THE SOVIET IN AFGHAN TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800340002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 28, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/10: CIA-RDP90T00114R000800340002-2 25X1
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Central Intelligence Agency
28 July 1987
The Soviet Role in Afghan Terrorism in Pakistan
Summary
The escalation of terrorist bombings in Pakistan that has
been undertaken by KHAD this year is primarily intended to build
domestic pressure for a change in Islamabad's policy of
supporting the Afghan resistance. The Soviets, who control KHAD,
are almost certainly the originators of this scheme, but they
have been careful to avoid clear links to specific incidents and
mav, in fact, be leaving the details of implementation to KHAD.
on US targets have been few.
BCHAD has concentrated its resources on activities that
directly affect the Pakistani population because these stand the
best chance of producing public pressure for Islamabad to be more
accommodating to Kabul's "peace" initiatives and of disrupting
aid to the insurgents. Nonetheless, Kabul--and, presumably,
Moscow--has apparently decided to include US facilities in the
expansion of sabotage, perhaps partly in retaliation for the
provision of Stingers to the ,insurgents, although so far attacks
The Expansion of Sabotage
Until spring this year, most sabotage in Pakistan by the
Afghan intelligence service (KHAD) was confined to Peshawar and
other areas in the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan with large
concentrations of Afghan refugees. Recently, however, sabotage 25X1
has been directed increasingly towards Pakistani as well as
refugee targets, and it has been extended beyond the border areas 25X1
into Punjab and Sind, where the majority of Pakistanis live.
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis) 25X1
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Third World Activities Division
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/10: CIA-RDP90T00114R000800340002-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/10: CIA-RDP90T00114R000800340002-2 25X1
Recently, saboteurs have increasingly targeted
_
bazaars, bus depots, and other public places, where the
explosions are likely to generate maximum casualties and thus
publicity and increased public pressure on Islamabad. ~ 25X1
The present sabotage is undoubtedly designed to stir up
anti-refugee, anti-government, and anti-US sentiment among the
Pakistani population in the hope that this will destabilize the
Zia regime or make it more amenable to a settlement on Soviet
terms. 25X1
It is highly likely that this policy was implemented on
orders from Moscow. The intensity of recent terrorist activities
is probably a sign of the Soviets' frustration over their
inability to master the Afghan situation. This frustration has
recently been compounded by the provision of Stinger missiles and
other improved weapons to the insurgents and the negative
reception that Islamabad and the resistance gave to Kabul's
national reconciliation initiative:
-- Soviet officials have threatened in the past that
continued Pakistani support for the resistance--especially
the introduction of Stingers--could result in more
vigorous efforts to exploit the country's internal
vulnerabilities.
A recent report in a widely circulated Asian news magazine that
the Kabul regime has undertaken the current bombing campaign
without Soviet approval and specifically to undermine Moscow's
efforts to reach a compromise settlement is so implausible that
it is most likely disinformation. 25X1
The Soviets may, however, be leavin the details of
operations to KHAD's discretion. the 25X1
Soviets regard KHAD as more effective and reliable than other
Afghan institutions, and the expansion of terrorist operations
may have made it more difficult for the Soviets to direct all of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/10: CIA-RDP90T00114R000800340002-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/10: CIA-RDP90T00114R000800340002-2
Have US Interests Been Targeted?
few incidents suggest that
this policy has been put into effect:
-- In December last year, a car bomb left near the US
Consulate in Peshawar exploded after it was towed by
Pakistani police.
-- In mid-June a powerful briefcase bomb was found near the
US Agency for International Development office in Quetta.
-- On 13 July, a small bomb exploded in a hedge near the US
Consulate in Peshawar, causing minor damage. 25X1
There is nothing so far that explicitly links the Soviets to
these incidents, though it is unlikely that they are merely rogue
enterprises by KHAD. The Soviets may hope that pressure against
aiding the insurgents would build in the United States if it were
shown to be costly in terms of American casualties. At a
minimum, they would see the bombings as a means of creating a
more intense public debate in Washington. They might also regard
attacks on US installations as justifiable retaliation for the US
provision of Stingers to the resistance or for insurgent raids
into the Soviet Union, for which the Soviets have blamed the
United States.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/10: CIA-RDP90T00114R000800340002-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/10: CIA-RDP90T00114R000800340002-2 25X1
Incidents directly affecting the Pakistani
population stand the best chance of putting pressure on Islamabad
to be more accommodating to Soviet initiatives on a settlement.
The Soviets and Afghans are, therefore, likely to continue to
concentrate their resources here.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/10: CIA-RDP90T00114R000800340002-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/10: CIA-RDP90T00114R000800340002-2 25X1
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SUBJECT: The Soviet Role in Afghan Terrorism in Pakistan
Internal Distribution
NIO/CT
NIO/NESA
NIO/USSR
DC/NESA/SO
C/NESAJSO/PB
C/NESA/SO/A
CTC
CPAS/IMD/CB
D/BONA
C/BONA/RIG
SOVA/RIG/TWAD
SOVA/RIG/TWAD
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/10: CIA-RDP90T00114R000800340002-2