SOVIET APPROACH TO SEVEN REGIONAL ISSUES: THE KOREAS, CAMBODIA, NICARAGUA, ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS, IRAN-IRAQ WAR, THE HORN OF AFRICA, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000800030001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 18, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agcncy
DATE ~/~ /,`'/
DOC
OIR
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE P & PD
18 February 1987
Soviet Approach To Seven Regional Issues:
The Koreas, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Arab-Israeli Peace Process,
Iran-Iraq War, The Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa.
This memorandum was prepared for the Undersecretary Of State by the Third
World Activities Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries
can be directed to the Chief, Third World Activities Divisio
SOV M 87-20017X
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I I
Soviet-North Korean relations have improved to a marked degree since Kim
I1-song's visit to Moscow in May 1984, especially in the military sphere. The
Soviets, after refusing for over a decade to provide North Korea with advanced
weapons, have delivered 46 MiG-23 aircraft and a number of SA-3 surface-to-air
missiles within the past two years. Naval ships from the two countries have
exchanged port visits, and air and naval forces of the two countries conducted
their first combined exercise last fall.
North Korea also has moved closer into line with Moscow's regional
goals--endorsing Soviet activities in Afghanistan, while toning down public
support for the Cambodian resistance forces under Prince Sihanouk--and become
more vocal in supporting Soviet stances on international issues, especially
arms control questions.
There are, however, several matters on which the two sides remain apart.
The Soviets, for example, have carefully preserved their freedom of action
ici tion in the 1 88 O1 ics in Seoul.
regarding part
Other factors also serve to limit Soviet-North Korean collaboration. The
Soviets remain wary of Kim's intentions and reluctant to provide the military
assistance that would significantly improve the North's offensive capabilities
or otherwise alter the balance of power on the peninsula, a development that
could raise Moscow's risks and/or reduce its leverage over P'vongyang.
By the same token, P'yongyang's desire to retain an image of independence
also will affect its relationship with Moscow. The ongoing Soviet refusal to
recognize publicly Kim's plan for his son, Kim Chong-il, to succeed him is yet
another significant irritant. The elder Kim must have discussed this question
with Gorbachev during their talks in Moscow last October, but the Soviets seem
as reluctant as ever to make any public commitments on the matter.
The reasons for Kim's sudden five-day visit to Moscow remain unclear, but
the evidence at hand--while sketchy--suggests that:
-- The Soviets told Kim they would not boycott the Seoul Games if he did not
get his way on the co-hosting issue, and warned him to keep the peace and
not be impatient over reunification of the two Koreas.
-- Kim reiterated his determination to keep North Korea on an "independent"
course between the USSR and China, instead of tilting further toward the
USSR by joining CEMA or other Soviet-dominated organizations.
Gorbachev also may have offered additional advanced weapons in return for
access to North Korean air or naval bases, or an understanding to conduct even
larger joint military exercises in the coming year. But there is no evidence
as. yet that Moscow has now accepted Kim's longstanding request for T-72 tanks,
or agreed to provide more modern surface-to-air missiles, such as the SA-5.
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Cambodia
Although the Soviets for the most part have acquiesced in Vietnam's desire to
play the dominant role in Cambodia, they are neverthless resolved to maintain
their own inde ndent presence there, in part to exert some leverage on the
Vietnamese. the Soviet Union is reluctant
to see Vietnam as a leader of an Indochinese bloc pursuing an independent
policy. Moscow's apparent objective is to keep as high a profile as possible
in Cambodia and Laos--through official delegations, direct contact with the
Khmer government, sponsorship of Russian language courses and cultural
activities, and the like--without offending the Vietnamese.
Soviet economic aid to Cambodia--mostly in the form of project aid--has
averaged $80 million per year over the last six years, and may be rising
slightly. The roughly 300 Soviet technicians and advisers among other things
help repair and operate the Kampong Saom port facilities, used for military as
well as civilian deliveries. Moscow probably sees direct deliveries of aid
not only as more efficient, but also as a way of ensuring that credit for the
aid is not claimed by Hanoi or that aid is not siphoned off by Vietnam.
The Soviets play a key role in supporting Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia.
They have supplied Vietnam with nearly $1.5 billion per year in arms since
1982, including tanks and ground attack aircraft useful in counterinsurgency
war. Moscow has given Cambodia around $200 million a year in military
aid--including SA-3 SAMs--over the last five years. The Soviets also have
provided training in the Soviet Union for around 200 Cambodian pilots since
1981. The Soviets have an estimated 200 military advisers in the country[
Moscow continues to support Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia despite the
political costs for Soviet relations with China and with ASEAN. Nevertheless,
the Soviets are eager to present an image of flexibility and undoubtedly
pushed for the recent Vietnamese proposals for negotiations that allowed for
participation by the Khmer Rouge (but not by Pol Pot). Moscow's public
position is that the problem must be solved by the Cambodian parties, and the
Soviets deflect Chinese demands for Moscow to exert pressure on Hanoi by
urging the resumption of direct negotiations between Hanoi and Beijing. The
Soviets have indicated their willingness to participate in any international
conference on the issue that includes the current regime and have stated that
they would be prepared to join an international mechanism to guarantee a
negotiated settlement. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets would
damage their important relationship with Vietnam--and risk losing their base
at Cam Ranh Bay--by stopping support for Hanoi's venture in Cambodia without a
political arrangement in Phnom Penh that is acceptable to Hanoi and that
brims an end to the resistance.
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Nicaragua
The Soviets remain strongly committed to the consolidation of a
Marxist-Leninist state in Nicaragua, despite the rising costs of economic and
military materiel assistance needed to keep the Sandinista regime afloat. In
Moscow's eyes, the advantages of a Nicaragua responsive to Soviet political
and strategic interests clearly justify the growing Soviet investment, which
is still small relative to other Soviet third world aid programs.
Warsaw Pact military support reached a high of $575 million in 1986.
Moscow's direct role in delivering this materiel has steadily increased, as
have efforts to tailor assistance to Managua's counterinsurgency needs. In
1986, Moscow provided 23 MI-17 and six MI-25 helicopters to the Sandinistas,
more than doubling the helicopter inventory. At least in the near term,
Moscow will probably focus the remainder of its military aid on replacing
transport vehicles and consumable items such as ammunition. The Soviets may
also send new air defense equipment, such as SA-3s, but, sensitive to
Washington's stated concerns, will probably refrain from delivering jet
fighter aircraft. The Soviets are likely to keep their military advisory
presence--about 75--as small and low-profile as possible, preferring to use
surrogates, especially Cubans.
Moscow has tried to limit economic assistance to Managua by urging the
Sandinistas to seek other sources of financial support. As Western assistance
has dried up, however, the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies have filled in the
gap. Soviet Bloc support includes economic credits, virtually all Managua's
crucial oil deliveries, and even scarce hard currency. Moscow's credits to
Managua in 1986 reached a high of X325 million, representing a 38 percent
increase over 1985. While the Soviets are committed to keeping the Sandinista
economy afloat, however, their assistance is not unconditional. Moscow is
pressing Managua to reorganize its economic institutions according to the
Soviet model. During 1986, Soviet State Planning Committee experts visited
Managua to examine Sandinista economic performance, and approximately 500
Soviet Bloc economic advisors are assigned to Nicaragua--some to oversee
Nicaragua's economic agencies, and others to work on long-term development
projects.
The Soviets reportedly believe that US opposition to Managua will decline
and that the next administration will probably accept the Sandinista regime as
a fait accompli. Accordingly, they appear to be playing for time:
cultivating favorable international opinion on the Sandinistas' behalf,
becoming more vocal in support of the stalled Contadora talks, and avoiding
provocative behavior-- while counseling Managua to do the same. Nevertheless,
the need to avoid direct US intervention remains a major Soviet concern. For
example, late last year Moscow issued a government statement--only the second
in support of Nicaragua--and made a demarche to the US warning Washington
against direct military action against Nicaragua. These unusual moves were
probably prompted by an increase in insurgent offensive capability due to
renewed Congressional funding, and concern over a perceived regional US
military build-up.
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The Arab-Israeli Peace Process
In July 1986, Gorbachev renewed the Soviets' longstanding call to convene
an international conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute by proposing to French
President Mitterand a new vehicle, a preparatory committee meeting, to get the
process moving again. The proposal contains no substantive policy changes and
is apparently intended to project a new image of Soviet flexibility. The
Soviets are also evidently trying to take advantage of what they perceive as
an impasse is current US policy.
Since the July proposal, Soviet diplomacy has focused less on the
substance of the peace process and more on the form a conference would take.
Late last summer, Moscow sent emissaries to various Arab capitals to promote
the proposal and to get a feel for Arab opinion, and obtained broad, if not
enthusiastic, support. In late September, Shevardnadze formally proposed the
preparatory conference in his speech to the UN General Assembly. In early
December the UNGA passed a resolution calling for an international conference
on the Arab-Israeli dispute that includes the Soviet-proposed preparatory
conference. A month later a Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement touted the
resolution in language crafted to minimize US and Israeli objections, while
maintaining traditional Soviet support for professed Arab and Palestinian
goals.
Syria occasionally pays lip service to the Soviet concept of an
international conference, but Moscow will probably have great difficulty
convincing Damascus to. participate. The Syrians did not attend the 1973
Geneva conference, co-sponsored by the US and USSR. Moscow is also
working--so far without success--to reconcile competing PLO factions and bring
them to apoint where they would be able to participate in a conference.
In offer to obtain Israeli participation in a Soviet-initiated peace
process, Moscow apparently has accepted that it must try to improve relations
with Tel Aviv. The Soviets and Israelis have met with increased frequency in
the past year, including the August meeting in Helsinki and the September
Peres-Shevardnadze meeting in New York. Over the last 18 months, Moscow has
been tempting Israel on the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration. Last month,
the Soviets enacted a new law that they claim is more lax and will result in
the release of large numbers of Soviet Jews in the near future. So far,
however, there has been no tangible change in emigration policy and Israeli
officials remain skeptical; Jewish emigration was at its lowest point in 1985
and did not increase appreciably last year.
At the same time, Moscow is also aware that renewing ties carries risks,
both in internal policy and in Moscow's relations with its Arab friends.
While Moscow and Tel Aviv will probably continue to discuss normalizing
relations-- perhaps at a consular level or by setting up interest
sections--Moscow will be reluctant to do so without Israeli acceptance of a
greater Soviet role in the peace process.
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Iran-Iraq War
The Gulf war has not served Moscow's overall interest in the region.
Instead, it has sparked the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council which
turned to the United States for strategic security assistance. It has also
complicated Soviet efforts to achieve greater cooperation among Iraq, Syria,
and Libya, diverted Arab attention away from the conflict with Israel and has
tended to offset resentment among moderate Gulf Arab states against the US for
its pro-Israeli stance.
Despite Moscow's support for Baghdad since Iraq began losing territory to
the Iranians in 1982, the Soviets probably do not want either Iran or Iraq to
emerge as a clear victor, having long preferred a relative balance between the
two countries as the best way to exert Soviet influence in the region. Soviet
relations with Tehran have remained cool since 1983, and Moscow probably does
not expect Iran to change its anti-Soviet posture appreciably any time soon.
Moreover, a victorious Iran would be likely to undermine Soviet influence in
Baghdad, with which Moscow has had a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
since 1972; Iraq purchases approximately half of its arms from the USSR. An
Iranian victory would also make Tehran even less susceptible to Soviet inroads
or pressure and would free up Iranian assets that could be used to support the
Afghan mujahideen or help spread Islamic fundamentalism beyond Iranian
borders. Such a victory would also draw the Persian Gulf countries even
closer to the United States.
Moscow's inability to influence Tehran and Iraq's inability to force Iran
to enter negotiations suggest the USSR will continue to support Iraq in its
war effort especially as long as the United States remains locked out of
Iran. -
The USSR officially maintains a neutral position on the war and has
supported calls for peace negotiations by the United Nations and other
international organizations. The Soviets issued their first government
statement on the war in early January, calling for an immediate negotiated
settlement and the return to pre-war boundaries--a position that coincides
with Baghdad's--and charging the United States with fueling the war. But this
was largely an attempt to curry favor with the Arabs, who were due to meet at
the Islamic Conference held in Kuwait later that month, and particularly the
Iraqis, who were struggling to defend Basra and were still irritated over the
US arms sales to Iran.
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati's two-day visit to Moscow in
mid-February was marked by strong disagreement over the Iran-Iraq war and
Afghanistan. Velayati met with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, President
Gromyko, and Premier Ryzhkov, but Izvestiya noted twice that his three-hour
talks with Gromyko were "frank and businesslike" and highlighted the two
sides' differences. Even in the realm of economic cooperation--the one area
where the USSR and Iran have the most potential to work together--the Velayati
visit did not appear to produce any new results.
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The Horn of Africa
Moscow's primary objectives in the Horn of Africa are reducing Western
influence and access, preserving Soviet access to military facilities, and
building Marxist-Leninist institutions in Ethiopia. The primary Soviet policy
tool for pursuing these objectives is maintaining close relations with Addis
Ababa, which are underpinned by the extensive military relationship between
Ethiopia and the USSR.
The Soviets are Addis Ababa's major source of military assistance,
supplying Ethiopia with over $6 billion in arms and military equipment from
1977-1986, along with 1700 military advisers.
Soviet military
e ver es fell from $910 million in 1985 to $270 million in 1986 and Moscow
probably is not keen on massive new injections of military assistance for
major offensives against the Eritrean insurgents. The Soviets have
nevertheless indicated a willingness to provide further assistance as well as
defer indefinitely payment on Ethiopia's estimated $3.7 billion military debt
to Moscow--a clear indication that Moscow is committed to continue supporting
the regime.
Political ties are marked by extensive bilateral exchanges and frequent
reiterations of mutual support. Ethiopia, however, has complained about
shortfalls in economic aid (which totaled $1.3 billion from 1977-85 and
includes 2200 economic advisers), quality problems with military aid,
differences over the coup in South Yemen, and the development of the Workers'
Party of Ethiopia. Mengistu's distrust of Moscow's motives and disagreements
over policy will continue, but almost certainly will not lead either side to
reconsider their close bilateral relations.
Soviet relations with Somalia are unlikely to be warm soon, despite the
October 1986 meeting between the Somali and Soviet Foreign Ministers--the
first official public contacts between the two counries since the bilateral
rift in 1977. The Soviets have limited expectations for relations with
Somalia and are probably unwilling to make significant moves to improve
relations by forgiving Somalia's $100 million military debt or--even more
unlikely--pressuring Ethiopia to be more flexible in peace talks with Somalia.
A visit to Somalia by an as yet unspecified Soviet delegation originally
scheduled for early this year has meanwhile been delayed.
Soviet ties to D i3 bouti are limited, but Moscow has shown slightly
increased interest in the last few months, signing an agreement to provide
TASS news service and training and asking
Djiboutian permission to stockpile fuel and make port calls, probably as an
alternative to South Yemeni port facilities. Djibouti agreed to fuel storage
and merchant ship access but not naval port calls.
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Southern Africa
Angola is the major Soviet priority in Southern Africa, and its
importance has increased further due to US support for UNITA. The Soviets
shipped over $1 billion worth of arms and military equipment to Angola in
1986, and have provided about 1,200 military advisers, while their Cuban
allies provide some 36,000 technicians and troops. Luanda helps offset the
cost of the aid Moscow and Havana provide by paying for some of their arms
with hard currency earned from oil shipments, leading to some $1 billion in
payments in 1985; payments in 1986, however, almost certainly fell due to low
oil prices. The Soviets meanwhile continue to build Angolan military strength
while encouraging Luanda to keep steady military pressure on UNITA with the
aim of gradually containing the insurgency.
Soviet commitment to Mozambique is less intense than its backing of
Angola, despite Maputo's treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow and
consistent support of the Soviets on international issues. Moscow
nevertheless continues its military and economic aid, although arms deliveries
are down and likely to remain fairly low for the next few years due to
Mozambique's inability to absorb or pay for new equipment. Moscow also seeks
political and propaganda gains by playing up its support for
multilateral--primarily African--military action against RENAMO.
In South Africa, the Soviets anticipate the eventual breakdown of white
rule will pave the way for the evolution of a pro-Soviet ANC-dominated
government, although Moscow believes this will take a long time. The Soviets
and their allies continue supplying arms to the ANC, supporting the South
African Communist Party to try to ensure its influence in the ANC, and
promoting the ANC role as the leader of the antiapartheid movement. The
Soviets use propaganda and disinformation extensively to demonstrate
solidarity with black African positions and discredit the United States as a
backer of the Pretoria regime.
The status of Soviet relations with other countries in the region varies.
Soviet relations with Zimbabwe improved significantly over the past two years.
Mugabe visited Moscow for the first time in December 1985, and the two
countries since have exchanged delegations to discuss possible arms
agreements. Zimbabwe has not yet made a commitment to purchase Soviet arms,
however, and lack of funds and Soviet unwillingness to offer generous terms
may limit purchases. Once warm Soviet ties to Tanzania have deteriorated
because of Dar es Salaam's dissatisfaction with Soviet military and economic
aid, but Moscow relies on Tanzania's lack of alternative military suppliers to
ensure continued influence, and the two countries signed a new $190 million
arms deal in late 1986. The Soviets have tried to play on Botswana's fear of
South African military action to strengthen ties, but neither Botswana nor
Zambia, once a purchaser of Soviet arms, have recently turned to the Soviets
for significant military assistance. The USSR has almost no influence in
Lesotho and no relations with Malawi.
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DDI/SOVA/TWAD
(17 Feb 87) 25X1
SUBJECT: Soviet Approach To Seven Regional Issues:
The Koreas, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Arab-Israeli Peace Process,
Iran-Iraq War, The Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa.
Internal Distribution
1 - D/DCI/DDCI Executive Staff
7D60, Hqs
1 - ED/DCI
7D55, Hqs
1 - Executive Registry
7D60, Hqs
1 - D D I
7D47, Hqs
1 - Senior Review Panel
7E47, Hqs
6 - OCPAS/IMD/CB
7G15, Hqs
1 - Vice Chairman, NIC
7E47, Hqs
1 - NIC/AG
7E62, Hqs
1 - NI0/USSR
7E47, Hqs
1 - NIO/LA
7E62, Hqs
1 - PDB Staff
7G15, Hqs
1 - ILS
7G57, Hqs
1 - OCA/DDI Rep
7B24, Hqs
2 - D/OEA
4F18
2 - D/NESA
7G15
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Internal Distribution (continued)
SUBJECT: Soviet Approach To Seven Regional Issues:
The Koreas, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Arab-Israeli Peace Process
Iran-Iraq War, The Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa.
3 - D/ALA
3F45
1 - D/SOVA
4E58
1 - C/SOVA/RIG
5E25
5 - SOVA/TWAD/AFLAME
4E28
2 - SOVA/TWAD/ASIA
4E28
3 - SOVA/TWAD/FA
4E28
1 - SOVA/TWAD/Chrono
4E28
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