NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00659R000100320001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 9, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of I Op 3M'CF0.-
Central
Intelligence
National Intellim
ence Daily
Monday
9 February 1987?.
CPAS NID 87-032JX
s ruoruary-VYB7
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Too Secret
Contents
Iran-Iraq: Fighting Likely To Intensify .......................................... 2
Syria: Assad's Economic Initiatives .............................................. 3
Lebanon-Syria: Negotiations on Summit Stalled ........................ 4
Iraq: After Al Basrah .................................................................... 4
Philippines: Military Operations To Resume .............................. 5
Sri Lanka: New Military Offensive ................................................ 5
France-Chad-Libya: French Troop Deployments ........................ 6
UN-USSR: Soviet Bid To Control Disarmament Session ............ 7
USSR: Resistance to Quality Control .......................................... 7
Saudi Arabia: Drawing Down Oil Stockpiles ................................ 8
Canada-South Africa: Hints of Further Sanctions ...................... 8
Special Analyses
India-Pakistan: Force Levels, Tensions Remain High ................ 10
USSR: Improved Economic Performance in 1986 ...................... 12
Peru: The Threat From Sendero Luminoso .................................. 14
Top Secret
February 198-7
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Iq
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Fighting Likely To Intensify
Anticipating a resumption of intense fighting on the battlefield
east of Al Basrah, both sides have sent more men into the area 25X1
and continue to fortify their positions; Iraq will probably also
increase its airstrikes a ainst Iranian cities and economic
targets. 25X1
25X1
Iraqi warplanes attacked Qom and Tabriz in response to. Tehran's
Scud missile attack on Baghdad on Thursday. So far this year, Iraq
has bombed more than 20 cities and towns in Iran, some almost daily.
Tehran savs total Iranian civilian casualties this year already exceed
12,000. 25X1
drive the - ck with small, localized attacks. Baghdad probably
want conserve its resource it expects Iran to launch new
atta
Comment:12raqi-c~~aiat~r-a# aek-to~- ove4heranian salient
east of Al B srah remains unlike) in the next fea -we . Instead, Iraqi
units will probab - -ni - le-at'the Iranian frontlines and slowly
DIA Com rent: While the Iranians could launch a major attack with
little wining, both sides now appear to be consoiffl`ting their
post9'ons. DIA believes that their-agis control Ujayraw~i .ah`~sland, and
the is no posit veeevidence of Iranians there. ihe~position of any
remaining-lrarfianlvforces would be tenuousat*best because t
w-oWd-be well within Iraqi direct-fire weapaa&+eng .
Top Secret
Iran probably will launch new attacks, either to expand its salient east
of Al Basrah or to threaten Iraq's forces elsewhere on the southern
front-and us to draw Iraqi units away from the fighting near
Al Basrah LI: to 25X1
isolate sari y to capture, asra , ut it is Also trvina to
~.,~~vvaq~s~4~r; par#tolareserar 25X1
Iraq's_bom1J1 ig ranian cities-is-uniikelyat,Jeast,in the near term, to
dissuade Tehran from further offensives. A moreefective use of air
and artillp y stri k es against Iranian rear stain areas, however, might
disrupt Tehran's-preparations 25X1
2 9 February 1987
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Ton Secre
25X1
I
concerns
nfluenced Assad's decision to attend the recent Islamic summit in
Kuwait. As an enticement for Assad's attendance Kuwait provided
Syria with free oil late last year
President Assad is taking new measures to halt Syria's economic 25X1
decline-his most critical domestic concern-including pressing
for more aid from moderate Arab states and cutting government
subsidies. 25X1
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Weakened domestic finances have forced Assad to approve
additional measures to cut spending, although they will impose
further hardships on the Syrian population. Earlier this week,
Damascus increased the price of gasoline b 71 percent and meat by
31 percent. +wne-M1 n+sti r 25X1
another-~7?da-perms-rise-in-the-price- 25X1
Public dissatisfaction over economic conditions is increasing)
evident in Damascus, although there is little active dissension 25X1
,099--automobifes-were 25X1
he-bitterne!? of
y~Ta-e-being-asked-t o'
l IC r.YL_
ndfie The __ IIVG s; CA
...,,,.ss. ... v ~- ,. lice recen use orce
to control a crowd outside a governments ore. 25X1
for bread are likely to be left in place.
Comment: Assad's position is still secure, but he will face increasing
difficulty in deflecting the blame for economic problems. The plan to
eliminate subsidies will probably be implemented slowly, and those
into organized antiregime activity.
Assad is ready to use Syria's extensive security apparatus to
quash any domestic unrest. His opponents-chiefly Islamic
fundamentalists-have been unable to translate economic distress
Top Secret
growing sacrifiltes
3 9 February 1987
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Top Secret
LEBANON-SYRIA: Negotiations on Summit Stalled
The Syrian-Lebanese negotiations on convening a summit between
Presidents Assad and Gemayel are continuing, but new obstacles are
likely to delay any such meeting
-t4ie-iaa~lWSion-ef-Mtastim-Tlttl l r i and
.Jurablat - n4he-ne ti 'tions; which are focused-on= eparing-a-
paek-age-of-Lebanese,7olitic-al-reforms: In the meantime, an additional
400 Syrian troops entered West Beirut late last week to bolster the
existing 1,000- to 1,500-man contingent that has been there since last
July. The fresh troops were dispatched to enforce a new security plan
to cope with the deteriorating conditions in West Beirut, especially at
Beirut International Airport
Comment: Syrian insistence on including the Muslims in the
negotiations for the summit almost certainly will delay the meeting
between Assad and Gemayel. Substantive differences continue to
separate the two sides. The deployment of additional Syrian troops
into West Beirut will do little to contain the growing anarchy there. To
be effective, Damascus must introduce several thousand troops, a
commitment it has been reluctant to make.
Baghdad remained relatively calm during the early phases of Iran's
recent offensives,eeordu' t-to--UG-Essy??ts3 but public
morale began to decline as the magnitude of the casualties-
estimated at 20,000-became known. There was great elation among
the leaders when the Iranian attacks east of Al Basrah finally were
blunted; President Saddam Husayn awarded Defense Minister
Khayrallah the country's highest medal for directing the
counterattack. raq's generals are pushing for
more aggressive tactics, but civilian leaders fear the public would not
stand for continued high casualties.
Comment: Barring a catastrophic military defeat or an assassination,
the Iraqi regime will probably stay intact. A coup would be likely only if
Saddam's continued rule is perceived to jeopardize Iraq's survival.
The elevation of Khayrallah last week to the post of Army Chief of
Staff may be an attempt to placate the generals by giving them
greater influence in the leadership councils. The generals will use him
as their conduit into Saddam's inner circle. Khayrallah's military
competence is suspect, however, and this could become an issue if
Iran launches another attack within t weeks, as expected.
Tnn Rarrat
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L~.)A I
4 9 February 1987
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PHILIPPINES: Military Operations To Resume
X
The 60-day truce between the Philippine Government and Communist
insurgents ended Friday-shortly before its scheduled expiration-
after a rebel ambush in northern Luzon in which five soldiers were
killed. In a published announcement, the insurgents accused the
government of brutally suppressing their forces, appeared to rule out
any possibility of further talks, and said the truce was over in northern
Luzon. Philippine military leaders warned they would begin operations
against the rebels today but said, they would exempt areas where
local peace talks are continuing.
Comment: Although further raids are likely in remote areas as the
Communists seek to demonstrate their military power and to bolster
insurgent morale, local Communist leaders probably remain divided
over future plans..Insurgents in the western islands reportedly are
considering extending the truce, while rebels and military forces
elsewhere are braced for a resumption of hostilities. The attack in
northern Luzon and the insurgents' uncompromising public
statement he
Communist nations leadership feared the continuation of the
wmild Prnrip thp nronananda and military oai~ made thus far.
SRI LANKA: New Military Offensive
The military offensive Colombo launched against Tamil insurgent
strongholds in the north this weekend-the second in a month-may
damage prospects for a renewal of Indian-backed peace talks.
Government spokesmen claimed the Army's two-pronged attack in
Jaffna destroyed 15 insurgent bunkers while limiting casualties on
both sides, according to press reports. Indian officials expressed
serious concern to Colombo on Saturday about its month-old
economic blockade of the Jaffna Peninsula and other recent Sri
Lankan military operations in the east, which allegedly killed at least
100 Tamil civilians. Tamil insurgents have launched raids against
Sinhalese villages in the east in retaliation for Colombo's alleged
massacres. Two Indian envoys are scheduled to arrive in Colombo
later this week to resume discussions on peace talks.
Comment: Colombo probably will try to limit civilian casualties in the
Jaffna operation-it has not yet used aircraft-to prevent charges of
massacre by security forces and to avoid providing an excuse for
further insurgent reprisals against civilians. Military operations
against rebels in the north this year have been more successful than
past efforts and probably have been designed in part to show that
Colombo is not negotiating from a position of complete weakness.
New Delhi, however, may delay the visit of its envoys to protest
Colombo's offensive.
Top Secret
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Military Developments
Lake
Chad
Deployment of
French forces
75 150 Miles
1-1 %
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Top Secret
FRANCE-CHAD-LIBYA: French Troop Deployments
French forces in Chad were moved d possibly
Biltine, according to press aril The
redeployment to Abeche, 138 miles (220 kilometers) south of the 16th
parallel, is the first step in setting up a forward defensive and logistic
base from which the French can ship supplies to Chadian forces
above the 16th parallel and block an attempted Libyan advance
toward N'Djamena.
also willvir enae-ra rs-a ro a e sur ace-to-air missile
Comment: The French have portrayed the redeployment as part of
the defensive mission of their force in Chad, but it is probably also
intended to signal Libyan leader Qadhafi that Paris intends to live up
to its commitment to Chadian President Habre. The decision to move
the Crotale missiles to Abeche may explain the denial of Habre's
recent request to move the system to Fada.
x
Top Secret
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L~.)A I
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6 9 February 1987
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UN-USSR: Soviet Bid To Control Disarmament Session
p.reparafory commission anrbicia.-wj]l-meet is- ay. 25X1
The USSR is already working to ensure that next year's scheduled
UN Special Session on Disarmament-the first since 1978-is an
effective forum for Soviet positions at the expense of the US. The
session will be chaired by an East German, unless the West succeeds
in postponing it to 1989, when a Latin American would normally
assume the chair. ovie#s aretisup~iorfin`g n-and-M .agari-on
'he--S-ov+ets- lan-to-p ess&- e-US--hand on isarmame - 25X1
isMes avi an-e,a-?n4be ms d tisi-ete-ction-ca tg
Comment: Moscow is well aware the special session in New York will
attract close international attention. The Soviets will bend every effort
to control the agenda and resist Western moves to delay the session.
USSR: Resistance to Quality Control
Soviet party's Central Committee.
control program, despite opposition. at the recent plenum of the
dissatisfaction among factory workers with new quality-control
measures. According to senior officials, inspections have sparked
increased grumbling among workers and have reportedly led to
isolated work stoppages. The complaints focus on requirements
to fix substandard goods, which take time away from work on the
quantitative targets on which salaries and bonuses are based.
General Secretary Gorbachev renewed his support for the quality-
Soviet industrial managers are concerned about growing
satisfaction within the USSR
competitiveness in manufacturing and increased consumer
Comment: The recent protests underscore the perversity of the
Soviets' incentive structure and the strains inherent in Gorbachev's
modernization drive. Civilian industries are being required to raise
quality standards, but they have gotten no relief from ambitious plan
targets and have experienced few improvements in the supply of raw
materials. Gorbachev's commitment to the program is expected to
remain strong, however, even if dissatisfaction among workers
escalates. The Soviet leader has made clear that he will keep pressing
in order to achieve long-term payoffs in the form of greater Soviet
7 9 February 1987
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Top Secret
SAUDI ARABIA: Drawing Down Oil Stockpiles
Saudi Arabia apparently believes its 55-million-barrel oil stockpile 25X1
abroad is unnecessarily large and potentially destablizing to oil prices
and has begun trimming it. the 25X1
drawdown has averaged about 200,000 barrels per day since early
last month. At this rate, oil stockpiles could be virtually eliminated by
fall 25X1
Comment: Riyadh stockpiled oil as a strategic hedge against
disruptions of the world oil market by the Iran-Iraq war and to
increase its marketing flexibility. It probably will continue its
cautious rate of depletion to avoid depressing oil prices.
Nevertheless, Riyadh is eager to trim storage costs, which-at about
$6 million per month-now outweigh the benefits of large stockpiles.
The Saudis may also be attempting to dissolve Norbec, their Swiss-
based oil-marketing arm, which has been manaaing the oil stocks.
Prime Minister Mulroney announced recently that Canada was
considering total economic sanctions against South Africa and might
go as far as breaking diplomatic relations. Mulroney also said he
would try to persuade the US and the UK of the need for stronger
action against Pretoria. The comments followed meetings with 25X1
leaders of the Frontline States at which he op osed the use of
violence to combat apartheid. 25X1
Comment: Canada has played a major role within the Commonwealth
on the South African issue and is likely to call for more sanctions at a
Commonwealth meeting in Vancouver next fall. It may also propose
more economic aid for the Frontline States, but a break in diplomatic
relations with Pretoria is unlikely. Greater economic pressure against
South Africa would meet with widespread public support in Canada
and would cost the troubled Mulroney government little because
South Africa accounts for less than 1 percent of Canada's foreign
trade. Given recent tensions with the US, Ottawa is unlikely to make a
major attempt to influence US policy toward South Africa. 25X1
Top Secret
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8 9 February 1987
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Top Secret
reduce threat to insurgent strongholds in area. 25X1
supply route to forwar Angolan units severed ... will temporarily
- UNITA commandos attacked bridge near Cuito Cuanavale in
Angola on Thursday, primary 25X1
Mwinyi's economic reform, new IMF agreement
appeals demanding he stay ... Nyerere undermining President
- Former President Nyerere may renege on promise to resign as
head of Tanzania's only party ... cronies reportedly engineering
Americas - Colombian terrorist group M-19 reiterating threat to kidnap US
Embassy personnel in retaliation for Lehder's arrest ... reports
have linked traffickers in plans to target Embassy
personnel.
opposition plans for additional protests
students, who turned out for human rights rallies in Seoul,
elsewhere Saturday ... meager public response may scuttle
- South Korean police easily handled some 9,000 protesters, mostly
will probably persist in pushing new forum
be left to summit ... P'yongyang rejected this approach before,
- South Korea reportedly will respond on Friday to North Korea's
call for political-military talks ... will reiterate these issues should
Western Europe - Antonio Hernandez Mancha elected this weekend to head Spain's
main conservative opposition party ... likely to give party more
progressive, center-right image ... first major test will come in
municipal, local elections this spring.
Hansen ... if he resigned, government might be in jeopardy.
- Norwegian Defense Minister Hoist, Chief of Staff Bull-Hansen
continuing dispute over military strength, embarrassing minority
Labor government ... opposition, conservative press support Bull-
Top Secret
9 9 February 1987
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Special Analysis
INDIA-PAKISTAN: Force Levels, Tensions Remain High
Ton Secret
The agreement this week to reduce forces in the border area is
likely, if implemented by both sides, to reduce tensions and to
provide the basis for continuing efforts to defuse the current
situation. New Delhi appears determined to follow through with
the Brass Tacks IV exercise, however, which is scheduled to
continue until April, and each side is almost certain to retain a
higher-than-normal military presence in sensitive border areas
at least until the exercising forces return to garrison.
So far, both sides have deployed forces to provide defense against a
sudden attack by the other. With the juxtaposition of heavily armed
regular Army forces, a shooting incident could escalate quickly to
more intense fighting, which could involve major forces on each side.
Both countries appear prepared for a localized border conflict now.
Although India and Pakistan have taken steps to increase their overall
military preparedness, particularly in the immediate border area,
neither has taken the steps it would consider necessary for offensive
action. Forces in the immediate border area are primarily infantry
divisions, not the armored or mechanized units that both sides would
rely on to press a major assault.
India, if unconstrained by efforts to conceal the transition to a war
footing, would be prepared to launch a major invasion of Pakistan
and to bring the country to a war footing in 48 to 72 hours. Islamabad
could achieve similar preparedness in 48 hours
Pakistan has some 145,000 troops 25X1
and 850 an s near a or er, inc u ing its two armored divisions
held in strategic reserve opposite Kashmir and Punjab. Islamabad
considers these two divisions as necessary to counter any Indian
continued
Too Secret
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Top Secret
breakthrough; New Delhi sees them as the primary Pakistani invasion
forces.
Navies have not traditionally played a major part in Indo-Pakistani
wars, and current naval dispositions probably are not considered
threatening by either side. Both Navies are on alert, but most ships
remain in port.
During the initial implementation of the limited withdrawal
agreement, Indian and Pakistani forces probably will continue to take
additional steps to increase readiness elsewhere. The momentum of
India's buildup should begin to slow next week, however. Because
either side could gain a substantial advantage by cheating on the
agreement thei .oGr- teJJi .c bi,l iee both will
continue to eye each other warily; a perception of cheating could
triaaer new deployments and a new round of increased tensions.
Tnn Sat-rat
11 9 February 1987
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Top Secret
Soviet Economic Indicators for 1986
1983-85a
Metallurgy
Energy
1976-82a 1983-85a 1986
10 20 30 40 50 60
9 February 1987
Top Secret
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Special Analysis
Improved Economic Performance in 1986
growth were missed.
X
The Soviet gross national product increased by about 4 percent
last year, its fastest rate in a decade, because of a new high in
farm output and reduced loss of work time. Progress in industrial 25X1
modernization was slow, however, and some targets important to
General Secretary Gorbachev's program to accelerate economic
Farm output increased by more than 7 perce
meat,-milk; and
reduce .grainamper4s
goals for output mix, timely deliveries, and product quality
well below the 6.6-percent growth planned to support industrial
modernization. The sector was repeatedly criticized for failing to meet
a n
cord-helped-M oscow-
utedte-increased?productioroff
Industry posted solid gains with annual growth
of roughly 3.5 percf-up from about 2.5 percent in 1985. In the
machinery sector output grew by nearly 4.5 percent-respectable but
management, forced, in part, by labor shortages.
Labor productivity in industry increased substantially to roughly
3 percent, as compared with about 2 percent per year between 1983
and 1985. Much of the improvement appears to have come from
increased discipline, less drunkenness on the job, and more effective
Some Mixed Signals
energy and metal resour
Some indicators of technical progress in industry show little
improvement in 1'986, despite gains in volume of output. The share of
steel output produced with modern technology, for example, was
virtually unchanged: In the machinery sector the rate of increase in
production of high-technology products was not substantially higher
than in recent years. On the other hand; S~prt a -~'
-41h some slow progress-,was made last Year in t r~""rfva of
construction.
The Soviets fell well short increase manufacturing
capacity-an essential for Gorbachev's modernization campaign-
despite the fastest annual growth in investment since the mid-1970s,
about 7.5 percent. Although newly commissioned production facilities
increased by 6 percent, this was less than half the rate planned to
support the modernization program. Shortfalls were especially large
in metallurgy, machine building, and energy. Progress remained slow
in concentrating resources on high-priority projects, curtailing
construction time, and reducing the volume of unfinished
continued
Top Secret
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Too Secret
Per capita consumption grew by less than 1 percent in 1986, in part
because legal sales of alcohol-a major component of consumer
expenditures-fell by 37 percent as a result of the antialcohol
campaign. Continued growth in wages, coupled with cutbacks in
alcohol sales, resulted in a large increase in the amount of cash held
by consumers. Despite greater availability of quality foods in both
state-controlled and free markets, prices in the uncontrolled
collective farm markets rose during 1986, reflecting the substantial
increase in discretionary purchasing power.
Gains in key components of consumer welfare-food and housing-
may have earned Gorbachev some points with the populace. He can
claim credit for improving Soviet economic performance despite the
impact of the Chernobyl' nuclear accident and a deterioration of 15 to
20 percent in hard currency terms of trade because of the falling
world price of oil
Ton Secret
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Top Secret
Sendero Luminoso Operating Regions and
Government Emergency Zones
Golfo de
Guayaquil
South
Pacific
Ocean
Ecua
Metroopgiitaa
25
% Percent of Sendero Luminoso
attacks by region, Mar-Dec 1986
-Region boundary
o Government emergency zones
0 150 Kilometers
0 190 miles
Colombia
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Brazil
Top Secret
Bolivia
Lego
Titicaca
*LA PAZ
9 February 1987
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Special Analysis
k
Widespread attacks last month indicate that the extremist
Sendero Luminoso insurgency has recovered from personnel
losses it suffered during prison riots in mid-1986. The movement
continues to recruit among the Indian peasantry, extend its rural
operations into new regions, and increase its terrorist strikes in
Lima. Neither President Garcia nor the military has developed a
counterinsurgency strate y that will stem growing violence.
throughout the country.
Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, is Peru's largest and most
dangerous insurgent group. It is a tightly knit organization of
ethnocentric fanatics who espouse a hybrid ideology fashioned from
Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, and a rural, indigenous populism. The
group seeks the total elimination of white and mestizo authority from
Peru and the expulsion of all foreign influences. Although it shuns
foreign sponsors and spurns alliances with other domestic radicals, it
has grown from several hundred members in remote Ayacucho
Department in 1980 to more than 4,000 guerrillas who operate
riots in Lima's prisons. As a result
Sendero Luminoso suffered a severe setback last year when some
250 members were killed during the government's suppression of
is leaders slowed operations du
and restructured their forces nationwide
Resumption of Insurgent Attacks
Lima has recently experienced a new wave of terrorist attacks, and,
Sendero Luminoso plans to
bombed several banks.
the power failure, the guerrillas burned two textile factories and
carry out a major aitaCK in a capital every week. In mid-January,
according to the US Embassy, the group blacked out Lima and six
coastal departments-affecting more than one-half of Peru's
population-by bombing power facilities in Lima and Junin. During
few days later murdered a senior member of the ruling party
Late last month, the group bombed several offices of Garcia's ruling
party, wounding at least seven party members. The guerrillas also
killed three guards in a daylight assault on the Indian Embassy and a
Meanwhile, the guerrillas continue small-scale attacks in rural areas
to replenish supplies, damage economic infrastructure, and kill local
authorities. Embassy reporting indicates the group is expanding
Ton Secret
continued
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
2 Al
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/26: CIA-RDP88T00659R000100320001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/26: CIA-RDP88T00659R000100320001-1
rapidly into Puno and Cusco Departments in the south. 25X1
he insurgents are establishing a new military 25X1
front in Puno-which borders Bolivia-and
logistic center and safehaven. 25X1
The Government Response
Garcia has been unwilling to extend to new areas of heavy guerrilla
activity emergency powers that would enable the military to take over
the counterinsurgency effort from the police. He apparently believes
such a move would call attention to the declining security situation.
Peru's three police forces, however, lack the manpower, weapons,
transport, communications equipment, and intelligence resources to
combat the insurgency effectively
Even in areas where re in control, according to
the military generally reacts to 25X1
insurgent actions and provides defense for larger towns, rather than
patrolling aggressively. The rugged mountain regions where the
insurgency thrives pose special tactical problems for the Army,
particularly because the military is deficient in high-altitude
helicopters. 25X1
Garcia has often said that the underlying causes of the insurgency are
poverty and inequity, but neither he nor the military is yet committed
to a comprehensive counterinsurgency program that emphasizes civic
action, psychological operations, or rural development. Sendero
Luminoso leaders, however, apparently recognize the potential
effectiveness of government civic action programs; they are
increasingly targeting persons and facilities associated with rural
development efforts
Rural insurgent attacks and urban terrorism are likely to increase this
year. The guerrillas probably will continue to avoid major clashes with
the military, preferring small-unit attacks and high-profile sabotage
operations that pose little risk of a substantial setback. Moreover, the
extension of Sendero Luminoso activities into new rural areas will
further stretch the government's already strapped counterinsurgency
Peru-particularly Lima-already is experiencing one of the highest
rates of terrorism in the world, and the likelihood of foreign casualties,
even if incurred incidentally, is rising. Attacks on foreign targets, and
assassinations of high-level civilian and military leaders, would put
increased pressure on Garcia to adopt tougher counterinsurgency
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/26: CIA-RDP88T00659R000100320001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/26: CIA-RDP88T00659R000100320001-1
I oo aecrei
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/26: CIA-RDP88T00659R000100320001-1