NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 9 FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: February 9, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
Intelligence
Top Seeret
Director of
(Qn+ral
VF#NUWYIVFV
Coon "a A
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
11 25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
Top Secret
Contents
Lebanon: Uneasy Truce . .......... .. 1
Romania-US: Foreign Minister's Visit 3
USSR-China-US: Soviet Remarks on Sino-US Ties
UK: Controversy Over Ban on Union
South Africa-Angola: Disengagement of Forces
USSR-Afghanistan-Pakistan: Growing Military Pressure
Somalia-Ethiopia: Tense Relations ....
China: Offer To Store Spent Nuclear Fuel
Mozambique: Need for Disaster Relief ... ... 12
Special Analysis
Lebanon: The Next Steps 13
Top Secret
25X1
9 February 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
Top Secret
Top Secret
9 February 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
Top Secret
LEBANON: Uneasy Truce
Druze leader Junblatt protested US naval bombardment
yesterday, but there has been limited reaction from other opposition
groups and from Syria.
Junblatt claimed that the shelling resulted in the deaths of 30
people in one Druze village, and he threatened that such actions could
drive him to "terrorism." He told the US Ambassador in Damascus
that he would be ordering Druze batteries to open fire on US forces.
According to the US defense attache in Beirut, the shelling raised
morale among Army officers and Christian civilians of East Beirut.
The reaction in Damascus thus far has been limited to an official
military statement condemning the action and claiming that Syrian
Key Sunni and Shia religious leaders issued a joint statement
yesterday urging all parties to support the cease-fire in Beirut. Druze
and Shia leaders previously had called for a cease-fire and for the
protection of all foreign nationals.
Sunni leaders refused yesterday to go along with Junblatt's call
for the resignation of President Gemayel, according to the US
Embassy in Damascus. They reportedly want to stop the fighting in
Beirut and strongly desire a political settlement without more
Comment: The Sunnis probably would agree to let Gemayel
remain president if he appointed a Muslim-dominated cabinet that
abrogated the accord of 17 May and ensured that the government
and the Army did not exclusively serve Christian interests. The Sunnis
benefit from the present confessional distribution of key positions in
the government and do not want to see the arrangement altered. The
Druze and Shias, however, control the military situation in West Beirut 25X1
and seem determined to force Gemayel's resignation.
Status of Multinational Force
The Italian Government has decided to redeploy its troops aboard
ships gradually over several months, according to the US Embassy.
The Italians remain committed to safeguarding the Palestinian
refugee camps, however, and Defense Minister Spadolini has
25X1 Top Secret 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
Top Secret
suggested that some UN forces from southern Lebanon be moved to
Beirut to protect the camps.The local Italian commander told the
press yesterday that his troops would continue to patrol their area
until new orders are received from Rome.
The French have not yet made a decision about withdrawing their
troops, according to Defense Minister Hernu.
Comment: The Italians are anxious to safeguard their own forces,
but they believe they have a moral responsibility to make alternative
security arrangements for the camps. They are likely to renew their
call for consultations with the other MNF contributors.
The French probably are inclined to pursue their own interests,
which they have said are independent of those of the other MNF
countries. French forces may remain in their current positions while
Paris pushes for a UN presence in Beirut.
Soviet Reactions to US Moves
Soviet media have noted the US announcement of the withdrawal
of the Marines from Beirut, but they have focused on the broader
rules of engagement for US forces. Moscow claims that Washington is
Comment: Although Moscow has been pushing for the
withdrawal of the Multinational Force, it may defer authoritative
comment until the fighting in the Beirut area subsides.
Top Secret
2 9 February 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
Top Secret
ROMANIA-US: Foreign Minister's Visit
Foreign Minister Andrei, who begins talks in Washington
tomorrow, will be upbeat about bilateral relations.
Comment: Andrei will try to improve relations with the US, which
he claims already are the best in a decade. He probably will urge
more high-level consultations, possibly including a visit to Washington
by Ceausescu this year. He almost certainly will argue for an end to
INF deployments in Western Europe and the reopening of INF 25X1
The Romanians fear that East-West tensions over INF will
increase Soviet pressure on them for greater conformity. Gromyko
may have tried to bring Bucharest more into line, but, if he did so, he
Ceausescu also is facing serious domestic pressures. Food and
energy shortages are likely to become more severe as a result of a
drought last year that damaged crops and reduced hydroelectric
generation. Ceausescu has responded with measures to force
farmers and holders of private plots to increase sales to the state and
a 50-percent cut in private energy consumption.
Mild weather has reduced the impact of the restrictions on energy
use. On the other hand, the crackdown on private farming and
continuing pay cuts for workers who fail to meet unrealistic
production quotas will increase social tensions.
Ceausescu is increasingly being blamed for the country's
problems, even by government officials. He evidently can contain the
opposition for now, but the potential is growing for more public
disturbances that could seriously weaken his authority.
Top Secret
3 9 February 1984
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
Top Secret
USSR-CHINA-US: Soviet Remarks on Sino-US Ties
Unusually sympathetic remarks by Soviet officials about Beijing's
policy toward the US suggest that the USSR will not let the recent
warming in Sino-US ties interfere with its encouragement of better 25X1
USA-Canada institute staff member Lukin claimed in the
institute's journal last month that the high-level contacts between the
US and China last fall were not a dramatic new development. He
described China as "socialist" and resistant to US attempts to form a
strategic partnership against the USSR. According to Lukin, China
wants "mutually advantageous cooperation" with the US, "just as
Igor Rogachev, the chief of the China Department at the Soviet
Foreign Ministry, took a similar approach recently with US diplomats.
He claimed that Premier Zhao's trip to Washington last month took
place in a subdued
atmosphere, in comparison with the visit by Deng
F__ I
Comment: Most of Moscow's recent comments on Sino-US
relations have been more critical of Beijing, reinforcing the impression
that Lukin and Rogachev are moderate spokesmen among the
USSR's divided China analysts. There long have been conflicting
views in Moscow on this subject, and both officials may have
exaggerated their positive attitude at this time to influence a policy 25X1
The Soviets see their relations with China as closely linked to
Sino-US ties, and the warming between China and the US may have
rekindled the debate among Soviet experts. Lukin complained
privately last fall about his inability to publish on this topic. The ability
of the moderates to express themselves in print again suggests that
Moscow is confident its efforts to promote a gradual improvement in
relations with Beijing are on course.
Top Secret
4 9 February 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
Top Secret
UK: Controversy Over Ban on Union
Prime Minister Thatcher continues to face embarrassment over the
government's mishandling of a ban on union membership at its signals
intelligence headquarters.
Some Conservatives have joined the Labor Party and the unions
in criticizing the ban. Members of Parliament have attacked a
reported decision by Thatcher that the current head of the
Government Communications Headquarters not be permitted to
testify before a select committee of the House of Commons. Former
US and British officials also have contradicted the Prime Minister's
claim that Washington did not urge the ban.
Thatcher reportedly is especially displeased with Foreign
Secretary Howe's inept handling of the matter. Howe had available a
list of union disruptions at the headquarters to justify London's
action, but he did not adduce it until after opposition to the ban had
grown.
The Prime Minister is to meet again with union leaders this week.
She is under pressure to lift the ban on union membership and settle
for a no-strike pledge and union agreement to stronger security
procedures.
Comment: Thatcher apparently made her decision without
consulting other cabinet members or the unions and without gauging
sentiment among Tory MPs. Her evident surprise at the strong
reaction is likely to increase speculation that she is becoming less
adept at sensing backbench sentiment.
Many of those criticizing the government's position apparently
believe that it was prompted by the US. The decision to block
testimony in Parliament by the Director of GCHQ probably will
encourage more speculation that he might discuss the US role in ways
Thatcher would find embarrassing.
Thatcher will be reluctant to back away from the ban, especially
since some employees have agreed to leave the union. Nonetheless,
she may agree to consider alternatives that would allow her to claim
that security objectives have been met.
Too Secret
5 9 February 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
Status of South African Presence in Angola
Angola
South African
buffer zone
-'Xangongo
I ,:~utf rlfir ry
tlril~Eury ,.,res. Ir '_
Namibia
0 100 KILOMETERS
0 100 MILES
Top Secret
F
9 February 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
Top Secret
SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Disengagement of Forces
The status of the withdrawal of South African forces from
southern Angola, which Pretoria said would begin on 31 January
remains unclear
South African infantry force, antiaircraft guns, and three helicopters
are still at Xangongo, where a pontoon ferry on the Cunene River was
observed in operation last week.
South African troops have left Cuvelai. A
senior South African official reports that offensive operations in
Angola have ceased but that reconnaissance patrols in Angola have
been attacked by SWAPO forces on two occasions since 31 January.
The official also says that tanks and other new equipment are being
sent to bases in Namibia as a contingency.
month. The continued operation of the ferry at Xangongo indicates
that reconnaissance units may be active on the west side of the
Cunene River.
USSR-AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN: Growing Military Pressure
Last week the Soviet Ambassador publicly accused
Pakistan of arming, training, and providing base camps for Afghan
insurgents. He had warned in a press interview in December that
Kabul and Moscow would take joint action if needed to end
Islamabad's support for the resistance.
Comment: The Soviets presumably are trying to intimidate
Pakistan into restraining insurgent infiltration.
If Pakistan ignores the threats, the Soviets
will have to consider whether military pressure along the border would
prompt Islamabad to curtail infiltration or merely give President Zia
additional domestic and international support.
Top Secret
7 9 February 1984
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
2bx1
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA: Tense Relations
Top Secret
Somali President Siad apparently is trying to reduce the fallout
from recent operations by Somali-backed, anti-Ethiopian dissidents.
Two attacks by the Western Somali Liberation Front on the rail line
between Djibouti and Addis Ababa in January provoked two
retaliatory Ethiopian airstrikes on northwestern Somali border towns,
inflicting heavy civilian casualties. Siad reportedly has ruled out
retaliatory actions by the Somali military because of the overwhelming
superiority of Ethiopian forces. Djiboutian President Gouled has
complained to both Ethiopia and Somalia about the economic impact
on Djibouti of the disruption in rail service, and he has asked the US
to use its influence to prevent additional attacks.
Comment: Siad probably will direct the dissidents to attack less
sensitive targets to avoid provoking further Ethiopian attacks and to
head off criticism from Somalia's-and Djibouti's-Western backers.
The Ogadeni tribes that form the Front's popular base provide
important political backing to Siad, however, and he would be
reluctant to place blanket restrictions on its activities. Moreover, the
Front has at times resisted Mogadishu's efforts at control, despite its
heavy dependence on the Somali military for funding, equipment, and
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
Top Secret
CHINA: Offer To Store Spent Nuclear Fuel
China's offer to provide long-term storage for spent fuel from
nuclear power reactors appears cost-competitive and probably will be
attractive to a number of countries.
Spain, Switzerland,
Austria and West Germany are among the potential customers.
the contracts Beijing is offering do not contain any
restrictions on China's use of the spent fuel, which in effect would
become Chinese property.
Comment: The spent fuel cannot be transferred or altered
without the approval of the US, Canadian, French, or Soviet
Governments. These governments probably will require that the fuel
continue to be under IAEA safeguards, and they will require explicit
guarantees that China would not reprocess the fuel or use it for
military purposes. In the past, Beijing has refused to provide such
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
10 9 February 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
South
Africa
Top Secret
9 February 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
Top Secret
MOZAMBIQUE: Need for Disaster Relief
The US Embassy in Maputo, in assessing the damage caused by
the typhoon that hit southern Africa late last month, reports that
heavy flooding in southern Mozambique resulted in more than 100
deaths, the devastation of cattle herds, and the destruction of crops.
Even if enough seed were available for rapid replanting, the Embassy
estimates that at least $20-25 million worth of food assistance would
be required until the next harvest in April 1985.
Comment: The damage will aggravate catastrophic economic
conditions in the south, where two years of severe drought has
caused 100,000 people to starve to death and has made 300,000
others dependent on foreign disaster relief. This latest disaster
probably will prompt President Machel to increase his efforts to seek
political accommodation with South Africa and the West-the only
sources of significant development and food assistance.
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
Special Analysis
LEBANON: The Next Steps
President Gemayel has few political alternatives to help him stave
off the collapse of his regime. Despite resistance from hardline
Christians, he has no choice but to make concessions to Damascus
and to his Muslim opponents. Opposition to his leadership, however,
is increasing from all sides. In the rapidly deteriorating security
situation, Gemayel could be forced to resign.
Gemayel's only realistic choice is to select a prime minister
acceptable to his Syrian-backed opponents and form a government
of national unity with a mandate to undertake political reform. The
first act of such a government probably would be the abrogation of
At the same time, the President does not want to move closer to
the Syrians. He fears that Damascus will insist on substantial revisions
to the confessional arrangement reached in 1943 that established
Christian hegemony in Lebanon.
At this point, however, the prospect of forming a government of
national unity may have evaporated. Gemayel has equivocated for so
long on the question of political concessions to his Muslim opponents
that the growing violence may make it impossible for any Muslim to
form a government under his presidency.
Gemayel may try to avoid pressures to alter Lebanon's
confessional balance by seeking a deal with Syria that would make
Damascus the guarantor of Christian preeminence in Lebanon. Syria
might be prepared to accept this arrangement if enough concessions
were made to its interests. Damascus almost certainly would insist on
at least some political reforms, however, to retain credibility with its
Such a solution would approximate the circumstances in 1976. At
that time, Syrian troops were invited into Lebanon by the Christian
government of President Franjiyah.
If Gemayel should refuse to seek Syrian protection, he might
make a last-ditch effort to stay in office by invoking emergency
powers and forming a multiconfessional military government. This
strategy, however, would collapse if the Army disintegrated.
Top Secret 25X1
13 9 February 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
Top Secret
The Succession Problem
If Gemayel chooses or is forced to resign, he has no obvious
successor. Under the constitution, the prime minister and his cabinet
exercise executive authority until the parliament is convened to elect
a new president
Before resigning, Gemayel would try to continue the tradition of a
Christian head of state by naming a Maronite prime minister. In 1952
President Khoury named ronite Army Commander Shihab as
Prime Minister.
Domestic opponents have not seriously challenged the concept of
a Maronite presidency. The Syrian-backed Lebanese National
Salvation Front last week nominated former President Franjiyah, a
longtime Syrian ally, as its candidate to succeed Gemayel. Although
Christian Phalange party members and Lebanese Forces militiamen
would challenge Franjiyah's candidacy, they probably are too weak to
If Gemayel were to designate a Maronite prime minister, that
choice would be seen as the Christian candidate for the presidency.
There are several possible civilian candidates who would be more
acceptable to Christian hardliners than many of the traditional
politicians who have been more closely identified with Syria. One is
Michel Khoury, president of the Lebanese Central Bank and son of
Lebanon's first president after independence.
Gemayel might turn to an Army officer, however, as was done in
1952. Army Commander Tannous probably wants the position, but he
is likely to be unacceptable to the Shia and Druze because of Army
actions in West and southern Beirut. General Faris, Gemayel's military
The View From Damascus
The Syrians now have the difficult task of maintaining pressure on
Gemayel and the Army without provoking full-scale civil war or
political collapse. President Assad will continue to press for
abrogation of the agreement of 17 May and for political reforms giving
Lebanese Muslims substantially greater power. He will stop short,
however, of trying to eliminate Christian preeminence.
The Syrians do not want Muslim victories to result in the division
of Lebanon into a Christian ministate dependent on Israel and a
Muslim rump state that would be potentially fundamentalist or radical.
Syria intervened militarily in Lebanon in 1976 to support the
Top Secret
14 9 February 1984
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
Top Secret
Christians and to stop the alliance of Lebanese leftists and
Palestinians from achieving victory. In the current crisis, Damascus
would be likely to act to prevent a complete political and military
In the near term, continuing Shia, Druze, and Sunni pressure on
the government serves Assad's purpose in forcing Gemayel to
compromise. Over the longer term, however, Damascus will have to
Syrian and Iranian interests ultimately will diverge. Shia radicals
supported by Tehran could then begin opposing the Syrians.
Top Secret
F
15 9 February 1984
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020032-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP87T0097OR000100020032-5
Top Secret