CURRENT SOVIET STRATEGY ON AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800390001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 2, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
2 September 1987
Current Soviet Strategy on Afghanistan
Summary
The Soviets have adopted new tactics on Afghanistan,
including suggestions that they will accept some limited form of
power-sharing with regime opponents, an international public
relations campaign designed to portray their policy as
reasonable, and intensified pressure on Pakistan. The proposals
made by the Soviets and the Afghans so far, however, indicate
that Moscow is not prepared to accept less than a government
dominated by its clients, and the Soviets have deflected attempts
to set up discussions on the composition of a new government.
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summit this fall.
Moscow will probably have the Afghans offer a troop
withdrawal timetable of about 12 months during the next Geneva
round (7-9 September). The Soviets almost certainly calculate
that this might seriously erode support for the resolution on
Afghanistan scheduled for a vote in the UN General Assembly late
next month. They presumably hope that such a result would induce
Islamabad--at a time when it faces possible suspension of US aid
over the nuclear proliferation issue and increasing domestic
pressure for a settlement--to agree to Soviet terms for resolving
the conflict. Moscow may also judge that this tactic will weaken
arguments to the US Congress that the importance of the Pakistani
conduit to the resistance should override nonproliferation
concerns. Moreover, the Soviets probably hope that a short
timetable proposal at Geneva will strengthen their position
heading into talks with US officials this month and a possible
may be addressed to the Chief, Regional Policy Division
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Soviet
Analysis Comments and queries are welcome and
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The Soviets might even be prepared at Geneva to accept a
date to start implementating a withdrawal. This would almost
certainly be contingent'on acceptance of its conditions for
commencing withdrawal--agreement on a new government and the
cessation of outside support for the resistance. Moscow has no
reason to alter these conditions for a negotiated settlement
fundamentally until its efforts to exploit current opportunities
have played themselves out.
Soviet Moves Since the Last Geneva Session
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev told a news
conference in Moscow on 25 August that specific dates for the
withdrawal of Soviet troops would be set at the next Geneva
round. Soviet officials have said frequently this year that
setting a withdrawal timetable requires not only the guaranteed
cessation of "outside interference" but establishment of a
coalition in Kabul to avoid a "bloodbath" after Soviet troops
leave. UN negotiator Cordovez and the Pakistanis believed that
high-level meetings were essential to pave the way for setting a
short withdrawal timetable at Geneva. But, since the last Geneva
session (25 February-9 March) the Soviets and their Afghan
clients have deflected the efforts of other parties to arrange
high-level, formal discussions about a future government--an
issue not up for negotiation in the Geneva talks themselves:
-- Kabul made excuses this summer when Cordovez tried to set
up shuttle negotiations to discuss the question of a new
government.
-- The Soviets have frustrated Pakistan's attempts to hold
bilateral talks focusing on the same issue, in particular
stalling on a date for First Deputy Foreign Minister
Vorontsov to visit Islamabad.
Meanwhile, the Soviets have adopted several measures
designed to weaken Pakistani and international support for the
Afghan resistance and to sow dissension within the resistance
itself:
-- Pressure against Pakistan has been intensified, including
a rash of crossborder attacks earlier this year, a sharp
increase in sabotage since last year and its expansion
beyond the frontier rovinces
-- Afghan leader Najib announced a six-month extension of
Kabul's ceasefire, elaborated on the positions that
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opposition figures might hold in a government of national
reconciliation, and addressed his proposals specifically
to "moderate" resistance parties.
-- The Soviets have attempted to lure former King Zahir Shah
and other exiles into taking part in a coalition,
overtures that continue despite Zahir's public rejection
of them in June.
-- Soviet media have claimed that Kabul's proposals have been
answered with an escalation of the war by the other side,
notably through the provision of Stinger missiles to the
insurgents. Moscow has increasingly labeled the war a US-
run enterprise that serves only the interests of the
United States.
-- In an effort to follow up on this "peace campaign," both
Moscow and Kabul have sent envoys to many UN member states
to lobby against the annual UN General Assembly resolution
on Afghanistan in October.
Soviet officials have continued to claim
Moscow is anxious to get its troops out of Afghanistan because of
the international political costs, frustration at the inability
of its Afghan client to develop an effective government or to
shoulder a greater military burden, and popular dissatisfaction
within the Soviet Union at mounting casualties. They have
stressed that they seek
only a ace-saving way out and are prepared to make concessions
in return for cooperation from the other side in devising a
neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan ruled by an acceptable coalition:
(Moscow might propose a conference on
Afghanistan that would include the Kabul regime, the
resistance, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and the United
States. The Soviets had floated this idea several weeks
earlier in the Indian press.
-- A Soviet Embassy official told a State Department official
last month that Najib's statement in Moscow in July that
he "hoped" the PDPA would continue to lead Afghanistan
after a coalition is set up meant this was not a
requirement.
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The specific offers made by Kabul so far, however, would
leave the PDPA firmly in control, and Najib has insisted
elsewhere that the party would remain "the chief mobilizing and
directing force in a government of national unity, even after it
becomes a coalition." His contention has been repeated in the
Soviet media.
Soviet domestic media have focused increasingly in recent
months on the difficulties in the way of national reconciliation
as well as the justification for the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan--the defense of Afghanistan's revolution and national
integrity and the defense of the Soviet Union's own southern
border. Much was made this spring of insurgent incursions into
Soviet territory, and these are still occasionally cited.
Nevertheless, the media also continue to claim that national
reconciliation is making progress and to stress the necessity of
pursuing a "realistic" political settlement. Much of this
commentary, however, seems aimed at domestic critics of the
concessions entailed in this policy and could reflect an effort
to prepare for justifying a resolution of the conflict that
hardliners will find distasteful. Media discussion of these
issues is presented as a response to readers' and listeners'
concerns, and we have no solid evidence that it reflects
divisions in the Kremlin.
Events on the ground this year--including successful
25X1 insurgent use of improved weaponry, the lackluster results of
several Soviet-Afghan offensives, and the continued poor
performance of the Afghan Army--have caused Moscow concern,
but do not substantially alter
either side's military position. The Soviets probably realize
that to maintain a stalemate they will have to carry an even
greater burden of the fighting. They will need to devise tactics
to counter insurgent air defenses and increase their efforts to
interdict insurgent logistics. We doubt, however, that the
Soviets have concluded that the war has taken a decisive turn for
the worse requiring fundamental revision of their goals.
What Are the Soviets Up To?
Moscow's political moves have been aimed this year primarily
at breaking Pakistan's resolve and reducing international support
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public.
for the Afghan resistance. Kabul's proposal to resume the Geneva
negotiations is almost certainly part of this campaign. We
believe that it is calculated to influence the UN voters on the
Afghan resolution in October by suggesting that Moscow and Kabul
are prepared for breakthroughs in the Geneva talks and to exploit
Pakistan's vulnerabilities at a time when Islamabad faces the
possibility of a suspension of US aid and domestic pressure for a
settlement that has been intensified by this year's increase in
Kabul-sponsored terrorist bombings. Islamabad had publicly
insisted on the necessity for careful preparations to ensure a
successful outcome at Geneva--preparations that Kabul and Moscow
consistently declined to undertake. Yet had Islamabad refused
this short-notice proposal or sought a substantial delay, it
would have fueled Soviet charges that it is placing obstacles in
the way of peace and faced increased dissatisfaction from its own
25X1 Kabul will probably offer a withdrawal timetable of 12
months or so during this session, down from 18 months at the last
round. Not only does it face widespread expectation that such a
timeframe will be proposed, but the offer would gain
international approbation and make it difficult for Pakistan to
continue to insist on a schedule determined solely by the time
necessary to march Soviet troops home in reasonable order.
coalition with the Afghan Communists.
It is unclear from Rogachev's statement whether Kabul will
move beyond offering a significantly shorter timeframe to
negotiating the date on which it will be implemented. The former
would suffice to score international public relations points and
put Pakistan on the spot, but the naming of a specific date is
also possible. It would, however, almost certainly be contingent
on meeting Moscow's standing conditions for implementation. The
Soviets might calculate that this move would so raise
international and Pakistani domestic expectations that Islamabad
would be forced to make concessions on halting aid to the
resistance and to pressure the resistance to take part in a
Moscow may hope that any appearance of Soviet
"reasonableness" will undermine those arguing that the US
Congress's threatened suspension of aid to Pakistan over the
nuclear proliferation issue should be overridden in the interest
of sustaining Pakistan's vital role as a conduit for military aid
to the the Afghan resistance. Moreover, the Soviets may also
expect that a short timetable at Geneva will improve their
position heading into the US-Soviet experts talks on Afghanistan
and the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze this month, as well as a possible summit this
fall. The Soviets will probably press US officials to reduce aid
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to the resistance in response to Kabul's offers at Geneva.
goals through alternate tactics can be contained.
Outlook
We do not believe that Moscow is prepared to accept less
than a government dominated by its clients. Most of its
political and diplomatic moves this year have, however, risked
demoralizing and further fragmenting the regime. Najib's visit
to Moscow in July, during which he was almost certainly directed
to seek a Geneva resumption, led to rumors in Kabul of impending
regime changes and the imminent withdrawal of Soviet troops. The
Soviets probably believe that, in any case, their chances of
inducing the present regime to become more effective and capable
of defending itself are negligible over the short run and that
the risks to its cohesion entailed in seeking to secure Soviet
government.
Moscow conceivably might agree to have the issue of the
future government of Afghanistan placed on the agenda at Geneva,
seeking to exploit tensions within the resistance and between the
resistance and Pakistan on this subject. Such dissension could
serve to place the onus for inconclusive and prolonged
negotiations on Islamabad and the resistance, either because
disunity within the resistance or its disagreements with Pakistan
became public or because this inability to agree on a position
was widely taken as intransigence. By raising the issue at such
a forum, however, Moscow and Kabul would also come under pressure
to deliver something that went beyond their current offers and
the cohesion of the regime would be further undermined. It is
probably for this reason that the Soviets have so far refused to
schedule formal, specific discussions on the composition of a new
Moscow is unlikely to alter its bottom line on a settlement
until it has been able to assess the results of its current
initiatives, including the next Geneva session. Even if their
reasons for wanting to extricate themselves from the Afghan
conflict are as compelling as some Soviet officials have
suggested, the Soviets probably judge that gains in the UN
General Assembly, Pakistani domestic problems, and the outcome of
the present US-Pakistani nuclear proliferation dispute might make
fundamental adiustme f their negotiating position
unnecessary.
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SUBJECT: Current Soviet Strategy on Afghanistan
Distribution:
NI0/USSR
OCPAS/IMD/CB
D/SOVA
SOVA/RIG
SO VA/RPD
SOVA/RPD/NESA
SOVA/RPD/NESA
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