NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 15 FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020051-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: February 15, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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4",- -1 Director of Top See. et
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Top Secret-
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15 February 1984
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Contents
Lebanon: Pressure Increases on Gemayel
USSR: Possible Leadership Alignments
South Africa-Angola: Status of Disengagement
USSR-Syria: New Coastal Defense System
Eastern Europe-USSR: Reaction to Chernenko's Succession 7
Pakistan: Student Unrest in Karachi 8
West Germany-East Germany: Leaders Meet in Moscow 8
Honduras-Ell Salvador: Bilateral Talks
China-Egypt: New Naval Deliveries
Special Analyses
USSR: Implications of the Succession
Jamaica: Seaga's Prospects
12
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Beirut and Vicinity Military Update
Top Secret
Areas of control
Syrian
Druze
Druze and Shia
Christian forces
Lebanese government
forces
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LEBANON: Pressure Increases on Gemayel
A successful joint attack by opposition forces against Army
positions on the southern Alayh ridgeline yesterday probably will force
President Gemayel either to come to terms with Syria or resign,
indicate that a Druze and Palestinian attack that began on Monday
dislodged elements of the Army's 4th Brigade from positions near
Qabr Shmun on the Alayh ridgeline. Despite airstrikes and attempts
at reinforcement, the brigade has evacuated its positions near
Khaldah and retreated south to Ad Damur. To try to intimidate the
Druze, the Israelis sent an armored column north of the Awwali River
along the coastal road to Ad Damur.
IlPhalange hardliners and Christian Army
officers are concerned that the Army's increasingly desperate
situation will prompt Gemayel to reach an accommodation with Syria.
Christian extremists, who reportedly already believe that both
Gemayel and Army commander Tannous should step down. will
violently oppose such a move
Comment: The withdrawal of the 4th Brigade from Qabr Shmun
opens the way for unimpeded reinforcement and resupply of Druze,
Palestinian, and Shia fighters in south and West Beirut.
Israeli units frequently patrol north of the Awwali River to remind
the Druze and Christians in the Shuf of their ability to intervene
militarily if either side violates the cease-fire there. They are unlikely
to intervene in fighting between the Army and its opponents, however,
unless the government accepts Tel Aviv's demands for
implementation of the 17 May accord.
With the effective loss of the 4th Brigade, only the 8th Brigade is
left on the Alayh ridgeline. If Gemayel withdraws this unit to prevent it
from being outflanked, the entire ridgeline would be lost to the Druze.
If the President leaves the 8th Brigade in place, however, he risks
losing it to an attack by the Druze and the Palestinians. The Christian
community is likely to urge that the brigade be saved for the defense
of the Christian heartland north of Beirut.
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Gemayel is in an increasingly untenable position. Opposition
victories yesterday will further undermine morale among Army troops
and the government's remaining credibility. The Army and the
Christian Lebanese Forces militia now control only East Beirut and
the Christian heartland.
Under these circumstances, Gemayel has few alternatives. He
may yield to demands for his resignation, or seek an accommodation
with Syria and his Syrian-backed Druze and Muslim opponents. He
probably still hopes, however, that US military action will save his
government.
If Christian hardliners seeking to prevent an accommodation with
Syria try to assassinate or overthrow Gemayel, they almost certainly
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USSR: Possible Leadership Alignments
Older members of the Politburo have played the predominant
roles in all the public ceremonies held since Andropov died. 25X1
Chernenko, Premier Tikhonov, Defense Minister Ustinov, and
Foreign Minister Gromyko stood at the forefront of the leadership
during the lying-in-state and honor guard ceremonies on Saturday. At
the Central Committee plenum on Monday, Tikhonov nominated
Chernenko for the post of general secretary. According to all Soviet
media releases to date, they were the only speakers.
At Andropov's funeral yesterday, Chernenko, Ustinov, and
Gromyko delivered eulogies. These three, plus Tikhonov, also were
the only Politburo members to hold discussions yesterday with
visiting party and government leaders of Warsaw Pact countries.
A Western news service states that some Soviet officials are
saying privately that the delay in announcing the selection of
Chernenko as general secretary was the result of resistance on the
part of younger members of the Politburo to his succession.
Comment: In 1982 the selection of Chernenko to nominate
Andropov apparently was intended as a show of unity between loser
and winner. This time, however, no losing group is represented.
Chernenko and Tikhonov have been allies since the Brezhnev era.
Many Soviet officials privately acknowledged that Ustinov was a
primary source of Andropov's support in the Politburo and that
Ustinov and Gromyko backed Andropov against Chernenko in
1982. As a result, the delivery of eulogies by all three suggests a
demonstration of solidarity that was missing at the plenum.
At least two of the younger members of the leadership, party
secretaries Gorbachev and Romanov, probably should have played a
more prominent role in the ceremonies. They and other young leaders
may be temporarily eclipsed as a result of having opposed Chernenko
and lost-especially if Ustinov and Gromyko backed Chernenko.
The reported unhappiness of younger leadership figures over the
perpetuation of "old guard" rule probably stems in part from career
concerns. More broadly, however, they may fear that the "seniors"
are no longer capable of ruling effectively in the face of the USSR's
manifold problems.
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Status of South African Presence in Angola
Angola
Former Angola-Cuba
forward defensive line
-- - * ~~ c Malawi
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A
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Angola
South
Africa
L-th,
South African
reconnaissance forces
Techamutete
#'.Mupa
\\South 1African
1, military &Embundu
7: presence
Namibia
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100 KILOMETERS
100 MILES
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SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Status of Disengagement
The military disengagement in southern Angola apparently
continues without serious incident.
South Africa is
continuing to withdraw its conventional forces from the area but that
it retains a military presence at Ngiva, Xangongo, Mupa, Embundu,
and Calueque. Although a senior South African official told the US
Embassy last week that conventional forces would be out of Angola
by today, he said that reconnaissance forces would remain at
Techamutete and some other points until a cease-fire monitoring
agreement is reached.
South Africa recently has protested offensive activity by SWAPO,
Last week SWAPO leader Nujoma told a US official that his
organization would cooperate with a cease-fire, but he insisted he did
not control guerrilla forces in the field. Nujoma said he distrusted the
Angolans and resented being excluded from the impending talks.
Comment: Both Pretoria and Luanda are eager to give a cease-
fire a chance, and they appear to be adhering to the terms of the
disengagement. SWAPO, which appears to be the most reluctant
party, is concerned that it may be the casualty of Angolan-South
African negotiations and may try to play an obstructionist role.
Pretoria so far seems willing to tolerate minor infractions by
SWAPO. A major clash in southern Angola or a bloody terrorist
incident in Namibia, however, could provoke a South African military
response and set back broader negotiations.
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SSC-3 Antiship Cruise Missile Deployment
Boundary represent ation is
not necessarily authoritative.
t West Bank
/ (Israeli occupied-
Z status to be
I determined)
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USSR-SYRIA: New Coastal Defense System
The USSR has for the first time delivered to
antiship cruise missile system
The SSC-3 system uses a shore-based development of the
SS-N-2 Styx missile carried on Syrian missile patrol boats and is
highly mobile. It has a range of approximately 90 kilometers.
Comment: When the system is deployed. the missiles will pose a
threat to ships operating near the Syrian coast. The Syrians probably
will need only a short training period on the SSC-3 because they
already have some ex erience with the Styx missile.
EASTERN EUROPE-USSR: Reaction to Chernenko's Succession
The East Europeans are reacting cautiously to the accession of
Konstantin Chernenko as Soviet party leader. Congratulatory
messages from the East European leaders closely resemble those
sent to Andropov when he succeeded Brezhnev 15 months ago.
Official reaction to Andropov's death has been restrained. Romania's
was almost perfunctory.
Comment: Most East European leaders probably hope the
succession will help clarify the lines of Soviet authority, and they will
be anxious to see how Chernenko puts his stamp on policy. The
Czechoslovaks and Bulgarians were uncomfortable with Andropov,
the Romanians had serious differences with him, and all three almost
certainly anticipate an improvement in relations with the Soviets. The
Hungarians, who lost a sympathetic friend in Andropov, will try to
reestablish support in Moscow for their innovative policies. All East
European leaders presumably hope that a new Soviet leadership will
allow an easing of East-West tensions and greater leeway to pursue
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15 February 1984
Boundary representation is
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University students in Karachi are demonstrating against the ban
on student unions declared last week. The US Consulate General 25X1
reports that police so far have contained the protests, but university
officials fear the opposition will grow. 25X1
fundamentalist students, who generally support
President Zia's government, feel betrayed by the ban. Although the
president of Pakistan's strongest religious party has urged Zia to
rescind the order, he also has called on the students to remain
peaceful.
Comment: Student activists previously spent most of their
energies on squabbling among themselves, but the ban could unite
them. As a result of the failure last year of the opposition's campaign
of agitation, however, Zia may judge that student radicals lack
support to contest the government on this issue. The President is
likely to win his gamble, if the protests remain confined to Karachi. If
they spread to Punjab Province, however, he might lose substantial
conservative support.
WEST GERMANY-EAST GERMANY: Leaders Meet in Moscow
Chancellor Kohl and East German party leader Honecker publicly
expressed satisfaction with the results of their meeting on Monday in
Moscow. This is the first time that the two have met. Their session of
nearly two hours-twice the scheduled length-dealt primarily with
the general international situation and with the development of intra-
German relations, according to press statements issued by both
Comment: The hasty arrangement of the summit on the eve of
Andropov's funeral reflects the continued, mutual desire to improve
relations. Kohl hopes to isolate intra-German ties from general East-
West tensions, partly because furthering relations remains one of his
most popular policies, while East Germany remains especially
interested in making favorable economic deals with Bonn. Honecker
apparently calculates that Moscow's current policy toward Western
Europe allows him some latitude in dealing with the West Germans.
The two leaders probably did not reach any specific agreements, but
the discussion could encourage some movement in bilateral talks.
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HONDURAS-EL SALVADOR: Bilateral Talks
Recent talks between senior Honduran and Salvadoran officials in
Tegucigalpa represent a limited improvement in relations.
both sides candidly discussed nationalistic
concerns that have hampered negotiations on their territorial dispute.
The Salvadorans reportedly agreed to consider a Honduran
suggestion to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice
earlier than the date of late 1985 stipulated by a bilateral treaty.
On regional issues, the officials concluded that closer unity in the
Contadora negotiations is essential and that political and military
pressure has to be maintained on Nicaragua.
Comment: The often-postponed meeting followed several weeks
of heated rhetoric and mutual misunderstandings. The Hondurans
and Salvadorans now plan to continue discussing their differences at
the ministerial level, where some compromises could be reached.
Moreover, their agreement on mutual regional goals improves the
atmosphere for future bilateral cooperation.
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I. Since early 1982, Beijing has delivered
four diesel submarines, five subchasers, and four Shanghai-class
patrol boats under a $750 million contract that calls for additional
deliveries, including two frigates. Egypt currently is China's only
customer for warships larger than coastal patrol craft. The US military
attache in Egypt says Cairo plans to improve the serviceable but
outdated Chinese naval craft with Western electronics and weapons. 25X1
Comment: The Egyptians are anxious to replace their aging
Soviet-built fleet, but they are severely in debt. The Chinese provide
an attractive solution by offering generous repayment plans and
compatible military hardware at low prices. Beijing probably
anticipates that exports to Egypt will lead to more naval sales to other
Third World countries.
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Special Analysis
USSR: Implications of the Succession
In choosing 72-year-old Konstantin Chernenko as Andropov's
successor, the leadership appears to have voted for the political
status quo, as opposed to the uncertainty that selection of a younger
leader might have created. This holding action, however, could
stimulate resentment among middle-level officials in the party and
lead to discord in its higher ranks. As a result, more overt politicking is
likely to develop over time within the leadership.
The current political circumstances are considerably different
from those that existed when Chernenko lost his bid for the top party
job after Brezhnev died. Andropov's death left Chernenko as the only
member of the Politburo's "old guard" who was institutionally in a
good position to claim the post.
Defense Minister Ustinov, the only other senior leader who
realistically might have been chosen, may not have wanted the job, or
he may have been considered too important in his current position to
move. Ustinov also may have preferred to play the role of power
broker, rather than to seek the job.
Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko, who reputedly were
unwilling to support Chernenko when Brezhnev died, may have found
him less threatening to their political careers than the younger
alternatives in the Secretariat-Mikhail Gorbachev and Grigoriy
Romanov. The senior members of the Politburo probably considered
Gorbachev, at 52, too young for the job. The more experienced
61-year-old Romanov moved from Leningrad to his post in Moscow
less than a year ago, and he may not have had enough time to build
the required power base in the capital.
There have been signs that the decision to select Chernenko was
a difficult one. For example, the Central Committee plenum that
ratified the Politburo's selection was not held until Monday. Some
Soviet sources say the delay was caused by a rearguard action by
younger members of the Politburo opposed to Chernenko's selection.
The fact that Premier Tikhonov, Chernenko's strongest ally, made
the speech nominating the new General Secretary, rather than one of
the younger Politburo members or one of the seniors associated with
Andropov's accession, also indicates that all was not smoothed over.
In 1982, Chernenko, in an obvious effort to portray a united
leadership, made the speech nominating Andropov.
continued
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If the selection was as contentious as these signals suggest,
Chernenko's victory may have been won at the cost of some power-
sharing arrangement. Ustinov and Gromyko, for example, may have
gained an even stronger voice in national security issues than they
had under Andropov. In this area, Chernenko has less experience
than either Brezhnev or Andropov had.
Under these circumstances, the state presidency could go either
to one of the younger leaders who was passed over for the top party
job or to a senior member of the group opposing Chernenko. Some
agreement also may have been reached on the premiership, which
could be vacated soon by the 78-year-old Tikhonov. Chernenko's
elevation, however, may give Tikhonov incentive to stay on.
Regardless of whether such arrangements were made,
Chernenko's narrow background and his lack of a strong political
base argue for a decrease in the General Secretary's authority. It also
may portend an increase in looser decisionmaking, with perhaps
more participants involved in the process.
Unlike Andropov, Chernenko appears to have more support
among the regionally based leaders than among the Politburo
members based in Moscow. This increased emphasis on "collectivity"
and Chernenko's apparent political dependence on Politburo
members assigned outside the capital could cause the leadership to
be slower to respond to sensitive US proposals.
Direction of Foreign Policy
While Brezhnev was in power, Chernenko emphasized many of his
patron's favorite themes, including the importance of "detente" and
the need to expand East-West trade. Shortly before Brezhnev died,
Chernenko endorsed the "normalization and improvement" of
relations with the US.
Under Andropov, Chernenko echoed criticism of US policies but
refrained from stressing the importance of military readiness or ruling
out the possibility of improved Soviet-US ties. Now that Chernenko is
General Secretary, however, he probably will tailor his public forei n
policy references to the demands of a broader constituency.
In Chernenko's first speech as General Secretary, he made an
obligatory bow to the importance of strengthening the country's
defense capacity, although he also took a moderate line toward the
US. His latitude in this area is likely to be limited as long as Gromyko
and Ustinov remain firmly entrenched.
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Economic Priorities
On the domestic front, Chernenko is most associated with efforts
to promote a more open style of leadership-as reflected in the
decision to publicize Politburo agendas-and greater responsiveness
to citizens' complaints. In the past, Chernenko has called for
increasing the availability of consumer goods, and he is likely to
devote more attention than Andropov did to this program.
Nonetheless, there are no indications that Chernenko has the
influence or the inclination to push for any major shifts in resources.
In his first speech he indicated that he will continue to pursue
Andropov's goal of "improving the economic mechanism."
Chernenko is likely to be less willing than Andropov, however, to take
on the economic bureaucracy overseen by Tikhonov.
Reassuring Notes
Unlike Andropov, Chernenko probably will be more sensitive to
job security and fill more vacancies through promotions within the
Chernenko's concern with building his political base also is likely
to mean that he will make a sharper distinction than Andropov did
between the discipline campaign, which appears to have broad
support, and the campaign against corruption, which party and
government officials probably find threatening. He appeared to be
assuring his audience that no purge was imminent when, in his initial
speech, he noted that "competent, experienced, knowledgeable
people" had been elected to leading posts.
The General Secretary also gave a nod in his speech to the
important role played by regional party leaders-the group that is
said to be the core of his support and which he is likely to cultivate in
the future. During his funeral oration, he pointedly referred to the
Central Committee-where regional leaders represent the largest
bloc-rather than the Politburo, as the source of authority for party
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Jamaica: Chronology of Events
Early November Events in Grenada give Seaga a lead in
the polls.
23 November Seaga announces failure to meet IMF
targets and devalues the dollar.
25 November Seaga calls for general election.
Opposition announces a boycott,
charging Seaga violated his promise not
to hold new general elections without
updated voter lists.
29 November Nominations close; opposition boycott
holds in all 60 constituencies.
Early December Polls show 70 percent want new
elections based on updated lists and
indicate a 55-percent margin for Manley
in such an election.
15 December Country's first one-party parliament
elected.
15 January
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15 February 1984
More austerity measures and increases
in gasoline and electricity prices
announced.
Rise in antigovernment sentiment
reflected in last-minute surge in voter
registration.
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Special Analysis
JAMAICA: Seaga's Prospects
Prime Minister Seaga is in Washington this week seeking a
softening of terms from the IMF and more US assistance. His hope of
serving out the full five-year term that he won in the early election he
called two months ago is fading rapidly. Growing political tension
and deteriorating economic conditions have increased Seaga's
vulnerability to opposition attacks and weakened his ability to control
the tempo and direction of events. Seaga could face overwhelming
pressure to call a new general election as soon as electoral reforms
are implemented in May or June-a contest his party would have
difficulty winning.
The rise in Seaga's popularity immediately following the
intervention in Grenada has been eroded by popular dissatisfaction
with the uncontested election in December and the country's growing
financial problems. The private sector's support for Seaga's austerity
program is faltering as a result of high interest rates and stringent
credit and the government's continuing difficulty in reaching an
agreement with the IMF for a standby loan. Meanwhile, labor unions
are calling for higher wages to counter steep price rises resulting from
the 56-percent devaluation of the Jamaican dollar last year.
Investor and voter confidence probably will continue to
deteriorate. The IMF's demands-including a free-floating exchange
rate and substantial budget cuts-would increase prices, further
reduce key imports, and raise unemployment. The country's foreign
financial bind has become so severe that Kingston reportedly is
considering a moratorium on servicing its debt to private lenders and
an appeal to the Paris Club for rescheduling of its officially held debt.
Seaga's Strategy
Continued economic troubles could result in the ruling party
losing local elections that are legally required to be held by June. US
Embassy sources say Seaga may try to postpone these elections until
fall, when he expects a rise in bauxite production and new investment
in tourism that he hopes will shore up his popularity. The Embassy
reports that Seaga met with IMF officials in Washington this week to
request that IMF-stipulated budget cuts be phased in after the local
election in order to maintain employment on several rural projects.
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Seaga will try to persuade Jamaicans that there is a better chance
for economic recovery under his leadership than under opposition
leader Manley. If he does not, he could be faced with the choice of
risking political defeat by acceding to demands for a general election,
or jeopardizing any hope of a quick economic recovery by resorting to
repressive measures to maintain order.
Manley's Strategy
Manley also has given priority to repairing the party's reputation,
which has been tarnished by past anti-US rhetoric and by a close
association with Havana and Moscow. He is emphasizing more
moderate positions and underscoring his support for foreign
investment and the US-sponsored Caribbean Basin Initiative. The
party's leftwing faction has been pushed into the background.
Outlook
Seaga's political fortunes are linked to the economy's uncertain
prospects. The anticipated recovery in bauxite and tourism earnings
is predicated on a steady improvement in the world economy, and it
could be undercut by recently proposed taxes on these industries.
The potential for labor unrest will grow as inflationary pressures
intensify.
Calls for a new general election are likely to become more
strident, and they will not be calmed by holding elections for local
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