NIE 23-54: "PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST GERMANY"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A004100020019-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2013
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 3, 1954
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3 NoveMber 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)
Colonel Robert O'Brien, USA (G4)
Captain B. E. Wiggin, USN (ONI) ?D
Colonel William S. Boyd, USAF (AFOIN-2B2)
Colonel Floyd E. Dunn, USA
SUBJECT NIE 23-54: "Probable. Developments in West
Germany"
REkERENCE Item 31, IAC-D-1/9 dated 7 October 1954
In view of the fact that the deadline for completion of
this estimate is relatively short (14 December), we request
that your representative meet with us at 2:00, Friday, 5 No-
vember, to discuss these terms.
Distribution "B"
6_
PAUL A. BOREI:
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I
?COECLASSIFED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: T$ s c
NEXT REVI7Vvi DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 11.NWIA REVIEWER: C4 f5-57
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Mr'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3 Novenber 1954
SUBJECT: TERMS OF RE.tolikENCE: NIE 23-54: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS
IN WEST GERMANY
THE PROBTRM
To estimate the present situation and probable developments
in West Germany.
NOTES
i. NIE 23-54 is designed to revise and update NIE-82,
"The Outlook in West Germany" (17 July 1953), which
ettimated probable developments over the next five
to 10 years.
We believe that substantial portions of NIE-82 will
not require revision. The new Terms of Reference call
for contributions only on those sections which seem to
require updating or extensive rewriting in the light
of recent developments. However, contributors should
also feel free to propose the revision of other
sections if they believe it necessary.
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Lit. Except for Section these tetras of reference are
prepared on the assumption that the London and Paris
accords are ratified.
iv. The terms of reference are a revision of the terms
distributed to the Agencies on 20 September 1954.
QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
I.DOMESTIC POLITICAL TRENDS (paras. 13-22, NIE 82)
. _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _
The more general portions of this section(paras. 13-14, 16,
20-22) appear to remain generally accurtte although some updating
(paras. 15,17) and elimination (para. 18) will be necessary. The
comparison of political party strengths (para. 14, footnote 5)
should .be updated to reflect the 1953 elections.
A. What is the state of Adenauer's present and pros-
pective control over the coalition? What is the
likelihood that the present coalition will break
up and that the CDU will attempt to govern alone?
What would be the effect of such developments on
West Germany's political stability? In the event
of Adenauer's departure from off!ce, who would be
likely to succeed him? With what effect on West
Germany's political stability?
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B. What is the possibility of a CDU-SPD "grand coalition"
prior to the next general election? What are likely
future trends in SPD policy and popular support? In
FDP policy and popular support?
C. Are there any indications of a significant decline
of popular confidence in gov,3rnment by moderate
political parties? What is the outlook for the
predominance of moderate constitutional forces?
D. Is a sharp increase in nationalist feeling likely?
Under what circumstances might it arise? To what
extent would such an increase affect the attitudes
of the major West German political parties? What
domestic political actions would Adenauer or his
successor be likely to take in the event of
rising West German nationalism? Which parties
would be likely to benefit from increasing nationalism?
Would the Communists benefit?
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E. Is there any significant Communist infiltration of the
coalition parties Or the SPD?
F. What will be the im.pact on the political situation
of the re-establishment of military forces? Are the
professional military leaders likely to assert a
political role? Will the Bundestag retain control
of military affairs, or might the military, leaders
consolidate a separate power center? What are the
prospects for extreme nationalists taking control of
the military establishment? ?
SOCIAL IsslEp (paras. 23-26)
This section appears to remain generally adequate.
A. Are there indications of renewed anti-Semitism or of
serious antagonisms over the confessional schools?
Are charges of CDU clericalism likely to develop into
a significant issue?
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B. Have the attitudes of West German labor or the role
of labor unions changed since 1953? Is management
resistance to labor's demands likely to lead to a
significant breach bt" labor-management relations and
to any protracted. period of instability?
C. What progress has been made in the assimilation of
refugee elements into the West German social pattern?
D. Will the creation of military forces lead to significant
social changes?
ECONOMIC TRENDS (paras. 27-33)
This section still appears accurate, although updating
of economic data is necessary.
A. Internal
1. Has the outlook for German economic prosperity
changed since ME 82? What will be the impact of
rearmament on the West German economy? What
percent of GNP will be expanded on the military
establishment?
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ivoyamitA,
2. Are the government's conservative economic
policies likely to continue to satisfy the
West German public? Is the government likely
to sell any of its industrial enterprises to
private interests? What is the likely course
of West German industrial organization?
3. What will be the availability of private West
German investment capital? What are the
prospects of private foreign capital being
offered and accepted?
4. Would industrial wage increases resulting from
labor agitation be likely to cause any sub-
stantial weakening of West Germany's competitive
position abroad?
B. Foreign
1. By what means are the West Germans improving
their foreign economic position? Is West Germany's
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willingness to extend highly favorable credit terms
to foreign customers likely to threaten West
Germany's domestic economic foundations? What
would be the economic effect of a world recession
on West Germany's competitive position in foreign
markets?
2. Does it appear likely that West Germany will
achieve economic hegemony over Western Europe?
What will be West German governmental and
popular attitudes toward continued participation
in the coal and steel community? What are the
prospects for broad expansion of Franco-German
economic cooperation?
3. What is the outlook for further West German
economic penetration in the Middle East? In
other foreign markets? Does West German
competition threaten seriously the foreign
economic position of the US, the UK, or Japan?
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IV. REARMAMENT
'',4,9610141PPW
The statement of West Germany's military potential in
paras. 34-38 still appears accurate, but this section requires
revision in the light of the London and Paris accords.
A. How much time will West Germany require to reach
presently scheduled force goals? By what date will
the German forces equal those of the US and the UK
in military effectiveness? What are prospects for
effective Allied control of the size, disposition,
equipment, and employment of the German forces?
B. What is the attitude of the public, the government,
and the political party leaders toward re-establishment
of forces? What will their attitudes be when rearm-
ament is under way? What is their attitude toward
NATO and Western European Union? Toward integrating
the West European defense forces? Are serious West
German objections likely to develop toward the limita-
tions on rearmament and arms manufacture? Is West
Germany likely to seek to evade these limitations?
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V. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CAPAEILTTIES (paras, 39-40)
We believe that the estimative judgments in this section
remain accurate.
VI. PROBABLE FOREIGN POLICY (paras. 41-62)
Some parts of this aectiOn appear generally valid but
considerable updating and revision seems required in most
parts.
A. General Orientation
1. In order of priority, what are West Germany's
current foreign policy objectives? How will the
recovery of sovereignty and military powers
affect these objectives? How will implementation
of the London and Paris accords shape the course
of West German foreign policy?
2. What role will West Germany seek to play in NATO?
Is West Germany likely eventually to attempt to
change the defensive character of NATO? Will it
attempt to dreg the other Western Powers into an
aggressive policy toward Soviet-dominated German
territory?
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111 ?
3. Will a sovereign West Germany seek to influence
the West to adopt more cordial relations with
the Bloc?
B. Reunification of Germany
1. How strong is the West German desire for reunifica-
tion? What are the trends regarding this desire?
Do the West Germans believe that reunification is
attainable through negotiations among the four
occupying powers? Do they believe that reunifica-
tion will be advanced or retarded as a result of
rearmament?
2. Would the present tonn Government oppose Soviet
proposals to reunify Germany, on condition that
Germany be neutralized? What will be the position
of the lesser coalition parties and the SPD on
reunification? Is it still likely that most Germans
would favor Soviet proposals to reunify Germany
through free elections but with controlled rearm-
'Dent and denial of the right of alliance?
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wesgidig,
3. Under what circumstances would Bonn enter into
negotiations witti the East German regime leading
toward more normal'relations? Toward reunification?
C. German Attitude Toward the Western Powers
1. What will be the likely West German attitude
toward the US? Toward the retention of US
forces in Germany? What would be the attitudes
in the event that the US undertook to reduce
these forces?
2. What is 1ikely to be the West German attitude
tOtkard France during the next few years? Are
the West Germans likely to press for the early
reduction of French garrisons in Germany? Will
the Saar issue continue to irritate Franco-West
German relations?
D. Attitude Toward the USSR
1. What will be the likely West German attitude
toward the Soviet Bloc? Under what circumstances
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might West Germany eventually seek a neutral
position between East and West? Seek a rapproch-
ment with the USSR? How would failure to ratify
the Paris accords change the West German policy
toward the USSR?
VII. What would be the most important consequences in West
Germany of a rejection of the London and Paris accords
by: (a) the French Parliament, (b) the West German
Parliament?
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