NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 10 FEBRUARY 1984
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020035-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
23
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 26, 2010
Sequence Number:
35
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 10, 1984
Content Type:
REPORT
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Body:
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fF
Director of
~ ~ Central
Intelligence
Beare! Top 25X1
ruary
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Contents
Syria-Lebanon: Pushing Political Talks
Kuwait: Trial of Terrorists
Hungary: Statements on Foreign Policy
USSR-Angola: MIG-23s Delivered
Vietnam-Kampuchea: Attacks on Resistance Bases
Taiwan-US: Curbing the Trade Surplus
Southeast Asia: Increased Opium Production
USSR: Initiatives in the Consumer Sector
North Korea: Production of Military Aircraft
Japan-UK: Licensed Production of Artillery
USSR: Setbacks for the Nuclear Industry
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Special Analysis
Jordan-US: King Hussein's Visit
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Lebanese Army forces
Syrian
Druze
Druze and Shia
Christian forces
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SYRIA-LEBANON: Pushing Political Talks
The Syrians are encouraging Lebanese factional leaders to begin
talks on political reconciliation, according to sources of the US
Embassy in Damascus.
President Assad met yesterday with National Salvation Front
leaders Franjiyah, Karami, and Junblatt. Earlier this week Assad held
talks with Lebanese Sunni notables. President Gemayel's
representative, Jean Obeid, reportedly has arrived in Damascus.
Embassy sources say Syrian officials are worried that Christian
extremists in Gemayel's Phalange Party might persuade Israel to
intervene militarily if a settlement is not achieved. The Syrians
reportedly e that progress can be made within the next few days.
Beirut remained calm yesterday, although there were press
accounts of some shelling of East Beirut and of clashes between
Christian and Druze militias in the Kharrub area. The US defense
attache reports that the Army is preparing to resist an attack it
expects along the Alayh ridgeline in retaliation for the US naval
bombardment of the last two days.
Comment: Assad probably hopes a quick political deal can be
arranged that meets Syrian demands and stops the fighting before
Muslim gains prompt moves by the Phalange Party to set up a
Christian enclave. Damascus has not called for Gemayel's
resignation, and Assad appears to believe that accommodation is still
possible.
If Gemayel does not move soon to make political concessions and
appoint a new prime minister, the opposition forces are likely to
increase military pressure on the Christians in Beirut. They might take
new action along the ridgeline. in the Kharrub, or against the Christian
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KUWAIT: Trial of Terrorists
The trial of 25 people implicated in the bombings of the US
Embassy and other installations in mid-December will begin tomorrow
amid fears of further Iranian-backed attacks against Kuwaiti and US
targets.
Dawa, the Iranian-backed Shia dissident group that the
authorities consider responsible for the bombings, has threatened
additional terrorism if the suspects are not released. Most of those
who are to stand trial-including 17 Iraqis, three Lebanese, and three
Kuwaitis-have already admitted to being Dawa members.
An official in the Foreign Ministry warned the Embassy earlier this
week that US personnel and installations in the Persian Gulf might be
attacked to put pressure on Kuwait to free the prisoners. He did not
expect such an attack in Kuwait itself.
Officials also are worried that an impending Iranian offensive
against Iraq could spill over into Kuwait. The Air Force was put on
alert Tuesday, and the Army is scheduled to take over the port of
aI-Ahmadi today. National Guard units withdrawn from the Embassy
compound are reportedly being sent north to assist the Army.
Comment: The prospect of the trial and an Iranian offensive,
combined with recent murders in Paris, probably will persuade Kuwait
and other Persian Gulf states to try to placate Iran. Kuwait still seems
determined to punish the bombing suspects, but it hopes to avoid
public mention of Shia schemes or Iranian involvement.
Kuwait's security services were spread thin by the investigations
of the bombings, and officials probably are overconfident of their
ability to monitor internal threats. Security will be further strained by a
trial that could last many months, by continued efforts of Dawa
sympathizers to secure the prisoners' release, and possibly by
violence after the verdicts are announced.
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HUNGARY: Statements on Foreign Policy
Recent public statements by party Secretary Sz_uros that Hungary
is committed to an independent foreign policy reflect Budapest's
resolve to maintain good relat
pressure to take a harder line.
Szuros said in a radio interview last month that Hungarian policies
are not identical to those of the USSR, and he asserted that national
interests should not be subordinated to common ones except in an
"extraordinary situation." He added that the Hungarians would
continue to seek East-West dialogue despite current strains in
relations between the superpowers.
Hungary came under
Soviet pressure late last year to take a firmer stance toward the West
in reaction to INF deployments. Budapest subsequently increased its
criticism of the US and NATO, and a senior foreign policy official
denied Western reports that Hungary wants to help bridge the
differences between East and West.
Comment: Szuros's remarks seem designed to portray Hungary
to the West as a negotiating partner not totally controlled by Moscow.
The Hungarians may believe that uncertainties in the USSR's policy
caused by General Secretary Andropov's illness give them some
additional leeway in foreign policy. Budapest will be hosting visits in
the next few months by several Western leaders, including West
German Chancellor Kohl and Italian Prime Minister Craxi, who are
likely to encourage Hungarian leaders to pursue a more independent
Szuros also probably was seeking to reassure the Hungarian
people that heightened East-West tensions will not cause
retrenchment in domestic policies or a substantial reduction in
Western contacts. Hungary's liberal economic policies and its open
political atmosphere are important sources of popularity and
legitimacy for the regime.
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Comment: The MIG-23s will complement other advanced air
defense weapons sent by the USSR in recent months. They probably
will be flown by Cuban pilots. Cubans have been flying MIG-21s in
Angola-until now the most advanced interceptors in the country.
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Thailand
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Vietnamese troops and forces
of the regime in Phnom Penh overran the small base of the
non-Communist Khmer People's National Liberation Front at 0 Bok
on Wednesday, driving more than 2,000 civilians into Thailand.
Although information on casualties is incomplete, unconfirmed press
reports say that 18 soldiers of the resistance are being treated for
symptoms caused by an unidentified gas. Other press reports say that
the Vietnamese also have attacked a small Democratic Kampuchean
base at Chong Bok near the Lao border, but no details are available.
Comment: The attacks appear to have only limited local
objectives. Most Vietnamese forces recently have stayed away from
the border, and there are no indications of imminent attacks on the
large non-Communist bases south of 0 Bok or against Prince
TAIWAN-US: Curbing the Trade Surplus
Taiwan is seeking to reduce its growing trade surplus with the US,
which reached $6.7 billion last year. The government recently eased
some import restrictions and is considering several other steps,
including relaxing additional import restrictions, promoting US goods,
and diversifying export markets. Taipei previously limited its efforts
mainly to calling on the US to sell Alaskan oil and advanced arms to
Taiwan and to sending buying missions to the US. Purchases by the
US, predominantly of consumer goods and textiles, account for about
half of Taiwan's exports.
Comment: Taipei is aware of Washington's concerns and wants
to head off any US economic retaliation. Taiwan also is worried about
the recent improvement in Sino-US relations and probably will use
these trade policy efforts to improve its own standing in the US.
Nevertheless, the continuing strength of the US dollar, as well as
resistance in Taiwan to lowering import barriers, will impede the
government's efforts to reduce the trade imbalance.
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Poppy Cultivation in the Golden Triangle
Bhutan
Bangladesh
K a ;h
St.lt
Sham
State
By
of
Be qa!
Rangoon
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Louang
Namtha
rOudomxai
Less intensive
cultivation
- Internal administrative
boundary
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SOUTHEAST ASIA: Increased Opium Production
Preliminary estimates of opium production in the "Golden
Triangle" area of Burma, Thailand, and Laos indicate an increase over
the harvest of 600 tons in 1983, presaging larger exports to the US.
According to US Embassy reporting the
area planted in opium poppies returned to the level of 1981/82 after a
decline last year. A late monsoon delayed early sowing, but
subsequent good weather and favorable prices led to the increase in
Comment: Increased military action by Thailand against
traffickers and counterinsurgency operations by Burma have done
little to check opium production. Burmese eradication efforts are
limited by insurgent activity, lack of resources, and corruption, and in
Thailand inadequate political support threatens the eradication
program. About 90 percent of production in the Golden Triangle
comes from Burma, where much of the major growing areas remain
outside government control. Southeast Asia accounts for about
25 percent of the heroin reaching the US.
USSR: Initiatives in the Consumer Sector
The summary in Pravda of the Politburo meeting last week states
the leadership has ordered that an experiment, limited to eight small
regions, be carried out in consumer service enterprises. The initiative,
which is similar to one begun last month in other selected industries,
is aimed at decentralizing management, increasing labor incentives,
and improving overall efficiency in the consumer sector. In addition,
Politburo member Vorotnikov and party secretary Kapitonov
addressed high-level meetings last week on ways to improve the
quality and availability of consumer goods and services. According to
the media reports, these developments are in response to General
Secretary Andropov's emphasis on improving consumer goods at the 25X1
Comment: Andropov has pushed for improvements in the
consumer sector since he took over as party chief, and the Politburo's
decision suggests that he continues to give direction to policy. The
experiment is part of the recently announced long-term program for
improving consumer welfare, which emphasizes increased efficiency
instead of investment to improve the sector gradually.
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NORTH KOREA: Production of Military Aircraft
The North Koreans are building an aircraft production complex
that will enable them to produce military aircraft within the next few
years
Comment: If construction continues at the current rapid pace, the
helicopter facility probably will be complete this year, the fixed-wing
facility next year, and the engine facility in 1986. The production of
aircraft will be a major step toward self-sufficiency in military
production. The North Koreans already manufacture tanks, self-
propelled artillery, armored personnel carriers, missile boats, and
submarines. The first aircraft built at the complex are likely to be
copies of the MIG-21 fighter and the MI-2 helicopter.
JAPAN-UK: Licensed Production of Artillery
The US defense attache in Tokyo reports that Japan has decided
to purchase the rights from the UK to produce the FH-70 155-mm
howitzer. During evaluations in 1981, Japanese defense officials were
impressed with the FH-70's high rate of fire and transportability by
helicopter. Production of an undisclosed number of guns is expected
to begin next year.
Comment: Japan chose the FH-70 mainly because it could not
acquire licensed-production rights for comparable US or Swedish
howitzers. Tokyo hopes to apply manufacturing technology and
components for the FH-70 toward developing a self-propelled
155-mm gun for its armed forces.
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USSR: Setbacks for the Nuclear Industry
Recent statements by Soviet energy officials indicate there will
be further delays in the commercial nuclear energy program. The
Minister of Power and Electrification has complained to a Western
diplomat that new safety regulations-imposed by the State
Committee on Nuclear Safety-restricting the places where plants
may be located will lead to higher costs, greater technical
requirements, and slower growth in the nuclear power program.
Soviet turbine designers recently made public a major planning
mistake that could delay for some time the manufacture of a special
steam turbine needed at some new types of Soviet nuclear plants, two
of which are already under construction.
Comment: The nuclear industry has grown steadily in recent
years, but construction bottlenecks and problems with the
manufacture of components have retarded progress. The new safety
criteria for plant location and the difficulties producing turbines will
cause more setbacks. The impact probably will be felt after 1985,
when the affected plants are to enter service. It could prompt the
Soviets to seek some Western components for nuclear stations or
machine tools to build the components.
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The Arab Revolutionary Brigades have claimed
responsibility for the murder on Wednesday of the United
Arab Emirates' Ambassador to France. The Brigades,
which previously claimed responsibility for blowing up a
UAE-owned airliner, for murdering an Israeli diplomat in
Paris, and for several attacks on Jordanian diplomats,
may be a cover name for the Black June Organization.
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Special Analysis
JORDAN-US: King Hussein's Visit
King Hussein will use his discussions in Washington next week
with senior US officials to probe current US attitudes toward the peace
process before he resumes talks with PLO Chairman Arafat. The King
will explain that he cannot begin negotiations without Palestinian and
moderate Arab support, and that he has to have persuasive evidence
of Israeli flexibility to win them over. In stressing the risks to Jordan,
Hussein will solicit advanced US weapons to ward off the threat he
perceives from Syria and its radical Palestinian clients.
Hussein wants to determine the priority the US places on an
Arab-Israeli settlement. He is worried that Jordan's concerns are
being obscured by US preoccupation with the situation in Lebanon.
He also is worried that, in an election year, Washington will find it
difficult to help him reach an agreement with Arafat.
Reviving the Peace Process
The King apparently believes that he is in a better position now
than he was last April-when his dialogue with Arafat ended-to
arrange a Jordanian role in peace negotiations. Hussein believes that
the split in PLO ranks and the subsequent weakening of Arafat's
leadership work to his advantage. He also sees the participation of
Palestinians in Jordan's recently reconvened parliament as
strengthening his hand with Arafat and with moderate Arab leaders.
Hussein has invited Arafat to Amman without imposing
conditions. This is a departure from his previous insistence that
discussions have to take up where they left off. To strengthen his
hand, the King reportedly has lined up a group of about 40 West Bank
leaders who would be present in Amman to put pressure on Arafat to
conclude an agreement.
Arafat, despite his weakened position, still commands broad
support in the West Bank and is likely to be confident that he does not
have to make concessions. Even if Arafat's popularity declines, he
probably will continue to give more weight to PLO than to West Bank
opinion in determining his next moves.
If Hussein fails to receive Arafat's backing, he may consider
forming a Jordanian-West Bank negotiating team drawn from
members of the parliament. West Bankers might hesitate to challenge
Arafat, however, by accepting such a group as their legitimate
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representative. Moreover, I Ithe
West Bank parliamentarians are not viewed by their constituencies as
representatives of Palestinians as a whole
Syrian Pressure on Hussein
During his discussions, Hussein will emphasize the Syrian threat
to Jordan. He fears that his efforts to revive the peace process will
prompt Syrian reprisals. The King suspects that Damascus
encouraged Black June and other radical Palestinian groups to
conduct terrorist acts against Jordanian diplomats last November as
a warning to him not to reopen talks with Arafat.
Damascus probably would not hesitate
to use its radical Palestinian assets to disrupt the dialogue between
Hussein and Arafat. The Syrians would be less likely to threaten direct
military intervention unless the talks appeared to be on the verge of
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Looking to the US
Hussein feels strongly about the need to acquire advanced US
weapons to strengthen Jordan's ability to defend itself against Syria.
He rejects Congressional opposition to selling Jordan arms before it
has committed itself to the peace process. The King argues that
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The Jordanian leader also will stress his country's vulnerability to
political and economic pressures from other Arab states. He will not
risk Jordan's security by entering negotiations without explicit
Palestinian and moderate Arab support. To persuade Arafat and
moderate Arab leaders that negotiations offer hope of a positive
return, Hussein will insist that the US prove its willingness to extract
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