NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 21 FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020068-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: February 21, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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TV Director of T~3 ei
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
21 February 1984
r~nw
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Contents
Lebanon-Israel: Jockeying for Position ..................................
Iran-Iraq: Military Developments ............................................
1
3
Morocco-Libya: Improving Relations ......................................
USSR: Status of New Surface-to-Air-Missile ..........................
6
7
Philippines: Treatment of Opposition Leader ........................
8
Bahamas: Pressure on Prime Minister .................................... 10
Albania: Foreign Policy Initiatives .......................................... 10
Special Analysis
NATO-US: Tension Over the Arms Trade .............................. 11
Top Secret
21 February 1984
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Beirut
International
Airport
Top Secret
{ ' I o
Kilometers
M
Druze and Shia
Christian forces
Lebanese Army forces
Lebanese Army brigade,'
21 February 1984
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LEBANON-ISRAEL: Jockeying for Position
remain vulnerable to attack by Druze and Palestinian forces.
Meanwhile, factional leaders, convinced that the government of
President Gemayel is on the verge of collapse, have begun to argue
among themselves over what form the "new Lebanon" should take.
The Lebanese Army is maintaining its precarious hold on the
Alayh ridgeline at Suq a/ Gharb, but 8th Brigade positions there
Army.
US military officers who traveled to Suq al Gharb with the 8th
Brigade commander on Sunday concluded that the brigade's units
were understrength and that overall troop morale was "fair." Morale
continues to deteriorate because of the virtual rout of the rest of the 25X1
Israeli armored vehicles were spotted heading north of the Awwali
River yesterday, according to press reports.
Comment: Israeli forces may be planning a show of force or
simply patrolling north of the Awwali. The Israelis have sent armored
patrols toward Druze lines at Damur almost daily since the town was
seized from the Lebanese Army last week.
Disagreements Between Amal and Druze
A former head of the Shia Amal movement told the US Embassy
that serious differences are developing between Amal and the Druze
militia of Walid Junblatt. He said that the Shias resent Druze control
of the coastal road south of Beirut and are annoyed by the infiltration
of Palestinian fighters through Druze-held areas. Moreover, he said
Amal opposes Druze efforts to partition the country and is willing "to
fight anyone who tries to bring about partition."
Too Secret
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Comment: Opposition leaders, anticipating an imminent collapse
of the Gemayel government, almost certainly are jockeying for
position and attempting to consolidate their areas of control.
Disagreements between Junblatt and Bard, however, also reflect
the basic incompatibility of Druze and Shia long-term objectives. The
Druze probably would settle for a self-governing Druze "canton" in a
partitioned Lebanon. The Shias-whose population is scattered
throughout Lebanon-deeply oppose partition, which would leave
most Shias under Syrian or Israeli occupation.
Growing Christian Fears
Several Christian leaders have told the US Embassy in recent
days that most Christians are afraid that a complete Druze-Muslim
victory would result in their political eclipse and possibly even their
physical annihilation. Hardliners continue to argue that the US must
draw a "red line" at Suq al Gharb to prevent the total disintegration
of the Lebanese Army.
Comment: Many Christians feel betrayed by the US and Israel,
which they believe could still somehow forestall the collapse of the
Gemayel government. Most doubt, however, that opposition forces
will allow Gemayel to remain in office for long. Despite hardline
statements by Lebanese Forces officials, many Christians probably
accept that their community will have to reach an accommodation
with Syria to survive.
Top Secret
2 21 February 1984
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Iran-Iraq Military Developments
T rk3_y
n roevg
n \
Darbandikhai
Qap-e Shirin
Iraq-Saudi Arabia
-Neutral Zone
Top Secret
'Ali al
Gharbi
Khark` Is.
21 February 1984
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IRAN-IRAQ: Military Developments
There has been little change in the tactical situation in the battle
area south of Mehran, as Iran continues preparations for a major
a lull in the fighting south of Mehran,
with Iranian forces continuing to shell Iraqi positions. The Iranians
have not crossed the border into Iraq, but Tehran has publicly
Senior Iraqi Foreign Ministry officials told the US
would be difficult to withhold attacks on Iranian urban areas that are
staging points for the expected Iranian offensive.
nterests Section in Baghdad that because of Iraqi public opinion it
Comment: Revolutionary Guard units and other irregulars
being moved to the front probably number around 100,000 men.
Preparations for the offensive likely will not be completed before
strategic targets.
Iranian attacks on Iraqi cities last week and the threat of a major
ground offensive will probably force Iraq to renew its attacks on
Iranian urban areas. Tehran's provocations could push Baghdad into
striking economic targets soon, but Iraq is reluctant to lose aircraft
despite its air superiority. Iraqi officials, moreover, probably are
unsure of the military's ability to carry out successful attacks against
Top Secret
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MOROCCO-LIBYA: Improving Relations
The closer relations that were resumed last summer between
Morocco and Libya withstood their first serious test last month and are
still developing rapidly.
Libyan leader Qadhafi was angered last month when King Hassan
engineered Egypt's readmission to the Islamic Conference and invited
President Mubarak to Morocco over Qadhafi's objections. Qadhafi
subsequently acquiesced, however, and even sent an envoy to meet
with Mubarak in Rabat.
A Moroccan-Libyan commission reached agreement last month
on a broad range of economic, social, and cultural projects.
Hassan, meanwhile, has announced that he plans to visit Libya
soon.
Qadhafi publicly withdrew support for the Polisario last
summer, and he recently endorsed Morocco's aim of incorporating
Western Sahara.
Comment: Hassan probably has no illusions about Qadhafi. He
evidently is trying to obtain financial relief for Morocco's troubled
economy, hold Qadhafi to his renunciation of Saharan separatism,
and avert any attempt by Algeria to wring concessions from Morocco
on the Western Sahara issue.
Qadhafi is likely to hope that good relations with Morocco-
originally urged on him by Saudi Arabia-will help gain development
loans from the Persian Gulf states. He also may calculate that
Moroccan and Saudi ties will discourage US efforts against him.
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*MOSCOW
SAM
support facility
Soviet Union
Mobile SAMs
Range
Min./Max.
Altitude
Min./Max.
Guidance
Rails per
launcher
Year
operational
SA-4 lOkm/50km, CIA
Ganef 80km, DIA
lOOm/25,000m
Semiactive
radar
2
1967
SA-X-12 l
(developmental)
Okm/l00km
50m/30,000m
Tracks via
missile
4
1984
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21 February 1984
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Soviet troops will receive the new system later this year. Several
vehicles associated with the smaller of the system's two missiles were
seen at the site, which serves both an operational SA-4 brigade and a
school for SAM troops. SA-X-12 equipment previously had been
observed only at production and at research and development
Comment: The site is a logical location for the first operational
SA-X-12 unit because it also was the first to receive the system's
predecessor, the SA-4. The smaller of the two missiles can intercept
aircraft, cruise missiles, and short-range tactical ballistic missiles,
such as the US Lance. The larger missile also probably can intercept
tactical ballistic missiles of the Pershing class. The presence of
equipment associated only with the smaller missile suggests that the
SA-X-12 might be initially operational only with this missile and that
the larger, more capable missile requires additional testing.
Top Secret
7 21 February 1984
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PHILIPPINES: Treatment of Opposition Leader
Top Secret
The detention of Salvador Laurel-leader of the moderate
opposition coalition UNIDO-may cause some opposition groups to
boycott the National Assembly elections in May. Laurel, who was
arrested Friday at Manila airport on charges of concealing a gun in his
luggage, claims the weapon was planted to frame him. President
Marcos on Saturday ordered Laurel released, and he continued on his
trip to the US, where he was scheduled to meet with several
Congressmen and to participate in fundraising efforts. Just before he
was arrested, Laurel had announced that UNIDO would participate in
the elections.
Comment: President Marcos's decision to detain Laurel may
carry a high political cost if, as seems likely, opposition groups regard
the arrest as new evidence that Marcos does not intend to hold fair
elections. The incident has also served to focus international attention
on the elections, making it all the more important for Marcos to solicit
and retain the participation of some moderate members of the
opposition to lend credibility to the elections.
Top Secret
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Prime Minister Pindling is under increasing pressure as high-level
officials continue to be implicated in hearings on drug trafficking and
corruption. The o osition remains too weak to exploit growing public
disenchantment
Comment: If Pindling were to try to make the most of his
declining support by calling for an early election, Ingraham-who
leads the liberal faction of the ruling party-probably would call for a
vote of no confidence. If Ingraham commanded a parliamentary
majority, he would serve out Pindling's term and would not be
required to call elections until 1987.
ALBANIA: Foreign Policy Initiatives
Tirana has made several moves to reduce its diplomatic isolation,
and it appears less opposed to contacts with the US. Albania expects
next month to sign a trade protocol with Italy for 1984 and wants a
15- to 20-year deal calling for Italy to build turnkey factories.
Within the past month, moreover, both
the Foreign Minister and his deputy listened to Italian and Turkish
suggestions that Tirana establish a dialogue with Washington without
engaging in standard diatribes against US policy.
Comment: Albania's recent moves suggest new interest in
expanding economic ties with the West and in improving relations
with selected Communist states in the Third World. Tirana remains
hostile toward both superpowers and continues its polemics against
US and Soviet policies. Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister's unusual
silence on the Turkish and Italian suggestions may indicate that
Albanian leaders are tentatively considering the costs and benefits of
a trade relationship with the US.
Top Secret
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Balance of Trade in Defense Equipment With
Major NATO Trading Partners a
(Ratio of US Exports to US Imports)
Country
Ratio
FY 82
'Total
1977-82
Belgium
7.6:1
7.8:1
Denmark
8.6:1
6.6:1
France
2.3:1
5.9:1
West Germany
5.9:1
13.4:1
Italy
10.4:1
16.4:1
Netherlands
10.8:1
9.7:1
Norway
7.6:1
5.6:1
UK
3:1
3:1
Total Europe
Top Secret
21 February 1984
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Special Analysis
The NATO Allies over the last year have expressed keen
displeasure about the large US advantage in the arms trade within the
Alliance, and they have questioned whether the US actually wants a
mutually advantageous two-way trade in this market. During recent
negotiations to buy the Patriot air defense system, the Dutch and West
Germans demanded substantial offsetting contracts from the US. The
Allies also are becoming restive over the US initiative on emerging
technologies and other US proposals on arms development, in part
because they see them as a means of maintaining US dominance in
advanced weapons technology.
This dissatisfaction is not new, but the decline in Third World
arms purchases and the general economic malaise in Western
Europe, particularly the high unemployment rates, have made it
worse. Creating jobs is the most important domestic policy objective
for West European governments, and they believe the defense sector
has to make an important contribution. They argue that the large US
advantage in arms trade with Europe-with sales more than six times
the value of purchases in fiscal 1982-has harmed their defense
programs and stifled their arms industries.
Allied Positions and Actions
The Europeans are demanding offset arrangements that provide
substantial compensation for purchases in the US. Agreements
recently concluded with West Germany and the Netherlands for the
Patriot air defense system may serve as models.
Under the agreement with West Germany, the US will give Bonn
14 Patriot surface-to-air missile units-12 operational, one spare, and
one for training-and the West Germans will buy an equal number. In
return, the West Germans will man two battalions equipped with US-
owned Patriot missiles and provide and operate 27 French-German
Roland surface-to-air missile units at three US airbases in West
Germany. The Hague's decision to procure the Patriot is contingent
on offsets from the US manufacturer as well as the US Government's
purchase of some $70 million dollars worth of Dutch military
equipment.
The European Allies recently have increased efforts to "buy
European." In 1983 the European Parliament passed a resolution
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calling for increased arms cooperation within the EC, and the French
and Italians have increasingly advocated using the West European
Union for the purpose.
Recent codevelopment and coproduction agreements include a
program by the UK, West Germany, France, Italy, and Spain to
develop a new-generation fighter. The Italians and the British have
agreed to coproduce a new naval helicopter, and the Dutch and the
British have agreed to cooperate in developing naval equipment. The
Hague had rejected a US-made engine for its new frigates, preferring
to deal with the British because they offered major government-to-
government offsets.
Despite this cooperation, there is strong competition among
European arms producers for lucrative sales both in Europe and to
the US. For example, an Italian mine-warfare ship was in competition
with a French-Belgian-Dutch design for a US Navy contract. When the
joint entry was eliminated, the Dutch complained about the failure of
the "two-way street."
The US choice of the British Hawk trainer over the French-
German Alpha Jet brought strong complaints from both Bonn and
Paris. The Allies reacted strongly to the US selection of a Swedish
antitank weapon over NATO competitors. The decision not to work
with the British to codevelop a weapon to destroy runways but to buy
it from the French led some British officials to question US reliability
as a development partner.
The West Europeans' emphasis on the sale of complete weapon
systems, particularly those in competition with US systems, has
hampered their ability to redress the imbalance in arms trade. The
Netherlands, Belgium, and other smaller states often cannot produce
enough weapons suitable for the US market.
Sales of European subsystems to the US or contracts for
maintaining US equipment stationed in Europe offer the Allies greater
opportunity to offset their arms trade imbalances. These options,
however, probably will not be enough to bring the arms trade
between the European Allies and the US into balance.
The West European nations individually will continue to face
serious obstacles in producing and selling competitive advanced
weapons as they seek a better balance in their arms trade with the
US. They almost certainly will turn increasingly to European
codevelopment to shore up their defense industries. Joint programs
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and licensed production offer some potential for maintaining
employment levels, keeping development costs down, and acquiring
new technology.
Overall procurement costs tend to be higher when some Allies
rely on codevelopment or coproduction projects than when all buy
from a single source. This will remain a problem until they begin to
specialize more.
The NATO Allies probably will make increasing demands for US
government offsets in negotiating for US systems. They also are likely
to seek a major role for European industries in the development and
production of new systems incorporating new US technologies. The
Europeans probably hope to persuade Washington to accede to their
requests by threatening a slowdown or cancellation of NATO force
modernization programs.
Top Secret
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