NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 16 MARCH 1984
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010027-1
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T
Document Page Count:
22
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 27, 2010
Sequence Number:
27
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Publication Date:
March 16, 1984
Content Type:
REPORT
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Central
Intelligence
OCPAS/CIG
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? National Intelligence Daily,
Friday
.16 March 1984
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16 arc 4
CPAS NID 84-063JX
Copy 2 8 5
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Contents
. EC: Outlook for the Summit .................................................... 3
Bulgaria-Nicaragua: Arms Delivery Completed ......................
Poland: Party Conference Opens ............................................
West Germany-East Germany: Increased Contacts ..............
Iraq-Arab States: Results of Foreign Ministers' Meeting ...
Pakistan: Student Disturbances .............................................. 10
USSR: Possible Proposal of Chemical Warfare Treaty .......... 10
Colombia: Guerrilla Attack ...................................................... 12
China: President Li's Travels .................................................. 12
Special Analysis
Iran-Iraq: The Perspective From Tehran ................................ 14
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EC leaders are likely to make limited progress toward solving the
Community's budget crisis at their summit in Brussels on Monday and
Tuesday.
Comment: Reducing agricultural spending will receive priority
attention. The leaders will consider a proposal accepted by their
Agricultural Ministers early this week to reduce costly overproduction
of milk by taxing surpluses. They also will debate phasing out the EC's
complicated system of special exchange rates for agriculture by
eliminating the compensation of West German farmers over the next
three years to offset the strength of the mark.
In addition, the Ten will examine future EC financing. The
Commission claims that, if the EC is to avoid bankruptcy this fall, it
has to increase the share of the value-added taxes that EC members
pass on to the Community.
The EC leaders probably will agree to undertake broadly defined
reforms but leave the details to the next summit in June. They appear
to be ready to compromise on the crucial dairy and exchange rate
issues. They are determined to avoid a fiasco like the one that
embarrassed them last December.
Prime Minister Thatcher's insistence that the UK be granted relief
from what it regards as disproportionate EC budget payments poses
the greatest threat to the summit. After agricultural issues are settled,
the nine other members are likely to support raising the share of
value-added revenues to be contributed, possibly by as much as
1.4 percent.
Thatcher, however, may try to veto new funding until her demands
for financial restitution are met. This could jeopardize other
agreements and disrupt the summit.
President Mitterrand probably will seek a commitment from the
other EC leaders to conclude negotiations by the end of September
for Spanish and Portuguese entry. France and Spain have agreed to
negotiate their differences over enlarging the EC bilaterally.
The EC leaders may issue statements urging improved East-West
relations and supporting the Contadora process in Central America.
These statements probably will not deviate from previous EC
positions
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BULGARIA-NICARAGUA: Arms Delivery Completed
Bulgarian arms shipped to Nicaragua earlier this month roughly
double the Sandinistas' inventory of tanks.
__]the delivery included some 20 medium tanks, 20 or so light
amphibious tanks, and 1.6 other armored vehicles. It also included at
least three 152-mm howitzers.
Comment: This shipment is the fourth by Bulgaria in some 18
months, and it supports the continuing buildup of Nicaragua's military
capabilities. The medium tanks are about enough to form a battalion,
and they probably will replace some outdated equipment in the
armored brigade. The remainder of that brigade consists of two other
battalions, each with about 22 medium tanks delivered in 1981 and
1982.
The Sandinistas have not been using their existing armored units
extensively against anti-Sandinista insurgents. Recently, however,
they moved a few medium tanks into the northwest, ossibl in
response to clashes along the border with Honduras
The light amphibious tanks probably will be used to perform
reconnaissance missions. Permanent garrisons or deployment areas
for the new tanks and armored vehicles have not been identified.
Previous patterns indicate, however, that Nicaraguan troops are likely
to train with the new equipment under Cuban instruction in the
northwest at La Paz.
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POLAND: Party Conference Opens
Premier Jaruzelski seems intent on using the party conference
that begins today to show that the party is recovering from the political
losses it has suffered over the last several years.
Delegates will assess the progress made in implementing the
liberal party program they passed in July 1981 and set tasks to be
accomplished before the next congress is held sometime in 1986.
The agenda also will include a formal report by government
representatives on the state of the country.
The conference is expected to endorse declarations on ideolo
and party voting procedures
Comment: The conference is the first high-level party meeting
since the military's involvement in politics disrupted the traditional
lines of political authority. Although short of a full-fledged congress,
Jaruzelski probably hopes that holding the session will help persuade
his critics that he is making every effort to revive the party.
Nonetheless, the party has not recouped nearly 1 million members
lost since August 1980, and party bureaucrats continue to grumble
over their failure to regain a monopoly over decisionmaking.
Jaruzelski apparently is moving ahead on redefining the role of
the party apparatus. Government participation in the conference is an
innovation that may be aimed at indicating a reduction of the party's
involvement in the daily running of the country. Jaruzelski evidently
believes this task is best left to the government bureaucracy.
Some of Jaruzelski's policies could come under attack at the
conference. Nonetheless, he should be able to deflect militant critics
by pointing to recent moves by the regime to silence dissident
intellectuals, to remove ideological mavericks from important party
posts, and to harass the church.
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WEST GERMANY-EAST GERMANY: Increased Contacts
Government and opposition parties in Bonn are devoting more
attention to intra-German affairs.
The meeting yesterday between opposition Social Democratic
parliamentary leader Vogel and East German leader Honecker follows
visits to East Berlin by Social Democratic Bundestag and trade union
groups. Reporting from the US Embassy and by the press indicate a
number of government officials, including Economics Minister
Lambsdorff, have attended the trade fair in Leipzig or visited East
Berlin.
Christian Social Union chairman Strauss also met with Honecker
in Leipzig. Strauss, whose role in intra-German affairs has been
praised publicly by Chancellor Kohl, commended the current surge in
emigration allowed by East Germany as an adequate response to the
$400 million credit extended by Bonn last year.
Comment: Kohl wants to prove that his government can preserve
the intra-German ties built during the 1970s. He probably hopes to
use public approval of its intra-German policy to help reaffirm the
consensus on security and foreign policy, which was damaged during
the INF debate. Bonn apparently sees signs of flexibility in East Berlin,
despite reports that East Berlin is no longer allowing emigration by
those who take refuge in Western embassies.
The Social Democrats cannot allow themselves to be outflanked
on a policy they consider their own. While they continue to endorse
Kohl's intra-German policy, they are likely to keep pushing
interparliamentary meetings and other initiatives to improve ties.
The increased activity could pave the way for new credit
guarantees and other concrete actions. It also could lead to
difficulties for the West, however, if the East Germans represent
the meetings to be implicit recognition of their sovereignty over
East Berlin.
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IRAQ-ARAB STATES: Results of Foreign Ministers' Meeting
The strong endorsement of Iraq's position at a meeting in
Baghdad on Wednesday of the Arab League Foreign Ministers is
likely to have little practical impact on the war. US diplomats in
Baghdad report that the meeting went substantially beyond previous
League resolutions in condemning Iran and demanding a cease-fire.
A committee of Foreign Ministers from Iraq's supporters-Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and North Yemen-will
monitor implementation of the resolutions and urge other countries to
refrain from measures that would prolong the fighting. US diplomats
believe Iraq will urge the Persian Gulf states to put pressure on West
European countries and Japan to curtail trade with Iran.
Comment: Iraq will have difficulty translating its political success
at the meeting into economic and military gains. Iran would use
intimidation and price cutting to counter any effort to restrict its oil
sales. Iraq and the Gulf states probably will try to enlist US super
their efforts to put pressure on countries trading with Iran.
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Student Demonstrations:
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PAKISTAN: Student Disturbances
Students in Karachi on Tuesday staged their largest
demonstration of the year as protest activity continues against
President Zia's ban on student unions. There also have been protests
in Lahore, and on Monday fundamentalist students in Peshawar tried
to disrupt a presidential rally. The US Consulate in Karachi reports
14 student groups there have formed a united front.
Comment: The authorities have had little difficulty controlling
the limited demonstrations, which so far have been confined mostly
to center and leftist student groups. Fundamentalist leaders appear
divided over whether to join their campus enemies in the protests
or to accept the ban in hopes of gaining preferential treatment.
Increasing discontent among the fundamentalists, however, might
provoke government retaliation that could offend Zia's conservative
political supporters.
USSR: Possible Proposal of Chemical Warfare Treaty
The Soviet delegation to the UN Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva recently dropped its insistence on drafting a treaty text in the
ad hoc subsidiary body on chemical weapons. The US delegation
believes that this may indicate that the Soviets are writing a draft in
Comment: The Soviets probably were surprised by the statement
made by Secretary of State Shultz in his address in mid-January to
the Conference on Disarmament in Europe that the US would propose
a treaty banning chemical weapons on a global basis. They may try to
preempt the US by producing a draft first. General Secretary
Chernenko may have foreshadowed such a move in his election ?
speech on 2 March when he noted that the conditions for a CW
accord are "beginning to ripen." If the Soviets have not offered
a draft by the end of the current session in late April, however, their
next opportunity would be the session opening in June.
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The attack this week by the M-19, Columbia's second-largest
guerrilla group, on a departmental capital probably reflects a decision
to resume full-scale fighting and is a serious blow to President
Betancur's peace proposals.
Press reports state that Betancur has reacted
by declaring a state of siege in four southern departments.
Comment: The M-19's leadership crisis, which began with the
death last April of its former commander, apparently has been
resolved in favor of militants who reject the peace offers. This policy,
however, could cost the guerrillas some domestic support. The public
generally has supported Betancur's peace efforts, and it probably
will blame the insurgents for the rise in terrorist violence. The attack
also will encourage the military to press Betancur for expanded
counterinsurgency operations.
President Li Xiannian is in Turkey, the third stop of his three-week
trip that includes visits to Pakistan, Jordan, and Nepal. While in
Pakistan, Li emphasized Beijing's support for Islamabad's firm
opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Li met with PLO
leader Arafat in Jordan,
Comment: This is Li's first trip outside China since he assumed
the presidency last June. Beijing is using the trip to reiterate its
position on the Afghanistan and Palestinian issues. The Chinese also
probably are trying to gauge reaction to developments in the war
between Iran and Iraq. Although China has little leverage on these
issues, it remains concerned about opportunities for new inroads by
the USSR.
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Special Analysis
IRAN-IRAQ: The Perspective From Tehran
Ayatollah Khomeini remains determined to pursue the war against
Iraq, despite the heavy casualties his forces have taken. He has
ordered another offensive, hoping it will bring down Iraqi President
Saddam Husayn. Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani and other influential
clerics, however, have been arguing that the war is undermining
popular support for the regime and crippling the economy. If the
offensive results in more substantial losses and only limited territorial
gains, this group would be in a better position to persuade Khomeini
to end the fighting.
Khomeini and other militants apparently have abandoned the
strategy they pursued last year of waging a war of attrition. Iran had
hoped that limited military pressure, subversion, and preventing Iraqi
oil exports through the Persian Gulf and the Syrian pipeline would be
enough to topple Saddam. Baghdad's success in making a deal with
dissident Iraqi Kurds, however, and reports that Iraq planned to ship
oil through pipelines in Jordan and in Saudi Arabia probably caused
Iranian leaders to rethink this strategy.
In January Khomeini and other leaders began calling for a "final
offensive." Even clerics opposed to continuing the conflict may have
agreed to another offensive, hoping that Khomeini would halt the war
if it failed.
In the past few weeks, the Iranians have seized the Majnoon
Islands near Al Basrah and made minor gains elsewhere in a series of
limited attacks, but they have suffered over 20,000 casualties. The
attacks evidently are designed to wear down the Iraqis and to seize
important terrain in preparation for the offensive, which is likely to
occur before the end of the month.
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Divisions in the Leadership
Recent remarks by Khomeini, Rafsanjani, and President
Khamenei suggest that disputes continue in the leadership over
Khomeini's determination to pursue a military solution. Early this
month Khomeini criticized unnamed "nationalists" who question the
need for military operations outside of Iranian territory and who worry
about popular dissatisfaction about casualties.
Rafsanjani long has advocated keeping Iranian casualties low.
Recently Rafsanjani suggested that Tehran could use oil from
the Majnoon Islands as war reparations and agree to "any verdict"
against Saddam rendered by an international court acceptable to
Iran. Rafsanjani also has suggested that Iran could accept as
Saddam's replacement any Iraqi official who has not been involved
in conducting the war.
The latest comments by Rafsanjani suggest that he sees a chance
to improve his position by exploiting growin popular discontent over
the war. antiwar protests are
becoming more frequent throughout ran
=Iranian troops taken prisoner in the latest fiahtina claim that
military and civilian morale is low.
In speeches earlier this month Khamenei, who is a major rival of
Rafsanjani, strongly supported Khomeini's militant views on the war.
Khamenei, however, probably is not committed to a military solution
to the war. He is likely to be more interested in winning Khomeini's
favor at Rafsanjani's expense.
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Khomeini's Position
If the offensive fails, Khomeini will then weigh the political risks of
continuing the conflict. He has agreed so far with those who fear that
ending the war without ousting Saddam would weaken clerical control
in Iran and reduce the international appeal of the Islamic revolution.
The prospect of suffering additional heavy casualties, however,
may persuade Khomeini that the cumulative effects of the war pose a
real threat to the regime. In that case, he might announce a new policy
with little public warning. He took such a step to end the crisis over
the US hostages-a problem as intractable for Tehran as the war with
Iraq.
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