NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 18 FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020064-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 64
• Publication Date: February 18, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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~E?E Director of Top Seeret
Central
Intelligence
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Lebanon: Preparations for Partition
USSR: SS-20 Construction Renewed in the West
Iran-Iraq: Iranian Attack Continues
Contents
China-Vietnam: Border Tensions
Belgium: More Problems for INF
France-Lebanon: Hard Line on UN Force
USSR: Impending Session of Supreme Soviet
Chad: Military and Political Activity
Yugoslavia: Military Involvement in Politics
Hungary-USSR: Differences Over Western Visits
USSR-Poland: Criticism of Defense Efforts
Top Secret
Romania: Foreign Minister in Trouble 10
International: Terrorist Watch 12
Special Analysis
Middle East: The Next Steps After Lebanon 14
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Areas of Control
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LEBANON: Preparations for Partition
Most Christians expect the government to collapse soon, and they
are preparing plans to establish a Christian ministate.
Comment: The development of a partition mentality reflects a
widespread belief among Christians that opposition forces will soon
succeed in bringing down the government. Most Christians doubt that
the Saudi initiative or any other national reconciliation plan will
succeed. They fear that the Army will soon have to abandon its
remaining positions on the Alayh ridge.
Christians are afraid that a Muslim-dominated government would
not protect them. As a result, most believe their safety would only be
guaranteed in a Christian ministate encompassing East Beirut and the
Christian heartland north of the capital.
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The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
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Soviet Union
18 February 1984
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USSR: SS-20 Construction Renewed in the West
Construction has begun on a new SS-20 base in the western
USSR, the first since November, when Andropov announced the end
of the moratorium.
Comment: The resumption of SS-20 construction in the west at
this time is part of the USSR's response to INF deployments. The
Soviets probably were planning to build more SS-20 bases when
Brezhnev announced in March 1982 a moratorium on SS-20
deployment opposite NATO in an attempt to forestall US deployments
of Pershino Ils and round-launched cruise missiles.
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After Brezhnev's announcement, the Soviets did not initiate new
base construction in the west. They did, however, complete work on
four bases in the region that were under construction when the
moratorium was announced.
The base at Krolevets probably will not be operational until late
this year or early 1
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control constraints, the Soviets probably will continue construction in
both the western and the eastern USSR. If they continue past rates of
base construction and deployment practices, they could have
between 315 and 378 launchers opposite NATO and 216 to 270
launchers in the east by 1987
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Iran-Iraq Military Developments
Iran
Bandar-e Khomeyni
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*TEHRAN
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Fighting continues south of Mehran and Iraq is planning air
attacks against Iranian civilian and economic targets.
Iranian forces had not crossed
the border as of yesterday. Tehran claims to have retaken 150 square
kilometers of Iraqi-occupied Iranian territory.
the Iraqis contained the attack
near the border and had reinforced their positions with an armored
brigade.
Iranian aircraft yesterday raided the Iraqi town of Ali al-Gharbi,
about 65 kilometers southeast of the battle area, accordin to ress
reports from both sides.
Baghdad has announced that its forces will continue to observe a
seven-day unilateral suspension of attacks on Iranian urban areas,
which expires on Monday.
that there is extensive popular support in Iraq for intensifying the
conflict. A military spokesman quoted on Baghdad radio today said
bombing of Iranian targets will resume after the moratorium.
Comment: The Iranians appear to control much of the ridgeline
on the border, which probably was their immediate objective.
Baghdad's measured response suggests Iraq is confident that this is
not the offensive they are expecting and that lightly reinforced Iraqi
forces in the area can contain it. The Iranians are likely to pause to
resupply their forces before continuing the attack.
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Armed clashes are taking place along the Chinese-Vietnamese
border on the anniversary of their 16-day war in 1979.
Only a few
minor skirmishes reportedly occurred on the Guangzhou Military
Region front.
Vietnamese press
reports had portrayed the border area as the calmest it has been in
five years. Beijing, however, disputed this claim and accused Vietnam
of 35 border provocations during the New Year holiday.
Comment: The fighting is unlikely to result in a new border war.
China has 16 combat divisions near the border and can conduct
artillery barrages and small unit assaults, as it did last April. There are
no indications, however, of a major redeployment of forces needed
for a major ground assault like the attack in 1979.
Beijing uses tensions along the border as part of its effort to
maintain military, economic, and political pressure on Hanoi to
withdraw its forces from Kampuchea. Chinese Foreign Minister Wu is
scheduled to visit Malaysia and Thailand next week, in part to reaffirm
China's support for the Kampuchean resistance coalition.
Vietnam has not yet begun large-scale dry season operations
against resistance forces in Kampuchea. An increase in border
tension with China reminds Hanoi that provocative actions in
Kampuchea that threaten Thailand could elicit Chinese reprisals. The
increased tension also counters Vietnamese propaganda suggesting
that reduced border problems might improve chances for resumption
of bilateral talks.
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Armed clashes are taking place along the Chinese-Vietnamese
border on the anniversary of their 16-day war in 1979.
Only a few
minor s irmi!
Region front
Vietnamese press
reports had portrayed the border area as the calmest it has been in
five years. Beijing, however, disputed this claim and accused Vietnam
of 35 border provocations during the New Year holiday.
Comment: The fighting is unlikely to result in a new border war.
China has 16 combat divisions near the border and can conduct
artillery barrages and small unit assaults, as it did last April. There are
no indications, however, of a major redeployment of forces needed
for a major ground assault like the attack in 1979.
Beijing uses tensions along the border as part of its effort to
maintain military, economic, and political pressure on Hanoi to
withdraw its forces from Kampuchea. Chinese Foreign Minister Wu is
scheduled to visit Malaysia and Thailand next week, in part to reaffirm
China's support for the Kampuchean resistance coalition
Vietnam has not yet begun large-scale dry season operations
against resistance forces in Kampuchea. An increase in border
tension with China reminds Hanoi that provocative actions in
Kampuchea that threaten Thailand could elicit Chinese reprisals. The
increased tension also counters Vietnamese propaganda suggesting
that reduced border roblems might improve chances for resumption
of bilateral talks.
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Belgian efforts to move forward on INF are again bogged down in
regional squabbling.
Defense Minister Vreven told US diplomats this week that no
decision on INF construction contracts will be made until a split is
resolved between Flemish and Walloon cabinet members over the
proposed purchase of jeeps for the Army.
Comment: A compromise over the jeep contract is probable.
Prime Minister Martens's dominant Flemish Social Christians do not
want a government crisis now, and there is no good alternative to the
current Social Christian-Liberal coalition.
The government recently has been forced to sidestep many
communal questions, however, and the accumulation of divisive
issues increases the odds against the government's survival. Many
Belgians appear to believe that a new election-probably coinciding
with the election of the European Parliament in June-is needed to
renew the government's mandate.
Martens's INF strategy calls for continued discreet preparations
for basing and a final decision on deployment after an election early
next year. The longer Brussels delays, however, the greater the risk
that INF will become enmeshed in parochial Belgian issues.
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FRANCE-LEBANON: Hard Line on UN Force
A senior official in the French Foreign Ministry says Paris believes
that French, Soviet, and Syrian ideas concerning a UN force for Beirut
have to be negotiated simultaneously and without preconditions. The
French regard Soviet demands to constrain the movements of the US
and French fleets as unreasonable and unacceptable. They believe,
moreover, that Moscow's demand for a pledge of future
nonintervention makes no sense, saving that all parties agree in
principle to this proposal.
Comment: Paris may want to counter a possible impression that
it is amenable to the Soviet and Syrian preconditions. It may believe
that the French UN Ambassador's speech on Wednesday, which
implied a willingness to consider the withdrawal of warships, made
France appear too ready to compromise.
USSR: Impending Session of Supreme Soviet
Academy of Sciences Vice President Velikhov told the US
Embassy in Moscow on Thursday that the Supreme Soviet will meet
within a month after the completion of the current elections to that
body on 4 March.
t e session is to be held within two
wee KS o owing the elections rather than in late May or June, as was
rumored before Andropov's death. The last two times a new Supreme
Soviet was convened, in 1974 and in 1979, it met within about six
Comment: The leadership may see representational advantages
in convening the Supreme Soviet soon to designate a state president.
After Brezhnev's death, politicking among the leadership led to a
delay of more than six months before Andropov was named
president. Agreement may already have been reached on General
Secretary Chernenko or someone else-possibly Foreign Minister
Gromyko. If the issue is not yet decided, there could be considerable
maneuvering before the Supreme Soviet session to determine who
will assume the post.
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CHAD: Military and Political Activity
as many as 1,200 Chadian
dissidents last week moved south from Faya-Largeau to positions just
north of the 16th parallel. Government officials in N'Djamena indicate
that Libya continues to send arms and supplies from the occupied
north to dissidents in the south and east.
IThe US Embassy in
Brazzaville reports that the French Ambassador also is encouraging
dissidents to reconcile with President Habre
Comment: The threat of rebel attacks in the north and Libya's
apparent attempts to resupply southern dissidents indicate Tripoli
intends to maintain pressure on Habre. The President has reached an
accommodation with some southern rebels, but the Libyan resupply
effort may encourage others to increase acts of sabotage against the
government. Habre's moves to open a dialogue with dissident leaders
are likely to reflect his concern that an increase in fighting could
quickly erode his control in the south. Reconciliation efforts by Paris
probably are aimed at a diplomatic settlement in hopes of avoiding
military conflict with Tripoli.
YUGOSLAVIA: Military Involvement in Politics
the "threatening attitudes" of Yugoslav
generals have induced civilian leaders to be more wary of opposing
them on high-priority military programs. The military played a role late
last year in forcing the resignation of Finance Minister Florijancic, who
unsuccessfully disputed the Army's budget requests for 1984.
Florijancic later clashed with Prime Minister Planinc on another issue,
and she forced his removal from office. Defense Minister Admiral
Mamula has since warned that funds for arms modernization cannot
be reduced.
Comment: Florijancic was the only leader to fall during the
military's unprecedented push for a broad purge of officials who
obstruct the government's stabilization program. Although the
military hierarchy has since stayed on the political sidelines, the
generals probably will again put pressure on the regime for more
decisive action on economic stabilization at the next plenum late this
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HUNGARY-USSR: Differences Over Western Visits
The Soviets last month were unhappy with the Hungarians' refusal
to cancel or dela visits by Western leaders who have accepted INF
deployments They believe that the
Hungarians are p acing their own national interests ahead of those of
the Warsaw Pact. The Czechoslovaks have publicly criticized British
Prime Minister Thatcher's visit this month to Budapest, and a senior
c;zecnoslovak official has told the US Ambassador that Thatcher's
trip was an anti-Soviet act. Budapest has scheduled visits by Italian
Prime Minister Craxi in April and West German Chancellor Kohl later
in the spring
Comment: The Hungarians will be alert for further action by
Moscow on this issue as a sign of the new Soviet regime's attitude
toward their increasingly active foreign policy. Although the
Hungarians want relations with the new leadership to begin positively,
they will be reluctant to back off f eir dialogue with the West.
USSR-POLAND: Criticism of Defense Efforts
Soviet Marshal and Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Kulikov
reportedly criticized Polish defense efforts during meetings with
Premier Jaruzelski and Defense Minister Siwicki early this month.
Neutral and nonaligned military attaches in Warsaw say Kulikov told
Jaruzelski that Polish military modernization was proceeding too
slow) t he demanded more money be spent on the military.
Comment: Kulikov's comments and criticisms are consistent with
his statements during past visits to Poland and do not indicate a
substantial increase in Soviet demands. As a result of Poland's
economic difficulties, the Soviets have little choice but to continue to
tolerate the situation. Kulikov is
disliked by many non-Soviet Warsaw Pact officers because of his
contemptuous treatment of them, even though he commands respect
for his intellect and dynamism. There are indications that Kulikov's
manner was a factor in his replacement by Marshal Oaarkov as chief
of the Soviet General Staff
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ROMANIA: Foreign Minister in Trouble
Foreign Minister Andrei ~could
be in political difficulty for failing, during recent talks in Ottawa and
Washington, to arrange visits to Canada and the US this spring for
President Ceausescu. Andrei did not accompany Ceausescu to
Andropov's funeral, as he did to Brezhnev's.
Andrei may
have been saved temporarily because Ceausescu needs expert
advice during the transition in Moscow.
Comment: Andrei is the strongest advocate of closer relations
with the West and, as Ceausescu's top foreign policy adviser, has
played a major role in developing them. His departure probably would
mean reduced emphasis on Romania's ties with the West. Andrei has
survived other rumors of his impending political demise, however, and
his colleagues have exploited them to urge the US to support
Romanian proposals. Moreover, the Soviets dislike Andrei, and he
may have been excluded from the funeral delegation primarily to
indicate Bucharest's desire for less acrimonious relations with the
new regime in Moscow.
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- The Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party announced on Monday
that the two Swiss and Italian technicians kidnaped in Iraq
earlier this month will be released if Baghdad agrees to free
jailed party members and to end its summary executions of
Kurdish prisoners. Baghdad is unlikely to comply with these
demands.
Europe
- Some Italian authorities believe the claim of responsibility
made by a Red Brigades-related group for the killing of Sinai
MNF administrator Hunt in Rome. They cite similarities
between the attack and previous operations of the Brigades.
The Armed Lebanese Revolutionary Brigades also has claimed
credit for Hunt's death, however, and the involvement of
Middle Eastern terrorists cannot be ruled out.
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Special Analysis
MIDDLE EAST: The Next Steps After Lebanon
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Syrian President Assad appears increasingly confident he can
block US initiatives on the peace process. Jordanian King Hussein is
likely to move cautiously in the face of Syrian pressure, and Israel will
reject the argument that Jordan has to be strengthened militarily
before it can risk steps toward peace. The moderate Arab states
deplore Assad's aggressive tactics, but they are intimidated by them
and are unlikely to go beyond quiet efforts to promote moderation in
Assad's sense of victory in Lebanon almost certainly is tempered
by the difficulty of avoiding its partition into a Christian ministate
allied with Israel and a radical Muslim state potentially supported by
Iran and hostile to Syria. He can claim to have stood up to the US and
Israel, but he has few positive results to show for nearly eight years of
politically unpopular military involvement in Lebanon. The warring
Lebanese factions are no closer to resolving their differences than
when Syria first intervened.
Following a US withdrawal from Lebanon, Assad would be even
less likely to back away from his insistence that no settlement can
succeed that does not recognize Syria's interests. Despite the
fragmentation of the radical coalition-the "Steadfastness Front"-
that opposed Egypt's separate peace with Israel, Assad is likely to
calculate that Syria acting alone could block any similar peace. He
probably believes that Jordan and other moderate states are
unwilling to risk Syrian opposition and that the US is unlikely to
become militarily involved to defend Jordan against Syrian
Assad's strategy of holding out for a peace initiative based on a
unified Arab position stems from his belief that Israel probably will not
make substantial concessions as long as the Arabs negotiate from a
position of weakness. In his view, Israel remains bent on territorial
expansion.
The Syrian leader believes the Camp David accords and the US-
Israeli agreement on strategic cooperation have reduced the chances
for peace by strengthening the Israelis and dividing the Arab states.
He evidently also believes that any further separate peace resolving
the status of the West Bank would leave Damascus isolated and
would eliminate any chance for Syria to regain the Golan Heights.
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Pressure on Jordan and the PLO
Damascus has responded to the possibility of new talks between
Hussein and PLO chief Arafat by mobilizing its resources against the
Hussein already seems increasingly nervous about Syrian
pressures, and some Jordanians claim that the Syrians are
considering military intervention in Jordan. As a result, Hussein is
likely to delay taking serious steps toward negotiations if he does not
receive advanced US weapons to strengthen Jordan's capability to
stand up to Syria.
Before entering negotiations, the King also is looking for explicit
support from at least the other moderate states. He fears that, in light
of Syria's belligerence, the Saudis will be more hesitant about giving
Moderate Arab Reactions
Egyptian leaders believe their recent rapprochement with Arafat
allows them to play an important role in beginning a new round of
talks between Arafat and Hussein, although they probably would not
participate directly. President Mubarak will seek opportunities to
moderate Syria's behavior, and he seems to believe that, given a
chance, he could persuade Assad to become more flexible.
Saudi Arabia is unwilling to contest Syria's aggressiveness in the
region despite strong misgivings about Syrian policy objectives. The
Saudis' decision last week to postpone again the Arab League
summit meeting that was scheduled for Riyadh next month
underscores their reluctance to confront the Syrians directly on key
regional issues, as does their disinclination to push for Egypt's
readmission to the Arab League. In the event Syria tried to undermine
an agreement between Hussein and Arafat, Riyadh would do little
more than lodge private protests with Damascus.
The Saudis probably calculate that a confrontation with Syria
would hinder their efforts to arrange an accommodation between the
Lebanese Government and Syrian-backed opposition elements.
Riyadh worries that its opposition to Syria and its ties to the US leave
continued
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it vulnerable to charges of weakening the Arab front against Israel.
Recent terrorist attacks on Jordanian and United Arab Emirates
diplomats have reawakened longstanding Saudi fears that Syria might
sponsor a subversive campaign against Saudi interests abroad.
Israel's Strategy
Recent developments in Lebanon represent a major political
setback for Prime Minister Shamir's government. Together with the
reversal of the "strategic" gains of the war-the expulsion of the PLO
and the eclipse of Syrian influence-they will reinforce domestic
concerns about the futility of the war and needless loss of Israeli lives.
Public disillusionment with the Lebanon issue will undercut support
for hardline ministers who favor using force to bring about political 25X1
The Israelis have turned their attention in Lebanon to securing the
buffer zone along the border by working out security arrangements
with local Shia militias. Even this goal, however, may remain elusive.
Despite mounting domestic pressure for an Israeli withdrawal, Tel
Aviv would be prepared to keep its forces in southern Lebanon
indefinitely if it were unable to work out arrangements to protect its
The perceived lack of US support for the accord with Lebanon
probably has also damaged US credibility as a peace broker in Israeli
eyes. As a result, Tel Aviv is likely to approach future peace talks with
Arab states more cautiously and will probably be more demanding
with respect to any US assurances as part of a settlement.
The Israelis welcome Jordanian participation in the peace
process, but they are unlikely to offer concessions that would induce
Amman to negotiate. In their talks with US officials they have rejected
the argument that a stronger Jordan is more likely to begin talks with
Israel.
In addition, the Israelis believe more military hardware for Jordan
would not deter Syria and could be used at some point against their
forces. In Tel Aviv's view, what is needed from Amman for broadened
peace negotiations is a commitment by Hussein to the recognition of
Israel and to a peace settlement.
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