NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00091R000500250001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 11, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of TO
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
11 April 1987
Top
CPAS NID 87-084JX
rrxPrn rse/
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Con#ents
USSR: Gorbachev's Speech in Prague ....................:................... 1
USSR-China: Resumption of Political Talks ................................ 3
Suriname: Democratization Ploy Advances ................................ 4
South Africa: Black Labor Problems .......................................... 5
Brazil: Contemplating Action Against President .......................... 6
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Egypt: Results of Assembly Election ............................................ 7
Israel: Debate on International Conference ................................ 7
Madagascar
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Denmark: Defense Agreement Rejected ...................................... 10
USSR-Philippines: Offer To Build Power Plant .......................... 10
Special Analyses
Cuba: Trade Showing No Sign of Improvement .......................... 12
Ethiopia: Seeking Legitimacy ......................:............................... 14
Western Europe: Response to AIDS ............................................ 16
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Ton Secret
Gorbachev's Speech in Prague
General Secretary Gorbachev elaborated on Sov et arms control
positions in his ma%or public speech in Prague but 25X1
failed fo offer the long-rumored unilateral withdrawal of one or
two of the five Soviet divisions stationed in Czechoslovakia.
Gorbachev reaffirmed Soviet interest in separate talks on shorter
range INF missiles. He specified that such talks should cover only
missiles with a range between 500 and 1,000 kilometers, be aimed at
reducing and eventually eliminating these missiles, and be
independent of the progress and outcome of current talks on longer
range INF missiles. The General Secretary confirmed a willingness to
impose a fr 'ssiles while talks
proceeded.
inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons on the agenda b citin the 25X1
dual-purpose nature of the delivery systems involved
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In keeping with recent Soviet efforts to accelerate movement toward
new conventional arms talks in Europe, Gorbachev called for a
meeting of Foreign Ministers from all 35 CSCE participants to set a
date for "large-scale talks" on reducing conventional forces and on
tactical nuclear weapons. He again raised the Warsaw Pact's June
1986 Budapest Appeal as a basis for such negotiations and defended
24 in the European USSR.
Comment: Gorbachev's specification that SRINF talks should cover
only missiles in the 500- to 1,000-kilometer range clarifies a point left
ambiguous in his 28 February statement and implies-as had argued
the Soviets early in the INF talks-that constraints on shorter range
systems should include only the 900-kilometer range SS-12. Moscow
appears willing to sacrifice_the SS 2 to eliminate Pershing Its and
GLCMs and to prevent ~ matching SS-12 numbers by
fielding a 740-kilometer range Pershing Ib. The Soviets have fielded
only 110 SS-12 launchers, of which 42 are in Eastern Europe and
Tnn Ror~~of
1 11 April 1987
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Top Secret
Moscow probably intends to exclude from SRINF talks the
400-kilometer range SS-23, which is replacing the Scud-a missile
more widely fielded with Soviet Ground Forces than the SS-12.
Gorbachev's statement echoes recent Soviet proposals that the much
more numerous short-range ballistic missiles-with ranges of less
than 500 kilometers-be discussed in broader, multilateral talks on
the ground and air forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, whose
mandate is under discussion in Vienna.
Gorbachev evidently decided, perhaps at the urging of the military,
that, despite the propaganda value of a unilateral troop withdrawal
from Czechoslovakia, such a move would have little chance of
influencing Western governments.
Ton Secret
2 11 April 1987
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Resumption of Political Talks
clandestine radio station on Soviet territory. 25X1
addition, late last year the Soviets stopped jamming Radio Beijing's
Russian-language broadcasts and ended broadcasts to China from a
be in ullin out slightly more than a division of its troops from 25X1
Mongolia and y e~ay stated that the process has begun. In
Toa Secret
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The biannual Sino-Soviet deputy foreign minister talks aimed at
resolving political disputes begin next week in Moscow in an
atmosphere of improving ties, buf lingering ma%or problems
probably will prevent any breakthrough at this round 25X1
Since the generally unproductive ninth round last October, the two
sides have resumed boundary negotiations after anine-year hiatus
and opened consulates. Moscow announced that on 16 April it will
Foreign Minister Wu to Moscow this year.
Both sides have portrayed the boundary negotiations positively, but
the Chinese have publicly played down the significance of the Soviet
withdrawal from Mongolia. Vice Foreign Minister Qian, who will head
the Chinese delegation, was upbeat about this round of political talks
at a press conference last week but said Beijing has no plans to send
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev.
for the first time but was dissatisfied with the unyieldina position of
Comment: Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia is
the main stumblingblock in improving Sino-Soviet ties. At the last
round, Beijing welcomed Moscow's willingness to discuss this issue
lead to a settlement.
In an effort to detect any flexibility in Moscow's position, Qian may
press Rogachev to elaborate on Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's
hints during his trip to Southeast Asia last month that elements of the
Communist resistance Khmer Rouge-although not its leadership-
might be allowed to participate in settlement talks. Chinese media,
however, have claimed Shevardnadze revealed no change in support
for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and Qian is likely to
reiterate that only strong Soviet pressure on Hanoi to withdraw will
Moscow of Hu Yaobang's ouster as party general secretary in January
and the conservative drift of China's domestic policy since then.
The Soviets will be assessing the impact on Beijing's policy toward
again; a resumption in the second half of 1987 seems likely.
sides agreed in principle in the opening talks in February to meet
Announcement of a date for the next session of boundary talks may
be the only real achievement of the Qian-Rogachev discussions. Both
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Toa Secret
SURINAME~~ Democratization Ploy Advances
Leaders of Suriname's traditional political parties apparently
have yielded to pressure from Head of Government Bouterse to
proceed with his "democratization" program, even though a
draft constitution guarantees the military a continued political
role
t e supreme policymaking council, the
Topberaad, last week approved -the draft constitution, after the
appointed National Assembly incorporated only a few of many
changes requested by the traditional parties. Bouterse reportedly
announced that a legislative election will be held on 25 November.
following a constitutional r f r n min tember.
urmamers wi vote fora 51-member
assembly, which will then elect a president and vice president. The
constitution, however, reportedly calls for the establishment of a
separate, military authority and stipulates that the military will not be
subject to the civilian judiciary.
Bouterse may see a pr si ency, although he
said his 25 February Movement will not participate in the election. In a
recent press conference, Bouterse said hP would seriously consider
becoming the candidate of another party.
Meanwhile, influential labor leader Derby and his labor federation
have accepted Bouterse's invitation to participate in the governmen ,
Derby reportedly plans to form a labor
Comment: Party leaders probably remain skeptical of Bouterse's
democratization gambit but evidently fear that strong challenges to
his efforts to retain power would lead him to act against them. They
probably regard cooperation with Bouterse as their best chance of
regaining a measure of political influence and hope to push the
military strongman into a less dominant role
Barring a rebel victory or increased civilian opposition, Bouterse and
the military are likely to continue dominating politics. The draft
constitution probably guarantees that military personnel can
prosecuted for the murders of 15 regime opponents in 1982.
An increased political role for labor might weaken the political power
of the traditional parties and business groups. Derby's participation in
the government probably will complicate economic policy making by
making it more difficult for the government to adopt needed austerity
Top Secret
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Tee Spcrpt
Growing black labor unrest in South Africa has increased
government concern about union militancy and could provoke a
crackdown before the white election in May.
Unions, the largest black labor federation
A month-old, illegal strike by at least 14,000 black employees of the
government-run South African Transport Services, the country's
largest employer, continues despite management threats to fire
strikers. The strikers are demanding recognition of their union-an
affiliate of the 660,000-member Congress of South African Trade
Other black unions, including some outside the labor federation, are
supporting the strikers. A wildcat strike this week by an independent
black postal and telecommunications union has closed all post offices
in Soweto and some in Johannesburg. According to ~
press reports, the two strikes are the worst in th sector in the
Johannesburg area since 1980.
behavior could lead to "the end of trade unionism."
Government officials recently accused the labor unions of seeking to
shift political conflict to the workplace. Foreign Minister Pik Botha
warned in a campaign speech this week that "irresponsible" union
most successful elements of its reform program.
is less likely because Pretoria has long showcased them as one of the
Pretoria wants to prevent more significant labor problems before the
6 May election for whites. If the railway strike spreads or leads to
more violence, such as the two recent bombings of rail lines, the
government probably will crack down on unions by dismissing
strikers and detaining more union leaders. An outright ban on unions
1 May be designated the official holiday.
Comment: Although black unrest and protest remain at low levels,
Pretoria is worried about growing union militancy-particularly in
such strategic sectors as transportation-and recently banned a
labor rally to launch a national campaign fora "living wage."
President Botha's recent decision to make the first-Friday-in-May an
annual labor holiday was designed to defuse tensions but backfired
because most unions resented not- being consulted and insisted that
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Top Secret
BRAZIL: Contemplating Action Against President
~-widespread talk of direct military intervention, and the press reports
accusations that the former chief of the National Intelligence Service
is involved in coup plotting. Aware of public animosity toward a
possible coup, the military members of the President's cabinet have
publicly endorsed continued civilian rule.
Sarney could be
removed by calling for an early presidential election or by the
adoption of a parliamentary form of government that would weaken
the President's power under the new constitution. Senior officers
probably prefer either of these actions-which could risk benefiting
the left-to a coup, which would be extremely unpopular and could
be maintained only by force
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EGYPT: Results of Assembly Election
Egypt's ruling National Democratic Party has emerged the clear
winner in this week's election, according to press reports and the US
Embassy in Cairo. Although a handful of runoff elections remain, the
party has won about 75 percent of the 448 elected assembly seats.
The makeshift Labor-Liberal-Muslim Brotherhood alliance won about
17 percent of the seats-taking the title of official opposition from the
centrist New Wafd Party, which barely received the 8-percent national
minimum vote needed to win elected seats. The leftist groups were
shut out altogether.
Comment: The results are a victory for President Mubarak, whose
party retains the two-thirds majority necessary to reelect him in
October. At the same time, the almost doubled opposition presence
will enable him to claim a step toward more representative
government
The sharpened debate between Prime Minister Shamir and Foreign
Minister Peres over an international Middle East peace conference
will not threaten the stability of the unity government. Labor Party
leader Peres has continually stressed this week that an international
forum should serve as a framework for direct negotiations between
Israel and a joint Jordanian/non-PLO Palestinian delegation. In
coming weeks, he plans to follow up on recent meetings with Soviet
officials and Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Likud leader Shamir has stiffened his resistance to an international
conference because he believes it would create a powerful Soviet-led
Arab bloc demanding Israeli concessions.
Comment: Neither Shamir nor Peres is inclined to force a Cabinet
decision on an international conference because moderate Arab
interlocutors have not yet agreed to a framework for talks. The
contrasting views of the two Israeli leaders were already well known.
Both men are likely to retreat soon from the excessively harsh tone of
recent days. Shamir has probably been emboldened by his recent
reelection at the Herut party convention, and, with a view to the
national election next year, is plavino to his natural hardline party
constituency.
Ten Secret
7 11 April 1987
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Too Secret
prolonged demonstrations and rioting in the capital and outlying cities
last month a sirak~called for the opposition to wait patiently for a
presidential election slated for 1989.
Comment: Ratsiraka's strategy of nonconfrontation and
appeasement has failed to settle the student strike or to win over the
mostly southern-based opposition. He probably hopes his restrained
approach will avoid alienating other groups, but he may also fear that
his military would not follow orders to suppress opponents.
Opposition leaders appear to be gaining confidence that they can
force significant political concessions from him and probably hope to
test the loyalty of the security forces during his absence. They do not
yet appear to have the power, however, to mobilize enough
opposition to push Ratsiraka from office
Tee Secret
8 11 April 1987
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Ten Secret
DENMARK: Defense Agreement Rejected
Denmark's opposition Social Democratic Party has rejected the
government's proposed five-year defense plan. According to the US
Embassy in Copenhagen, the government's plan called for annual
increases totaling 6 percent over five years, whereas the Social
Democrats are still calling for azero-growth budget indexed for
inflation. Unless reversed, the Social Democrats' rejection of the plan
ends 20 years of interparty accords on defense budgeting outside of
parliament.
Comment: A new accord probably will not be reached before the next
election, likely to be held this fall. Without such an accord, the budget
will have to be debated in the full parliament, where the Social
Democrats and leftist parties have a majority. As a result, there
probably will be zero growth in the next five-year plan, but
administrative adjustments may allow for some additional funds. A
zero-growth defense budget would result in the cancellation of plans
to replace dwindling ammunition stocks and old air defense missiles
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and would continue the strain on Denmark's limited manpower.) 25X1
The Philippines will probably reject a Soviet offer to build a
$350 million, 300-megawatt coal-fired power plant in northern Luzon.
A senior Philippine energy official says that the Department of Foreign
Affairs has not authorized even preliminary discussions and that
serious negotiations, which he implies will prove fruitless, cannot
begin until late this year, according to the US Embassy.
Comment: The offer is consistent with the Soviets' desire to raise
their profile in the Philippines. Moscow probably thinks Manila will be
tempted by the offer-which would be the largest Soviet venture in an
ASEAN country-because it would reduce electrical shortages
~ caused by last year's scrapping of the Bataan nuclear power plant.
' Senior Philippine officials have been wary of Soviet overtures, and
concerns about technical standards, financing, and potential
demands for concessions on fishing rights make an agreement on the
plant unlikely.
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Western Europe
Americas
East Asia
~ Italian President Cossiga asking Christian Democratic Interior
Minister Oscar Luigi Scalfaro to form government ...pro forma
step before early election ...Scalfaro will head caretaker minority
government to oversee election.
- Colombian President Barco has authorized special civilian judges
to try drug traffickers, terrorists nationwide ...circumvents
Supreme Court decision voiding military jurisdiction in drug cases
...protection of judges crucial to effective prosecution.
and other oppositionists will hinder new party's efforts.
clash at rally Monday for new opposition party ...government
prohibition of meetings between party cofounder Kim Dae Jung
South Korean security officials concerned dissidents, police may
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Cuba: Trade With OECD Countries
Billion US $ -
Imports
Exports
I I I I I I I I
0..1980 81 82 83 84 85 86a 87b
a Estimated.
n Projected.
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
CUBAN Trade Showing No Sign of Improvement
Inefficiency and worker apathy are damaging President Castro's
efforts to revive the economy and diversify Cuba's exports. Hard
currency shortages-which may reduce much-needed Western
imports to 10 percent of total trad h" year-will aggravate
these problems.
Inefficiencies in the industrial sector are contributing to Cuba's shaky
financial situation, already a problem as a result of poor sugar and
tobacco harvests and reduced prices for Cuban exports. ~~-tt9
"~ a Belgian-built glass factory and a
Swedish-built printing plant-both of which produce for export-are
operating at 30 percent of capacity because of worker apathy, bad
management, and a shortage of raw materials. Products of a frer->~-
i~ paper mill, originally intended for export to France and the UK
for hard currency, are of such poor qualit the could be m keted
only as part of a barter deal with Algeria
Poor quality control and failure to guarantee delivery schedules have
made it difficult to market traditional exports as well. Cuban citrus, for
the most part, finds buyers only in CEMA countries because of the
inferior quality of the fruit. Poor packaging ruined a shipment of
pineapple juice to Saudi Arabia and a sugar shipment to Japan,
according to the Interests Section.
Such problems are leading Western trade partners to demand cash-
in-advance or barter arran ements.
Some Trade Continuing
Despite these problems, a few countries remain willing to trade with
Cuba. Spain has granted concessional trade credits in order to retain
a market share and political influence. Madrid almost certainly will be
Havana's leading Western trade partner in 1987
Top Secret
12 11 April 1987
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Trade with the UK is declining, but British businesses have scheduled
four trade shows for 1987, despite reports that Havana cannot repay
the debts it already owes to 185 British firms trade with
France fell sharply in 1986 and Italy will no longer ensure exports to
Cuba's economy will continue to deteriorate as Western imports
become harder to acquire. Cuba is unlikely to receive new money or
new trade credits, even if it eventually reaches rescheduling
agreements with its commercial creditors. Havana for the most part
will continue to have little success finding alternative credits and
suppliers in South America.
Further deterioration in trade with the West will not only drive Havana
closer to the USSR and other CEMA nations but also will probably
make it impossible to implement any new program to revive and
diversify the stagnating Cuban economy.
13 11 April 1987
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Special Analysis
ETHIOPIA: Seeking Legitimacy
Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu, who marked a decade in power in
February, is proceeding with his plans to establish a people's
republic next September in an effort to put a civilian face on his
military regime. Mengistu appears to be firmly in control, and he
and a few key military colleagues will dominate the new
government. He probably hopes that the appearance of civilian
control and popular institutions will please his Soviet allies and
counter a growing perception in the Ethiopian military that his
dictatorial rule has betrayed the goals of the revolution that
toppled Haile Selassie. The next major step in the regime's drive
for legitimacy will be the election of a national parliament-
ostensib/ the county 's most owerful institution-in May.
Since the overwhelming approval of the new Soviet-style constitution
in agovernment-controlled referendum in February, Mengistu and his
aides have turned their full attention to selecting candidates for the
top posts in a new administration. In March, Addis Ababa announced
a shuffle of high-level government and military personnel in part to
prepare the way for a new regime.
Growing Role of the Party
Mengistu's eagerness to increase at least the nominal authority
of civilians probably reflects his growing confidence in the
60,000-member Workers Party. Founded in 1984 with Soviet
assistance, t e party has steadil ex anded its role in mana in the
reaime's dav-to-dav affair
The party is playing the leading part in the regime's controversial
resettlement and villagization programs, which are designed to
increase Addis Ababa's control over the countryside and to prepare
the rural population for collectivized agriculture. Although Mengistu
has announced that resettlement will not resume as expected this
year, the party's participation in the expanding villagization effort and
its role as a watchdog against disloyalty in the government, and the
military will probably ensure its growth as a lever of power.
Toa Secret
14 11 April 1987
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Signs of Discontent
The public has shown little enthusiasm for Mengistu's efforts to
legitimize his rule, despite intense propaganda and the regime's
painstaking attempts to create the image of popular involvement.
Although some Ethiopians voiced reservations about the new
constitution and the sweeping powers it grants to Menaistu._the vast
majority appear to be resigned to his rule.
military continues to back Men istu and to remain the re ime's
key p f support, but
there is incr std private cn icism o engis u s ea
methods, his han i f the stalemated north urgencies, and
the country's ties to the arge ers of senior officers are
listening to attacks on Men p " ' b the former Ethio ian
Foreign Minister on oice of America.
Mengistu probably hopes that his elaborate efforts to establish a
civilian regime and the appearance of representative institutions will
increase popular support for his regime and counter the perception
that his rule has become increasingly authoritarian. Although
Mengistu and a few key military supporters will continue to dominate
the regime, he probably believes that giving the party more of a role
will raise his status in Soviet eyes.
The regime's pervasive security network will probably be able to deter
any active coup plotting, at least for the short term. But the main
causes of the military's unhappiness-particularly, the protracted
northern insurgencies-are likely to persist. Should the Voice of
America broadcasts contribute to increased unrest, Mengistu will
probably crack down on disloyal officers and, other officials.,~~-men-~
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15 pri
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Cases of AIDS_Symptoms
Reported Cases
Per Million People Total
Austria 7.1
Belgium 20.9
Greece 3.5
-Italy 8.0
Netherlands 14.9
Norway 8.4
Portugal 4.5
Spain 6.1
West Germany 14.4
1,253
32,825
Based on data as of 16 March from the World Health Organization
and the Center for Disease Control. The numbers indicate those
people who have symptoms of the disease, not carriers of the AIDS
virus.
Top Secret
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Special Analysis
WESTERN EUROPE: Response to AIDS
Public concern about the AIDS problem in Western Europe is /25X1
increasing. Most governments are developing prevention and
treatment programs. Political controversy is likely to grow,
however, over proposals for mandator screenin of specific
groups, including foreigners. 25X1
According to the World Health Organization, some 4,000 West
Europeans are reported to be ill with AIDS. This number is expected
to double every 9 to 11 months. In addition, a half million to 1 million
people in Western Europe are carrying the AIDS virus; if 10 to .
30 percent of them actually develop AIDS, as,seems likely, there will
be from 50,000 to 300.000 deaths from AIDS in Western Europe over
the next five years.
In West Germany and France, the number of cases of AIDS jumped
150 percent over the past year. France has the most cases in Western
Europe-1,253. Switzerland and Denmark have the highest per capita
rates
Reactions by Governments
France has launched a $2 million prevention campaign and has
increased funds for testing for the virus from $4 million to $5.7 million
this year. Concern about AIDS has prompted Paris to repeal a
20-year-old law banning condom advertisements. The Minister of
Health has pro sting for all couples wishing
to get married.
The UK will spend $122 million in a three-year program to seek a cure
and to develop a vaccine against AIDS. It also began a $30 million
crash education program in November; the government sent
pamphlets to 23 million households describing the AIDS virus and
ways to avoid it, including the use of condoms
West Germany has committed $22.2 million for information
campaigns and the establishment of 10 centers for AIDS victims.
Another $82 million has been earmarked for clinical researchers. The
State of Bavaria has adopted controversial mandatory testing for
high-risk groups, including prostitutes, prison inmates, and some
foreigners. The federal government favors strict penal sanctions for
individuals who knowingly infect others, but it has sharply criticized
Bavaria's mandatory testing decision, arguing that high-risk groups
can be located best on a voluntary basis. without driving them
underground
continued
Tee Spr_rrat
11 April 1987
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/24 :CIA-RDP88T000918000500250001-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/24 :CIA-RDP88T000918000500250001-5
Proposals for mandatory testing of high-incidence groups and for
registration of known AIDS carriers have been criticized by some
West Germans on human rights grounds. The controversy will
undoubtedly spread to other countries. Governmental promotion of
condoms in Italy, Ireland, and Austria has drawn criticism from the
Catholic Church and conservative groups, which argue that such
programs implicitly endorse contraception.
Anti-AIDS programs may complicate West European relations with
some countries outside of Europe. Belgium's mandatory testing of
African students and withdrawal of scholarships from those who test
positively have drawn charges of racism from Zairian officials 25X1
Soviet disinformation that AIDS was developed in the US has made
little headway in Western Europe. Nonetheless, US citizens-
particularly military personnel, but also tourists-might increasingly
become the focus of European scrutiny because the US has the
highest reported incidence of AIDS. A recent British poll shows that
82 percent of respondents believe that all visitors to Britain should be
tested before entry. As public concern grows, AIDS is likely to
become a major consideration in West European policies on tourism
foreign labor. and immigration, and possibly on other issues.
Too Secret
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/24 :CIA-RDP88T000918000500250001-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/24 :CIA-RDP88T000918000500250001-5
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/24 :CIA-RDP88T000918000500250001-5