NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 2 MARCH 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100030007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 2, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/18: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100030007-2
Director of -70P-SeCret-
00-LICet.
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Central
Intelligence
qft arn
D/ !;Y el,
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
2 March 1984
Top Secret
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CPAS NID 84-051JX
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2 March 1984
Copy 285
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To ? Secret
Contents
Iraq-Iran: Iranian Attacks Increase 1
Lebanon-Syria: Christians Resisting Compromise 3
Sudan: Nimeiri Buying Time 4
USSR-US: Interest in Talks on Space Weapons 5
South Africa-Angola-Mozambique: Talks Continue 6
China: Resistance to Party Reform 7
Central America: Regional Tensions 8
Venezuela: Impact of Economic Program 9
Hungary: Leadership Concerns
11
France-Lebanon: Prospects for Troop Withdrawal
Palestinians-Jordan: Results of Arafat-Hussein Talks
West Germany: Labor Problems
USSR: Proposed Air Corridor Agreement for Berlin
12
13
13
14
Morocco: Signs of Unrest in the North
15
International: Terrorist Watch
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2 March 1984
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IRAN-IRAQ: Iranian Attacks Increase
Iran has launched what may be the initial phase of its major
offensive at Al Basrah. Meanwhile, it is strengthening its air defenses
protecting Khark Island. Morale problems appear to be develo
however, among the Iranian population and within the military.
fighting under way
along two sections of the border northeast of Al Basrah. Iranian
forces have advanced about 4 kilometers in one area but have not
penetrated the main Iraqi defense. Iraqi armored forces were
counterattacking in both areas.
more Iranian armored forces
have moved forward close to the frontlines
Comment: The Iranians are likely to be trying to outflank the main
Iraqi defenses and overmatch Iraqi forces in the south, but the Iraqi
counterattack could cut off the Iranians and trap them against the
marshes. The movement of Iranian armor indicates additional attacks
involving regular troops could beqin soon.
Situation in the Persian Gulf
Iraq yesterday claimed to have sunk eight ships near Bandar-e
Khomeyni. The US AWACS aircraft in Saudi Arabia detected a
marked increase in the number of Iranian F-14 sorties out of Bushehr
Airbase following Iraq's alleged attack near Khark Island on Monday.
two Iranian destroyers
being fueled and armed with antiship and possibly antiaircraft
missiles at Bandar-e Abbas.
Tehran radio warned on Wednesday that, if the US tries to reopen
the Strait of Hormuz in the event it is closed by Iran, suicide attacks
will be made against the US Navy.
continued
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1 2 March 1984
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Comment: Iran appears to be preparing its forces in case the
fighting spreads into the Persian Gulf. The F-14s operating out of
Bushehr increase Iran's capability to protect Khark Island. The Iranian
destroyers probably will not operate near the island, where they
would be vulnerable to Iraqi air attack, but they are likely to be kept
ready to threaten shipping in the strait.
The threat of suicide missions against US naval forces is a
departure from Iran's previous position. Tehran had maintained that
Western media reports that it was preparing such missions were
propaganda inventions intended to pre are the way for an increased
Western presence in the Middle East.
Iranian Morale
Senior and middle-level Iranian military officers are upset about
clerical interference with military planning and operations.
small
demonstrations against the war erupted in Shiraz, when bodies of
soldiers killed in the fighting were brought home for burial.
Comment: Popular discontent with the war could become
widespread in Iran if it fails to make maior gains and the casualties
from the latest battles become public.
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LEBANON-SYRIA: Christians Resisting Compromise
Christian hardliners in Beirut are preparing to resist any
accommodation with Syria that might result from President Gemayel's
talks in Damascus.
Several militia leaders told the US Embassy yesterday that the
Lebanese Forces are planning to oppose Gemayel politically and
militarily. Their new program, which will be separate from that of the
Phalange, will seek to create a Christian autonomous area with close
relations with Israel. They claim that most Christians have abandoned
the conceit of a unified Beirut and a unified Army and now support
them.
Comment: The entire Christian community appears to be
adopting the unyielding stand of the Lebanese Forces. If Gemayel
announces the abrogation of the Lebanese-Israeli agreement,
Christian militia leaders probably will attempt to take over the Army
and the Ministry of Defense. Most Christian officers believe that a
unified army of Christians, Druze, and Muslims is no longer possible,
and they would not resist such a move. The consolidation of the
Lebanese Forces and the Army into a Christian front would set the
stage for renewed civil war.
Israel probably is discouraging the Lebanese Forces from
following this course because it would isolate the Christian community
and leave it vulnerable to Syrian-supported forces. Tel Aviv is under
increasing domestic pressure to withdraw from Lebanon and does
not relish the prospect of a long-term commitment to defend a
Christian state. Israel's policy instead is to concentrate on security
arrangements in the south, for which it hopes to get local Shia, Sunni,
and Druze cooperation.
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SUDAN: Nimeiri Buying Time
President Nimeiri, who is facing discontent in his armed forces
over the insurgency in the south, probably will make only limited
conciliatory gestures toward southern dissidents in his Unity Day
speech tomorrow.
The government has not yet released the recommendations
forwarded to Nimeiri last week by a commission of northern and
southern politicians. The US Embassy reports that the status of north-
south negotiations is unclear but that many southerners will wait for
Nimeiri's speech to assess his sincerity about a political settlement.
Comment: Nimeiri ultimately may make additional concessions,
but he seems to view negotiations with southerners and his speech as
stopgap measures. He appears to be concentrating on improving his
position through increased arms deliveries from the US and a
lessening of tensions with Ethiopia.
Most dissidents still appear willing to negotiate, but they will
become more intransigent if their military position improves. In
addition, the declining morale of the armed forces has fostered open
criticism of Nimeiri and rumors of coup plotting
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USSR-US: Interest in Talks on Space Weapons
Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a speech on Monday, alluded to
earlier Soviet proposals regarding weapons in space and called on
the US to start talks on this issue now. Defense Minister Ustinov and
Politburo member and party secretary Gorbachev also alluded in
recent speeches to the proposals.
Comment: The most urgent Soviet concern almost certainly is the
development of the US antisatellite system to be launched from an
F-15. They would like to prevent or at least delay US testing and
deployment.
Limiting weapons in space gained added urgency for Moscow
following President Reagan's discussion last March of the possibility
of space-based strategic defense systems. Soviet approaches and
propaganda are likely to intensify as the US moves toward further
testing
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SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA-MOZAMBIQUE: Talks Continue
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South Africa's negotiations with Angola and Mozambique are ?
continuing, but insurgent activities will remain a concern to all parties. 25X1
The South African-Angolan Joint Monitoring Commission agreed
last week on mechanisms to police the cease-fire. At the meeting in
southern Angola, South African negotiators expressed strong
concern about increasing SWAPO infiltration into Namibia. The
Angolans acce ted full responsibility for controlling the insurgents'
movements.
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Senior South African officials recently said that there have been
42 contacts with SWAPO insurgents in northern Namibia since the
beginning of February. South 25X1
African light attack aircratt nave been moved to bases closer to the
area of the reported infiltration. South Africa has released SWAPO
founder Toivo ya Toivo from prison, according to press reports. 25X1
Meanwhile, the Embassy reports that Mozambique's response to
the draft security accord presented by Pretoria two weeks ago will be
largely favorable when negotiations resume in Cape Town today. A
senior Mozambican official has said his government will no longer
allow the ANC to stage attacks from Mozambique. He also said,
however, that Maputo will reject Pretoria's demand that Mozambique
expel all ANC officials and South African refugees.
Both the ANC and the South African-supported Mozambican
insurgent movement?RENAMO?have become more active. In the
past week ANC saboteurs have attacked two power stations in South
Africa, while RENAMO has hit economic targets within 80 kilometers
of Maputo.
Comment: SWAPO may have infiltrated some guerrillas into
Namibia, but the South Africans probably are exaggerating insurgent
military activity there. Pretoria may have released Toivo ya Toivo in an
effort to split the insurgent movement by creating a rival to SWAPO
leader Nujoma. Pretoria and Maputo, however, will remain concerned
about the level of insurgent activity. Hardliners in both ?overnments
could cite it as reason to break off the negotiations.
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CHINA: Resistance to Party Reform
the party's three-
year rectification program is fully under way in the provinces after
months of confusion caused by the "spiritual pollution" issue.
A contact of
the US Embassy says party General Secretary Hu Yaobang included a
particularly faction-ridden province in a recent tour in order to deal
with an "immobile" local leadership. Several other leaders, including
Dena Xiaoping, have made tours of the provinces recently.
Comment: The senior leaders almost certainly are taking the
opportunity to push rectification goals in the areas they visit. Beijing is
playing a larger role in local party rectification than originally
stipulated in the guidelines issued by the Central Committee in
October, which stated that work teams from higher levels generally
would not be dispatched to subordinate organizations. Stalling tactics
by provincial leaders wary of the rectification process evidently have
driven Beijing to become more directly involved.
Although the liaison teams are instructed to work closely with the
local leadership in dealing with specific problems, they probably are
empowered to force compliance with Beijing's orders. The
intimidating presence of national-level observers at rectification
meetings, however, may eliminate the need for more forceful
intervention.
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CENTRAL AMERICA: Regional Tensions
New diplomatic strains between Guatemala and Honduras may
threaten unity among Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El
Salvador?known as the "Core Four"?in regional negotiations with
Nicaragua.
Press reports state Guatemala has recalled its Ambassador from
Honduras and officially protested the visit of Belizean Prime Minister
Price to Tegucigalpa last week. The Guatemalans claim Price is trying
to persuade other Central American countries to bring Belize?which
Guatemala claims as its territory?into regional organizations.
Colombia, a member of the Contadora group mediating in Central
America, suggested last week that Belize be admitted to the OAS.
The Hondurans are privately criticizing both Guatemala and El
Salvador for failing to support a stronger position against Nicaragua
in the Contadora negotiations. The US Embassy reports Honduran
leaders believe that the elections in Nicaragua in November could
legitimize the Sandinista regime and that the Core Four should press
Nicaragua in advance to adopt more democratic procedures.
Comment: Honduran support for Belize, combined with
Colombia's statement, will heighten Guatemala's sense of isolation in
the region and may jeopardize its backing of Core Four objectives in
the Contadora mediation. Guatemala apparently believes it is not
benefiting from the negotiations and has little to gain by giving strong
support to Honduras.
The Guatemalans also may resent large-scale US assistance for
Honduras and El Salvador. They probably will be cautious in
supporting US objectives unless they see clear benefits for
themselves.
The Hondurans evidently believe that they are bearing the burden
of maintaining pressure on Nicaragua, a feeling increased by recent
Guatemalan and Salvadoran reluctance to extend political support.
They may see a need for closer relations with Costa Rica and Belize?
the region's oldest democracies?to prevent isolation in their policy
toward Nicaragua.
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VENEZUELA: Impact of Economic Program
President Lusinchi's economic adjustment program, his first major
policy initiative, responds to several concerns of creditors but only
partly addresses Venezuela's economic problems.
The US Embassy reports that the four-week-old Lusinchi
administration, in keeping with its promise of a "social pact," has
consulted closely with private business and labor. The program
contains reduced interest rates and other measures aimed at
mollifying the private sector. Food subsidies and a requirement that
all firms expand employment levels by 10 percent are designed to
appeal to labor.
Other important provisions of the program are designed in large
part to satisfy foreign banks. These include permission for private
firms to use a preferential exchange rate for servicing foreign debt, a
devaluation of the bolivar, and steps to increase agricultural
production.
Comment: Lusinchi is likely to have improved his position at
home by putting together an adjustment program that is acceptable
to a wide range of labor, business, and political groups. By
successfully mediating between the contending factions in his
economic cabinet, he probably also has strengthened his reputation
for being skillful at developing a consensus.
Nevertheless, tougher fiscal and monetary measures will be
necessary to cut public deficits and shift resources from consumption
to investment. The low interest rates will undercut efforts to increase
domestic savings and could prompt a resurgence of capital flight.
Government subsidies and mandatory employment regulations
almost certainly will make production even less efficient.
The administration appears to have taken a major step toward
facilitating a rescheduling of public debt without an IMF-mandated
austerity program. Parts of the program meet some of the demands
of international bankers, and its announcement contrasts with the
previous administration's tough stance toward them. As a result, it
may improve the atmosphere for further talks.
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HUNGARY: Leadership Concerns
Uncertainty about the USSR's policy toward Hungary, caused by
Andropov's protracted illness and the change in Soviet leadership,
may be behind new concerns about party chief Kadar's health and
speculation about the eventual succession in Budapest.
several groups
in the leadership are maneuvering to be in a better position for the
succession. Kadar is said to have groomed Laszlo Marothy as his
successor?at 42, the youngest Politburo member?but a group led
by senior party secretaries Nemeth and Havasi reportedly has the
inside track. Conservatives unhappy with the regime's economic
reform program have coalesced around Central Committee member
Grosz, who criticized the leadership at the Committee plenum last
December.
Comment: Kadar's active schedule for the past several weeks
suggests he is not suffering severe health problems. The rumors
probably were prompted by nervousness in Hungary about the
leadership situation in Moscow. They also are likely to reflect concern
that, if the new Soviet regime were to press for a more orthodox line,
no other Hungarian leader cou d defend Budapest's innovative
political and economic policies
The top Hungarian leaders differ over the scope and pace of
reform. All of them support Kadar's fundamental policies, however,
and they probably would try to continue them after his departure. Few
militant conservatives remain in positions of power.
Nemeth, the party's number-two man, now appears to be in the
best position to succeed Kadar. He has broad experience and good
connections in Moscow. On the other hand, his questionable health
and leadership ability would tend to make him a weak, transitional
leader
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FRANCE-LEBANON: Prospects for Troop Withdrawal
Officials in the Foreign Ministry in Paris have told the US Embassy
that President Mitterrand has not yet made a decision on the
withdrawal of French forces from Beirut. Paris is considering a
number of options, including a partial reduction of its UN contingent
in southern Lebanon and the withdrawal of a portion of its MNF
contingent in Beirut. A senior French official said on Tuesday that
France probably would pull its troops out of Beirut and consider
withdrawing from the south if the USSR vetoed the French resolution
calling for a UN peacekeeping force in Beirut.
Comment: The French almost certainly are discouraged by the
Soviet veto, and they are likely to be considering the withdrawal
of a large part of their contingent from Beirut. They may leave a
substantial force there, however, to protect the more than 4,000
French civilians and to maintain a French presence. France
presumably will await the outcome of the discussions between
President Gemayel and President Assad before making a final
decision on withdrawal.
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PALESTINIANS-JORDAN: Results of Arafat-Hussein Talks
PLO chief Arafat left Amman yesterday without giving King
Hussein specific commitments that would allow the King to enter into
peace negotiations. During his four-day visit, Arafat met several times
with Hussein, but talks were largely confined to general principles that
would form the basis of future joint action. West Bankers invited by
Hussein presented Arafat with a petition advocating a formal
relationship between Jordan and the PLO.
Comment: Neither Hussein nor Arafat expected to reach any
major decisions. Nevertheless, the visit allowed both to satisfy their
Palestinian constituencies temporarily by giving the appearance of
momentum through highly publicized meetings of the joint PLO-
Jordanian committee. In practical terms Arafat will remain
preoccupied with shoring up his support in the PLO, and Hussein will
await conditions more favorable to a renewed peace initiative.
WEST GERMANY: Labor Problems
Short warning strikes and demonstrations are likely in West
Germany on the eve of Chancellor Kohl's arrival in Washington. The
Metalworkers' Union, the largest union and pacesetter for the rest of
organized labor, is deadlocked in negotiations with employers over its
demand for a 35-hour workweek. A no-strike agreement expired on
Wednesday.
Comment: Widespread participation in these initial protests is
possible. The willingness of the rank and file to follow the increasingly
militant union leadership on this issue remains in doubt, however,
because of weak worker support for the shorter workweek. A good
turnout would support the contentions of labor leaders that the 35-
hour week dispute could become the most serious labor problem
since World War II. Economics Minister Lambsdorff also has warned
of the possibility of a general strike this spring.
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Berlin Air Corridor Altitude Restrictions
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rt Jo' Se-
Ber in air traffic
control zone
Poland
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.2\Cornpulsoty flight corridor
e Flight restricted
below 4500 feet
Spree
Germany
Impact of Soviet Restriction Change on
Some Approaches to Tegel
New approach
5,500 F'
Lower limit with Allied safety factor
4,500 F
Lower limit of new Soviet restriction
01632 (546840) 3-84
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Ohl approach
2,500 Ft
Normal lower limit of approaches
to Tegel
East Germany Berlin Control
Zone Boundary
100 (1,
Kilometers
Berlin Tegel
Airport
The final border, rOermany have ?
not been ?stabil ed and some other
boundaries are r ot necessarily authoritative
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USSR: Proposed Air Corridor Agreement for Berlin
The Soviets are urging a new agreement that would formalize the
altitude restrictions imposed last week on Allied flights in Berlin's air
corridors. The chief Soviet controller in the Berlin Air Safety Center
told his Western counterparts on Wednesday that permanently
assigning flight altitudes between either 3,500 feet and 11,000 feet or
4,500 feet and 12,000 feet to the Allies would reduce the number of
temporary Soviet airspace reservations. He said the move also would
eliminate air traffic conflicts near the boundary with the Berlin air
traffic control zone. The chief controller acknowledged that his
proposal would revise the quadripartite agreement on air corridor
traffic of 1946, but he gave the US controller the impression that the
Soviets were willing to negotiate the terms.
Comment: Although the text of the current agreement is
imprecise, it was intended to give Western flights priority over all
other aircraft crossing the corridors and does not give the USSR veto
power over Allied flights. The proposed altitudes would not afford
adequate safety for Allied flights unless the Berlin air control zone
were enlarged. The Soviets probably hope to secure at least minor
restrictions on Allied use of the corridors.
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Army Reinforcements to Northern Morrocan Towns
ibraltar
Mediterranean Sea
(U.K.)
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MOROCCO: Signs of Unrest in the North
Security in northern Morocco is being strengthened by regular
Army troops in anticipation of disturbances tomorrow, the
anniversary of King Hassan's accession to the throne. The US
Embassy reports that there have been isolated incidents recently,
and the US Consul in Tangier has observed an unusual proliferation
of antimonarchy graffiti in northern towns. The appearance of
"independence" flags in predominantly Berber areas has raised the
fear of revived regional friction. Hassan has promised northern
leaders increased assistance to overcome the region's severe
poverty.
Comment: The combination of pledges of aid and increased
security precautions probably will help prevent serious disorders.
Nonetheless, considerable resentment has been stirred up against
the regime by the degree of force used to put down the disturbances
in January and by the King's speeches reminding northerners of how
he suppressed their revolt in 1958. In addition, militant Islamic
fundamentalism is becoming increasingly attractive to young and
unemployed northerners.
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INTERNATIONAL: Terrorist Watch
Middle East
? A caller claiming to belong to "Islamic Jihad"?probably a
cover name for Iranian-supported Lebanese Shias?has
threatened attacks in Beirut against French troops of the
Multinational Force if they do not depart within a week.
Latin America
? The pro-Cuban National Liberation Army of Colombia has
increased its terrorist activities. This probably is part of a
long-term strategy of challenging the nation's two largest
guerrilla groups, the 19th of April Movement and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.
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16 2 March 1984
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25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/18: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100030007-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/18: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100030007-2
Top Secret
25X1
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/18: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100030007-2