ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNIST SUCCESSES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440008-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 26, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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MtMCMANUUM : Lir. Lhales
Attached is an amplified and revised full-
text draft for the National 'Tar College speech.
I think it is approximately right in length,
but should have at least a short section on
Sino-Soviet relations and the prospects for
Communist China. I am working on these.
W. P. Bundy
27 Jan 56
(DATE)
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1 iAt //An
SECOND DAFT 26 January 1956
DCI Lecture for
National War College
3 February 1956
Assessment of Communist Successes,
Problems and Prospects
After looking over the formidable array of previous lectures and
discussions in this course, I have interpreted my own function as one
of reflection and speculation primarily. I shall not attempt to repeat
matters you have already considered, except insofar as they contribute to
a broad assessment of where the Communist Bloc stands and where it is headed,
both in its own eyes and in our judgment.
I start with the proposition that there has been no basic change what-
ever in Soviet objectives. The tactical variations we have witnessed over
the last five years, and conspicuously within the past year, have never been
beyond the bounds of the traditional Communist theory of alternate advances
and retreats, initiated by Lenin and I.am sure deeply grooved in the thinking
of all the present leaders of the Kremlin.
Indeed, I think it is of crucial importance for us all to avoid any
sharp swings in our view of Soviet activity. During the past year, speculation
among the public has reached the point of wondering whether what we called the
cold war was at an end. Since the second Geneva conference and the recent
statements of Soviet leaders, there has been some tendency to swing to an
opposite view -- that the cold war far from being abandoned will be intensified.
The difficulty in preventing such swings in public opinion is a major concern
of our policy makers. There should be no justification for them among groups
such as yourselves.
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Let me then attempt to give a Soviet view of the world situation,
which I should think would be broadly shared by all the top men in the
Kremlin whatever their personal rivalries or other differences:
First, they must be quite well satisfied with their progress in the
development and production of major military weapons. In the nuclear field,
they have advanced to the point where, notwithstanding a continuing marked
superiority in US striking power, particularly over the next two years, the
world generally, and our major allies particularly, believe that a period of
nuclear stalemate has already begun. Moreover, as a result of the first
Geneva conference -- and notwithstanding the barren results of the second --
the Soviets must be more confident than before that the US-will not deliber-
ately precipitate a situation of major conflict in which nuclear weapons would
be used. This does not mean that the Soviets are not still deterred by cur
awn massive nuclear power from adventures of their own that would be likely
to lead to major conflict. I am sure they are, and that they are convinced
of our intention to act if certain lines are crossed or certain boundaries of
action exceeded. But they are probably now confident that they will soon.
"have it too" -- that in the meantime they too have the benefits of deterrence,
in part because they are credited, in the world at large, with greater
capabilities than they have, and in part because their capabilities are in
fact already a great threat to US allies in Eurasia.
As to the future, it is clear that the Soviets are going all out to
achieve the next stages of military power ahead of us if they can. Andin
certain fields, notably in medium range guided missiles, we have had
disturbing evidence within the past year that they may reach the level of
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operational capability before we do. I do not infer from this any great,
or at least any immediate changes in their intentions with respect to a
major conflict or general war. In intercontinental missiles, the race now
looks about even. Whatever the relative dates of achievement of the inter-
continental missile may be, the Soviets will in any case continue to be
confronted by massive strategic air power from bases so dispersed that it
is unlikely that they could expect to knock them out. We can never rule
out the possibility of a truly decisive surprise attack capability by the
Soviets -- and must obviously bend every effort to prevent that coming about
but I should doubt whether the Soviets are now planning to any major degree
on any assumption that this will happen.
Another major question is whether their growing nuclear capabilities
will permit the use of pressure or "blackmail" tactics in support of local
aggression and subversion. This,is a more likely possibility than an
achievement of a decisive surprise attack capability. If the United States
and the free world fail to meet Communist expansionist moves effectively over
the next five years, this could indeed become the method by which we would be
"nibbled to death." In present Soviet calculations, however, I think it
represents a hope rather than a firm expectation.
In summary, the Soviet view of the major weapons balance is probably two
fold: (1) that there is a present balance or near-balance sufficient to
reduce the risks of major conflict to a low point; (2) that there are hopes
that the situation may develop in ways favorable to the Sino -Soviet Bloc,
either by the pressure possibility or by the more remote chance of prior
achievement of a surprise attack capability.
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This brings us to the second point, the present status of the cold
war struggle.
On this front, the Soviets must consider the prospects for gain to
be considerable -- perhaps less than they were in early 1947, and with no
major area as ripe for the plucking as North Vietnam stood in early 1953,
but on an overall basis presenting great opportunities for the growth of
Communist influence.
In the past year, we have certainly ssen a new Soviet line of policy
in action. Essentially, this can be viewed as a third stage in the cold mar.
In the first stage, from 1947 to 1949, Communist control was extended over
China, but elsewhere a series of Soviet thrusts were turned back, and NATO
was set in motion. In the second phase, the Soviets turned to aggression
by proxy, first in Korea and then in Indochina. Beginning in 1952, there
were signs of a different line, and these signs expanded into the flood of
actions taken in 1955, in two directions. The first of these was to promote
a general reputation for peaceful intentions, through adjusting such local
situations as Austria, failing to follow up on their promises of drastic
action if West Germany became allied to the West, and accepting the Geneva
Agreement on Indochina (of course in the expectation that Communist takeover
of the South was only a matter of time in any case). The second prong of the
new line of policy -- or you may call it tactics -- was the use of every
possible device to extend Soviet influence and diminish US influence through:-
out the peripheral and uncommitted areas of the world.
In the last six months, Soviet intervention in the Middle East and
SOuth Asia has revealed a greater tactical flexibility than in the past, and
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in particular the judicious employment of two Soviet assets, a plentiful
supply of obsolescent arms and the ability of a controlled economy to absorb
the critical surpluses of underdeveloped countries at a relatively 'small
overall cost. In quantitative terms, we estimate that ihe aggregate cost
of Communist military and economic assets sent to these areas is on the order
of 400 million dollars, most of which is in the. Egyptian arms deal. Object-
ively however, those surplus arms really had almost no marginal value at all,
and in cold economic terms the cotton they are to receive in exchange may even
be more valuable -- apart from its political importance in breaking Egypt's
dependence on Western, particularly British, markets.
I have little doubt that the Soviets can continue to play the arms game;
their reserves of such items as MIG-15's and T-34 tanks is enormous, and the
now-surplus IL-28, a type of plane we and the British have never had in Soviet
numbers, offers a special attraction to such countries as Egypt and India.
Moreover, the Soviets can clearly continue to absorb surpluses more
readily than we can, and can offer, through state financing, more attractive .
financial terms than we can either as a government or through the World Bank.
When it comes to supplying really useful economic aid, Soviet capabilities
are more limited, but still more than adequate for their present purposes. A
million tons of steel to India, over a three year period, is only a tenth of
the increase in Soviet steel capacity over that time. If the Soviets were to
'build the Aswan Dam, it mould require only about 3% of their heavy electric
equipment capacity. The equipment they are sending to Burma in exchange for
surplus rice -- which is being diverted to North Vietnam to meet the pressing
food problems there -- is substantial in Burmese terms but minute in Soviet
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terms.
Perhaps most serious, the Soviets do have a substantial supply of
technicians, whom they can readily train in the local language, and then
send to the area where they can do the most good in the Soviet interest.
In all of this effort, the Soviets have their Satellites. While no
sophisticated person is fooled by the Czech label on the arms sent to Egypt --
and we have every indication that the negotiations were quite firmly controlled
from Moscow last August and September -- the fact remains that the Satellite
identification obscures the extent of the total effort. The impression is
even created that the Satellites are in honest competition with each other:
Communist China's part is more minor, but appears to be at least partly
coordinated with the USSR in such countries as Egypt and Indonesia.
One may ask why the Soviets appear to get such substantial results in
good will from these efforts, which are in fact far less extensive or
constructive than US and Western aid has been. In part, this is because
Western aid is still tarred with the heritage of colonialism. The Soviets
do all they can to stress this, and to conceal their awn record in the
Satellites and in their nationality areas. They have also, in these latest
efforts, been fairly astute in managing to create a belief that the USSR's
progress is a worthy model for these nations, that the USSR has faced and
surmounted the same problems. The Soviets can, for example, point with pride
to their accomplishments in developing marginal lands and educating backward
peoples in the Republics of Central Asia.
The Soviets have also managed to avoid any impression of condescension,
and to make it appear that their offers have no strings attached. Even the
fact that some of the transactions have been hard bargains indeed, on a strict
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quid pro quo basis -- like the steel to India -- has contributed to this
impression.
In addition to being receptive to the kind of military and economic
contributions the USSR and the Satellites have to offer, the Middle East
and South Asia offer a store of local issues on which the Soviets feel they
can take sides to their advantage. Foremost of these is, of course, the
Arab-Israel dispute, with Goa, Kashmir, and Pushtunistan (more moderately)
as other conspicuous examples.
It goes without saying that the positions of the USSR toward these
countries is entirely cynical. Contrast their present 100% espousal of the
Arab cause with the fact that the USSR supported the creation of Israel
completely, and in 1948 only the supply of Czech arms made it possible for
Israel to establish its independence: Compare the advocacy of continued
partition in Kashmir with the Soviet position on Indochina and, at least
verbally, on Germany and Korea.
In many ways, what the Soviets -- and the Satellites in concert -- are
doing in these areas is nothing more than 19th century realpolitic, conventional
power politics designed to increase the influence of the USSR and to alienate
these nations from the Vest by any tool that is handy.
As of now, I think the Soviets may feel that they have made considerable
progress by these tactics, and that they have opened up a profitable new front
on which they may be able to make still further progress. Certainly, there is
very little reason to suppose that these are one-shot operations -- and just as
little reason to suppose that "competitive coexistence," which should be called
"antagonistic" or "hostile coexistence," has any other ultimate purpose than
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the extension of Communist control in the fullest possible sense.,///
Meanwhile, among our major allies, especially in NATO, the -oviets
must believe that they have been fairly successful in reducing the "cement
of fear" in NATO and that, whether or not Khrushchev and Bulganin revert to
type in the hostile tone of their utterances, it will remain extremely
difficult for our major allies to maintain the defense burdens of the
1949-54 period.
Moreover, the Soviets must be well pleased with the results. ofthe
French elections and by the talk of "openings to the left" in Italy. If it
does nothing more, the renewal of popular front tactics seems sure to exert
a continued disruptive effect on these countries. I do not think that
popular fronts are imminent in either case, but they are surely a stronger
possibility than at any time since 1948.
Finally, and in my judgment more immediately important than either
Europe or the Middle East and South Asia, there are the two great sore spots
of the current Far East picture, the offshore islands and Laos. These are
not direct Soviet problems, but the Soviets must see clearly the advantages
that may come to the Bloc from them -- and .they are of course rendering all
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possible material support to the Communist Chinese and the Viet Minh.
There are a few indications that the Soviets exerted a restraining hand
on the Communist Chinese during 1955 on the islands, and also on the situation
in South Vietnam. Yet I have little doubt that, to the degree this was done,
it was accompanied by an assurance to the Communist Chinese that the taking
of the offshore islands would be done more easily, and to greater advantage
to the overall cause, if the will of the major European nations could be
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further softened by the general "peace offensive" -- as has clearly taken
place -- if the US could be isolated from its allies, and if the major
"third-force" nations, notably India, could be subjected to increased Soviet
influence -- as has also taken place.
In the case of Laos, the Communist moves are almost certainly designed
largely as a balancing operation to offset the fact that South Vietnam has
not developed, or rather deteriorated, as they anticipated when the Indochina
agreements were made in 1954. But Laos is no mere token balancer; while its
loss to the free world mould be less serious than that of South Vietnam, the
undermining effect in Thailand -- of which there are already indications --
might in a fairly short time virtually outflank even a greatly strengthened
and pro-Western South Vietnam, while the situations in Malaya and Singapore,
which have developed more adversely than we expected during the past year --
and with too little sign of effective British counteraction -- would be '
likely to go completely to pot. From the purely Soviet standpoint, it may
be that any drastic action against the offshore islands or Laos would appear
undesirable in that it would tend to interfere with the efforts to extend
Soviet influence in the Middle East and South Asia, which are of course draped
in the mantle of IIpeace.It But if this is the Soviet view, it still might not
prevail with the Communist Chinese and the Viet Minh. The major determinant,
finally, is so largely the posture of the US and its allies that I can go no
further as an intelligence officer. As the Soviets see it, there must appear
to be lively possibilities of Communist gains in this, their area of maximum
present expectations.
In sum, the Soviet leaders may well feel that they are doing at least as
well as they may have expected in the cold war.
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Thirdly, in looking at their own internal situation, the Kremlin leaders
must find much to be hopeful about. Their overall economic growth has
continued. 1955 was a good year for agricultural quantitive output. The
burden of military expense has not yet operated seriously to reduce the large
amounts spent for investment, and, although the flow of consumer goods has
been held back, the real income of the Soviet citizen is still rising at a
rate of about 3i5 per year.
Even more basically, Soviet scientific and technical training continues
to produce ever increasing numbers of competent technicians, and secondary
education is being expanded at a rate that will mean that well over 80% of
Soviet children will receive such education by 1960. In the use of human raw
material for narrow ends, there is no question that the Soviet system can
produce results.
Moreover, despite the enormous dissatisfactions, particularly among
nationality groups, overall morale in the USSR is almost certainly at a
fairly high point. The aggregate evidence of travelers to the USSR in the
last year is convincing that, whatever his View of the nature and personal
consequences of the system, the Soviet citizen appears to be convinced that
it works. This pride constitutes an enormous cohesive force for the present.
Moreover, the visits of foreign leadersip the USSR, and the visits of Soviet
leaders abroad as they have been reported to the Russian people, have
undoubtedly contributed to a sense of international prestige and acceptance
greater than at ark time sinde the war.
Fourth, as they look at their relationship with the Satellites and
Communist China, the Kremlin leaders can see, on the favorable side, continued
stability in the Satellites, with little reduction in the prospects for effective
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Soviet control over the next five-ten years under present conditions.
Communist China likewise continues a firm ally for the present, and Soviet
economic aid to Communist China while substantial, and a serious future
concern, is not in aggregate terms a very large burden on the Soviet
economy at present.
* * * * *
In summary, as the Soviet leaders look at today's balance sheet, as
compared to a year or five years ago, they can see many favorable factors
from their standpoint. In the aggregate, they might well conclude that the
overall power position of the USSR and the Sino -Soviet Bloc is greater relative
to the forces clearly arrayed against it than at any time.
Yet it may be that many of the assets in the balance sheet are not nearly
so substantial as they appear, and that even those which may be taken at full
value are outweighed by other situations or other aspects of the internal
picture. So it is necessary to look closely at the debit side of the ledger
the problems that the Soviets still confront externally and internally.
The first of these on the external front, is that in no major area of
the world has popular support for the
over the past year. The situation in
rest of the Satellites, has compelled
Communist form of government
increased
East Germany, and to some extent in the
the Soviets to make brutally clear at
the second Geneva conference that they have no thought of permitting free
elections in East Germany, and that they know the outcome of such elections
would be repudiation of Communism. While I do not look for another June 17,
1953, the Soviets have clearly found no way to keep East Germany below the
simmering point. Just as one indicator, the number of refugees reaching Nest
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Germany over the past year has been 260,000, 40% above the level of the
CONSistibtr
preceding year and with about .a quarter emiet-i-ng of military-age youths.
Soviet and East German controls can reduce this flow, but only at the oost
of more repression and more hostility in those forced to remain. Berlin
remains a major sore spot to the Soviets and, despite all the harassments,
the Soviets can hardly take drastic action against it without involving great
risks of a major conflict. The key fact is that East Germany simply is not
setting into any kind of satellite mold; on the contrary, to East and West
Germans alike, its condition is a complete condemnation of the Communist
system.
Similarly, on the other side of the world, whereas it appeared probable a
year ago that the Communists might min an all-Vietnam election even if
considerable elements of a free election were present (though perhaps not if
a prolonged period of impartial administration preceded the election), Viet
Minh prestige and influence have been sharply reduced by the growing strength
of the Diem government in the south, and by the failure to solve the basic food
problem in the north. Thus, the prospect of a Communist victory in what the
world might have considered a free election no longer appears substantial. If
the Communists are to make substantial progress in South Vietnam, they will have
to come above ground -- where they can probably be met and where they will in
any case reveal their true aggressive nature to the unconvinced leaders of India
and other key neutralist countries of the area.
Elsewhere in the world, there now appears to be no area where the threat
of Communist takeover is as acute as it was in Iran in 1953 or Guatemala in
1954, where the Communists met their match. The Indonesia situation is better
than it seemed likely to be a year ago, although still precarious. Latin
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America has many unstable situations, but there have been encouraging
signs that nations such as Brazil have passed through the inoculation
phase with respect to the internal Communist threat, and are able to
generate -- if we play our hand coolly -- their own corrective forces.
Secondly, although the Soviet-Satellite campaign in the Middle East
and South Asia is off to a flying start, it will soon run into serious
problems. To date, it has been largely a campaign of extending state
influence, and its success has entailed some soft-pedalling of internal
Communist efforts and even, in the case of the Communist Party of India,
almost a disavowal of that Party. Yet, without continuing or increasing
the efforts of local Communist forces, Soviet aid may serve largely to
strengthen governments that are ultimately non-Communist or anti-Communist.
I do not discount the possibility of growing economic or military
dependence on the USSR, or that Nehru and Nasr will go somewhat further dawn
the road of cooperation with the Soviets, or the seriousness of the threat
posed by the presence of Soviet agents in these countries. It may be that
the Soviets can conceal their hand and have the best of both approaches for
the time being, particularly through the increased respectability of local
Communist Parties. But they will be under continual temptation, and perhaps
pressure from among the Soviet leaders themselves, to take a stronger line
which would cause them to be recognized for the modern imperialists they are.
Similarly, the Soviets have the problem of fulfilling the expectations of
the countries they have now undertaken to assist. Things are now in honeymoon
period, which may not last long. I do not think we shall see such flagrant
gaps between promise and performance as took place in the trade agreements with
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the Argentine and Uruguay, or in some Soviet dealings with the UK in
1953-54. If they mean business at all -- as we think they do -- they
can avoid such fiascos. But there will still be strong possibility of
disillusionment with Soviet actions that are bound to be partial and super-
ficial in many cases.
In other areas where the Soviets have made apparent progress during the
past year, they also confront dilemmas. Tito cannot be further wooed without
the danger of increasing similar "national Communist" sentiments in the
Satellites, and without creating even more serious dilemmas for the Communist
party in Italy, which has been substantially weakened over the past year by
this fact among others . . . In Germany, the Soviets can push the theme of
direct negotiations between West Germany and East Germany to a point, with
disruptive effects, but if the West Germans start to take the,possibility of
such negotiations seriously, they will almost certainly pierce the sham issue
of "compulsory NATO membership" and come face to face with the ultimate Soviet
position that .a unified Germany should not have free elections and should not
be free to determine its awn foreign policy. Feeler unofficial negotiations
between West and East Germany might well result in a very healthy clearing of
the air in West Germany and in the strengthening of West Germany's ties to the
West.
The fact is that in West Germany and in Japan -- still probably the major
power centers subject to the cold mar -- the Soviets have not made real
headway. Despite some minor economic problems, and a slight decline in its
phenomenal rate of economic growth, the fact is that West Germany continues
extremely prosperous and is more and more tied to the West in what should be
enduring economic relationships. If we can assist the strengthening of these
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Lastly, there is
Gee4.4?X4 a 4ti,4,.u.0 2 e4,ed- 14414
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Nilitary and
Communist China. o- timagreat/material progress
4
mean a constantly increasing threat to Western positio s in -ast Asia.
And, as I have said, the common nterests of the USSR and Communist China should
make then working allies over at least the next five years. Yet, from the Soviet
there must he concern about 4=stmailam#:_.
standpoint, /the increasing demands that Connunist Chia is al-ost sure to levy on the
-USSR (unless, of course, Communist ,laina is able not only to trade with, but to
obtain ci.edits from, the Free World). In particular, the prospect that Communist
China wills not be able to solve its food problem may mean that the USSR will be called
while
on for agricultural exports $xstxxx/its own aOricultural problem remains unsolved.
Such problems as this are not likely to disrupt the r elationship, but they axe pert of
a pftture in which the Soviets must realize that they will bear a considerable burden
in support-ng an increasip independent ally.
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ties through NATO or through European integration moves, so much the
better . . . And, of course, West German rearmament is underway, and her
scientific and technological resources increasingly applied to the total
NATO effort.
In Japan, too, the picture is far from dark. Not as much armament as
we should like, and more trade with Communist China, but on the other hand
greater stability than seemed likely a year ago, and substantial toughness
in negotiating with the Soviets, without any substantial loss of popular
support.
* * * * *
In sum, looking at the world picture as a whole, I think we must take
the Soviet and Satellite moves of the last year extremely seriously, and
intensify our actions to meet them. Yet, when you look at the whole of the
balance, what the Soviets have mainly done has been, in most cases, to cash
white chips without facing the difficult choices required for the red and
blues. In the ebb and flaw of the cold war, taken as a whole, the Soviets
would hardly feel themselves compelled to correct, even if they could, the
historic Communist doctrines of the growth of revolutionary situations, or
Stalin's 1952 prophecies of softening and division in the free world -- but
neither will they find any clear proof of the validity of these basic beliefs.
As to the United States itself, and the alleged "internal contradictions of
capitalism," we have had some recent indications that Communist theoreticians
are coming to believe that, while capitalism will rot in time, it may take a
pretty hefty dose of the acid of internal Communist disruption to bring on
the process.
Turning now to their own internal picture, the.Soviet leaders must realize
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that they have not solved two crucial domestic issues: organizing
agriculture and increasing
of leadership itself.
I have said that 1955
culture, and I have little
its productivity, and above all the problem
was statistically a good year for Soviet agri-
doubt that Khrushchev will be as zealous in
claiming credit for the results of good weather in the Ukraine as he was
last year in denouncing Malenkov for the results of bad weather there. The
fact is, of course, that Khrushchev's corn and new lands programs had very
little to do with this year's results. They are not wholly visionary; some
useful techniques have been employed, and it was a substantial achievement to
obtain even small yields from the new lands in so dry a year. Nonetheless,
another bad year in the new lands were not compensated by an unusually good
year in the Ukraine, Khrushchev's bold experiment would be exposed as the
risky thing it is. This would not mean that millions of Russians would
starve or that the Soviet economy mould be drastically slowed down, but it
surely would mean serious damage to Khrushchev's political credit and
standing.
. This brings me to the problem of leadership,
which of all the Soviet
problems is the one that must hang over the minds of the Kremlin more than
any other.
Predictions on the future holders of power in the Soviet Union are among
the more perishable items on the intelligence shelf, particularly when made on
the eve of a Party Congress. But I think we can be reasonably confident that
power has come to reside over the past two years primarily in a small group of
a half dozen at the top, but, as a close second, also in the considerably
if
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I %.4, I
larger Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It
also seems clear that for the present neither the Army nor the secret police
are in the control of any identifiable individual or group in the top
leadership. Rather they are in substantial measure "institutionalized."
The prestige of the military forces is unquestionably greater than under
Stalin: they are capable of exerting policy pressure, as they probably did
at the time of the decision for emphasis on heavy industry a year ago, and
they are capable of negative pressure, as was almost certainly demonstrated
against the secret police in the removal of Beria. But they do not stand
as a separate and manipulatable element of power.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the present situation is that the
Central Committee of the CPSU is almost certainly used as a forum, not only
for organization and the disposition of personalities, but for the discussion
of major policy questions.. We know too little about what went on at its
meetings last January and July, but the combination of almost total silence
during these meetings, followed by an outburst of activity on many fronts,
strongly suggests that if decisions were not actually made in these meetings,
they were at least not valid until ratified therein.
07, In this situation, it is of course crucial whether Khrushchev and his
friends have obtained or can in the future obtain thoroughgoing control of the
Central Committee. The pattern of personal appointments over the past year
suggests that he has made considerable progress in this direction, but the
odds still seem against his having the Central Committee elections sewed up
by this Party Congress at least.
One is tempted to draw parallels to the rise of Stalin after Lenin's death,
and to wonder if we may not be at, say, the 1927 stage of that process, which
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I OF Stk..,ti
will proceed eventually to the conclusion of one-man power. It may be that
this will be the case. Yet there appear to be striking differences between
the present situation and the earlier succession problem. Above all, the
decisions now taken -- apparently after being thrashed out in the Central
Committee -- are vastly more complex and difficult, and the results come
home to roost more quickly than in the 19201s. If Khrushchev, or any group
of leaders, propose a given policy, either internal or external, that policy
is tested promptly and its faults revealed. Moreover, on the internal front,
whereas any gain in the 1920's could not be set against a norm, the very
confidence the Soviets have gained in the capabilities of their economy, now
means that decisions are judged harshly, by whether they in fact produce the
.
results claimed for them at the time of decision. We are all familiar with
the enormous political consequences in a democratic society of even the
smallest economic shifts, which may have been in fact little, if at all) the
fault, or the credit, of the incumbent government. Obviously, not even the
Central Committee taken alone is in any sense comparable to a democracy, but
its criticisms nonetheless may exert a continuing effect in preventing the
successful rise of any single, supposedly omnipotent individual.
In short, there is a good case for supposing that the Soviet system may
lack for some time the strong one-person control under which the system was
created. This does not mean that the system will collapse in the short or
even medium-term. Nor does it mean any conspicuous decline in the skill with
which the Soviets conduct at least limited maneuvers in the field of external
policy: on the contrary, at several times during the past year there has been
every indication that Soviet footwork was faster than in the Stalin period.
What the continued collective leadership does mean, however, is that world
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1UP ?:f.
Communism will lack a single ideological voice capable of adjusting basic
doctrine to changing demands as Stalin so conspicuously did. And there is at
least a substantial chance that it will mean over time the development of
major differences among the leadership which will tend to diminish the
effectiveness of Soviet policy, both externally and internally.
Moreover, in the less likely event that Khrushchev or some other
individual should attempt a drastic seizure of power, the countervailing
forces are now such as to produce a serious internal conflict.
Meanwhile, the broad structure of Soviet society itself is being
drastically changed by the very forces that have contributed to the growth
of Soviet material strength and economic power. I do not suggest that
industrialization, in itself, is in any way fundamentally at odds with the
continuing of a highly centralized and totalitarian form of government --
Nazi Germany is the obvious example of just such a case. Nor is it necessarily
true that a more highly educated populace will resist totalitarianism in any
short or medium-term period.
Yet, when a people find their living standards substantially increasing
at the present Soviet rate, and when that same people is undergoing an enormous
educational revolution at a rate more rapid than that of any nation in history,
these trends must create vast imponderables in the calculations of Soviet leaders.
We have had some evidence that the improvement in the sciences has been
obtained in part by diminished emphasis on ideology, particularly in the physical
sciences and even recently in the once-strait jacketed field of biology. Such
trends may well be hard to prevent from expanding to other fields of stu40y,
including history. In simpler terms, it cannot be so easy for a regime to
spread wholly false views among a generation 80% of which has received a secondary
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iv+
education.
This is not a new problem in Russian history. Writing of Peter the
Great, a pre-revolutionary Russian historian once said:
"His beneficent actions were accomplished with repelling
violence . . . . He hoped, through the threat of his authority,
to evoke initiative in an enslaved society, and through a slave-
awning nobility to introduce into Russia European science and
popular education . . . . He desired that the slave, remaining a
slave, should act consciously and freely. The interaction of
despotism and freedom, of education and slavery -- this is the
political squaring of the circle, the riddle which we have been
solving for two centuries, from the time of Peter, and which is
still unsolved."
I do not say the present Soviet rulers cannot solve this problem of
combining discipline with education. Indeed, as you can see, I cannot offer
firm predictions on any of these trends. Certainly they cannot develop in a
manner that would tend to make the Soviet Union an acceptable member of
international society unless Soviet expansion, whether by aggression or
subversion or even the growth of marked influence, can be held in firm check.
Plainly, that is not now the case. But if Soviet confidence in the exportability
of their system can be reduced, it stands to reason that Soviet energies will
find increasing outlet -- and adequate psychological reward -- in the internal
development of their society.
If, then, We ask ourselves what are the prospects for the USSR over the
next ten-twenty years, we can be most confident that, barring a major conflict,
the USSR will have attained great economic and educational advances. Those
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advances may conceivably be harnessed to the wishes of a still highly
centralized and totalitarian government and that government may, through
subversion, techniques of influence, or atomic blackmail, succeed in
greatly expanding the territories it controls, perhaps even to the point
of making our own 'situation desperate.
On the other hand, Soviet techniques of influence, such as have emerged
in the past year, may prove as transitory as some of the efforts of the Czars.
If this can be done, while at the same time the threat of Soviet and Chinese
Communist aggression is reduced, the Soviet internal system could evolve into
forms for which I see no real historic parallel but which offer at least the
possibility of a Soviet state that will not be at rest or without any
aggressive designs, but that can be handled by a continuously vigilant policy
on the part of the rest of the world.
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