LIKELY SOVIET POSTURE ON AFGHANISTAN AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800590001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 30, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE Central Inteuigence Vary
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reciprocal gestures from Pakistan and the United States.
30 November 1987
Likely Soviet Posture on Afghanistan at the Washington Summit
Summary
A recent spate of hints from the Soviets that they are prepared to discuss the
issue of a future Afghan government and to offer in the near future a troop
withdrawal timetable of a year or less appears timed to suggest flexibility on the eve
of the Washington summit. Afghan leader Najibullah confirmed this week that Kabul
would table a 12-month withdrawal timeframe at the next round of UN-mediated
negotiations in Geneva. General Secretary Gorbachev will probably give general
assurances of Soviet desire to get out of Afghanistan quickly, citing Najibullah's
statement, but Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov suggested to US
officials in mid-November that Gorbachev would not amplify this offer by naming a
date for its commencement. Gorbachev will press the United States to facilitate
Soviet withdrawal by suggesting possible "face-saving" compromises, using its
influence to get the Afghan resistance, former Afghan king Zahir, and Pakistan to talk
to Kabul about A coalition, and reducing aid to the insurgents. The Soviets may hope
that a forthcoming posture in these discussions will lure Washington into a taking a
more active role in working toward a settlement--a development they may calculate
could precipitate a rift with Islamabad. If Gorbachev wants to make a move that might
deflect international pressure on Moscow to get out of Afghanistan, he may announce
a limited withdrawal of Soviet troops, which could be either unilateral or scaled to
Whatever Gorbachev offers, we do not believe that Moscow has abandoned its
goal of keeping a Marxist-dominated government in power in Afghanistan. For
Gorbachev, who is now apparently in a period of political retrenchment in Moscow,
accepting anything less could leave him open to charges of having "lost" Afghanistan.
Moreover, fundamental changes in Soviet strategy are particularly unlikely at a time
when Moscow probably is waiting to assess Afghan leader Najibullah's latest efforts
to eliminate party factionalism, Soviet bilateral discussions with Pakistan and the
United States, and whether Islamabad's continuing nuclear controversy with
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis)
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Regional Policy Division
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conciliatory diplomacy would be undermined.
Washington might yet work to Soviet advantage. 25X1
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
The Impact of Recent Soviet Political Setbacks
For most of this year, Moscow has pursued a strategy that
concentrated on breaking the links between the resistance and its
supporters through initiatives designed to demonstrate Kabul's
flexibility and increased coercive pressure against Pakistan.
Although the Soviets have had to expend greater effort to maintain
the military stalemate this year in the face of improved
resistance antiaircraft capabilities and overall combat
effectiveness, they undoubtedly hoped that their other measures
would sow dissension among the opposing players, erode Pakistani
domestic support for Islamabad's Afghan policy, and soften
international disapproval of the Kabul regime. The Soviet
"national reconciliation" strategy has not worked, however, and
may have further weakened the position of its client, the People's
The failure of the Soviets to offer a 12-month withdrawal
timetable at Geneva in September--after they had built up
international expectation that the proposal would be made--
suggested they had become concerned that the regime was too weak
to survive it. Pravda, for instance, carried Najibullah's
statement at the Afghan party conference in October that the
Afghan forces remained unable to defend the country without Soviet
assistance, implying that the Soviets agreed with his assessment.
Najibullah's moves soon after Geneva--his assumption of the
presidency and engineering of the adoption of a new constitution,
his purge of some party opponents, and his affirmation of the
PDPA's determination to remain the "leading force" in
Afghanistan--further indicated that the Soviets had decided that
the need to shore up the regime outweighed the risk that their
resolution passed by a slightly greater margin.
resolution or to water it down with amendments failed, as the
Together with the failure to deliver at Geneva, Najibullah's
consolidation of power in Kabul may have influenced the outcome of
the UN General Assembly's vote on Pakistan's Afghan resolution in
mid-November. Intense Soviet lobbying to reduce support for the
What Gorbachev Will Bring to Washington
Moscow has recently stepped up hints that it is ready to
discuss the composition of a future Afghan government and that a
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withdrawal timetable of a year or less will be offered either at
next month's US-Soviet summit or at the next Geneva session.
Najibullah confirmed this week that a 12-month offer would be
tabled at Geneva, though its implementation remained contingent on
the end of "outside interference" and the beginning of talks with
the resistance on 'oinin the Af han Government,
The latest spate of conciliatory signals appears timed
to suggest Soviet flexibility on the eve of the Washington summit.
a letdown at the summit.
Statements made by Vorontsov to Under Secretary Armacost in
mid-November, however, suggest that at the Washington summit
Gorbachev will not go beyond Najibullah's announcement by
proposing a date for the withdrawal to begin. Vorontsov said that
a new offer would be made at the Geneva session planned for early
1988, that before the Soviets finalized it, he would have to try
it out on Pakistan--which he could not visit before
mid-December--and that Gorbachev should not be pressed on the
matter in Washington. Vorontsov's comments could have reflected
indecision or debate in Moscow and been designed to guard against
the United States.
If Gorbachev wants to avoid specific revelations on the
timetable but still is determined to make an attention-getting
move on Afghanistan, he might--as rumored in Kabul--announce a
unilateral limited withdrawal of Soviet troops. In view of
Moscow's cheating on last year's claimed pullout of six regiments,
this would presumably be intended more for public relations effect
than to have an immediate influence on US policymakers, who the
Soviets probably would expect to remain skeptical unless and until
such a withdrawal proved to be genuine. Gorbachev might say that
the size of the withdrawal would be scaled to reci rocal reduction
of US and Pakistani aid to the resistance
E::~ Either move would be in line with previous Soviet
efforts to shift the onus of producing concessions to Pakistan and
Gorbachev is likely in any case to insist that he is serious
about getting Soviet troops home as soon as possible, citing
Najibullah's statement, and to press for US assistance in
facilitatin g a face-saving solution. He will probably solicit US
ideas on possible compromises, ask for US influence to be used to
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their Marxist clients in that government.
If the Soviets persist in probing for discussion of a
coalition government, stating clearly and consistently that the
PDPA need not be the senior partner, if they seek to talk directly
to the resistance alliance, or if they offer a short withdrawal
timetable less hedged with conditions than we expect, this would
indicate that they have decided to settle for less in Afghanistan.
The Soviets might in particular explore devising a neutral interim
government made up of exiles and technocrats, while securing the
right of PDPA members to vote and run for office in any
Such moves, which would indicate substantially more
flexibility than Moscow has shown thus far, could still represent
post-interim arrangement.
get the resistance, former king Zahir and other exiles, and
Pakistan to talk to Kabul about the composition of a coalition,
and urge a reduction in military aid to the resistance. Moscow
may hope that a forthcoming posture in discussions with the United
States will lure Washington into a more active role in working
toward a settlement. The Soviets may calculate that this could
precipitate a rift with Pakistan, which might resent the
superpowers going over its head, provoke resistance accusations of
betrayal, and prompt world public opinion to view Afghanistan as
an East-West issue.
Beyond the Summit
There have been hints that over the longer term Moscow may be
considering entering into talks on solutions that do not provide
for the dominance of the PDPA and that the Soviets are preparing
the ground internationally and domestically for such an
eventuality:
o UN negotiator Cordovez's plan for setting up talks on a new
government, in which the Soviets have expressed interest,
calls for resistance participation and for Kabul's
representatives to attend in their party rather than their
government capacities.
o Soviet' domestic media have recently featured discussion of
the presocialist stage of Afghanistan's development and the
necessity for compromise.
o Soviet officials have implied
that as long as Soviet troops leave behind a neutral
government, they have "won," regardless of the role of
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just bolder variations on its present policy rather than a
decision to accept de facto defeat. Moscow would retain the
option of reneging and might be gambling that it would never be
called upon to carry out its commitment because Pakistan and the
United States would be unable to persuade the resistance to accept
even a limited Communist role in a coalition government. Because
of the increasing risk that PDPA members will panic and cut their
own deals, however, this interpretation would become less
plausible the more specific and less conditional Soviet discussion
of withdrawal and a genuine coalition became.
In the months following the summit, the Soviets will probably
follow through on at least some of their hints. They may:
o Have the Afghans formally propose a 12-month or shorter
withdrawal timetable at Geneva. They will, however,
probably continue to insist that its implementation is
contingent on further elaboration of the timing and
guarantees for ending "outside interference" and on settling
interim arrangements for a transitional government in Kabul.
o Agree to a forum under UN auspices for discussion of a
coalition government. Moscow might propose a plan--such as
an international conference--that would give the Afghan
regime. greater standing than the proposals made so far by
UN negotiator Cordovez and the Pakistanis.
o Have Kabul resume national reconciliation offers to the
resistance, increasing the number of posts open to
insurgents and exiles.
o Conduct a limited withdrawal on the order of last year's--
about 3,000 men. The large-scale withdrawals of up to
45,000 men rumored in Kabul are unlikely because the
Soviets probably know that the regime could not manage the
increased security responsibilities that would devolve upon
All of these developments would be in line with other Soviet
attempts to unravel the international coalition supporting the
resistance. Such efforts have reflected increased Soviet
willingness to take some risks in the interest of obtaining a
settlement without reflecting a fundamental revision of Moscow's
goals.
We judge that the Soviets have not decided to settle for less
than a Marxist-dominated regime. They continue to keep their
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options open by building up their military and political
infrastructure in Afghanistan. Despite Moscow's recent
embarrassment over the UN vote, the international costs of Soviet
involvement have become less acute over the years and are unlikely
to prompt the Kremlin to revise fundamentally its goals in
Afghanistan. F- -1 25X1
A Soviet decision to settle for less is particularly unlikely
at this time. Moscow probably wants time to assess several
developments, including Najibullah's latest moves to eliminate
factionalism in Kabul, its own bilateral discussions with the
United States and Pakistan, and whether Islamabad's nuclear
controversy with Washington might yet work to Soviet advantage.
Moreover, the "loss" of Afghanistan would be a major risk to
General Secretary Gorbachev, who has already spent considerable
political capital attempting to push his domestic program past
conservative opponents and who is now apparently in a period of
political retrenchment in Moscow.
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SUBJECT: Likely Soviet Posture on Afghanistan at the Washington
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SUBJECT: Likely Soviet Posture on Afghanistan at the Washington
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