NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 6 FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020020-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: February 6, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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11 , Director of won Seorot
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Intelligence
COPY 7 Q
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Contents
Lebanon-Syria: Gemayel Under Siege
USSR: Andropov's Health May Have Worsened
Nicaragua: Insurgent Activity
India: Political Ferment in Three States
USSR-South Korea: New Initiatives
North Korea: Reaction to Military Exercise
Nigeria: Government's Lack of Progress
Nicaragua: Tanker Safely Enters Mined Port 10
Vietnam-China: More Missiles Opposite China
Burma: Insurgent Activity Increases 11
Canada: Naval Modernization Delayed
Special Analysis
Egypt-US: The Military Debt Issue
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LEBANON-SYRIA: Gemayel Under Siege
Serious political and military challenges are jeopardizing the
presidency of Amin Gemayel and threaten to precipitate a new round
of ground fighting between the Army and Syrian-backed opposition
forces on the Alayh ridgeline.
Gemayel accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Wazzan and
the cabinet yesterday but implored the cabinet members to remain as
caretakers until a new government is formed. Gemayel has said he
hopes to create a "government of national unity" under his
leadership.
The US Embassy states that both the Sunni Murabitun militia and
the Shia Amal militia participated in attacks on Army positions in the
capital yesterday. A key Sunni leader in West Beirut announced the
formation of an "Islamic Resistance Front," which reportedly will join
the National Salvation Front and Amal in opposing the Gemayel
government.
Comment: Gemayel probably hopes the creation of a
government that includes opposition figures will alleviate the
immediate crisis and prevent the collapse of his presidency. Most of
the available Sunni, Shia, and Druze politicians whom he could
appoint to a new cabinet, however, are susceptible to Syrian
pressure.
Gemayel has to first appoint a Sunni Muslim as prime minister. He
almost certainly realizes that nearly all Sunni politicians-as well as
key opposition leaders Barri, Junblatt, and Franjiyah-will demand
fundamental changes in Lebanon's political system and the
abrogation of the Lebanese-Israeli accord signed last May as
preconditions to participation in such a government.
The Army is struggling to retain strategic positions around Beirut.
The involvement of Sunni Murabitun militiamen-who refrained from
attacking the Army during the uprising in September-suggests that
the Army will have greater difficulty in calming the situation in the
capital now than it did in September.
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Neither side has yet begun major troop movements on the
ground, despite the intensity of the fighting on the Alayh ridgeline.
The growing anticipation of an imminent offensive on both sides,
however, could prompt either the Army or the opposition militias to
launch a preemptive ground attack.
Reports of large-scale Shia defections from the Army appear to
be exaggerated. Nonetheless, the Army's cohesion is being strained
by the continuing violence. If General Tannous launches a ground
assault on the Alayh ridgeline or attempts a counteroffensive in the
capital to push back Muslim street fighters, the number of defections
almost certainly will rise.
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USSR: Andropov's Health May Have Worsened
The cancellation of Defense Minister Ustinov's visit to India
planned for this week strongly suggests that General Secretary
Andropov's health may have taken a sudden and unexpected turn for
TASS announced the cancellation on Saturday, only three days
after the Soviets had officially announced the trip.
IThe Soviets
decided to call off the visit for "domestic reasons," according to
press accounts.
Comment: High-level officials recently had been more positive
about Andropov's health, indicating he was recovering and working
part time. Party secretary Gorbachev's vacation to Georgia last
month and Ustinov's planned visit seemed to assume that Andropov's
condition was stable or improving.
The cancellation suggests that these assumptions are no longer
valid. The decision to keep Ustinov in Moscow probably was reached
at a Politburo meeting on Thursday or Friday.
If Andropov is gravely ill, Ustinov's own political interests require
that he remain in Moscow now. As the leader after Andropov with the
most prestige and authority, Ustinov would want to be available to
give direction to succession politicking
Other reasons, such as an unexpected health problem for
Ustinov, a hitch in Indian-Soviet relations, or perhaps even
developments in Lebanon could be responsible for the cancellation.
Nevertheless, the seriousness of Andropov's condition for the past
several months makes it the most likely reason
Andropov may bounce back, but, if his health is as grave as the
sudden decision to cancel Ustinov's trip suggests, other signs of an
imminent succession should be seen this week. Evidence of
maneuvering for succession would include an unusual level of
leadership activity around the Kremlin or Central Committee buildings
in Moscow, heightened security measures, the return of out-of-town
Politburo members, and anomalies in protocol indicators.
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There is no clear choice now as to Andropov's likely successor.
Although Gorbachev evidently is Andropov's choice, both he and
party secretary Romanov, the other younger candidate, have
significant liabilities that make them less than ideal candidates. The
Politburo, therefore, could turn to Ustinov, particularly if he wants the
position.
Age and ill health have created problems for the leadership in the
past few years. Ustinov's age, therefore, may be seen as a serious
liability. On balance, their position in the Secretariat, age, and
abilities appear to m ke Gorbachev and Romanov the front-runners.
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AROE Democratic Revolutionary Alliance
Nicaraguan Democratic Force
Misura Revolutionary Front
0 100
6 February 1984
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NICARAGUA: Insurgent Activity
Leadership and supply problems continue to plague anti-
Sandinista guerrillas in the south, but Managua is facing stronger
pressure from northern insurgents.
Combat is still widespread in the north, where recent US defense
attache reports indicate the insurgents are holding some high ground
near Esteli. Travel in eastern Boaco Department is restricted because
of guerrilla activities there. the
Sandinistas last month suspended construction on the road between
Matagalpa and Puerto Cabezas because of the insurgent presence.
The Sandinistas recently have suffered several setbacks as a
result of poor communications. The US Embassy in Managua reports
that an Air Force transport was shot down by government troops,
The insurgents in the north currently are finding it easier to
maintain their positions in the region, apparently as a result of their
improved handling of logistic problems. During their major operations
in 1983, large numbers of guerrillas had to return to Honduras for
supplies. Moreover, the insurgents are causing the Sandinistas
difficulty by controlling some key terrain and by striking at selected
targets, rather than attempting large-scale attacks on major towns.
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States With Political Disturbances
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Bay of
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Political violence fomented by the opposition has broken out in
three states.
Over 27,000 farmers in the state of Karnataka have mounted
massive demonstrations over the past month against government
agricultural policies. They have stopped road and rail traffic and
paralyzed communications. According to press accounts, the
Congress Party may be supporting the agitation in an effort to
discredit the opposition party's ruling state government.
The northern state of Jammu and Kashmir has been racked by
communal and political disturbances, and leaders of Prime Minister
Gandhi's Congress Party have been implicated in the violence. The
opposition government of Chief Minister Abdulla Farooq, however,
recently won a vote of confidence. This has forestalled Gandhi's
threat to impose President's Rule.
The US Embassy reports that in Maharashtra state, which is ruled
by the Congress Party, various opposition groups have exploited
protests by farmers. Last week, for example, they staged a one-day
general strike that succeeded in closing business in Bombay, the
nation's financial and industrial center.
Comment: This is an election year, and more disturbances are
likely as the Congress Party and regional opposition parties maneuver
for political advantage. Farm groups probably will continue their
efforts to place agricultural issues on the national agenda.
In states where Gandhi's party recently has lost major elections,
the Prime Minister hopes to capitalize on local dissatisfaction with
agricultural policies to topple regional opponents. In Maharashtra and
other strongholds of the Congress Party, opposition coalitions are
using the same tactic against Gandhi. They are attracting thousands
of disaffected farmers to participate in demonstrations and strikes.
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Seoul and Moscow apparently have resumed contacts that were
broken off last fall following the shootdown of the South Korean
airliner, but they could be jeopardized by the USSR's interest in
improving relations with North Korea.
The Soviets have told US diplomats they anticipate a more
dynamic relationship with North Korea, as a result of the recent
leadership changes in P'yongyang. The Chinese say their Embassy in
Moscow also has been told to expect a substantial improvement in
Soviet-North Korean relations this year. An East European diplomat
who recently spoke with Soviet officials in Moscow claims that a visit
by North Korean leader Kim II-song is possible this spring.
Comment: South Korea has expected all along to revive its
informal exchanges with the USSR gradually, after public outraae
over the shootdown had subsided
P'yongyang's attitude will influence
The Soviets apparently are interested in improving their cool
relations with P'yongyang, in part to ensure that they will have a voice
in any negotiations on Korean reunification and related matters. Even
if the USSR proceeds with the utmost caution in resuming contacts
with South Korea, however, Moscow and P'yongyang will have to
improve relations substantially before Kim will agree to visit the Soviet
capital.
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NORTH KOREA: Reaction to Military Exercise
North Korea on Saturday publicized an order instructing its
military and reserve forces to strengthen "combat mobilization" in
reaction to the annual US-South Korean military exercise Team Spirit
84, which began last week. The announcement contrasted the North's
recent proposal for tripartite talks involving the US and South Korea
with what it alleged were war maneuvers by Washington and Seoul.
Comment: The North's announcement this year is less strident
than in 1983, when P'yongyang declared a "semistate of war" alert.
The North Koreans probably hope to build international support for
their proposal for talks. Seoul opposes the North's tripartite formula,
which it believes would place South Korea in an inferior position.
NIGERIA: Government's Lack of Progress
Reports from the US Embassy indicate that, one month after the
coup, Head of State Buhari's government has done little to reassure
the public that it can reverse economic decline, overcome
administrative inertia, or calm rising tribal tensions. A purge of
southerners in the military has increased their apprehensions that the
northern-dominated regime is discriminating against them.
Meanwhile, the Embassy reports the regime has indicated-partly out
of economic necessity-that it will retain close relations with the US.
Comment: Southern officers of middle rank could begin plotting
a takeover if Buhari and his northern colleagues continue to single
them out for corruption. Public disturbances are possible if
southerners believe northern officials are discriminating against them
economically and socially. Like previous regimes, the new
government probably will balance pragmatic working relations with
the West with an increase in nonaligned rhetoric, in order to appease
domestic critics who believe Lagos has been too accommodating to
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NICARAGUA: Tanker Safely Enters Mined Port
a tanker bringing crude oil-probably
from Mexico-has passed through mines laid by insurgents at Puerto
Sandino, Nicaragua's main oil port.
Comment: No tankers had entered Puerto Sandino since the
insurgents mined it in early January, and the Sandinistas probably felt
pressed to bring a tanker into the port. They had shut down their
refinery last week for lack of crude. Moreover, Managua probably
wanted to demonstrate that the insurgents had failed to disrupt oil
deliveries.
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China
Tong Mou
t
Pha Lai 11 HAN01 New Scud
missile bric~'ade-
Vietnam.
CEP at Year
Range 2/3 Range Operational
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VIETNAM-CHINA: More Missiles Opposite China
Vietnam has
deployed a second Scud-B tactical surface-to-surface missile brigade
within striking distance of China. The new brigade is housed in a
garrison at Pha Lai, 150 kilometers from the border, in Vietnam's
strategic 2nd Corps area. The garrison was first observed under
construction in late 1982, and it is
occupied and that training is under way. The first confirmed Scud unit
was identified in early October 1982 at Tong Mou, 130 kilometers
from the border.
Comment: Vietnam could use the 300-kilometer-range Scud-B to
deliver high-explosive or chemical warheads against Chinese cities,
strategic airfields, and lines of communication near the border.
Vietnam's deployment of this second brigade with its elite forces
along the Chinese border is another example of Hanoi's continuin
effort to modernize its Army along Soviet lines.
BURMA: Insurgent Activity Increases
Burmese security forces have
defused seven bombs in the stadium where the Union Day celebration
will be held on 12 February. 50
members of the Karen ethnic insurgent group had infiltrated Rangoon
to conduct terrorist activities during the celebration. The Army,
meanwhile, is expanding its offensive against Karen bases along the
Thai border. As many as 3,000 troops overran the second-largest
Karen stronghold on 28 January.
Comment: The Karen have increased their terrorist activities over
the past two years to publicize their long struggle for autonomy, and
they probably planted the bombs. They may believe that Rangoon is
more vulnerable as a result of the recent, massive purge of the
security forces. The Army operation will have no immediate impact on
terrorist activity. The bulk of the insurgents can seek sanctuarin
Thailand, and others reportedly are located north of Rangoon.
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CANADA: Naval Modernization Delayed
The US defense attache reports that Ottawa has decided to delay
ordering six new frigates and is reexamining its program for replacing
warships. In mid-1983 Ottawa ordered six new ASW frigates as the
first step in a three-phase program to replace its obsolescent frigates
and destroyers. The government also said it would soon order an
additional six frigates under phase two, in order to reduce costs
through large-scale procurement. No funds have been allocated for
the phase-two ships, however, and knowledgeable Canadians have
told the attache that they are concerned that funds available for the
program may be reduced or eliminated while the reexamination is
under way.
Comment: The government has embarked on a limited naval
reequipment program in response to pressure from NATO and in an
effort to create jobs. Modernization efforts are lagging, however, and
a number of programs have been reduced. Delays in ship
replacement will lead to higher costs and could reduce the Maritime
Command's surface fleet from 20 operational warships to as few as
12 by the mid-1990s.
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Special Analysis
EGYPT-US: The Military Debt Issue
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Egypt's military debt to the US will be a key topic during visits by
the Ministers of Economy and Investment to Washington early this
week and by President Mubarak on Saturday. Cairo has declared that
it will halt interest payments unless it and the US arrange bilateral
rescheduling by July, and this issue will become increasingly difficult
as the cutoff date approaches. Although the financial effects of the
debt warrant concern by Egypt, the threat to halt payments is
motivated primarily by political considerations. Cairo is seeking both
to quiet domestic criticism of budget priorities and to gain greater
benefits from the "special relationship" with Washington.
Mubarak and other Egyptian policymakers are skeptical of US
explanations that a debt payment suspension would cause an
automatic cutoff of economic and military aid. The Egyptians continue
to believe that something can be done bilaterally, rather than in
multilateral negotiations, and Mubarak is likely to pursue this course
vigorously.
Financial Impact
The Egyptians contend that timely payment on military debt to the
US and other Western donors will strain foreign exchange reserves
and divert funds from domestic development. According to data
provided by the Egyptian Government, service payments on this debt
will take about 11 percent of Egyptian current account earnings, or
$1.3 billion, in FY 1984
The Egyptians claim that more than 60 percent of the payments
due this fiscal year are owed to the US and France. Cairo has
tentatively approached Paris about rescheduling its debt to the
The Egyptian figures are highly questionable, probably
because of sloppy bookkeeping. The amount said to be owed to the
US-$506 million-appears to be overstated by about $135 million.
Other components of the debt are likely to have been similarly
Even so, military debt payments will require a good portion of the
foreign exchange available to the central government. A substantial
part of Egyptian current account earnings are in the free exchange
market and are unavailable for use by the central bank in making
repayments. The Egyptians, however, can use earnings from military
sales that appear in separate Ministry of Defense accounts.
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Multilateral Rescheduling
Cairo has rebuffed arguments by donors that debt rescheduling
should be carried out in multilateral talks. Mubarak and members of
his government have expressed fear that rescheduling by the "Paris
Club" of creditors would dama a Egypt's international credit rating
and reputation.
Cairo also probably is motivated by the fact that Paris Club action
would require an Egyptian agreement with the IMF. Such an
agreement would necessitate economic reforms-including higher
prices for food and energy. Cairo's thinking is affected by the bread
riots in Egypt in 1977 and the recent disturbances in Tunisia and
Morocco, and it is unlikely to come to terms with the IMF until the
parliamentary elections in late May, if then.
The "Special Relationship"
Mubarak has strong political reasons to stick to his demand for
bilateral rescheduling. With elections coming, he wants to forestall
criticism from opposition parties that military aid payments are
diverting funds from development. Mubarak also wishes to show that
his government's close ties to the US, also a source of criticism, are
paying off in the form of generous aid.
Cairo's perception that Israel is receiving more favorable financial
treatment than Egypt further complicates the issue. Egyptian leaders
contend that the US has reneged on a commitment to maintain parity
in aid to its two Camp David partners. If there is no bilateral
rescheduling of its military debt, Cairo probably will ask for increased
economic aid, both to cover the repayments and to move closer to
parity with the Israelis.
The debt and aid issues have not diminished Cairo's reliance on
the US to achieve a Middle East peace agreement. Egyptian leaders
consider the US peace initiative to be the most promising basis for a
comprehensive settlement. They have indicated, however. that they
Cairo believes it is supporting the initiative by encouraging PLO
Chairman Arafat to reach an agreement with Jordanian King Hussein
and by promoting a dialogue between the US and the PLO.
US-Egyptian military cooperation also has continued smoothly.
Cairo, however, considers such cooperation and US aid to be parts of
the same package. Mubarak may feel politically compelled to reduce
the level of cooperation if he is unsatisfied on the military aid issue
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