NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 17 FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020060-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: February 17, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
1 UAry 1984
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Contents
Lebanon-Syria: Reactions to Peace Plan
Iran-Iraq: Iranian Attacks
Nicaragua: Planning for Elections
UN-Cyprus: New Diplomatic Proposals ...
Finland-USSR-Sweden: Natural Gas Deal
Italy: Controversial Economic Policy
New Zealand-US: Prime Minister's Visit
USSR: Gorbachev's Remarks ...
USSR-Pakistan: Chernenko Snubs Zia
USSR-US: Interest in Improving Trade
Spain-Nicaragua-Cuba: High-Level Meeting
South Africa-Angola: Evidence of Disengagement ... ...
Sweden-USSR: Suspected Submarine Intrusion ... _..
Poland: Glemp's Problems .....................
Canada: New Budget ..... ............. .... .._ ...
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LEBANON-SYRIA: Reactions to Peace Plan
President Gemayel's signing of a Saudi-sponsored peace plan
may temporarily ease Syrian and opposition pressures against his
government, but the plan glosses over basic differences between
Gemayel and his opponents and contains provisions that Christian
hardliners and Israel will reject.
Gemayel's agreement to the plan-which calls for abrogation of
the Lebanese-Israeli accord of 17 May-meets a key demand of Syria
and its Druze and Muslim surrogates. According to press reports,
however, Druze leader Junblatt has rejected Gemayel's gesture as
"too little, too late." Israel has threatened to stay in Lebanon if
Gemayel scraps the accord.
Meanwhile, Damascus continues to avoid calling for Gemayel's
resignation.
The security situation in the Beirut area was generally quiet
yesterday,
Comment: Generally, the Saudi plan restates outstanding issues
that need to be addressed and that have been problems in the past. It
offers few specifics on political reform and suggests no action to
promote Syrian and Israeli troop withdrawal.
Gemayel probably hopes his agreement to cancel the accord will
satisfy his Druze and Muslim opponents. He may expect the Saudis to
intercede with Washington to urge Israel to soften its response to the
cancellation. Abrogation, however, might have appeased Gemayel's
opponents two weeks ago, but now it may not be sufficient because
his opposition has hardened as a result of the Shia and Druze
victories over the Army.
The Syrians may be concerned that events are moving beyond
their control, and they are unlikely to reject the Saudi plan. Damascus
probably believes that, if Gemayel were driven from office or killed, he
would be replaced by a hardline Christian leader unwilling to
accommodate Syrian interests and ready to call openly for Syrian
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Turkey
Northern Front
Darbandikh8n. 414t' Iranian attack
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ran
*TEHRAN
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Iran has launched attacks against Iraqi lines while it continues to
prepare for a major offensive.
The Iranians attacked about 150 kilometers east of Baghdad
yesterday and claim to have taken one ridgeline on the border.
Fighting on a second ridgeline is continuing, but Iraq claims to have
contained the attack and inflicted heavy losses on the Iranians. During
a similar limited attack on Sunday at Darbandikhan, Iranian forces
overran a small Iraqi unit, seized a ridgeline, and began shelling an
Iraqi supply road.
The Iranian press reports
h
that irregular forces are being called up t
roughout the COUntry.
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Comment: The Iranian attacks probably are designed to cut Iraqi
roads parallel to the frontlines, thereby hampering Baghdad's ability
to transfer troops from one sector to another. These actions place the
Iranians in a slightly better tactical position to launch a major
offensive.
Iran's forces on all fronts now appear to be involved in
preparations for attacks, suggesting that the coming offensive could
be the largest of the war. Iran's main efforts still seem to bE! centered
on the areas opposite Al Basrah and the central front, but
preparations are not yet complete. Once Tehran launches i?s main
offensive, Iraq probably will intensify its air attacks in the Persian Gulf,
including strikes against Iranian oil tankers and facilities.
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NICARAGUA: Planning for Elections
The Sandinistas have approved a presidential election, and they
may announce next week that they are advancing the date from 1985
to this year.
The Council of State also has amended the government's
fundamental statute to provide for the election of a vice president and
a constituent assembly, as well as for the formation of a supreme
electoral council. There previously was a provision only for election of
a constituent assembly.
The political opposition criticizes the change, saying that it should
be the prerogative of the assembly to determine the form of
government. It had proposed that the assembly elect a broadly
representative provisional junta, but the Sandinistas contend that
separate elections would be too expensive.
A press report states that the government is considering holding
elections before this November, because it fears increased insurgent
attacks after the US presidential election. The Cuban Charge in
Managua recently told the US Embassy that the elections might be
held sooner than expected.
Comment: The Sandinistas are moving ahead rapidly with
election plans in preparation for ceremonies next week
commemorating the 50th anniversary of the death of their namesake,
Agusto Sandino. They probably will emphasize that these
preparations comply with recent guidelines on democracy set at the
Contadora peace negotiations, and they will use them to deflect their
neighbors' demands for verifiable treaty provisions.
Managua may hope to gain propaganda points by announcing an
accelerated schedule to the assembled dignitaries.
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r~ 1
Crete, Cyprus
Mediterranean Sea
--,NICOSIA
TAirAOrt
Cyprus
Dheke/ia
(U.K. Best)
Mediterranean Sea
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Akrotiri
(U.K. Base)
0 20
Kilometers
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UN-CYPRUS: New Diplomatic Proposals
UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar will talk with Cypriot
President Kyprianou in New York today about new UN proposals on
the Cyprus problem that appear to have some chance of achieving
progress.
US diplomats in New York report that UN officials want the Greek
side to resume direct negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots on a
comprehensive settlement. Kyprianou, Turkish Cypriot leader
Denktash, and the Secretary General could meet to begin the talks.
The Greeks would be required to forgo taking their case to the
General Assembly or other international forums.
The Turkish Cypriots, in return, would allow the UN to take control
of a large portion of Varosha as a prelude to a gradual resettlement
by the Greek Cypriots, who controlled the area before the Turkish
invasion of 1974. The UN also is asking the Turkish side to desist from
efforts to consolidate the new "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus."
UN officials so far have discussed the proposal mainly with the
Comment: Turkey is likely to give serious consideration to the UN
proposals. Ankara may first insist that the UN take up the plan with
Denktash, or wait to see how the Greek side responds. The Turks
probably believe that these tactics offer the best chance of learning
Greek intentions and deflecting possible Western and US pressure
regarding the Cyprus problem.
Kyprianou is likely to be receptive to the UN plan because the
Greek Cypriots have long sought the return of Varosha. The
concessions the UN is asking him to make, moreover, can be satisfied
by offering private assurances to the Turkish side and to the UN.
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The United St.tee Go.ernmeni n.. not rec oem zetl
ins ~ncorporetion of Estonia, Lalvie, -d Lilnuania
~nio ins Soviet Union
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Finland signed an agreement with the USSR on 10 February to
quadruple Soviet natural gas imports by the year 2000, a move that
could increase the pressure on Sweden to accept a similar proposal
from the USSR.
The Finns, who already depend on the Soviets for about
75 percent of their energy needs, are to extend an existing pipeline
westward to Helsinki and Tampere. Helsinki has not disclosed the
price of the future gas purchases.
Stockholm also has been considering a Soviet-Finnish proposal
to extend a pipeline across the Gulf of Bothnia to Sweden's east
coast. A Swedish official recently hinted that Stockholm probably will
decline the offer unless the Soviet gas price is competitive.
Comment: Moscow has urged Helsinki for several years to buy
more Soviet goods, particularly natural gas and nuclear power plants,
to redress a perennial trade imbalance. To retain access to the Soviet
market, the Finns have accepted Soviet-purchased Libyan oil for
resale on the West European market.
Soviet flexibility on pricing suggested by the Finnish contract may
make it more difficult for Stockholm, whose relations with Moscow
are at a low ebb, to reject a deal on economic grounds. Stockholm
does not want to assume a new long-term commitment to buy gas,
but, with relations already in disrepair, it fears Moscow would view a
rejection as political retaliation for Sweden's failure to win a share in
the large Soviet Tallinn port project.
The cost of laying a pipeline across the Gulf of Bothnia is yet to be
determined, however, and such a high-cost project might give the
Swedes a good excuse. Moreover, Sweden would be able to purchase
gas via Denmark in the late 1980s, when a gasline to northwest
Sweden is completed.
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ITALY: Controversial Economic Policy
The government has broken a deadlock,n wage negotiations with
a decree law that limits wage increases, but the measure could face
resistance within the coalition.
Press reports state that the decree law issued on Tuesday limits
the inflation adjustment in wages to 9 percent this year. The decree
has provoked scattered strikes and protests, even though it was
accompanied by controls on some taxes and prices.
The move is designed to set in motion an incomes policy aimed
at lowering inflation to 10 percent this year, as compared with
15 percent in 1983. Negotiations with labor and management had
been at an impasse for two months, largely because of a split in the
labor movement. Christian Democratic and Socialist-oriented unions
have been willing to accept the government's proposals of a ceiling on
the inflation adjustment, but the Communist-dominated union has
rejected the proposals.
Comment: The decree law is likely to cause more labor unrest.
The government's opponents probably will try to turn the
controversy to their advantage. The Communists have announced
that they will oppose the decree, which has to win parliamentary
endorsement by mid-April. Communist support for labor
demonstrations this week suggests that the party will follow a hard
line.
Prime Minister Craxi also may face problems from within the
governing coalition. The Republicans and the Christian Democratic
leadership both insist that the government has to stand by the decree
law, but significant numbers of the coalition's parliamentary
supporters could vote against it.
A group of 12 to 20 Christian Democrats hostile to Craxi has
already demonstrated a readiness to defy their party's whip. If they
are joined by other Christian Democrats who fear that the bill would
undermine the party's election chances and by defectors from other
parties, Craxi's government could be threatened.
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NEW ZEALAND-US: Prime Minister's Visit
Prime Minister Muldoon regards his working visit to the US next
week as helpful to his chances in the national elections he t as to call
late this year.
Comment: Any New Zealand leader finds it politically
advantageous to be able to demonstrate high-level access in
Washington. The government's one-seat majority in Parliament
makes this consideration more important than usual.
In seeking his fourth term, Muldoon will have to persuade voters
that he has made substantial progress in dealing with the troubled
economy. He has had some success in recent years in finding new
markets for dairy products, one of New Zealand's most important
exports, and in ending double-digit inflation which has lasted nine
consecutive years.
The record 6-percent unemployment may overshadow the
decisive leadership Muldoon has given his country since 1975. On the
other hand, the opposition Labor Party's chances at the polls are hurt
by its deep ideological divisions and its inability to offer any credible
alternative to Muldoon's economic programs.
Muldoon has revitalized relations with the US within the context of
the ANZUS alliance. A victory by Labor would lead to new difficulties
for that relationship. Labor, in seeking to capitalize on widespread
nuclear fears shared by all sectors of the public in New Zealand, has
said that it would follow the practice of the last Labor government and
deny port calls by US nuclear-powered warships.
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Soviet media on Wednesday reported for the first time on an
address by party secretary Gorbachev to the Central Committee
plenum that elected Chernenko to be General Secretary. According
to the US Embassy, Gorbachev called for party unity, praised the
unanimous election of Chernenko, and pledged full support for his
policies. An important official of the Central Committee told the
French delegation at Andropov's funeral that Gorbachev is now
"unofficial" second secretary.
Comment: Gorbachev's remarks were conciliatory in calling for
support of Chernenko, but the failure to publish or even mention them
earlier is the clearest sign yet that there was at least some infighting in
the leadership over the succession. The fact that Gorbachev's
remarks were eventually publicized and his position next to
Chernenko at Andropov's bier tend to support the Central Committee
official's statement that Gorbachev now ranks number two in the
Secretariat. This probably was part of the compromise-which may
prove only temporary-among the factions that elevated Chernenko
to be General Secretary.
USSR-PAKISTAN: Chernenko Snubs Zia
Press reports state that General Secretary Chernenko had private
meetings with Afghan President Babrak and Indian Prime Minister
Gandhi after Andropov's funeral, but that he ignored Pakistani
President Zia's, request for a meeting. Andropov met with all three
South Asian leaders at Brezhnev's funeral. Zia, who returned to
Islamabad on Wednesday, tried to put the best face on the situation
by expressing hope that the new Soviet leadership would carry
forward the improvement in bilateral relations that took place under
Andropov. Chernenko reported) acce ted Gandhi's invitation to visit
India as soon as possible.
Comment: Chernenko's decision to meet with Gandhi and not Zia
indicates the Soviets want to heighten Zia's sense of insecurity on the
Afghanistan issue. It also suggests that Moscow currently sees no
advantage in raising expectations of a possible political solution to
the conflict in Afghanistan. Well in advance of Andropov's death, the
Soviets had reverted to their earlier position that the insurgency had
to end before Soviet troop withdrawals could be considered. UN and
Pakistani officials agree that no additional progress on a political
settlement can be made unless Moscow and Kabul are willing to show
flexibility on the issue.
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USSR-US: Interest in Improving Trade
A middle-level Soviet foreign trade official last month indicated
that the USSR wants to establish trade symposia with US industries
to improve commercial relations The
official proposed that a delegation from the Soviet trade organization
responsible for importing machine tools discuss with US
manufacturers future Soviet industrial projects and ways US firms
could more effectively participate in Soviet trade shows
Comment: Similar Soviet approaches to US businessmen have
yet to be translated into increased business. The renewed interest,
however, indicates Moscow is examining Western markets as part of
the process of determining the level and composition of machinery
and equipment imports for the next plan period. The Soviets also may
be concerned that the reduction in commercial relations with the US
is causing the USSR to miss out on advances in US machine tool
technology. General Secretary Chernenko's past emphasis on
detente and expanding East-West trade suggests that bilateral
industrial contacts and trade opportunities will now be encouraged
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SPAIN-NICARAGUA-CUBA: High-Level Meeting
Cuban President Castro and Nicaraguan Junta Coordinator
Ortega met yesterday in Madrid with Prime Minister Gonzalez during
a four-hour refueling stop on their return from Andropov's funeral.
This was Castro's first visit to Western Europe since taking power,
and a Spanish official said the initiative for stopping in Madrid came
from Castro. The official also said the three leaders had a warm and
friendly discussion about Central America and East-West relations.
Comment: Castro has long wanted to visit Western Europe, and
he almost certainly will tout the visit as evidence of his international
respectability. Gonzalez has tried to portray himself as a Western
point of contact with Castro, and he probably found it difficult to turn
down a Cuban request for a meeting. Gonzalez may even have seen
the contact with Castro as a means of improving his standing with
leftist voters upset by his pro-Western foreign policy and moderate
economic program.
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Status of South African Presence in Angola
Angola
Jamba
Cahama.
ri mwlrtary presence J
/ .
Xangonga South African
* Embundu
~ umucyu
Sout African buffer zone
Namibia
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SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Evidence of Disengagement
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Finland
Norway
Sweden
Karlskrona
Naval Base 0
COPENHAGEN *
Denmark
West ~Z
.East
Germany r IL08EfluN
s -'t Germany
STO1KHOLM
Baltic
Sea
Poland
HELSINKI
Soviet Union
200 The United Statee G.,--,, "I not .ngni~nd
J the orporatio of Estonia Latvia. ano Lithuania
into tthe Soviet Union Bou nd e,y rnpunsnntal~on
is not neceasardy amnornaeve
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SWEDEN-USSR: Suspected Submarine Intrusion
Sweden apparently believes a Soviet submarine is in the naval
base area at Karlskrona. The Navy yesterday was conducting an
intensive search for a suspected foreign submarine near the base
area, while troops searched the surrounding archipelago for
unidentified frogmen that reportedly had been sighted. Surface
vessels on Tuesday began dropping depth charges in the harbor near
where a Soviet submarine ran aground in 1981. Press reports state
that naval officials believe that they have trapped a foreign mini-
submarine and that its mother submarine is waiting in the outer
islands, but no definitive contact has been made.
Comment: It is unclear whether any submarine is present. The
Soviets would seem to have little to gain from violating Swedish
waters in the midst of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe
being held in Stockholm. Foreign Minister Gromyko gave strong
assurances to Prime Minister Palme last month that they would
continue to respect Swedish territorial integrity. This latest incident
will frustrate Palme's desire to take advantage of the change in Soviet
leadership to relegate the entire submarine problem to the past and
improve relations with the USSR.
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SWEDEN-USSR: Suspected Submarine Intrusion
Sweden apparently believes a Soviet submarine is in the naval
base area at Karlskrona. The Navy yesterday was conducting an
intensive search for a suspected foreign submarine near the base
area, while troops searched the surrounding archipelago for
unidentified frogmen that reportedly had been sighted. Surface
vessels on Tuesday began dropping depth charges in the harbor near
where a Soviet submarine ran aground in 1981. Press reports state
that naval officials believe that they have trapped a foreign mini-
submarine and that its mother submarine is waiting in the outer
islands, but no definitive contact has been made.
Comment: It is unclear whether any submarine is present. The
Soviets would seem to have little to gain from violating Swedish
waters in the midst of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe
being held in Stockholm. Foreign Minister Gromyko gave strong
assurances to Prime Minister Palme last month that they would
continue to respect Swedish territorial integrity. This latest incident
will frustrate Palme's desire to take advantage of the change in Soviet
leadership to relegate the entire submarine problem to the past and
improve relations with the USSR.
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POLAND: Glemp's Problems
Cardinal Glemp departed from Warsaw yesterday for Rome,
before making a monthlong trip to South America to visit Polish
emigre communities. Before leaving, he implied that he had been
forced to transfer an outspoken pro-Solidarity priest, Mieczyslaw
Nowak, from Warsaw to a rural parish. The police have threatened
two other activist priests with criminal proceedings. They interrogated
Nowak on Wednesday, the day after he received notice of his transfer.
Comment: Glemp may have bowed to pressure from the regime.
Criticism of him is likely to increase both in the Polish church and the
Vatican, where there reportedly already is widespread dissatisfaction
with his handling of church-state issues. Cardinal Macharski, a
confidant of the Pope, probably will oversee church affairs in Glemp's
absence. He may provide more acceptable representation in talks
with the regime on the release of political prisoners and the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican.
CANADA: New Budget
The budget announced on Wednesday emphasizes fiscal
conservatism in preparation for the federal election expected this fall.
The document aims to reduce the federal deficit by $1.5 billion, from
an estimated $25.5 billion this year, and it provides for only
moderately increased social spending and tax reforms to help
business. The budget has received widespread support from the
business community, but opposition party and labor leaders have
criticized the government for not doing more to create jobs.
Comment: The conservative nature of the budget is an effort to
increase the private sector's confidence in the Liberal Party's ability
to manage Canada's recovery. This may be a result of recent media
claims that the deficit now rivals unemployment as the most important
economic issue for voters. The Tories will now find it difficult to attack
the government for excessive spending or to offer the voters ~n
economic program markedly different from that of the Liberals.
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