CURRENT SOVIET POSTURE ON THE PERSIAN GULF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800630001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 30, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Centml Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
30 November 1987
Current Soviet Posture on the-Persian Gulf
Summary
perceived internationally as a US victory.
At the summit meeting in Washington, General Secretary Gorbachev will probably
claim that the Gulf is one area where the potential for US-Soviet cooperation is
greatest, provided the US acts responsibly. It is unlikely, however, that he will
announce any major shift in Soviet positions. Instead, he will probably argue for a
US naval drawdown, push Moscow's scheme for a UN fleet, and equivocate on
implementing UN Resolution 598. The Soviets are likely to remain unwilling to
cooperate with the US in achieving a cease-fire in the Gulf unless the US first
substantially reduces its fleet, since joint action without a reduction would be
on Resolution 598 or the UN fleet in response to Arab concerns.
Moscow is still actively engaging in discussions with Tehran because of a
coincidence of interests in wanting the US fleet out of the Gulf, a desire to foster the
perception of the USSR as the mediator in the conflict, and the longer term prospect
of making gains in Iran. Soviet footdragging on UN Resolution 598 and the
appearance of mediation are hurting Moscow's relations with the Arabs, and the
Soviets are attempting to limit damage by assuring the Arabs that they are not tilting
toward Iran. Reversing the US naval buildup is the primary Soviet goal in the Gulf at
the moment, however, and Moscow probably will not revise its fundamental positions
Footdragging on a UN Sanctions Resolution
To date we have not detected any Soviet intent to propose new
ideas on the Gulf war during General Secretary Gorbachev's visit
to Washington. Although he probably will come with some new words
in support of UN Resolution 598--mainly for propaganda purposes--
and claim that the Gulf is one area where the potential for
US-Soviet cooperation is considerable, he will try to avoid
angering either the Arabs or the Iranians.
This memorandum was prepared in the office of Soviet Analysis
in response to a request from Fritz Ermarth, Special
Chief, Regional Policy Division
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
SOV M-87 20120CX
Copy 3 of 81
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impartial body to determine blame for starting the war.
views on arranging a cease-fire and the establishment of an
Despite public protestations that they are fully committed to
the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 598 in its
entirety, the Soviets have remained reluctant to press ahead with
sanctions. In late October, Soviet UN Ambassador Belonogov argued
.that no discussion on sanctions should be undertaken until
responses to the UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's plan for
implementing 598 were received. The plan seeks Iraqi and Iranian
enforcement resolution.
without parallel efforts toward creation of a UN naval force. In
his latest meeting in Geneva with Under Secretary Armacost,
Vorontsov reiterated Soviet commitment to the implementation of
Resolution 598, but would not agree to begin drafting an
Soviets would not be interested in an enforcement resolution
the size of the US fleet there.
Hawking UN Fleet Scheme
It is unlikely that Gorbachev will agree to a major policy
shift regarding the Soviet proposal for a UN fleet unless
Washington agrees to reduce its fleet in the Gulf. He will be
reluctant to appear to be giving in to the US naval presence in
the region and probably remains hopeful that Iranian actions and
Congressional pressure will eventually force a major reduction in
The Soviets are buttressing their proposal for an
international fleet under UN sponsorship and calls for the removal
of the US naval presence with two arguments. While warning Arab
countries of the dire political and military consequences of a
continued US naval presence for regional security, the Soviet
Union also has pointed to an alleged US ineffectiveness in the
face of Iranian defiance.
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The response to Soviet diplomatic efforts promoting the idea
of a UN fleet has been lukewarm, if not clearly negative.
At the UN the
Soviet proposal has not attracted interest because of the
perception that it is vague and difficult to implement. The
Iranians, however, have abstained from publicly condemning or
endorsing the Soviet proposal, suggesting their own version of an
international fleet that apparently would not include 25X1
representation from either superpower.
Before the Arab League summit in early November, the Soviets
prodded the Arabs to issue a statement favoring a UN fleet. The
Arab League Director for International Relations confided to the
US Ambassador in Tunis that Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
had sent an urgent message requesting clarification of the Arab
position on foreign fleets in the Gulf. The Soviets also tried to
get Syria to do their bidding at the summit. Jordanian Foreign
Minister Masri told the US Ambassador that the Saudis and Kuwaitis
stood strongly against Syrian efforts to mention foreign fleets
and propose UN flagging and that eventually Syrian President Assad
agreed to withdraw the motion
Moscow the "Honest Broker"
The Soviets have continued their whirlwind diplomacy in the
Gulf area, attempting to portray themselves as mediators between
the warring sides. Upon his return from visits to Baghdad,
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Kuwait, and Tehran in early November, Vorontsov told Ambassador
Matlock in Moscow that Iran had shown more flexibility than Iraq
during his discussions in both capitals. Hinting at his effective
mediation effort, he added that both sides had moderated their
positions somewhat as he talked with each. He insisted that it
was important to keep the dialogue going and claimed that Iran was
Perez de Cuellar's report issue
d af
ter Vorontsov's meeting
with Ambassador Matlock in effect b
elie
s Vorontsov's assertion
regarding the softening of position
pointedly states that they had now
s by
retr
the two parties. It
eated from the acceptance
of the Secretary General's initial
plan
for implementation of 598
and that they differ profoundly on
how
to begin implementation of
approaching acceptance of Resolution 598.
credibility further the longer Iran continues to be intransigent.
Moscow's attempt to assume the role of a mediator and its
continued contacts with Tehran risk greater damage to Soviet
standing with the Arabs. We believe that Iranian leaders remain
determined to end the war only on their own terms and that, as
long as they hold this view, there can be no mediation--Soviet or
otherwise. Moscow's attempts to portray Tehran as "flexible" have
angered Iraq, Kuwait, and other Arabs and will damage Soviet
the plan, attaching, in fact, new preconditions.
The Soviets appear to have been further sensitized to Arab
concerns when in early November the Arab League summit came out
with a strong, pro-Iraqi stand and made no reference to the
Soviet-sponsored UN fleet. In response to these concerns, Moscow
appears to be taking some additional steps to assure Gulf Arabs
that it is not siding with Iran and that it supports UN efforts to
resolve the conflict.
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o Late last week the Soviet military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda
reported that a Soviet destroyer had recently warned off an
Iranian frigate after the ship trained its guns on a Soviet
tanker the destroyer was escorting. The story gave no
indication when the incident occurred, but publication of
the event may be a signal to Gulf Arabs that the USSR also
has reason to want an end to the hostilities.
Despite these efforts to mollify the Arabs, the Soviets
apparently do not believe Arab anger has reached a point where
they have to abandon their expanded contacts with Iran. Such
contacts will continue, based, we believe, primarily on the shared
objective of reducing the US naval presence in the Gulf. These
contacts, moreover, will assist the Soviets in exploiting Tehran's
sense of isolation to position themselves, as opportunities arise,
to gain influence in Iran. Moscow's more subdued approach than
Tehran's to these contacts and the fundamental differences
separating the two sides suggest, however, that the Soviets will
continue to move cautiously with a view to protecting their
broader regional interests.
Moscow's opportunities might increase substantially if Iran
eventually concludes it is running out of options for
demonstrating its determination to resist the US presence and
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shows its anger by drawing closer to the USSR. -Tehran's
incentives would increase if Iran and the US become engaged in
serious military clashes. Iran's options would include offering
oil and gas agreements on terms favorable to the Soviets,
permitting an expansion of the Soviet diplomatic presence, or
discreetly lessening Tehran's support for the Afghan resistance.
.The Soviets, in our view, would pocket such concessions but would
be careful not to take any actions that could be interpreted as a
dramatic---shift -in support-of Iran in order to avoid appearing to
have abandoned the Arabs and to preserve Soviet credibility at the
UN Security Council.
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SUBJECT: Current Soviet Posture on the Persian Gulf
External Distribution
White House
1 The Honorable Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Room 298, Old EOB
2 The Honorable John Negroponte
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
3 Dr. Fritz Ermarth .
Special Assistant to the President, NSC
Room 368, Old EOB
4 William H. Courtney
Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC
Situation Room, The White House
5 Robert B. Oakley
Special Assistant to the President
for Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC
Room 438, Old EOB
6 Dennis Ross
Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs
National Security Council
Room 351, Old EOB
7 Peter W. Rodman
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs (Foreign Policy)
Room 372, Old EOB
8 The Honorable Fred C. Ikle
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Room 4E830
The Pentagon
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SUBJECT: Current Soviet Posture on the Persian Gulf
External Distribution
9 Dr. Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy
Room 2E812, The Pentagon
10 Vice Admiral Powell Carter, USN
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E936,
The Pentagon
11 Major General George Lee Butler, USAF
Vice Director, J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy)
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E996, The Pentagon
12 Rear Admiral William 0. Studeman, USN
Director, Naval Intelligence
Room 5C564
The Pentagon
13 Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DI0 for European and Soviet Political-Military Affairs
Room 2A520, The Pentagon
14 Colonel Walter P. Lang
DIO for Middle East and South Asia
Room 2C238, The Pentagon
Department of State
15 The Honorable Michael H. Armacost
Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
Room 7240, Department of State
16 Richard H. Solomon
Director, Policy Planning Council
Room 7311, Department of State
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SUBJECT: Current Soviet Posture on the Persian Gulf
External Distribution
Department of State
17 Richard W. Murphy
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
Room 6242, Department of State
18 Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway
Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6226
Department of State
19 Lynn Pascoe
Deputy Executive Secretary
Office of the Secretary
Room 7224, Department of State
20 Thomas Simons
Deputy Assistant for Secretary of State
European/Canadian Affairs
Room 6219, Department of State
21 Edward Djerejian
Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 6242, Department of State
22 Mark R. Parris
Director of Soviet Union Affairs
European and Canadian Affairs
Room 4217, Department of State
23 Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director of Intelligence and research
Room 6531
Department of State
24 Richard Clark
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Regional Analysis, INR
Room 6535, Department of State
25 Wayne Limberg
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843, Department of State
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SUBJECT: Current Soviet Posture on the Persian Gulf
External Distribution
Department of State
26 Peter Burleigh
Director, Northern Gulf Affairs
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 5246A, Department of State
27 George S. Harris
Director of Analysis for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, INR
Room 4634, Department of State
28 Lt. Gen. William E. Odom
Director, National Security Agency
T532/CDB, Fort Meade, MD
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