MOSCOW CHANGES ITS TACTICS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800350002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 11, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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or.
Central Intelligence Agency
VVashington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
11 August 1987
Moscow Changes Its Tactics In Central America
Summary
Mocow apparently has concluded that the Contadora Peace
Process' is not likely to achieve a political settlement in
Central America and therefore poses little danger that the
Sandinistas will have to accede to the plan's calls for
democratization and demilitarization. At the same time, the
Soviets reportedly have come to view the continuation of the
peace process itself as a major impediment to direct US military
intervention in Central America. When the Contadora talks
seemed to stall early last year, Moscow initiated a series of
actions aimed at creating the impression of movement in the
process, apparently hoping to preserve the appearance of
Contadora as a viable alternative to a military confrontation.
In tandem with these moves, Moscow has assumed a more
conciliatory attitude toward three of the 'Core Four" Central
American democracies--Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica. In
contrast to Moscow's previous condemnation of the Central
1The Contadora Group was established in January 1983 by the
foreign ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, and Colombia.
Their aim was to draw up a treaty that would reduce tensions
between Nicaragua and its democratic neighbors--the "Core Four"
democracies of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica.
The proposed treaty includes a ban on foreign military bases or
Installations and external aid to insurgent groups, calls for the
reduction of armies and arms inventories in Central America, and
advocates political pluralism for the region. In 1984 the
Contadora Support Group, composed of Peru, Argentina, Uruguay,
and Brazil, was formed to support the efforts of the Contadora
participants.
This memorandum was prepared in
the Office of Soviet Analysis
Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Regional Policy
Division
SOV M 87-20078X
Copy SI of 111
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American democracies as willing pawns of the United States,
Soviet media have commended the trend toward democracy in these
countries and frequently excused their support for US policies as
the product of poverty and economic dependence. Moreover, the
Soviets have extended a number of diplomatic and commercial
overtures, including an offer to renew diplomatic relations with
Guatemala City and to develop trade with Tegucigalpa and San
Jose.
Moscow appears to have chosen this course of action as a
means to buy time for the Nicaraguans. It hopes to reduce
regional responsiveness to Washington and the willingness of the
Central American democracies to cooperate with the United States
in activities against Managua. Moscow also hopes to foster a
benign image of the USSR as a peacemaker both locally and
... internationally and eventually carve out a larger role for itself
in regional affairs.
The Central American states may entertain Moscow's
overtures, but they recognize that the Soviets are prepared to
offer only token economic assistance. Regional leaders are also
sensitive to the likelihood that developing significant ties to
Moscow would expose them to strong domestic criticism and could
endanger current levels of US economic and military assistance.
The Soviet Approach to Contadora
The Soviets initially were cautious about endorsing the
Contadora process. Despite requests for support from Contadora's
sponsors, Moscow demurred, declaring--according to various
sources--that overt Soviet support might tarnish the legitimacy
of the initiative for international audiences. Moscow may have
hesitated because the initiative, if successful, could force the
fledgling Nicaraguan regime to make important concessions, such
as domestic democratization and limiting its ties with the Soviet
Bloc and Cuba. The Soviets also may have been suspicious of the
Contadora Group's sympathies; in 1980, for example, Panama
withdrew its advisers from Nicaragua, and in 1984 Mexico cut off
credits to the Sandinistas for the purchase of oil.
The US invasion of Grenada and growing assistance to the
Nicaraguan insurgents, however, appears to have reinforced
Moscow's perception of an increased US challenge to its interests
in the Third World. Seeking ways to limit Washington's options
in Central America, the Soviets apparently seized on Contadora as
a useful forum for building regional nationalism and opposition
to US influence. This assessment was reinforced as the
negotiations proceeded and some of the Contadora and Support
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I I
411.11.
Group nations began to characterize Washington as obstructing the
_peace process./
Although the Soviets reportedly believe the Sandinista
regime has a good chance of surviving if it can wait out the
Reagan administration, the pressure of stepped-up US support to
the insurgents apparently has increased Moscow's uncertainty
regarding US intentions in the region. The Soviets have
consistently tried to portray their military aid to the
Sandinistas as defensive in nature, and have so far refrained
from sending weapons systems--such as MIG jet fighter aircraft--
which might provoke direct intervention from the United States.
/ Last November the Soviets issued a rare
Government Statement demanding an end to US preparations for
direct military action against the Sandinista;--only the second
Government Statement in support of Nicaragua.' An official of
the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) told the US Embassy
that the statement was prompted by US legislation approving aid
to the insurgency. The Soviets had by then already initiated a
series of actions, apparently prompted by the deadlock of the
Contadora talks in early 1986, designed to create the impression
of movement in the negotiations:
2A Government Statement presents the official position of the
Soviet government on a particular issue. Moscow issued its first
Government Statement in support of the Sandinistas on the
occasion of the US invasion of Grenada.
3
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o Also last November, Soviet UN envoys made an offer to
their Honduran counterparts to hold bilateral talks on the
region in either Moscow, Tegucigalpa, or a third country,
according to the US mission at the UN.
o In January, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze hosted a
meeting with ambassadors from the Contadora and Support
Group nations, who presented texts of the Contadora
declarations for Soviet approval. The meeting received
extensive coverage in the Soviet press, and Izvestiya
noted the apparent "reactivation" of the Contadora
process.
o In April, Soviet spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov announced
that the USSR expressed full solidarity with the efforts
of the Contadora and Support Group foreign ministers, who
were then meeting in Buenos Aires.
Moscow apparently hopes that the revitalization of the talks will
serve as a subtle way to ease some of the pressure on Managua.
Reaching out to the Central American Democracies
In addition to trying to portray itself as a regional
peacemaker, Moscow has sought maneuvering room by assuming a more
conciliatory attitude toward Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa
Rica. Since early last year, Soviet press and academic
publications have commended the transition to civilian
democracies in Guatemala and Honduras. Soviet media have toned
down their previous attacks on these countries, and instead now
frequently characterize them as states whose growing poverty and
economic dependence have placed them in "bondage" to
Washington. In December a prominent Soviet journal
sympathetically quoted a Honduran scholar's lament that the
regional states assist Washington's policies "not because we are
in sympathy but because we are poor," and referred to the new
Central American democracies as "a success for the region's
progressive forces."
Concurrently, Moscow has been pressing some of the Central
American democracies to improve ties with Managua.
4
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o Most recently, our mission at the UN reported that the
Soviet UN First Secretary met with his Costa Rican
counterpart to propose that the two missions set up a
"permanent dialogue" aimed at improving Nicaraguan-Costa
Rican relations.
The Soviets probably calculate that improved relations between
Nicaragua and its neighbors will complicate US efforts to
coordinate policies among the Central American states. They may
also hope that improved relations might result in a more
"trusting" atmosphere in which at least some of these countries
would be less exacting in their demands for concessions from
Managua during regional peace negotiations.
The clearest manifestations of Moscow's new tactics in
Central America are its attempts to build direct commercial and
diplomatic ties with several Central American states.
Honduras. In early May the chief of the regional Soviet
trade mission, based in San Jose, met with the Honduran Minister
of the Economy to discuss the beginning of permanent commercial
relations. While the Honduran response has been mixed,
Tegucigalpa has shown other signs of interest in maintaining some
form of contact with Moscow. /
Guatemala. Since last spring, the Kremlin has persistently
tried to lure Guatemala into reactivating official ties which
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4110110
have been dormant since 1954. At ceremonies in Costa Rica in May
last year, the leader of the Soviet delegation offered Guatemalan
President Cerezo diplomatic ties and unspecified economic and
military assistance, according to the US Embassy.
Last February the Soviet Ambassador to Costa Rica made a
"private" visit to Guatemala to explore economic and cultural
ties. The timing of the visit--while both President Cerezo and
the Guatemalan Foreign Minister were out of the country--probably
was intended to avoid a Guatemalan rebuff. Strong opposition
from the still influential Guatemalan military, as well as other
conservatives, is likely to prevent Cerezo from resiondins to
Soviet overtures
In a statement
probably calculated to preserve the appearance of Guatemalan
neutrality, the Foreign Minister recently announced that
diplomatic relations with the USSR had never been formally
interrupted, but that there is no economic justification to open
an Embassy at this time.
Costa Rica. Moscow also has stepped up its efforts to
strengthen ties with Costa Rica--the only democracy in Central
America which has diplomatic relations with the USSR--since the
inauguration of President Arias in May 1986. The Kremlin sent a
relatively high-level delegation to Arias's inauguration, headed
by the Chief of the MFA's First Latin America Department, who was
formerly the Soviet Ambassador to San Jose. Perhaps hoping to
play to Arias's aspirations as a regional leader, last November
the Soviets invited him to Moscow, but Arias refused the
invitation, according to the US Embassy.
Commercial contacts between the two states have also
increased over the past year. San Jose purchased 260 Soviet Lada
vehicles for its security forces early this year,
and the Soviets purchased 32,000 tons
of Costa Rican sugar after the United States reduced San Jose's
sugar quota by half to 17,000 tons. Although fear of endangering
US economic aid will limit Costa Rica's trade with the USSR (as
well as Soviet trade with other Central American democracies),
San Jose probably is not above using Soviet contacts as pressure
for increased benefits from Washington. Increased trade with
Moscow also provides a non-threatening way for San Jose to
demonstrate some independence from the United States.
6
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Soviet interest in Costa Rica has heightened since President
Arias proposed his regional peace initiative in February.
Initially the Soviet reaction reflected suspicion of Arias's
motives and concern that the new peace plan might undermine the
Contadora process. Early Soviet commentary, for example,
referred to the initiative as barely differing from "US plans to
remove the Sandinistas from power."
The Soviets probably now calculate that the Arias proposal
may serve to impede US policies in a way similar to Contadora.
Moscow has praised the proposal, but has also expressed some
reservations about its substance. For example, Arias received
high marks from the Soviet media for adopting a neutral position
4110 "in defiance" of US pressure(
/Such comments
convey the impression that the Soviets will support any regional
proposal that holds out the prospect of limiting US actions in
Central America, but also indicates Moscow's desire to avoid
alienating either the Contadora Group nations or the Core Four
democracies.
What's In It for Moscow
The Kremlin's new use of diplomatic activism in Central
America is part of a larger pattern of attempts to reassert its
importance a? a player in regional conflict issues throughout the
Third World, but it also appears to be tailored for specific
goals.
Buying time for Managua. Soviet officials have repeatedly
discussed the need to buy time for the Sandinista regime--by
preventing direct US military intervention or a drastic surge in
aid to the insurgents--until the next US administration, when,
Moscow is reportedly convinced, US policy toward Nicaragua will
become less "aggressive."[
/ Despite
their concern that a regional settlement might limit Sandinista
7
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- ? , ,
internal prerogatives, the Soviets apparently believe that the
ongoing negotiations act as a shield against possible US
intervention. In February, for example, TASS approvingly noted a
statement by the Chairman of the European Economic Community
(EEC) that the EEC viewed the Contadora process as an "effective
instrument for preventing military confrontation." Moscow seemed
eager to try to create the illusion of movement in the talks when
they appeared permanently stalled last year, lest Washington use
the stalemate in the talks as a rationale for forceful action.
Moscow has made similar use of the Arias plan by holding it up as
evidence of Latin America's ability to pursue a settlement
independent of the United States.
Fostering a Non-Threatening Image. The Soviets have an
interest in altering Central American perceptions of their
influence in the region as threatening. In addition to playing
down their assistance to Central American insurgents, they have
gone to some lengths to publicize their sensitivity to the
"realities" of the region and the pressures faced by Central
American leaders.7
Promoting A Larger Soviet Role. Finally, the Soviets may
hope that a higher profile in regional conflict negotiations will
gain them some voice in the outcome, in the unlikely event that a
settlement is concluded. For their part, the Central American
countries may seek to include Moscow in the process as a
signatory to a protocol obliging the Soviets to respect a
regional accord because they believe Soviet compliance is
necessary for any Central American settlement to succeed. Signs
of this attitude are already apparent. For example, President
Arias has stated publicly that the USSR and Cuba are parties to
the Central American conflict and that it is advisable to hold a
dialogue with them in order to achieve peace in the region. But
while Moscow derives benefit by portraying itself as a regional
peacemaker, there is no evidence that the Kremlin is willing to
make substantial moves toward a settlement, such as pressuring
Nicaragua to make political or military concessions.
Outlook
Moscow apparently hopes its new efforts will limit-US
options in the region and buy time for the Sandinistas until the
8
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1988 US elections. The Kremlin will probably use this interlude
to provide additional military and economic assistance, as well
as political advice, aimed at guaranteeing the survival of the
Sandinista regime and establishing a stable, pro-Soviet,
Communist government in Managua.
The USSR almost certainly will be unable to wean the Central
American states from their pro-US orientation in the near term.
While these states may entertain Soviet overtures, the
democracies recognize that Moscow is prepared to offer only token
economic assistance. Regional leaders are also sensitive to the
likelihood that developing significant ties to Moscow would
expose them to strong domestic criticism--especially from the
military--and endanger current levels of US economic and military
assistance. They may use the prospect of limited commercial
deals or diplomatic concessions with the USSR, however, as a
bargaining chip for additional aid from Washington.
9
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SUBJECT: Moscow Changes Its Tactics in Central America
External Distribution
NSC
1. Dr. Fritz W. Ermarth
Special Assistant to the President for
European and Soviet Affairs, NSC
Room 368, Old EOB
2. Raymond F. Burghardt
Special Assistant to the President for
Latin American Affairs, NSC
Room 391, Old EOB
3. William Perry
Di rector for Latin American Affairs
NSC
Room 393, Old EOB
4. George Van Eron
Director Secretariat
NSC
Room 381, Old EOB
5. Ronald C. St. Martin
Senior Director, Crisis Management Center
Room 303, Old EOB
6. Colonel Tyrus W. Cobb
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
NSC
Room 361, Old EOB
7. The Honorable Donald P. Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
National Security Affairs, NSC
Room 298, Old EOB
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SUBJECT: Moscow Changes Its Tactics in Central America
External Distribution
8. The Honorable Anne Armstrong
Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board
Room 340, Old EOD
9. Peter R. Sommer
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
NSC
Room 361, EOB
10. Paula J. Dobriansky
Director, European and Soviet Affairs
NSC
Room 368, EOB
11. Peter W. Rodman
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs (Foreign Policy)
The White House
12. Michael K. Bohn
Director, Situation Room
West Wing White House
13. William H. Courtney
Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC
Situation Room
The White House
DOD
14. Dr. Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy
Room 42E812, The Pentagon
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SUBJECT: Moscow Changes Its Tactics in Central America
External Distribution
15. Col. David R. Brown
Executive Secretary
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room 3A948, The Pentagon
16. Nestor D. Sanchez
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Inter-American Affairs
Room 4C800, The Pentagon
17.
41* DIO for Latin America
Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 2C238, The Pentagon
18.
DIO for European and Soviet Political
and Military Affairs
Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 2A520, The Pentagon
19. Dr. Andrew W. Marshall
Director of Net Assessment
Department of Defense
Room 3A930, The Pentagon
20. Donald C. Latham
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Command, Control, Communications/Intelligence
Room 3E172, The Pentagon
21. Ronald H. Stivers
Assistant Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), OSD
Room 2E812, The Pentagon
22. Lt General John H. Moellering
Assistant to the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E872, The Pentagon
23. Vice Admiral Powell Carter, Director
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E936, The Pentagon
STAT
STAT
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SUBJECT: Moscow Changes Its Tactics in Central America
External Distribution
24. Lt General Dale A. Vesser
Director, J-5 (Plans and Policy)
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E996, The Pentagon
25. Peter P. Herrick
ANIO/W
National Warning Staff
Room 1C921, The Pentagon
26. Maj General Schuyler H. Bissell, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Room 4A932, The Pentagon
27. RADM Willi am 0. Studeman
Di rector of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
Room 5C600, The Pentagon
State
28. Thomas Simons
Deputy Assistant for Secretary of State
European/Canadian Affairs
Room 6219
Department of State
29. Steve Coffey
Special Assistant for Under Secretary Armacost
Room 7244
Department of State
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SUBJECT: Moscow Changes Its Tactics in Central America
External Distribution
30. Robert Gel bard
Deputy Assistant Secretary for South America
Room 6263
Department of State
31. Richard H. Mel ton
Director, Central America and Panama
Inter-American Affairs
Room 4917
Department of State
32. Peter Askin
Di rector of Central American and Panamanian Affairs
(Lac/Cap)
Room 5258A
Department of State
33. John J. Taylor
Deputy Assistant, Secretary
for Intelligence and Coordination
Room 6534
Department of State
34. Richard N. Holwill
Di rector of Caribbean Affairs
Inter-American Affairs
Room 3248
Department of State
35. Henry S. Myers
Executive Assistant to the Director, INR
Room 6531
Department of State
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SUBJECT: Moscow Changes Its Tactics in Central America
External Distribution
36. Mark R. Parris
Director, of Soviet Union Affairs
European and Canadian Affairs
Room 4217
Department of State
37. Robert K. German
Director, INR/SEE
Room 4758
Department of State
38. Wayne Limberg
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843
Department of State
39. Richard A. Clarke
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Affairs
Intelligence and Research
Room 6535
Department of State
40. Office of Soviet Political Affairs
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
(INR/SEE/FP)
Room 4225
Department of State
41. E. Raymond Platig
Director, Long Range Assessments, INR
Room 6842
Department of State
42. David G. Smith
Chief, INR/IAA/SA
Room 7637
Department of State
43. Richard H. Solomon
Director, Policy Planning Council
Room 7311
Department of State
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SUBJECT: Moscow Changes Its Tactics in Central America
External Distribution
44. V. James Fazio, Jr.
INR-IS
Room 6510A
Department of State
45. Robert Fouche
Director, INR/IAA
Room 7538
Department of State
... 46. Arthur P. Shankle, Jr.
Director, Mexico
Inter-American Affairs
Room 4258
Department of State
47. Everett Briggs
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Inter-American Affairs
Room 6263
Department of State
48. Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director of Intelligence and Research (INR)
Room 6531
Department of State
NSA
49. GCO/NSA
PO 532
2W1111 Fort Meade, Md
50.
D/NSA Special Assistant
Q42
Room 9A171, Fort Meade, Md.
Other
51. DIA/RTS-2C2
Bolling AFB
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SUBJECT: Moscow Changes
Internal Distribution
Its Tactics in Central America
52.
D/DCl/DDCI Executive
Staff
53.
ED/DCI
54.
Executive Registry
55.
DDI
56.
Senior Review Panel
57.
OCPAS/IMD/CB
58.
OCPAS/IMD/CB
59.
OCPAS/IMD/CB
60.
OCPAS/IMD/CB
61.
OCPAS/IMD/CB
62.
OCPAS/IMD/CB
63.
Vice Chairman, NIC
64.
NIC/AG
65.
NIO/USSR
66.
NIO/LA
67.
PDB Staff
68.
ILS
69.
OCA/DDI Rep.
70.
CIA Rep NMIC
71.
DI Rep., CINCLANT
72.
DI REP.,
CINCSOUTH
73.
C/DDO/SE
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74.
C/000/LA
75.
D/ALA
76.
ALA/MCD/CUB
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77.
D/OIA
78.
C/OIA/TWFD/ALA
79.
C/OIA/IID/ATB
80.
81.
OIA/IID/AT
OIA/TWFD/AL
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82.
OIA/TWFD/AL
83.
D/OGI
84.
C/OGI/ISID/AT
85.
C/OGI/ISID/IT
86.
OGI/ISID/AT
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87.
OGI/ISID/AT
88.
D/NPIC
89.
C/NPIC/IEG/TWFD
90.
D/SOVA
91.
DD/SOVA
92.
SA/SOVA
93.
C/SOVA Executive Staff
94.
C/ES/CIB
95.
C/SOVA/RIG
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102. C/SOVA/DEIG
103. C/DE IG/DED
104. C/DEIG/DID
105. C/SOVA/TWA
106. C/SOVA/TWA/A
107. C/SOVA/TWA/AFLAME
108. C/SOVA/TWA/FA
109. AFLAME Chrono
110. SOVA/TWA/AFLAME
111. SOVA/TWA/AFLAME
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP90T00114R000800350002-1