REASONS FOR THE IMPACT OF SOVIET ORBIT'S MILITARY, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL DRIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440014-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: January 1, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/19: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440014-0
REASONS FOR THE IMPACT OF SOVIET ORBIT'S MILITARY,
ECONOMIC, CULTURAL DRIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
SOUTH, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
Following a recent briefing of the NSC on Communist offers of aid to
the countries of the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, the question was
asked; "Why do the Communists programs appear to have such an impact in these
areas while our,, own substantially larger programs over the past five years
or more have filed to win the area over to our side?"
1
are some answers to this questions--
1. First, "colonialism". They believe that the U.S. is tied in with
the colonial powers in the West through NATO, in the East through SEATO.
They also see a concerting of action in the U.S. and U.K. in the Near East.
Hence they fall for the claim made by the Communists. that our aid programs
are a form of economic imperialism or colonialism.
2. These former colonial countries suffer from an inferiority complex
in dealing with the West. This causes them to react in the classic way of
self-assertion and opposition. Also unfortunately over many decades Westerners
have too often acted in a tactless and overbearing manner. They don't forget
the Kipling concept of "lesser breeds."
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3. The Communists are very astute in th 3r approach. They have
created the impression that they do not look upon \these people as "backward"
or "undeveloped", phrases we have too often used. The struggle between the
Soviets and U.S. and Western Europe, together with thh racial and geographic
background of the Soviets, have made it possible for tfie Soviets to get
I
themselves accepted as non-Europeans, as fellow Asians. k9 is lc BARD to
n Soviet `colonialismain the European satellites 'and ruthless oppression and .
liquidation of minorities in the USSR.h , the Soviets have been
most flexible in their negotiations. They have required no obvious quid
pro quo in terms of political alignments and MAP type agreements; they have
no Battle Act problems.
The trade factor is of great Importance. The U.S. has little
interest in acquiring the surplus products of these countries _.. cotton,
rice and rubber -- for which Egypt, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and even
Thailand require a market. The Soviet Bloc on the other hand will take
these commodities in exchange for arms and other aid. They offer low
interest rates and easy terms of payment. They accept large quantities of
local currency which will be a most convenient war chest for their subversive
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i The countries of this area believe that the West, particularly
the European countries, want to discourage their industrialization, hoping
to keep them as good customers of the West in industrial products. t
F. , These countries now see our aid tapering oft and hear our public
discussions regarding the termination of aid, discussions which are often
phrased in terms offensive to them, Also the neutralist countries see
the bulk of U.S. aid going to individuals and regimes which they do not
like, e.g., -Rhee, Chiang, Diem, Japan and Israel,
Our pattern of alliances, the Baghdad Pact and SEATO are resented
by countries not included even though their non-inclusion is^ matter of
their own choice.
When the Soviets took a definitely pry Arab and anti-Israel
stand, this gave them a new basis of appeal to the Moslem countries. our
position appears ambiguous or even hostile in the Arab world. Our support
of Pakistan alienates India and Afghanistan..
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J(gt. Perhaps more important than any of the above factors is the
attitude of these countries toward the achievement of their economic
revolution, Many of them thought that when colonial status, or protected
status, ceased, their economic advance would progress rapidly. It did
not and we have tended to remind them that progress is slow and requires
the laying of sound foundations and the undertaking of long term projects.
TILE", At4q tcrr .. o.r n,,--- Lab-, U .U~ -1--o-,
GThe countries in this area have been
profoundly impressed by
n
developments tin the Soviet Union.? Thirty years or more ago the USSR was
almost as backward industrially as they now are. In this relatively short
space of time, the Soviets have achieved a position which in the eyes
of many of these countries is that of the second military, industrial
and prestige power in the world and a leader in science and technology.
The Soviets claim this transformation is the result of the Communist
system and through subtle and persistent propaganda, the Soviets have
tended to make many people in these countries believe that such is true
and that possibly.. by cooperating with the Communist Bloc, they too can
somehow achieve a measure of growth similar to that which they see in the
Soviet Union. Communist China is following the same course as the USSR
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and many of these people believe that, within a limited space of time,
Communist China will achieve a somewhat comparable goal. This Communist
appeal plays on and feeds the desires of the undeveloped countries to
achieve a rapid advance in economic development and to abin the prestige
and position which appear to go with such development.
4. Finally, many of these countries believe that they can now
( Lam- I 3t- d.E.a , d) $1 t t
have the best of both the free and the Communist worlds, play one
_
off against the other, t~ that they are the
beneficiaries of Soviet aidwwill make the U.S. even more anxious to give
2t'-50 Ca....._ -t...d i- GA-L- ". V
them counter-balancing or even greater aid.. adopted
a neutralist role, tImW feel that they can best continue to maintain this
if they accept both U.S. and USSR aid.
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