COMMENTS ON US VISIT BY A. I. MIKOYAN TO SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS, 31 JANUARY 1959.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A000801140001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 31, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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Subject: Comments on US. Visit by A. I. Mikoyan to Soviet
Party Congress, 31 January 1959.
. . Comrades, one of the many questions I was asked
at meetings and gatherings in the United States was why lately
we have again attacked the antiparty faction. The people
asking this question referred to the December (1958) plenary
meeting of the central eommittee which concerned itself with
agriculture and to the period following the plenum. Was this
not because the opposition had grown stronger and constituted
some sort of a menace, they wanted to know.
I replied that this was not at all the case. Our party
is completely united and there is no struggle going oft. The
faction has not increased by a single person in this time.
We thought it necessary to speak of the antiparty faction and
we do so at this congress for the sole purpose of proving
again with facts how wrong and detrimental the political
position of this faction was and in order to underline again
that the Leninist central committee was quite right in fighting
the faction.
There has never before been such inner consolidation of
all the forces of Soviet society or such organization and
ideological unity in our party and such close contact with
the masses as there is today. If anyone doubts this, I said
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to my questioners, he should wait until the 21st congress
which will be an unprecedented demonstration of the unity
and solidarity of the Communist party and the Soviet nation.
Of course, the gentlemen who asked this question did
not do so because they were sorry for us and were concerned
lest we have difficulties in our party. Still 1 felt I
should (warn) them so that they should not have wrong illusions
and then be disappointed .
Many questions were asked in the United States about
relations between the Soviet Union and China. We may assume
that the questions sprang from the revisionist anti-China
propaganda of the Yugoslav press which lately has been doing
some wishful thinking and insinuating that some sort of
differences are cropping up between the USSR and China. In
this case also, of course, it was not a desire that we should
be close friends with China that prompted the question. No,
it was a desire to ascertain whether there was not at least
a small crack in our friendship and whether some sort of
political plans could not be built on it.
I replied that apparently the gentlemen asking these
questions had been dreaming happy dreams that, by some sort
of magic, differences might arise in the socialist camp, say
between the USSR and China. But I said it was only their
dream, a dream that would never come true. .
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; ;
; ;:d [.)!';f' '0 0i LH
;',.1.)()"t
pe.:)ple and blEAn. f.)n, and it has repoi' Lcd our ta
vilth 1j3 statesmen. I should like to inform the congress of
main conclusions and impressions of that trip.
As for what impressed me most in the United "Itates,
should say it was the fact that both ordinary Americans and the
businessmen I talked with, looked upon me as an emissary OT{
the Soviet Union, although I was there unofficially. Their
attitude was very friendly. There seemed to be a great desire
to learn what Soviet people want and what we are striving for,
Many questions were asked, some of them indicating
prejudices and a wrong impression of our policy and our
country. The explanations we gave met with profound under-
standing. We felt that the Americans wished to understand
us correctly. They also made an effort to see that I under-
stood them correctly. I for my part gave the proper attention
to the questions they raised and listened attentively to what
they said, without evading any questions, not even the most
ticklish, It would have been wrong to evade the ticklish
questions; I answered them as best I coulth
wish to note that the atmosphere at the close of the
4.at1xerings and meetings was always much better and more
friendly than at the beginning, because the friendly exchange
o opinions removed much that was Superficial and accidental,
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We explained the Soviet Union's position on the. issues raised
and as a result there was a greater feeling of friendship.
It should also beusaid that as our statements and the answers
we gave to questions at the outset of our visit reached the
US public, there was less and less that was superficial and
accidental at our later meetiAis and there were fewer of what
you might call unpleasant questions.
We had expected the Americans to be nice to us but, to
tell the truth, we had not expected such a friendly reception
and such great interest in our conversations on the part of
public circles and the captains of industry and finance. We
were pleased by their attitude toward us and tbeir desire to
understand the Soviet Union's position. We sensed the long-
ing for peace of the American people and most businessmen.
We could see tAat they are fed up with the cold war and want
real peace on this earth and good peaceful relations between
the Soviet Union and the United States.
Americans realize what a terrible thing a world war would
be under present conditions with such deadly means as nuclear
and rocket weapons. Business circles are already aware that,
before business could be made out of war, under present con-
ditions, US business and the people themselves may perish
in the flames of war.
Though I had no particular plans, I thought I might have
talks with members of the US Government, the more so since
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Mr. Dulles, on his own initiative, stated before I left Moscow
that he would be prepared to receive mo on my ai rival in the
,Jnited States. Then it turned out that most
the US Government found the time and felt it
me. I had many long talks, in the course of
of the members of
necessary to meet
which we .discussed
major international problems and Soviet-US relations. The talks
were frank and very proper. There seemed to be a desire on both
sides to understand each other. No _ticklish questions were evaded,
and each side listened patiently and attentively to the other.
The President and other US officials emphasized that it was the
duty of Soviet and US statesmen to try to find a-course we could
both follow that would lead to better relations between us, To
this, I said that it fully coincided with the views of the So-
viet Government.
US statesmen said that their government seeks to be con-
ciliatory in the hope that the United States and the USSR may
live in peace and each can work for higher living standards and
greater prosperity in its own way. In these conversations we
exchanged opinions about a large number of international prob-
lems and both sides found the exchange beneficial. We were, of
course, pleased to hear President Eisenhower, Vice President
Nixon, and Secretary of State Dulles say that they want world
peace and good relations with the USSR, that they have no ag-
ossive intentions with regard to our country, and that they
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favor extonEilve cultural ties and contacts at all levels, as
President Eisenhower sa ically and at great length,
I assured the US leaders that the USSR wants peace and
friendship with the United States as much as it always has and
that we feel certain good relations betweenthe USSR and the
United States will promote universal peace and good peaceful
relations between all nations.
When the 'conversations turned to concrete disputed aspects
of international politics, questions on which the positions of
our two countries are far apart, the US statesmen explained
their position at great length and also,it seemed to me, showed
a proper understanding of the position of the USSR and of the
arguments which I used. The conversations on such topics usually
ended with the more or less standard phrase of the US leaders
that they had a common policy with their allies which they could
not change and that it had the support of both the Democratic
and the Republican parties.
This was said, for example, about the Berlin problem and
about the question of a peace treaty with Germany. To this,
said that a policy that did not change when circumstances de-
manded a change was not necessarily a good policy, I emphasized
that this was the way matters stood at present with US policy
on Berlin and a peace treaty with Germany, The US leaders also
said that their policy on Berlin and a peace treaty with Germany
was bipartisan and that we should not expect it to change if the
Democrats came to- power, and they asked me to convey this fact
to the Soviet Government and Comrade Khrushehevo
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I may add here that Mr. Harriman too, who no longer
occupies an official position, and apparently not only at
his own initiative, remarked to me during a convers tion
at his home, in the presence of a small group of New York
captains of finance and industry on whose behalf he was
speaking, as he said, that all of them, and there were
people from both parties there, fully
present position of the United States
armament. I want to note th t in our
supported the
on Berlin
nd
dis-
convers tions, I no
longer heard the US side talking of a policy of contain-
ment, roll-back, or liberation. On the contrary, both
the President and the Secretary of State said that they
do not consider it their aim, right, or duty to pronounce
an anathema against Communism and that the United States
does not wish to interfere in the intern :.l affairs of the
Socialist countries.
We may conclude from these statements of the Presi-
dent and Secretary of State that now they are inclined
to recognize the principle of peaceful coexistence of
countries with different social and politic .l systems.
If that is the case, it is very significant for peace.
But these statements must be followed by action to bear
them out, and we have every right to expect such ction.
I should like to call attention to still another
important point: in contrast to'e rlier times, the US
statesmen expressed a readiness to negotiate the disputed
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issues. This was very important because we have always felt that
all disputed international problems can be settled by negotiation.
I endeavored to make this point clear in my conversations with US
statesmen. I have already said that both sides found the exchange
of opinion beneficial. It was natural to expect that after that
the US Government would take advantage of the favorable atmosphere
created during these meetings, and would also map out moves to
bring the cold War to an end, knowing that the Soviet Union has
always been opposed to the cold war, and is working to eliminate
Ito
I made this point at my news conference in Moscow on returning
from the United States. But even before I left the United St tes,
apparently when it became known to what extent the US public had
reacted favorably to our statements, our desire for friendship,
and for an end to the cold war, this frightened some in America.
After my departure, the American press began to c 11 for a
campaign that would in some w y offset the positive effect this
trip had exerted on American public opinion. The first shot was
fired by .former President Truman, who accused American businessmen
of having shown me too w rm a welcome. What particularly 1 rmed
him, he wrote, was the desire of certain prominent US industrial-
ists and financiers to surround the visiting deputy soviet pre-
mier with a degree of kind attention nd worldly brilliance which
would result in pressure on the White House. Truman said he
feared that these American financiers and industrialists, swayed
by the possibility of new deals, would be unable to weigh properly
their interests against the national interests, and the security
of the country as a whole.
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We all remember that it was during Truman's presidency
that Soviet-American relations began to deteriorate ; Fe cold
war started. But now he has gone to entirely ridiculous ex-
tremest since when, indeed, and in What way, can rapproche-
ment between our countries or the hospitality shown to a So-
viet representative by the businessmen of the United States
threaten that country's national security? As for the mood
of the American people, it is apparent that the cold war has
already thawed considerably. But the (prongs) of the old
war strategists are still so strong that we must not yet
commit ourselves to any far-reaching conclusion concerning
retreat on the part of the American circles interested in
fanning the cold War. For example, hints are already appear-
ing in the American press that the businessmen who extended
us their hospitality may even be called to account for it.
Matters have reached a pass where very prominent US Gov-
ernment spokesmen and specialists in that field have now
joined this campaign to fan up the cold War. Two of Secretary
of State Dulles' able assistants, Dillon and Murphy, went on
countrywide tours, taking in the cities I visited, and addressed
the same audiences before whom I spoke, filling their speeches
with the spirit of the cold war and throwing mad water on the
heads of the business circles that began to feel a softer breeze
warming up our relations. But that, evidently, did not yield
the desired results, for Dulles has since drawn his heavy ar-
tillery into the field.
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In this connection, it is interesting to note that in the
telegram he sent to us on our departure from the United States
on 20 January, which reached me in the plane, Dulles said that
the President was hopeful that a stable atmosphere of peace and
friendship, essential to the welfare of the peoples themselves,
would continue in the interests of both our nations. This
telegram, which actually sums up the results of our meetings,
expresses the hope that an atmosphere of peace and friendship
will develop in our relations. That would seem to place a con-
siderable responsibility on the American side to strive for
rapprochement between our countries.
We replied to the telegram in the same spirit from the US
military base at Argentia, when the plane we were returning
on made a forced landing. The statement we made at the press
conference in Moscow was also made in the same spirit. Then to
our general surprise, on 27 January, the day our congress opened,
Dulles made a statement at the press conference to the effect
that he saw no signs of a sincere desire on the part of the So-
viet Union to end the cold war and that the Soviet Union alleged-
ly intended to continue the cold war and seek victory in that
war, Dulles put it as though he was the one who wanted the cold
war to end while the Soviet Union wanted it to go on.
In that statement he also distorted the Soviet Union's peace-
ful proposals, Citing our proposal for the development of normal
trade in peaceful commodities, he charged the Soviet people with
making that proposal to give itself and International Communism
an advantage in the cold war and win a victory in that war, He
did not say that to me. There was nothing to that effect in his
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telegram. Dulles puts everything upside down. We did not
start the cold war and we do not want it to continue. We
want to end it immediately and without striving for any victory.
What is Dulles after? He claimed that the Soviet Union
does not want the cold war to end. This unfounded claim, in
whose support no arguments are offered, can only be interpreted
as emanating from the sole desire to turn back the progress in
American public opinion which has been calling more and more
vigorously for rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the
termination of the cold war.
Nor can we help feeling surprised at another of Dulles'
statements at the press conference in which he expressed the
hope that Mr. Mikoyan's trip would not serve as a basis for mis-
taken calculations on the part of the Soviet Government in ap-
praising the mood in the United States. In one breath, Dulles
says, and correctly, that the impression I have gathered concern-
ing the attitudes which prevail in the United States was a true
one, and, in the next, he expresses diffidence concerning the
same question, and throws the shadow of suspicion over the for-
eign policy of the Soviet Union.
All the Soviet proposals on international problems are
directed toward peace and the easing of international tension.
Surely it must be clear to Dulles that our proposal concerning
a peace treaty for Germany, for instance, is aimed at doing away
with the remnants of war in Europe. Then why has Dulles come
out against the peace treaty with Germany? Can he not see that
absence of a peace treaty with Germany does not consolidate the
peace, but, on the contrary, creates an atmosphere of war? Is
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not he himself beginning to get worried about the activity of
the excessively belligerent West German militarists?
can say more: in talking to Dulles, we touched on the
question of the threat of another war. When I asked him wheth-
er he really believed that we want to wage war, whether he be-
lieved there was A threat of war from the Soviet Union, he
told me outrilthtthat he did not believe this was the case,
In turn, Dulles asked me whether I believed there was
such a threat from the United States. I said that in my opin-
ion the United States did not want war at the present time,
but that we entertained serious suspicions in connection with
the existence of US military bases around the Soviet Union,
with America's efforts to conclude military pacts with our
southern neighbors, and with the policy of resurrecting
German militarism, and so forth. Dulles tried to dispel these
suspicions.
should also like to touch on the recent speech of Vice
President Nixon, made at Fordham College after my departure
from the United States, In this speech, he goes at length
into the substance of my talks with him, which entitles me to
say a few words on the question, too. Speaking to me, Nixon
said that be thought it important that the statements made on
both sides at government level should be distinguished by mod-
eration and objectivity; that it was necessary to refrain from
careless words, let alone careless actions. Going over to various
concrete matters, Nixon supported the principle of noninter-
ference in the domestic affairs of other states
It is to be regretted that Nixon considered it possible
in his speech to interfere most unceremoniously in the domestic
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affairs of the European countries of people's de.flocracics, al-
t'...1Oup;h it ',,!ust be noted that when speain t o iioi and
otHs: statesmen declared that they did not waat to iatee
a these countcies domestic affairs.
Ia my conversation with Nixon, I fully concurred vi La
on the undesirability of both careless actions and
V
csawo'l..ds and with hiS view that the statements on both siCe!-.;
should be distinguished by ,ilodeation and objecti_vity.
; 0 \'; 11.5 atId exoOVinileed man, who
a tai ,
;;Lt(JSM011
17,00t his own coufeet words about of
It is surprising that such a man does not see how he places
Pmself in an embarrassing position I should iie to 1.10,)C "LIAt
this was just a relapse to an old habit, that this statement of
Nixon slipped off his tongue in the heat of oratory, and that in
the future he will succeed in keeping to the reasonable rules nC
;-JeLavior of which he spoke so elouently in his eonversaloh
In ape ing CO RIC, both Nixon and Cull. es s(d au
a hoot [ateaatoual Com,ouals.A. hi.ic :!cre given to ati
metfons.of instance; in My A:onveiloation i CtL NiNO(1, --
plete Insolvency and baselessaess of statements to Lhe eU,:ect
that the 3oviet Union wants to make use of the Communist 91oveffient
in other countries to expand the area of its influence and under!)-ine the governments of these countries was made clear to him,
-U was stated that we, as Communists, sympathize with the Com-
munists of other countries, but our socialist state in no case
Mteads to interfere in any form in the affairs of other states
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or in the affairs of their political pa:Li s, inclusingthc
Communist party.
This question was also explained with exhaustive clarity
to Dulles in our conversations, It appeared at the time that
both Nixon and Dulles understood our position, but now they are
again taking their stands on this issue as though no explana-
tion had been given. It follows that Dulles fears Communism,
but fearing Communism means fearing the American people, for
there is no ie other than the American people to establish a
Communist system in the United States. It is the American peo-
ple, and no one else, who will decide when and how this is to
be done.
I said in my conversations in th United States that, as
a Communist, I regret that there are so few Communists in Amer-
ica, but there is no way in which I could help them. The ideals
of Communism originated in the world prior to Soviet power, and
not in Russia They will live and advance in keeping with his-
torical laws of development, no matter who takes action against
them and no matter what action is taken against them, This ques-
tion should not be confused with the foreign policy of the social-
ist countries, If this is understood and viewed as the starting
point, it will be possible to find a common tongue on this bas.
and to secure peaceful coexistence I formed the impression
that the American statesmen understood this.
My conversations with statemen in the United States brought
to light differences on trade issues. I had only one meeting
with Dillon,; deputy Under secretary of state for economic af-
fairs, before my departure from the United States, since at the
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beginning of my tour Dillon was in Canada. My conversation
with Dilloi. s interesting. I must say that I formed a good
impression of him. He is young, experienced, and knows his
job. I will not conceal the fact that at times the conversa-
tion became quite heated. These were not negotiations, of
course, but we exchanged views on trade matters frankly for
the purpose of ascertaining each other's views in order to
pave the way for agreement in the future. After my departure
from the United States, Dillon made a speech in the cold-war
spirit. In this speech, he raised many questions of Soviet
foreign trade policy, distorting several aspects.
0 ing to a shortage of time, it is impossible for me to
answer all these qu stions now. I expect that our minister
of foreign trade, Comrade Patolichev, will give a detailed
reply in the press to Dillon's speech. If you listen to Dillon,
and to Dulles, who also raised this question a few days ago in
his speech, you might think that th United States places no
barriers in the way of developing Soviet-American trade, and
that the solution of this problem depends entirely GT the posi-
tion of the USSR_ This is a typical case of an attempt to lay
the blame at thW wrong dbiarest summer, in a reply to Khru-
shchev's letter seeking to break the deadlock in Soviet-Ameri-
can trade, President Eisenhower gave a favorable reply on the
whole, and said that he was instructing the State Department
to examine our concrete proposals and to reply to them.
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Since practically eight months have gone by and no reply
has been forthcoming from the State Department, it was naturally
interesting to me to hear from Dillon what was being done to
fulfill the President's instructions. Dillon tried to justify
their delay by referring to political events in various par'.s
of the world; he mentioned the events in the Far East in addi-
tion to the Berlin question. This explanation of Dillon's alone
shows that in questions of trade the American Government is not
guided by business considerations but ties these questions to
the different controversial political problems that spring up in
the international situation. Prompted by the same motives, the
US Government undertook a number of measures to hinder trade b
tween our countries as soon as the cold war was started' every-
one r members the unilateral US abrogation in 1951, on purely
political motives, of the Sovi t-Am rican trade agreement con-
cluded in 1937 during President Roosevelt's term of office.
This was a good agreement, forming the juridical basis for normal
trade exchange between our countries.
BY abrogating this agr ement, the US Government discriminated
against the Soviet Union. By way of illustration, I can say that
in this connection US import duties on certain commoditi s of ours
became much higher than on similar items imported from other coun-
tries. The duty imposed on our manganese ore was boosted four
times, on ferrochrome and ferromanganese three times, on certain
items of sawmill output four times, on birch plywood three times,
tobacco two times, alcholic beverages--including vodka--four
times, and canned salmon nearly two times the duty charged on the
same items imported from other countries.
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By the way, I expressed my surprise to Dillon at the fact
that they place our vodka, which enjoys a brisk demand in the
United States, in a discriminative position, while they pro-
duce their own vodka at home under the name of Russian vodka.
I jokingly added that the Americans did not ask our permission
for licenses for its production. Dillon replied that Soviet
vodka, to his regret, was much better than the vodka made in
the United States. I noted in reply that by expressing his
regrets he was in this particul r case thinking in the spirit
of the cold war.
Of course, vodka is not the decisive item of our exports,
although we are, of course, ready to sell it abroad in any
quantity, the more so since the consumption of vodka here in
this country has fallen sharply. But Soviet furs, which h ve
won world-wide renown, are an important item of export. However,
in 1951 the United States banned the import of certain types
of our fur. At the same time, the Americans banned the import
of our canned crabmeat claiming it was made with the aid of
the labor of Japanese prisoners of war nd Soviet prisoners.
The ridiculousness of these claims are obvious to all.
In order to cre te normal conditions for our trade with
the United States it is necessary for the United States to re-
move the discriminatory duties on Soviet goods which are tradi-
tional items of US import. It is necessary to restore order
so that the same duty would pply to our goods in the United
States as to the goods of other countries. This would enable
us to increase the sales of goods in the United States, and to use
the dollars ,earned to place more orders with US firms. Dillon id
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Alot ff,reo with this pronosal, with restoring the trade agreement.
Dillon stated in his speech that it could not he ex,pocted
that the Jnited 6tates would supply the USSR with moans of warfare,
The same was said by Dulles in his speech. He, for instance,
claims that we want to buy strategic goods in the United States
;:tnil what is more, make our own choice. It is surprising how
statesmen can say such things after the meetings and conversa-
tions that took place. They well realize that we do not need
their arms and did not intend to purchase arms or any other
strategic goods, that we have enough of our own and of a higher
quality than they have. We speak of trade in peacetime commodities
in our proposals for an expansion of Soviet-US trade,
Dulles and Dillon object to giving the USSR most-favored-
nation treatment. Our proposals to restore normal conditions
for Soviet-US trade, that is, the conditions that existed before
the cold war, enVisage nothing exceptional or different from the
conditions which exist in our trade with other capitalist coun-
tries, with Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Sweden, and
others, At is known, these countries, together with many others,
have most-favored7nation- agreements with the USSR. It is also
known that our trade with these countries is steadily expanding,
14 1958, the trade turnover of the USSR with the capitalist coun-
tries of Europe and the United States nearly trebled compared with
11:-)50.
The only exception was the United States, but they are to
blame for this, not we. In the light of these facts, there is
absolutely no ground to Dillon's claim of a certain unreliability
in trade relations with us or to his claims that at times we stop,
then resume, trade with capitalist countries
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'hy are these on Lively unfounded allegations euu
The UFM has long-term agreements on mutual trade deliveies
covering three to five years with a large number of capitalist
countries. These agreements are being fulfilled satisfactorily.
They cover a broad list of goods for delivery on both sides.
are prepared to sit down at one table with the Americans and
come to terms in a businesslike manner on a concrete program
for mutual deliveries for 3, 5, and even 7 years on normal trade
terms if, of course, the US Government consents.
The USSR stands for an international division of labor, not
only between the countries of the world socialist system hut also
between the socialist and all the other countries, including the
Western countries. Dillon claimed afterwards that we only \,ra it
to trade on our own terms. Yet all the statements made by Dillon
indicate that he considers trade between our countries to be pos-
C!
only on terms restricting this trade, terms which have
established unilaterally by the Americans. During my convevs t,on
with Dillon, I told him that there are two axioms which comprimise
the immutable truth: the first is, bad political relations do nGt
promote a development of trade, and the second is that good trade
promotes good political relations. Dillon agreed.
So you see, we did not only argue. If the United States did
not connect trade problems with current international political
problems such as the Far East or Berlin--after all, you canlot
buy or sell Berlin or the Far East,? Both sides could study the
views we exchanged during my meeting with Dillon and make that:
meeting the starting point for a mutually acceptable lasis or
US,-,Soviet trade,
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This Congress will take decisions on the seven-year plan
for the development of the national economy and culture of the
USSR. But now no one, not even in the capitalist countries,
doubts whether the Soviet economic plans are realistic. That
is a great achievement. However, there are some who try to
frighten businessmen with our plan. Such people inspire mis-
givings about whether the USSR will buy anything from anyone.
They say that trade with the USSR has no prospects and Mat all
this follows from the autocracy they ascribe to us, but this
is absolutely wrong.
It is refuted by our policy and by the history of our for-
eign trade. Suffice it to say that the seven-year plan provides
for the possibility of doubling our trade with the capitalist
countries. Besides, experience throughout history indicates that
the more highly developed a country is industrially the greater
,r() its needs and opportunities for extensive foreign trade. The
scare is also raised that the USSR will advance its economy to
such a degree that it will begin to flood world markets with low-
priced goods in order to undermine capitalist economy.
This is just as much nonsense as the other assertions. We
never engaged in dumping and always opposed it in principle as
an unhealthy practice. These fabrications come from the same
sources that engage themselves in such impermissible methods.
Our foreign trade organizations try to make as much as possible
on the articles they sell. By the way, they are given bonuses
when they get good prices. After all, why should our country
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?
sell goods cheaply when we can get full value for them and use
the proceeds for the benefit of our people?
Unfortunately, such prejudices and erroneous arguments are
widespread in the capitalist countries. I explained this in
the United States and it seemed to me that to a certain degree
I cleared up these misunderstandings. We wish to trade, and
we trade according to the generally accepted rules of international
commerce, according to which the capitalists themselves trade.
They also say that when the USSR is still stronger economical-
ly it will be able to expund'its cooperation with the economically
underdeveloped countries,? claiming that this will be a threat to
the Western powers. We db not see any threat in that. If you
like, it will be a sort of competition in cooperation with the
economically underdeveloped countries in advancing their economy.
This will compel the capitalist countries and their monopolies to
grant credit and trade with those countries on the same fair con-
ditions we apply and which are advantageous to the underdeveloped
countries. There is nothing unfair in that, though the capitalists
would sustain certain losses.
But, as I stated in America, they have grabbed so much in
those countries that by God's justice, which they refer to so
often, it would be no sin to return part of it. When you go
beyond the frontiers of our country, you feel especially strong
about the grandeur and might of the USSR. Our people can be
proud of the dynamic, high-principled, consistent, and flexible
foreign policy of the Soviet Government and the Communist party
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?
which fights ?stuPPorn-Y, stPP by step, to dispel international
, ,
tension, to eliminate the cold war, and Lo ensure peace an
friendship among ala aat i-ons, Now it is not only our pegple,
hit aUo the socialiwt countries and our friends in the West
,
who 4PPrecip.te our Pel,iPY an,d WheLky approve of it .,.4
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