NIE 23-54: "PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST GERMANY"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A004100020018-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2013
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: November 9, 1954
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
,9 November 1954
ML 10RANDUM FOR: Mr, Allan Evans (OM)
Lt. Colonel Paul S. Reinecke, USA (G-2)
Captain B. E. Uiggin, USN (ONI)
Colonel UUTilliam S. Boyd, USAF (AFOIN-2B2)
Colonel Floyd E. Dunn, USA (JIG)
SUBJECT : NIE 23-54: "Probable Developments in I-lest
Germany"
1. The attached 'terms of reference for NIE 23-54 were
agreed on in a meeting of the Board with yolx representatives
on 5 November.
2. Following is the allocation of production responsibil-
ities for the preparation of contributions:
Sections
I, II and III
IV
V OS I/CIA
VI and VII OIR/State
3. All contributions are due in ONE, by the
on Friday, 19 November.
4. Production schedule follows:
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANCE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
SATE: Wbl~ 1 REVIEWER: C? d
Agent
0m./State
Defense (primary)
OIR/State (secondary)
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1
a.
Contributions due
19 November
b,
Staff draft to Board'
1 December
c.
Board draft to IAC representatives
3 December
d.
IAC representatives com fete action
9 December
e,
IAC consideration
14 December
f.
Advance copy to NSC
15 December
PAUL A. B 0 EL
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
9 November 1954
SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 23-54; PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS
IN WEST GERMANY
To estimate the present situation and probable developments
i. NIE 23-54 is designed to revise and update NIE-82,
r"The Outlook in West Germany" (17 July 1953), which
estimated probable developments over the next five
to 10 Years.
ii. We believe that substantial portions of NIE-82 will
not require revision. The new Terms of Reference call
for contributions only on those sections which seem to
require updating or extensive rewriting in the light
of recent developments. However, contributors should
also feel free to propose the revision of other
sections if they believe it necessary.
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iii,. Except for Sc ct:io VIII,.. these tcrr.:s of refevo:!.ce are
pre pared on. the assu:~Pti`OLI that the London and Faris
accords are ray f4_c ..
iv. The terms of reference are a revision of the terms
distributed to the Agencies on 20 September 1954.
QUESTIONSBEARINq ON THE PROBLEM
'OIR T I .
DOMESTIC POLITICAZ, TRENDS (pares. 13-22, NIE 82)
The more general portions of this section (paras. 13-14, 16,
20-22) appear to remain generally accurate although some updating
(paras. 15,17) and elimination (para. 18) will be necessary. The
comparison of political party strengths (para. 14, footnote 5)
should be updated to reflect the 1953 elections.
A. What is the state of Adenauer's present and pros-
pective control over the coalition? What is the
likelihood that the present coalition will break
up and that the CDU will attempt to govern alone?
What would be the effect of such developments on
West Germany's political stability? In the event
of Adenauer's departure from office, who would be
likely to succeed him? With what effect on West
Germany's political stability?
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B. What is the possibility of a CDU-SPD "grand coalition"
prior to the next general election? What are likely
future trends in SPD policy and popular support? In
FDP policy and popular support?
C. Are there any indications of a significant decline
of popular confidence in goverm-lent by is oderate
political parties? What is the outlook for the
predominance of moderate constitutional forces?
D. Is a sharp increase in nationalist feeling likely?
Under what circumstances night it arise? To what
extent would such an increase affect the attitudes
of the major West German political parties? What
domestic political actions would Adenauer or his
successor be likely to take in the event of
rising West German nationalism? Which parties
would be likely to benefit from increasing nationalism?
:, ould t~
. ~ CO.:JL'.. i. StS '17:':,: fit? To `.71''.?1.,'i: G:{'Gt.li'- v ill Saar rei'aii,l LZ dot.'estic ;Jolitical issue?
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E. Is there any significant Corziunist infiltration of the
coalition parties or the SPD?
F. What will be the impact on the political situation
of the re-establisrntient of military forces? Are the
professional military leaders likely to assert a
political role? Will the Btu'!de8tag retain control
of military affairs, or might the military leaders
consolidate a separate power center? What are the
prospects for extreme nationalists taking control of
'OIR II.
the military establishment?
SOCIAL ISSUES (paras. 23-26)
This section appears to remain generally adequate.
A. Are there indications of renewed anti-Semitism or of
serious antagonisms over the confessional schools?
Are charges of CDU clericalism likely to develop into
a significant issue?
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B. Have the attitudes of %but *11 labor or the role
of labor unions changed since 1953? Is management
resistance to labor's demands likely to lead to a
significant breach of labor- agerlent relations-and
to any protracted .period of jjstatbility?
C. What progress has been 1 'i3 the assimilation of
refugee elements into the Wort Gorman social pattern?
D. Will the creation of military forces lead to significant
social changes?
OIR III. ECONOMIC TRENDS (paras. 27-33)
This section still appears accurate, although updating
of economic data is necescyary.
A. Internal
1. Has the outlook for German economic prosperity
changed since NIE 82? What will be the impact, of
rearmament on the West German economy? What
percent of GNP will be expanded on the military
establishment?
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2. Are the government's conservative economic policies
likely to continue to satisfy the West German
public? Which elements of the population are likely
to be dissatisfied? To what extent will this dis-
satisfaction,affect government policies? Is the
government likely to sell any of its industrial
enterprises to private interests? What is the likely
course of West German industrial organization?
3. What will be the availability of private West German
investment capital? What are the prospects of pri-
vate foreign capital being offered and accepted?
Would industrial wage increases resulting from labor
agitation be likely to cause any substantial weak-
ening of West .Germany's competitive position abroad?
B. Foreign
1. By what means are the West Germans improving their
foreign economic position? Is West Germany's
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willingness to extend highly favorable credit terms
to foreign customers likely to threaten West
Germany's domestic economic foundations? What
would be the economic effect of a world recession
on West Germany's competitive position in foreign
markets?
Does it appear likely that West Germany will
achieve economic hegemony over Western Europe?
What will be West German governmental and
popular attitudes and those of special interest
groups toward continued participation in the
Coal and Steel Community? What are the pros-
pects for broad expansion of Franco-German
economic cooperation?
What is the outlook for further West German
economic penetration in the Middle East? In
other foreign markets? Does West German
competition threaten seriously the foreign
economic position of the US, the UK, or Japan?
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IV. REARMAMENT
Defense
OIR
The statement of West Germany's military potential in
paras. 34-38 still appears accurate, but this section requires
revision in the light of the London and Paris accords.
A. How much time will West Germany require to reach
presently scheduled force goals? By what date will
the German forces attain combat effectiveness? What
are prospects for effective Allied control of the size,
disposition, equipment, and employment of the German
B. What is thQ attitude of the public, the government,
and the political party leaders toward re-establishment
of forces? What will their attitudes be when rearm-
ament is under way? What is their attitude toward
NATO and Western European Union? Toward integrating
the West European defense forces? Are serious West
German objections likely to develop toward the limita-
tions on rearmament and arms manufacture? Is West
Germany likely to seek to evade these lirai.tations?
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OSI V. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL OP T S (paras? 39-)40)
We believe that the estimative judgments in this section
remain accurate.
OIR VI. PROBABLE FOREIGN POLICY (parts. 41-60)
Some parts of this section appear generally valid but
considerable updating and revision seems required in most
parts.
A. General Orientation
1. In order of priority, what are West Germany's
current foreign policy objectives? How will the
recovery of sovereignty and military powers
affect these objectives? How will implementation
of the London and Paris accords shape the course
of West German-foreign policy?
2. What role will West Germany seek to play in NATO?
Is West Germany likely eventually to attempt to
change the defensive character of NATO? Will it
attempt to drag the other Western Powers into an
aggressive policy toward Soviet-dominated German
territory?
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Will a sovereign West.:Germany..seek to influence
the West to adopt more cordial: relations with
the Bloc?
B. Reunification of Germany
1. How strong is the -West rman . desire, for reunifica-
tion? What are the trends regaling .this desire?
DDo thee' West C rr gns,%belie.v'e;=thtt reunification is
attainable through negotiations e ong the four
-occupying powers? Do they believe that reunifica-
tion will be advanced or retarded as a result of
rearmament?
2. Would the present Bonn Government oppose Soviet
proposals to reunify Germany, on condition that
Germany be neutralized? What will be the position
of the lesser coalition parties and the SPD on
reunification? Is it still likely that most Germans
would favor Soviet proposals to reunify Germany
through free elections but with cantralled rear-
ment and denial of the right of alliance?
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Under what circumstances would Bonn enter into
negotiations: with the East German regime lead n.g
toward more normal relations? Toward reunification?
C. German Attitude Toward the Western Powers
1. What will be the likely West German attitude
toward the US and UK? Toward the retention of
US and UK forces and facilities in Germany?
What would be the attitudes in the event that
the US or UK undertook to reduce these forces?
2. What is likely to be the West German attitude
tceard France during the next few years? Are
the West Germans likely to press for the early
reduction of French garrisons in Germany? Will
the Saar issue continue to irritate Franco-West
German relations?
D. Attitude Toward the USSR
1. What will be the likely West German attitude
toward the Soviet Bloc? Under what circumstances
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might West Germany eventually seek a neutral
position between East and West? Seek a rapproach-
ment with the USSR?
OIR VIE, POLICES OF A UNIFIED GERM~.1~N (Paris. 61-62)
1. What would be the most likely policies of a unified
OIR VIII. What would be the most important consequences in West
Germany of a rejection of the London and Paris accords
by: (a) the French Parliament, (b) the West German
Parliament?
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