KUWAIT'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND BEYOND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89S01450R000200190001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of. Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Kuwait's National Security Policy:
The Iran-Iraq War and Beyond
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NESA 88-10021
April 1988
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Intelligence 25X1
Kuwait's National Security Policy:
The Iran-Iraq War and Beyond F-
This paper was prepared by 25X1
Office o ear Eastern and 25X1
South Asian Analysis, with a contribution by[::= 25X1
Office of Leadership Analysis. It was LOA I
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.F1 25X1
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 88-10021
April 1988
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Kuwait's National Security Polit
The Iran-Iraq War and Beyond 25X1
Key Judgments A small, virtually defenseless city-state surrounded by larger and often
Information available hostile countries, Kuwait uses a combination of diplomacy, money, and
as of 1 April 1988 political accommodation to protect its territorial integrity and oil wealth.
was used in this report.
Kuwait's defense strategy is to avoid conflict, remain on good terms with
its neighbors, and rely on help from both superpowers, the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council (GCC), and other Arab states for protection.
For the short term, Kuwait's national security policy is increasingly based
on deflecting Iranian aggression-its most immediate threat. The Iran-
Iraq war is producing increasing apprehension in Kuwait, and Kuwaiti
leaders can no longer dismiss the possibility of direct Iranian attacks. To
bolster the country's defenses against Iranian aggression, Kuwait has
altered its traditional national security policy to include:
? Closer cooperation with the superpowers, particularly the United. States.
? Stronger ties to the GCC and other Arab states.
? A more active military posture.
? Financial and logistic support for Iraq.
Kuwait's traditional security concerns-Iraqi irredentism, Saudi hegemo-
ny, and Palestinian nationalism-have been overshadowed by the Iran-Iraq
war. Should the threat of Iranian aggression recede, these issues probably
will return to a more prominent place in Kuwait's national security
concerns, resulting in a more nonaligned foreign policy.
Kuwaiti leaders have no illusions about their potential effectiveness against
external threats. If faced with a direct military threat, Kuwait will try to
defend itself while seeking military assistance from its regional allies and
the United States. Despite a more active military posture and plans for
sizable arms purchases, Kuwait's military will remain small and weak.
Kuwait's decision to seek US protection for its oil tankers marked a major
shift in its foreign policy. As long as the Iranian threat remains high,
Kuwaiti cooperation with the United States will continue and, if tensions
rise, probably expand. Despite growing understanding and cooperation,
Kuwait will probably avoid a long-term, close public alignment with US
policies in the region.
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A significant reduction in tension with Iran would probably cool the
security relationship with the United States, although not to the low level
of the early 1980s. Kuwait's deep historical and political commitment to
nonalignment and to Palestinian self-determination-issues currently
played down by Kuwaiti leaders-will probably eventually reappear as
irritants in US-Kuwaiti relations.
Kuwait has sought ways to garner greater Soviet support to demonstrate
balance in its relations with the superpowers. Although the Kuwaitis are
suspicious of Soviet long-term intentions in the region, they believe that
Moscow is too dangerous to be ignored and can be helpful in promoting
Kuwait's security and political interests.
Kuwait's financial and logistic support for Iraq in its war with Iran is
perceived as fundamental to Kuwait's security. Sustained Iranian terrorist
or military attacks could compel Kuwaiti leaders to minimize their support
for Iraq, but Kuwait would not abandon Baghdad.
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The Iran-Iraq War: A Primary Concern
Traditional National Security Concerns
Strategies
Saudi Hegemony 2
Strengthening Relationships
Checkbook Diplomacy
Dialogue With Tehran
Military Moves From Reaction to Deterrence
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Kuwait's National Security Policy:
The Iran-Iraq War and Beyond
Kuwait's national security policy reflects the coun-
try's weakness and susceptibility to manipulation by
external forces. Kuwait's basic defense strategy has
been to avoid conflict, keep on good terms with its
neighbors, and rely on the collective capabilities of the
superpowers, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
and other Arab states for protection. Kuwait's power
is derived from a shrewd combination of diplomacy,
financial assistance, and accommodation
The Iran-Iraq War: A Primary Concern
In our judgment, the most pressing security threat
confronting Kuwait is the Iran-Iraq war, now in its
eighth year. Kuwait's other regional security concerns
pale in comparison with the threat of increasing
Iranian aggression. The war has produced deep appre-
hension in the country, and Kuwait must deal with the
possibility of direct Iranian attack. To bolster the
country's defenses against Iranian aggression, Kuwait
has adjusted its national security policy to include
closer cooperation with the superpowers, particularly
the United States, stronger ties to the GCC and other
Arab states, and a more aggressive military posture.
The Iran-Iraq war has placed the Kuwaitis under
strong, conflicting pressures. The Kuwaitis have little
interest in seeing either side emerge victorious and
hope that the war will leave both weak and exhausted.
Not surprisingly, they_ have sought to accommodate
both Iran and Iraq-traditionally Kuwait's most hos-
tile neighbors-while giving substantial assistance to
Iraq. Under intense Iraqi pressure, Kuwait has pro-
vided Baghdad over $10 billion in financial aid since
the start of the war and has allowed significant
amounts of military as well as civilian goods bound for
Iraq to transit Kuwaiti ports,
Iranian hostility toward Kuwait represents the most
serious threat to the country since independence. As
one of Iraq's major financial and logistic backers,
Kuwait has been singled out as a primary target of
Iranian antagonism since early in the war. Iranian
actions against Kuwait over the past several years
have included:
? Directing the preponderance of its attacks in the
Gulf against commercial vessels serving Kuwaiti
ports, hitting between 70 and 80 tankers involved in
trade with Kuwait since 1984.
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? Sponsoring numerous terrorist attacks by local Shia
supporters intended to destabilize the Kuwaiti Gov-
ernment. Kuwaiti officials believe Iranian-backed
terrorists were responsible for the bombings of the 25X1
US and French Embassies in 1983, the car-bomb
attack on the Amir's motorcade in 1985, and a
series of explosions at oil facilities and commercial
offices in 1987.
? Launching 10 Silkworm missile attacks in 1987
against Kuwaiti territory, oil facilities, and tankers.
So far, Iran's attacks on Kuwaiti tankers have not
significantly disrupted Kuwait's ability to export oil,
in our judgment. Moreover, Kuwait could draw on the
country's foreign assets, estimated at about $80 bil-
lion at the end of 1987, or on investment income,
estimated at $6.8 billion annually, to make up for a 25X1
temporary reduction in oil revenues. A greater risk to
Kuwait would arise if the country's seaborne im ort
trade were cut off. more 25X1
than 85 percent of Kuwait's food needs and nearly all
of its consumer goods, spare parts, and machinery to
run its oil industry and critical desalination plants are
imported through its two Gulf ports-Ash Shuwaykh
and Ash Shu'aybah. A blockade is unlikely, because
Iran would have to use most of its naval and air power
and would be risking a confrontation with Western
forces
Traditional National Security Concerns
Traditionally, Kuwait has faced regional challenges
from Iraq and Saudi Arabia and internal threats from
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expatriate Palestinians. Apart from Iran, Kuwait
fears most the possibility of military conflict with Iraq
over longstanding territorial disputes. Saudi Arabia is
seen as a competitor for regional influence. The
Palestinians, on the other hand, are primarily an
internal threat, and Kuwait fears that radical ele-
ments might try to destabilize the regime. If the
threat of Iranian aggression recedes, we believe these
issues will return to the forefront of Kuwait's national
security concerns.
Iraqi Irredentism. Iraq's territorial claims on Kuwait
were a frequent source of tension before the Iran-Iraq
war.' Before the conflict, Iraq had only a narrow-80
kilometers-Gulf coastline, and the wartime closing
of Al Basrah, the Iranian seizure of Al Faw, and
Iran's blockade have cut off that limited access. These
developments have increased the strategic importance
of the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah, which
have long been claimed by Iraq. Because of Kuwait's
support for Iraq in its war with Iran, Baghdad has
temporarily shelved its territorial claims against Ku-
wait, and consultations between the two countries
occur with regularity.
There are several unresolved issues that could lead
Baghdad to revert to its prewar bullying of Kuwait:
? Baghdad has shunned efforts to settle its border
dispute despite Kuwait's generous wartime
assistance.
? Baghdad has refused to cede the small strip of
Kuwaiti territory that it annexed in 1973, largely
because the land adjoins Iraq's naval base at Umm
Qasr.
? In the past, Iraq has asserted that it needs Bubiyan
and Warbah to protect the naval base and its Gulf
oil lanes in the event of another war, according to
leader among the Gulf monarchies.
they resent-and frequently challenge-
Saudi dominance in the GCC.' For example, Kuwait
did not support Saudi efforts to persuade the GCC to
call for a break in relations with Iran in August 1987
in reaction to Iranian-led riots during the annual
pilgrimage to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
Moreover, Kuwaiti leaders have at times pursued
radically different policies from Riyadh. Kuwait nor-
mally has insisted on a nonaligned foreign policy and
decided in 1963 to establish diplomatic relations with
the Soviet Union in return for Moscow's agreement to
lift its veto of Kuwait's application for membership in
the United Nations. Until the US plan to reflag
Kuwaiti tankers was put into effect, Kuwait strongly
criticized the close security ties between Riyadh and
Washington.
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, nonetheless, hold similar
views on several regional issues:
? Kuwaiti leaders acknowledge that Saudi Arabia
must play a key regional role in protecting the Gulf,
and we believe they keep Riyadh informed on key
decisions that affect regional security.
? Kuwait joins forces with the Saudis on political
issues demanding a moderate Arab consensus, inter-
national economic issues, and defense against Irani-
an expansionism.
? Kuwait shares Riyadh's view on the need to contain
the growth of radical and foreign influences in the
region.
The Palestinian Issue. The Kuwaitis regard the coun-
try's expatriate Palestinian community as an impor-
tant internal security threat with external ramifica-
tions. Palestinians are the largest alien group in
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US Embassy reporting.
Saudi Hegemony. Kuwait sees itself as an alternative
Gulf leader to Saudi Arabia and has remained rela-
tively independent of Saudi policy over the years. The
Kuwaitis believe their experience in and knowledge of
foreign and economic affairs make them a logical
' The dispute is based on Iraq's claim that Kuwait was an integral
part of the territory administered by Baghdad under the Ottoman
Empire. The Iraqis acknowledged Kuwait's sovereignty in 1963 but
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'The Gulf Cooperation Council was created in May 1981 by Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and
Oman. The impetus for its formation was the Iran-Iraq war, which
was eight months old when the Council was formed. The war gave
the Gulf states the opportunity to increase formal cooperation
without including either Iraq or Iran-traditional rivals for domi-
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Kuwait and are generally estimated at 350,000 or
about 20 percent of Kuwait's population. Many Pales-
tinians have lived in Kuwait for 20 years or more and
form a cohesive, dynamic community that contributes
significantly to the economic well-being of the coun-
try. We estimate they make up nearly 40 percent of
the work force and 20 percent of all civil servants
(approximately 25,000 employees). Palestinians are
particularly prominent in local business, teaching,
medicine, and the media, according to the US Embas-
sy in Kuwait. They also serve as advisers to the Amir
and the ruling family, particularly on investment
matters, and hold important positions in the Defense
and Interior Ministries such as recently retired Chief
of Staff Gen. Hanna Shuhaiber.
Kuwait provides diplomatic and financial support to
the Palestinian cause:
? In international forums and the press, Kuwait pro-
vides strong diplomatic support to Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (PLO) chief Arafat and his posi-
tion in the Arab-Israeli peace process, reiterating
the need for PLO participation in an international
peace conference.
? Kuwait has been an important source of financial
assistance for the Palestinians. The government
turns over about 3.5 percent of its Palestinian
employees' salaries to the PLO's Palestine National
Fund, and private Kuwaiti citizens have contributed
about $1.2 million this year, according to the US
Embassy. Kuwait's persistent economic slump, how-
ever, has caused a decline in the government's
contributions from $63 million in 1979 to $22
million so far this year,
Kuwait and the various Palestinian organizations
have reached an understanding over the years. In
return for support, Kuwait expects the PLO to behave
inside Kuwait and to help authorities police the
Palestinian community. The local security authorities
do not tolerate political activism in the Palestinian
community. For example, the US Embassy reports
that in February the Kuwaitis arrested about 80
Palestinians who were demonstrating in support of the
riots in the West Bank and Gaza and summoned PLO
leader Arafat to obtain assurances that there would
be no further disturbances from the Palestinians.
Nonetheless, Kuwaiti concerns for the country's inter-
nal security have been heightened by the PLO's
collapse in Lebanon in 1982 and Palestinian involve-
ment in the bombings of two popular seaside cafes in
July 1985. The US Embassy reports that, to curb the
growth and activity of the Palestinian community, the
government has:
? Virtually suspended Palestinian immigration since
the late 1970s, imposing strict limits on visas.
? Cracked down on illegal aliens, threatening stiff jail
sentences, financial penalties, and deportation.
? Refused to renew work permits and denied resi-
dence permits to offspring of Palestinians living in
Kuwait.
? Closed offices of the radical Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine and Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine, forcing them to operate
as part of the officially sanctioned Fatah office.
? Banned an armed Palestinian presence in the coun-
try.
According to the US Embassy, the government's
nightmare is that radical Palestinian elements will
join with other potential antigovernment activists,
such as pro-Iranian Shias, to threaten the regime.
Palestinians have grievances that are exploitable,
according to US Embassy reporting. They know that,
with few exceptions, they will always be mistrusted as
foreigners and potential troublemakers who do not
share the Gulf Arabs' concerns or faith in the tradi-
tional family alliances by which the Gulf governments
are run. The Palestinians resent the restraints on their
opportunities and benefits but are reluctant to jeopar-
dize the understanding that provides them a haven in
exchange for guarantees of noninterference in their
hosts' internal affairs.
Strategies
Through shrewd diplomatic maneuvering and almost
$1 billion in foreign aid, Kuwaiti leaders have
strengthened alliances with the superpowers and key
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regional states and bolstered the country's defenses
against Iran. Moreover, Kuwaiti leaders are begin-
ning to change the country's image. They have toned
down their criticism of US policies, broadened their
foreign policy beyond a strict Third World orienta-
tion, and demonstrated a willingness to participate in
serious joint security planning with their allies. At the
same time, Kuwait has looked for ways to ease tension
with Iran by leaving channels of communication open
and limiting actions that Tehran may view as provoc-
Strengthening Relationships. Historically, Kuwait
has tried to maintain good relations with both super-
powers while limiting their presence in the region.
Iran's increased attacks on Kuwaiti shipping, howev-
er, which began in earnest in mid-1986, prompted
Kuwait to seek superpower protection for its oil tanker
fleet. By placing 11 ships under the US flag and
chartering three Soviet oil tankers, Kuwait hoped to
deter Iranian attacks and ensure safe passage for
Kuwait's decision to seek US protection for its oil
tankers marked a major shift in its foreign policy,
effectively ending opposition to a prominent US secu-
rity role in the Persian Gulf. Kuwait's support for the
escort plan also has forced it to accept an unprece-
dented level of operational cooperation with Washing-
ton. Moreover, the increased possibility of further
Iranian attacks has caused the Kuwaitis to view as
desirable a long-term US presence nearby. According
to the US Embassy, Kuwaiti leaders have made clear
their desire to expand the budding US-Kuwaiti secu-
rity relationship.
Despite Kuwait's tilt toward the United States, Ku-
wait has sought ways to garner Soviet support as well.
some Kuwaiti leaders
have insisted that Moscow participate in protecting
Kuwaiti oil. Some key decisionmakers,
have spent much of their careers promot-
ing the policy of balance and can be expected to cling
to it tenaciously. These advocates apparently calcu-
late that a Soviet presence in the region can provide
useful leverage over US policy. Some Kuwaiti offi-
cials probably believe they received greater US pro-
tection under the tanker reflagging plan by playing a
shrewd diplomatic game of threatening to turn to the
Soviets if Washington refused to help.
Although the ruling Al Sabah family is suspicious of
Soviet long-term intentions in the region, it believes
that Moscow is too powerful to be ignored and can
help promote Kuwait's security and political interests
in the region. Kuwait has also used its good relations
with Moscow to encourage Soviet cooperation in UN
peace efforts in the Gulf, and it hopes to use Moscow's
contacts with Tehran as another channel to ease
tension with Iran, according to the US Embassy.
Moreover, the Kuwaitis probably hope that they can
have some influence on Soviet policy in the region,
particularly in Afghanistan.
Once a reluctant participant in Gulf Cooperation
Council security cooperation, Kuwait increasingly
looks to the GCC as its long-term first line of defense.
According to US Embassy reporting, Kuwait has
taken an active role in generating GCC support for
Kuwait's tough policies toward Iran. In our view,
Kuwait expects the Council to help deter Iranian
aggression and, in the long term, to check the alleged
hegemonic intentions of Saudi Arabia. Of major
importance to Kuwait has been the GCC's willingness
to reaffirm that an attack on one member is an attack
on all, giving tacit approval to using its Peninsula
Shield Force for Kuwait's defense if necessary. Aware
of Iran's efforts to weaken the GCC by developing
closer ties to Oman and the United Arab Emirates,
Kuwait is careful to build consensus on regional issues
and minimize GCC differences over policies toward
Iran.
The Kuwaitis have also improved their ties to Saudi
Arabia. Kuwaiti leaders have portrayed Iranian ag-
gression against Saudi interests as a mutual concern
and have argued that an Iranian attack on Kuwait
should be viewed by Riyadh as an attack on Saudi
Arabia.
both countries have engaged in an unprecedented
level of military cooperation to defend against Iranian
attacks on their shipping and offshore oil facilities and
mining of their territorial waters. In the diplomatic
arena, Riyadh and Kuwait have worked closely to-
gether in the Arab League and the GCC to build a
more unified Arab position against Iran.
Checkbook Diplomacy. In our view, Kuwaiti leaders
believe generous financial assistance is one of their
most effective diplomatic tools to encourage allies and
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Figure 2
Kuwait: Total Aid Distribution, 1982-87
? Enhance its international prestige and influence less
developed countries to be more responsive to Gulf
Arab concerns in regional and international forums.
Kuwait's aid to Iraq is primarily motivated by fear
that an Iranian victory will spread the Islamic revolu-
tion to its shores. According to US Embassy report-
ing, Kuwait is also concerned about the possibility of
Iraqi reprisals and terrorist attacks if it halts such aid.
Kuwait's offer to help pay for war damages as part of
a negotiated settlement of the Iran-Iraq war is almost
certainly designed to enhance Kuwait's security
against both Iranian and Iraqi expansionism in the
postwar environment.
conciliate enemies. Last year about 12 percent of
Kuwait's oil revenues was distributed to regional
powers, regardless of their politics, to build up politi-
cal credits for times of crisis.
bilateral and other aid dis-
bursements totaled nearly $1 billion or about 4 per-
cent of gross domestic product last year. Political
gains have been modest but significant, even though
the effectiveness of checkbook diplomacy has been
reduced by the current oil glut, which lowered Ku-
waiti oil revenues from $13.6 billion in 1981 to $8
billion last year.
We believe Kuwait has attempted to use aid to:
? Mollify countries, especially Iraq and Syria, that
pose potential threats to its security.
? Bolster its reputation in the Arab League and
enhance internal security by supporting the Pales-
tinian cause.
? Mold a moderate Arab consensus by supporting
other conservative Arab states, particularly Egypt,
Jordan, and Morocco.
More recently, Kuwait has overlooked Egypt's peace
treaty with Israel and has parlayed Egypt's need for
financial assistance into additional security commit-
ments. In exchange for Kuwait's restoration of formal
diplomatic ties and promises of over $300 million in
economic assistance, Cairo has pledged additional
military advisers and undefined security assistance to
Kuwait in the event of direct Iranian attacks, accord-
ing to US Embassy reporting.
Kuwait also has used its financial leverage to extract
concessions from Syria on regional issues critical to
Kuwaiti security. After the Arab League summit
meeting last year, Kuwait agreed to continue to
provide economic assistance to Syria in return for 25X1
Syrian cooperation on ending the Iran-Iraq war, 25X1
efforts to improve relations with Iraq, and restraint in
condemning Arab reconciliation with Egypt, accord-
ing to US Embassy reporting. Kuwaiti officials have
made clear to the Syrians that further financial
assistance depends on their political acquiescence.
Dialogue With Tehran. Kuwait recognizes that Iran
is a major regional power that will have considerable
political, economic, and military influence regardless
of the war's outcome. Nonetheless, Kuwaiti leaders
pride themselves on their tough stand against Iranian
aggression and have demonstrated no signs of caving
in to Tehran's demands that they end their support for
Iraq and the US tanker reflagging operation.
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Kuwaiti leaders believe a dialogue is essential to
mitigate Iran's hostility, gauge Iranian intentions in
the war, and discuss OPEC oil policy. The Kuwaiti
Government has kept diplomatic channels open de-
spite the seizure of its Embassy in Tehran last
August, according to US Embassy reporting. Kuwait
also has endorsed a GCC initiative to begin talks with
Tehran to ease tension in the region. We believe
Kuwaiti leaders have calculated that the threat of
breaking relations can help moderate-at least tem-
porarily-Iranian hostility.
Despite Tehran's hostile rhetoric, Kuwait has kept its
public anti-Iranian allegations to a minimum while
strengthening security against Iranian-sponsored ter-
rorism. Faced with the possibility of increased Irani-
an-sponsored subversive activities, Kuwait has little
choice but to continue tough security measures, in-
cluding deporting Iranian workers and removing Ku-
waiti Shias from sensitive jobs in the oilfields, the
military, and government institutions. Kuwaiti leaders
realize that the government's tough response to Irani-
an-sponsored terrorism has increased sectarian ten-
sion, and they have not publicly highlighted Iran's
complicity for fear of sparking further sectarian vio-
lence.
Kuwait's mercantile tradition also restrains the coun-
try's leaders from undertaking actions that might
damage long-term commercial relations with Iran.
Kuwait's merchant elite, many of whom are Shias of
Iranian origin and an important source of support for
the ruling family, trade with Iran, and their support
could wane if their financial ambitions are frustrated
by an Iranian-Kuwaiti confrontation. Kuwaiti leaders
hope to keep relations healthy enough to benefit
economically from postwar reconstruction efforts in
Iran.
Military Moves From Reaction to Deterrence
Kuwait's defense policy has been primarily reactive,
with little threat analysis or contingency planning.
Defensive measures have rarely been taken until after
the enemy has initiated action.
measures to defend against Silkworm at-
tacks, for example, were undertaken in earnest only
last October after eight attacks in 1987. These efforts
came too late to prevent serious damage to the vital
Sea Island terminal in late October, but they appear
to have prevented additional damage to the terminal
during a subsequent attack in December.
The Defense Ministry suffers from inexperience and
bureaucratic inertia and generally plays a secondary
role in formulating Kuwait's security policy. Kuwait's
economic interests often govern the decisionmaking
process. Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and its sub-
sidiaries, including the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company,
have the economic incentive and management experi-
ence to identify threats to Kuwaiti interests, analyze
possible solutions, and swiftly implement actions to
reduce potential dangers. The tanker company, rather
than the military, proposed the US reflagging scheme
and constructed the radar reflector barges-Kuwait's
most successful Silkworm defense system
The Defense Ministry's ineffectiveness during the
repeated Silkworm attacks last fall led to increased
domestic criticism, according to the US Embassy, and
probably contributed to the switching of the Ministers
of Defense and Interior in January. These develop-
ments have forced the military to begin to take a more
active role in defending against additional Silkworm
attacks.
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Meager Capabilities. Kuwait recognizes the limited
capabilities of its military forces and harbors no
illusions about its ability to defend against external
attack. Kuwait's armed forces suffer from inadequate
training, aging equipment, and low morale. Despite its
poor capabilities, the Army has deployed forces to
northern Kuwait at least three times over the past two 25X1
years to guard against Iranian aggression. In addition,
the Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard, and air defense
units have fired at perceived hostile targets,
The Army, Kuwait's largest military service, is ineffi-
ciently deployed to defend against a sudden ground
attack. Organized into two armored brigades, a mech-
anized infantry brigade, and supporting units, the
Army is stationed to defend the three approaches to
Kuwait City. The 6th Brigade, a unit in transition
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from regular infantry to mechanized infantry, is the
vanguard responsible for protecting Kuwait from its
most likely adversaries-Iran or Iraq. The more
powerful armored brigades are stationed well away
from the potential invasion routes.
The Army suffers from numerous problems, including
poor logistics, outmoded equipment, infrequent train-
ing, and insufficient manpower. For example, the
35th Armored Brigade can muster only half of its
authorized strength, enough to crew only 15 to 20 of
its 78 tanks
We believe similar manning problems are present
throughout the Army and may be worse in its combat
support units.
Kuwait's Air Force is one of the most active on the
Arabian Peninsula, providing daily combat air patrols
in addition to frequent training flights. The Air Force
has two US-supplied A-4 squadrons to provide the
bulk of its strike capability with cluster, laser-guided,
and free-fall bombs. Two Mirage F1 squadrons con-
tain Kuwait's primary interceptors. Kuwait's air de-
fense units belong to the Air Force. When on alert
because of an increased Iranian threat, the Air Force
has shown the capability to sustain frequent sorties.
Nevertheless, it would be hard pressed to defend
against a surprise Iranian airstrike.
The fledgling eight-ship, 750-man Navy is the small-
est and most inexperienced of Kuwait's military ser-
vices, but it is rapidly gaining importance within the
Ministry of Defense. The US Embassy reports that
Iran's mining of the Mina al Ahmadi channel and its
attempted attack on the joint Kuwaiti-Saudi Hut 1
and Al Khafji offshore oilfields last year forced the
Navy to assume a more important security role. We
believe the Navy is becoming as aggressive as the air
defense units in engaging unidentified targets in
Kuwaiti waters.
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Kuwait's internal security forces-the National
Guard and Ministry of Interior-also play an impor-
tant defense role. They are responsible for preventing
terrorism, controlling the dissident Shia population,
and protecting vital industrial facilities. Bureaucratic 25X1
infighting following several terrorist bombings of pe- 25X1
troleum facilities last year has led to confusion over
which organizations are responsible for protecting key 25X1
targets. We believe the role of guarding oil facilities is
assigned to whichever security force has personnel
available, including the Kuwait Petroleum Company's
own security guards.
Since the attempt on the life of the Amir in 1985, the
Guard has been trying to modernize its 3,000-man
-
force and increase its internal security capabilities. F
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Defending Against the Silkworms: A Case Study
Following three Iranian Silkworm missile attacks
last October, which damaged two oil tankers and the
vital Sea Island export terminal, Kuwait implement-
ed a multitrack policy to discourage additional at-
tacks, improve its defenses, and limit damage from
future missile attacks. Kuwait's initial response was
to seek diplomatic support in condemning Iran. Al-
though Kuwait decided against formally raising the
issue at the UN Security Council, it sought interna-
tional condemnation of Iran from the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council, Arab League, and individual members
of the UN Security Council. The government-con-
trolled Kuwaiti press was quick to charge Iran with
responsibility for the attacks.
Kuwait directly confronted Iran by threatening to
break diplomatic relations if the attacks continued.
Kuwait had already ordered a reduction in the size of
the Iranian diplomatic presence because of earlier
Iranian attacks. Kuwait issued a strongly worded
protest to the Iranians, promising to "reconsider its
entire relationship" with Tehran if the attacks per-
sisted, according to the US Embassy.
In addition to its diplomatic efforts, Kuwait quickly
sought to increase its defenses against missile at-
tacks. I-HAWK, SA-8, and SA-14 surface-to-air
missiles as well as antiaircraft artillery were moved
to Faylakah Island-directly under the Silkworm's
flightpath. In addition, SA-14 missiles were deployed
on Bubiyan Islandfor the first time. Kuwaiti leaders
called in Egyptian advisers to conduct a survey of
Kuwait's air defenseforces. Moreover, Kuwait began
talks with the United States and France about weap-
onry capable of shooting down the Silkworms
Kuwait further improved its defenses by installing at
least 19 radar reflector barges to serve as decoys for
incoming missiles. Built with US assistance and
positioned around key facilities, the barges have been
successful in confusing the Silkworms,
For example, a deflector successfully
diverted a Silkworm missile launched at the Sea
Island terminal last December, just seven days after
the facility was reopened following a previous Silk-
worm attack.
Armored cars
205
Self-propelled artillery
57
Towed artillery
16
12
346
Missile attack craft
8
Patrol boats (Coast Guard)
25
Landing craft
10
Transport helicopters
Air defense artillery
31
177
SA-7 and SA-14 antiaircraft missiles 4,200-4,400
I-HAWK antiaircraft missile launchers 27
SA-8 antiaircraft missile launchers 12
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National Guard will assume responsibility for key
facilities when it becomes fully trained on its recently
purchased armored vehicles.
The Guard has long-term plans to establish a compre-
hensive security system to protect Kuwait's industrial
centers, refineries, and ports. The system-which
would include motion detectors, infrared sensors, and
video cameras-will almost certainly not be opera-
tional before the early 1990s. Despite the upgraded
equipment, we believe the poorly educated and moti- 2bA1
vated Guard troops will be only marginally effective.
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We believe Kuwaiti military purchases over the next
few years will be spread among several suppliers.
Although the current relatively close Kuwaiti-US
security relationship was the catalyst behind its recent
request for 40 F-16 fighters and 200 M-1 tanks, we
believe Kuwait sees the request as a major test of US
support for Kuwait. In our opinion, Kuwait will not
abandon its traditional desire to avoid becoming
dependent on a single supplier and will look to
nontraditional arms suppliers-such as Brazil, China,
Egypt, or the East European countries-for basic
military equipment. Increasingly, these nontraditional
suppliers will compete with the United States and
Western Europe for major purchases, such as ar-
mored vehicles. Kuwait may also believe it necessary
to balance large US arms purchases with Soviet
The Ministry of Interior controls several security
units charged with border and coastal patrol, civil
defense, riot control, and counterterrorism. The Coast
Guard has been the most active of these, aggressively
patrolling Kuwait's territorial waters to interdict Ira-
nian small boats. According to the US Embassy, the
Ministry's Assault Force is a highly motivated and
well-trained counterterrorist force that is expected to
perform well during a terrorist attack.
Future Arms Purchases. We estimate the military is
interested in purchasing at least $2.5 billion worth of
major new weapon systems over the next few years,
including advanced fighters, tanks, infantry fighting
vehicles, and minesweepers. These expenditures would
be in addition to the nearly $1.5 billion annually spent
on its security forces. Falling oil revenues, however,
make it unlikely that Kuwait will acquire sufficient
new military hardware to meet future threats.
Kuwait's revenues have plummeted nearly 60 percent
over the past seven years-a trend we believe will
continue into the early 1990s-reducing its ability to
purchase major new weapons. Nevertheless, if Kuwait
believes its security depends on acquiring additional
modern equipment, we believe its financial reserves
are adequate to provide financing for any weapon
systems necessary.
purchases.
Prospects
We do not believe recent shifts in Kuwaiti foreign
policy reflect a lasting change, and a cessation of
Iranian aggression or a cease-fire along the lines of
the current stalemate could bring about a return to
Kuwait's preference for a nonaligned foreign policy
and its support for a reduced superpower presence in
the region. Kuwait's relationship with the Soviet
Union will continue to be governed by conflicting
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Figure 7. Gazelle attack heli-
copter being loaded with HOT
concerns. Kuwait will not let its ties to Moscow
become so strong that it loses independence in its
actions, nor so weak that it weakens the bargaining
position it believes it has with the United States.
Reports of Kuwaiti interest in advanced weapons
from Moscow suggest that it may be laying the
groundwork for significant purchases in the 1990s.
Kuwait, however, is reluctant to permit significant
numbers of Soviet advisers into the country and will
try to limit the number of advisers that must accom-
pany any arms purchases.
Kuwaiti leaders might try to play down the extent of
their support for Iraq if Iran undertakes a sustained
and effective campaign of terrorism and subversion
coupled with periodic military strikes threatening
Kuwait's oil production. Kuwaiti leaders might re-
strict the amount of arms transshipped to Iraq
through Kuwaiti territory and perhaps try to place
conditions on Iraqi use of Kuwaiti airspace, which
Baghdad almost certainly would ignore. Kuwait is
unlikely to reduce its support for Iraq in any meaning-
ful way, believing that Iraq is the key defense against
Iranian expansionism.
We believe that Iraq will refrain from seizing Bu-
biyan and Warbah islands after the Iran-Iraq war
because of the political costs. Baghdad realizes it will
need allies in the Gulf to help rebuild its crippled
economy and to counter Iran if hostilities are re-
newed. Moreover, the other Gulf states probably
would suspend aid to Baghdad if it seriously threat-
ened Kuwait. Nevertheless, Baghdad is likely to re-
new its longtime territorial claims periodically to
remind Kuwait that Iraq is still a force to be reckoned
with.
We believe Kuwait's military will not improve suffi-
ciently to be able to defend the country against either
external or internal threats over the next several years 25X1
because of manpower shortages, poor training, and
old equipment. Even with large purchases of military
equipment, Kuwait's military capabilities will im-
prove only marginally. Without these improvements
Kuwait will almost certainly continue to rely on
strengthening alliances with key allies, checkbook
diplomacy, and appeasement of its major antagonists.
Implications for the United States
As long as the Iranian threat remains high, coopera-
tion with the United States will continue and, if
tensions rise, probably expand. Kuwait appears to 25X1
have been satisfied with Washington's response to
pleas for assistance over the past year. Kuwait's belief
that the United States is its ultimate security guaran-
tor will ensure future cooperation
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aecrer
Figure 8
Responsibilities of Kuwait's National Security Organizations
= External Security
Internal Security
0 Foreign Policy
Deputy Prime
Minister/Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Frontier Force
Civil Defense
Special Forces
I Riot Control Force
Ministry of Oil
I Assault Force
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Figure 9
Kuwait: Defense Expenditures, 1980-87
1980/81 1981/ 1982/ 1983/ 1984/ 1985/ 1986/
82 83 84 85 86a 87a
980/81 1981/
82
1982/
83
Despite recent understanding and cooperation with
the United States, we believe Kuwait will ultimately
try to avoid a close public alignment with US policies
in the region. Discretion and secrecy will be funda-
mental conditions for Kuwaiti support, precluding
highly visible security arrangements with the United
States. Kuwaiti leaders want to preserve the appear-
ance of independence from US policy and, in our
view, will seize opportunities to demonstrate autono-
my from US policies even during periods of height-
ened Iranian aggression.
A significant reduction in tension with Iran would
probably result in a parallel cooling of the security
relationship with the United States, although it proba-
bly would not sink to the low level of the early 1980s.
The recent operational support provided by Washing-
ton has eased suspicions of US intentions and would
set the standard for security cooperation after tension
with Iran eases. Over the long term, Kuwaiti leaders
probably are concerned that unresolved territorial
disputes will lead to a confrontation with Iraq and
hope that cooperation with Washington will be useful
in countering pressure from Baghdad. Nonetheless,
weapons sales almost certainly will return as a litmus
test for measuring Washington's commitment to
1983/
84
1984/
85
1985/ 1986/
86a 87a
a Estimated expenditures.
b Includes Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and
National Guard.
Kuwait's security.
US participation in the tanker reflagging and escort
plan has enhanced Washington's image throughout
the Arab Gulf states as a reliable partner in ensuring
the security of the Gulf. Even though the US position
remains fragile, other GCC members are now more
likely to seek US military assistance and rely on the
United States in a crisis. Despite the risks, this
provides the United States new opportunities to build
a lasting security relationship with the Gulf Arabs.
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