveloped peoples are extremely vulnerable to
this kind of Soviet exploitation. Nearly a).1 of them are extrem?ly anxious
to develop their economies. They are experiencing explosive population growth.
In some cases they cannot maj.ntain even the present law living standard without
outside help. Few of them can accumulate the capital necessary to carry out
their own development. Many are prepared to accept economic aid from any
quarter.
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31. Soros of these underdeveloped peoples are engaged in disputes with
their present or former colonial masters. Sometimes these disputes are based
more upon a desire to humble their former masters than upon real issues. But
this too provides an opportunity for Soviet maneuvers.
32. The Middle East, of course, is the area where these problems have
been most forcefully brought into focus. Those of you who are familiar with
diplomatic telegrams must at sometime or other have read a telegram reporting
a difficult situation which concluded with the words, "The situation is seri-
ous, but not hopeless." A few years ago there was a tempest in a teapot in
the Middle East which was reported in lurid detail, and the 3oker who wrote
that telegram them summed it up with these words, "The situation is hopeless,
but not serious." No telegrams like that are coming from our Middle Eastern
posts today.
33. The most important developments in the Middle East in the past few
pears have been the rise of Nasser as a symbol of nationalism, and the Soviet
exploitation of this nationalism. Today, Nasser may have more prestige out-
side his own country than he has in it. Even school boys in Morocco can be
found carrying a picture of Nasser in their wallets. Nasser is important to
the other Arabs because of the force of his example. He has won against the
British and the Israelis, or at least he is thought to have won. He is cer-
tainly trying to give the appearance that he has won. There are still many
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moderate nationalists in the Arab states, but they have felt powerless to
oppose him. A natural conspirator, Nasser has frightened the moderates and
he has quite successfully played upon personal and group rivalries to weaken
the other Arab leaders.
34. The willingness of the USSR to provide arms, economic aid and
diplomatic support has permitted these Arab rationalists to make their efforts
to eliminate special Western interests and to settle scores with Israel. The
Egyptian leaders are not Communists and apparently have no desire to be subjected
to Soviet control, but they have accepted Soviet help and have encouraged their
neighbors to do likewise.
35. I cannot here go into a detailed discussion of the Middle Eastern
problem or the question of Israel. One thing which does appear inescapable
is that this area of the world faces a period of continued uncertainty and
turbulence. ~'ven if more moderate leadership should emerge and should prove
more courageous in combatting extremist and irresponsible nationalism, the
Israeli problem is one which will trouble the area f~~r many years to come.
It will be a lone ~.~me before even the moderates could abandon a violent anti-
Israeli position and negotiate a settlement with Israel.
36. In As;.a, the situation is less gloomy. The eountrips there which
are allied with us have made modest progress in building up their military and
economic strength. While these countries will probab?y demonstrate considerable
national sensitivity in their dealings with us, we believe they will support us
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in internatio-gal policy. The British have lost some of their influence as a
result of the Suez affair, and India will. continue to exist a neutralist
influence.
37. The countries of Southeast Asia are far from a stable element in
world affairs. They all have deep-seated political and social problems. They
have large overseas Chanese populations, and loyalty of these Chinose is an
uncertain quantity. The influence of Communist China has increased in South-
east Asia. There seems to be a growing feeling that Communist China is here
to stay and that is would be wise not to defy Peiping or to rebuff its overtures.
38. Black Africa is an area which is increasingly receiving our atten-
tion. The nationalist movement there has not advanced as rapidly as elsewhere,
and thus it has not been so pressing a problem as in the Near and Far East.
Nevertheless, changes are taking place, and in some cases with amazing rapidity.
It appears likely that over the next ten years, many of the areas of Africa
that are now under colonial administration will receive some form of independ-
ence. This will occur most rapidly in the areas under British control. It
appears to us that if the colonial powers follow a liberal policy, they still
have time to exert a moderating influence. They still can insure that the new
states will be friendly to the West. They will of course have to contend with
Soviet efforts to subvert the native populations to stir up racial tensions,
and generally to promote anti-Westernism.
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39. In North Africa, the problems are most urgent. The French have
granted independence to Morocco and 41g~r#a., but their relations with these
countries are not very good. The French still must work out detailed
arrangements for evacuation of their military forces and for regularzation
of their economic relations. Much more troublesome is the irritation caused
by Algeria. So long as the Algerian problem is unresolved, relations between
France and 'I~inisia and Morocco will be under strain. The French must some-
time grant virtual independence to Algeria, but this will create serious
internal difficulties in France. We see no prospect of an early situatfz~n.
40. Despite the reticence of such powers as France to grant independ-
ence to their colonial possessions, we feel that this trend toward withdrawal
of colonial authority and privilege is one which is bound to accelerate. As
we have seen in the Middle and Far East, it is a process fraught with
danger. These underdeveloped peoples are often naive; many of them lack the
experience to manage their own affairs. Some of them lack the natural physical
and cultural unity essential to orderly existence.
L,1. But we are faced with a virtually irreversible trend. These
countries are in social revolution. They are becoming industrialized; their
peoples are becoming aware of the outside world and of new horizons in their
existence. They have aspirations and hopes which appear to us to be irrepress-
ible.
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Conclusion
1,2. I said at the beginning of my talk with you that great changes were
taxing place in the world. This trend toward independence is certainly one of
them. The upheaval in the Communist world is another. I feel that psycho-
logical factors have assumed a new importance; whether it is Hungary, Poland
Algeria, or Ghana, people want freedom from outside control. In a world where
nuclear weapons play such a big role in our thoughts, it is surprising to see
f
what people can do with moral pressure, popular indignation, stick and stones
and homemade bombs to demonstrate their urge for freedom.
43. In this world of change, the US, as a great power, can do much
to influence the direction and the dimensions of the change. What is r?-
quired first is for us to see things clearly and objectively. That is what
we as estimators are trying to do. We trust that all of us will have the
wisdom to determine and carry out the appropriate policies.
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