NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 28 FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020091-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 91
• Publication Date: February 28, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
Intelligence
E
25X1
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
28 February 1984
7010 Saul V!
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Copy 2 8 5
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Tog) Secret
Contents
Syria-Lebanon: Waiting on Gemayel ...................................... 1
Iran-Iraq: Military Developments ............................................ 2
USSR-PLO: Support for Arafat ................................................
France-Chad-Libya: French Views on Military Presence ......
USSR: Deactivation of SS-5 Force ..........................................
Spain: Basque Election Results ..............................................
Nicaragua: Labor Strife ..........................................................
Ethiopia-Sudan: Influx of Refugees ........................................
USSR-Cuba: New Air Defense Equipment .............................. 10
Liberia: Preparing for Civilian Rule ........................................ 11
Poland: Bureaucratic Infighting .............................................. 12
Special Analysis
USSR: The New Leadership .................................................... 13
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Beirut
International
Airport
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8th
ilometers
28 February 1984
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SYRIA-LEBANON: Waiting on Gemayel
The Syrians continue to give President Gemayel time to abrogate
the Lebanese-Israeli agreement, but his domestic opponents are
becoming impatient and military pressures on the Lebanese Army are 25X1
increasing.
The Sunni commander of the Army's 3rd Brigade has told the US
defense attache that he is under intense pressure to leave the Army.
He says he will stay as long as he believes that the government is
working for national reconciliation and a religiously balanced Army. If
the government continues to vacillate, or if it enters into an open
alliance with Israel or the Christian Lebanese Forces militia, his
brigade and most Muslims will join the opposition.
Comment:) IAssad is still likely to hope
Gemayel will make a deal with Damascus and begin the process of
national reconciliation. Assad could encourage Druze and Palestinian
attacks on Suq al Gharb and then on the presidential palace at
B'abda, but such a move would panic the Christians and all but
eliminate the possibility of restoring political stability any time soon.
Gemayel probably realizes that continued inaction on his part will
eventually provoke additional Syrian-backed pressure on the Army.
He almost certainly believes an attack on Suq al Gharb would cause
the collapse of the 8th Brigade there and fragment the Army. He
therefore is likely to move toward an accommodation with Damascus
soon.
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Iraq-Saudi Arabia
Neutral Zone
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CCentraAfront
Iraqi-Iranian
fighting
rich River front
fZ.
--S o illery and
tev utionary Guard
rei f`orrcements
r \ Al /E srah front
Me ly activated
HAWK batteries
\ man ad r-e Khome`yni-
KUWAI, Persian
Kuwait Gulf Khark
an
s
yy~
~yy
ui~
Oil tankers
reportedly hit by
Iraqi airstrike
28 February 1984
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IRAN-IRAQ: Military Developments
The Iraqis claim their aircraft attacked tankers at Khark Island
yesterday, and Iran appears ready to launch its offensive.
Press reports from Baghdad state that an Iraqi military
spokesman warned that the attacks on Khark Island will continue.
Iranian press reports also state that Iraqi aircraft were active near
the Iranians have
sent more artillery and Revolutionary Guard units to an area north of
Al Basrah and have activated two HAWK air defense missile sites on
the southern front. Iraqi and Iranian forces are still fighting in the
Iran's failure to score a major success so far has reduced
pressure on Iraq to use chemical agents, according to the US
Interests Section in Baghdad. The Iraqis seem satisfied with the
performance of their troops.
Comment: Baghdad is aware that Tehran is about to launch
large-scale attacks at Al Basrah and along the central front. The Iraqis
may hope that the raid on Khark Island will show Tehran that they are
serious about expanding the war if Iran launches an offensive or
continues its attacks on Iraqi towns.
The activation of the HAWK sites, which could provide air defense
for attacking Iranian troops, suggests the main Iranian offensive
against Al Basrah is likely to begin this week. Despite Iranian attacks
in the marshes, the Iraqis still control the main road to the city and are
able to send reinforcements to meet the Iranian offensive.
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Iq
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USSR-PLO: Support for Arafat
Moscow is continuing discreetly to back Yasir Arafat as the PLO's
legitimate leader, but it is unlikely to give him strong public backing
against his Syrian-supported opponents in the organization for fear of
antagonizing President Assad.
Comment: Moscow wants an independent, pro-Soviet PLO to
help ensure against any decision by Syria to negotiate an Arab-Israeli
peace settlement without the USSR's participation. Nevertheless, the
Soviets almost certainly will remain reluctant to support Arafat too
openly, in order not to alienate Assad-their only major ally in the
Arab-Israeli disput - or nova thp earance of interfering in
Palestinian affairs.
Moscow views Arafat as its second-best ally in its effort to gain
influence in the Middle East peace process, and it is probably
concerned about the talks between Arafat and Hussein and their
progress toward cooperation with Egypt. The Soviets want to prevent
joint Jordanian-PLO participation in the Middle East peace plan
prepared by the US and any coalition of moderate Arabs that further
isolates Syria.
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FRANCE-CHAD-LIBYA: French Views on Military Presence
Recent statements by French officials indicate Paris may be
resigned to an extended military presence in Chad.
The French Ambassador in N'Djamena told a US Embassy official
last week that France is determined to resist Libyan pressures on
Chad, and he strongly implied that a French troop presence there
would be necessary for years. Senior French officers in Chad recently
told a US defense attache that their orders are to engage any clear
thrust from north of the 16th parallel. The Ambassador and the
officers noted, however, that President Habre is vulnerable to
infiltration of Libyan-backed dissidents.
Meanwhile, the French Ambassadors to Qatar and Togo have told
their US counterparts that Paris recently warned French missions of
possible Libyan terrorist attacks against French diplomats. French
embassies in West Africa have been told to tighten security.
Comment: The Ambassador to Chad has been consistently more
pessimistic about a negotiated settlement than Foreign Minister
Cheysson, who continues to push for a diplomatic opening. The
Ambassador's views, however, are likely to parallel thinking in
President Mitterrand's office and the Defense Ministry. His remarks
probably were intended in part to encourage increased US material
and financial support for Habre.
There is no confirmation of the reported Libyan threat to French
diplomatic personnel. Nonetheless, French concerns on this score are
consistent with other indications that Cheysson's talks with Qadhafi
went poorly and that the French may be expecting new Libyan efforts
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Deactivated SS-5 Sites
Greece
ATaybola
The United States Government has not rewgmzed the
corporation of Estonia, Latvia. and Lithuania into the
Sovlet Union. Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authwitahve
Kilometers
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The Soviets evidently have deactivated the last of their SS-5 IRBM
launchers.
The SS-5 was first fielded in 1961. It was a single-warhead, liquid-
propellant missile with a range of 4,100 kilometers. By 1965, missiles
from 101 launchers could hit most theater targets in Western Europe
and Asia.
Some SS-5s were deactivated in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The Soviets dismantled them more rapidly after 1977, when SS-20s
were introduced.
Comment: Andropov last October asserted that all the SS-5 sites
had been deactivated, but evidence of this has been ambiguous.
Although skeleton crews are still at some launch sites and some
abandoned equipment is still in place, none of these sites are likely to
have been only temporarily deactivated.
Deactivation of the system leaves the USSR with 378 launchers
for the three-warhead SS-20, plus about 220 SS-4 medium-range
single-warhead ballistic missiles. As the Soviets build more SS-20
bases, they probably will eventually resume deactivation of the SS-4
force. Phasina the system ut by 1987 or 1988.
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SPAIN: Basque Election Results
The results of the election on Sunday for the Basque regional
parliament demonstrate declining popular support for ETA terrorism,
but the failure of the governing Basque Nationalist Party to win a
parliamentary majority will hamper cooperation with Madrid.
The moderate Nationalists gained effective control of the new
assembly by winning 32 of its 75 seats. The Socialist Party pushed the
terrorist-linked party, Herri Batasuna, out of second place. The
Socialists won 25 percent of the vote and 19 seats-10 more than in
the previous election.
Herri Batasuna's percentage of the vote dropped from 16 percent
to 14 percent, but it kept its 11 seats. The party's leadership has
stated that it will continue to boycott parliament.
Comment: To govern effectively, the Nationalists will need the
backing of other political parties. As a result, they will be more
worried than ever about losing support both to more radical parties
and to the Socialists.
This could force the Nationalists into frequent disputes with
Madrid over counterterrorism policy and issues relating to Basque
autonomy. The problems will be aggravated if, as seems likely,
rightwing antiterrorist groups with suspected links to the central
government continue to retaliate against ETA murders.
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The Sandinistas have settled a strike at the country's largest sugar
refinery, but they are instigating another labor crisis to discredit an
opposition business leader.
Managua agreed to the demands of some 5,000 field workers and
authorized a 50-percent wage increase to end the wildcat strike. The
strikers had ignored their Sandinista union leaders and appealed to
an independent union to represent them. The union refused, fearing
government reprisals and agreed only to facilitate talks.
Nevertheless, state security agents detained several of the
independent union leaders and threatened at least one with death if
he did not sever his connection with a union confederation opposed
to the government. Although the leaders want to leave their posts,
confederation officials are urging them to stay until replacements can
The Sandinistas also are accusing a prominent businessman,
Enrique Bolanos, of trying to block formation of a proregime union at
his cotton plant. The plant's manager has told US officials that two-
thirds of the workers belong to an independent union and do not want
to switch. He says the government used pressure tactics on the
workers and brought in outsiders to demonstrate.
Comment: The walkout of sugar workers is the first major strike
in Nicaragua since strikes were outlawed in 1981, and it indicates
labor's frustration with frozen wages and rising prices. The
Sandinistas may have caved in because they did not want to use
repression against workers they claimed to represent. Nonetheless,
the regime will face tough choices if labor actions spread.
The Sandinistas probably hope to intimidate Bolanos, who has
been a leading opposition spokesman on election issues. The
opposition will be likely to view the move as a major act of
government bad faith at a time when the Sandinistas are claiming
loosening of political restrictions.
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New
Refugee
camp i
North
SANAA*
Yemen
Al Qada-rif Ethiopian
refugees
Z( \ ake Djibo~ti
is QN DJIBOUTI
t + A
Lake
Rudolf
'Kein ya
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ETHIOPIA-SUDAN: Influx of Refugees
A massive influx of Ethiopian refugees into eastern Sudan over
the past four months has caused local tensions there to reach the
highest level in more than three years, according to the US Embassy.
Ethiopians fleeing drought and heavy fighting are entering Sudan at
the rate of at least 300 per day, and anti-Ethiopian sentiment has
risen sharply, especially in Al Qadarif. Local officials blame the 40,000
new refugees for water shortages and soaring food prices. Islamic
fundamentalists are preaching against the government's policy of
giving the refugees sanctuary.
Comment: The heavy flow of refugees, which probably will
continue for the next several months, will increase strains between
Sudan and Ethiopia. In addition to trying to cope with a total of nearly
700,000 refugees, Khartoum is facing a growing Libyan- and
Ethiopian-backed insurgency in the south.
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USSR-CUBA: New Air Defense Equipment
the Soviets
have delivered the Cone Dish antenna, which is used with a high-
speed data link transmission system. The antenna was identified at
the surface-to-air missile support facility at Managua, south of
Havana. This data transmission system is used to support a variety of
air defense systems, including the SA-2 and SA-3, that are deployed
Comment: The delivery probably is the latest step in the USSR's
three-year-old program to strengthen Cuba's air defenses. The new
system will speed communications in the air defense network, which
could improve tracking of the US SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft and
other high-speed targets. It can be used to support SA-5s, but there
is no site construction or other indication that the USSR is planning to 25X1
deploy SA-5s in Cuba.
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LIBERIA: Preparing for Civilian Rule
Head of State Doe and four senior colleagues on the ruling
council have released all junior members from their duties, ostensibly
to permit them to prepare for retirement after the scheduled return to
civilian rule in April 1985. Doe's draft constitution, which was made
public Thursday and now faces a popular referendum next month,
contains amendments to provide council members with financial
security and legal immunity for their official actions.
Comment: The amendments probably will mute opposition to the
transition among junior officers and help ease Doe's anxieties over
ensuring a peaceful turnover. Nonetheless, Doe is under pressure to
run for the civilian presidency, and he is showing frustration over the
problems involved in managing a deteriorating economy. As the time
for returning to civilian rule approaches, he may become increasingly
inclined to lash out at his domestic critics. He also may seek more US
support.
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POLAND: Bureaucratic Infighting
Premier Jaruzelski is trying to
remove from the civilian apparatus of the Communist Party
individuals who he believes are obstructing his political and economic
policies. aruzelski has had some success in
removing a number of central party officials, but that he has failed to
im purge of perhaps as many as 2,000 bureaucrats.
the conservative provincial party apparatus has
not been touched. Party bureaucrats, who are angry about the
continuing influence of Jaruzelski's military appointees in the party,
are said to be striking back by working to undermine the military's
reputation and reduce its authority.
Comment: The infighting, which probably will continue over an
extended period, will increase tensions and further complicate the
process of formulating and implementing policies. Bureaucratic
obstruction by the party apparatus could lead Jaruzelski to rely even
more on trusted subordinates and other institutions, especially the
government. This could in turn create more tension.
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Interlocking Directorate of the Soviet Leadership
Party
Government
Politburo
Full Member
Age Othe
r Post
Secretariat Council of Ministers Presidium of Supreme Soviet
Chernenko
72
General
Secretary
Aliyev
Grishin
60
69 Mosco
party
w
chief
M
ari
inister of ForeignAffairs
td First DeputyChairman
Kunayev
72 Kazak
party
hstan
chief
Member
Romanov
61
Heavy Industry
Member
Shcherbitskiy
Solomentsev
66 Ukrai
party
70 Party
Comm
ne
chief
Control
ittee
Member
Tikhonov
78
Ustinov
Vorotnikov
Candidate Member
75
58 RSFS
Premi
R
er
M
inister of Defense
Chebrikov
60
Demichev
66
Dolgikh
59
Kuznetsov
83
Ponomarev
Shevardnadze
69
56 Georg
party
ia
chief
Kapitonov-Light industry,
consumer goods
Ligachev-Personnel
Rusakov-Ruling
Communist parties
Ryzhkov-Economic
management
Zimyanin-Propaganda,
ideology
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Special Analysis
USSR: The New Leadership
The weight of evidence since Andropov's death suggests that
General Secretary Chernenko rules over a divided leadership and will
have obstacles to overcome if he is to consolidate his position. It is too
early to assess how much strength Chernenko has or what his staying
power will be. In the days ahead there are likely to be conflicting
signals as the political situation sorts itself out. Several events in the
next two months-the completion of the Supreme Soviet election
campaign, a plenum of the Central Committee, a session of the
Supreme Soviet, and the possible selection of a new chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet-will provide more solid indications
of Chernenko's power.
Some representatives of the key national security bureaucracies
appear to have reservations about Chernenko's qualifications. A
Soviet ambassador who is a member of the Central Committee
conveyed his lack of enthusiasm for Chernenko. Another ambassador
even suggested that Chernenko is unqualified for office because he
lacks foreign policy experience.
have also been cool to Chernenko. The initial treatment of the new
General Secretary in the military press was noticeably faint in its
praise of his qualifications.
Such reservations are not unusual. The military, the Foreign
Ministry, and the KGB provided the backbone of Andropov's support
when he became General Secretary.
Defense Minister Ustinov, in his article commemorating Soviet
Army-Navy Day last week, made scant reference to Chernenko, and
he attacked US policy despite Chernenko's avoidance of such
rhetoric in his initial speech. In a subsequent speech to the military
last Friday, however, Ustinov praised Chernenko and suggested that
the General Secretary's statements were authoritative.
The change in emphasis may derive from a decision by the
Politburo at its regular meeting on Thursday. Soviet media indicated
that Chernenko had addressed the meeting and had defined major
policy issues.
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Some Soviet officials have claimed that Ustinov and Foreign
Minister Gromyko preferred Chernenko to a younger leader who
might interfere in their spheres of responsibility. While this is
plausible, it does not necessarily signify their total support of the new
leader. They will still probably resist any efforts by Chernenko to
expand his control over their domains in foreign policy.
West German Chancellor Kohl and Canadian Prime Minister
Trudeau noted that in their meetings with Chernenko, Gromyko
showed an independence and outspokenness he had not displayed in
Andropov's presence. Moreover, when Chernenko met with the East
European party leaders, he was surrounded by Gromyko, Ustinov,
and Premier Tikhonov, thereby conveying the impression of a
collective leadership.
Supreme Soviet election speeches since Andropov's death also
seem to point to varying degrees of enthusiasm for Chernenko.
Officials closely associated with Andropov, including party secretary
Ryzhkov and KGB chief Chebrikov, have been restrained in their
comments about the new leader.
On the other hand, party secretaries Kapitonov, Zimyanin, and
Ligachev have praised Chernenko's abilities-in some cases lavishly.
Ligachev's praise is particularly noteworthy, because Andropov
brought him into the leadership to supervise personnel appointments.
This suggests that some of Andropov's proteges are covering
themselves politically by lauding Chernenko.
Sources of Support
Chernenko's support appears to come mainly from the regional
party leaders and government ministries-the two largest groups in
the Central Committee. These were the groups most threatened by
Andropov's anticorruption policy and plans to rejuvenate personnel. 25X1
The General Secretary underscored his appeal to these groups in
his initial speech as party leader. He noted the contribution of
regional party secretaries and pledged to reduce interference in the 25X1
work of the economic managers.
Chernenko benefited from the continued presence in the
Politburo of Brezhnev's cronies, Tikhonov and Kazakh party boss
Kunayev. Politburo independents may also have joined the coalition if
they believed the choice boiled down to selecting a younger, and
presumably more aggressive leader who might clean house, like party
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secretary Gorbachev, or an older and more cautious figure, like
Chernenko, who probably would be less inclined to interfere in their
bailiwicks.
Chernenko's Prospects
The Soviets are already publicizing the trappings of Chernenko's
authority. On Thursday the Chief of the General Staff at an Army-Navy
Day function identified Chernenko as the chairman of the Defense
Council, but this has not yet been reported by the Soviet press. An
official account states that on the same day Chernenko also
addressed a session of the Politburo, where he is said to have
"defined" the major directions of economic policy.
The next two months should provide a better appreciation of
Chernenko's degree of authority and his ability to push controversial
policies, particularly on the sensitive issue of relations with the West.
The Supreme Soviet election speeches of Ustinov and Gromyko,
when compared with Chernenko's speech, will be especially
important indicators of consensus among the senior leaders.
A Central Committee plenum this spring will be an even more
important indicator of Chernenko's strength and of Gorbachev's
reported role as unofficial second secretary. If the latter retains
control of personnel appointments while acquiring responsibility for
ideology, he would be in a strong position to influence policy and build
his credentials as the next general secretary.
The appointment of a new chairman of the Supreme Soviet, which
could be made at the session in March or April, also will provide
evidence of Chernenko's actual power. He presumably would want to
assume this position, but it could go to Gromyko or another senior
leader.
Regardless of who gets the job, the coming months may see an
increase in political maneuvering. Individuals could concentrate on
advancing their own careers, with Chernenko clearly seen as an
interim leader. This situation could cause some disarray in
policymaking.
Such a period probably will provide inconclusive and
contradictory signals about power relationships. Moreover, the
signals could give a false impression. Those in the national security
apparatus, particularly the Foreign Ministry and the KGB, who seem
to have the most serious reservations about Chernenko are much
more accessible to Western observers than those in the regional
apparatus and government ministries, where his support is greater.
Tee Spr_rat
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In any case, it seems unlikely that Chernenko will be able to
embark on bold new policies in the immediate future. If the leaders
is divided, it would find it easier to stick to the established course.
DIA Comment
DIA believes that reports of institutional opposition to Chernenko
within the leadership have been overstated. Defense Minister
Ustinov's Army-Navy Day article and speech as well as the statements
of other Soviet military VIPs were less strident in tone than last year's.
This can be attributed to a Soviet perception of political advantages
in returning to less confrontational rhetoric. Faint praise for
Chernenko in some of the speeches does not equate to military
opposition to the General Secretary. Chernenko has been in power
only two weeks and has made only one major speech in that period.
Although his references to the military in that address were limited,
they were supportive. Some leadership elements probably preferred
an older leader such as Chernenko, and individual jockeying for
position will continue. However, there is no evidence of institutional
opposition to Chernenko's consolidation of power. Senior leadership
figures such as Ustinov and Gromyko will almost certainly oppose
efforts to diminish their influence on policy, but the vast majority of
reporting indicates Ustinov and Gromyko supported Chernenko in the
succession and suggests they were two of Chernenko's key backers
in his bid for the top party post.
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