NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00659R000100250001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 31, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of r Up OwwfCjL-
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
31 January 1987
Top
CPAS NID 87-025JX
31 January
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Top Secret
Contents
South Africa: Date Set for White Election .................................. 1
USSR: Moscow Gains Little From Muslim Conference ................ 2
Argentina: Civil-Military Tensions Rising .................................... 3
Sudan: Sadiq at Odds With Military ............................................
Mexico: National University Strike ..............................................
Haiti: Heightened Tensions .......................................................... 7
Special Analyses
Western Europe: Concern About Limited SDI Deployments
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31 January 1987
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Top Secret I
National Party's confidence that it can renew its mandate.
date of a whites-only parliamentary election reflects the ruling
President Botha's announcement yeeftreWy setting 6 May as the
residential areas for whites.
Botha made the announcement during his speech at the opening of
parliament. He signaled no change in the ruling-party's hardline
security policies and made clear that the state of emergency would
not be lifted soon. Botha implicitly rejected a proposal for a
multiracial provincial government joining Natal Province and the
KwaZulu homeland. Senior officials have recently backed away from
other controversial reform proposals and reaffirmed the
government's commitment to separate education and separate
tactics, resigned recently to run as independents.
In preelection maneuvering, the Conservative Party failed ee
to form a rightwing coalition with the Herstigte National Party. The
liberal Progressive Federal Party and the tiny New Republic Party
have formed a coalition for the election campaign. Several liberal
National Party members of parliament, frustrated by the
government's slow pace of reform and its heavyhanded security
Comment: The National Party, which holds 127 of the 188 seats in the
white chamber of parliament, is likely to emerge with a comfortable
majority and a renewed mandate for its policies of limited reform,
tough security measures, and defiance of Western pressures and 25X1
sanctions. The rejection of the Natal-KwaZulu proposal and the
tougher line on reform are intended to reassure conservative whites
and to blunt ri htwin charges that reform will result in black
domination. 25X1
benefit the conservatives by further diluting the liberal vote.
National Party members and their plan to run as independents may
The most spirited battle in the election will be for the designation
of official parliamentary opposition-currently held by the
Progressives-the winner of which, under current emergency
restrictions, will be the only group in the country outside the
government to have freedom of speech. The rightwing opposition
parties are unlikely to have much chance of gaining enough seats
to oust the Progressives unless they reach at least an informal
agreement not to compete with each other in individual
constituencies. The resignations of a limited number of "enlightened"
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1 31 January 1987
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adopting a slightly tougher stance on Afghanistan.
Kuwait, has frustrated one of Moscow's foreign policy goals by
The Islamic Conference Organization, which nie week in
Top Secret
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Soviet officials lobbied the organization's Secretary General Pirzada
four times last year, including talks with him in Moscow in November.
yjreportingM indicates that the
Soviets pre ed him on three issues: represents ion for Soviet
Muslims in the organization, a reduction of the Afghan Mujahedin
delegation's status, and less criticism of the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. Pirzada has repeatedly denied admission into the OIC to 25X1
Moscow's chosen representatives of "official" Soviet Islam. 25X1
thei oposals for nuclear-free zones, an international peace
conference on the Middle East, the withdrawal of the Soviet and US
navies from the Mediterranean Sea, and a negotiated end to the Iran-
ain favor by citing their sham troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and
Rimad -was-=B-W s venal-Muslim-dignity-nest vm"he-J?S6fHrMtf
ast year. Others include-rAlgeriaWleader Bendjedid in March, Arab
League Secretary-G- eral Chedli Klibi in May, and Saudi Oil Minister
Narzil - Lr&VeH."@_sfs P'EC repres tir -t1 a--th s mn less-si-
reports indicate that the Soviets have repeatedly tried to
Iraq war.
regime, represented Afghanistan.
A TASS summary of the Islamic summit played up Syrian and South
Yemeni support for Soviet policies in Afghanistan and the OIC
communique's support for the international conference on the Middle
East. TASS nonetheless attacked the tone of the Afghan resolution in
the OIC's final communique and the fact that an Afghan Mujahedin
observer delegation, not one from the Soviet-supported Kabul
officials.
Comment: The Islamic summit's call for a complete withdrawal of all
Soviet forces from Afghanistan is tougher than the OIC's previous
resolutions and represents a setback for Moscow's yearlong drive to
court world Islamic opinion on this issue. Although the effort cost the
Soviets little and there is some consolation for Moscow in the OIC
communique's explicit condemnation of the US, Moscow was clearl
disappointed with the treatment of the Afghan issue.
Several members of the OIC-Syria, South Yemen, Libya, and the
PLO-support some Soviet policies. Even so, Moscow would have
preferred to have its own voice in the organization. Neither the
presence in the USSR of more than 50 million "Muslims" nor
Moscow's concerted efforts to portray the USSR and the Kabul
regime as tolerant of Islam, however, carried much weight with OIC
Too Secret
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Too Secret
ARGENTINA: Civil-Military Tensions Rising
Civilian trials of Argentine military officers charged with human
rights violations are increasing restiveness in the armed forces,
but President Alfonsin's efforts to limit the trials are meeting
with public resistance.
Last month, Alfonsin issued a decree placing a 60-day limit on filing
new charges against military personnel, and he tried last week to
minimize the number of midlevel and junior officers who may be
indicted by asking the courts not to proceed against personnel who
were only following orders. Human rights groups and some judges are
pushing to declare the decree unconstitutional, and much of the
judiciary has already rejected Alfonsin's request not to file charges
against subordinate "officers. Proceedings have begun against
600 active-duty and retired officers in more than 1,000 cases, and
several hundred additional cases are expected before the filing
deadline on 22 February.
Comment: Alfonsin appears to have failed to defuse the sensitive
human rights issue. Human rights groups will probably not be able to
overturn the 60-day statute of limitations legislation, and the courts
are likely to move quickly to take advantage of the 60-day period to
begin proceedings against a wide variety of military personnel,
including field officers.
government is unlikely.
Evidence in many of the cases is thin, however, and Alfonsin will
probably try to convince the officers to appear in court by assuring
them that there will be few convictions. At the same time, he will
increase behind-the-scenes pressure on the judiciary to conclude the
trials as quickly as possible. The appearance in court of officers on
active duty could spur rightwing attacks on the left or provoke the
military to defy the courts, but a direct challenge to the Alfonsin
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Top Secret
SUDAN: Sadiq at Odds With Military
X
The Sudanese Government's sudden decision to request removal
of pre-positioned US military equipment stored at Port Sudan
has further weakened Prime Minister Sadiq's backing among
Sudan's top military officers.
Comment: Top military officers still support civilian government,
but Sadiq's habitual failure to accommodate military interests may
provoke a crisis. The General Staff wants to be consulted on
decisions bearing on national security and is jealously guarding its
prerogatives against civilian encroachments. Sadiq's flouting of those
considerations is widening the gap between himself and the military
hierarchy.
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4 31 January 1987
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Top Secret
X
MEXICO: National University Strike
President de la Madrid reportedly has ruled against a harsh response
by his government to the student strike at Mexico's national university
that began Thursday. the
government believes the problem is an internal university affair, but
it is carefully monitoring the situation. The university has scheduled
a meeting on 10 February to discuss the reforms being protested,
including higher tuition and stricter entrance standards.
reforms.
Comment: De la Madrid undoubtedly hopes to avoid a repeat of the
university protests in 1968 during which hundreds of students were
killed. A prolonged strike or any violence would probably place a
cloud over Interior Secretary Bartlett, a front-running candidate to
replace de la Madrid, and over Education Secretary Gonzalez Avelar,
a darkhorse contender for the presidency. As a result, the
government is likely to encourage the university to rescind the
r
HAITI: Heightened Tensions
The violent demonstration in Port-au-Prince on Thursday may
portend future disturbances before the anniversary, a week from
today, of the overthrow of former President Duvalier. The protest
apparently was not politically motivated, according to the US
Embassy, but the police killed a civilian and a mob attacked several
US Embassy personnel in the area.
Comment: The cycles of demonstrations and violence in Haiti over
the past year usually have stemmed from minor incidents fueled
largely by discontent with dismal living conditions. Tolerance of
dissident activity has helped the government to weather these
outbursts. The rise in anti-US sentiment results partly from the
perception of many Haitians that the US has not provided sufficient
economic aid. A harsh response by Namphy to further unrest would
probably lead to more violence and benefit the government's leftist
opponents, who charge that little has changed since Duvalier left the
country.
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In Brief
Middle East - US Consulate in Jerusalem says Israelis dismantled bomb
intended for Bethlehem mayor ... fear Palestinian extremists will
attempt to kill three new pro-Jordanian West Bank mayors to mark
anniversary of assassination of Nablus mayor last March.
moderate Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev directing all Asian
Hardline Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa has retired ...
relations, not just those with Communist regimes ... shift may
mean more flexible policy toward non-Communist Asia.
- Sendero Luminoso terrorists in Peru yester-d assassinated
senior official of ruling party ... vowed to kill 10 party members for
.: .
each of its approximately 250 comrades killed last year
assassination capped 15 days of attacks in capital.
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Special Analysis
Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and Pakistani President Zia remain
in regular contact through diplomatic intermediaries and 25X1
anticipate that talks this weekend will reduce border tensions.
Military deployments by both sides, however, are reducing the
time available for either nation to contain an inadvertent clash
before it erupts into full-scale hostilities. New Delhi, meanwhile,
is taking advantage of the crisis to address domestic concerns.
Although Gandhi and Zia project the mistrust that has long existed
between India and Pakistan, they have established a better rapport
than had previous leaders. Each probably has at least some
confidence in the other and almost certainly doubts the other would
allow the situation to slide into war.
Foreign Secretaries To Meet
The Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries, accompanied by senior
military officials, are meeting this weekend in New Delhi. Press
coverage on prospects for conciliation has been heavy, and both
sides expect the meetings to remain cordial and gradually to dispel
mutual fears of escalation.
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I The lndians I say
publicly they want to discuss only a mutual drawdown of border units.
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Top Secret
Military Dangers
The Indian and Pakistani mobilizations increase the risk that an
inadvertent local clash could spread. Indian ground and naval patrols
have strayed into Pakistani territory at least twice this month, and
small-scale shooting incidents occur regularly in Kashmir.
The military preparations by each side have reduced the warning time
either would have before an outbreak of major hostilities. In addition
to the forward deployment of ground units and the increased
readiness of the Air Forces, the Indians have dispatched troops from
the Eastern Command to the west. These steps, however, remain
largely defensive in the absence of other activity, especially logistic
preparations by either side.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
Impact on Indian Domestic Security
Gandhi has used the crisis to emphasize his position that Pakistan
should curtail support for Sikh and Muslim separatist movements in
India. New Delhi also has used its charges that Pakistan is reinforcing
units opposite Punjab as a pretext to increase the Indian Army's
presence in the border states and to place all Paramilitary units in
Punjab under command of the Army.
same time, to crack down on Sikh extremists.
retain an elected moderate Sikh government in Punjab and, at the
The increased Army presence is likely to reassure Hindus who fear
Sikh and Muslim extremists and to weaken the appeal of opposition
politicians who play on such fears. The military moves allow Gandhi to
intentions.
DIA Comment: DIA disagrees with the first two sentences of the
second paragraph. Gandhi and Zia, according to reports, are not in
communication and have little rapport. Consequently, each probably
has little confidence in the other's intention and ability to prevent war.
On the other hand, Gandhi and Pakistani Prime Minister Junejo do
have some rapport and probably more confidence in each other's
Top Secret
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Special Analysis
WESTERN EUROPE: Concern About Limited SDI Deployments
Recent statements by US officials proposing an early decision on
the first deployments of SDI have elicited reactions in Western
Europe opposing such deployments unless they are compatible
with a restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty and reversible
as part of a possible arms control agreement with the USSR. The
West Europeans expect Washington to consult them prior to any
US decision to go beyond the research phase.
The West Europeans doubt that SDI deployments would enhance
Western security, but until recently their assumption that a decision to
deploy would not be made until the early 1990s had assuaged their
concern about US intentions.
without consulting them.
If the Allies conclude that the US is committed to limited SDI
deployments, they will continue to call for a major NATO debate on
SDI and almost certainly will accelerate intra-European consultations.
West Germany and the Netherlands are insisting on a major
examination by the Alliance of the political and military implications of
SDI; they have the support of other Allies. West European leaders
may try to use bilateral and multilateral security forums that exclude
the US to develop a common position in opposition to SDI
deployments if they believe that a US decision has already been made
continued
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31 January 1987
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Top Secret
The West German and British Governments might come under
growing public pressure to abandon their bilateral agreements with
the US on SDI research, which would probably precipitate debates
within those governments. Public controversy over SDI deployments
ial
would not be likely to prevent existing West European commerc
participation in the US research program. London and Paris would
probably want their companies to stay involved in order to develop
defenses
i
t
.
c
eg
effective countermeasures to future Soviet stra
The Longer Term
Allied reactions to US SDI deployments will be influenced by the US
military and political rationale as well as the timeliness and extent of
US consultations with NATO and by Allied perceptions of Moscow's
strategic defense efforts. The Allies probably would oppose US
attempts to build large nationwide defenses as infeasible and serving
only to spur the Soviets to greater military efforts, but they would be
likely to acquiesce in limited strategic defenses that are aimed at
protecting US retaliatory forces. The Allies would want even limited
deployments to be bargaining chips, however, to gain restrictions on
Soviet strategic offensive and defensive weapons. Thus, they would
expect the US to be flexible on the timing of its SDI deployments and
to seek new arms control agreements that limit strategic defenses in
F__ I
exchange for deep cuts in offensive forces
DIA Comment: The West European posture on SDI is more varied
than this analysis depicts. Most center and center-right forces-
including the bulk of Prime Minister Thatcher's Conservatives,
Chancellor Kohl's Christian Democrats, and Prime Minister Chirac's
conservatives-are generally supportive of the program. They believe
that SDI might enhance Western security while insisting that
Washington must consult with its Allies in order to ensure that West
European security interests are taken into account. Support for SDI
has increased among these groups since the program was first
announced in 1983. Leftwing and some liberal factions, on the other
hand, remain strongly opposed. There is, however, little public
pressure against SDI.
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