AN INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL OF CURRENT SOVIET POLICY NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001402400005-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 30, 1954
• Content Type: MISC

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AN INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL OF CURRENT SOVIET POLICY
National War College
April 30, 1954
(1) No pipeline into Kremlin. Problem of getting
intelligence from behind Iron Curtain.
(2) No detailed- blueprint of policy -- Soviet
improvises on details just as every govt does;
also have uncalculated reverses: -- They did not
plan break with Tito - nor foresee our reaction to
North Korea - or the defeat of the Tudeh in Iran.
(3) These considerations basic to Soviet conduct: --
Don't really believe in "co-existence"
though preach it when convenient. Hence useless
for us to plan any over-all settlement as long as
Revolutionary characteristics of movement endure.
Each Soviet move calculated to weaken non-communist
world with view to its eventual destruction.
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/19: CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402400005-4 2.
Hence policy one of perpetual probing to find
weak spot in non-communist world -- when they
find stiff opposition, they engage in tactical
retreats.
(b) Second: All present Soviet policy
tempered by their view that they not yet ready
to take on USA and allies in general war --
Still fearful of our industrial and nuclear
striking power; also unwilling risk any adventure
which would risk their own control over govt
apparatus. Even Russian victory which destroyed
basis of power of Soviet ruling caste unacceptable.
Will this be true in 5 - 10 years when
atomic "enoughness"?
(4) Details of policy within this framework
influenced by the policy makers and the home base --
their policy making and policy executing machinery.
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(a) Stalin demise and decline of Stalin
cult -- the new collective leadership:
Malenkov -- Krushev -- (describe K) --
the new role of the army (?) Zhukov - Konev,
etc.
(b) Beria -,- The decline and reorganization
of MVD - "keep off grass".
(c) Molotov -- Control of foreign policy.
(5) The internal policy base
(a) The new look economic policy:
Modification of emphasis on heavy industry
toward better balance -- Production more
consumers goods - use of gold for foreign
purchases. -- In their policy cannot wholly
disregard the "people".
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(6) Agricultural polity:
(a) Diversion of manpower from industry
to agriculture and agricultural machinery.
(b) Partial failure of "collective farm"
system -- Food supply seems problem. Have
stopped certain massive projects reforestation,
irrigation, canals.
(7) Military program -- Soviet "new look" (?).
Budget shows decrease from 110 to 100 Billion rubles
but "national economy" up from 192 to 216.
Atomic program -- (August tests)
Guided missiles
Long-range bombers
Submarines
But still have ground forces sufficient
dominate Europe & through China Theater SEA.
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(8) On this gov't domestic and military
base, build foreign policy, which has these features:
I. Divide Western World.
(a) Relax tensions -- sweetness and
light (but query whether tough Berlin tactics,
particularly toward Austria, and break
with Australia indicates some change. )
(b) Use atomic blackmail -- Our allies
forced deter us from any use atomic weapons.
Following from Mikoyan's speech April 28:.
"Therefore, the latest type of weapons,
the atom and hydrogen bombs, which in the hands
of the aggressors constitute the means for
unleashing war, in our hands, are reliable
means for defending peace, since they are
tying the hands of those who would want to
fight. "
5.
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6.
(c) Foster neutralist sentiment England,
France, Italy, India, etc.
Portray U. S. 1Ax. as seeking a war
that will first destroy Europe.
(d) Propaganda weapon -- B. W. campaign --
U.S. as warmonger.
II. Hold all acquired positions.
No communized territory abandoned
(a bit of Korea).
No relaxation of hold on Satellites
(attitude re East Germany and Austria. )
III. The policy of partition.
Divide countries artificially and then
subvert (Germany -- Korea -- maybe Indo-China).
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IV. Use of Communist parties -- Trade
unions and front organizations.
(From Comintern to Cominform, to
Front organizations).
Seek shield Kremlin from direct
participation.
Force us use blue chips while they use white.
V. Develop Asia nationalism through grand
alliance with China.
(Discuss "uneasy" control of Chinese ally --
apprehension China may go too far). Chou's demand
"all foreign military bases in Asia be removed."
Effect of Nationalism issue in Indo-China,
VI. Block German and Jap rearmament.
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VII. _ Apply all these pressures - - up to but
not beyond point where real risk of war -- until
Soviet industrial potential and nuclear stockpile
adequate -- gambling in meantime on Western
depression, disintegration or division and on real
successes in cold war.
(9) Weaknesses in Soviet policy structure.
(a) Total lack of confidence among
top Soviet leadership..
(b) Western Satellites held down by
force -- uncertain allies in any military
adventure. Growing evidence of disillusionment
with communism.
(c) 'China - - an ally difficult to control.
(d) Industrial base still inadequate for
major war adventures.
8.
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SECRET 0
(e-) Shortage of trained manpower to
7 carry out their grandiose political schemes.
(f) Defections.
SECRET
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CONCLUSION.
The success of policy depends on a variety
of factors. Obviously policy must be realistic
and it must be backed with adequate force. But
one of the prime requisites is initiative. If you
can force the opponent to frame his policy to
meet yours, you have a vast advantage. If your
policy is merely an answer to moves of the opponent's
own choosing, you are sure to come off second best.
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/19: CIA-RDP80MO1009AO01402400005-4 11 .
c F
This is exactly the dilemma we are faced
with in Southeast Asia today. What the Soviet and
Communist China will dare to do there depends upon
the strength and cohesion of the non-communist
group. (Unfortunately can't call it coalition
today. Each side has power -- who will seize
the initiative ?
The answer to this question will be fraught
with important consequences for the future of
American policy in the contest with the expansionist
move of the Kremlin.
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Quotes from Krushev's speech of 27 April 1954.
I. Bureaucracy.
"It is essential to reduce correspondence
and inflated reporting, eliminate mercilessly
bureaucratism and state machinery and carry out
better work . . . with a smaller number of people. "
"We are still spending too much on
inflated staffs in various. departments. Is it not
obvious such a disgusting state of affairs ought to
end?"
12.
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II. Overstaffing
"It is sufficient to say that in the USSR
Ministry of Agriculture, there are 422 administrations,
departments, and sections. The reorganization
has been carried out in such a way that there is
one chief for every two officials of the Ministry.
(Animation in the Hall). "
13.
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III. Tax Collecting.
"Is it not indeed a crying shame that in
a number of rayons of the Karelo-Finnish SSR, after
reductions in the tax collecting system, there are
still so many agents that their salaries are more
than the amount of taxes collected in the rayons ?
(Animation in the Hall)
"For instance, in Kalevala Rayon, the
total amount of a year's salaries of tax collection
agents amounts to 56, 000 rubles while the total of
taxes collected by these agents in the rayon amounts
only to 55, 000 rubles. (Laughter)
"In Sudyarsky Rayon, the total amount
of a year's salaries of tax collection agents is over
26,000 rubles while the taxes collected by them
amount to 20,000 rubles. (Laughter)
"We are still spending too much on
inflated staffs in various departments and institutions.
Is it not obvious that such a disgusting state of
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14.
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IV. Filling out of Forms.
"Scores of various forms of assessment
of competition have been laid down at Kharkov
bicycle plant. According to but one of these forms,
concerning the introduction of advanced labor methods,
every workshop must submit a monthly report in
which it is necessary to reply to 1, 000 questions
(Laughter in the Hall) Scores of workers are
sweating over the compilation and propagation of
these reports, being taken away from useful work.
This is a most harmful bureaucratic undertaking.
It is essential to decisively liquidate such red
tape and such a generally stereotyped attitude
toward the organization of competition.
15.
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