ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNIST SUCCESSES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS BY THE HONORABLE ALLEN W. DULLES PRESENTED AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE WASHINGTON, D.C. 3 FEBRUARY 1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440007-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 3, 1956
• Content Type: MISC

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ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNIST SUCCESSES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
BY
The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Presented at
The National War College
Washington, D. C.
3 February 1956
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ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNIST SUCCESSES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
By
The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
(3 February 1956)
ADMIRAL WOOLDRIDGE: Gentlemen of the National War Col-
lege and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces:-
It is very fitting that we complete our consideration
of the study of the Soviet Bloc by making an assessment of the
prospects of the Communist cause. It is also most fitting that
we have as our guest today the man who is best qualified to
assess the successes, the problems and the prospects of this
revolutionary movement.
Our guest, the Honorable Allen W. Dulles, has not only
a background for making this assessment due to his having been
Deputy Director of CIA and now the Director of CIA, but he has
been a lifelong student of the study of the problem powers. He
has had extensive experience, both in peace and during two wars,
asia student and as a participant in the solution of these power
problems.
It is a great pleasure to welcome back to this platform
today and to present to this audience the Director of Central
Intelligence Agency, Mr. Allen W. Dulles.
Mr. Dulles.
MR. DULLES: Admiral (Wooldridge), thank you very
much. In the old days I used to call you "Slim," when we
were working together on the Senior Staff (as I believe they
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called it then), now the Planning Board of the NSC.
I always had great admiration for the way you
handled a difficult task. The Joint Chiefs, of course, will
never say naything about what they think until they get it
all nicely before them in final form. "Slim" had to interpret
what their views were going to be before he really knew what
they were. He very rarely missed. Very seldom, as I
remember it, did the Joint Chiefs come up with a view differ-
ent from "Slim's." You have a very wise director here.
The Admiral referred to the fact that X had been
involved in the problems resulting from two world wars. He
suggested that I might have helped toward solving some of
these postwar problems. They don't seem to have stayed solved
very well.
When I look back on my own modest participation
at an early age in drawing up the Treaty of Versailles I am
not sure that we showed all the wisdom required by the
circumstances at that time. However, I have always thought
the Treaty of Versailles was better than some people said it
was. At least, after World War I, we had a peace treaty.
Now, we have had World War II, and we still haven't a treaty.
You have given me quite a subject today -- "Assess-
ment of Communist Successes, Problems, and Prospects."
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I want to begin with certain basic assumptions.
You may or may not agree with them, but I accept them as a
useful way to approach the subject you have given me.
First, there has been, so far as I can see, no
change over the years in basic Soviet objectives. There have
been tactical changes, variations within the traditional zig-
zag theory of Communism under Leinin and Stalin. There have
been tactical retreats when situations demanded, but the
Communists have always kept an eye on their main goal.
I believe that our policy makers must not be
deceived or taken in -- and I believe that they have not been
by temporary shifts in Soviet policy. I have the impression
that some people thought our policy makers were taken in at
the time of the so-called Summit conference. I can assure
you, -- on the basis of having participated in drawing up
some of the position papers for that meeting, -- that we were
in no way deluded by Soviet gestures at that time. It was
not possible, however, in view of world public opinion, to
take an adamant and hostile position toward the Soviet desire
to talk.
As a second basic assumption, I believe that as
long as the present leadership and political system prevail
in the Kremlin, there will be no drastic change in the final
objective of international Communism, -- domination of the
world.
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It follows that any changes we may consider making
in our own position should depend on Communist performances,
not on Communist promises. Even then, we must be aware of the
danger that their actual deeds may be no more than traps to
delude us into believing that a change has taken place when
actually it hasn't.
Here I au thinking particularly of the Austrian
treaty. The motive behind the Soviet agreement to sign the
Austrian treaty was to set up the Summit meeting. The Commu-
nists were also moved by certain pressures to which I shall
refer later.
As another fundamental proposition, I believe that
the Communists will continue their massive military build-up.
They will hold this power as a threat over the heads of the
weak and the neutralist nations and as a deterrent to the
United States and its allies. Later, possibly, if they
cannot achieve their ends by any other means, they will use
this power at a time of their own choosing. I hope I am
wrong about that, but I think we must proceed on that assump-
tion since it may well be actual Communist policy.
They do pay lip service to raising the standards
of living in the Soviet Union and to dealing out more con-
sumer goods, but this is only a secondary objective. They
will continue to devote, as they are doing today, some 35
percent of their gross national product to capital investment
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and design in order to produce more end items. These are,
and will be, largely military goods.
They will take every measure they can to increase
output in their heavy industries. In 1950 this output was
roughly one-fifth of American production. If their current
Five-Year plan, projected through 1960, is carried out, their
output will rise to about two-fifths of our own. We cannot
assume that they will fail to reach the goals of this Five-
Year Plan. In the past they have generally come close to
their objectives in heavy industry, but they have not met
their goals in agriculture and certain other fields.
It's worth noting that the present Five-Year Plan
calls for tripling and in sone cases quadrupling production
of electronic items. It provides for a sixfold increase in
the production of special heat resistant alloys, thus under-
lining the emphasis they are placing on guided missiles and
jet engines. (This, of course, is public. They published
it in their Five-Year Plan.)
As far as perfornance to date is concerned, their
1955 steel production rose to 45 million netric tons.
American production was 106 million metric tons. Their
primary aluminum production increased to 500,000 netric tons.
The United States produced 1,250,000 tons.
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They are giving particular emphasis' to these items.
While their production is still less than half of ours, it
is worth noting that they are narrowing the gap. At the ,
same time, in comparing production on a per capita basis,
we must remember that their population is substantially
larger than ours. Nevertheless, their intention to emphasise
heavy industry and military end it. is obvious. In addition
to the items I have mentioned, their greatest emphasis will
probably be in the fields of nuclear research and development,
guided missiles, and long-range, high-speed aircraft.
By contrast, their production of automobiles and
trucks is only one-twentieth of ours. They manufacture one-
fiftieth the nunbor of washing machines that we do. They're
doing a little better in radio and television sets, but they
still lag far behind.
In any case, the basic Soviet intention to con-
centrate on heavy industry and military strength is evident.
This, intention, as well as accomplishments so far, aro clear
indications of basic Soviet policies, and they reveal a
great deal about the general Soviet posture in the world
today.
Turning to smother phase of their basic posture,
I think their foreign policy is dominated, at least for the
imsediate future, by a determination to avoid the risk of a
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major war. In the present stage of their nuclear development,
aircraft production, -- particularly of long-range bombers
and guided missile development, they do not wish to run the
risk of massive nuclear retaliation. Hence, they will pro-
bably avoid risky adventures.
Whether they will continue to exercise such caution
when they feel they can deliver nuclear weapons by long-range
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aircraft or missiles is a question which will bear very close
scrutiny at the proper time. That time does not seem to be
here yet, but they can, of course, deliver bombs on us today
if they want to use one-way missions.
At the present time they regard themselves as
encircled by our overseas bases. In my opinion, the effort
to undermine these bases by getting the peoples concerned
to drive us out will, in the days ahead, be one of the main
themes of Soviet policy. We can see that they are watching
closely the development of this line in North Africa. They
will continue to encourage and foment such activity. They
will harass everywhere they can, even with the Eskimos, to
make us feel that our bases are not safe and cannot be
counted on in an emergency.
With these basic elements of Soviet policy in
mind as I have sketched them, I should like to draw a trial
balance sheet on where we stand in the cold war at this
time.
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This country first became aroused about the nature
and magnitude of the Communist threat sometime around 1946-
1947. For a long time both the people of this country and
even some who were in positions of high authority did not
seem to realize what the Communists were up to.
It's a funny thing, but we don't seem to believe
what these people write. When they write books setting forth
their program, it is worth our time to read them and reflect
on them. Hitler wrote "rein Kampf." Everyone had a chance
to read it, but no one paid very much attention to it. Yet,
up to a point, what Hitler said he was going to do in his
book was what he actually did.
I do not doubt, if we read what the Communist leaders
write, that we can find out pretty well what they are up to.
In any case, we did not do much readng back in 1946 and 1947,
and what we read then was usually not Communist literature.
It took actual events to awaken us to the Soviet
challenge.
From about the middle of 1946 on Greece was threatened
by a possible Communist takeover. Iran and Turkey, especially
Iran, were threatened by Communist aggression.
The European economy, -- with some rather clever
maneuvering by the Communists in a situation which was
already chaotic -- began in 1947 to head toward real disaster.
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Czechoslovakia fell to the Communists in 1948. I
-think this was the blow that did more to wake people up than
any other single thing. A country was conquered without a
single shot having been fired. At the time of the takeover
the Communists had only about 38 percent of the seats in
parliament. They showed us that we don't have to wait until
there is a Communist majority before there is a real danger.
Following the Czech coup, we had a bad scare in the
1948 Italian elections. The Communists threatened to take
over that country by winning the election. Disaster was nar-
rowly averted. The Berlin blockade started in June 1948.
Meanwhile, we were in the process of losing China.
Thus, from 1946 through 1948 there was a series
of events -- / have not tried to name them all -- which
served to wake us up to the facts of life about Communism.
This period I should call the first Communist threat.
To answer this threat, we responded with actions
of our own.
American aid to Greece started in 1947. Eventually,
under General Van Fleet and others, the Communist menace in
that country was turned back. Tito's defection from the
Kremlin fold was a valuable assist in the Greek problem.
His action had the effect of sealing off a good part of the
Greek frontier with an adverse effect on Communist subversive
activities.
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--MET
Shortly before this, the Communists were ousted
from the governments of both Italy and France. They have
not regained this stature since, although they have been
able to maintain strong parliamentary representation.
The Marshall Plan was passed in A pril 1948. The
airlift broke the Berlin blockade. Planning for NATO
proceeded.
By the middle of 1949 the free world, and partic-
ularly the United States, had responded with at least
reasonable success to the various Soviet challanges in
Europe. We were not so fortunate in the Far East. China was
finally lost, and Indochina was being threatened.
This phase I should call the first Communist threat
and the first part of the free world's answer.
Then, possibly because the free world response had
been fairly effective in some parts of the 'world, and partly
because we did not seem to have any answer to the Communists
in the Far East, the second threat became apparent The
major action in this new Communist campaign was, of course,
the attack in Korea, which was followed by a stepping up of
the war in Indochina.
What we did in Korea to meet this second challenge
is a matter of history and needs little discusaion. While
a total victory was not won, at least the enemy was stopped
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cold and did not achieve his objective by the means he had
chosen. I have a feeling that this may have had more to do
with changes in Communist techniques than anything else. It
probably had much more to do with these changes than the
death of Stalin.
In Indochina we had to settle for half a loaf, and
a pretty soggy half at that.
On the other hand, the second Communist threat had
the effect of hastening the entry of West Germany into MATO
and plans for rearming the Germans. In the Far East the
Manila Pact was signed. Congress passed a resolution about
defending Taiwan and the Pescadores.
In the Middle East, the Baghdad Pact took shape.
In Iran, Mossadegh was overthrown. An anti-Communist govern-
ment was installed. In our own hemisphere, Arbenz was driven
from Guatemala.
Generally_ the second threat ended with the West
doing rather well, again responding somewhat more succeesifully
in Europe and the Middle last than in the Far last.
There is one little item which we tend to forgpt.
While the Communists have been boasting of their successes,
1,250,000 Germans have fled from their Communist "paradise"
in East Germany since 1949. At the present tine, the flow
of refugees from the Communist to the Free World in this area
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alone has grown to nearly 1,000 a day. While the Nast Germans
are trying to build up their army, more and more of their
young men of military age are fleeing to the free world.
Now I come to the third Communist threat and to
the problem of what the best answer will be.
Briefly, the third threat is the new Soviet policy,
the "new look." It emerged gradually and became most clear
at the time of the Summit conference. The new look includes
the Communist "ruble, rifle, and rice" policy in the Biddle
East, South and Southeast Asia, -- the arming of trouble-
makers, economic penetration, appealing to neutrals, and
treating the Biddle Eastern Arabs much as the big bad wolf
k
treated Little Red Riding Hood.
It has often been said that this new policy was
a result of Stalin's death. This assumes hoc, Lose
propter hoc, which is about all the Latin I know, and which
is a slogan which can lead to more errors in intelligence
than almost any other slogan I know. The more fact that after
Stalin's death the Communists changed their policy does not
necessarily mean that they would not have changed their policy
in anjcase. There are some indications that such a change was
being considered before Stalin died. It is obviously more
difficult to change your policy when your dictator is a
stubborn old man who won't admit he was ever wrong. So the
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change in policy was probably easier to carry out after the
old man died than it would have been if he had lived longer.
In any case, there are other and more compelling
reasons for the Communists' changing their policy. I think
they felt they had not done too well with their policies up
to that time. Atter our intervention in the Korean war,
the possibilities of that situation must have been frighten-
ing to then. I think they may have felt, as they analyzed the
situation in the Kremlin, that they had come very close to
getting themselves involved in a wiljor war at a time when
they were not ready for such a war. This business of sending
your minions to fight for you while you stand on the side-
lines looks fine; but if your lackies don't do well, then
you have to go into action yourself.
At this particular stage, the COmmunists decided
on a policy which might still yield large dividends and had
the advantage of being such less risky, They began by making
a series of gestures aimed at presenting themesilves as
peacelovers, taking on a peaceful posture in order to
attract sympathy from the neutralists and the weaklings.
They chose as their primary target the soft underbelly of
Asia, stretching from Syria to Thailand.
Then came the Summit conference. As I have said,
I don't think our policy nappers were caught napping. A
refusal to go, in view of public opinion around the world,
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would have been more harmful than going Even so, merely
by attending we gave the Communists an appearance of
respectability and undoubtedly gave them some temporary aid
in carrying out their new policy.
The reversal of the Soviet attitude on the question
of the Austrian treaty is a good example of a Communist action
which made a substantial impact on world opinion. At about
the same time they swallowed all the threatening words they
had uttered about what they would do if West Germany were
armed. They did nothing about it.
I believe they did at least try to restrpin their
Chinese allies from going too far on the offshore islands
situation.
They settled for their own h lfa, loaf in Indochina,
even though it seemed at the time that they could have, by
taking some risks, secured the whole loaf.
Thus they prepared the world for their new policy
by appealing to the former colonial areas in the Near and
Middle East, by offering economic aid, and by giving military
aid where it would cause the most trouble for the Western
powers.
The Communists are in a very good position to offer
substantial military aid. As you well know, they are chang-
ing over from MIG-15's to MIG-17's and other more advanced
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planes. The 1L-28 is an obsolescent bomber, but MIG's and
IL-28's are pretty hot weapons for the Middle Eastern nations,
The Communists have plenty of old tanks, too. They may even
have some old submarines which they would be perfectly will-
ing to give away, if they thought they could cause enough
troubles I imagine that a submarine or two in the Red Sea
would do just that. Certainly the IL-28's now in the hands
of the Egyptians are something of a worry to the Israelis
and to others.
The Communists have become merchants of death on
a large scale at little or no cost to themselves, except,
possibly freight charges. They have used their satellites in
a very subtle way in this armaments game, letting the Czechs
or Poles or Hungarians front for them so that the offers are
more palatable than they would be if the hand of Moscow
were openly displayed.
We have been making a series of studies trying to
keep up with the various Communist offers and the size of
their total effort. It is a confusing exercise, First,
it is very hard to judge how firm some of the offers are.
Again, it is difficult to fix an actual value to these offers.
They have probably promised somewhere around 300,600,000
dollars worth of goods and technical aid to various countries
in the Near and Middle East. This figures may be something
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like the actual value by our standards, but it is not what
the offers will cost the Communists.
For example, let us assume that what they are giving
to Egypt could be sold in a "normal" market for 160 or 200
million dollars. Giving these items to Egypt has not cost
the Soviet Union anything like that amount of money.
They have promised India a aillion-ton steel mill,
which would be one of the largest steel sills in the country.
The Soviet contribution to this mill will cost the Indians
in the neighborhood of 100,000,000 dollars, but the major
part of the Soviet aid will be in the fora of ? loan, not a
gift, -- a loan with very low interest rates.
As you know, they have offered the Afghans a credit
of 100,000,000 dollars, We are getting some of the details
about this offer, and it turns out to be somewhat different
than it first looked, It is a credit apparently extended
over a number of years with partial amounts to be drawn down
annually. The agreement permits either side to terminate the
arrangement at any time. The Afghans won't be such interested
in ending the credit, but the threat that the Communists can
is present, If the Afghans don't behave, they may be denied
their next installment.
The Communists are buying rice from Burma, They are
building plants there and elsewhere; they are offering to
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build bridges and railways, The Poles have offered to build
a railway-in Saudi Arabia.
They have offered to help with the building of
the Aswan dam in Egypt, a project which will involve goods
and services running into hundreds of millions of dollars in
value and requiring substantial expenditures outside Egypt
The whole Aswan dam undertaking, including the high dam,
will cost close to 1,500,000,000 dollars, About half of
this work would be done with local labor and Egyptian
resources and the rest would come from abroad. Even if
the Egyptians turn down the Communist offer in favor of
finanding by the International Bank the offer by itself
indicates the size of the projects in which the Communists
are evidently willing to engage.
A great many of the Communist offers may not be
accepted; some have not been finally settled. Although we
learn of new offers every day, the whole program is still
more in the stage of promises than performances.
The Communist approach is very subtle, and it is
having a great impact in underdeveloped areas. Some months
ago, I gave a briefing in the National Security Council about
the Communist campaign. I was ahked why the Soviet program
was having such an impact in view of the fact that as far as
actual money, actual hardware and actual accomplishments were
concerned, the Communist offers and promised were far less than
what we had already done in the same area for years.
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The answer to this question -- which is obviously
an important part of the Western answer to the third Soviet
threat -- is not easy to come by. I drew up a little paper
which I summarized for the Security Council a few days ago.
tried to list some of the factors were operating in favor
of the Communists and against us,
The first thing seems obvious, -- the problem of
colonialism. The people in the underdeveloped countries, many
of which have recently gained their independence, believe that
the United States is tied in with the colonial powers, -- in
the West by our membership in NATO; in the Far last, through
SZATO. They see the United States and the United Kingdom
concerting their action in the Near last. They fall for the
Communist allegation that our aid programs are a form of
economic colonialism or imperialism.
These tomer colonial countries suffer from an
inferiority complex in their dealings with the West, and
they tend to react by self-assertion and opposition. Also,
unfortunately, for a long time Westerners have far too often
acted in a tactless and overbearing manner toward the people
In these areas. The former colonials have not forgotten the
Kipling concept of "lesser breeds."
The Communist approach is very astute. They have
successfully created the impression that they do not look on
these people as "backward" or "undeveloped," -- words found
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too often in the Western vocabulary. The contrast which
has grown between the Russians and Americans and Europeans
together" with racial and geographical background of many
Russians, has made it possible for the Russians to get
themselves accepted in many places as non-Europeans, non-
Westerners, and, hence, as fellow Asians.
Many people in this area also feel that the
Communist movement is a movement which they can join and
thereby gain a social status which they have never had
before. It 18 not like the Western clubs from which they
have been barred. These same people are able, by some
logic of their own, to overlook completely the facts of
Soviet colonialism, both in the European satellites and in
the ruthless suppression and even liquidation of minorities
within the Soviet Union itself.
The Communists have also been very flexible in
their negotiations. They haVe asked no obvious quid pro
quo in the fora of political alignments or *DAP-type
agreements. They have no Battle Act problems. They make
a great point of saying their aid 14 offered "without
strings." Moreover, they can tailor their offers to fit
the local situation. They can underbid anyone anywhere
they choose
I have always felt that one of the major problems
when it comes to making our policy effective in this field
was the fact that we seemed to be tied down by so many
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congressional "inhibitions." These are actually safeguards
designed to protect the American taxpayer, and they quite
correctly seem reasonable to the legislator. However, the
official who goes out to Indonesia and other countries and
asks them to sign specific agreements about their own trade
finds that they feel a new kind of servitude is being
imposed on them. The effort to overcome this feeling
delays and hinders our whole aid program.
The Communists enjoy another practical advantage
in theft trade program. The United States has little
interest in acquiring the surplus products of many countries
1because we have a surplus in the same products such as
Cotton, rice, and rubber. Egypt Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia,
and Thailan have to have a market for these particular
commodities. The Soviet bloc will accept these products
and in turn give arms and other aid. They offer low
interest rates and easy payment terms. They will accept
local currencies which they can also use as a handy local
was chest for whatever subversive activities they may
choose to launch.
The countries in this area believe moreover that
the West, particularly the European countries, want to
continue - as they have done in the past - to discourage
industrialization so that the Western powers can keep markets
for their own industrial goods
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These countries now see our aid tapering off,
and they hear our public discussions about the possibility
of ending such aid, discussions which are often carried
on in language which offends these countries. Many
countries dislike seeing the bulk of American aid going to
individual or regimes which they do not like. India. is a
particularly good example, cNehru doesn't like to see our
aid going to Chiang Kai-shek and Syngmau Rhee. By giving
to Israel, we have aroused the enmity of the whole Arab
world. Whether this aid is worthwhile is not the question..
I am speaking of the effect our actions have on neutralist
and other nations.
? Obviously) there is no reason why we should
pattern our policies to fit the desires of the neutralists.
They resent our alliances or close ties with such groupings
as SEATO and the Baghdad Pact but in many instances their
failure to belong is entirely a matter of their own choosing.
In any case, our taking sides or even? appearing to
take sides Kives the Communists an opening. When the Commu-
nists took the side of the Arabs in the Middle East they
acquired a new atttactiveness throughout the Moslem world.
By contrast, our support for Israel and France and Britain
makes our position seem ambiguous, if not hostile, to the
Arabs. When we support Pakistan, we alienate India and
Afghanistan.
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rriE
Perhaps none of these factors, which favor the
Communist cause, is as important as the attitude of these
new nations toward their own economic aspirations, -- their
desire to achieve an economic revolution. Many of them
assumed that when their colonial or protected status
ended, economic progress,would follow automatically and
swiftly, It did not, and we have been the ones to impress
on them the fact that economic progress must be slow and
required the laying of solid foundations, the undertaking
of long-term projects,
In their impatience, they look at the Soviet
Union and are profoundly impressed. Thirty years or more
ago the USSR was almost as backward industrially as these
budding countries. In a short space of time -- short as
compared with the hundreds of years of the Western industtial
revolution -- the Soviet Union has reached a position where
it is now, in the eyes of many of the new nationr, the
second military, industrial, and political power in the
whole world and a leader in science and technology.
The Communists claim that all this progress has
been the result of applying the Communist theory, We know
this is false, but through subtle and persistent propaganda
they have been able to make many people believe that it is
true. Thad() people tend to believe that if they cooperate
with the Communist bloc they, too, can somehow magically
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acquire the rate and size of growth which they see in the
Soviet economy. They believe that Communist China is
following the path of the Soviet Union, and they think that
the Chinese will in time match the Russian accomplishments.
This Communist example, be it true or false,
encourages the undeveloped countries to press for rapid
progress in economic development, sometimes heedless of risks.
They want the prestige and stature which would go with these
attainments even before they have reached their goals, The
Communist propaganda and attractive offers feed on these
desires and whet their appetites. Westerners, by contrast,
seem gloomy about progress and act as though they are trying
to hold the new nations back.
Finally, many of these countries have now decided
that they can have and enjoy the best of both worlds, the
Free world and the Communist world. They are trying to work
both sides of the street, play one side against the other.
They are beginning to conclude that if they are the beneficiaries
of Soviet aid, the United States will be even more anxious to
give them matching or greater help. Those countries which have
chosen to adopt a neutralist role feel that they can best
maintain their position if they accept aid from both the
United States and the Soviet Union.
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We have ample evidence that this last factor is
becoming very fashionable. Some of our staunch allies feel
that they say have made a mistake in not getting a little
Soviet aid on the grounds that we might then rush them sore
Arai or money. This attitude is a serious problem.
All these factors throw light on the nature of what
I call the third Communist threat.
The answer is in the making. I cannot tell you
what it is today, but I can tell you that at the highest
levels close study is being given to the best methods of
meeting this subtle, insidious "new look" in Communist policy.
I can tell you some of the things which we feel
are not required. We do not think that this threat can be
Answered adequately by another great outpouring of money.
As we have said publicly, we do not feel that it can be
answered by running after the Communists and trying to outbid
them everywhere.
There have been some positive suggestions about
what we ought to do, but at the moment it is easier to indicate
what a good answer is not than to show what a good answer is.
Some people suggest that we let the Communists go ahead with
their offers on the grounds that they will fall flat on their
faces in performance.
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We cannot be entirely sure about that. They may
fall on their faces in some cases, but they may also be successful
in many instances. They have the capability to carry out many
of their offers, and it is reasonable to assume that they will
want to make a good showing before the world. The danger is
that once the Communists get hold of a country, there isn't
any second guess about getting it back, except possibly
going to war. Hence, it is not the kind of game in which
you can sit back and say: "Well, let's just see how it works
out." If we wait or guess wrong, that particular game is
-over and done with.
I do not think, however, that we have any reason
whatsoever to accept the predictions of some of the prophets
of doom in our press and of other pundits throughout the
world who tell us, "All is lost." I trust I have been able to
show today that we met the first and second phases of the
postwar Communist threat with reasonable success.
I think that we shall go right ahead and respond
successfully to the third Soviet challenge, even though the
nature of the response is not as readily clear as it was in
the case of the first two threats. We have the benefit of
hindsight on those.
,
We must remember that the Communists have their
own problems. They are perhaps more difficult to see than
our own, but they are nonetheless real.
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During the last war, when I wan is Switzerland, I
was able to get a look at what was going on in Germany. I
remember that at a time when this great Nazi organism seemed
absolutely unbreakable, the seeds of its own destruction were
present and readily apparent.
I do not go so far as to say that the seeds of
destruction are as apparent in the Soviet system today, but
there are real problems.
There is the problem of leadership in the Kremlin.
Khrushchev seems to be moving along pretty rapidly. Each one
of the recent changes in administrators may be a move toward
slowly getting people he can control into positions of power.
There is some question in my mind whether he has the
qualifications for a dictator, but his moves may arouse the
suspicions of other members of the Soviet hierarachy. This
raises the general question of how long a committee fora of
government can last in a state like the Soviet Union.
They have not solved their agricultural problems.
They have done well in heavy industries, but they have made
little progress in agriculture. They are net importers in
farm products. They have begun a massive experiment to open up
new lands, but it does not seem to be going very well, and
further difficulties may lie ahead. They are trying to open
up areas where there is only marginal rainfall. A couple of
years of drought there, and they could end up with nothing but
a gigantic dust bowl.
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When we look at a sap of the Soviet Union and
see its great expanses, we must remember that in most of
the country no grain will grow, and that very little corn
can be grown other than where it is already cultivated.
The southern!Ukraine, which is their great grain-producing
region, is like our own Dakotas. Much of the rest of the
country is out of bounds as far as extensive farming is
concerned.
The Communists are not easy about the situation
in their satellites. The Soviet grasp is firm, but the
Communists are evidently puzzled about what to do over the
long run, Their situation in East Germany may now be more
precarious than it ever has been. So long as they keep
400,000 troops in the country, obviously nothing drastic
can happen. But they have been trying to turn the country
over to the Nast Germans, and the Germans are dragging their
feet. They cannot get qualified people to take government
jobs, and they face a real problem with no solution in sight.
They are still trying to maintain iron discipline
within the Soviet Union, even though they have felt it necessary
to relax a little from the Stalinist standards. Whether they
consider this relaxation as both desirable and necessary is
not clear.
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As I have said, they are putting all their em-
phasis on heavy industry, and giving very little of the
fruits of Soviet economic progress to the people. They
may not be able to go on like that forever.
Apparently on the positive side, they are stepping
up, at a perfectly fantastic rate, the education of their
people, especially in the sciences. One of the most dangerous
features, I think, of Soviet policy today is the number of
scientists they are educating. About 60 percent of their
university graduates are in scientific fields. Only about
25 percent of ours are. Soon they will be turning out more
scientists than we are, and before too many years they
will have more scientists than we do.
However, even this apparent strength raises a
problem. The other day in a talk at Columbia University
I asked the question:
Can you educate people to the extent that the
Communists are doing and not have these people begin to think
about the facts of life, -- not have these people begin to
realize that they are being denied the basic freedoms which
ordinary human beings demand?
Some of us have felt -- I know I did at one time,
but I have changed my mind somewhat -- that if you keep a
country under an iron rule like the Communist system long
enough, the people will forget what liberty is. It hasn't
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worked out that way. We have had many, many defectors who
have come from countries where the people have never known
any form of government except a Communist regime, and yet,
these people have instinctively rebelled against tyranny.
I feel that the desire for liberty is an inherent
quality of the human race and cannot be wiped out. It may
well be that the Communists' disregard for the decency of the
individual human being will be their Achilles' heel. This
may be a problem more serious than any they will have to face
in more worldly affairs like agriculture or technology.
Thank you very much.
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