NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 4 FEBRUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100020015-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: February 4, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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f;Ef Director of
,~t' 1#1 ~'' Intelligence
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Contents
Lebanon: More Fighting
France-Lebanon: New Ideas for MNF Withdrawal
NATO: Sentiment for New MBFR Initiative
Italy: Possible Cabinet Dispute
Nicaragua-Honduras: Alleged Massacre of Indians
Japan: New Session of the Diet .
Yugoslavia: Anti-Western Sentiment
Brazil: Unsafeguarded Nuclear Activities
Top Secret
USSR-US-Lebanon: Restrictions on Soviet Naval Activity
West Germany-Egypt: Tank Assembly Plant
Angola: UNITA Attack
China: Deployment of Fighter Aircraft
Special Analysis
Israel: Government Struggling To Survive
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Top Secret
4 February 1984
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Top Secret
West East
Beirut
Beirut
International
Airport
ebanon
'Alayh
Top Secret
February
19-94
i,age Iine
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Top Secret
LEBANON: More Fighting
Heavy fighting continued yesterday in Beirut, but Shia leaders
suggest they will reciprocate if the government makes conciliatory
Press reports state that the Army recaptured four positions near
the southern suburbs from Shia militiamen.
The US Ambassador urged Shia Amal leader Barri's political
adviser yesterday not to call for Shia soldiers to desert the Army or
to intensify the fighting. The Ambassador told the adviser that the
government had no intention of invading the southern suburbs and
that it was preparing political initiatives to deal with the situation. The
adviser said that Amal did not intend to call for Shia desertions,
supported US policy and the Marine presence, and wanted the
government to take some positive steps.
Comment: Druze and Shia fighters continue to be concerned that
the Army intends to attack the southern suburbs and Druze positions
along the Alayh ridge. Clashes are likely to continue unless the
government offers assurances to Muslim opposition groups that no
The current tense atmosphere raises the risk of miscalculation.
Both the Army and the Muslim forces suspect each other of planning
to launch an offensive. Apparent attempts by the Army to reinforce its
positions probably are contributing to Druze and Shia fears.
Shia Amal concerns about an Army move may have been calmed
Barri has avoided calling for Shia desertions in past crises, and he
would be likely to do so only if he gives up hope of reaching a political
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Top Secret
FRANCE-LEBANON: New Ideas for MNF Withdrawal
Recent discussions involving senior French officials and Middle
Eastern and Soviet leaders may have encouraged Paris to pursue
ideas for substituting a UN contingent for the Multinational Force,
The US Embassy in Paris says that top officials in the Foreign
Ministry visited the Middle East recently to promote the idea of
substituting a UN force in Beirut for the MNF. The French reportedly
now believe that Damascus might accept a UN force under certain
conditions and that Syria's attitude will determine whether the USSR
will go along. French Middle East Director Bonnefous suggested to
Embassy officials that Syria's conditions include withdrawing the MNF
before the UN force is placed in Beirut and limiting the UN area of
operation to the city itself.
French officials, meanwhile, have told US diplomats in London
that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko recently advised French
Foreign Minister Cheysson that the USSR would support an
expansion of UN forces in Lebanon if Syria agreed. Gromyko also
reportedly said that the Soviets wanted to avoid the simultaneous
presence of MNF and UN forces and wanted the US out of Lebanon.
Comment: Paris is pessimistic about the chances for an
agreement among the Lebanese factions. The French are likely to
believe that Syrian agreement on a small first step toward withdrawal 25X1
is the best solution possible.
For now, the French seem to have shelved their objections to the
agreement of 17 May. They probably do not believe, however, that
Syrian cooperation is possible without modifications to the Lebanese-
Israeli accord.
Top Secret
;d Gohri~r10AA
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Top Secret
NATO: Sentiment for New MBFR Initiative
Several Allies are urging that the West prepare a new proposal for
the MBFR talks, which are to resume in Vienna on 16 March.
At a meeting of NATO's Senior Political Committee last Monday,
Italian, Dutch, and Canadian officials argued that the USSR could
score a public relations victory in Western Europe if the Allies were to
go to Vienna emptyhanded. The Soviets continue publicly to stress
that the USSR has made concessions on verification measures but
that the West remains inflexible.
Prime Minister Thatcher is opposed to any retreat on the data
issue, but the British have suggested that the Allies consider taking
up MBFR issues in the second phase of the Conference on
Disarmament in Europe, which would not begin until at least 1986.
The initial phase of the CDE deals only with confidence- and security-
building measures. Officials of West Germany, France, Belgium,
Norway, Denmark, and Canada previously have indicated they expect
a second phase of CDE to address force reductions.
Comment: The USSR's willingness to resume MBFR talks, but
not negotiations on nuclear force reductions, has prompted West
Germany to make new efforts to persuade the Allies to adopt a more
flexible position on requiring agreement on data. Bonn is likely to urge
the other Allies over the next few weeks to push the US and the UK on
British references to a second phase of CDE indicate that some
Allies also may begin to pressure the US to consider broadening the
mandate of the conference to cover conventional disarmament
issues. Continuation of the stalemate in Vienna could increase Allied
interest in shifting negotiations on conventional force reductions to
Top Secret
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Top Secret
ITALY: Possible Cabinet Dispute
A decision to try the Bulgarian, Sergey Antonov, accused of
plotting to kill the Pope could prompt new wrangling among members
Magistrate Martella has completed his inquiry, and the judiciary
will rule later this month whether there is enough evidence to warrant
a trial. Antonov is under house arrest in Rome, endin appeal of a
lower court decision to return him to prison.
A senior Italian official has told the US Embassy that the case has
become a "delicate problem."
Comment: Disagreements last week among members of the
coalition over economic policy and high-level appointments suggest
that Craxi will be increasingly preoccupied with squabbles in the
cabinet in the weeks ahead. The Antonov case is one of several issues
that could provoke new infighting in the five-party government.
The Christian Democrats and the Socialists, the two largest
parties in the coalition, have different views on the Antonov affair.
The Socialists, who endorsed the theory of a Bulgarian role in the
assassination attempt, almost certainly would be embarrassed by a
decision to release Antonov. The Christian Democrats have become
increasingly vocal in their calls for easing East-West tensions, and
they may believe that they can turn Antonov's release to their
advantage.
Top Secret
4 4 February 1984
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Top Secret
NICARAGUA-HONDURAS: Alleged Massacre of Indians
The Sandinistas are trying to embarrass Honduras by publicizing
at the UN an alleged massacre of Miskito Indians.
Nicaragua has called for an investigation of charges by Nobel
Peace Prize laureate Perez Esquivel that Honduran troops murdered
200 Indians in early January when they tried to return to Nicaragua.
Honduran Foreign Minister Paz Barnica sent Nicaragua a note
denying the charge and suggesting that Perez had confused
Honduras with Nicaragua.
The US Embassy in Tegucigalpa reports that, during a visit to
Honduras last month, Perez was told of a massacre involving
Sandinista troops on Honduran soil. Perez thought Honduran troops
might be involved, however, and made his speculation public to force
an investigation of the incident.
Nicaragua asked Honduras last week for permission to send a
delegation to visit Miskito refugees to explain its amnesty decree and
to encourage the Indians to participate in planned elections.
Comment: The Sandinistas probably believe that by echoing
Perez's charges they can divert attention from insurgent reports of a
Nicaraguan incursion into Honduras in which several Indians were
killed. They also hope to offset the unfavorable press coverage they
received when over 1,000 Miskitos fled to Honduras in late December.
The allegation of Honduran involvement appears spurious, but
Honduras is unlikely to initiate an investigation because it does not
want to lend credibility to the Nicaraguan protest. Tegucigalpa
probably will refuse Managua's request to visit the refugee camps,
pointing to past Sandinista abuses of Indian rights. Honduras may
seek to reject Sandinista criticism of this move by citing the
Contadora negotiations as the proper forum to address the entire
refugee issue.
Top Secret
5 4 February 1984
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Top Secret
Issues of importance to the US will be addressed in the early
debates in the Diet, which reconvenes on Monday.
The opening speech by Prime Minister Nakasone will focus on his
domestic program, followed by two days of questions from the
opposition. Debate on the budget for fiscal 1984, which has to be
adopted by 1 April, will begin on 13 February.
Comment: The opposition parties are anxious to use the strength
they gained in the lower house election in December to challenge the
Liberal Democrats, and the session will be lively. The opposition is
likely to take the earliest opportunity to question the government
about nuclear weapons on US naval vessels calling in Japanese ports.
They have tried to keep the issue alive since the media raised it last
month.
The opposition also may try to weaken important rural support for
the Liberal Democratic Party. They may raise the possibility that
Nakasone may make concessions to Washington on agricultural trade
that will hurt Japanese farmers.
The most serious challenge probably will occur during the budget
debate, when the opposition will criticize the proposed 6.55-percent
increase in defense spending in a generally austere budget. It
probably will question Nakasone's commitment to solving domestic
problems and will warn that he is moving Japan toward spending
more than 1 percent of GNP on defense. Debate over the budget
could continue through March, forcing Nakasone to delay
presentation of his domestic programs, including educational and
The opposition parties will be outspoken, but they are unlikely to
push too hard on any issue, including the issue of former Prime
Minister Tanaka's continued membership in the Diet. They will not
want to risk losing their new strength in the Diet by giving Nakasone
an excuse to dissolve the lower house and call new elections.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
YUGOSLAVIA: Anti-Western Sentiment
Some members of the leadership reportedly are blaming
Washington and the West for the country's domestic problems.
Vice Premier Dragan, before leaving for the US with Mojsov and
President Spiljak, told Belgrade Radio that he remained optimistic
that Yugoslavia and the IMF would reach agreement on new standby
credits. Nevertheless, he warned that Yugoslavia might proclaim a
unilateral debt moratorium if this proves impossible. Defense Minister
Mamula also has publicly warned that foreign financial assistance
might not be forthcoming this year.
Comment: The leadership, while generally grateful for US help, is
receiving increasing criticism-especially from the military- because
of its political indecision and economic mismanagement.
Dragan has been the leading proponent of cooperation with the
IMF and Western creditors. He may be trying to persuade the IMF to
relax its conditions for agreement. At the same time, he may consider
it necessary to show critics that he will not knuckle under to IMF
conditions that are believed to violate Yugoslavia's sovereignty.
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Top Secret
BRAZIL: Unsafeguarded Nuclear Activities
Brazil is continuing to conduct unsafeguarded nuclear research,
and military officers have stated that by 1990 it will be in a position to
begin developing nuclear weapons, if it chooses.
Following Argentina's announcement in November of its
capability to enrich uranium, a number of Brazil's highest ranking
military officers for the first time publicly stated that Brazil will be able
to produce nuclear weapons by the end of the decade.
Comment: Despite the publicity surrounding the military's
unusual recent statements. Brazilian unsafeguarded research is small
in scale, and financial constraints are likely to limit acceleration of the
effort. Even if Brazil were to begin an intensive effort now to build a
nuclear device, it probably could not achieve this objective before the
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10 February 1984
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Top Secret
USSR-US-LEBANON: Restrictions on Soviet Naval Activity
The Soviets apparently believe US naval ships in the eastern
Mediterranean will soon become involved in some type of hazardous
activity. The Israelis have told the US defense attache in Tel Aviv they
have information that the Soviets have advised their naval ships in the
area to stay at least five nautical miles away from US ships until
10 February. If the Soviet ships should approach closer, however,
they are to identify themselves to the US ships. These restrictions
reportedly have been imposed for an area north of the US-declared
zone of hazardous naval operations in the waters off Lebanon.
Comment: The restrictions suggest that Moscow wants to avoid
any incident with the US resulting from current tensions in Lebanon.
The Soviets may have received information concerning the rumored
Lebanese Army offensive and expect that US naval units would
become involved. They also may have learned about possible terrorist
attacks against the US ships.
Top Secret
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i op aecrei
WEST GERMANY-EGYPT: Tank Assembly Plant
A West German newsletter reports that the Krauss-Maffei firm
recently contracted with a subsidiary in the UK to produce a less
advanced version of the Leopard II tank at a plant in Egypt. The
arrangement-circumventing West German restrictions on weapons
sales to areas of tension-allegedly would allow controversial sales to
Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The Social Democrats are demanding
clarifications, but the government and the company have refused
Comment: The contract is similar to one negotiated with
Argentina in the mid-1970s by the West German firm Thyssen
Henschel. Thyssen provides technical expertise and assists in the
construction of a medium tank in Argentina. Kohl has thus far refused
to approve the direct sale of tanks to Saudi Arabia. Recent publicity
and political opposition to the Krauss-Maffei deal probably will cause
him to disapprove this arrangement as well.
Top Secret
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Namibia
Zaire
Kilometers
Boundary repre entanon ie
not ne arily authoritative.
UNITA Claims
F7 Control
PH Influence
Botswana
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Top Secret
ANGOLA: UNITA Attack
Luanda said yesterday its troops repulsed a UNITA attack on
the border town of Luau in eastern Angola.
the insurgents began their attack late last week. Most of
the Angolan troops retreated, but sporadic fiahtino was rPnnrtPrt in
the town on Monday.
Comment: Despite Luanda's claims, the outcome of the fighting
is not yet clear. If UNITA were able to capture and hold Luau, it would
strengthen its position as it tries to win control of the northeast. On
the other hand, a government victory would slow the UNITA drive and
perhaps make the insurgents more cautious about attacking Angolan
Top Secret
13 4 February 1984
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F-8 Finback Size Comparison
6.0 meter
syu.are
Opera[ional Matinnnn Guns
Radius* Speed
F-8 460 nni Mach 2.4 2 30-nine cannons 4 ill t'rared-guided Search and
Finback or semiactive track
radar-guided
(under devclohmcnt)
F-7 370 mil Mach 2.0 2 30-nim cannons 2 inIrared-guided Range only
Fishbed C
Top Secret
4 February 1984
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Top Secret
CHINA: Deployment of Fighter Aircraft
The twin-engin
resembles the Beijing's indigenously produced version of the
MIG-21, but it is larger, has greater speed and combat radius, and an
improved radar. This is only the second delivery of F-8s, which were
first deployed in August 1982, and raises to 14 the total now
operational service
production at the Shenyang Airframe Plant recently has increased to
nearly two F-8s per month.
Comment: The latest delivery and the increased production
suggest Beijing is generally satisfied with the F-8's performance after
a long and troubled development. The unusually long period between
deliveries may have been for operational evaluation of the F-8. The
F-8's search-and-track radar will enable it to use a radar-guided
missile, which is still under development, and make it China's most
capable all-weather fighter. Assembly of F-8s at the Shenyang
plant-the country's most productive fighter facility-is likely to
increase to about five per month over the next two years.
DIA believes this analysis presents an overly optimistic picture
of the F-8/Finback program. Delivery of only six aircraft within a
17-month timeframe and production of approximately 14 aircraft
within the past year does not suggest Beijing's satisfaction with the
performance of this aircraft. Beijing has frequently expressed its
discontent with the performance of the F-8 to US officials. This
discontent may be further exemplified by the lack of training at the
only F-8 operational unit, as evidenced by
requests for US assistance in improving t
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Top Secret
Current Composition of the Knesset
Opposition
Likud bloc
Herut
25
Labor Alignment
Labor Party
42
Liberal Party
17
MAPAM
7
La'am
Citizens' Rights Movement
1
Independents
Subtotal
50
Subtotal
Democratic Front for
4
National Religious
5
Peace and Equality
Shinui
2
Party
Agudat Israel
4
TAMI
3
Tehiya
3
MATZAD
1
Total
Top Secret
4 February 1984
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
ISRAEL: Government Struggling To Survive
Pressure on Prime Minister Shamir's shaky coalition hGs
intensified as a result of no-confidence motions defeated last week
in the Knesset, renewed talk of early elections, and threatened
defections from the coalition. The economy remains Shamir's
principal worry, but he and his colleagues are being forced to pay
more attention to keeping the coalition intact than to dealing with it.
Barring an unexpected economic turnaround, the Labor Party could
come to power later this year.
Labor has publicly urged that the elections to the Knesset-now
scheduled for November 1985-be held as soon as possible. A recent
party statement maintained that early elections are necessary
because the government is consumed by "crisis and blackmail"-an
allusion to the economic concessions Shamir made to the three-
member TAMI faction in return for its support on the no-confidence
vote. Party chairman Peres recently told the US Ambassador that he
sees early elections as Labor's only route back to power and that they
Labor's call for early elections comes after a number of public
opinion polls have shown that the party has a strong and growing lead
over Shamir's Likud bloc. A poll published on 27 January showed
that, if elections were held now, Labor would win an absolute majority
of about 62 seats in the 120-seat Knesset and that Likud would win
about 28. Labor's popularity has grown consistently since last June,
and this poll is its strongest showing since the election in 1981.
The resignation from the cabinet on Sunday of Mordechai Ben-
Porat, an independent member of the coalition, added to the talk of
early elections. Ben-Porat said he would remain in the coalition but
would support early elections if efforts to form a national unity
Ben-Porat's resignation increases the chances for this Knesset's
approval of an election bill. Fifty-eight deputies-just short of the
necessary majority of 61-already had declared their support for
early elections.
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Top Secret
The coalition has not yet recovered from other adverse
developments last week. Israeli media report that the concessions
made to TAMI have angered many coalition members. Leaders of the
National Religious Party and the ultraorthodox Agudat Israel are
threatening to follow TAMI's example and present their demands to 25X1
the government.
Deputy Prime Minister Levy has stated that early elections may be
necessary "if it turns out that the government is preoccupied only
with its own survival and is again faced with crises." Levy's comments
reflect the bitterness felt by many in the Likud over TAMI's growing
demands for additional funds, tax breaks for the poor, and social
legislation as its price for remaining in the coalition.
The infighting in the coalition has stalled the government's efforts
to carry out the austerity program Shamir has advocated to deal with
triple-digit inflation and the trade deficit. The budget cuts adopted by
the cabinet on 22 January have already been undermined by the
concessions made to TAMI. Price hikes probably will continue to
accelerate, leading to increased labor unrest and reinforcing the
impression that Israel's economic problems are out of control.
Outlook
Shamir and most of his colleagues oppose advancing the date for
elections because they fear a major defeat. The US Embassy reports
that even Liberal Party mavericks Berman and Zeigerman are
rethinking their previous support for early elections, as is Ben-Porat.
To win more seats, Labor would like to take advantage of its
standing in the polls and insist on elections. Nevertheless, the party is
reluctant to push for a vote on early elections as long as passage in
the Knesset is not assured. If defeated, an early elections bill could
not be voted on again for six months.
Labor still could come to power later this year as a result
of a successful no-confidence bid in the Knesset. Under these
circumstances, President Herzog would be likely to ask Peres, as
leader of the largest bloc in the Knesset, to form a new government.
Peres probably would prefer this route to power, knowing that former
Prime Minister Rabin-and possibly former President Navon-would
try to supplant him as party head if early elections were called.
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