POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING GORBACHEV'S ABILITY TO NEGOTIATION ARMS CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800640002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 3, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Lwtmi n igence cy
Directorate of Intelligence
3 December 1987
Political Factors Affecting Gorbachev's Ability
to Negotiate Arms Control
Summary
General Secretary Gorbachev still appears to be
setting the agenda and maintaining a Politburo consensus
on foreign policy and arms control issues. In view of
his political setback in the Yel'tsin affair and some
civilian and military scepticism over elements of his
national security policy, however, he is likely during
his visit to Washington to be careful to avoid making any
commitments that could give his critics in the Politburo
new ammunition. We think he will. stick closely to
negotiating positions that have been worked out in the
Politburo and is less likely to change them than he was
at the Reykjavik summit.
While the signing of the INF Treaty will be a
vindication of his foreign policy, Gorbachev will also
want to demonstrate that his discussions in Washington
have improved the prospects for an agreement on
reductions in strategic offensive weapons, linked to the
continued US observance of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Both for
foreign policy reasons and as a means of strengthening
his political position at home, Gorbachev clearly wants
to achieve a breakthrough on these issues, but not at the
expense of concessions on delinking START from the
extension of the ABM Treaty.
This paper was prepared by
of the National Security Branch, Office of Soviet
Analysis. Comments and questions may be directed to the
Chief, Domestic Policy Division
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Gorbachev's decision to come to Washington appears to have solid
leadership support. There are fewer signs of differences within the
civilian leadership over arms control than there were before the two
previous summits. At the same time, while the top military
leadership appears to be fully supporting Gorbachev, there have been
indications of concern about some of his arms control initiatives
among elements of the military. In view of the current tensions
within the leadership over domestic policy and the skepticism of some
Politburo members about Gorbachev's past handling of US-Soviet
25X1 relations, the General Secretary will want to prevent any convergence
of military concerns about arms control and more generalized
questioning of his overall policy course in the civilian leadership.
Leadership Attitudes
The recent conclusion of the terms for the INF Treaty
demonstrates that whatever differences exist in the Politburo are not
currently serious enough to derail Gorbachev's foreign policy
agenda. In fact, public
indications of recent Politburo differences over INF, START and SDI
is particularly notable in view of increasingly clear indications of
conflict within the leadership over domestic issues.
Nevertheless, the political setback he suffered as a result of
the Yel'tsin affair is likely to make Gorbachev more sensitive to the
concerns of other Politburo members. He emerged from this affair
with somewhat diminished prestige and weakened authority. His recent
public remarks suggest that for now at least, while continuing to
push his policy agenda, he is hewing more closely to the middle
ground in the Politburo.
The decision to shift party Secretary Lev Zaykov to replace
Yel'tsin as head of the Moscow party organization will probably
deprive Gorbachev of an ally on both the Secretariat and the Defense
Council (the key policymaking group on defense issues, including arms
control). Some sources of the US Embassy in Moscow claim that Zaykov
may keep his position on the Secretariat, but such a combination of
jobs is without recent precedent and he will likely be removed as
party secretary for defense industry at the next party plenum and
relinquish his position on the Defense Council
Zaykov's departure from the Defense Council could make it more
difficult for Gorbachev to push through controversial national
security policies. Zaykov has publicly associated himself with
Gorbachev's military policies by supporting the concept of
"reasonable sufficiency" and pressuring the defense industries to do
more for the civilian sector. In addition to Gorbachev, the other
Politburo members on the Defense Council appear to be President
Gromyko, Premier Ryzhkov, "Second Secretary" Ligachev, KGB Chief
Chebrikov, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Defense Minister Yazov, and
possibly party Secretary Yakovlev. Three of the civilians--Ligachev,
Chebrikov, and Gromyko--appear to take exception to some of
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Gorbachev's foreign and domestic initiatives. Yazov's political
allegiance to Gorbachev will make him more amenable than his
predecessor to the General Secretary's national security agenda, but
in his role as the military's representative on the Defense Council
he can be expected to argue strongly for positions critical to the
military establishment.
At the same time, Gorbachev's allies control critical foreign
policy posts. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and party Secretary
Yakovlev, who respectively run the government and party foreign
policy apparatuses, appear to be Gorbachev's two most loyal
supporters on the Politburo. Although Yakovlev has reportedly
differed with party Secretary Dobrynin, Gorbachev's top advisor on
Soviet-American relations, their differences appear to be more over
tactics than over general approach and all indications suggest that
Dobrynin is also a loyal member of the Gorbachev team. All three men
will be accompanying Gorbachev to Washington.
25X1
there are
several Politburo members at least potentially sympat etic to
concerns expressed by some military officers about Gorbachev's arms
control initiatives:
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Recent remarks by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze suggest that they
are sensitive to internal sniping at their arms control initiatives:
--On 2 November Gorbachev made a stronger rhetorical commitment
to defense needs than he has in other speeches this year. He
appeared to take unusual pains to justify the INF Treaty by pointing
out that past treaties have been signed with the enemy due to
domestic problems.
--In September Gorbachev also sounded defensive in setting forth
his arms control policies, arguing that his nuclear testing
moratorium had not been in "vain."
--At his press conference following the conclusion of the INF
treaty on 26 November, Shevardnadze went out of his way to insist
that even though the Soviet Union will destroy more missiles under
the agreement, the interests of the Soviet Union "have not been
damaged."
Although other factors no doubt also played a role, Gorbachev's
efforts to prevent Politburo politics from complicating arms control
negotiations may have contributed to the failure to set a summit date
during the October Ministerial meeting in Moscow--which took place
the day after Yel'tsin's inflammatory speech to the party plenum. By
moving rapidly to get the summit back on track and working out final
details of the INF Treaty, however, Gorbachev demonstrated that his
arms control strategy is not seriously encumbered by domestic
opposition.
Military Attitudes
Gorbachev also has the support of the top military leadership.
Before the current drive toward the INF agreement began, he
strengthened his personal control over the military by using the
Cessna incident last May to install his own man--Dmitriy Yazov--as
Minister of Defense. In addition, General Staff Chief Akhromeyev has
consistently played a key role in negotiating the INF agreement,
frequently coming up with compromise positions that advanced the
negotiations. Some elements of the military probably welcome the
elimination of intermediate range nuclear missiles from Europe
because of the Soviet advantage in conventional weapons.
At the same time, there have been persistent indications that
Gorbachev's arms control initiatives are causing unease among some
members of the military:
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25X1
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--In an apparent effort to allay concerns within the military,
operational positions, no doubt feel threatened by these prospects.
Even some officers involved in strategic planning who are probably
more inclined to accept the value of the INF agreement, may worry
that it will create momentum toward other arms reductions they fear
These concerns have no doubt been aggravated by indications that
Gorbachev wants to tighten the spigot on military spending to help
modernize the civilian economy and is contemplating large reductions
in the size of the officer corps. Many officers, especially those in
offering assurances that they will not.
Krasnaya Zvezda has published letters questioning whether Gorbachev's
arms control proposals will adversely affect Soviet security and
could weaken Soviet security.
25X1 Gorbachev's ability to conclude the INF Treaty and dramatically
move the Soviet position on other arms control issues is the best
evidence that he can allay or overcome such military concerns. Those
in the military who continue to question the direction of Gorbachev's
policies are not in a position to challenge him directly.
Nevertheless, Gorbachev needs to pay attention to military
reservations because they may be exploited by some civilian leaders.
Moscow's larger arms control objectives.
Prospects
From a domestic political perspective the signing of the INF
agreement can be presented both as a vindication of Gorbachev's
vigorous efforts over the past two years to push for the agreement
and sufficient to call the summit a success, provided it is
accompanied by signs of progress toward deep reductions in offensive
arms that are linked at least in some way to limits on SDI. If
Gorbachev were to fail to make progress on START and the ABM Treaty,
he would naturally try to place the onus for the lack of progress on
the US position on SDI, but he might be subject, nonetheless, to
criticism that his concession on INF had yielded no progress toward
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25X1 Gorbachev clearly hopes that the visit will also pay other
dividends. It should boost his image as a world leader.
program.
IIf he can show
that he is making progress in controlling strategic relations with
the United States through negotiations, it will make it easier to
hold down the defense budget to gain resources for his economic
dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar.
If Gorbachev makes new proposals during his trip to the United
States, the odds are strong that they would have been fully approved
by the Politburo. Such proposals might amount to no more than a
repackaging of previous Soviet positions, but they could contain some
new elements:
--Gorbachev might announce a limited unilateral withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Afghanistan, as has been rumored in Kabul, or a
shortened timetable for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops after a
full settlement has been reached.
--Another possibility which, Gorbachev might hope would help in
the ratification debate, would be an initiative on a major arms
control compliance issue, such as an announcement of a decision to
compromises consistent with Soviet interest.
Given Gorbachev's record of playing to the world media, his
determination to break out of rigid foreign policy patterns, and his
penchant for the bold stroke, he may try to make the most of his
visit to Washington from a public relations point of view by
unveiling a new Soviet initiative on some aspect of bilateral
relations. His chief foreign policy advisors--Yakovlev,
Shevardnadze, and Dobrynin--have promoted "new thinking" in foreign
policy, which they claim means escaping from "dogmatism" and being
more flexible in seeking solutions to problems. A key element of
this approach is "interdependence," looking for policies from which
both sides can benefit, rather than seeing negotiations as a zero sum
game. While there is undoubtedly a large propaganda component in
"new thinking," these three top foreign policy advisors probably are
more pragmatic than their predecessors and more inclined to make
While political and military leaders seem to agree on the
critical importance of limiting SDI, recent remarks by Shevardnadze
and other Soviets show some flexibility on how the linkage between
START and SDI is formulated. Gorbachev is unlikely to delink a START
agreement from SDI, but he may be willing to proceed with strategic
arms negotiations in the expectation that as the prospects of a START
agreement grow, there will be more readiness to agree to specific
limits on SDI--if not from this administration, then from its
successor. The Soviets may see less risk in such a strategy if they
believe that SDI will prove unworkable for technological and
political reasons. Asked at a 31 October press conference if
Moscow's insistence on a strict observance of the ABM Treaty meant
that SDI would have to be curbed, Shevardnadze responded by
minimizing the significance of the program, stating he did not think
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it is "realistic," and pointing out that "many major scientists and
specialists" have voiced "serious doubts" about its feasibility.
25X1 __ The Politburo will likely give Gorbachev room to maneuver on
SDI, but in view of his current political situation he will be
unlikely to depart very far from whatever mandate he was given in
Moscow.* How far he will go in compromising will depend both on the
assessments of Soviet experts of how specific proposals affect Soviet
security and Gorbachev's assessment of the political climate in
Moscow. If Gorbachev cannot persuade Washington to accept terms he
is sure he can sell at home, we think he will want to consult with
his Politburo colleagues before making any commitment. How much
maneuvering room Gorbachev actually has in closing the outstanding
issues on a strategic agreement will provide some indication of his
political strength.
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